ISSUE 107 : Jul/Aug - 1994 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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44 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. <strong>107</strong> JULY/AUGUST <strong>1994</strong>This is not to suggest that the operational role of thepolice is any less important, but it does have the effectthat the police, from the perspective of the government,are seen to be at the operational level ratherthan the strategic. The high level strategies are implementedthrough various operational plans and ordersdesigned to meet the specifics of an incident.Australia" s national strategy for countering terrorismis based essentially on three fundamental elements:• integrated and coordinated preventive measuresdesigned to minimise the scope for any incident tooccur:• a comprehensive capability to respond to any incidentthat might occur; and• positive enhancement of the national security environment,which is to suggest that all elementsin our society regard security as a cooperativeendeavour which each element has a particularcontribution to make.'The major focus is on preventive measures. Preventionincludes such activities as support for cooperationagainst terrorism in international forums,arrangements within the international community forintelligence sharing, immigration entry controls, limitationson access to weapons and explosives and thecoordination of protective security programs for highrisk targets including both people and facilities.Most of the preventive measures in place inAustralia have been developed over many years and,initially at least, were established for purposes otherthan counter terrorism. For example, intelligencearrangements were established for national security,immigration entry controls to prevent the entry of allundesirables and limitations on access to weaponsand explosives were put in place to reduce criminalactivity. Preventive measures alone do not guaranteeimmunity from terrorism. Therefore, those measuresmust be backed by a comprehensive response capabilityto deal quickly and effectively with a terroristact. should one occur. Having an effective responsecapability also serves as a deterrent, which contributesto the preventive measures and to the general enhancementof the national security environment.Response Arrangements andCrisis ManagementTerrorism has been described as a form of communicationto publicise a cause using fear. Its focus ispolitical and for this reason it invokes national andinternational interests. This sets terrorism apart fromthe normal criminal activity dealt with day-to-day bythe police services.Responding to and resolving acts of terrorismrequires most of the operational capabilities found inthe average police service. However, the difference inmotive between the terrorist and the ordinary criminal,and that terrorists are likely to have been trained forthe operation, means that a much higher level ofoperational capability may be required. It is for thisreason that a greater proportion of the effort and costexpended in Australia since the Hilton bombing hasbeen oriented at improving the basic capabilities ofthe police and. in some cases, developing capabilitiesthat are beyond the police capacity.Overlaying the operational capabilities of the policeand other agencies are the government structuresneeded during an incident to provide political leadership,to respond to the terrorist's political demands andto provide support to the police in dealing with theterrorists. These arrangements, along with the policecommand and control structures, are referred to as thenational crisis management response arrangementsand are set out in the National Anti Terrorist Plan.A critical element of our ability to deal effectivelywith a major terrorist act in Australia is the relationshipbetween the government crisis managers andpolice operational commanders on the one hand andthe media on the other. To illustrate the dimensions ofthe problem, consider the hypothetical example of anaircraft hijacking. A number of dedicated, well armedand well-trained terrorists are threatening the lives ofhundreds of passengers and demanding the release oftheir colleagues from gaol in another country and safepassage out of Australia. What are the key considerationsin this situation?First, it is a police problem but one that goes beyondresponding to normal criminal activity and for whichpolitical guidance and specialist assistance will berequired, particularly from the CommonwealthGovernment. Secondly, there inevitably will be complexpolitical issues affecting government interestsand the interests of foreign states either because theirnationals are involved or because they are the targetof the demands. There are likely to be pressures forgovernment to take a firm stand and other conflictingpressures that the government take all possible measuresto end the incident without violence. Finally.there is the critical issue of the public informationpolicy where there will be conflicting demands fromthe media and public to know what is going on andfrom operational commanders that rescue operationsnot be prejudiced. Inevitably, a world audience oftens or hundreds of millions will focus on the minuteto-minutedetail of events and this will be one of thegreatest challenges that the police and other crisismanagers will have to face.
COUNTERING TERRORISM IN AUSTRALIA THROUGH COORDINATION 45Exercise Brindabella was held in Canberra in May 1992. Three of the key overseers,Senior Sergeant Graham Waite of the NT Police who was an umpire; Superintendent Brian Brinkler of the AFPwho was chief controller and the exercise coordinator Senior Sergeant Rowland Legg of theVictoria Police (then on secondment to the Protective Services Coordination Centre) get a briefingfrom Detective Sergeant Peter Drennan of the Special Operations Team (AFP).Over the past two decades. Commonwealth andState governments have adopted a consistent policytowards terrorism. This has included a determinationto oppose terrorism and to uphold the rule of law.support for international cooperation as the mosteffective means of combating terrorism, emphasis onpeaceful and legal counter measures, readiness to takefirm action to bring terrorists to justice, acceptance bythe Commonwealth Government of a leading role indeveloping a coordinated national capability tocounter terrorism and cooperation by the State andTerritory governments in developing plans and providingresources in support of the national capability.These principles have provided guidance to the operationalagencies, particularly the police, in developingappropriate capabilities.National Counter TerrorismOrganisationThe primary organisation for consultation and cooperationbetween Commonwealth and State governmentagencies concerned with maintaining a defenceagainst terrorism, is the Standing Advisory Committeeon Commonwealth/State Cooperation for ProtectionAgainst Violence (SACPAV). SAC-PAV has twoimportant functions:• to propose to heads of Government steps to ensurenationwide readiness and co-operation between relevantCommonwealth and State Government agenciesfor the protection of Australia from terrorism; and• to bring together bilateral and nation wide arrangementsbetween the Commonwealth and the Statesto deal with protective security and counter terrorismplanning including aviation security, the protectionof holders of high office and the NationalAnti Terrorist Plan. 4In discharging their responsibilities. SAC-PAVmembers refer appropriate matters to their governmentsand otherwise represent their State or thenational interest at the six-monthly meetings of thecommittee. SAC-PAV has not been without its difficulties,but generally these have been overcome by allmembers developing a better understanding of eachagency's responsibilities and through a good spirit of
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ISSUE 107 : Jul/Aug - 1994 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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