ISSUE 107 : Jul/Aug - 1994 - Australian Defence Force Journal

56 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 107 JULY/AUGUST 1994measures in the Indian Ocean were weak and opportunitiesfor attack more favourable. Donitz thereforedecided to continue sending long-range U-boats to theFar East. Ultimately. 44 operational and transportU-boats would be allocated to Indian Ocean operations.Besides Penang. facilities to support the boatswere also established with Japanese assistance inSingapore. Djakarta and Surabaya.German Interest in Australia.One of the first references to the possibility ofU-boat operations off Australia appeared in May1944 in a report written by Kapitanleutnanf Luddenof U 188. Liidden was the first of the Monsun commandersto return home and he recommended thatpreliminary reconnaissance of the areas south andwest of Australia should be undertaken. In this way. ifit was intended to make a surprise attack with a largergroup of boats, the force could operate with a soundknowledge of traffic and defence conditions."A great weakness of German operations in the FarEast was that operational control remained solelywith BdU. The German commander at Penang. Chefim Siidraum, Fregattenkapitan Dommes. thus hadlittle flexibility and no planning authority to arrange amission to Australia. German strategic interest in theIndian Ocean was, in any case, still concentrated onthe tanker and merchant ship routes in the PersianGulf and Gulf of Aden, so no immediate action wastaken on Uiidden's recommendations.However, the Japanese still found themselves hardpressed in the Pacific and continued to request evengreater German cooperation. The Head of the JapaneseNaval Mission in Berlin. Vice Admiral Abe. madeseveral personal representations to Donitz asking formore U4x>ats in the Indian Ocean and suggesting theexpansion of their operations to include the Australianarea. With the improvement of Allied defences in thewestern Indian Ocean making targets more difficult.Donitz finally agreed to the Japanese request. Afterinitial consultation with Penang he released thefollowing message on 14 September 1944:'Operation for Pich (U 168) and Timm (U 862) inAustralian area approved. They are to sail whenready for war. Make use of Japanese knowledge ofthe traffic and defence situation."'U 168. under the command of KapitiinleutnantHelmuth Pich. was a Type IXC U-boat of 1.140 tons.Pich was one of the most experienced of the FarEastern commanders, having first arrived in PenangKorvettenkapitan Heinrich Timm— Commander U862.Photo courtesy of U-Boat Archivin November 1943. U 862 was a larger and longerrange Type IXD2 and had only recently arrived fromEurope. Timm though, had already displayed hisprowess, sinking one ship in the South Atlantic andanother four in the Mozambique Channel on thevoyage out.Donitz understood that the Australian operationwould primarily be for the benefit of the Japanese, butto show further German commitment, agreed to allocatean additional U-boat. At a conference on 26September. Donitz was able to inform Vice AdmiralAbe that three submarines would now be scheduledto operate in the Australian area.'' The third U-boatwas to be U 537. commanded by KapitanleutnantPeter Schrewe. U 537 was another Type IXC. andhad arrived in Djakarta from the Atlantic in earlyAugust.The preparations required for a sortie of three submarinesto Australia were not insignificant. Skilledmanpower was scarce and. being far from home,spare parts were almost impossible to obtain. The FarEast bases were also critically short of torpedoes andthose that were available had often deteriorated in thetropical conditions. Many of these torpedoes ranslow, increasing the likelihood of a failed attack. Inlate September, the three Australian-bound U-boatswere each ordered to be equipped with 14 torpedoes.