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ISSUE 107 : Jul/Aug - 1994 - Australian Defence Force Journal

ISSUE 107 : Jul/Aug - 1994 - Australian Defence Force Journal

ISSUE 107 : Jul/Aug - 1994 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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64 AUSTRALIAN DEFHNCH FORCE JOURNAL NO. <strong>107</strong> JULY/AUGUST <strong>1994</strong>Company for most of the period. Major Bernard"Ben" O'Dowd. Gallaway's interest in these threeofficers is personal as well as historical. His aim is toget as close as he can to the truth about each officer'scontribution to the successes and failures of 3 RAR inKorea. The performance of these three men is crucialto understanding the story of 3 RAR in Korea untillate April 1951.One of the strengths of this book is Gallaway'smeticulous research. Gallaway realised that he neededto back up his incomplete personal knowledge ofaspects of 3 RAR's operations with additional information.He also recognised that he had reasons not tolike some of his fellow 3 RAR veterans and they hadreasons not to like him. Accordingly. Gallaway hasbased his interpretation of events on the recollectionsof almost 80 3 RAR Korean War veterans as well asother primary and secondary sources. He knew that ifhis book was not based on a wide range of sources itwould be dismissed as a personal diatribe.Notwithstanding his deeply-felt personal reasonsfor telling 3 RAR's story and his strong opinionsabout the performance of particular senior NCOs andofficers. Gallaway has adhered to the substance ofgood scholarship while largely ignoring academicform. He has a blunt writing style, replete with whatwould be now regarded as "politically incorrect"<strong>Australian</strong> colloquialisms. He lays out the facts,develops his line of argument and leaves it to hisreaders to come to their own conclusions. Academichistorians will have an interesting time deliberatingover Gallaway's thesis that 3 RAR was instrumentalin deciding the outcome of the Korean War.The vast majority of 3 RAR Korean War veteranswill be grateful that one of their number has taken thetime to write this book. The historic ledger needed tobe balanced. There will be some veterans who willfind fault with Gallaway's interpretation of events,especially a small number of venal, obsequious officersand senior NCOs. These men knowingly or unknowinglycontributed to the biased and incompletehistory of 3 RAR's first eight months in Korea. Theyhave much to answer for. Until recently, the <strong>Australian</strong>Regular Army's failure to retain operationalinformation, to record interviews with its veterans andto commission the writing of its own history has facilitatedthe oral and written perpetration of many incorrect,florid accounts of 3 RAR's operations inKorea. The Official History of <strong>Australian</strong> combatoperations in the Korean War. published by the<strong>Australian</strong> War Memorial in 1985. and a monographon the Battle of Kapyong. belatedly published by theArmy in 1992, have filled many of the gaps and comecloser to the truth. Gallaway's book continues tocorrect the record.In his 68th year Jack Gallaway has got off his chestwhat he wanted to say about 3 RAR in Korea. Hewrites in anger but mostly he writes with admirationfor fellow <strong>Australian</strong>s who fought as members of agallant <strong>Australian</strong> infantry Battalion, engaged foreight months in some of the most dangerous anddemanding operations ever fought by <strong>Australian</strong>infantrymen in war. Gallaway has done his Battalion,his Regiment and post-World War II <strong>Australian</strong> militaryhistory a great service.This book is also a reminder that institutional historiesof the <strong>Australian</strong> Regular Army need to becommissioned urgently as it approaches its 50thanniversary in 1996. At the book launch on 13 April<strong>1994</strong>. Jack Gallaway stated that he felt a very personalsense of urgency to write his book because so manyof his comrades were dying or succumbing to prolongedserious illness. The same urgency should befelt by the Army. The recent introduction of Armymilitary history grants of up to $15,000 per grant willnot facilitate the full time effort that will be requiredto write the Army's institutional history of the 1950sand 1960s. The Army, like other significant publiclyfundedinstitutions, should commission professionalhistorians to write more of its institutional history andnot rely on a free ride from authors like Jack Gallawayand other part-time enthusiasts.

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