ISSUE 76 : May/Jun - 1989 - Australian Defence Force Journal

Defence Force JournalContributions of any length will be consideredbut, as a guide, 3000 words is the ideal length.Articles should be typed double spaced, on oneside of the paper, and submitted in duplicate.All contributions and correspondence should beaddressed to:The Managing EditorDefence Force JournalBuilding C, Room 4-25Russell OfficesCANBERRA ACT 2600(062) 65 2682 or 65 2999PhotographyD.P.R. Stills Photo SectionPublished by the Australian Government ^^^Publishing Service, Canberra, for the Departmentof Defence.' Commonwealth of Australia 1989ISSN 0314-1039R 85/1198(18) Cat. No. 86 1367 4

DEFENCEFORCEJOURNALNo.76 May/June 1989Journal of the Australian Profession of ArmsCONTENTS3. One-a-Penny, TwoaPennyWing Commander B.L. Cavanagh. RAAF11. Medical Support to the Parachute Battalion GroupCaptain G.B. Farrow, RAR19. Should Australia Ratify the 197/ ProtocolAddendumsCaptain David Craig, RACT26. Geographic Information SystemsMajor C.J. Mitchell, RASVY29. The Distress SyndromeDr Ian G.F. Rossiter36. The Ground War in VietnamLieutenant Colonel D.W. Beveridge, RAE47. From Inchon to San CarlosColonel John Jackson, ARESCover: HMAS Shoalwater — Bay ClassInshore Minehunter — Illustrated byDefence Artist Jeff Isaacs.58. U.S. Deterrence Policy in the Late 1980sDavid Hodgkinson, University of WesternAustralia63. Book ReviewBoard of ManagementAir Commodore F. J. Tipping. RAAF, (Chairman)Captain G. Heron, RANGroup Captain J. T. Huet, RAAFColonel P.D. Gibbons. AMBrigadier S. GowerManaging EditorMr M. P. TraceyAssistant EditorIrene CoombesContributors are urged to ensure the accuracy of informationcontained in their articles: the Board of Management acceptsno responsibility for errors of fact.Permission to reprint articles in the Journal will generally bereadily given by the Managing Editor after consultation with theauthor. Any reproduced articles should bear an acknowledgementof source.The views expressed in the articles are the authors' own andshould not be construed as official opinion or policy.Printed by Ruskin Press, Collingwood

$00-T-HMAS ADELAIDE FFG NO. 01

"ONE-A-PENNY, IWO \-PI NM . . ."of air power means air assets must be retainedunder the highest practical level of centralisedcommand and control, and that they must becommanded by a leader experienced in the applicationof air power. Air forces, in fact, areadamant about this because historical experiencealso showed that the impact of unity ofair power has even greater consequences fomilitary effectiveness than the impact of unity• of the other combat powers. Similarly, experienceand logical analysis showed that airpower, divided, produces disproportionatelylarge reductions in military effectiveness incomparison with the effects of disunity in landor sea power. Aviators understood this adverseconsequence and they argued tenaciously forthe "invisibility of air power", a termsynonymous with unity of air power: bothterms mean that air power assumes its greateststrength when it is applied holistically as adistinct entity, rather than simply in a collectionof roles. Air power theorists and practitionersarrived at this conclusion for a number ofreasons, and these self-same reasons also exemplifyunity as the cardinal tenet of air power.These reasons warrant further analysis.Air power can be employed in a number ofstrategies at any one time, but it can only do sosuccessfully if its forces are unified under appropriatecommand. At the introduction to thisarticle the suggestion was made that support forthe other services was only one of the strategiesavailable to air power. There are two otherdistinct but interactive aerial strategies whichhave direct application for air forces andwhich, in their own right, can have direct andindependent influence on the outcome of thewar. One is to attack an enemy's war fightingcapacity; that is, to inflict moral or materialdamage directly on his homeland. The second isto oppose and defeat his air forces. Thesestrategies are termed Strategic Strike and AirSuperiority respectively. The three strategies ofair power are not independent actions wherebyone follows another in some battle campaignsequence — all three are interactive and, inreality, would be pursued simultaneously. Theirhierarchy of importance at a particular time,which can be termed air power employmentdoctrine, must be determined in the light ofstrategic as well as tactical considerations. 2 Forthis reason it must be determined by a supremecommander taking the advice of a commanderwith full knowledge of air power employment,which for Australia can only be a RAAFofficer.The second reason for unifying air power isthat unity achieves the greatest advantage airpower has to offer, which is the ability to concentrateits force rapidly in time and space.Whether to mount offensive actions against anenemy or defend against his initiatives, airpower's strength lies in its innate ability to concentratevast amounts of firepower in combat.Concentration enables a force to be decisive. Ifneed be, the whole weight of the air power forcecan be employed together against a single mostimportant target, or alternatively, against anarray of lesser targets. Used properly, whichmeans in accordance with the correct employmentdoctrine and concentrated in time andspace, air power can be singularly decisive in affectingthe outcome of the war, rather thanmerely influencing the land and sea battle bypiecemeal application.The ability to use concurrent aerial strategiesand to concentrate air forces rapidly indicate acompletely different perspective of time andspace within which air power is employed incomparison with land and sea power. The differencesare substantial and deserve closer examinationif we are to fully understand theaviator's concern over misuse of air assetswhich could lead to division of air power anddiminution of its effect. If we look at the traditionalevolution of command and control ofweapons systems the relative perspectives oftime and space will be more evident.Firstly, any extent of military command andcontrol is commensurate with the combatradius of action of the weapons system involved.For example, the combat radius of action ofan infantry platoon, depending on the timeframe, is a day's march or the trajectory rangeof small arms munitions. Therefore it wouldmake no sense to take divisional artilleryweapons, with ranges of 50 kilometres or moreand divide them up under command at battalionlevel or lower. As we know this is notdone; artillery assets are commanded at thehighest possible (divisional) level, where the'big picture' is more evident.What sense then does it make to break up, intopenny packets, a force with a combat radiusof action of hundreds and perhaps thousandsof kilometres, which can be used against avariety of targets by re-roling or re-equipping,and which can have a 'big picture' of strategic

6 DEFENCE I ORCE JOURNAL No. 76 May/June 89proportions compared with the more tacticalview by surface-locked combat units. EvenNavy fleet units at sea with speeds of advanceof less than 40 knots and combat radii of actionlimited to radar horizons and surface launchedweapons ranges are, within realistic timeframes, tactical units. Air Force combat unitsare capable of being used in the macro(strategic) sense, whereas most other combatunits belong to the micro (tactical)environment.Linked directly with combat radii of action,or the 'space' perspective, is the difference inappreciation of time between air power forcesand surface forces. Surface forces, by virtue oftheir speed and mobility limitations think morein terms of days and weeks to react to a threat,to manoeuvre or to redeploy their forces. Airpower operates in much shorter time frames; itscommanders think in terms of hours and evenminutes to complete a task. Again, what sensedoes it make to allocate sections of a highlyresponsiveforce to commanders who tradtionallywage war at a much different pace?The quantum difference in appreciations oftime and space between air forces and surfaceforces is the underlying, basal premise for unityof air power. 1There is yet another, unassailable reason whyair power should not be divided within the totalforce. Today's modern air assets are capable ofmore than one role. An anti-tank weaponwithin an army is an anti-tank weapon; an antitankweapon within an air force is also a battlefieldair interdiction weapon, perhaps an offensivecounter air weapon and even an airdefence weapon. Dividing up these flexibleassets to meet narrow, specific requirementsmeans in essence that they are not available forre-roling. A pertinent example is the P3 aircraftin the RAAF today. If P3 aircraft are permanentlyassigned to the Navy for Fleet Supportfunctions, they will not be readily availablefor other, first echelon, layered defence roles ofOut of Area Reconnaissance and Surveillance,as well as additional roles including ElectronicWarfare, Search and Rescue, general transportand airborne command and control. The resultfrom this and other examples is a reduction inmulti-role flexibility which decreases the efficiencyand application of the assets anddiminishes national military effectiveness.The foregoing are the operational reasonswhy air power theorists and practitioners arguethat unity of air power is vital to nationalmilitary effectiveness. In addition to theseoperational aspects there are two other importantfactors which also attest to the unity of airpower. They are the relevance of critical massand the importance of expertise and continuedprofessional development to air power'sapplication.The term critical mass, when used in this context,means the size of the entire body of an independentforce needed to support its fightingedge; that is, the total infrastructure within theforce which, together with the operational component,makes for an effective war fighting entity.The critical mass concept is especially relevantfor air forces because air forces have an inherentlyhigh "tail to teeth" ratio, thereforetheir critical mass is high. For example, it takesthe whole force of about 22,000 permanent servingmembers in the RAAF today to maintainan organization whose sole aim in a war is tolaunch a few hundred individuals in a lessernumber of aircraft to meet a hostile threat. Thisis a difficult concept for many to grasp bothwithin and outside the ADF. What they alsofail to realise is that should these few hundredoperational assets be divided among differentagencies, these agencies then each require an inordinatelydisproportionate support 'tail' tomaintain their own limited air power capability,compared with the size of the 'tail' required fora single air force.Size — critical mass — is a fundamental considerationto the control of air assets, particularlywith small, independent armed servicessuch as Australia's. Small, independentarmed services do not have organizationalstructures large or flexible enough to properlytrain personnel and operate equipment to itsmaximum capacity in more than one primaryarea of activity. Nor are their infrastructurescapable of providing adequate, independentmaintenance of, and logistic support for, dividedair assets. The resources needed to meet sucha challenge would be of an order of magnitudethat is available only in a service of the proportionsof the United States Navy. Only thenwould a service, not normally inclined tooperating in the air, be capable of maximisingair power, ensuring its continued logistic supportand providing a natural progression ofprofessional air power development.The ADF, now that it is committed to selfrelianceand if it is to achieve maximum

8 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 76 May/June 89capabilities, whereby one thinks in terms of theoptimum weapons or force mix, either biserviceor tri-service, to achieve a task or providea capability within the joint force. It is alsoa line of reasoning which takes little account ofthe interaction within individual services of thevarious tasks each can achieve. 4 With sensibleapplication, force-mixing has a valid placewithin our strategic thinking; after all, airpower,like land and sea power, cannot alonewin the war. Each component of combat poweris complementary. But force mixing must notbe allowed to dominate our thinking to the exclusionof those hard-learned lessons of historywhich vindicate a continuing need for three independentfighting arms of a defence force. Ifwe need to integrate a force from independentarmed services to complete a task or mount acapability, we need to carefully weigh up thebenefits of this action against possible disunityamong the parent services.Disregard for single-service unity is evident inAustralia today. There is a persistent and irrationaltrend within the ADF to parcel outpackets of air assets as each new requirementfor Joint Service capabilities is identified.Either in supporting the fleet at sea with a particulartask such as maritime strike operations,or meeting a close air support requirement ofthe land commander, permanent allocation ofair seems to be the inevitable cry — and damnthe consequences. Often this is considered withlittle thought for the integrity of the Air Forceas a unified force or for the best use of scarceair power resources. In fact today, in the interestsof meeting not even a joint capabilitybut a perceived single service need, we havegone to this extreme. The transfer or the BattlefieldHelicopter to the Army is the prime example.Here, the question must be asked ofconsequences — will the Battlefield Helicopterretain its multi-role capability in its new livery?For the reasons we have seen, the practice ofdividing air power is not effective. Air power,divided, suffered in the past. At the first battleof Kasserine Pass within Operation TORCH inNorth Africa in February 1942, the US Armysuffered heavy losses as a result of dividing itsair among Corps commanders. Following theregrouping of US Army Air Force assets, theoutcome of the second battle was radically different.The cost of dividing air power was notjust confined to the allies in WWII. Packagingof Luftwaffe assets rather than concentration,set in train Germany's defeat in the Battle ofBritain and also contributed to the failure ofthe Eastern Campaign in Russia. These lessonswere relearned in the early stages of the KoreanWar when the efforts of US air power forceswere unco-ordinated and relatively ineffectivebecause of a neglect of the principle of centralizationof air power, caused for the mostpart by interservice rivalries. On the otherhand, the Battle of Khe Sanh betweenDecember 1967 and February 1968 showed thesuccess of a unified air power operation, wherecentralized control and co-ordination was exercisedappropriately by one man, GeneralMomyer, through US 7th Air Force Headquartersin Saigon.All services have potential for disunity, butnone so great as air forces, because unlike tanksor ships, aircraft are prominent in all forms ofwarfare and readily lend themselves to parcellingout. Air is also the pervasive medium inany surface or above surface conflict. Land andnaval commanders are aware of the importanceof air to the success of their own missions, andnaturally are desirous of having within theirown control tese flexible, responsive forceswhich can concentrate large quantities offirepower. If all demands are met discreetly, airpower becomes divided.There are at times overwhelming temptationsto divide air power assets. Succumbing to thispractice does not guarantee a favourable shorttermresult in the battle, but in the longer termit does inhibit flexibility and an ability to concentrateyour force. Lord Tedder, in a lectureto the Royal United Services Institute in Londonin January 1946 warned:"If your organization is such that your airpower is divided up into separate packets andthere is no overall unity of command at the top,once again you will lose your powers of concentration.Air power in penny packets is worsethan useless. It fritters away and achievesnothing. The old fable of the bundle of faggotscompared with the individual stick is abundantlytrue of air power. Its strength lies inunity . . .'"The Consequences of Dividing Air Powerin Australia?The RAAF today is a modern, reasonablywell-balanced force with the capacity to employall three air power strategies. It is also a forcewhich has built up sufficient levels of expertise

"ONE-A-PENNY, TWO-A-PENNY . . ." 9and support to ensure that the ADF receives thebest return for the heavy investment it has madetowards a complete and credible air powercapability. Any weakening of the balancedforce or reduction of its levels of expertise bydisunity and decentralisation of command willhave implications far beyond normal singleservice,Air Force boundaries. Yet, this is happening.There are some well-intentioned, butmisguided individuals who see Australia'sdefence enhanced by the division of the combatair power of this country.As a middle ranking power, Australia has toofew available resources and its defence force istoo small to maintain and operate threeseparate air services. Should this trend continueimportant questions of efficiency and effectivenessdemand answers. Will the ADF realiseany savings in terms of manpower andresources by taking this route? Here one needsto carefully examine the real, total costs of currentArmy and Navy organic air. Will the ADFovercome unnecessary duplication of effort andwastage of resources in the future? More importantly,will divided air assets within theADF offer the maximum military effectivenessfor the defence of this nation? For all thereasons given in this article the answer to thesequestions is a clear and categoric no. It ispatently inept to have three air forces in thiscountry — Australia can ill afford iteconomically or militarily.What then are the most likely outcomes ofallowing the evolution of what effectively arethree independent air forces for Australia? Theshort term would see a weakening of Air Forcecapability and an increase in Navy and Armyforce structures to meet newly perceivedcapabilities. Air Force would have to reexamineits functions and roles and concentrateits limited capability into specialised roles suchas air defence. Eventually each service wouldlay exclusive claim to its own air assets andspecialised air power roles for retention withinthat service and not for the common good ofAustralia's defence. Even if they wanted to,and it is doubtful that they would, the three servicescould little hope to combine the three airservice arms into a co-ordinated entity to concentratethe force in times of conflict. The experiencesof the United States defence force,with four air arms, support this. In the longterm this would inhibit the use of flexibility andversatility to employ the total air power force inthe best possible manner for the defence of thiscountry, because each separate air servicegroup would be anchored to its vested interests.Secondly, the ADF would experience ageneral degradation of expertise and efficiencyin the way each service operated its air assets.This would be brought about by the reasonsstated earlier that the Army and Navy organizationsdo not have the necessary infrastructuresize and depth for maximum development ofair power trained personnel and most efficientuse of the equipment, nor do they have anatural inclination to operate in the air environment.As far as operational and technical expertiseare concerned, within the other two servicesair would eventually take a back seat.In all, should we not direct our thinking inthis country more towards retaining unitywithin the most pervasive form of combatpower available within our military inventory,the standard of air service provided by theAustralian Defence Force will drop significantly.This will result in a weakening of our totalair power capability and directly reduce theADF's ability to protect this nation.Perhaps in these days of competing prioritiesand limited resources we need to occasionallygo back to first principles. Let us then heed thewords of Field Marshal Montgomery, one ofthe first senior military commanders to appreciatethe essence of the unity of air power:". . . the Air Force .... must be centralisedand kept under Air Force command. Ihold that it is quite wrong for the soldier towant to exercise command over the air strikingforces. The handling of an Air Force is alife-study, and therefore the air part must bekept under Air Force command. 6 UNOTES1. Funnell, Air Marshal R.G. "The Royal AustralianAir Force A Small Air Force and Its Air Power", the1987 Sir Ross and Sir Keith Smith MemorialLecture.2. For a much more detailed coverge of air poweremployment doctrine, see Wing CommanderA.G.B. Vallance's "strategies approach" to doctrinein "The Evolution of Air Power DoctrineWithin the RAF 1957-1987", a thesis submitted toQueens College Cambridge UK, August 1988.3. The concept here is an extension of the idea of AirVice Marshal Tony Mason, (RAF) of determininglevels of command and control using comparativecombat radii of action of weapons systems. Theperspective of time to respond is added, thus commandand control can be analysed in the context ofthe two dimensions of time and space.

Ill DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 76 May/June 894. The "capabilities" versus "services" approach tototal force structure is from a concept of Wing CommanderA.G.B. Vallance (RAF) who used a doctrinaldevelopment matrix with "the optimum mixof air/land/sea weapons systems" as the verticalperspective, and the "balance . . . and interactionbetween the various air power roles" for thehorizontal perspective. In "Air Power Doctrine",Air Clues, May 1988, pp 163-168.5. Tedder, Lord. "Air Land and Sea Warfare",JRUSI, January 1946, p 61.6. Montgomery, Field Marshal, quoted in Terraine,John, "The Right of the Line: the Royal Air Forcein the European War, 1939-45". Hodder andStoughton, London, 1985, p 380.Wing Commander kavanagh has been working on RAAF doctrine for eighteen months.After Air War College, he was posted to Air Force Plans — Doctrine, which led to his subsequentposition on the CAS Project for doctrine. Wing Commander Kavanagh has extensive anddiverse expertise; a tour in Vietnam, flying maritime with both 10 and II Squadrons, Commands,including Commanding Officer of the Joint Communications Unit at Nurrungar, as wellas staff positions briefly summarise over twenty years experience in the RAAF. He is the authorof a book on water sources for desert survival in Australia; a result of his knowledge and expertisebuilt up in working with combat survival for the RAAF. A research paper on the changingwestern alliance in the South Pacific written by Wing Commander Kavanagh was published bythe USAF's Air University in 1987.NEW ARMY TRAINING AREA IN NORTHERN TERRITORYAn 1,170 sq km Northern Territory property has been bought as an Army fieldtraining area.The purchase was announced by the Minister for Defence Science and Personnel,Mr David Simmons.The Mary River Block of the old Mount Bundey Station, 120 km east of Darwin,near Annaburroo, will be used for field training by NORFORCE. The propertywas bought on the open market after preliminary environmental and militaryassessments indicated its suitability.An Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is being prepared by KinhillEngineers Pty Ltd of Darwin, to address the long term plan required to develop theproperty as a training area. The draft EIS will be available for public comment inearly 1990."Particular emphasis is being given to the possible impact of the training areaon the Kakadu Wilderness Heritage Area which it adjoins," Mr Simmons said..

Medical Support to the Parachute Battalion GroupBy Captain G. B. Farrow,RARIntroductionHILE the deployment of large numbers ofW paratroopers in airborne operations hasbecome commonplace since World War Two,the Australian Army has only recentlydeveloped this capability.Australian soldiers first participated inoperational parachuting when, in September1943, gunners from the 2/4 Field Regimentjumped into Nadzab, Papua New Guinea, insupport of the United States 503rd ParachuteRegiment. So successful was this operation thatshortly after, the First Australian ParachuteBattalion was formed, only to be disbanded atwars end.Thereafter parachuting remained thepreserve of Special Action Forces and theParachute Training School. In 1981 DeltaCompany, Sixth Battalion, The RoyalAustralian Regiment, was given the parachuterole. In October 1983 the Third Battalion tookover this role, and since then has developed theability to deploy as a Battalion Group, usingthe simultaneous door exit technique, from theHercules C-130 aircraft.The Battalion Group, in addition to 3 RAR,consists of:(1) A Battery, 8/12 Medium Regiment,(2) 2 Troop, 1 Field Squadron,(3) Detachment, HQ Squadron 1 Brigade,(4) Detachment 176 AD Squadron,(5) 39 ADE Maintenance Platoon,(6) Parachute Surgical Team.The total number of troops is 810, of whichat least 450 would take part in the initialparachute assault phase of an operation. TheGroup is significantly larger than a standardBattalion, and therefore the medical supportneeds to be proportionally larger. The role ofthe Battalion Group may include securing aremote point of entry for the ODF, or independentoperations involving off-shore territories. 1In this article I shall avoid the operationalconsiderations concerning the Battalion Group,and focus solely on the medical problemsassociated with the parachute role. In particular,I will consider physical fitness toparachute, the injury rate and patterns of injuryseen, drop-zone medical cover inpeacetime, and the deployment of medicalresources in war.Fitness to ParachuteThe disqualifying medical conditions forparachuting are well known, and can be foundin the Manual of Personal Administration 2 ,and the Manual of Army Training 3 . I will onlycomment on areas where problems regularlyoccur.Parachute Medical ExaminationsIt is essential that ALL soldiers undergo amedical examination and sign a form statingtheir volunteer status, PRIOR to posting to 3RAR. One case concerned a soldier who arrivedat 3 RAR three months after having a total kneereconstruction! Not only is he currently not fitto jump, but he will NEVER be fit, and hasbecome an administrative liability to the unit.Six months later, despite the immediatereclassification medical board, and notificationto CARO, he is still with us. A parachute uniton short notice to move cannot afford to havesuch soldiers. It seriously affects the operationalcapability of 3 RAR.Back painSpondylolysis, a defect of the lumbarvertebra, is said to be found in 5-6°7o of individuals.4 It's cause is unclear, some maintainingthat it is congenital, while others argue thatit is traumatic in nature, similar to a stress fracture.What ever its cause it is a disqualifyingcondition from parachuting 2 , but because itoften has no symptoms how are we to detect it?I have a number of patients now classified BMS(Below Medical Standard), either because ofback pain caused by parachuting and found tobe spondylolysis, or in one case, of a spondylolysisallowed to continue jumping, and progressingto Grade 2 spondylolithesis requiringsurgery*There are also numerous otherwise benignlumbar spine conditions, which are often first

i: DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 76 May/June 89discovered in soldiers with back pain afterparachuting. An example is sacralisation of thefifth lumbar vertebra. These soldiers should notbe allowed to continue parachuting, and I firmlybelieve that all volunteers for parachutetraining should have a lumbar spine X-ray, aspart of their medical examination. Apart fromprotecting the individual, the savings in timeand money with medical downgrading, administrativeaction and possible compensationclaims are inestimable.The Injured ParatrooperIf a qualified paratrooper becomes injured inthe course of his duty, and is no longer fit toparachute, he ceases immediately to be of anyuse to the Battalion in parachute operations. Itshould be noted here that there are some conditionswhich allow a soldier to be FE (FitEverywhere), but prevent him fromparachuting. Examples include CP-3 colorblindness, joint reconstruction and vertebralbody fracture. However, once such disabilitiesare discovered, there is no efficient mechanismfor having these soldiers replaced. Theylanguish in the Battalion, lose morale, and theBattalion loses an effective manpower position.My belief is that if a soldier is injuredparachuting, we owe him the best possiblemedical care. But if his recovery is likely to beprolonged, or he will never be fit again, then heshould be posted as soon as possible. AParachute Battalion is no place to recuperatefrom a serious injury.To further emphasize the problem, over a 12months period we saw 37 serious injuries fromparachuting of which 7 did not return toparachuting, or were restricted for more than 6months. Most of these soldiers are still with theunit.'PARACHUTE INJURIES AND INJURYRATESDuring a 12 month period between March 87and March 88 a prospective study was performedat 3 RAR, documenting injury rate with differenttypes of jumps, and comparing resultswith the overseas experience.- The followingtable illustrates our injury rate per 1000 jumps,for all jumps, clean fatigue jumps, combatequipment jumps, and tactical jumps. Tacticaljumps are defined as jumps into an exercise,carrying combat equipment, usingsimultaneous door exits, and after terrain huggingtactical flying.The injury rate for simultaneous door exitsalone, was 10.41 per 1000 jumps, notsignificantly greater than jumping with combatequipment.From Table One it can be seen that ouroverall injury rate is the highest, especiallywhen compared to Kiel (USA) 7 . The injury ratefor tactical jumps is comparable to that of theIsraeli Defence Force 6 , but far higher than thatseen by Essex-Lopresti 8 in 1944. I believe thereason lies in the far heavier combat load carriedby today's Infantryman.A soldier's equipment, including weapon andammunition, can weigh up to 1501bs. By comparison,Essex-Lopresti recorded the averageweight of paratrooper's equipment as 951bs. sThis extra weight greatly increases the soldier'svertical velocity under canopy, and even afterthe load hits the ground on its suspension line,there is little time left to slow down. It has beensuggested that perhaps the suspension lineshould be lengthened, but this may result in increasedoscillations and entanglements. Thisproblem would certainly be worthinvestigating.Table 1. Comprising of Injury Rales per 1000 jumps.TYPE OFJUMPAll jumpsClean fatigueCombat equipTactical17.514.3910.2013.43:6.262.18—13.1833.1———45.0——3.51. 3 RAR Survey (5)2. Hallel and Naggan (6), Israeli Defence Force.3. Kiel (7), United States Army.4. Essex-Lopresti (8), British Army.5. Pirson and Verbiest (9), Belgian Parachute School.55.0———

MEDICAL SUPPORT TO THE PARACHUTE BATTALION GROUP 13The apparent higher risk of simultaneousdoor exits is not supported by clinical data.However, the combination of a heavy combatload, tactical flying and simultaneous door exitspushes the injury rate up to 13.43 per 1000jumps. Further, all injuries caused by airsteals,mid-air collisions and entanglements in thisseries occurred in tactical jumps.83.8% of injuries occurred on landing, comparingwith 87.7% in civilians 10 , and 90% inthe Israeli Defence Force." Consider Table 2:.Table 2. Mechanism of Injury.1 MlFlightLandingTotalNumber513137°7o13.52.783.8100.0It can be seen that the majority of injuries(83.8%) occurred on landing as expected.When other factors in the flight or exit wereconsidered, it was found that only 62.2% of injurieswere due solely to the landing impact.Table 3. landing Injuries.FACTORSLanding aloneOther factorsMalfunctionINJURIES2371Table 4: Causes of landing InjuriesLANDING ONLYPoor position 4Surface 2Obstacles 2Equipment 5Wind 10Total 23PERCENTAGE62.221.6OTHER FACTORSExit 1Collisions 2Airsteal 2Entanglement 2Malfunction 1fotal 8Tables 3 and 4 show the causes of injury, andbring out a number of points. Firstly, a quarterof landing injuries were caused by an occurrencein flight, such as an entanglement. An exampleof this is a soldier who had multiple collisionswith another canopy during his decent.He was poorly prepared for landing, and sustaineda Colles fracture. While he was injuredon landing, the reason for his injury was poorflight drills. Injuries sustained due to airsteals,collisions and entanglements tended to be moresevere, with two upper limb fractures and threelumbar spine contusions. This can be explainedin general by a poor landing position, at increasedvelocity, often with equipmentunlowered, and emphasizes the importance ofgood flight drlls in the prevention of injury onlanding.Secondly, one malfunction and subsequentfatality was recorded in the survey. The causewas a malfunction of the T-10-B/D maincanopy, and subsequent reserve entanglement.This was the first such incident in Australiawith the T-10. The Parachute Training Schoolhas conducted well over 250,000 jumps withouta fatality, while Kiel" quotes a fatality rate of 1in 50,000. We have an enviable safety record.The cause of death was ruptured superiorvena cava, with right haemothorax; a classicdeceleration injury. Interestingly, Kiel 7 recorded77 fatalities of which half died of rupturedviscera or major blood vessels. In 1986 aparatrooper from 3 RAR survived a fall from850ft onto hard ground, due to a malfunctionof his MC-1 parachute. Because he landed in afeet together position, sustained multiple fracturesto his legs, pelvis and vertebra, absorbedthe shock of the impact, but did not sustain acatastrophic deceleration injury, he survived."It is possible to survive malfunctions, providinga good landing position is maintained.Other parameters considered included windspeedand injury, and as expected, injury ratemarkedly increased at winds greater than 10knots, particularly when other factors were excluded.Consider Table 5:Table 5: Injury and VVindspeedSITE OFINJURYLower LimbBackUpper limbHead andneckTOTALExcludingother factorsknots knots knots5 5-10 109 1 13 1 00 4 71 0 413 6 124 3 9TOTAL °7o11 35.54 12.911 35.55 16.131 100.016 48.5Lower limb and back injuries together madeup 48.4% of injuries, compared with 80.4% incivilians. 10 Further, our injuries were mainlysprains and contusions, with only one lowerlimb fracture, and no vertebral fractures. Morethan half the civilian injuries were lower limb

14 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 76 May/June 89and vertebral fractures 1 ", and this says muchfor the rigorous training in landing techniquereceived at the Parachute Training School.Upper limb and head and neck injuries accountedfor 51.6°7o of injury, and were moresevere in nature, with a number of limb fractures,three dislocated shoulders withassociated fractures, and two closed head injurieswith loss of consciousness. The majorityof these injuries occurred in winds of greaterthan 10 knots, the force of the wind "whipping"the soldier into the ground, without allowinghim to execute a proper parachute roll.Note that no upper limb injuries were recordedat winds of less than 5 knots. Consider Table 6:Table 6: Comparison of Upper limb InjuryIDFUKAUST% of total injuries2.58.521.6For the purpose of comparison, only dislocationsand fractures were included. A number ofAC joint sprains noted at 3 RAR were excluded,as this injury was not identified in otherstudies. Nevertheless, our injury rate remainshigh, and is of serious concern.Note also from Table 5 that the leastnumbers of injuries occurred in the 5-10 knotrange. This agrees with the general feeling thatit is better to have some wind, to give positivedrift, and allow a good landing with aparachute roll. Note also that as wind speed increases,the site of injury moves up the bodytowards the head, and the severity of injuryincreases.In summary, clinical data indicates that whileour injury rates are comparable to the IDF,they are still high compared to other defenceforces. While simultaneous door exits alone donot increase injury rate, the combination of"sim-doors", heavy combat loads, and tacticalflying do increase injury rates. The distributionof injury differs from that seen in civilians, butof particular concern is the high rate ofshoulder and upper limb injury, especially atwinds greater than 10 knots. I believe a reviewof wind limits for tactical jumping inpeacetime, is indicated. The importance ofgood (Tight drills and observation is emphasizedby the fact that a quarter of injuries on landingwere, at least in part, due to mid-airoccurrences.DROP-ZONE MEDICAL COVERThe general requirements for drop-zonecover can again be found in the Manual of ArmyTraining 14 , which basically states that for allparachuting, an ambulance with a medicalassistant should be present ON the DZ. Sincethe development of the Parachute BattalionGroup, parachute operations have becomemore complex, and the MAT fails to addressadequately the cover needed for mass drops ofCompany size or greater.At 3 RAR we have developed our own SOP'sfor this", and I would like to offer the followingobservations, for those involved in the planningof future operations.Communications.The size of drop-zone required for a Battaliondrop is approximately two kilometreslong, by 500 metres wide. It is not physicallypossible to see from one end of the DZ to theother, and it therefore follows that it is notpossible to see all the casualties, from the centralDZ Safety Officers position. This can besolved in two ways. Firstly, medical assistantsare spread along the DZ at 200m intervals, or atleast within eyesight. It follows that at least 10medical assistants will be required for a Battaliondrop.Secondly, as well as their medical kit, eachmedic has a hand held radio, with which he maycommunicate with the central aid post. This netis separate from the DZSO net, so as not to interferewith ground-to-air communications. Allcasualties can be reported to the central aidpost, and their condition relayed to the DZSO,who must then decide whether to "stop drop"to retrieve the casualty, or to continue.This method ensures adequate first aid isrendered, while avoiding unnecessary delays. Ithas been used on many Company sized dropsthis year, and is the method used by the BritishParachute Regiment. 15Aeromedical Support.Many drops are carried out in isolated locations,far from medical facilities. Evacuation tohospital needs to be swift and comfortable forthe patient, and we have a limit of 30 minutesevacuation time from hospital, for anyparachuting. The use of rotary wing aircraft ex-

MEDICAL SUPPORT TO THE PAR AC HI H II \ I I \l ION GROl P 15tends the distance from hospital we canoperate, before needing to pre-position asurgical facility. It can also assist in DZclearance of casualties after a drop has occurred,by flying up and down the DZ looking formissing soldiers. Further it is the "vehicle ofchoice" for the evacuation of lumbar spine injuriesand priority one casualties.What needs to be remembered however, isthat an AME team is just that, an evacuationteam. They take no part in retrieving casualtiesfrom the DZ, they have only limited ability toresuscitate, and cannot evacuate injured untilthey are at least stabilized. Moreover thepresence of rotating blades in close proximity toa DZ can cause a parachutist some concern, sothat the AME team must be positioned a safedistance away, with engines off. The team istherefore not in a position to provide adequateDZ cover without supplementation. The provisionof an AME team is NOT the panacea forDZ medical support. The DZ must still becovered by adequate personnel to retrieve andresuscitate casualties, and an ambulance is stillrequired to transport injured about the DZ.Personnel.Having demonstrated the need for adequatenumbers of personnel on the DZ, when shoulda RMO be present, and when should he be supplementedby a Surgical Team?A RMO is required at all jumps of Companysize and above. Further if multiple aircraft aredropping paratroopers in the one pass, thechance of collision and entanglement is higherand a RMO should be present. Whenever aRMO is on the DZ he should set up a small aidpost, with the ability to resuscitate casualties,and this should be co-located with the ambulanceand the DZSO (Drop Zone SafetyOfficer).' 3The RMO needs to be supplemented when,despite AME, he is still outside the 30 minuterange from a hospital. This support can take anumber of forms, but in general needs to havethe ability to perform limited life saving proceduresand anaesthetics. This lesson was firstlearned in the Cocos Islands in 1986", andsurgical support was provided for the Battalionexercise last year in Far North Queensland. Theformation of the Parachute Surgical Team willformalize the support needed by the Battalion,both in peacetime and in war.Medical Support to the Battalion Groupin OperationsThe role of the Battalion includes operatingin isolation, without re-supply or evacuation,for up to 72 hours. This will place great emphasison the first-aid skills of the Infantryman,forcing him to look after himself. It also meansthat medical support will have to be self sufficient,and individuals will need to be highlyproficient. In this section I will describe the intrinsicmedical elements of the Battalion, andbriefly touch on the Parachute Surgical Team.Intrinsic Medical Elements.The allocation of RAAMC personnel to 3RAR is the same as for any other Infantry Battalion.This has brought the need to trainRAINF soldiers in first aid, and to equip themwith quite sophisticated first aid kits, includingintravenous fluids. They have been trained toadminister these either rectally, or where possibleintravenously. I will consider each elementin turn.Stretcher bearers are RAINF bandsmen, allwith a formal Army First Aid qualification. Aswell as a first aid kit including IV fluid, theycarry non-rigid stretchers which roll up to thesize of a bum-pack. In addition they carry henormal load of first line ammunition, mines,mortar bombs etc. In an operation they deployso that all land in two groups, at either end ofthe DZ. After rally procedure, their role is toclear the DZ by extended line, rememberingthat there is no DZ safety party to greet them.Any casualties are picked up and brought backto the central RAP.Platoon medics are again RA Inf riflemen,with formal Army First Aid qualification. Theyare allocated on the basis of one or more perplatoon. Some platoons, such as Recon, requiremore highly trained first aider, and we have attempted,with little success, to have thesesoldiers included in the SASR med aid course atPortsea. Recon are required to operate in isolationfor up to three days prior to the Battalion'sarrival, and then for a further 72 hours afterthat. The need for better training is clear.The platoon medic is supervised by theRAAMC Company medic, and is expected towork in the RAP from time to time. His role isthe treatment of minor illness within the platoon,and immediate first aid of injured. Healso has the ability to administer fluids IV orrectally.

16 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 76 May/June 89Diagram 1: Medical Support to the Battalion Group.PM — PM — PM1>( MiiSTRETCHER BEARERSPM — PM — PM PM — PM -- PM PM — PM - PM1 1ii|l 11CMCMCMiili 1iiiSGT (STORES)iiSTAFF SGTSGT(HEALTH)MEDICAL OFFICERPARACHUTE SURGICAL TEAMI'MCMPlatoon medicCompany medicThe remainder of medical personnel aresimilar to any other Battalion.The details of how each element deploys canbe found in Battalion SOPs'\ but in generaleach element jumps in with that part of the Battalionit supports. For example, Recon will beaccompanied by one RA Inf first aider, eachCompany will have its full complement of platoonmedics and one RAAMC Cpl medic, andthe RAP staff jump with Battalion Headquarters.As all Rifle Companies and BHQjump with the first assault, this ensures thatlevel one and two medical support is on theground early in the operation.The major problem faced is how to get adequatemedical supplies on the ground in theassault phase. There is no landrover and trailerawaiting the RMO, and all stores must be carriedon the man. Intravenous fluids aredistributed one litre per soldier, and each mediccarries at least two, and in the case of the RMO,four litres of plasma expander and Hartmanns.Further, the equipment necessary to intubatecasualties, perform limited life saving proceduresincluding chest drainage, and splintageof fractures must all be carried on the man, andtherefore need to be light weight and compactwhere possible. The current medical haversacksin use are inadequate, and we are currentlytrialing a British pack, which is more rigid thanthe Alice pack, and has sidepockets for stowageof emergency equipment. These side pocketscan be detached and zipped together to providea hand carried "doctor's bag".Further supplies can be packed on wedges, orheavy dropped, but one must never rely on thearrival of equipment that is not firmly attachedto one's own suspension lines.!The Parachute Surgical Team (PST)The PST is still under development at thistime, and no doubt others will wish to write onthat subject in detail. I wish only to introducethe reader to the overall concept of the PST,and describe its projected capabilities.The PST will fill a gap in the support to theBattalion Group. Currently we have parachutequalified gunners, engineers, drivers, signallersand of course riggers providing necessary supportto a unit which must be largely self sufficientfrom a larger Brigade or Division formation,for up to 72 hours. With no Field Ambulanceof Field Hospital in support, the BattalionGroup must provide for itself level threemedical support, and this is the role of the PST.The PST will be capable of performing 20surgical cases, and holding them postoperativelyfor a further 72 hours, until evacuationbecome available. All members of the PSTmust be parachute qualified, including thesurgeons and anaesthetist, as in a worst casescenario, the entire unit will be parachuted in.Therefore all equipment is fully air-portableand parachutable.The problem currently to be considered withthe PST is at what phase in an operation shouldit be deployed. The rifle companies with theirintrinsic medical support will perform the in-

MEDICAL SUPPORT TO THE PARACHUTE BATTALION GROUP 17itial airborne assault, and it is not envisagedthat the PST will be committed at this phase ofthe operation. Rather, essential personnel willbe parachuted in, and will be able to provideadvanced life support until the arrival of theirequipment in the support phase. This may bedelayed by as much as 24 hours. The personnelneed only be a Surgeon, Anaesthetist, MedicalOfficer, and operating theatre technicians,known as a FIRST. They would carry most oftheir equipment on the man, but might be supplementedby a wedge.The arrival of the remainder of the PST inthe next "support phase" would in all probabilitybe air landed, as a typical operationwould involve seizing an airfield. Once this wassecure all equipment would be air-landed, butof course, depending on the location, therewould be rearward AME. Therefore a full PSTwith operating facilities may not be required inall operations. A decision would have to bemade as to whether patients would have surgeryat the airhead, and therefore need to bepostoperatively cared for some days beforeevacuation. Alternatively if level three supportwas close, then ideally all soldiers requiringoperation would be evacuated prior to theirsurgery.If the preceding paragraph confused you,then it has served to illustrate the many types ofoperation that a PST could find itself. Theequipment and personnel of the PST will haveto be categorised into manpacked and wedgedropped (assault phase), heavy dropped orairlanded (support phase), and what is finallyneeded to provide the best third level supportpossible. The decision as to what componentsof the PST deploy will rest with Land Command,and will require a full knowledge of thetype of operation, and the availability of rearwardcasualty evacuation.ConclusionWith the development of the Parachute BattalionGroup, a number of problems havearisen in providing medical support. All potentialparachutists should have a lumbar spine X-ray, as part of their parachute medical examination.This examination should be carriedout well in advance of posting, so that unsuitablesoldiers are not posted in to become anadministrative problem.Injured paratroopers deserve (and receive)the best medical care available, but once identifiedas no longer suitable to parachute, mustbe posted out of 3 RAR.The current injury rate at 3 RAR is highwhen compared to a number of other ArmedForces. Simultaneous door exits alone do notincrease injury rate, but when combined withheavy combat loads and tactical flying, the injuryrate does increase. Consideration shouldbe given to ways of lessening loads carried whenparachuting.The incidence of upper limb fracture anddislocation is very high, when compared toother Armed Forces and civilians, and strongconsideration must be given to decreasing windlimits, when tactical jumps are carried out.The provisions of proper drop zone medicalsupport is essential in peacetime, and lessonslearnt on Cocos Island in 1986, and in FarNorth Queensland in 1987, will be addressedwith the formation of the Parachute SurgicalTeam.NOTES1 3 RAR Operation Instruction 1/87, Parachute BattalionGroup Deployment File R 850/2/2.2 MPA Vol 3, Ch 34, Annex B.I MAT Vol 3, Ch 4, Annex C.4 Hughes S, and Sweetnam R, (1980), The Basis and Practiceof Orthopoedics, London, William Heinemann..5 Farrow G, A Study of Injuries Caused By Military StaticLine Parachuting, 1988. Draft, 3 RAR File R 538/1/1.6 Hallel T, and Naggan L, "Parachuting Injuries: ARetrospective Study of 83,718 jumps", J Trauma 1975,15:14-9.7 Keil F W, "Hazards of Military Parachuting", Milit Med1965, 512-21.8 Essex-Lopresti P, "Hazards of Parachuting", Br J Surg1946, 34, 1.9 Pirson J, and Verbiest E, "A study of some factors influencingmilitary parachute landing injuries". AviatSpace Environ Med 1985, 56:564-7.10 Amamilo S C et al, A Prospective Study of ParachuteInjuries in Civilians". Br J Bone Joint Surg 1987,69B:17-9.II Hutton D, Post Excerise Report, "Medical Aspects ofExercise Western Wing — Cocos Island, Aug 86" 14Oct 86.12 "Medical Support to the 3 RAR Parachute BattalionGroup in Airborne Operations", 3 RAR File R538/1/1.13 "Drop Zone Medical Cover", 3 RAR File R 804/1/1.14 MAT Vol 3, Ch 1, Para 442, Safety Requirements forParachuting.15 British Army Parachute Training Order Number 8, AnnexC, Appendix 2.

18 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 76 May/June 89Captain Farrow joined the Army Undergraduate Scheme in 1981, graduating in Medicinefrom the University of Melbourne in 1983. After two years as a Resident Medical Officer at theRoyal Melbourne Hospital, he was posted to 1 Field Hospital in 1986. He completed two years asRegimental Medical Officer at 3 RAR.He is currently Officer Commanding 3 Camp Hospital.Major Milestone for Jindalee ProjectThe Minister for Defence, Mr Kim Beazley, announced recently that a contractworth a total of $15 million had been awarded to GEC Australia Limited for thesupply and installation of eighteen high powered, high frequency transmitters at theJindalee Over-The-Horizon radar facility at Alice Springs.The contract represents another milestone in meeting the Government's plansannounced in 1986 to upgrade the experimental radar at Alice Springs to provide atest bed for scientific, engineering and operational development.This will enable the testing of important new features planned for incorporationinto the network of operational Over-The-Horizon radars now being developed toprovide broad area surveillance of our northern approaches.In addition to the installation of the new transmitters the upgrade of the radarat Alice Springs included the installation of advanced computers and the conversionof the complex computer software, as well as the refurbishment of technical equipmentand the construction of new operational, technical and domestic facilities.Under the contract signed with GEC, 50 per cent of the capital cost of the projectwill directly involve Australian industry. GEC Australia will establish a productioncapability for the Jindalee transmitters at their Milperra plant in NSW.For this project GEC has teamed with Marconi Communications SystemsLimited of the UK and Mathew Hall of Sydney. This phase of the upgrade to theAlice Springs radar is expected to be completed in late 1991.Mr Beazley said Jindalee was a unique Australian development which has placedAustralia at the forefront of Over-The-Horizon Radar technology. The project isa major undertaking and the Government places a very high priority on the capabilityit will provide in the defence of Australia.

Should Australia Ratify the 1977 Protocol 1 Addendums to the1949 Geneva Conventions?By Captain David Craig, RACTIn discussing the above question the followingareas will be discussed, the background tothe 1977 Geneva Protocol, its advantages forthe development of international rules of war,and the potential problems generated by its applicationto the modern battlefield.IntroductionEGISLATION is currently before Parliamentto ratify two Protocols which are ad­Ldendums to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.Protocol I concerns itself with the protection ofvictims of international armed conflict, whileProtocol II deals with the protection of victimsof non-international armed conflicts. TheseProtocols were drawn up by the InternationalConference of the Red Cross (ICRC) in the late1960s early 1970s to reaffirm and develop the1949 Geneva Conventions.In 1974, the Swiss Government convened, inGeneva, the Diplomatic Conference on theReaffirmation and Development of InternationalHumanitarian Law Applicable in ArmedConflicts. This conference attended by 124 nationsand held over four years (one session eachyear) formally adopted the two Protocols additionalto the Geneva Conventions of 12thAugust 1949, which were opened for signaturein Berne on the 12th December 1977.As at December 1978, 67 nations had signedthe Protocols with 11 having fully ratified themat that stage. 1 The Australian Governmentwithin the next few months will formally decidewhether or not to ratify these Protocols bypassing the appropriate legislation throughparliament, officially adopting them into ourmilitary forces.BackgroundThe Hague Conventions of 1907 and theGeneva Conventions of 1949 were important intheir day for regulating the methods and meansof war, as well as protecting the victims of war(especially the wounded, sick, Prisoners of War(POW) and civilians who fall into the hands ofthe enemy). These agreements however werenot dynamic. Solf and Grandison wrote that anupdate of international humanitarian laws wererequired due to the rapid change in technology,tactics and strategy associated with modernwarfare. 3Additional pressures for change to existinghumanitarian law included:1. The need to clarify application of existinglaw to wars occurring since World War II,that could be deemed non-international incharacter.2. How humanitarian law could be developedto incorporate the growing use of guerrillawarfare, and3. The need to further extend protection to innocentcivilians living in a hostileenvironment.'From as early as 1956 the ICRC appliedpressure to the United Nations GeneralAssembly for a revision of the rules of war. Itwas not until 1968 that the United Nations (inresolution 2444) called for the study of additionalhumanitarian international conventionsto ensure better protection for civilians, plusrestrictions on the use of certain methods andmeans of warfare. 4From a series of international conferencesand committees held throughout 1971 and 1972the ICRC drew up two Protocols aimed ateliminating the rift between modern warfaretechniques and existing law concerning meansand methods of war and protection of innocentparties. Although Australia, along with 66other nations signed the Protocols shortly afterdiscussion in 1977/78 ratification has not yetbeen officially endorsed. When this is doneAustralia will be officially bound by the Protocolssix months after the ratification date.This article will not investigate all the articles ofProtocol I, it will review selected articles todemonstrate both the advantageous and disadvantageousaspects of its implementation.Advantages of Protocol IJust as the Geneva Conventions of 1949evolved from the atrocities of World War II,

20 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 76 May/June 89the Geneva Protocols of 1977 have resultedfrom a need to develop the rules of war to keeppace with modern technology and tactics. It isindeed a difficult task to be able to formulate aseries of rules and regulations in such a fieldwhich will satisfy all concerned.Protection of Medical I nits and FacilitiesA major advantage of Protocol I is the additionalprotection given to mobile medical units,vehicles, ships and aircraft. As indicated in hisarticle "Progressive Development of the Lawsof War: A Reply to Criticisms of the 1977Geneva Protocol I", George AldricrT wrotethat the "(US) experience in Vietnamdemonstrated that prompt evacuation ofwounded personnel to hospitals by means ofhelicopter substantially increased the survivalrate of the wounded; these helicopters howeverenjoyed no immunity from attack, either in lawor in practice." 6Thanks to the new Protocols (Article 21-31)protection for all modes of medical transport,both in the air and on the ground has beendrastically improved. Although Protocol I hasa "land emphasis", importance is placed on airevacuation through active operational areas.To enjoy the protection of Protocol I, partiesusing the helicopter as a means of medicalevacuation must:1. Obtain prior agreement for such flightsfrom the adverse party (if the flight pathcrosses into unfriendly territory) Article27(1).2. Not use medical aircraft as a means of acquiringany military advantage over theadverse party, Article 28, and3. Employ suitable identification when usingaircraft in a medical role. Article 27(2). 7As Aldrich argues, the general adoption bythe more technologically advanced states of theblue flashing light and radio frequency identifiersfor such aircraft would greatly improvethe chances of these aircraft being successfullyidentified." Once identified the Protocol grantsthese aircraft substantial protections againstattack.Combatant StatusSubstantial improvements have been made inthe identifying of combatants and the conferringof protection in accordance with that status.To further develop this point it is necessary todiscuss three major aspects.Firstly, as laid down in Article 1(4) the definitionof "recognized" conflicts whose soldiersare then entitled to protection under the Protocolinclude,"armed conflict in which peoples arefighting against colonial domination andalien occupation and against racist regimesin the exercise of their right of selfdetermination,as enshrined in the Charterof the United Nations . . ." 9Major B. Roberts, 10 one of the main critics ofthe Protocol and against (US) ratification,argues that such an inclusion "internationalizessuch conflicts, recognizes National LiberationMovements (NLM) and Legitimizes foreign interventionin wars of national liberation."Aldrich agrees with this contention andjustifies it this way. If NLM's are recognizedand legalized under the Protocol (thereforebecoming a signatory to the Protocol) they willalso be required to abide by the protections andstandards of operation set forth, 12 thereby raisingthe standards of protection afforded to allparties in a conflict.The second advantage concerning the identificationof combat status (and therefore thoseentitled to POW protection) is the setting ofminimum requirements for the recognition ofguerrilla forces. Article 43 states that:"The armed forces of a party to a conflictconsist of all recognized armed forces,groups and units which are under commandresponsible to that party for the conduct ofits subordinates, even if that party isrepresented by a government or an authoritynot recognized by an adverse party. Sucharmed forces shall be subject to an internaldisciplinary system which inter alia will enforcecompliance with the rules of internationallaw applicable to armed conflict.""Aldrich believes that the absence of eitherqualification would justify a refusal to considerthe force, group or unit in question as coveredby Article 43.'" The imposition of these restrictions,(one's terrorists could not meet),eliminates terrorism as a means of war and enforcescompliance with the rules of internationallaw applicable in armed conflict.Finally, associated with the granting of combatantstatus, is the definition of mercenary,which details the requirements for theirrecognition. By providing this clear and veryrestrictive definition of "mercenary" the Pro-

SHOULD AUSTRALIA RATIFY THE 1977 PROTOCOL ADDENDUMS? 21tocol serves to protect legitimate foreign advisorsand personnel who join the armed forcesof a party to the conflict.The setting of standards for recipients ofcombatant status protection ensures a higherdegree of conformity and enforceability of theProtocol in international conflicts and reducesthe viability of radical fringe groups and irresponsibleactivities that could occur within acombat environment.Protection of Civilians and Civilian PropertyA major aim, (and success) of the 1977Geneva Protocol I was the desire to affordcivilians and innocent paties to a conflict dueprotection. Under the Protocol civilians areprotected against "dangers arising frommilitary operations"; will not be the "object ofattack"; and will not be "used to render certainpoints or areas immune from military operations"."The execution of this responsibilityfalls on the field commander who by virtue ofArticle 57(1) shall;". . do everything feasible to verify that theobjectives to be attacked are neither civiliansnor civilian objects. . . and choose a methodof attack with a view of avoiding and in anyevent to minimizing incidental loss ofcivilian life . .'" 6Protocol 1 has gone to great measures andquite rightly so, in providing protection to innocentparties within this environment. Article52 provides further advantages to the civilianpopulation by prohibiting indiscriminate attackson civilian objects and protecting placesof historic, cultural, artistic and spiritualheritage. 17PerfidyIn order to further promote the protectionoffered to the civilian population, as well asregulate the covert operations of special forces(or guerrillas). Article 37 prohibits the act ofperfidy. Perfidy is described as "Acts invitingthe confidence of an adversary to lead him tobelieve that he is entitled to, or obliged to accordprotection under the rules of internationallaw, applicable in armed conflict, with intent tobetray that confidence."" In order to be affordedthe protection of combatant status, andensure perfidy is not committed, Article 44 requirescombatants to:"distinguish themselves from the civilianpopulation while they are engaged in an attackor in a military operation preparatoryto an attack or, in the exceptional situationsreferred to in the second sentence ofparagraph three, to bear arms openly, at thetimes specified. A breach of these obligationsamounts to the war crime of perfidyunder Article 37(1 )(d), for which the individualsconcerned may be tried andpunished."Article 37 and 38 attempt to promote"honesty" within a combat environment withthe ultimate aim of civilian protection and theeradication of misleading tactics which mayresult in unnecessary loss of civilian life.Minimum Humane StandardAs long as rules for behaviour in war havebeen sought, fair and just treatment for all hasbeen a major goal. Article 75 provides fundamentalguarantees to ensure that all personsinvolved in a conflict enjoy minimum protectionregardless of race, colour, sex, language,religion, political or other opinion, national orsocial origin, wealth, birth or other status. 20The article goes on to detail prohibited practicesand the legal requirements for prosecution.This is a key article in protecting the rightsof parties to a conflict because it, in essence isan umbrella clause which sets a minimum standardof humane treatment for all involved in acombat environment. It will be necessary thatevery soldier is educated as to his rights and therights of others during combat, and the possiblewar crimes charges that could be laid if thesestandards are not met.Guerrillas in AustraliaIt is my belief that if Australia is invaded byan adverse party and defensive support is notforthcoming from the United States or anyother major ally, Australia's permanent forcewould be operationally ineffective due to itssmall size and limited capability. It is thereforeimportant for Australia in ratifying this Protocolto determine how it would affect (restrict)the operation of Australian guerrillas whocould emerge as a powerful force against an invadingparty.It is on these grounds that the Australiandelegation reserved its acceptance of Article 54,believing that it should be lawful to destroy objectsindispensible to the survival of the civilianpopulation, not only in the face of an invaderon national territory, but also, in that territory

DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 76 May/June 89once it has been occupied by the enemy. ;: It isimportant to fight for this belief because giventhe possibility that guerrilla tactics may play amajor role in future Australian defensivestrategy we should be careful not to ratify aProtocol that would restrict our ability tooperate in this way.Australia has received very little support withits stand, even from its closest allies.Any attempt to civilize the rules of war isworthy of support. George Aldrich believesProtocol I is valuable, and a long overduecodification of customary humanitarian lawworthy of adoption by countries throughoutthe world." Major Roberts, Aldrich's maincritic, does agree that Protocol 1 "extends protectionto medical units, improves protection tomedical aircraft and vehicles, provides some expansionof protection to the civilian populationand objects and attempts to ensure minimumhumane treatment for all persons." 23Criticisms of Protocol IApart from the limited support MajorRoberts has for Protocol I, he has numerouscriticisms of the document he sees as being ambiguouslydrafted and representing neither areliable codification of the rules of war nor acoherent expression of humanitarian principles.'4 These are a few of the problems evidentfrom a study of Protocol I. In order toprovide a balanced view of the Protocol theseand other problems associated with the documentwill now be discussed.The Widened Scope of Protocol IAs discussed earlier, the drafters of ProtocolI attempted to widen its application to cover:1. a wider range of conflicts,2. guerrillas, under certain circumstances, and3. increased protection to the civilianpopulation.In their attempt to satisfy these goals and, atthe same time stop future military infringementson human liberties, Protocol I hastended to raise more questions than it has beenable to successfully resolve. This poses greatburdens on the field commander whose job itwill be to interpret, apply and justify his actionsin accordance with the Protocol guidelines inday to day operational settings.A commander for example, given his responsibilitiesunder Article 57(2) must, prior to anattack:"(I) do everything feasible to verify that theobjectives to be attacked are neither civiliansor civilian objects and are not subject tospecial protection but are military objectiveswithin the meaning of para 2 of Article 52,and that it is not prohibited by the provisionsof this Protocol to attack them.(II) take all feasible precautions in the choiceand methods of attack with the view ofavoiding and in any event minimizing incidentalloss of civilian life(III) refrain from deciding to launch an attackwhich may be expected to cause incidentalloss of civilian life, injury to civilians,damage to civilian objects or a combinationthereof, which would be excessive in relationto the concrete and direct military advantageanticipated. 25From Article 57(2), it can be seen that the interestsand protection of civilians are of paramountimportance. In affording this increasedsecurity the drafters of Protocol I have (intentionallyor not) made more complex the job ofthose whose responsibility it will be to implementand abide by this document. The wordingemployed allows wide and at times varying interpretationsof the inferred standard.The commander for example could bejustifiably confused in determining, by Protocolstandards, whether he has "doneeverything feasible" (Article 57(2)(a)(i)) indetermining the suitability of a target prior toan attack. He would also have to rely on his interpretationof "all feasible precautions" (Article57(2)(a)(ii)) in ensuring the safety ofcivilians before an attack. What is judged byone commander to be feasible, given certain circumstancesmay not be judged so by another.Article 57 goes on to say that attacks "whichmay be expected" to cause incidental loss ofcivilian life "excessive" in relation to the concretemilitary advantage should not go ahead.Again, it is the commander, and his interpretationof these ambigious, undefined terms that,will be held responsible for any civiliancasualties on the battlefield. His idea ofwhether an attack will cause death, and to whatextent these deaths were excessive in relation tothe military advantage could be open to investigationand judgement made in relation toan as yet undefined standard.Article 35(3) also suffers from obscurewording:

SHOULD AUSTRALIA RATIFY THE 1977 PROTOCOL ADDENDUMS? 23"It is prohibited to employ methods ormeans of warfare which are intended, ormay be expected to cause widespread,longterm and severe damage to the naturalenvironment". 26The use of vague language provides legalgrounds for challenging the use of any weaponsthat may affect the environment. It is not statedhowever, how many people or how large ageographical area must be affected before theprohibition would apply. These articles imposeunworkable and impractical requirements onmilitary commanders in an effort to preventecological damage. 37A final example (but by no means the last) ofobscure Protocol language, can be seen in Article56. This article prohibits attacks on "dams,dykes and nuclear electric generating stations,if such attacks may cause the release ofdangerous forces" resulting in "severe lossesamong the civilian population."' 8 Robertsargues that the wording used in this article waschosen precisely to make clear that the attackermust be absolutely rather than reasonably certainno such loss will result. Such a standard ismanifestly impracticable and operationally unworkable.2 " This article has the effect of, yetagain, placing the onus of direct responsibilityon the field commander whose individual interpretationof the Protocol would be expected todetermine:1. The total effect of his means of attack,2. The meaning of "widespread, longterm andsevere" effects on the environment, and3. If there would exist a causal relationship betweenthe two.The Australian delegation accepted withreservations the articles concerning civilian protectionand field commanders decisions, in thatthey specified "military commanders andothers responsible for planning, deciding upon,or executing attacks, necessarily have to reachtheir decisions on the basis of their assessmentof the information from all sources which isavailable to them at the relevant time." 30Although this provides some reassurance to thefield commander he still must burden the additionalresponsibility for his decisions.ReprisalsThe doctrine of reprisal allows the victim of aviolation of international law to engage in aviolation against the offending state for thepurpose of (1) enforcing future compliancewith international law or (2) deference." ProtocolI (Article 51) prohibits the use of reprisalsagainst civilians and only allows them againstenemy combat troops and military property.Roberts argues that reprisals (or the threat ofreprisal) are of benefit in that it may very wellinfluence even the most callous enemy torefrain from further attacks on friendlycivilians and their property. 12 Given the publicpressurefavouring retaliation that inevitablyfollows an attack on a country's civilianpopulation, the political viability of the prohibitionson reprisals in Protocol I are subjectto severe doubt.The only situation that would allow effectiveoutlawing of reprisals is a system wherebysuitable policing and enforcement of Protocolstandards exist. Such processes are difficult toimplement and will be discussed at a later stage.The United States has reserved its right toemploy reprisals because it sees them as the onlyviable means to enforce the rules of war, andavoid possible conventional escalation intonuclear weapons. 3 ' Australia on the other handsupported the prohibition in article 51 of attackson civilians by way of reprisal; but hasstated that further extension of the range ofprohibitions (Article 52-56) was inimical to theendeavour of promoting international law insupport of humanitarian principles in armedconflict. 34InteroperabilityFollowing the U.S. announcement that itwould not ratify Protocol I there has beengrowing anxiety, primarily from theAmericans, concerning its interoperability withAustralian forces (whose government is consideringratifying the Protocol). A Law of WarSeminar involving U.S. and Australian Servicerepresentatives was conducted in Canberra on10-11 December 1987 in an attempt to discussthe perceived problems and to arrive at asuitable agreement. As a result of this conferencethe Australian representatives believedthat any problems which might occur werecapable of resolution. 3 - Nevertheless, it wasdecided that a seminar to further discuss thespecific problems of interoperability would beheld in February 1988. Colonel R. P. J.Noonan, a Defence representative doubted thatthe proposed re-examination would result in

24 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 76 May/June 89any change in the Australian stance.' 6 Resultsfrom the latest conference are as yetunavailable.At this stage Headquarters AustralianDefence Force (HQADF) have not identifiedany particular problems of interoperability arisingout of the fact Australia will be a signatoryof the Protocol and the U.S. will not. Regardinghowever the emphasis the United Statesplaces on defence and alliances, this situationcannot be taken too lightly. The followingquestions are posed to outline the potential forongoing conflict over this issue:1. Could the U.S. use this disagreement as anexcuse not to provide military assistance toAustralia in future times of need regardlessof current U.S./Australian defenceagreements?2. How far will the U.S. go to pressureAustralian conformity on the Protocol? and3. Could division over Protocol 1 have repercussionson1) future alliance agreements,2) U.S. trade and2) U.S. bases in Australia?Legal Ramification of Protocol IProtocol I, if ratified, would become law forthe operation of Australian forces and as suchwould prevail over the existing body of rulesand regulations. Two articles in Protocol I setdisturbing scenarios which pose potential problemsfor the future operation of this legalcode.Firstly, Article 16(1) provides that:"Persons engaged in medical activities shallnot be compelled to perform acts or to carryout work contrary to the rules of medicalethics or to other medical rules designed forthe benefit of the wounded and sick . . ."'Roberts argues that if ratified by the U.S.this Protocol would overrule in part the case ofthe United States v Levy. 38 This Protocol ensuresthe defence of "medical ethics" would remaina suitable defence during armed conflict.This being the case the employment and taskingof medical resources would be ultimatelygoverned, not by the operational requirement,but by medical ethics, which lies outside thecontrol of military commanders. This conflictof interest, and its ramifications could affectAustralian services in a similar manner, and isworthy of further clarification.Secondly, Paragraph 2(b) of Article 57 requiresan attack to be broken off if:"it becomes apparent that .... the attackmay be expected to cause incidental loss ofcivilian life .... which would be excessive inrelation to the concrete and direct advantageanticipated" 3 *This article allows a situation whereby asoldier could refuse to obey an order (duringexecution) if he believes that civilian casualtiesare or may be "excessive" in relation to themilitary advantages gained. For example CaptainMike Heck refused to participate in a B-52strike over North Vietnam because he believedexcessive collateral damage would result. 40 Thevague relationship between obeying a superiorofficer's commands and implementing the Protocolstandard remains unclarified. Due to thepotential impact this type of situation may haveon the operation of Australian forces, warrantsfurther investigation prior to full ratification bythe Australian Government.Finally, enforcement of such a Protocolwould prove a difficult task. No effective procedurehas been outlined for bringing warcriminals to justice, and there has been no practicalframework devised for the universal applicationof Protocol standards to all parties ofa conflic. These are serious exclusions from adocument devised to reaffirm and developmilitary law relating to international armedconflict. As Roberts argues, "the Protocol doesnot improve the international mechanisms forensuring compliance with the law of war. 41Such deficiencies must be addressed prior tofull implementation of the Protocol.ConclusionProtocol 1 is a serious attempt at reaffirmingand developing existing humanitarian law as itapplies to international armed conflicts. Anumber of advances have been made regardingprotection afforded to medical units, personneland transport, prisoners of war and civilians.Such advances are long overdue and necessaryin order to maintain the rules of war at pacewith developing tactics and technology ofmodern warfare.Prior to full Governmental ratificationhowever, the Protocols' ambiguity and the problemsassociated with reprisals, interoperabilityand legal ramifications must be further investigated.These problems, if not resolved, will

SHOULD AUSTRALIA RATIFY THE 1977 PROTOCOL ADDENDUMS?lead to confusion and frustration within thedefence force when finally adopted. Once theseproblems have been successfully addressed, Ibelieve Australia should ratify and adopt ProtocolI as soon as practicable. "NOTES1. "1977 Geneva Protocol II Additional to the GenevaConvention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to TheProtection of Victims of Non-International ArmedConflicts. International Committee of the Red Cross,PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVACONVENTION Oh 12 AUGUST 1949. Geneva, 1977,p.459.2. Solf W. A., Grandison W. G. "InternationalHumanitarian Law Applicable In Armed Conflict",Journal of International Law and Economics. Vol. 10,No. 2-3 1975, p.569.3. "1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the GenevaConventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to TheProtection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts",International Committee of the Red Cross,PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVACONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, Geneva,1977. Prefatory Note.4. Solf W. A., Grandison W. G. op. cit. p.569.5. George Aldrich was the head of the U.S. delegation tothe Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation andDevelopment of International Law Applicable in ArmedConflicts.6. Aldrich G. H. "Progressive Development of the Lawsof War: A Reply to Criticisms of the 1977 Geneva ProtocolI" Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol.26, No. 3 1986, p.696.7. Protocol I, op. cit. Article 27(2), p.403.8. Aldrich G. H. op. cit. p.696.9. Protocol I, op. cit. Article 1(4), p.390.10. Major B. Roberts is employed as the Assistant StaffJudge Advocate, Commander-in-Chief Pacific Forces,Camp Smith, Hawaii.11. Roberts G. B. "The New Rules for Waging War: TheCase Against Ratification of Additional Protocol I"Virginia Journal of International Law. "Vol. 26, No. 112.13.14.15,16.17.18.19.2021222324251985, p.125.Aldrich G. H. op. cit. p.702.Protocol 1, op. cit. Article 43, p.411.Aldrich G. H. op. cit. p.705.Protocol 1. op. cit. Article 51, p.415.ibid. Article 57(2)(i), p.419.ibid. Article 52, p.416.ibid. Article 37, p.409.Holden T. J. Captain RAN (For the Joint WorkingParty), "Assessment of the Military Implications ofProtocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12Aunust 1949". Dept. of Defence, Canberra. 24 June1983, p.21.Protocol I, op. cit. Article 75, p.430.Holden T. J. op. cit. p.26.Aldrich G. H. op. cil. p.719.Roberts G. B. op. cit. p. 167.ibid. p. 170.Protocol I, op. cit. Article 57, p.419.26. ibid. Article 35(3), p.409.27. Roberts G. B. op. cit. p. 148.28. Protocol I, op. cit. Article 56, p.418.29. Roberts G. B. op. cit. p. 156.30. Holden T. J. op. cit. p.25.31. Roberts G. B. op. cit. p.140.32. ibid. p. 143.33. ibid. p. 143.34. Holden T. J. op. cit. p.28.35. Noonan R. P. G. Colonel, Defence Force InternationalLaw. Letter. "Australia's Ratification of the ProtocolsAdditional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.September 1987.36. ibid. p.3.37. Protocol I, op. cit. Article 16(1), p.420.38. Captain Levy was an Army doctor who refused to trainGreen Beret paramedics. At trial, he pleaded that theorder to train the paramedics was contrary to medicalethics, which forbade training unqualified personnel toperform treatment which should be done by a physician.The court rejected his defence on the ground thatmedical ethics could not excuse disobedience of theorders of a superior.39. Protocol I, op. cit. Article 57(2)(b), p.420.40. Roberts G. B. op. cit. p. 160.41. ibid. p.168.BIBLIOGRAPHY1. "1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventionsof 12 August 1949, and Relating to The Protectionof Victims of International Armed Conflicts",International Committee of the Red Cross, PRO­TOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CON­VENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, Geneva, 1977.Prefatory Note.2. "1977 Geneva Protocol II Additional to the GenevaConventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to TheProtection of Victims of Non-International ArmedConflicts." International Committee of the Red Cross,PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVACONVENTION OF 12 AUGUST 1949. Geneva, 1977,p.459.3. Aldrich G. H. "Progressive Development of the Laws ofWar: A Reply to Criticisms of the 1977 Geneva ProtocolI" Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol.26, No. 3, 1986, p.696.4. Holden T. J. Captain RAN (For the Joint Working Party),"Assessment of the Military Implications of ProtocolI Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12August 1949" Dept. of Defence, Canberra, 24 June1983, p.21.5. Noonan R. P. G. Colonel. Defence Force InternationalLaw. Letter. "Australia's Ratification of the ProtocolsAdditional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.September 1987.6. Roberts G. B. "The New Rules for Waging War: TheCase Against Ratification of Additional Protocol I"Virginia Journal of International Law. Vol. 26, No. 11985, p.125.7. Solf W. A., Grandison W. G. "InternationalHumanitarian Law Applicable In Armed Conflict"Journal of International Law and Economics. Vol. 10,No. 2-3 1975, p.569.Captain D. Craig graduated from the Royal Military College in 1982 with a Bachelor of Arts Degree.Establishing a career within the Royal Australian Corps of Transport his first Regimental posting was as a TroopCommander in 35 Water Transport Squadron, followed by 12 months as Operations Officer in the same unit.1986/87 saw him move to Newcastle as 2IC of 16 Transport Squadron. Captain Craig is presently in his secondyear of L TS at Newcastle University.

Geographic Information SystemsWhat are they?By Major C. J. Mitchell,RASVYIntroductionAN information system is one that allowsfor the storage and retrieval of data. Librariesand filing systems are valid examples.The addition of the word "geographic" impliesthat the data in the system is associated with aparticular location in the real world.Geographical Information Systems (CIS) area relatively new and burgeoning application ofcomputer technology. It is only recently that aclearer distinction has emerged between GISand its "relative": Land Information System(LIS), the latter usually confined to cadastralrelateddata and frequently only 2-dimensional.GIS ObjectivePerhaps the primary design objective for GISis to develop a system that evaluates all therelevant data (including spatial relationships) torespond to the user's query in the most efficientand timely manner. For example, the question:"What are my options for driving a tank fromPuckapunyal to Bateman's Bay, avoidingbridges less than 6 metres wide and with loadcapacity less than x tonnes and avoiding gradientsgreater than 1 in 5?", can be answeredin seconds by a GIS.Data TypesOne of the difficulties in reading about orcomparing various implementations of GISstems from differences in terminology thatemerge as developers strive to be general yetprecise in their meaning. In the "object-oriented"approach to geographic data: nodeequates to point, directed arc equates to lineand face equates to area. But the casual readermight easily infer that "face" means part of a3-dimensional surface whereas "area" connotesonly 2-dimensions or that "node" implies rathermore than does "point"."Things", in GIS jargon, are variously: features,objects, entities, elements and so on.However, data on some "thing" in the databasecomponent of a GIS will consist of spatialdata: where it is, and attribute data: what it is,what it is used for and so on.There are various ways of describing data,although these may not be "types" in the strictestsense:Tabular Data — can be visualized as alphanumericlists.Vector Data — lines joining discreet points,where an object or area can be defined bya closed chain of vectors.Grid Data — where an imaginary grid issuperimposed over the real world. Each grid"cell" occupies a unique spatial location andthe absence or presence (including value) ofany number of attributes can be associatedwith each cell.Raster data is equivalent to grid data referencedby line and sample within a line (pixel— picture element). Raster is a commonly usedterm and sometimes infers a smaller samplinginterval than goes grid. Image data from remote-sensingdevices is a typical example ofraster data.A well-developed GIS will contain all of thesedata "types" with the capability to combine ormerge, analyse, display and answer queriesabout the data.Data-base StructuresThe design of data structures to allow efficientretrieval of the vast amounts of data in aGIS has become quite specialised. The mainkinds of data-base structures are:Hierarchical Structures — simple to understand,they can be visualized as a family treeor typical organisational chart.Network Structures — what is described inGIS terms as a network system might be seenas an organisational chart but with unrestrictedlines of cross-communication. Everynode can establish a direct link with everyother and they rely on linked lists and pointersto define relationships between entries inthe data-base.Relational Structures — these have no hierarchyand rely less on pointers. Relationsare established through labelled entries havingshared attributes.

GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEMSOne focus of current development in CIS isdirected at "topologically sound" systems. Topologyis in a sense "real world context"; howthings are related geometrically but without theneed for a specific reference co-ordinate system.Shape, curvature, proximity and orientation arebut a few topological concepts. The topologicalrelation between data can be explicitly storedin the data-base or implicit in the structure ofthe data or through its spatial location.For example, suppose you have a transportationfacilities data-base covering SE Australia.You query the system for all the undergroundfuel storage installations with at least 30,000litre capacity. You then ask the same questionbut specify only those within 20 km of theHume Highway between Goulburn and Wangaratta.The latter query requires that the databasecontains the topological relations; the formerdoes not.Where are We At?Many Federal and State Government Departments,with responsibility for land information,have already implemented digital informationsystems. At the national level thereis the Australian Land Information Council(ALIC); VCDF is a member and on occasionhas been represented by DSVY-A. The AustralianAdvisory Committee on Land Information(AACLI) reports to ALIC; it is anticipated thatDefence will be represented on this commiteealso.In June 1897, JIO and DSTO began workon developing the criteria for a Defence (initiallyIntelligence) CIS system.In August 1987, the Strategic & DefenceStudies Centre at ANU convened a workshopon ADF requirements for GIS.In May 1988, HQ ADF initiated a dialoguebetween potential users of a GIS in the Departmentof Defence and the ADF.So the stage is set for real progress towards( development of a Defence GIS.State of the Art?Although a number of commercial firms offer"turn-key" GIS systems, it is true that GISis still in a rather early development stage. Mostof the activity is in the academic and governmentareas and has an experimental flavour.Many of the commercial systems are based onexisting graphics or CAD/CAM systems andmay provide excellent graphic output, gooddata-base management or even efficient queryhandling but seldom will they provide all three.What is Important?There is wide recognition that establishing aGIS is a massive undertaking that will not yieldshort-term pay-offs. It is important that a startis made as soon as possible. RASVY's mappingactivity is a prime source of the underlyingspatial data. This activity in particular, as wellas other data collection activities, should be reorientedinto a "GIS compatible" mode as afirst step. To do so requires an early decisionon the type of data-base and the publication ofspecifications and guidelines to control the developmentof user systems.The most critical GIS issue for Defence is toensure interoperability between user systems.Existing GIS tend to serve a specific application.It makes sense that a Defence GIS should serveall potential users: Engineers, Signals, Intelligence,Logistics and whoever. Air, land andmaritime operations depend heavily on currentaccurate geographic data.A shared GIS containing the essential spatialdata with limited standard attributes (perhapsequivalent to standard topographic maps) wouldallow potential users to develop and overlaytheir application-specific attribute data-sets asthey are identified and refined.A Defence GIS should be capable also ofaccessing the numerous digital data-sets beingcreated and maintained by other organisations.It seems that there is a declining interest atthe Federal level in developing and maintainingthe national asset of comprehensive maps andgeographic information, perhaps due to the prevailing"cost-recovery" policy imposed on mostGovernment departments. This leaves Defenceas the next most likely "vested interest" toperhaps assume control and provide an essentialco-ordinating role in the GIS arena.Future DevelopmentMany of the shortcomings in earlier GIS havenow been solved. The next major advance willpossibly come through the application of socalledArtificial Intelligence (Expert or Knowledge-basedSystems). Prototypes already existand the fascinating thing about them is that itis not just a case of providing the logical rulesnecessary to analyse data and make decisions;systems are being developed that have the capacityto "learn from experience"!

28 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 76 May/June 89Suggested ReadingThose wishing to become more conversantwith GIS concepts and possible defence applicationscould start with:1. Burrough P.A. (1986), Principles of GeographicalInformaton Systems for Land ResourcesAssessment, monograph on Soil andResources Survey No. 12, Clarendon Press,Oxford.2. Granger K.J. (1988), The Rabaul Volcanoes:An Application of Geographical InformationSystems to Crisis Management, MAThesis, ANU, Canberra.and obtain a copy of the proceedings of theStrategic & Defence Studies Centre seminar/workshop when they are published.Each of these contains comprehensive referenceto relevant literature as well as beingdefinitive in their own right.UAcknowledgement. My thanks to Ken G. forhis patience in answering my many (sometimesdumb) questions and to Paul de C. for hisencouragement and constructive comment.Major C.J. (Jim) Mitchell Dip. Phot. (ULC), M.App.Sc. (WAIT), enlisted in the ARA in1964 and was commissioned in 1974. His interest in GIS flows from 23 years involvement indefence mapping. In Jan. 1987, he returned from a two year exchange with the Defence MappingAgency in Washington DC to his present posting in JIO.NEW RAAF SQUADRON IN DARWINThe RAAF will form a new ReserveSquadron in Darwin later this year.Announcing this the Minister for Defence,Mr Kim Beazley, said the establishment of 13Squadron will enable the RAAF to maximiseuse of skills within the local population. Thiswill assist the Australian Defence Force (ADF)in defence of our northern approaches.Mr Beazley said the new squadron will supportthe operations of deployed flying unitsthroughout the northbases at Learmonth,Darwin.including the RAAFCurtin, Tindal andThe new squadron is in keeping with therevitalised role of the ADF Reserves outlined inthe Defence White Paper.The Minister said 13 Squadron will bring thetotal number of RAAF Reserve Squadrons tonine, with one in every capital city on theAustralian mainland.

The Distress Syndrome("Stress") in the Context of Training Objectives, Medical Resources and theDefence Force Career.By Major Ian Rossiter,ARESIntroduction:MOST, if not all of us are aware of thephenomenon whereby psychological wellbeingand motivation can overcome illness orinjury to the extent that a task can be successfullycompleted and the illness or injuryresolves without medical intervention.On the other hand, the same type and degreeof illness or injury without the abovepsychological factor may result in abortion ofthe task, lowering of the discomfort or painthreshold, repeated presentation to the doctor,diagnosis and creation of a documented diseaseentity, medical intervention, assumption of thesick role and disability, and possible disruptionof a career.In many cases neither the doctor nor the patientis aware of this factor. Importantly, thepatient is suffering genuine disease and genuinedisability and requires treatment.The patient must always remain at liberty toattend whenever he or she wishes — howeverthere exists a challenge for the doctor andpsychologist to isolate and deal with this factor.To what extent can this factor be explained bythe concept of "distress"? Effective communicationabout distress is compromised byvariation in concept and definition.Aim:With a view towards engendering furtherdiscussion, particularly between medical examinerand psychologist, this article attemptsto give an overview and indicate some currentprinciples of thought with regard to definition,estimation of prevalence and costs, and preventionof the distress syndrome.Hypotheses:1. Distress is significantly prevalent in theDefence Force population.2. Distress is causally associated with diseaseand disability.3. Distress is a function of the perception of theindividual which in turn is a function ofgenetic make-up, familial and environmentallearning experiences, and inadequate pretaskbriefing.Rationale:The hypothesised causal chain presentedbelow (see diagram) indicates that the earlierpreventive intervention is applied, the less theneed to isolate "stressors". If one considersdistress to be a phenomenon closely related toan individual's perception of a demand (and noindividual is the same) then the concept of a"stressor" becomes relatively unimportant.Establishing causation by looking back froma specific disease to search for "stressors" haslittle use. Conversely, prospective studies requirea very large number of "conditioning"variables pertaining to the individual (andmany changing with time) to be eliminated orheld constant.Cross-sectional study however, by obtainingsome assessment of incidence and prevalence ofdistress within and between employing bodiesmay be useful if a satisfactory questionnaireand definition of distress could be obtained.Presentation:Definition of distress. A diagram indicatingpossible casual associations followed byamplification of its components. Levels andagencies of prevention. Suggested action includinga survey questionnaire. Bibliography.Defining Distress(Once distress has occurred, intervention isexpensive and often unsuccessful.)Old Fr. destresse (Imp. of destrecer), Lat.distringere — to draw apart (by simultaneouslyattacking the enemy lines at several points) —broken-up, shattered, molested, disorganised,inflicted with pain, anxiety, exhaustion (heredistress is a disease). Help is sought in an attemptto return to normal function. Not coping(although satisfactory social behaviour andcompletion of work tasks may continue duringdistress). This concept implies prolonged action,irreversibility of physiological status andineffective reaction (no defence).

30 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 76 May/June 89"Substantial physical and/or emotionaldiscomfort as a result of a perceived mismatchbetween demand and response capability(overload or underload) under circumstanceswhere failure to meet demand has importantperceived consequences 1 "."Inability to register consistency between thesocial rules (categorisations, values, concepts,goals and methods of achieving goals) of thedemand and the social rules 'programmed' inthe cerebral cortex of the individual 4 ".A possible definition (from the above) couldbe; "A reaction to a demand (actual orpereceived) consisting ot prolonged substantialphysical and/or emotional discomfort due tothe individual's inability to register consistencybetween his or her own social rules and thoseimplied in the demand".This sociopsychological model (while notdescribing the later psychoneuroendocrinemechanisms) provides a basis for preventivestrategies. From the above definition it wouldappear that distress is being equated with anxiety.Conversely, are all anxiety states simply amanifestation of the distress syndrome? Whatis the relationship between distress, anxiety,poor motivation and job dissatisfaction? Thesequestions beg input from psychologist andpsychiatrist.Physical stress such as the overuse syndromeis frequently complicated by distress (anddisability). Whether or not this is 'used' to obtaincompensation or change of employment,the problem remains that the demands of thework tasks are inconsistent with social rules anddistress (and disability) continues until the worktask or perception of the work task is altered orjob reallocation or discharge from the servicesis effected.The Individual (Conditioning Variables 1 )(Prospective Recruit):(a) Individual Variables: (Not amenable to interventionexcept by selection out)(i) Age(ii) Sex(iii) Genetic predisposition (heredity). Familyhistory, build, stature (biological limitations),physical and intellectual disabilities(iv) Medical history — physical and psychiatric(cognitive/affective)(v) Current Health status. Degree of physicalfitness training/endurance.(b) Situational Variables: (Rarely amenable tointervention).(i) Familial — diet, habits, (smoking, alcoholintake, medication)(ii) Rigidity of the social rules (categorisations,values, goals, [motivation] and strategies)"programmed" in the individual(Cerebrocortical level 4 ).(iii) Frequency of the individual's active andverbal social interaction which enablesprevailing social rules to be tested for consistency.When testing occurs frequenty,then reinforcing or alteration of the individual'srules (if not too rigid) may be effected.Coping and adaptation, althoughenabling the completion of a specific worktask will not prevent distress unless it occursat the cerebro-cortical level of rulechangingin the individual.(iv) Perceived incongruity of social status(worse if parents of different status). Socioeconomicclass. Salary(v) Perceived incongruity of provider role.(vi) Self-esteem. Educational achievement.Quality of Schooling. Manual skills.(vii) Social support (family, community,fellow-wbrkers). (viii) Recent major lifechanges — personal or material loss,marital or partner problems, job loss,retirement ("no exit situations") and immigration,which suddenly stop habitualverbal and active routines of social interaction(partner, community, environment). Ahistory of interaction outside the partnerand work environment areas prior to thelife changes, will lessen the tendency todevelop distress.Stress:Old Fr. estresse (Imp. of estrecer), Lat. strictus(p.p. of stringere) to push together (theenemy lines) — constrict, constrain, distort,press, prod, arousal. "Physical and emotionalstrain and challenge without substantialdiscomfort". Neuro-endocrine effects facilitatethe work task. Social rules are reinforced.There is a readiness for further demands. Thisdefinition implies short-term action. Reversibilityof physiological status and effectivereaction (defence).

THE DISTRESS SYNDROME 31DIAGRAM(Large parts of this construct and some of the terms andconcepts are taken from McGrath (1), House & Jackman(2), Singer (3) and Totman (4).lilt DIIIM h IDHCt.(EXPERIENCE \M>IKMMM, OH.II ( ll\l>PRE—H I ( IIDN111(11 MM.THE INDIVIDUAL(CONDITIONINGAR] ABLES)(PROSPECTIVERLC Rl IT).SKI ECTIONPOST—SELECTIONBRIEFINGPRE - DEMANDBRIEFINGDEMAND AND ROLE1 \l'l I II 1) A; ('( INSIST I N IWITH INDIVIDUAL'S - INCONSISTENT WITHINDIVIDUAL'S SOCIALkillsINCREASED ADRENALINDECREASED CORTISOLPREPAREDNESS I ORFURTHER DEMANDSIRRITAIIONLOSS OF CONTROL& UNCERTAINTYIV Rl \SI 1) COR1 ISO!DEC REASED IMMUNERESPONSEI OWPHYSIOLOGICALCOSTIR MNINGOBJECTIVESNOT ACHIEVEDHIGHPHYSIOLOGICALCOSTNO DISEASETRAINING OBJECTIVESACHIEVED. HIGHMORALE.DISABII II V

DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 76 May/June 89Increased Adrenalin:Sympathomimetic response. Elevatedmood, heart rate, blood pressure and decreasedCortisol. Transient and reversible. Neuroendocrineeffects cease on completion of thework task.Lnexpected Demand and Role:Overload or underload (repetition, boredom)work tasks inappropriate to role. Inadequatebriefing. Perceived mismatch of assigned roleand work task. Poor morale and negative socialinteraction at the workplace. Real or perceivedexposure to harmful physical, chemical orpsychological factors at the workplace.Increased Noradrenalin:Sympathetico-adrenal-medullary system.Irritation:Fighting, anger, increased muscle tension.Avoidance of perceived cause of perceived illeffect.Adverse effect on other workers.Loss of Control (of Territory) @ uncertainty:Low decision latitude. Perceived and real environmentalconstraints (constrained workposture, long work cycle).Inconsistency of demands, repeated interruption,personality clash with supervisor.Negative mood changes, depression, abnormalbehaviour lowered pain threshold, perceived erroror guilt, adverse effect on other workers.Decreased Immune Response:Cerebrocortical-limbic-hypothalamicpituitary-adrenocorticalsystem. Increased outputof ACTH and Cortisol and decreased T-cellreaction.High Physiological Cost':If prolonged and recurrent may not be fullyreversible. Neuroendocrine effects may persistlong after the work task is completed (orattempted).Disease:Possible aggravation and/or cause ofhypertension, hyperlipidaemia, atherosclerosis,myocardial degeneration, arrhythmia, suddencardiac death, diabetes, gout, ulcer, colitis,susceptibility to infection and cancer,psychiatric illness, chemical abuse, suicide,predisposition to accident and masspsychogenic illness in organisations'.Disability:Whether real or perceived may not be importantwith regard to outcome. Aggravation orfurther development of psychiatric illness,compensation.Member Loss:By death, disability, early retirement. Furtherrecruiting and retraining required.The following (in boxes in the diagram) areamenable to intervention.The Defence Force. Training Objectives:Must be defined by experience in peace andwar and in effecting satisfactory careerstructures.Pre-Selection Briefing:Interaction between the services and the individualthrough school visits, the media,parent meetings, work experience and jobdescriptions at the workplace (including the useof training videos which should be realisticrather than heroic) so that adequate and appropriateself-selection occurs.Selection:Self-selection (conditioning variables) andemployer selection by educational andpsychological tests, medical examination andenlistment officer interview.Levels of "Selection Out":1. "Self selection out" by the applicant followingcareer adviser information (including mediapamphlets, videos) or verbal communicationwith career adviser or recruit counsellor.2. Written advice from the enlistment officerfollowing receipt of application to enlist (actionbeing taken on the basis of answers to specificquestions on the application form).3. Written or verbal advice from the enlistmentofficer following formal testing (medical,psychological and enlistment, officerinterview).4. Medical discharge following performance atinitial recruit training, if unsuitable for unitallocation.5. Administrative discharge e.g. insubordination,chemical abuse.6. Recommended as unsuitable for further serviceby psychologist or psychiatrist.7. Medical discharge after basic and corpstraining.

TH1 DISTRESS SYNDROME-: 338. Failure to re-engage (and with A RES — lossof contact, failure to parade).The cost to the Defence Force with regard toresources and training objectives and to the individualand his career escalates from 2 through8.Having corrected for target population, abetter measure of the efficiency of a recruitingunit (from advertising through to enlistment)should not only include the number of recruitspresented for I.R.T. but also the proportion ofthis cohort who have left the service (for anyreason for all) at year n (n 1 to 20), (10), (11).Post-Selection Brie!in};:Thorough description of the job (career) andtraining requirements (general enlistment andspecial corps), again with extensive use of thevideo and socialising with serving members.Pre-I)emand Briefing:Adequate briefing before each and every newwork task. Some exaggeration of expectationsrather than understatement may be beneficial.Social Interaction:"Joining in" with fellow members. Purposefulaction and purposeful conversationwith common goals. The more frequently thisoccurs the greater the opportunity for socialrules to be tested for consistency and eithermodified or reinforced. (Adverse interactionmay, if permitted, lead to insubordination andpoor morale and verbal expressions that thework is repetitive, boring or hazardous.)Levels and Agencies of PreventionFrom the above, certain levels of interventionbecome apparent. These are: selection, briefingand social interaction.The agents involved are the Defence Force(general staff, heads of corps, unit comanders),the career adviser, the enlistment officer, therecruit medical examiner, the psychologist, thesection leader and fellow members.1. The Defence Forces — must be well informed(by experience and or consultant advice concerningrealistic expectations with regard tobiolgoical limitations (physical andpsychological) of the recruit in effecting trainingobjectives, career satisfaction, self-esteemand a readiness to train new members.2. The career Adviser — has the responsibilityof advertising and describing job demands andexpectations (short and long term). The importanceof the career adviser cannot be overemphasised.It is by his performance that appropriateself-selection will occur. If the prospectiverecruit selects himself out beforetesting occurs, then the very large costs of furtherselection processes and training (and occasionallegal action and compensation) may beaverted.3. The Enlistment Officer — must have skill inassessing individual motivation and expectationsassisted by previous work history andattitudes.4. The Recruit Medical Examiner — (preferablywith a knowledge of training objectives) has thetask of recording the "individual" conditioningvariables in particular the major ones such asage, sex, heredity, medical history and ifpreviously employed, pattern and particulars(all causes) of absence from work. The medicalexaminer should interact with the psychologistwho should be at the same testing venue.5. The Psychologist — has the important roleof assessing the "situational" conditioningvariables — in particular rigidity of social roles,social interaction (ability to socialise purposefully),self esteem, and social support (presentand future) (home and community).6. The Section Leader — should encourage byexample, be consistent and be regularly in contact(actively and verbally) with all membersunder his command.7. Social interaction at the wokplace by FellowMembers — must be regular and frequent yetavoiding geographical or psychological overcrowding.Active and verbal participation inimproved work methods and job rotation toengender team spirit and relieve repetitivenessand a member perception of high standard andaccomplishment should be actively encouragedby the section leader and unit commander toensure there is high morale and a common goal.Suggested Action1. Expressions of interest and further contributionsto this article.2. Convocation of medical examiner,psychologist, career adviser, recruitcounsellor and enlistment officer, with thefollowing agenda:(a) What agreement exists concerning concepts,causes and outcomes of distress?

?4 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 76 May June 89HEALTH Ql'ESTIONN \IREI'l sMEDICAL RESTRICTIONS?1. How many days have you had on duty but with medical restrictions of any type over the last:Six monthsTwelve months2, How many days (including days in hospital) have you had off duty due to illness, injury, or personal problems over the lastSix months1Twelve months3. How many sick parade attendances (including all visits to physiotherapy, pathology, X-Ray or specialist) have you had over the lastSix monthsTwelve months4. Are you at present receiving any medical treatment or suffering from any physical or emotional discomfort, or from injury or illness of anytype?No5, Do you consider that priorities and methods of achieving work or training objectives are incorrect or inappropriate?YesNo6. Do you consider that the work methods and standards required of your present job are wrong or different from your own ideas?YesNo7. Do you consider that you are mentally unprepared or insufficiently briefed with regard to your work or training requirements?NoNOTES:Q, 5, 6 and 7 are merely estimating point prevalence ofindividual perceptions.A 'yes' answer to Q.4 together with a 'yes' to Q.5 and/orQ.6 and/or Q.7 may be held to constitute distress.Answers to Q.l, 2, 3, 4 would be of use in their ownright.Non-response should not be permitted to avoid bias.The survey also examines for association between lack ofphysical and mental well-being (A), perception of inconsistencyof social rules (B), and perception of inadequatebriefing (C).This ignores other factors such as perception of pay andservice conditions (D), assuming the latter to be presentin the same proportions in those who have A, B and C asin those who have not A, B & C, an assumption whichmay not be valid. A further survey question on D may beappropriate.6. Distress (i.e. A together with B and/or C) may then becompared with use of medical resources (answer toQuestions 1, 2, 3) over the last six months and twelvemonths.

THE DISTRESS SYNDROME 35(b) Formulation of specific guidelines forpreselection (pre-testing) briefing of intendingrecruits. What exactly does the careeradviser or recruit counsellor tell the applicantwhen the latter makes first contact, with the recruiting centre? Informationregarding "history of" rejection criteria(e.g. asthma, sleepwalking) incurs thepossibility of false declaration at thei medical or psychological examination.However, measurable (unchangeable)parameters (e.g. weight, visual standards,colour vision) are often made known to theapplicant prior to testing — although noaction of rejection is made at this stage(i.e. the applicant is always permitted toproceed to formal application for enlistmentif he wishes). It is obvious that experienceand skill is required of the recruitcounsellor and enlistment officer 10 , ".(c) Estimation of the "unknown statistics"— for a given medical or psychologicalcondition which does not reach rejectionlevel — what is the proportion of memberswho have disability (related to that condiiton)during service? This would have littleuse if the distress factor was not takeninto account. How many would incurdisability if distress or job dissatisfactionwere not present? (Disability being equatedwith significant absence from duty for anyreason.)(d) With regard to the concept of distresspresented above, how prevalent is distressin the Defence Force population? A surveyquestionnaire is presented for discussion,modification and consideration offeasibility.(e) Analysis of the survey looking for differenceswhich might correlate with certainwork practices within and betweenestablishments with a view toward formulatingstrategies to prevent or minimisedistress and its consequences in particularpremature separation from the A.D.F.With regard to currently serving memberswho are suffering from distress:1. How should they be isolated? Perhapsguidelines could be formulated to assistthe medical officer or psychologist.2. How should they be managed? Couldpsychologist counselling be effectedwithout loss of confidentialitv and selfesteem?It is likely that the response tocounselling may be poor and from thepoint of view of cost effectiveness,prevention of the distress syndromemust be better than cure.OBIBLIOGRAPHY1. McGrath, J. H. Social and Psychological Factors inStress. New York, Holt Rinehart & Winston, 1970.2. House, J. S. and Jackman, M. F. Occupational Stressand Health in Toward a New Definition of Health.Plenum Press, New York, 1979.3. Singer, G. Work Environment Stress, NeuroendocrineChanges and Health. Abstract, LaTrobe University,1982.4. Totman. R. Social Causes of Illness — 1979, SouvenirPress, Lord & Carada.5. Calligan M. and Murphy L, Mass Psychogenic Illness inOrganisations: An Overview. J. Occup. Psychology.1979, 52-77.6. Sharit & Salvendv. Occup. Stress: Review and Reappraisal.Human Factors, 1982, 24 (2), 129-162.7. Kapasek, Baker et. al. Job Decision Latitude, JobDemands and Cardiovascular Disease. Am. .1. ofPublic Health, 1981, 71, 694-705.8. McQueen & Siegrist. Social Factors in the Etiology ofChronic Disease. Soc. Sci. Med. Vol. 16, pp. 353-367,1982.9. Kasl. Epid. Contributions to the Study of Work Stress.In Stress at Work, Cooper C. L. and Pavne, R. JohnWiley & Sons, New York, 1978.10. Communication with Maj. Val Somerville, 3 ARRU(Cadre Staff).11. Communication with Sgt. Murray Vendy and Capt.Cave, 3 ARU, DFRC (Melbourne).

The Ground War in South VietnamA Strategy of Tactics: US Operational Concepts Under WestmorelandBy Lt Col D. W. Beveridge,RAE"You know you never defeated us on the battlefield, "said [he American colonel.The North Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark amoment. "That may be so," he replied, "but it is alsoirrelevant. "Conversation in Hanoi, April 1975'THE Second Indochina War — the VietnamWar — was a frustrating experiencefor the United States. It was especiallyfrustrating for the US military, and particularlyso for the Army. The forces of the greatestWestern nation in history took on those of aragged, third world Communist nation andlost. There had been honour in battle and solidtechnical achievement; there had been heroesand cowards, military successes and failures;but overshadowing it all is the terrible fact thatthe whole effort was for naught':Yet there is adequate evidence to indicatethat the performance of US forces in the fieldwas sound. The tactical capability of Americanunits was good on entry to the war in 1964 andimproved throughout their involvement. Whythen did they not succeed? It has been claimedthat the failure to bring about an 'appropriate'solution at an 'acceptable' price resulted morefrom bad policy and in particular bad strategythan from technical or tactical failures'. Thisarticle will critically examine US ground warstrategy and operational concepts from 1965through to Tet 1968 — the period which saw thegreatest direct involvement of US ground forces— with a view to assessing this claim.The US Commander"It was apparent," a senior US military adviserwas to write, that in 1964, "the SouthVietnam Government could not prevent theenemy from taking over the country"*. Withthe fall of Diem, Saigon's new military regimehad given way to internal bickering. The Armyof the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) more apalace guard than an effective fighting force,had gone into a steep decline. The US advisorymission had to concede in mid-1964 that the initiativehad passed to the Communists, and itwas with a sense of growing urgency that theUS commenced plans to introduce its ownground troops. The man chosen for this taskwas Lieutenant General, William C.Westmoreland. A pillar of the US Armyestablishment and descended from men whohad fought in the US Civil War, Westmorelandwas a West Pointer who had served in NorthAfrica and Europe in World War II and commandeda regiment in Korea. Every inch anAmerican general, he was also a creature of thenew US Army, a vast bureaucratic establishmentin which management skills and respectfor routine counted more than any innate graspof strategy or tactical brilliance'. During hisperiod as Commander of the US MilitaryAssistance Command — Vietnam (MACV),Westmoreland was to shape (with assistanceand interference from external sources) the majorground war strategy from mid-1965 until hisdeparture after Tet 1968.In his memoirs Westmoreland insists that heinitially intended to employ US ground troopsonly to provide security for the Danang airbase— a key installation in pressing the air waragainst North Vietnam 6 . This initial deploymentwas opposed by Ambassador Taylor onthe grounds that once the US assumed anyground combat role the South Vietnamesewould attempt to unload more tasks on them.Indeed Westmoreland in a remarkably 'prescient'statement shared Taylor's reservations:"The presence of American ground troopseven on a static security mission could lead, Irecognised, to the pressure for a shift to amore active role and to more and moreAmericans. That would pose the very realdanger of the South Vietnamese relying moreand more on the United States, even thoughthey potentially had the manpower to do thejob themselves, so that eventually US forcesmight have to bear the entire burden of thewar amid a population grown as hostile tothe American presence as it had been for theFrench" 1 .He also asserts that he saw his call formarines at Danang not as a first step in a grow-

:HE GROUND WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAMing US commitment but merely a means tosecure a vital airbase. This may have been so atthe time but it was quickly overtaken by anumber of vested interests, not least of whichwas the American drive for a quick solution tothe problem — supported if not exacerbated byPresident Johnson's desire for a greater US involvementin the war.From the initial stages Westmoreland appearsto have mounted a runaway over whichhe exercised less and less control. Denied theopportunity to carry the war directly to theperceived source of the problem — theDemocratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN), heopted for a particularly military solution inseeking to carry it to the next level down. AsDoctor Andrew F. Krepinevich points out",Westmoreland wanted the opportunity to seekout and destroy the enemy main-force units, theNational Liberation Front (NLF) and PeoplesArmy of Vietnam (PAVN) battalions andregiments. He felt, quite correctly, that the Armyunits with their mobility and firepowerwould be ideal for breaking up the insurgent'semerging large scale operations in 1965. A keyerror however, lay in not anticipating what laybeyond the initial big battles.The Opposition — Some US Perceptions 9Before examining the American strategy andoperational concepts it will be useful to reviewsome US perceptions of the enemy. To beginwith the US assumed that communism was amonolithic entity controlled from Moscow.They did not appreciate the true nature of theSino-Soviet split and its strategic implications.Nor was any consideration given to thecenturies of conflict between Russia and China,and more particularly between China andVietnam. These misperceptions made theAmericans chary of any offensive groundstrategy aimed at the DRVN either directly orthrough Laos; and resulted in a decision tofight a localised war in South Vietnam aimed atdenying the DRVN success in the South bymaking the cost too high. This put them at astrategic disadvantage from the outset.It is perhaps a fine point with the advantageof hindsight, nonetheless contrary indicatorsexisted at the time. As Sir Robert Thompsonhas pointed out, the Lin Piao document of 1965which preached self-reliance, indicated that theChinese had no intention of interfering in thewar to help the DRVN win the south'".Although matters might have been different ifthere had been a direct ground threat againstthe territorial integrity of North Vietnam, itwould appear that a Chinese supported DRVNinvasion of South Vietnam was unlikely.Nevertheless as a result of a fear of Chinese orRussian involvement the US defined itsobjectives not in terms of defeating the DRVN,but in the more restrained terms of preventingthe fall of South Vietnam to hostile forces. Thisessentially negative policy objectiverelinquished the strategic initiative to theDRVN, and led to an unimaginative strategy ofattrition and cautious escalation, andultimately to defeat.The US also badly misjudged the situationwithin South Vietnam. Realising neither theextent of subversion from local to nationallevels, nor the extent of the NLF hold in certainareas, they further failed to comprehend thestaying power of the NLF/PAVN forces. Theenemy ability to recuperate, absorbing heavycasualties in numbers unthinkable to thewestern trained military, then replacing,retraining and reindoctrinating manpower inorder to bounce back, was totally outsideAmerican experience. As was the will, tenacityand determination of the Hanoi regime —"North Vietnamese leaders were playing forkeeps, believing that the use of any means wasjustified by their ends. They thought in terms ofgenerations; the longer the war continued, themore persistent they became. Their will topersist was inextinguishable" 1 '. Conversely theAmericans had an implicit belief in thesuperiority of US technology, Yankeeingenuity, industrial and military might,modern military organisation, and tactics andtechniques; these plus a tradition of success inpeace and war were considered enough toovercome.Many American leaders, Westmoreland'sdeputy General Bruce Palmer included, werewell aware of the disadvantages of limiting theground conflict to the boundaries of SouthVietnam, but were driven by an American 'cando' syndrome that refused to accept defeat; andmore importantly, having commenced aparticular action which proved unsuccessful,provided a psychological barrier againstseriously amending their modus operandi.Also, although te Americans have a strongrevolutionary tradition from their own struggle

38 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 76 May/June 89against the British, the Indian Wars and thePhilippine Insurrection and could have beenexpected to have learnt from the extensiveFrench Indochina experience; they could not orwould not comprehend the mixture ofconventional warfare fought somewhatunconventionally and guerrilla warfare foughtin the classical manner, employed by theenemy. Yet, in Palmer's words "Hanoi neverlost sight of its political objective, and everyaction it took, military or non-military, wasdesigned to further those objectives. Morever,from Hanoi's point of view it was all-out totalwar, while from the outlook of the UnitedStates it was quite limited'" 2 .Palmer's perception of the DRVN militarystrategy is also interesting. As he points out,although at times their execution of the strategywas faulty, their concept was brilliant.Basically, in his view the strategy tookadvantage of the long, narrow geographicconfiguration of South Vietnam that made thecountry very vulnerable to penetration from itsland border flank, and that in the northern andcentral regions provided very little depthbetween the generally wild and sparselyinhabited border areas and the heavilypopulated coastal region. Their strategicconcept was three pronged, directed towardsSaigon, the northernmost provinces, and theCentral Highlands", took advantage of thegeo-political weaknesses of South Vietnam, andexploited the high foot and sampan mobility ofthe NLF and PAVN infantry.Although written in retrospect this viewpointreflects the basis on which the US strategy wasdrawn up. Perhaps a reasonable perspective fora soldier, nevertheless it demonstrates a USpreoccupation with enemy military objectivesin primarily territorial terms, which is not acomplete or even a necessarily true picture oftheir strategic concept. An alternative and moresuitable approach would have been toconcentrate on the 'popular base'. AsKrepinevich points out' 4 , the way to destroy aninsurgent is not to seek destruction of his forcesin battle — a strategy of limited value where herefuses to fight for territory — but to attackhim at the source of his strength: thepopulation. It would appear then that the basicpremise on which the US based their strategywas flawed at the onset.A Strategy of TacticsThe overall US strategy comprises two parts,related more in psychological and political thanin military terms. The first being the airoffensive against North Vietnam, coupled withdiplomatic peace overtures aimed at persuading >the DRVN to stop its bid to take over SouthVietnam. The second was the ground war in thesouth' 5 . In drawing up a ground war strategyWestmoreland considered that the enemy was >moving into the third phase of revolutionarywar; committing NLF and PAVN regimentsand divisions to seize and retain territory,destroy RVN troops and eliminate governmentcontrol. While concurrently guerrillas, localforces and political cadres continued a Phase 2small unit war, aimed at terrorizing andcontrolling the population and knocking outsmall government outposts. These two closelyinterrelated facets being aimed at gainingcontrol of the countryside and strangling thecities' 6 .To oppose this Westmoreland envisaged athree phase strategy based largely on the use ofUS troops. American combat troops were to beused first to establish and protect supportinglogistic bases, although some might have to beemployed from time to time in a 'fire brigade'role against any enemy big units that posed athreat. In the second phase they were to be usedto gain the initiative by penetrating andwherever possible destroying the enemy's basecamps and sanctuaries. In his view as long asthe Communists could emerge from thesehideouts to terrorise, recruit, glean food, levytaxes and attack government troops, there waslittle hope of defeating the insurgency.Invading the sanctuaries would also bring anelusive enemy to battle, enabling thedestruction of his main force by superior USfirepower. Then in the third and final phase,US troops would move into sustained groundcombat and mop up the last of the main forcesand guerrillas, or at least push them across thefrontiers where they could be contained. Twoadditional tasks were to be pursued throughoutall three phases: pacification, and strengtheningthe ARVN. By the time that the final phase wasreached Westmoreland confidently anticipatedthat the bulk of the people would be undergovernment control and protection, and theARVN so trained and equipped and in suchnumbers that the South Vietnamese alone

THE GROUND WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM 39would be able to deal with any residualopposition 1 '.While American units pursued the 'big unit'war the ARVN was to be employed primarily indefence of the populated areas. Westmorelandbased this on a perception that the ARVN hadgreater compatibility with the people than didthe Americans. Also since the enemy's largeunits were more likely to be met in his baseareas or other remote regions, the greaterAmerican firepower and mobility could bebetter brought to bear. Further, using thisfirepower in remote areas would mean fewercivilian casualties and less damage to build-upareas. Finally, reducing the number ofAmericans in close contact with the Vietnamesealso meant that much less provocation of theVietnamese xenophobia, lessening theopportunity for incidents between Americantroops and the South Vietnamese'".This concept of operations placed the majorconduct of the ground war in the hands of USunits and ensured that it would be orchestratedin US terms. In addition the ARVN was in theprocess of being retrained and reorganised onthe US model. Krepinevich postulates that allthe way through the American involvement inthe Vietnam War, US commanders wereresponsive to an Army Concept based on theirconcept of the conduct of future war", ratherthan to any plan drawn up with Vietnamspecifically in mind — this appears to have beena major institutional factor in their concept ofoperations.The US Army Concept is, basically, aperception of how war ought to be waged and isreflected in the way that the Army organisesand trains for battle. Its characteristics duringthe Vietnam period included a focus on midintensityor conventional war, with a relianceon high volumes of firepower to minimisecasualties — in effect a substitution of materielfor human blood at every opportunity. On theface of it an admirable concept — but as anylong service sergeant knows, too great anemphasis on saving casualties can in the longterm result in a greater butchers bill than firstenvisaged. In Vietnam this theme wascombined with high level recognition of thepolitical necessity for US commanders to makeevery effort to minimise casualties, especially ina limited war. The concept was furtherreinforced by the great resource advantage heldby the US. Firepower and technology were seenas substitutes for precious manpower — in theUS Army's view it was better to send a bulletthan a man 2 ". This use of massive firepowerbecame embedded in the Army's institutionalpsyche. However, counter-insurgencyoperations place considerable emphasis on theprotection of an indigenous population, callingfor the employment of light infantry in closeconjunction with police, rather than massivefirepower liberally applied.The Army Concept represented a grossmismatch with the needs of an effectivecounter-insurgency strategy. To control acountry the insurgent must control the people,but any strategies aimed at directly counteringthis were eschewed by the US in favour ofseeking combat with enemy main forceelements, while relegating the equally criticalpopulation control to a secondary force — theARVN. In an interview in 1971 21 Westmorelandrecalled that he came up with the strategy ofattrition as a means of levelling off the USbuildup, in order to achieve a well-balancedhard-hitting force designed to fight a sustainedcombat and grind away at the enemy on asustained basis — something he saw the enemyas incapable of resisting as he lacked thelogistics.During this interview he explicity rejected thealternative of paying less attention to theenemy's big units and breaking down US unitsinto smaller groups in order to concentrate onpacification. His position was based on theNLF defeat of a number of ARVN unitsconducting pacification operations in BinhDinh province during 1964, citing 'defeat indetail' as an example of what could havehappened if he had broken down US forces toengage in pacification. This was an unrealisticassessment even then, the firepower marshalledin support of US forces permitted evencompany sized bases to fight off regimentallevel attacks, and the ability to provide quickreactionforces in the form of air-mobile unitsappears to have been selectively ignored.Furthermore, a major flaw in the strategicconcept was a failure to address the question —what if the enemy's big units refused battle?What if they (as they did) continued to wage aninsurgency in the traditional sense, with thepeople, instead of the opponent's armed forcesas the primary objective?The upshot of viewing the war in terms of theArmy Cncept was a preoccupation with 'grand

40 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 76 May/June 89tactics' rather than strategy, resulting in aperpetuation of the search and destroyoperations imposed on the ARVN during theearlier advisory period. Some like Sir RobertThompson argued for concentration on thelocal guerrilla forces which provided sustenanceto the main-force units, but MACV claimedthat it was the other way around — the big unitswere supporting the guerrillas 22 . Accordingly intheir view it was essential for the main-forceelements to be located and destroyed.Unfortunately, effective consideration of anyalternatives was prevented when the concept ofattrition was reinforced by a major US victoryin the La Drang Valley in late 1965.Reinforcement for the US Concept: The LaDrang ValleyThe US 1st Cavalry Division had beendeployed to the Central Highlands whereinsurgent strength was most formidable, during1965. In mid-November elements of the 1stCavalry encountered regimental sized PAVNelements in the La Drang Valley. The ensuringbattle was bloody and ferocious with 1200Communists killed against US losses of over200. To Westmoreland and his staff thisvindicated the strategy of attrition. Here werethe large enemy formations willing to slug it outwith the US forces, and their big units werebeing smashed by American firepower andhigh-tech mobility. Standard operations asenvisaged by the Army concept were working,therefore, there was no need for alternativestrategies to be explored. No further feedbackwas required by MACV except for body countsused to quantify the progress of the attritionstrategy 23 .Helicopter TacticsA major factor in the La Drang victory wasthe air support provided by fighter-bombersand helicopters. The Army saw these twoweapons as providing an advantage in mobilityand firepower — the fundamentals of combat— greatly exceeding that previously available tocounter-insurgency forces, and enablingoffensive operations in cases where the relativeforce ratios would indicate otherwise. Despitethis Army confidence in the attrition strategy, amajor criticism was levelled by Thompson whonoted that regardless of the mobility offered bythe helicopter, it generated a 'response'mentality. However, the enemy who wasmobile on his feet, could actually decidewhether he was going to accept battle in thefirst place, and could break it off whenever hewanted to. In Thompson's view victory couldonly be achieved through a long processinvolving the denial of enemy access to thepeople through intensive ambushing andpatrolling in and around the populated areas,and by the use of long-range patrols to harassguerrillas in the more remote areas. As a resultthe NLF, denied access to their primary sourceof supply, the population, would have to comeout in the open and contest governmentcontrol. At which point the main-force unitscould have been defeated by US firepower andtechnology 24 .Such an approach, however, was notconsidered a viable by MACV. An example ofthe attitude of the time is provided in aninterview between a senior Pentagon officerand a correspondent while in Vietnam:"Sitting and talking to him, he (thecorrespondent) made the charge. He said."You are doing more in your helicopters toprevent our side from winning this war thananyone else". I said "How's that". He said."Well let me illustrate it this way. Everybodyagrees that this is a war for the hearts andminds of the people. How do you expect ourforces to win the hearts and minds of thepeople when all they do is take off from oneArmy base and fly overhead at 1500 feetwhile Charlie is sitting down there and he'sgot 'em by the testicles jerking, and everytime he jerks their hearts and minds follow.Now until the Americans are willing to getdown there with Charlie, he's got their heartsand minds" 25 .Reflecting on the correspondent's view, theGeneral agreed that to be truly effective it wasnecessary to fight the war the way that the NLFwere fighting it — to get down there in themuck and fight at night and on a day-to-daybasis. But, he concluded such was not theAmerican way, and the American soldier wasnot going to fight like that 26 . However, thisstatement was not entirely true. While itreflected the view of the US Army, it was notrepresentative of the US Marine Corps who hadopted for a more traditional counter-insurgencystrategy.

THE GROUND WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM 41The Combined Action Platoon (CAP)ConceptThe US Marine Corps has a long history ofparticipation in small wars. This gave them abackground in the type of conflict encounteredin South Vietnam. As early as 1940 the Marinemanual on small wars stated:"In regular warfare . . . strive to attain . . .the maximum physical effect with the forceat their disposal. In small wars, the goal is togain decisive results with the least applicationof force and the consequent minimum loss oflife. The end aim is the social, economic, andpolitical development of the peoplesubsequent to the military defeat of theinsurgent. In small wars, tolerance,sympathy, and kindness should be thekeynote of our relationship with the mass ofthe population" 2 '.Although belied by an initial over-the-beach'show landing', the Marines adopted thisprecept. General Lewis Walt, the MarineCommander, ordered all Marine units toconduct vigorous patrols and ambushesovernight, and issued stringent orders regardingthe application of firepower, keeping it to anabsolute minimum. Walt realized that if theMarines were going to succeed they would haveto get close to the people and provide them withsecurity from communist intimidation. Ratherthan employing helicopters to the same extentas the Army (although to be fair the Marineallocation was nowhere as near as lavish), theMarines used the same roads as the civilpopulation. Walt observed that the Marinescould have used sea or air-lift for movementbetween major points on the north-south road(regularly mined by the NLF) in their area. But,that as for many other things in Vietnam thepurely military consideration was nevercompletely adequate, and it was important thatthe road be kept open for the people as well asfor the Marines 28 .The CAP concept was developed by a Marinecompany commander who, frustrated by hisinability to separate the guerrillas from thepopulation, deloyed his marines inside localhamlets. Increasing the number of night patrolsand ambushes the Marines also took the villagepara-military Popular Forces platoon undertheir wing, gradually making the PF accept agreater role in village security. By 1966 therewere some fifty-seven such units in the 1 Corpsarea. Each comprising fifteen marines and 34PFs living in one particular village or hamlet.Their mission called for a high priority to thetraditional elements of counter-insurgencystrategy: destruction of the insurgentinfrastructure, protection of the populace andgovernment infrastructure, organisation oflocal intelligence nets, and training of localforces. If CAPs suffered from any deficiency, itwas a failure of the Marine Command toorganise them into an interlocking network ofunits and thus expand the controlled area onthe 'oil spot' principle 29 .The Marines also initiated a programmecalled Golden Fleece, which involved saturatingcoastal farming areas with Marine guards andpatrols during the harvest season so that thefarmers could harvest, store and eventually selltheir crop free from NLF taxation. Eventhough only a small percentage of the marineforce was employed in these programs (aboutten companies in 1967), the results wereimpressive, and were achieved at a casualty ratelower than that found in units conductingsearch and destroy missions' 0 .Krepinevich points out that the Armyreaction to a moderately successful programmewith obvious potential was "ill-disguiseddisappointment, if not outright disapproval,from the top down"31 . Westmoreland wasparticularly upset over the Marine use of CAPs,challenging as they did his concept ofoperations. Westmoreland states in hismemoirs that "they were assiduously (sic)combing the countryside within thebeachheads, trying to establish firm control inhamlets and villages, and planning to expandthe beachhead gradually up and down the coast.... Yet the practice left the enemy free tocome and go as he pleased throughout the bulkof the region and, when and where he chose, toattack the periphery of the beachheads"i2 .However, the Marines were operatingsuccessfully within populated areas, reducingthe NLF ability to recruit or exploit thepopulation — and also successfully pursuingthe war.The Army did employ a version of the CAPinvolving mobile training teams (MTTs).However, this approach involved a four-manArmy team with an ARVN officer workingwith para-military forces for about a monthand then moving on. The program reflected theArmy quick-fix approach to counterinsurgencyand its desire for rapid results. The

42 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 76 May/June 89Army could not or would not accept tat if thepeople were to believe that they were going tobe protected, then an effective long-termgovernment security force that was alwaysgoing to be there was needed, together with alot of time and resources. 'Counter-insurgencyon the cheap' would not work 33 .Search-andDestroy OperationsBy mid-1966 Westmoreland had completedhis support base and begun a campaign ofmassive attrition. The number of US troops inVietnam stood at 350,000 (of whom only some80,000 were actually combat soldiers) whichcombined with 315,000 ARVN and nearly thesame number of regional and popular forcesbrought the total on the RVN side to over 1million men 34 . Operations were carried outduring 1966 against War Zone C an NLFstaging area near the Cambodian border, andWar Zone D, a base area near Saigon that theUS believed sheltered the COSVNheadquarters, Operations Attleboro, CedarFalls and Junction City involving suddenhelicopter deployments, large infantry sweepsand lavish use of firepower, ended with announcementsof high body counts and largequantities of captured weapons, supplies anddocuments; but failed to uncover eitherCOSVN or the NLF 9th Division also suspectedto be in the area. Or indeed to deny the enemythe use of these areas on a permanent basis. YetMACV continued to claim that search-anddestroyoperations were forcing the enemyaway from the populated areas, so thatpacification could be carried out.By mid-1967 the situation was one ofstalemate. With 425,000 US troops and anenormous logistic base Westmoreland seemedon the face of it to have a firm grip on thesituation. The ARVN employed mainly onstatic defence and pacification tasks appearedto be a rehabilitated force. However,revolutionary forces still retained the capabilityfor offensive action, indeed there wereindications that not only had the Army failed toseize the initiative but MACV was playing intothe Communist hands. The Communistobjective as General Vo Nguyen Giap stated atthe time, was to draw the American forces awayfrom pacification and engage them ininconclusive battles along the frontiers,inflicting US casualties in the process andsapping the US will to continue the war. Evenworse the big battles sought by the Army werenot occurring. The enemy was moving awayfrom direct assaults on US positions in favourof hit-and-run mortar attacks which were moreeffective in inflicting casualties. AlthoughMACV refused to admit it the Army was in asmall unit war: by 1967 over 96% of allengagements with the enemy occurred atcompany level or below'-. Then thestalemate was rudely broken by the 1968Communist Tet Offensive.Tet1968The 1968 Tet Offensive which saw the closeof Westmoreland's period of command wasseen as a victory by both sides. For the US Armyit represented a victory for US and alliedarms, and a disastrous defeat for the Communists.For Westmoreland it was a battle NLFand PAVN forces could not win, an offensivedoomed to failure. The enemy suffered enormouscasualties — some 40,000 by MACVestimate — the NLF infrastructure so importantto maintaining insurgent access to the peoplewas severely mauled. Westmoreland claimedthat the enemy had been driven back and theroad was open for MACV to assume the initiative,particularly if more troops were forthcoming'6 . The destruction of largenumbers of the enemy was seen as furtherjustification for the strategy of attrition.Unfortunately, the US Army was again guiltyof projecting its own imperatives onto theenemy. The enemy forces had failed to take andhold terrain, and had not won anythingrecognisable as a military victory; therefore,they had been beaten . However this appreciation,although well suited to a more conventionalbattlefield, did not reflect the strategicimperatives of insurgency style conflict. Eventhough from a traditional military viewpointthe Communists lost the Tet Offensive, theyachieved victory in the most important strategicdimensions of insurgent warfare. Their objectivesincluded first as a best case outcome, amajor uprising against the RVN and collapse oftheir military forces. Then as secondary objectives:the derailment of the pacification program;an increase in US casualties; an attritivestrategy aimed at reducing the American will topursue the war; a demonstration to the urbanpopulation that they were not as hithertoassumed safe from retribution; and an increasein refugee numbers and by extension the

THE GROUND WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM 43economic burden on the RVN. In all except thebest case outcome the Communists were successful'".Tet was a successful attack on the US Army'scorporate conduct of the war. When faced withthe Communist and US casualty lists, followedby a request from Westmoreland for still moreUS troops on top of a claim that a major victoryhad been achieved, the civilian Defenceestablishment lost faith in the Army's strategy.The ultimate result of Tet 1968 regardless ofwho was the tactical victor, was the removal ofWestmoreland (albeit on promotion), thedevelopment of a program to shift responsibilityfor the conduct of the war to the South Vietnamese,and the withdrawal of US troops.Alternative StrategiesThe invasion strategy in its simplest terms involveda direct US amphibious/airborne landingagainst Hanoi. It retained a strongmeasure of support in US Army circles bothduring and after the war — the underlying motionbeing that the US had lost in Vietnam notbecause it had failed to adapt the Army Conceptto counter-insurgency warfare, but ratherbecause the Concept had never been properlyapplied. Although he concludes on the side ofthe incursion strategy, this concept underliesColonel Harry Summers's thesis which isbasically that the Army exhausted itself againsta secondary enemy, the guerrillas, instead offocussing on North Vietnam 40 .The invasion approach presented several problems,not least that of the potential for warwith Communist China — a possibility that theUS Administration had shown itself unwillingto face during Korea. Furthermore, in the springof 1965 the ARVN were being defeated bythe NLF not the PAVN. While several PAVNregiments had located in the northern provincesof South Vietnam, they had not then joined thefight. Thus, a US invasion of North Vietnamwould not have materially affected the situationin the South. Furthermore, it would bespeculative to suggest that the US even withtheir technological advantage would have beenany more successful in the North than theFrench. An invasion strategy instead of solvingthe problem, could well have left the US involvedin both Vietnams, with the spectre ofreprisals from Communist China, together withthe world opprobrium due an aggressor nation.A final and significant factor would have beena US casualty rate which would almost certainlyhave exceeded that suffered under the attritionstrategy".The Incursion Strategy was essentially arevision of Op/an El Paso produced by MACVstaff in 1966. It called for a joint US-ARVN-ROK push across the Loation panhandle fromthe DMZ to Savannakhet on the Lao-Thaiborder. Once in place the forces involved wereto have blocked North Vietnamese access to theSouth, isolated the battlefield (and the NLF),and allowed the ARVN to destroy the insurgentsin the South. This is Summers's mainthesis; and is also proposed by Palmer, whofurther suggested that US naval power couldhave added an additional dimension by maintaininga constantly visible and credible amphibiouspresence off the coast of North Vietnam,threatening possible invasion of importantareas. Additionally air and sea powercould have been used in a blockade of northernports' 2 .Although perhaps a less problematic approachthan outright invasion, the incursionoption still had a significant shortcomings. Themost significant of which is probably that untilTet 1968 the NLF were by far the principalforce in the field against the RVN. Also a barrierforce operating from fixed positions wouldhave been little different from the forces manningthe McNamara Line 43 along the DMZ,which was constantly subjected to harassingfire particularly from artillery and mortars, andrequired a considerable number of supporttroops to maintain their positions 40 . Finally,a flanking movement through Thailand,although more difficult would still have beenfeasible.The remaining two strategies involved a shiftaway from the kind of warfare advocated bythe Army Concept towards counter-insurgencyoperations. As such they were not favoured byMACV. The enclave approach was proposed byAmbassador Taylor in early 1965 and supportedwith variations, by the US State Department.It called for the military to recognise thatthe war had to be won by the South Vietnameseand that the most effective role for Americantroops would be to aid the ARVN by controllingthe densely populated coastal areas, whilethe ARVN fought the guerrilla forces inland 4 '.In some ways this had the potential to be thestrategy of attrition with the US/ARVN rolesreversed. But, it was doubtful if the ARVN

44 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 76 May/June 89would have been able to carry out their assignedrole — assuming of course that they would haveconducted it in the US manner. It is possiblethat they would have shaken off the US training,reverted to the French groupement mobiletactics and fought their own version of the war.It may also be significant that most of the USmilitary's objections to this strategy (contributionto cultural contamination of the locals,development of a garrison mentality by the UStroops) were aimed more at benefiting the USthan the Vietnamese. Clearly though theenclave strategy would have required a muchstronger ARVN and a longer US involvementthan was envisaged by Westmoreland, and thismade it unacceptable.A demographic frontier strategy was proposedby the US Defense Department during Tet1968 and benefited from some three years experienceof the war. In basic terms it was an expandedenclave approach, with US troopslocated along the entire narrow band of thepopulous Coastal Plain from the DMZ toSaigon, linking the enclaves into one continuousbelt. The US forces would have beenresponsible for: first, securing and pacifyingthe densely populated Coastal Plain; and second,moving forward to the demographicfrontier, that area separating the Coastal Plainfrom the sparsely populated interior, in orderto isolate the insurgents from the people.Special Force units would have been used asstrike teams just beyond the frontier, detectingany attempts by the enemy to concentrate foran attack on the populous region; with sufficientconventional units kept in reserve to bluntany enemy attempt to launch a major groundassault against the pacification program 4 '.Most of the arguments against the enclavestrategy also apply to the demographic frontier.As with the enclave strategy it involved not somuch an abolition of the role of the US mainforce units, as a reduced emphasis on themrelative to light units engaged in security operations47 . Also there would have been a muchlesser need for the enormous logistic supportdeveloped for the attrition strategy. This appearsto have been a significant factor in theArmy's opposition to such a strategies infavour of those (invasion, attrition, and incursion)more oriented towards their institutionalmodus operandi. Given the Army Concept withits emphasis on mid-intensity conflict, this isnot surprising. Yet in counter-insurgency winningthe big battles is not decisive unless theenemy is also defeated at the lower levels ofcounter-insurgency, destroying his infrastructureand guerrilla forces as well as his mainforce units. It is this last failure to allocate sufficientpriority to these lower levels which appearsto be the most telling factor againstWestmoreland's strategy.ConclusionsThe essence of the strategic failure appears tobe that the US Army placed a disproportionateemphasis on combating the external threatfrom North Vietnam — one which was conceptuallymore manageable in terms of their internalisedmethod of operations. Unfortunatelythe nature of the war required an emphasis,first and foremost, on the internal threat to thestability of the South Vietnamese Government.Indeed Krepinevich argues that the external,conventional threat existed because of internalstrife within the South and without this, theRVN — with more appropriate US-SEATOsupport — would have been able to deterDRVN aggression 4 '.The strategy of attrition appears to have beena result of the institutional preferences of theUS Army, which denied the opportunity toemploy conventional methods (eg. invasion/incursion)and pressed in some ways against theirbetter judgement into large scale involvement,insisted on trying to adapt counter-insurgencyto meet their concept of war, rather than theother way around. Sam C. Sarkesian points outthat:"First, the Vietnam War developed into anasymmetrical relationship between theUnited States and the Vietcong/North Vietnamese.While we conducted a limited war,for the revolutionaries it was a total war. Second,conventional military wisdom, training,and professional education were apparentlyinadequate to meet the challenges ofthe political-military dimensionscharacteristic of revolutionary wars. " 4 "Stephen Young identifies the central lessonfrom the US military experience in Vietnam asthat of politics. Vietnamese politics — the warbeing only an extension of these politics inanother form 50 . The political objective wasthe survival of a non-Communist South Vietnamwith the same prospects for independenceand national integrity that any people deserves.This complex political objective was simplified

THE GROUND WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM 45to one of a military 'victory' resulting in a mismatchbetween the American desire for a quicksolution and the Vietnamese need. As a resultwhile US military power and assistance increasedfrom 1964 to 1968 so South Vietnamesecohesion and ability to fight decreased. Youngencapsulates this — The war was always theirwar; it could be no other war. Yet we never articulatedour massive power and abundantresources into conjunction with Vietnamesepolitics. We never located their good leaders,we never sought to define what we were fightingfor"* 1 .It is difficult to be other than critical of boththe stragegy of attrition and the rationalebehind It. After WWII the US organised theirarmed forces with a primarily European conflictin mind. This was rational, but instead ofadapting to the unique Vietnamese situationthey imported this style of war to Vietnam withunfortunate results. As in other wars the USfound the attrition strategy a natural institutionalresponse of forces immensely superior infire power and mobility which could not bringan elusive enemy to battle in the classic manner,and therefore sought to 'grind them down'.Worse the US also moulded the Vietnameseforces in their own image. Those who pointedout that neither was quite the answer were upagainst an institutional dynamic which madetheir advice-', no matter how sensible, quiteunacceptable to an organisation whichalthough it might have been able to comprehendit intellectually, was unable to accept itoperationally".In the final analysis the strategy of attritionmust be adjudged to have been an inappropriatewar fighting method which contributedto the ultimate defeat. It could onlyhave had any chance of success if it hadoperated in conjunction with an effective SouthVietnamese political system, disposing an efficientpolice network. As neither existed itrepresented a one sided military strategy whichonly saw problems in terms of that dimension.By its insistence on pursuing a big unit war, andfailure to give sufficient priority to protectingthe populace, the US relinquished the strategicinitiative to the enemy, and fought the groundwar more under a concept of grand tactics thana true strategy.ONOTES1. Summers, Harry G., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis ofthe Vietnam War, Presidio Press, Novato, 1982, pi.2. Thompson, Scott W & Fizzell, Donaldson, D (Eds)., TheLessons of Vietnam, Qld Uni Press, St Lucia, 1977, piii.3. Ibid, p iv.4. James Lawton Collins, Jnr., quoted in Turley, WilliamsS., The Second Indochina War, Westview, Boulder, 1986,p64.5. Turley, Ibid, p64.6. Westmoreland, Williams C, A Soldier Reports, DellPublishing Co, NY, 1976, pl23.7. Ibid.8. Krepinevich, Andrew F, Jnr., The Army and Vietnam,John Hopkins Uni Press, Baltimore, 1986, pl41.9. This section has been taken largely from Palmer, GenBruce., The 25 Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam,Simon & Schuster, 1984, ppl75-177.10. Thompson, op. cit., ppl2-13.11. Palmer, op. cit., pl75.12. Ibid. pl76.13. Ibid, ppl80-181.14. Krepinevich, op. cit., plO.15. Palmer, op. cit., pl77.16. Westmoreland, op, cit., pl45.17. Ibid.18. Ibid.19. Krepinevich, op. cit., pp4-7.20. Ibid.21. Ibid, pl65-166.22. Ibid, pl68.23. Ibid, pl70.24. Ibid.25. Ibid, pl71.26. Ibid.27. Ibid, pl72.28. Ibid, pl73.29. Under this principle small pacified areas would havebeen linked together into larger areas, and then each largerarea linked together into regions. Thus extending thepacified area like a spreading oil stain.30. General Richard Clutterbuck, a British counterinsurgencyexpert, noted that "although (Marine) casualties(in the CAPs) are high they are only 50% of the casualtiesof the normal infantry or marine battalions being flownaround by helicopters on large scale operations". Quoted inKrepinevich, op. cit., pl74.31. Ibid.32. Ibid, pl75.33. Ibid, pl77.34. Turley, op. cit., p76.35. Krepinevich, op. cit., pl92.36. Ibid, p248.37. Ibid, 250.38. Ibid, pp261-267.39. Ibid, p261.40. Summers, op. cit., pp81-90 and plOl.41. Krepinevich, op. cit., p263.42. Palmer, op. cit., ppl82-I83.43. See Griffith, Paddy., Forward into Battle: FightingTactics from Waterloo to Vietnam, Antony Bird Pubs,Chichester, 1981, pi 10 for a description of the McNamaraLine — a barrier of electronic surveillance devices that wasto be set up along the DMZ. The original scheme wasmodified during the Khe Sanh siege from a linear barrier tolocalised use of sensors between and around strong points.44. Krepinevich, op. cit., p264.45. Ibid, p265.46. Ibid, p266.47. Ibid, p267.48. Ibid, p268.49. Sarkesian, Sam C, Beyond the Battlefield: the NewMilitary Professionalism, Pergamon Press, NY, 1981, p66.

46 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 76 May/June 8950. Young, Stephen., in Thompson, op. tit., p225.51. Ibid.52. This advice emanated from the US State Department,people such as Sir Robert Thompson, and internally fromsuch officers as then then Lt Col David Hackworth. SeeHackworth, David., "Guerrilla Battalion, US Style" in Infantry,Jan-Feb 1988 for a description of a US unit whichemployed the enemy's own tactics. Westmoreland's view ofinside criticism is demonstrated by the following commenton Hackworth: ". . . as reflected by these awards (he hadseveral awards from the DSC down) (Hackworth's) combatrecord was unusual, but . . . developed an affinity for personalpublicity . . . spoke irresponsibly . . . conductedhimself with questionable ethics . . . retired prematurely. . .", Westmoreland, op. cit., p305.53. Paraphrased in part from a view put by AmbassadorRobert Komer in Thompson, op. cit., p268-269.BIBLIOGRAPHYGravel, Senator Mike (Ed)., The Pentagon Papers: TheDefense Department History of United States DecisionMaking on Vietnam (Vol III and IV), Beacon Press,Boston, 1971.Griffith, Paddy, Forward into Battle: Fighting Tacticsfrom Waterloo to Vietnam, Antony Bird Pubs, Chichester,1981.Krepinevich, Andrew F, Jnr., The Army and Vietnam,John Hopkins Uni Press, Baltimore, 1986.Palmer, Gen Bruce, The 25 Year War: America's MilitaryRole in Vietnam, Simon & Schuster, 1984.Sarkesian, Sam C, Beyond the Battlefield: the NewMilitary Professionalism, Pergamon Press, NY, 1981.Summers, Harry G., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis ofthe Vietnam War, Presidio Press, Novato, 1982.Thompson, Scott W & Frizzell, Donaldson, D (Eds)., TheLessons of Vietnam, Qld Uni Press, St Lucia, 1977.Turley, William S., The Second Indochina War, West view,Boulder, 1986.Walt, Lewis W., Strange War, Strange Strategy: AGeneral's Report on Vietnam, Award Books, NY, 1970.Westmoreland, William C, A Soldier Reports, DellPublishing Co, NY, 1976.Westmoreland, William C & Sharp, U.S.G., Report on theWar in Vietnam, US Govt Printing Office, WashingtonDC, 1968.GEE HARDWAREThe following items will be supplied as GFE to be incorporatedinto the IASSF. Respondents should indicate anyadditionalitems or quantities of GFE hardware required.a. 4 x CP-1699/AYK-14 Mission Computers;b. 2 x AN/AYQ-9(V) Stores Management Set, comprising:(i) 2 x CP-1342/AYQ-9(V) Stores Management Processor,(ii) 2 x KY-851/AYQ-9(V) Wingtip Decoder,(hi) 4 x KY-853/AYQ-9(V) Wing Pylon Decoder,(iv) 2 x KY-854/AYQ-9(V) Fuselage Decoder,(v) 1 x KY-855/AYQ-9(V) Gun Decoder;c. 2 x 1P-1317-A Digital Display Indicator;d. 1 x IP-1350/A Horizontal Indicator;e. 1 x AN/AVQ-28 Head-Up Display;f. 1 x C-10380/ASQ Up-Front Control Panel;g. 1 x C-10382/A Communications System Controller;h. 1 x AM-6979/A Intercommunication Set;i. 1 x An/APG Radar set, comprising:(i) 1 x CP-1326/APG-65 Radar Target Data Processor,(ii) 1 x MT-4955/APG-65 Electrical Equipment Rack,(hi) 1 x AS-3254/APG-65 Antenna,(iv) 1 x T-1377/APG-65 Radar Transmitter,(v) 1 x R-2089/APG-65 Radar Receiver-Exciter,(vi) 1 x CP-1325/APG-65 Computer Power Supply;7.4.1.15.2 Air-to-Ground TargetsFour types of A/G targets shall be provided:a. Fixed-point targets: These shall consist of up to five fixed,ground-referenced targets.b. Moving-point targets: These shall consist of up to fivemoving ground-referenced targets, moving at up to 100knots. These targets shall not be required to moverelative to each other.c. Line targets: There shall be at least one target which correspondsto a fixed linear ground feature.d. Multipoint targets: There shall be at least one targetwhich corresponds to a four-sided fixed ground area.

From Inchon to San Carlos: Amphibious Warfare since 1945By Colonel John Jackson, ARES(This article is based on a paper, submittedfor the ADFA Master of Defence Studiesprogram.)IntroductionTHE enemy came up ... a few ships at atime, since there was no room to bringgreater numbers inshore, and, while somerested, others kept up the attack . . . in theirefforts to force back the defenders and capturethe fortification. It was Brasidas whodistinguished himself more than anyone. Hewas in command of a warship, and when hesaw that, because of the difficult nature ofthe ground, the captains and helmsmen,even at points where it did seem possible toland, were hanging back for fear of damagingtheir ships, he shouted out . . . askingwhat was the point in sparing ships andmeanwhile tolerating the existence of anenemy fortress . . . telling them to break uptheir ships so long as they forced a landing,. . . to run them aground, to make a landingsome way or other, and to overwhelm theplace and its defenders'.The amphibious assault, involving as it doesa transition from sea to land of all the elementsof force — combat, support and command — isa most complex, risky and yet potentially mosteffective form of attack. To the missiles of theenemy are added the vagaries of the sea, and inno other form of attack is preparation moreessential, both of materiel and of the men involved.Nevertheless, in the amphibious assaultas in all others the critical point is the applicationof superior combat power at the appropriatetime and place.As Thucydides' account implies, the Spartansat Pylos were not prepared: the landing sitecould not accommodate the assault force, clearpriorities were not specified in ordersbeforehand, assault elements were committedpiecemeal or unsupported, and the men werenot imbued by training with the necessity ofgetting ashore rapidly and closing with theenemy. Notwithstanding their justified reputationas the greatest of the Greek armies, theSpartans failed to capture Pylos.This article examines developments in amphibiouswarfare and its place in maritimestrategy since World War 2. The impact of newequipment and techniques on amphibiousoperations will be examined, from the assaulton Inchon during the Korean War to the landingin San Carlos Bay in The Falklands War.In addition, the current capacity of the majormaritime powers to conduct amphibious operationsas an instrument of naval strategy will besurveyed.Amphibious Warfare in Nuclear Strategy1945-1950Amphibious operations may be conductedfor strategic reasons, as, for example, the onlymeans of gaining a foothold on a hostile shore— as in Normandy or Gallipoli or TheFalklands. Or they may be a matter of operationalor tactical choice, to harass or to achievesurprise — as at Dieppe or Inchon 2 . In addition,the potential to mount amphibious operations,on any scale and in a wide range of locations,has recently emerged as a key element inmaritime strategy.Till points out that operations against theshore are one of the two main ways in whichcommand of the sea is exercised. They mayrange from invasion in order to conquer territory,to minor raids and bombardment.Because war is fundamentally about territory,some strategic thinkers cast operations againstthe shore as the culmination of the naval art.These include Brodie, Nimitz and Gorshkov,who wrote: "Successful operations of a fleetagainst the shore brought a better result thanthe operations of fleet against fleet. In the firstcase the fleet solved a direct 'territorial' task,whereas in the second, victory over the enemy'sfleet merely created the prerequisites for thelater solution of territorial tasks'". Others, includingCorbett before World War 2, andOmar Bradley immediately after it, believedthat sea power could not defeat a modern landpower, and for a time their view prevailed.After World War 2, US strategic and nuclearsuperiority saw the adoption of a strategy ofmassive nuclear retaliation to defeat aggression.Dependence on long-range air strike and

48 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 76 May/June 89large conventional ground forces in Europecalled into question the relative importance ofmaritime strategy and, particularly, the needfor forces such as the US Marine Corps(USMC). The latter's reputation in US historyand its domestic political influence were sufficient,however, for the passage of the NationalSecurity Act of 1947, which specified the rolesof the USMC and required it to provide FleetMarine Forces of combined arms, and air supportcomponents, for service with the fleet andfor the conduct of land operations necessaryfor a naval campaign 4 .Limited War and Flexible Response1950-1968The relegation of maritime strategy, based onthe assumption of total nucelar war, did notsurvive the re-emergence of limited conventionalwar when, in June 1950, North Korea invadedSouth Korea. Within six weeks the NorthKorean army had driven the ROK forces backinto a perimeter around Pusan in the south-eastof the Korean peninsula. Here the UN Commander,MacArthur, was able to halt the advancein August, and build up sufficient USand UN forces to plan a breakout and therecapture of South Korea. On 15 September anamphibious landing was successfully conductedat Inchon, on the west coast, followed by therecapture of the capital, Seoul, and thebreakout from Pusan, South Korea was regainedby early October. The keys to the success ofthe Inchon landing were the surprise achievedby the wide outflanking amphibious assault,and the availability of the amphibious forces,equipment and shipping. Notwithstandingthat a serious rundown had occurred afterWorld War 2, 230 ships were assembled, and70,000 men. The assault force consisted of the1st Marine Division, brought from the US andMediterranean, and the 7th Infantry Divisionfrom Japan, including about 50 per cent reinforcementsfrom the US'.Historically, Korea is of great importance inthe development of amphibious warfare. Thesuccess of the Inchon landing, and to a lesserextent the amphibious rescue of 1st MarineDivision at Hungnam, challenged the conventionalstrategic wisdom of the day that, with theadvent of nuclear weapons and superpowerconfrontation, forces were no longer justifiedwhich did not contribute directly to the NATOeffort on the Central Front in Europe.Although US national strategy during the 1950scontinued to emphasise nuclear retaliation, theoccurrence of a "limited" war, in which amphibiousoperations had played a significantpart, was sufficient for the US National SecurityAct to be amended to specify that the USMCwas to maintain a minimum of three activecombat divisions and three air wings 6 .Another major combined operation involvingamphibious landings occurred in 1956 withthe Anglo-French invasion of Egypt to regaincontrol of the Suez Canal. The invasion forceincluded 90,000 troops, 50 per cent British and50 per cent French, 500 aircraft and 130 warships.Two French and three British aircraftcarriers were included to provide close air support,and aircraft from Cyprus were used tosecure air superiority. Two more British carrierstransported helicopters and troops. Mostof the invasion force moved from Malta toEgypt in convoy, but the initial assault on thecanal was conducted by parachute and marineamphibious landings, followed up byhelicopter-borne assaults in the rear 7 .Major technical developments during the1950s affecting amphibious operations were thefirst military use of the helicopter, in theKorean War, and the subsequent developmentof the technique of vertical envelopment. Thefirst British use of helicopters for assault landingswas at Port Said, to secure the Raswabridges during the Suez campaign.Amphibious capability continued to play animportant role in British global interests outsideEurope, into the 1960s. In 1962, Roskill notedthe advantages of the commando carrier withits complement of Royal Marines andhelicopters, for quick deployment wherever thepresence of conventional power might be required.He advocated Britain's acquisition oftwo amphibious task forces capable of landingand supporting a brigade group. He proposedthe deployment of one in the Indian Ocean andone at home, with the nucleus of a third in thereserve. He also saw the need for appropriatesea and air transport, and integral combat airsupport on board a new class of light aircraftcarrier 8 . The commando carrier task group waswidely used in the "withdrawal from Empire",for example, at Aden in 1967.By the 1960s, the proliferation of revolutionarywars, growing Soviet strategiccapabilities, and a US recognition that globalresponsibilities could not be met by nuclear

I ROM INCHON IO SAN CARLOS 49retaliation and NATO alone led to the adoptionof a national strtegy of flexible response'. Thiscombined a nuclear deterrent force with theconventional capability to fight simultaneouswars in Europe and Asia and a limited warsomewhere else. Maritime strategy againassumed some importance.In Europe it was recognised that NATOcould not match Soviet conventional forces permanentlydeployed in the European theatre. Astrategy of delaying defence was accepted,which requires rapid reinforcement from theUK and the US, in the event of a Soviet attackon the Central Front in Germany. As a result,amphibious operations began to featuresignificantly in both NATO and Warsaw Pactplans for operations in Europe, particularly onthe flanks.On the NATO northern flank the difficultterrain and relatively light Norweigian defensivecapacity have been a constant cause forconcern. An advance south through Norway isone means available for Soviet forces to securethe exit from the Baltic Sea into the North Seaand Atlantic for their fleet. Such an advancecould include amphibious landings along thecoast, to secure airfields and bypass the manydefensive positions available, particularly in thenarrow mountainous fjord region south of theFinnmark plateau. By the 1970s Soviet forcesdeployed in the Kola Peninsula were known toinclude a naval infantry amphibious brigade.Accordingly, because movement by sea has advantagesin that area, planned NATO reinforcementsto northern Norway included a UKmarine commando group and a Netherlandsmarines unit, trained in mountain and arcticwarfare 10 .The second Soviet objective required tosecure the Baltic exit is Denmark, the capture ofwhich would also pose a serious threat to theflank of NATO's central front. Soviet forcesdeployed for this task have long included anaval infantry brigade with considerable amphibiouscapacity and a Polish amphibiousdivision.Similarly, on NATO's southern flank, an immediateWarsaw Pact objective of securing thesea approaches between Greece and Turkey wasassumed. To forestall such a move throughBulgaria, and because again the terrain is ruggedand mountainous, NATO planned rapidreinforcement of the area by amphibiousforces. Forces initially assigned included theamphibious brigades of Greece and Turkey,with support from ACE Mobile Force andItaly's San Marco marine battalion. In the early1970s, however, NATO amphibious capacityon this flank was seriously reduced whenGreece and Turkey ceased their annual combinedamphibious exercise (Deep Furrow) followingthe Cyprus dispute, and the UK lost itsnaval and marine base in Malta".Meanwhile, in South-east Asia, growing concernin the SEATO area led the US to send amarine brigade to Thailand in 1962. This wasfollowed by the commitment of US groundforces to South Vietnam, following the collapseof the Geneva Accords, which had ended theFrench Indo-China War in 1954. Again marineswere employed in an amphibious role to securethe initial lodgement. Thereafter, however, theescalating US commitment and the land-basednature of operations saw little use of amphibiousforces. There were selective amphibiousoperations 12 , and both US and SouthVietnamese forces conducted "riverine" warfarein the Mekong delta. But the continued useof substantial USMC forces throughout theperiod of the war 1962-72, including the majoraction at Kne Sanh (1967), where about 6,000marines were involved, was in their alternativeprescribed ground forces role, to "performsuch other duties as the President maydirect" 13 . The use of US marines in theDominican Republic in 1965 is a better exampleof the support which readily available amphibiousforces can provide for nationalpolitical objectives.Decolonisation, Recession and Detente1968-1977Several significant developments affectingamphibious warfare occurred in Europe in theperiod from the late 1960s to the late 1970s. Thewithdrawal from empire brought a perceptionthat amphibious capability, as an element ofcolonial maritime strategy, was no longer sonecessary in a number of European nations.Spain and France reduced or disbanded amphibiousformations, and in the UK smalleroverseas commitments became a justificationfor some defence capability losses necessitatedby the economic recession of the early 1970sand the consequent defence budget cuts. Oneamphibious helicopter assault ship (LPH) andan amphibious transport dock (LDP), capableof carrying 400 marines and operating 8

50 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 76 May/June 89helicopters as well as landing craft, were takenout of service, and a second LPH was convertedto the ASW role 14 .For the Western alliance this process was partof the period of detente that followed the endof the Vietnam War. The Soviets, on the otherhand, continued to develop an offensive amphibiouscapability as part of a growing interestin global maritime strategy. The revival of theirnaval infantry force, begun in the 1950s, wasaccelerated to the point where three divisionswere deployed by 1970, with clearly definedtasks against the NATO front in Europe. Navalinfantry were known to be exercising on aregular basis, from the mid-1960s on, in theBaltic and with Bulgaria and Rumania. Formationswere integrated within each of the Northern,Baltic and Black Sea Fleets, respectively,to:• support the invasion of Norway, by bypassingdifficult terrain and NATA defensivepositions;• support the capture of the Jutland peninsula(Denmark), and an attack on Schleswig-Holstein (in West Germany); and• secure the southern entrance to the BlackSea, in support of land forces from Bulgaria.The expenditure of considerable conventionalwarfare resources during the VietnamWar discredited the two-and-one-half warstrategy in the US, and showed how easily alarge-scale limited conflict could absorbmilitary capability. US strategy in the 1970sreduced the scope of the global military commitmentto "one-and-one-half" wars, i.e. amajor war in Europe and a minor conflictelsewhere. Under the Nixon Doctrine, regionalallies were expected to make a greater contributionto defence, and some US economic andstrategic interests were relegated' 5 .The Nixon Doctrine had quite specific effectson USMC tactical and logistics doctrine for amphibiousoperations. It required the continuedprojection of US influence abroad and retentionby the Navy of control of the sea, against abackground of decreasing foreign commitmentsand a reduction in overseas bases andpresence. Again the USMC had to justify its existenceas an amphibious force. By the early1970s, for example, US amphibious forces weredeveloping the concept of sea-based landingforce operations. Sea-based amphibious forceswere seen to be able to apply precise degrees ofpower, while remaining uncommitted until required.The concept included both a tacticaldoctrine and the Seaborne Mobile LoeisticSystem (SMLS)' 6 .Sea-based amphibious operations are thosethat are launched, commanded, controlled,coordinated and supported, both logisticallyand tactically, principally from the sea. Theyassumed the use of existing amphibious shipping1 ", existing budget limits, and the deploymentashore only of those elements necessaryfor the mission. The concept applied only at theATU/MAU (marine battalion group) andATG/MAB (brigade) levels in low- to midintensityconflicts, because of the naval threatto the sea base in higher intensities, and thelimited available shipping. Its greater flexibilitywas achieved by closer intergration of USN andUSMC resources and by retaining at sea thecommand, control and support elements andequipment. This meant:• Command and control by the CLF retaininghis HQ on board, integrated with the HQCATF, and landing only a small tactical HQif required; a major change from traditionaloperations where the CLF is establishedashore as soon as practicable;• Combat support by integrating tactical andlogistic transport (especially helicopters), andrelying on naval gunfire support (NGS) andclose air support (CAS) without artillerynecessarily being established ashore; withCAS provided by ships or vertical/short takeoff-and-landing(V/STOL) aircraft operatingfrom limited facilities ashore; and• Logistic support under the SLMS kept mostlyafloat, controlled by a Logistics Support Centreon the flagship (both naval and marineelements), through subordinate Ship LogisticControl Centres on each ship of the sea-base,and with a Forward LCC ashore, ifnecessary, to maintain any safety stocks.Possible sea-based ATF missions rangedfrom humanitarian/disaster relief and protection/evacuationof US nationals, through interpositionof a force to prevent conflict, to amphibiousraids and traditional amphibious Iandingswithout the expectation of permanentcommitment. Tactical flexibility was seen asconferring diplomatic flexibility".During the 1970s a number of developmentsin technology occurred which have had a majorimpact on amphibious wafare capability andthe conduct of amphibious operations. Theseincluded the rising cost of military forces and

FROM INCHON TO SAN CARLOS 51equipment, technological advances in aviation,and innovations in amphibious landing equipmentand armour.While advances in technology per se contributedto improved defence capabilities, theycombined with contemporary economic factorsto cause a major surge in the cost of militaryequipment. The effect of the resulting defencebudgetary constraints on Europe and NATOamphibious capability has already been mentioned,as has the US move to develop morecost-effective amphibious doctrine through thesea-based landing force concept and the SMLS.Meanwhile, V/STOL technology revolutionisedair warfare, and nowhere more than inamphibious operations. The first and outstandingexample of a military V/STOL aircraftwas the British Harrier "jump jet", forms ofwhich entered service with the RN, RAF andUSMC (the AV-8B) in the late 1970s. Since theAV-8B Harrier can operate from amphibiousships, fewer strike aircraft need to be embarkedon aircraft carriers. These can increase their interceptorcapability to provide air superiority inamphibious and sea control operations.Secondly, apart from extending the deploymentcapacity of amphibious forces combat airsupport, use of V/STOL reduces airfield constructionrequirements. Thirdly, the greaterdispersion of V/STOL in the amphibious landingarea reduces the ground vulnerability ofair support elements, and its speedier deploymentreduces dependence on aircraft carriersand, in turn, their vulnerability. The developmentof supersonic V/STOL aircraft usingvectored-thrust may make it possible for allfixed-wing air support for amphibious forces tobe provided by V/STOL".Innovations in amphibious equipment sawthe development and refinement of a number ofspecialist amphibious ship types. Amphibiouscommend and control ships (LCC) weredeveloped by both the USN and RN. The conceptsbehind the converted helicopter commandocarriers became the basis for such types asamphibious assault ships (LHA) and amphibioushelicopter carriers (LPH), whichcould embark, transport and deploy marineamphibious units by combinations ofhelicopters, landing craft and amphibiousvehicles, and which also had extensive storageand maintenance facilities. Other types, such asamphibious transport docks (LPD), were evolvedfrom the landing ship heavy.Developments in the use of armour in amphibiousoperations during the 1970s stemmedpartly from the reluctance of the USMC to dependcompletely on the helicopter. Limits to itsrange, survivability and firepower, inability toguarantee air superiority and the need for amechanised capability saw the replacement ofthe M48 main battle tank (MBT) with the M60,with its stabilized fire control and 105mm gun.In addition, the introduction to service duringthe 1970s of the LVT7 amphibious assault vehicleincreased mobility and reliability. Furthermechanized technological improvements wereprojected for the 1980s with the development ofthe Ml MBT, with laser rangefinder, solid-statecomputer and thermal night sights, and theLVT-7A1 improved amphibian 2 ".Sea Control, Power Projection andPresence 1977In the second half of the 1970s, a vigorousargument was mounted by the advocates ofnaval power in the US, against the strategicweaknesses of the Nixon Doctrine and itsneglect of wider US interests. In particular, theUSMC campaigned to stress the advantages,for flexible response to crises that mightthreaten US interests, conferred by the readyavailability and appropriate deployment of amphibiousforces-in-being. General Wilson,Commandant of the USMC, for example,argued in 1977 that the international environmentdepended on the increasingly complex interactionof political, economic and social factors,and that industrialized societies were increasinglydependent on underdeveloped countriesfor raw materials and energy sources.Apart from high profile needs like oil andagricultural products, he referred to mineralscritical to US industry, including chromium,manganese and nickel.Against the background of increasing internationaleconomic rivalry, including the controlof offshore resources and the UN sponsoredformation by developing countries of commodityassociations to exercise "sovereignty",he pointed to the increasing potential for instabilityin regions of critical economic importanceto the US. Given the growing Sovietmaritime ability to project influence and to exploitsituations to the disadvantage of the US,he argued the need for the capability to protectvital interests overseas and to support treaty

S2 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 76 May/June 89allies, through control of ocean access to rawmaterials by naval power.He went on to point out the ability of readyamphibious forces to contribute in a major wayto three of the four areas of maritime strategy:sea control, power projection and presence, ifnot to strategic deterrence. In lower level crises,peacetime forward deployment of amphibiousforces in areas of vital national security interestscould, for example, support diplomaticefforts by visible show of force and demonstrationof interest in areas of threatening crisis, aswell as assist allies and facilitate the commitmentof forces, if required, without actual landbasing.In crises requiring actual intervention whilelimiting the scope of conflict, Wilson pointed tothe capability of deployed amphibious forces tooperate independently with little preparationand minimal support. Similarly, in situations ofdirect or indirect confrontation with a majorpower outside the NATO area, such forcescould contribute readily to deterring, limitingor countering enemy action. Missions in thesescenarios could include assistance to allies,evacuation or protection of US nationals orproperty, interposition between contendingparties, protection of an area or resource, andin the latter scenario, commitment to a combatrole.In all-out conventional war, Wilson defined arole for amphibious forces in support of otheroperations, not only in the reinforcement ofNATO and protection of the European sea linesof communication (SLOC), e.g. by control ofthe Greenland-Iceland-UK gap, but in directsupport of the land campaign, particularly onthe Soviet flanks, e.g. in the Baltic. He stressed,however, not only the maintenance of theUSMC, but its readiness for amphibious operations.This required combined arms training, tointegrate the application of naval, ground andair weapons systems, exercises in varyinggeographic locations, to reflect global responsibilities,and the acquisition of appropriateweapons and equipment 2 '.Others supported the maritime strategydebate, putting cases for the revamping of amphibiouscapability, integrated marine airpower, and the advantages of forward deployment.One of the most telling of these isMellin's argument for the amphibious force asa ready political instrument of national policy.He developed Luttwak's functional typologyfor classifying and analysing the political usesof an amphibious force' 2 , tabulating the relationshipbetween specific amphibious force tacticsand specific diplomatic objectives 23 .By the late 1970s, strategic assessments of thebuild up of Soviet naval power in the KolaPeninsula and the North-west Pacific, andgrowing Soviet influence in Angola, Ethiopia,Vietnam and Kampuchea confirmed the newSoviet interest in maritime strategy. This, andworld events including the Iranian revolution,the Iranian seizure of American hostages andthe Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, led to abroader world approach in US strategic thinking.The Carter Doctrine of January 1980recognised US vital interest in Persian Gulf oilsupplies and a return to a global militarystrategy. A revised maritime strategy establishedthe Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), basedon carrier battle groups and amphibious forces,and equipment for a MAB was moved by neartermprepositioning ships to Diego Garcia 24 .Soon afterwards, The Falklands War (1982)brought home the relationship between navalpower and diplomacy and deterrence, and thatbetween sea control and air superiority. It alsosaw two major amphibious operations andnumerous minor ones. The first of these,Operation Rosario, was the Argentine invasionof The Falklands and South Georgia, and includedthe landing of a marine battalion group(2500 men) by an amphibious force comprisinga carrier, six destroyers, two corvettes, a submarine,a landing ship and two trooptransports. Both landings were successful, butresistance on South Georgia was a sufficientreminder of the difficulties of opposedlandings 25 .The British Operation Corporate to retakeThe Falklands was much larger, and militarilyand logistically more difficult. The operationmeant assembling a force of two carriers, twoassault ships, 23 destroyers and frigates, 21Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) vessels and about50 STUFT (including three passenger liners),traversing 8,000 miles, and conducting abrigade-sized opposed amphibious assault,simultaneously with a naval battle for airsuperiority. A preliminary operation to recaptureSouth Gergia, although successful,demonstrated the hazards of amphibious warfarein the South Atlantic.

I ROM INCHON TO SAN CARLOS 53The major difficulty for Corporate was thedistance, compounded by the fact that theBritish Forces were in the process of reducingnaval air and amphibious assets when the warstarted. The balance was redressed by the use ofthe base on Ascension Island, and the reservenaval capacity of a maritime nation. Considerablerapid adaptation included conversionof aircraft for refuelling, and of STUFT totransport personnel, aircraft and stores.The landing was planned and conductedmethodically. San Carlos Bay was selected aftercareful reconnaissance by helicopter, submarineand special forces. Although strategicsurprise was not possible, tactical surprise wasachieved by diversion. During the landing andthe subsequent ground force operations, effectiveuse was made of naval gunfire support,close air support, the limited helicopter tacticaland logistic support available, and flanking amphibiousoperations. In most respects theBritish-Falklands campaign was a text-book exampleof traditional amphibious warfare 2 '.Amphibious Capability TodaySignificant amphibious warfare forces,capable of global maritime power projection,are maintained today only by the major navalpowers, principally the US, the Soviet Union,Britain and France. Russian naval infantry aretrained as an elite force, in motor rifle operations,close combat and parachuting. They areorganised in regiments of three battalions (ofabout 400 men each) or independent brigadesof five battalions, including artillery and tanks.Standard equipment includes multi-barrelrocket-launchers (MBRL), amphibious mortarcarriers and PT-76 amphibious tanks. Theirtactics in the assault include night landings,radio silence, reliance on local air superiorityand detailed planning. Combat support includestransport and assault helicopters,Alligator (5800 ton) and Ropucha class (400ton) LSTS and Folnochy class (800 ton)LCTs 27 .Soviet naval infantry total (1986) 18,000. Adivision of two regiments, with 18 amphibiousships including a Rogov class LPD, is part ofthe Pacific Fleet. The other Soviet fleets (Northern,Baltic and Black Sea) each include anaval infantry brigade of five battalions (3,000men) with between 15 and 25 amphibious ships.All four fleets include a naval special forces(Spetsnaz) brigade 28 .France today maintains one air-portablemarine division of 8,000 men, with about 10amphibious ships. Although it is designated aspart of the strategic Rapid Action Forces, itsfour regiments, which include armour, artilleryand engineers, are permanently deployed in the"global power projection" role, which inseveral cases would be better described as internalsecurity. There is one regiment each in theCaribbean, South Indian Ocean, NewCaledonia and Polynesia 2 '.The UK retains the Royal Marines as aspecialist amphibious force of 7,600 men, witha strategic role in NATO to reinforce the northernflank in Norway. It comprises one RMcommando brigade, with organic artillery,engineer, aviation an logistics units, and aspecial forces unit, the Special Boat Squadron.Naval amphibious ships in support include twoLPD, six LSL and support ships of the RoyalFleet Auxilary. The RM have the most recentcombat experience of NATO's amphibiousforces, following The Falklands War, wheretheir deployment demonstrated the power projectioncapability of specially trained andequipped amphibious forces. On the otherhand, their limited size being required for a nationaltask outside Europe meant a significantreduction of NATO defensive capability forsome months in 1982.Other European/Mediterranean maritimenations with specialised amphibious capacity intheir own region include Holland, Spain, Portugal,Italy, Greece and Turkey. Most of thesehave designated operational roles in NATO,referred to earlier. Of course, others have thecapacity to employ conventional ground forceson amphibious missions in special circumstances,but generally without maintainingspecialist equipment and training.A number of Asian countries maintainmarine forces, some of considerable sizenumerically. Most of these are part of the localbalance of power and without long-range amphibiouscapacity. The largest are China's, with65 landing ships, and 56,000 naval infantryorganised in three divisions, one with eachfleet. Against these, Taiwan operates about 30landing ships and an LPD, with 39,000 marinesalso organised in three divisions.Similarly, in North-East Asia, North Koreahas 80,000 men in special operations brigades,some with commando, reconnaissance and amphibiousroles, while South Korea has 23,000

; 4 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 76 May/June 89marines, organised in two divisions and onebrigade, including tanks and 8 LSTs. In South-East Asia, Vietnam has 27,000 naval infantry in10 marine brigades and seven LSTs, and marineforces of between 10,000 and 20,000 are maintainedby Thailand, Indonesia and thePhilippines 30 .The largest specialised amphibious forces todayare those maintained by the US as a majorelement in their maritime strategy. They includetwo main elements:• The USMC has 195,000 personnel. Theoperational elements remain the Fleet MarineForces, organised principally in 3 marinedivisions, each with a marine air wing ofabout 150 combat aircraft, and a supportgroup. Each of these groupings under theMarine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)concept can constitute any of three types asMAGTF according to the size required forthe mission, as before: a MAF, based on acomplete division, a MAB (supportedbrigade) or a MAU (supported battalion). Atpresent there are two MAF based in the USand one in Japan/Okinawa which has a MABin Hawaii. MAUs are deployed either permanentlyor intermittently in the Mediterranean,the Philippines and the Indian Ocean.The USMC Reserve of 43,000 has a furtherdivision and air wing.• The USN Amphibious Forces compriseabout 60 specialised amphibious ships, 56large landing craft and many smaller craft.These are deployed with US fleets that includea marine capability".Combat air support is integral to theMAGTF. The marine air wing provides itsMAF with a range of air support, including tacticalair power, for amphibious assault operationsor sustained operations ashore 32 . Ittypically includes:4 interceptor squadrons of F-4 being replacedby F-18;4 FGA squadrons of AV-8C, AV-8B (Harrier),A-4 or A-6;2 attack helicopter squadrons of UH-1 beingreplaced by AH-1;8 transport helicopter squadrons, either lightUH-1, medium CH-46 or heavy CH-53;1 tanker squadron of KC-130; andreconnaissance, ECM, FAC and commandaircraft.At MAB level a marine air group is formed,with lesser capability, but normally includingfixed-wing attack aircraft. At MAU level offensiveair support is usually provided by V/STOLaircraft.As for logistic support, current US planningfor large amphibious operations recognises thatthe scale has changed for the US Navy, particularlyin shipping resources. The British experiencein The Falklands has emphasised theneed to intergrate civilian-manned and -ownedships into the Amphibious Task Force (ATF),and to plain for and train with civilian shipping'3 . To provide for this, US ATF doctrineseparates the assault echelon (AE) from thefollow-on echelon (AFOE). For a Marine AmphibiousForce (MAF) landing, i.e. a marinedivision fully supported, the AFOE might berequired to transport and land 19,000 troopsand 5,500,000 cubic feet of cargo, excludingPDL' 4 . The estimated requirement for civilianshipping includes:7 troopships1 aviation support ship1 crane ship4 LASH9 container ships4 roll-on/roll-off ships4 tankersApart from ships of Military Sealift Command(MSC), capable of operating and communicatingwith a naval force, civilian shipstaken up from trade (STUFT) present significantplanning problems for future amphibiousoperations. In a war situation the best shiptypes may not be available. Older break-bulkcargo ships may substitute for container ships,and the ATF commander may need to secure aport for unloading. The US is short of troopships.As The Falklands war showed, thoseavailable can increase their troop capacity fourfold,but without helicopter or landing craftdisembarking capability, alternatives might berequired, such as securing an airhead. Otherdifficulties with STUFT include:a. lower damage tolerance,b. low or nil cargo transfer capability at sea,c. no cargo handling personnel,d. no medical facilities, ande. no organic defences.Some solutions are being investigated likecontainerised berthing. The Falklands War suggestsothers, including:a. troopships deployment of landing force airdefence units,

FROM INCHON TO SAN CARLOS 55b. installation of "quick-fix" nelo-decks, andc. use of organic marine medical resources.Amphibious Warfare in ContemporaryMaritime StrategyUS military strategy developed since 1980sees Europe, the Pacific and South-west Asia asvital interests. It includes the concepts of deterrence,forward deployment and cooperationwith allies. It emphasises control of vital sealines of communication (SLOC) through navalsuperiority, and the capacity to react to a widerange of crises. The US maritime strategy providesa planning base for the employment ofnaval forces in low-intensity conflict and inglobal conventional war with the Soviet Union.The aim is to deter war if at all possible; then, ifdeterrence fails, to destroy enemy maritimeforces; protect allied SLOCs; support the landcampaign; and secure favourable leverage forwar termination 35 .Under the maritime strategy, the AmphibiousWarfare Strategy was approved forpublicatin in 1985 36 .It outlines the phased employment of amphibiousforces in global conventional conflict,but recognises their utility in the more likelycrisis scenarios of low-intensity conflict, alongthe lines suggested by Liddell Hart:"Since Russia has developed nuclear weaponsin quantity to match America's, a nuclearstalemate has developed. In such a situation,local and limited aggression becomes more likely,and amphibious forces become morenecessary, both as deterrent and as a counter toaggression — a counter which can be usedwithout being suicidal and a deterrent which istherefore credible." 37The concept of "force-in-readiness" stressesthe value of amphibious forces in rapid and effectivecrisis suppression and preventing minorconflicts becoming major ones. It includes:• The forward peacetime deployment of amphibiousready groups (ARG) with theirMAGTFs based on a MAU, in the Mediterraneanand Pacific/Indian Oceans;• The deployment of three squadrons ofmaritime prepositioning ships (MPS), eachwith equipment and supplies for a MAB for30 days, in the Atlantic, Indian and PacificOceans; and• The training of deployed MAUs innaval/amphibious special operations.Phase 1 of the Amphibious Warfare Strategyis Deterrence, or the Transition to War, whenUS naval forces would deploy as far forward aspossible in response to a growing crisis betweenthe superpowers. Marine action in this phaseincludes:• deployment of a MAB in each of the Atlanticand Pacific;• relocation of MPS squadrons to join airliftedMABs; and• amphibious deployment of a MAB toNorway 38 .Phase 2 is Seize the Initiative — the counterattack following a Soviet invasion of CentralEurope, when Soviet naval forces will be engagedin all theatres, in particular to keep pressureon the Soviet flanks in Northern Europe, theMediterranean and the Pacific, and to preventthe movement of forces to Central Europe orSoviet interdiction of NATO's reinforcingSLOCs. Likely amphibious missions in thisphase would include:• MAB or MAF amphibious assaults to secureadvanced naval bases for the introduction ofground forces;• amphibious assaults along the Norwegiancoast, and, as opportunity presents, in theNorth and Baltic Seas, the Mediterranean andNorth-west Pacific; and• retention of an amphibious reserve to exploitSoviet vulnerabilities, or for the emergencyreinforcement of NATO defence on theEnglish Channel.Phase 3 is the NATO counter offensive onEastern Europe and Russia, including naval offensivesagainst the Kola Peninsula and in theNorth-west Pacific. MAGTFs supported bybattleship surface action groups would be taskedto retake lost territory or seize key objectivesin the Soviet rear, on the North Cape, theEastern Baltic or Black sea coasts, the Kurilesor Sakhalin Island.In support of the amphibious warfarestrategy, equipment programs include completionof the LSD-41 and LHD-1 classes of amphibiousassault ships, to increase the total ofamphibious ships to 76 by 1995. This will providean assault lift capacity for both a MAF anda MAB. In addition, acquisition in quantity ofLCAC and the MV-22A Osprey tilt-rotor aircraftwill improve ship-to-shore movementcapacity from over the horizon.

56 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 76 May/June 89ConclusionIn conclusion, a review of developments inamphibious warfare since World War 2 confirmsits integral part in naval operations andthe exercise of maritime strategy. As Till pointsout 39 , one of the two principal uses of the sea inwar, along with its use for or denial to commerce,has been to project power from itagainst the land as part of the naval instrumentof national policy. The period has alsodemonstrated that, in war and peace, navalpower as an instrument of foreign policy can bemore diplomatic than military in character, andnone more so than amphibious forces.At times during the last four decades, themaritime powers, for various historical,political or economic reasons, have neglected,or been slow to realise, the significance of theactive projection of naval power for theirphysical and economic security and progress.Generally, ensuring imbalances in their internationalposition have brought them quickly to amore active pursuit of maritime strategy.The period has demonstrated that thepolitical, diplomatic and military value of welltrained, appropriately equipped and readilyavailable amphibious forces justifies theirmaintenance. Secondly, the capabilities of amphibiousforces to perform their traditional roleof assault across the shore have been enormouslyenhanced by quantum leaps in technologyand consequent advances in operational andlogistic techniques.Finally, the period has confirmed old lessonsof the amphibious assault, that most difficultform of attack — readiness, measured in equipmentand training, careful planning, in the concentrationof all available elements of combatpower, an offensive spirit, and maintenance ofthe aim. As the Spartans found to their cost atPylos 2,500 years ago, "the critical element inthe amphibious assault is the rapid buildup ofcombat power ashore" 40 .NOTES1. The vital moment during the Spartan amphibious assaulton Pylos, Western Greece, 425 BC, Thucydides, ThePeloponnesian War, Book 4, Chapter 11, Trans. R.Warner, Penguin, London, 1954.2. Roskill, S. W., The Strategy of Sea Power: its developmentand application, Collins, London, 1962, p.243.3. Till, Geoffrey, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age(2nd ed.), Macmillan, London, 1984, p. 140.4. Kelley, F. X. & O'Donnell, H. K., "The AmphibiousWarfare Strategy", in The Maritime Strategy, US Naval Institute,January 1986, pp.22-3.5. Thompson, Sir Robert (ed), War in Peace: An Analysisof Warfare Since 1945, Orbis, London, 1981, pp. 44-47.6. Kelley, op.cit., p.23, and also Hamilton, R. E., "AndThree Air Wings", in USNI Proceedings, November 1977,pp. 100-103: The USMC is the only US service that has itsorder of battle specified in an Act of Congress. Apart fromsome name changes resulting from developments in amphibiousoperational concepts, the basic organisation of theUSMC for amphibious operations has remained constantsince World War 2:The combat elements of the USMC are known as FleetMarine Forces (FMF) and consist of 3 active and 1 reservedivisions and air wings. Joint USN/USMC task forces areformed for specific amphibious missions and are knowngenerically as Amphibious Task Forces (ATF). An ATF asa whole is under a naval Commander Amphibious TaskForce (CATF), while the USMC component is referred toas the Landing Force and once ashore is under a CommanderLanding Force (CLF). Landing forces may be ofthree types depending on the size required for the mission:A landing force based on a complete division and airwing is called a Marine Amphibious Force (MAF);A landing force of brigade size is called a Marine AmphibiousBrigade (MAB). The elements of the marine airwing attached form an air group, and the ATF is called anAmphibious Task Group (ATG);A landing force of battalion size is called a Marine AmphibiousUnit (MAU), and the ATF is called an AmphibiousTask Unit (ATU).7. Thompson, op.cit., p.93.8. Roskill, op.cit., pp.254-5.9. Kelley, op.cit., p.23: the "two and one-half war"strategy.10. Villar, G. R., "Amphibious Warfare Forces in Europeand the Soviet Union", in USNI Proceedings, November,1977, pp.112-4.11. ibid., p. 115.12. Wilson, L. H., "Ready-Amphibious-Marine", in USNIProceedings, November 1977, p. 18.13. The US National Security Act, Title 10, quoted ibid.,p.22.14. Villar, op.cit., p.l 14.15. Kelley, op.cit., p.23.16. Snowden, L. F. and Carter, M. N., "Sea-based LandineForce Operations", in USNI Proceedings, November1972, p.105.17. Such as command and control ships (then the LCC-20Mount Whitney class) and landing ships dock (LSD-30 FortSnelling class), ibid., p. 106.18. ibid., p.107.19. Hamilton, op.cit., pp. 102-3.20. Estes, K. W., "Ground Mobility for Marines", inUSNI Proceedings, November 1977, pp. 103-6.21. Including the M60 tank, TOW missile, AV-8B aircraftwith laser-ground stand-off weapons, AH-1 attackhelicopters, EA-6 Prowler tactical electronic warfare aircraft,CH-53 heavy-lift helicopters and the LCAC aircushionedlanding craft, Wilson, opcit., pp.18-25.22. Luttwak's typology is based on the concept of "suasion"as a neutral description of the supportive versus coercivepolitical application of naval power. See Luttwak, Edward,The Political Uses of Sea Power, Johns Hopkins,Baltimore, 1974.23. Meilin, W. F., "The Amphibious Force: A ReadyPolitical Instrument", in USNI Proceedings, August 1977,pp.44-5.24. Kelley, op.cit., pp.23-4.25. Till, op.cit., p.255.26. Ibid., pp.255-6.27. Villar, op.cit., pp.115-7.28. The Military Balance 1986-87, Institute for StrategicStudies, 1987.29. Ibid.30. Ibid.

I ROM INCHON IO S\\ CARLOS31. US amphibious ships currently include, ibid.:TYPEAmphibious command sh psAmphibious assault shipsAmphib helicopter carrierAmphib transport dockLanding ship dockLanding ship lankAmphibious cargo shipILCOILHAI1LHD1iLPD-lllLPD4lILSD28I1 si) •••.1 SI > 4iLSTliLKAlCLASSBlue RidgeTarawaWaspIwo JimaRaleighAustinThomastonAnchorageWhidbevNewportCharlestonl()\s19.00039.00041.00016.50016.000NO.-s172II2+ 5185In addition there arc 56 landing craft (mostly LCU-1610),and numerous smaller landing craft including 12 landingcraft air cushion, with a speed of over 40 knots and capableof ship-to-shore and across-the-beach transport of troopsand weapons.32. Ibid, and Hamilton, op.cit., p. 100.33. Brosnan, J. F., "An Amphibious Landing? WithCivilian Ships?" in Naval War College Review, Vol. 34,No. 2, (Mar/Apr '86), pp., 35-42.34. In addition to the assault force.35. Watkins, J. D., "The Maritime Strategy", in TheMaritime Strategy, US Naval Institute, January 1986,pp.8-15.36. Kelley, op.cit., pp.24-6.37. Quoted ibid., p.25.38. Land prepositioning of a MAB set of equipment andsupplies is to be completed by 1989.39. Ti].,op.cit., p.17.40. Brosnan, op.cit., p.42.BIBLIOGRAPHYAlford, Jonathan (ed.). Sea Power and Influence: OldIssues and New Challenges, Gower and Allanncld, Osmun,1980.Bid well, She! ford, Modern Warfare, A Study of Men,Weapons and Theories, Allen Lane, London, 1973.Carver, Michael, War Since 1945, Weidenfeld & Nicholson,London, 1980.Deitchman, S. J., Military Power and the Advance ofTechnology: General Purpose Military Forces in the 1980sand Beyond (2nd ed.), Olvol, 1983.Gretton, Sir Peter, Maritime Strategy: a Study of BritishDefence Problems, Cassell, London, 1965.Hastings, Max, & Jenkins, Simon, The Battle for TheFalklands, Pan, London, 1983.Komer, R., Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defence? ABTAssoc, Olvol, 1984.Leckie, Robert, Conflict: The History of the Korean War,1950-1953, Putnam, New York, 1962.Lee, R. G., Introduction to Battlefield Weapons Systemsand Technology, Brasseys, Oxford, 1981.Luttwak, Edward, The Political Uses of Sea Power, JohnsHopkins, Baltmore, 1974.Marine Corps Gazette, USMC.Merglen, Albert, Surprise Warfare: Subversive, Airborneand Amphibious Operations, Trans, K. Morgan, George,Allen & Unwin, London, 1968.The Military Balance 1986-87, Institute for StrategicStudies, 1987.Moineville, Hubert, Naval Warfare Today and Tomorrow,Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1983.Naval War College Review, US Naval War College.Ranft, Bryan & Till, Geoffrey, The Sea in Soviet Strategy,Macmillan, London, 1983.Roskill, S. W., The Strategy of Sea Power: its developmentand application, Collins, London, 1962.Thompson, Sir Robert (ed), War in Peace: An Analywsls ofWarfare Since 1945, Orbis, London, 1981.Till, Geoffrey, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age (2nded.), Macmillan, London, 1984.U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, I874-, USNI.Walmer, Max, an Illustrated Guide to Modern Elite Forces,Salamander, London, 1984.Whitehouse, A. G. J., Amphibious Operations, Muller,London, 1964.Colonel Jackson joined Sydney Univerity Regiment in 1960 and left as 2IC in 1975. He wasCOofboth 1/19 RNSWR and 3 RNSWR, and subsequently served at HQ 2 DIV and 2 TrgGp and as Colonel (Projects) Reserve Staff Group, Army Office, where he drafted policy onrecruiting and enlistment for the Army Reserve. From 1985 to 1988 he was Chief Instructor,RCSC 2 Trg Gp. Colonel Jackson is a graduate of Sydney University (BA, Dip.Ed) andJoint Services Staff College, and in 1988 was awarded the degree of Master of DefenceStudies at ADFA.

U.S. Deterrence Policy in the Late 1980s: MADDisavowed?By David Hodgkinson,University of Western AustraliaUS. strategic doctrine in the post-1945 era• has been based upon the theory of de-'terrence. As Colin Gray has recently stated,from 1945 until the present, 'the concept ofdeterrence has been the master leitmotiv forWestern policymakers and strategic theorists.' 1Deterrence is a simple concept; it can be describedas 'the creation by a state seeking toprevent military aggression of a situation inwhich the potential costs of the aggression riskoutweighing the potential gains.' 2 Further,Deterrence of any kind is based on the paradoxthat in order to deter and thus avoidcombat one must convince the potential opponentthat one is ready to engage in combatand that one has the capability to prevail. . .What matters is not whether one has thiswill and capability but whether the potentialopponent perceives that one has. The realsituation is a secondary consideration, importantonly to the extent that it influencesthe perception. 1Deterrence, then, as a concept involves notonly, the nuclear force capabilities of a state,but also, such factors as credibility and perceptionof intent. Put another way, one's deterrentposture, so the theory or concept goes, influencesthe way one's opponent thinks, and thereforeacts. Deterrence is, as a result, also psychological,because it is impossible to measurethe success or otherwise of such influence. If astate perceives that another is both willing andable to use its nuclear forces, and that 'thepotential costs of the aggression risk outweighingthe potential gains,' then that state is deterred.Since the mid-1960s, a concept of deterrencetermed Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) hasbeen generally held to be the basis of US deterrencepolicy. However, because of developmentsin U.S. strategic nuclear force capabilitiesand in certain areas of US strategic policy, bothunder the Carter administration and, to a greaterdegree, under the Reagan administration, thereis evidence to suggest that such a doctrine,MAD, is no longer the basis of US deterrencepolicy. Indeed, it will be argued that MAD isno longer the foundation, to any real extent,upon which US deterrence policy is based. Thisis not to question whether or not deterrence isthe basis of US strategic doctrine; there seemslittle reason to doubt that it still is. Rather, myargument is that the emphasis within a frameworkof deterrence has changed, that MAD hasbeen largely disavowed in favour of a policysometimes referred to as 'first strike dominance.'It is not suggested that an eventual first strike,a 'capability to inflict a disarming or unanswerablefirst strike against a rival nation,' isthe goal of the Reagan administration. 4 Howeveras John von Neumann wrote, 'there is nocure' for technology.' Applicable also to theCarter administration, regarding deterrence,'what matters is not whether one has the willor capability' to launch a preemptive first strike,'but whether the potential opponent believesthat one has.' And certainly, it will be argued,the perception of the Soviet Union is that theUS believes in the efficacy of a first strike. TheUS strategic doctrine in the late 1980s appearto be deterrence through 'intimidation,' so tospeak.Within the framework of an analysis of USstrategic doctrine, and its various phases, thegradual U.S. disavowal of MAD in favour ofa more offense-oriented concept of deterrencewill be analysed. This involves both changes inUS will and strategic capability, perceived orreal. Mutual Assured Destruction, then, hasbeen largely disavowed as the basis of US deterrencepolicy; how this came about can onlybe understood within the general context of USdeterrence policy since 1945, beginning withDulles' 'massive retaliation' doctrine of the1950s.U.S. deterrence policy has been characterisedby a number of changes and shifts in emphasis.Aaron Friedberg concluded that US doctrinewas 'a complex and sometimes contradictorymelange of notions, principles and policies;'

U.S. DETERRENCE POLICY IN THE LATE 1980s 59and Keith Payne has written that 'US strategicthought has been curiously inconsistent.' 6 It isnonetheless possible to identify the variousphases of US deterrence policy and to trace,from the 1970s, the decline of MAD as thebasis of that policy.Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' doctrineof massive retaliation (as with, subsequently,McNamara's 'flexible response' andMAD) reflected both US and Soviet capabilitiesat the time. According to Dulles, in 1954, 'theway to deter (Soviet) aggression is for the freecommunity to be willing and able to respondvigorously at places and with means of its ownchoosing,' through the power of US strategicnuclear forces, based largely on the intercontinentalbombers of the Strategic Air Command(SAC). Such a doctrine was only viable throughUS nuclear superiority, US ability to inflictmassive devastation upon the Soviet Union (yetupon industrial and urban targets only; militarytargets, then as now, required very accurateweapons, which SAC bombers were not). Yetas the Soviet 1CBM missile and intercontinentalbomber potential improved, massive retaliationas a concept of deterrence lost credibility. USforce survivability, or retaliatory capability, andespecially the invulnerability of SAC bombers,came into question. As strategic capabilities,both US and Soviet, evolved, so too did USdeterrence policy.'Flexible response,' as promulgated by PresidentKennedy's Defence Secretary, RobertMcNamara, held thatBasic military strategy in a possible nuclearwar should be approached in much the sameway that more conventional military operationshave been regarded in the past. Thatis to say, principal military objectives shouldbe the destruction of the enemy's militaryforces, not his civilian population. KIt was a response to the Soviet Union's introductionof its own ICBM, a developmentwhich threatened the survivability of US strategicforces, and hence rendered useless thedoctrine of massive retaliation. At the heart offlexible response, given improved missile accuracyand the introduction of photographicreconnaissance satellites, 9 was the concept of'no-cities, counterforce' strikes; main Soviettargets would no longer be industrial and urbancentres but military forces and installations.Flexible response through the 1961 Single IntegratedOperational Plan (SIOP), identified aspectrum of military targets, together with somenon-military ones. This doctrine, or 'flexiblecounterforce,' was a reaction against the inflexibilityof massive retaliation and its plan formassive use of nuclear weapons. 'Less than alloutnuclear rejoinders would be made to lessthan all-out Soviet attacks.'"' It was made possibleby improved US strategic capabilities.However, the counterforce aspect (nuclear attacksagainst military targets) of flexible responsedrew enormous criticism, primarily criticismsof its first strike aspects." Publicly,McNamara appeared to retreat; 'flexible counterforce'gave way to Mutual Assured Destruction.MAD ostensibly places great emphasis on thesurvivability of second strike, retaliatory capabilities.To defuse first strike criticisms,McNamara now emphasised unacceptable damage,however 'unacceptable' was to be determined,to Soviet urban and industrial centres.In theory, the Soviet Union would be deterredfrom attacking the United States through fearof a US retaliatory strike, a strike which wouldthreaten the Soviet Union with such unacceptabledamage. To this end, the survival of USsecond strike forces was emphasised. Neitherside, even if it struck first, could destroy theother side's capacity to return the strike, tostrike back. MAD is inherently defensive innature.The ABM, treaty, the Treaty Between the USand USSR on the Limitation of ABM Systems,tacitly endorsed this MAD deterrent policy. Asthe treaty states, 'Each party undertakes not todeploy ABM systems for a defense of the territoryof its country.''" Survivability of retaliatoryforces was coupled with the vulnerabilityof both the American and the Soviet populationsto nuclear attack; if one's popultion wasexposed to nuclear attack from the retaliatoryforces of one's enemy, then one would notinitiate a nuclear war. Such is the theory. Yetthe targeting patterns of the US remained counterforce,in essence the same SIOP of 1961."The ABM treaty, one of the two agreementscomprising SALT I, was signed by PresidentNixon, for the US, in 1972. Despite the searchfor an alternative to the 'suicide or surrender'doctrine of MAD, as it was paradoxically envisagedby the same President who signed theABM treaty, a search which resulted in a policyof 'limited nuclear options,' it was still the basisof US deterrence policy, a policy which had

60 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 76 May/June 89been primarily defensive in nature. With theadvent of the Carter administration, and specificallywith Carter's Presidential Directive 59(Pd-59), US deterrence policy became essentiallyoffense-oriented. The Reagan administrationcontinued, and enlarged upon, this offensivedirection. US strategic doctrine in the post-World War Two era, then, has been based onvarious conceptions of deterrence, but deterrencenonetheless; this was to continue into the1980s. With a basis in the late 1970s, within aframework of deterrence, US strategic doctrinewas to shift from an emphasis on retaliatory,second strike capability, MAD, to conceptsbased on limited nuclear war, warfighting strategies,and emphasis on first strike, offensivecapabilities.Whatever their ideological differences, theReagan administration's offensive strategic doctrineis in many ways a continuation of thatarticulated in the latter stages of the Carteradministration. Both reflected dissatisfactionwith MAD, yet both emphasised the importanceof deterrence as the context within which anyreplacement of MAD should be placed. Carter'sPresidential Directive 59 proved to be the basisupon which US strategic doctrine developed inthe 1980s. In many respects, this doctrine wasa refinement of Carter's countervailing strategy.PD-59, signed by President Carter in July,1980, called for 'the capacity for flexible, controlledretaliation against a full range of targetsfor any attack at any level.' 14 Such 'countervailing'strategy, wrote President Carter'sNational Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski,. . . marked an important new step in theevolution of American strategic though . . .flexibility was expanded beyond preplannedoptions. Greater targetting emphasis wasplaced on military targets, on CI,. . . itcalled for a 'look-shoot-look' capability foridentifying new and moving targets. 15PD-59 was concerned with 'flexible use ofour forces, strategic and general purpose, onbehalf of war aims that we would select as weengaged in conflict." 6 The essence of PD-59was such flexibility. Harold Brown, Carter'sDefense Secretary, has stated that the US mustbe able to attack 'a wide range of targets,' andthat credibility 'cannot be maintained. . .with. . . inflexible forces. . .' I7This doctrine represents a warfighting conceptionof an adequate deterrent. Indeed, withits emphasis on limited nuclear options andresponses, Brzezinski has referred to the 'modernisationof American military doctrine, from1978 to 1980' as moving the US 'towards a warfightingdoctrine.' 18 PD-59 represents a search,begun during the Nixon administration, for astrategic doctrine other than one which offeredonly two options: suicide or surrender. PD-59deemphasises retaliatory capabilities and insteadconcentrates on military targets and 'lookshoot-look'capabilities.Carter's counterveiling strategy, therefore,emphasises nuclear warfighting capabilities. Beyondthe traditional military bias in favour ofthe offense, however, there are also politicalreasons for such emphasis.' 9 From the outset ithas been argued that credibility, the perceptionthat one side has of the other's willingness touse their nuclear weapons, are as important todeterrence as actual capabilities. 'Power lay inthe perception.' 2 " And, as Brzezinski argues,I was convinced that our old doctrine waspolitically and psychologically credible onlyas long as America was in fact superior, andthat it might not deter an opponent capableof conducting both a major or a more limitednuclear conflict. . . Defense planning. . . hadto accommodate itself to this new reality,and our defense doctrine and programsshould be adjusted accordingly. 21In effect, PD-59 was as much a signal to theSoviet Union as it was a blueprint for fightingnuclear war.So, PD-59 was a response aimed at makingthe US deterrent posture more credible, as wellas a response to improved nuclear capabilitieswhich allowed, through improved C'l (command,control, communications and intelligence)facilities and greater missile accuracy,the US to adopt such a policy. Brzezinski hadbecome concerned that the- existing (prior to1979/1980) deterrence doctrine, 'based on theprinciple of mutually assured destruction, hadbeen formulated largely in a setting of actualUS superiority in the early sixties. . .' He hassubsequently written that PD-59, in replacingMAD, was 'a more coherent and more effectivedoctrine of deterrence, designed in keepingwith. . . the capabilities. . . of our potentialopponent and thus more likely to deter himeffectively.'" Similarly, Harold Brown believedthat MAD had been disavowed, not deterrence,when he stated that credibility cannot be maintainedwith 'a purely retaliatory counter-urbanindustrial strategy,' and, after leaving office,

U.S. DETERRENCE POLICY IN THE LATE 1980s 61that PD-59 was a 'doctrinal modification toenhance deterrence.' 2 ' Such 'doctrinal modifications'were to be further carried out underCarter's successor, Ronald Reagan.As mentioned earlier, it is not my contentionthat the Reagan administration is actively pursuinga first strike strategy, or that it believesin the possibility of a 'disarming' or 'unanswerable'first strike. However, it has been arguedthat deterrence is essentially a psychologicalconcept based on credibility of use or intent;that what matters is whether one's opponentperceives that one has the will and capabilityto use one's strategic nuclear force. Given this,then, it is important for the Reagan administrationthat the Soviet Union perceives that theadministration is willing to use nuclear weapons,and is therefore deterred from using itsown weapons. This has involved a disavowalof MAD, primarily defense-oriented, and amove toward a more offensive-oriented strategy,a strategy I have termed 'deterrence throughintimidation.' Again, this is not to argue thatthe Reagan administration believes a disarmingfirst strike is possible, merely to argue that itis important (for the US) that the Soviet Unionperceives that the US thinks it is.So, credibility of intent is of prime importance.Indeed, it was a belief that MAD lackedsuch credibility which led to the administration'smore or less overt, versus the previousadministration's tacit, denial or denunciationof the doctrine of assured destruction, but stillemphasising deterrence. The President's Commissionon Strategic Forces, led by GeneralBrent Scowcroft, highlighted the necessity ofcredibility when it reported in 1983 that;In order for deterrence to be effective wemust not merely have weapons, we must beperceived to be able, and prepared, if necessary,to use them effectively against thekey elements of Soviet power. . . Deterrenceis the set of beliefs in the minds of the Sovietleaders. . . about our capabilities and ourwill. 24MAD lacked credibility. By contrast the offensive-orientationof the Reagan administration,with its emphasis on warfighting and 'firststrike dominance' was seen as offering suchcredibility. Richard Halloran reported in theNew York Times that Reagan's NSDD-13, aplan which lays out specific military requirementsand nuclear targetting plans necessary tofight a nuclear war, 'is the first declaratorystatement of a US Administration to proclaimthat US strategic forces must be able to win aprotracted nuclear war.' 2 ' Similarly, defenseSecretary Casper Weinberger has written in ForeignAffairs that 'our Administration has acceleratedthe development of more selective,discriminate, and controlled' targeting plans,and that 'concepts of the MAD logic' have been'rendered obsolete.' 26 Finally, Weinberger hasalso warned against 'the transposition of thedefensive orientation of our peacetime strategyonto the strategy and tactics that guide us inthe event of war.' 2There is no inconsistency between, on theone hand, a concept of deterrence which isbased on intimidation, or a doctrine which hasas its basis counterforce targeting and a beliefin the value of highlighting first strike capabilities,and the knowledge that a completely disarming,unanswerable first strike against theSoviet homeland is technically impossible. 2hWhat matters is that the Soviet Union perceivesthat the US is willing to use its nuclear forces,that such use would present the Soviet Unionwith unacceptable damage (although the SovietUnion would still be left with a retaliatory capability,however diminished) and that the SovietUnion is therefore deterred through intimidation.For the Reagan administration, suchcredibility of intent is best achieved throughemphasis on first strike, counterforce-targed capabilities.Such a strategy represents a repudiationof MAD, with its stress on retaliatory,second strikes.Such a deterrence concept as that which hasreplaced Mutual Assured Destruction has beenmade possible not only through dissatisfactionwith MAD but also through technological advances.The inexorable push of technology hasmeant that American nuclear forces have becomemore and more offensive in nature. Specificallythis has meant improvement in ICBMand SLBM accuracy.US ICBMs and SLBMs are now more accuratethan they have ever been. And becausean ICBM's capacity to destroy military targets,or counterforce targets, depends overwhelminglyon the accuracy of that missile, improvedCEPs (circular error probable, a measure ofthe probability that, at minimum, 50% of warheadstargetedat an object will fall within apredicted radius of that object 29 ) have enabledthe US Administration to stress counterforce

62 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 76 May/June 89strategic targeting. As an example, the minutemanIII has a CEP of only 220m.'"In terms of accuracy, a similar situation nowexists with regard to US SLBMs. The TridentC-4 SLBM has a CEP of less than 300m. Theability of US SSBNs to link into the NavStarnavigation system 'guarantee location accuracy— in real-time terms — of ten feet or less,making the SLBM firing location almost asfixed as that of an ICBM.' 11 Moreover, theTrident D-5 SLBM, due for deployment by1989, should have a CEP of less than 120m. ,:The end result is that ensuring the survivabilityof second strike forces has, since the late1970s, become more and more difficult. Thusthe move away from MAD and, in the 1980swith improved missile accuracy, towards offensive,counterforce doctrines. In addition, giventhis inability to ensure the survivability of retaliatoryforces, the Scowcroft Commission, thePresident's Commission on Strategic Forces,recommended that the MX missile be housedin existing silos." From the Soviet viewpoint,given also that deterrence, whether based onintimidation or not, to be credible, is based onone's perception of the other's will and capability,the MX would appear to be a first strikeweapon, given its vulnerability to attack.Related to this, the Strategic Defense Initiative(SDI) may also appear to the Soviet Unionto support a US first strike doctrine. As RobertMcNamara has recently written, 'a leaky umbrellaoffers no protection in a downpour butis quite useful in a drizzle.'' 4 In other words,a defensive shield such as that envisaged by theSDI would collapse under a Soviet first strike,but would offer sufficient protection againstSoviet missiles which had survived a US firststrike.Deterrence, then, is still the basis of US strategicdoctrine. It is, however, a concept ofdeterrence which emphasises both the threat, ifnot the technical possibility, of a US first strike,and US warfighting capabilities. Such a doctrineresulted from two factors: dissatisfaction withMAD, which offered US Presidents the choiceof either suicide or surrender and was perceivedas lacking credibility, and technological advanceswhich meant improved strategic missileaccuracy.MAD is no longer the basis of US deterrencepolicy. It has been replaced by what 1 havetermed 'deterrence through intimidation.' Sucha doctrine stresses first strike, warfighting capabilitiesand emphasises that deterrence isabove all based on the enemy's perception ofone's willingness to use nuclear weapons, termedcredibility of intent. Finally, the Reagan administrationbelieves such credibility is offeredthrough an offense-oriented nuclear strategy,but one which nonetheless is placed within aframework of deterrence.QNotes1. Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style,(Lanham: Hamilton Press/Abt Books, 1986), p.97.2. Nuclear Forces in Europe, quoted in Michael Stephensonand John Weal, Nuclear Dictionary, (London:Longman, 1985), p.47.3. B.C. Brett, Rethinking Deterrence and Arms Control,Australian National University, Strategic and DefenceStudies Centre, Working Paper No. 104, (Canberra:Australian National University, 1986), p.2.4. Robert C. Aldridge, First Strike! The Pentagon's Strategyfor Nuclear War, (Boston: South End Press, 1983),p.25.5. David C. Hendrickson, The huture oj American Strategy(New York): Holmes and Meier, 1987), p.140.6. Aaron L. Friedberd, 'A History of US Strategic 'Doctrine'— 1945-1980,' Journal of Strategic Studies 3(March 1980): 39; Keith B. Payne, 'Deterrence, ArmsControl, and US Strategic Doctrine,' Orbis 25 (Fall1981): 747.7. Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, (New York:Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 175. See also LawrenceFreedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, (London:Macmilland, 1981), pp.84-90.8. Stephenson and Weal, Nuclear Dictionary, p. 157.9. Desmond Ball, 'The role of Strategic Concepts andDoctrine in US Strategic Force Development,' in NationalSecurity and International Stability, eds. BernardBrodic, Michael D. Intriligator, and Roman Kolkowicz,(Cambridge: Oelges Chlager, Gunn & Hain, 1983),p.46.10. Daniel Ford, The Button, (London: Unwin Paperbacks,1985), p.100.11. Ball, 'The Role of Strategic Concepts,' pp.47-9; Kaplan,Wizards, pp. 315-17; and Freedman, Evolution,pp.239-44.12. Seyom Brown, The Faces of Power: Constancy andChange in United Slates Foreign Policy from Trumanto Reagan (New York: Columbia University Press,1983), p.340. See also John Newhouse, Cold Dawn:The story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart andeWinston, 1973); Gerard Smith, Doubletalk: The Storyof the First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, (NewYork: Doubleday, 1980); and Raymond L. Garthoff,Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relationsfrom Nixon to Reagan, (Washington, D.C.: The BrookingsInstitutions, 1985), pp. 127-98.13. Kaplan, Wizards, pp.318-9.14. Stephenson and Weal, Nuclear Dictionary, p.158.15. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs ofthe National Security Adviser 1977-81, (London: Weidenfieldand Nicolson, 1983), p.459.16. Ibid.17. Brown, Faces of Power, p.550.18. Garthoff. Detente and Confrontation, p.790.19. For a general discussion of traditional military bias infavour of the offense see Jack Snyder, The ideologyof the Offensive, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,1984).20. Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason and Power: AmericanDiplomacy in the Carter Years, (New York: Hill andWang, 1986), p.236.

L'.S. DETERRENCE POLICY IN THE I ATI 1980s21. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p.455.22. Ibid., p.459.23. Brown, Faces of Power, p.550; Garthoff, Detente andConfrontation, p.790.24. Documentation, 'Report of the President's Commissionon Strategic Forces (Excerpts): 11 April 1983," Survival25 (July/August 1983): 177.25. New York Times, May 30, 1982, quoted in RobertScheer, With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and NuclearWar, 2nd. ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1983),p.1(1.26. Leon Wieseltier, 'Madder than MAD,' New Republic,May 12 1986, p. 19.27. Annual Report to the Congress: Fiscal Year 1983,quoted in Barry R. Posen and Stephen Van Evera,'Defense Policy and the Reagan Administration: Departurefrom Containment,' International Securitv, 8(Summer 1983): p.29.28. Gray, Nuclear Strategy, p.99.29. Walter S. Jones, The Logic of International Relations,5th. ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1985),p.354.30. Stephenson and Weal, Nuclear Dictionary, p.94.31. D. Douglas Dalgleish and Larry Schweikart, 'Tridentand the Trident,' United States Naval Institute Proceedings,112 (June 1986): 76.32. Ibid, see also Aldridge, First Strike, p.96.33. documentation, 'Report of the President's Commission,'p. 182.34. Robert McNamara, Blundering into Disaster (London:Bloomsbury, 1987), p.98.Book ReviewIMAGES OF GALLIPOL1By P. A. Pedersen and Ross BastiannPublished by Oxford University PressPrice $35.Reviewed by Colonel John Buckley,OBE.THE book is based on an outstanding collectionof photographs held by Ross Bastiaan,a young Melbourne periodontist, who is aLieutenant Colonel in the Royal AustralianDental Corps, Army Reserve.Bastiaan discovered the photograph ofGallipoli whilst doing post graduate work inLondon. Most of the descriptive photographshave not been published before. Many exhibitthe work of the British 3rd Field Ambulance;but it is a most versatile portrayal of all sectionsof the British Armed forces on the Peninsula.The Royal Navy has not been forgotten andfeatures in many of the scenes. Bastiaan hasshown great enthusiasm over many years andhas visited Gallipoli to research his project andalso London.The narrative and explanatory notes havebeen written by Dr Pedersen whose researchand writing on the First World War are wellknown to most readers. His book on "Monashthe Military Commander" is a brilliant piece ofresearch and presentation.The quality of the photographs and theirreproduction in the book deserve special mentionas also does the introduction which takesup 25 pages. It sets the stage for what is tofollow.There are some excellent photographs of theBritish battleships Queen Elizabeth; Implacable;Inflexible; the Raglan class monitors;cruisers and others. An amazing show of navalstrength during the campaign. The naval heavybombardments were not appreciated by theTurks.Recently, I reviewed Hurley at Waranother outstanding photographic record ofWWI in France and the Middle East and WWIIin the Western Desert and Syria. Both bookswill be enjoyed by the general reader andhistorian.It is remarkable how books about WWI andWWII continue to be so very popular andachieve a ready sale. It looks as though themarket will never become saturated.Images of Gallipoli is an excellentpublication.MSBS In World War Two, by G.B. (Jumbo)Courtney, Collins Publishing 1986.Reviewed by Captain B.J. FugeTHE story commences with the SamuelJohnson quote, 'Every man thinks meanlyof himself for not having been a soldier, or nothaving been to sea', and subsequently describes

',4 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 76 May/June 89some of the privileged few who have done both.This is a very witty and personal history of theSpecial Boat Section (SBS) of the Army Commandos.SBS was composed of and led mostlyby a larrikin element who successfully replacedconventional wisdom with sheer commonsense. As a tribute to Roger Courtney, theunit's founder and author's brother, and in itsaccuracy, the book stands alone as a reliablesource on the SBS.Jumbo Courtney's description of submarinesoldiering is at once instructional, humorousand interesting. The detachment of canoesoldiers to submarines effectively increased theability of submarine captains to extend their influenceinto shallow water and ashore. Thislesson has not been lost on other countries andits application in the Australian SubmarineSquadron can only enhance its effectiveness.Historically, it seems, common sense has solvedproblems more effectively than equipment. Oneexception to this was an infra red signallingdevice called a monocular which is not yet onissue in Australia.The author has been very kind to Australiansin this book and if a self-confessed 'sleazy,charming pommie' is prepared to declare us ingeniousand humorous then 1, for one, am notprepared to differ. The prospect of future workby Jumbo Courtney on Australian specialoperations is pleasing, particularly if he continueshis style, depth of research and humour.1 strongly recommend this book and look forwardto more of Courtney's work. MAUSTRALIAN INDEPENDENCE: COL­ONY TO RELUCTANT KINGDOM. By W.J.Hudson and M.P. Sharp. Melbourne UniversityPress, 1988. 153pp.Reviewed by Lieutenant R.M.O. Hawke,RANTHIS book deals with a subject which, surprisingly,most Australians have littleknowledge, and when prompted for an opinion,either express ignorance or completemisunderstanding. The central argument of theauthors, both members of the Department ofForeign Affairs and Trade, is that independencecame to Australia with the passingof the Statute of Westminster in December1931.Although 1901 saw Federation and the Constitutionbrought into being, Australia was stilldependent upon the United Kingdom. Whilstthis dependence had a definite legal status,Australian political leaders were content to ignorethis legal status and rely upon more tangible,and, to their mind, realistic bases for continuingdependence. Quite simply, Australialooked to the United Kingdom for economicprosperity and defence. Independence wasneither wanted nor needed.It was supposedly always a future goal forour early leaders that Australia would becomeindependent. Nevertheless, it was never activelysought and was indeed thrust upon us. Independencewas given in three phases between1917 and 1931; with the United Kingdom surrenderingcontrol over dominion diplomacy,their executive governments and finallylegislative control. The authors show that it wasa combination of the efforts of three "radical"dominions, Canada, South Africa and the IrishFree State, which gave independence to alldominions, including a reluctant Australia.Together with this examination of the processof independence, the book also focuses uponthe role of numerous Australian politicalfigures and their efforts to stem, or at least slowdown the process.In retrospect, it is hard to understand whythis subject has not received closer attention inthe past. Be that as it may, this work fills anoticeable gap in Australian historical and legalstudy, and does it well.U