L20 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALIreland and New Guinea to capture those thenGerman colonies. The Royal <strong>Australian</strong> Navy'sfirst action casualties were suffered al the firstamphibious landing when Lieutenant CommanderC. B. Flwell was killed, sword in hand,on I lth September 1^14 leading a bayonetcharge against the German trenches defendingRabaul.Then in March 1915 an RAN Bridging Trainwas formed under Lieutenant CommanderL. S. Bracegirdle DSO, one of the companycommanders from the naval component ofANMEF. Five months after being raised thisunit was responsible for the ship-to-shore movementof the British Army IX Corps landingat Suvla Bay at Gallipoli. and there theyremained until the withdrawal from Gallipoli.The unit was then in demand to serve threedifferent Army Commanders, but the AIF' wonand the Bridging Train joined the <strong>Australian</strong>Army in Egypt where they supported Canalcrossings and then an amphibious landing atEl Arish as the Commonwealth Desert <strong>Force</strong>advanced up the Sinai to Palestine.At the end of 1916 the hard won amphibiousexpertise was allowed to be disbanded andthen, twenty-six years later in 1942 <strong>Australian</strong>amphibious training had to be restarted fromscratch when a Combined Operations TrainingCentre was set up in Port Stephens with adirecting staff provided by the RAN, RoyalMarines, Royal Artillery and RAAF while atToorbul in Queensland a complementary Armyschool was established under Lt. Col Rose, acavalryman from 7 Division. The 2/25thBattalion of 7 Division was the first completeunit to be trained at Toorbul while at HMASAssault in Port Stephens individual trainingwas conducted for RAN landing craft crewsand beach parties (designated Beach Commandos)and for Combined Operations Signalsunits. Interestingly in view of its role todayas base for the First <strong>Australian</strong> Landing CraftSquadron, HMAS Moreton in Brisbane thenrecruited RAN personnel with local knowledgeof the Queensland coast specifically to supportArmy amphibious training at Toorbul.By early 1944 when the whole of 6 Divisionhad been trained for amphibious operations,the First <strong>Australian</strong> Combined OperationsSection was formed to direct the amphibioustraining of the three divisions of I <strong>Australian</strong>Corps with Commander A. S. Pearson RANas SNOCOS (Senior Naval Officer, CombinedOps Section) and Senior Beachmaster for theseries of <strong>Australian</strong> amphibious landings inBorneo and New Guinea carried out in successionat Salamaua, Lae. Buna, Tarakan.Wewak, Labuan, Brunei and Balikpapan.I liese landings were executed from ships ofthe RAN's amphibious squadron comprisingthe three Landing Ships Infantry, Westrcdia,Manoora and Kanimbla. These ships eachcarried 20 RAN landing craft of a type whichwould now be designated LCVP (landing craftvehicle and personnel.) The troops landedacross beaches controlled by RAN Beach Commandos.The final <strong>Australian</strong> landing of thewar, that at Balikpapan on 1st July 1945, wasa truly combined operation with <strong>Australian</strong>troops landing from RAN ships under thecover of an RAN cruiser and destroyer force'sguns and with RAAF air cover.Apart from these offensive landings, <strong>Australian</strong>troops had to be extracted by sea byRN and RAN ships from Greece and Creteand, as an administrative move from Tobruk:all without the advantage of amphibious ships.Post-1945, although <strong>Australian</strong> Army unitshave not participated in operational amphibiouslandings, the allied land forces, of whichthey have formed part, have had to conductamphibious operations in Korea, Borneo andVietnam, and HMA ships have been involvedin these amphibious operations. Meantimesoldiers of the SAS Regiment and the Commandoshave maintained an expertise in atleast small scale amphibious operations for,by <strong>Australian</strong> definition, a section landing bycanoe or rubber dinghy from the sea and preparedto meet opposition (though planning toavoid it) is conducting an amphibious operation.'Additionally the Gunners maintainedan Amphibious Observation BaUer> until theend of the Korean War.An Amphibious Capability for the 1980sIt. Colonel Johnson's article suggested thatAustralia should raise a brigade size amphibiousforce of which a battalion group with astrength of about 1300 should be maintained1Amphibious Operation. An operation in whichland forces are landed and supported from thesea as a combat operation prepared to meetarmed opposition.
A NEW AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY FOR THE AUSTRALIAN SERVICES 21at sea. He observed that the bulk of the forcesand equipments required are already availablein the <strong>Australian</strong> Services, apart from specialistamphibious shipping, but he went on, withoutexplanation, to claim that the creation of anamphibious force would reduce the size andcapability of the three Services for the performanceof individual Service duties. Thisclaim would appear to be based on the ideathat a separate Marine Corps with its ownair support is a necessity for the conduct ofamphibious operations; but the need for sucha concept cannot be substantiated. As notedearlier, <strong>Australian</strong> Army units have conductedamphibious operations successfully in twoWorld Wars: although the US Marines conducteda series of island-hopping amphibiousoperations required in the Pacific in WorldWar II, US Army units provided the bulk ofAmerican participation in allied landings inthe North Africa and European theatre; whilein the UK forces the British Army has alwaysprovided the bulk of wartime landing forces.Even in the so-called 'peace' of the '50s to'70s, when the Royal Marines CommandoBrigade has provided the spear-head of UKlanding forces, their armour, artillery, engineerand logistic support has been provided byArmy units.In this writer's view, to meet Australia'sstrategic requirements and to give greatertactical flexibility to operations around Australia'scoast, all Field <strong>Force</strong> units should becapable of tactical deployment by sea as wellas by land and air. There would be no lossin any Service's capabilities to conduct theirindividual single service roles, but there wouldbe a very definite gain in joint capabilities forstrategic and tactical movement. A PatrolBoat inserting a beach recce party; destroyersproviding escort and/or naval gunfire support;a clearance divin« team clearing underwaterBritish LSLs beached during an exercise in the Mediterranean.