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ISSUE 107 : Jul/Aug - 1994 - Australian Defence Force Journal

ISSUE 107 : Jul/Aug - 1994 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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4() AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. <strong>107</strong> JULY/AUGUST 1944in the main well area of Baidoa. There was approximately115(X) bodies buried on the edges of the mainravine from the mass starvation suffered during thecivil war. The primary task was to prevent thesebodies from contaminating the local water system,with the onset of the rainy season in April (Borchini,1993).Due to sensitive nature of exhuming Somali bodies.<strong>Australian</strong> forces wanted only to announce a portion(the Safe Water message) of a designed leaflet (seeFig. 3) to keep UNITAF military forces detachedfrom the task. The designed leaflet was eventuallydistributed by SACO throughout Baidoa by hand andvehicle. The attempt by SACO to exhume the Somalibodies was achieved over many days without incident.This action was further followed up by an articlein the "Rajo" newspaper and radio in April 1993(Borchini, 1993).The last PSYOPS mission was developed tocounter PSYOPS by Somali warlords about UNITAFand relief agencies desecrating grave sites throughoutSomalia. The use of newspaper, radio, loudspeakerand leaflets clearly illustrates to the reader, how manyof the UNITAF PSYOPS missions were conductedby the JPOTF.As shown. PSYOPS was simply applied to enhancethe effectiveness of missions by using only loudspeaker/leafletcapabilities with 1 RAR in Baidoa.However, the overall PSYOPS approach by theJPOTF of further informing the Somali people ofactivity within Baidoa by newspaper and radio, alsohelped prevent further conflicts in operational areas(Borchini, 1993).This section has examined how the 4 POG(A), particularlythe 8 POB(A) acting in the capacity of theJPOTF conducted some "real world" missions inSomalia. It demonstrates exactly how the US ArmyPSYOPS Structure, objectives, and assets are utilisedin times of conflict. Although the PSYOPS shown bythe 8 POB(A) in Operation Restore Hope wereundoubtedly impressive, a more critical look at theproceedings in the next section of this is essential forfuture PSYOPS planning.Lessons for Australia From USPSYOPS Experiences in SomaliaIgnorance concerning PSYOPS. even in the USArmy, is still a significant stumbling block in planningoperations. Analysing the problems encounteredin Operation Restore Hope and particularly in supportof Operation Solace, is vital for future <strong>Australian</strong>PSYOPS. Taking into account time pressures, personneland operational constraints imposed on the 8POB( A), some unforeseen problems did arise.The main area of concern that will be covered isthe low priority that was given by the 8 POB(A) topre-testing and post-testing of PSYOPS prcxiucts ontarget audiences. Pre-testing is where a representativesample of a target audience is assessed under appropriatebehavioural research methods. During pre-testingof a potential PSYOPS product (ie. a leaflet, loudspeakeror radio messages), people from a samplegroup that represents the target audience are randomlychosen to give feedback on the PSYOPS product.Post-testing involves finding appropriate measuresthat indicate the impact of the PSYOPS product on anintended target audience (Shipman. 1985).Evidence of pre-testing by the 8 POB( A) was onlyshown by UNITAF PSYOPS personnel on a randombasis with educated Somali journalists, interpretersand workers within the old US Embassy compoundin Mogadishu. Similarly, only some verbal feedbackwas gained on the impact of leaflets, handbills, postersand loudspeaker announcements (Borchini, 1993).Although most UNITAF commanders were verypositive towards PSYOPS support, they did express aconcern that they could not see the actual impact ofPSYOPS in their operations. There was limited objectivemeasuring of whether these products had a negative,neutral, or the intended psychological impact onthe Somali people. What behaviours were actuallybeing changed in the target audiences, and were thereany unintended consequences from the developedUNITAF PSYOPS products?It is recognised that in time of war and low intensityconflicts, forces will not always have the opportunityor the resources to objectively measure the impact ofPSYOPS on behaviour. However, without objectiveresearch conducted on PSYOPS. the 8 POB(A) hadto continually try to sell the worth of PSYOPS toeach UNITAF commander. This is because at thetime they could not back up their actions with solidresearch results from previous operations in Somalia.If the underlying goal of PSYOPS is to changefriendly, neutral or enemy behaviour towards a commander'sintent (FM 33-1. 1990). it is perfectly logicalthat we must aim to measure those changes. This willenable us to see whether we are changing the targetaudiences behaviour in the desired direction. Thismeans that we need correct research methodologiesdeveloped to ensure PSYOPS is appropriate and properlyaccountable (Shipman. 1985).The profession of Psychology aims to understandthe complexities of human behaviour. AAPsych Corpsis well placed to contribute to <strong>Australian</strong> PSYOPS

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