Decision Making using Game Theory: An introduction for managers

113Summary of features of mixed-motive prototypesimpossible in real-life situations, the technique at worst sheds light onwhat is an interesting category of game. Mixed-motive games like thisare often aVected by what other players are expected to do, making itimportant for players to conceal their intentions or to misrepresentthem deliberately; metagame theory, if it does nothing else, illuminatesthis deception.What experimental evidence there is supports the theory outlinedabove (Axelrod, 1981, described in Chapter 9). One-oV prisoner’sdilemma games show the predicted predisposition to selWshness (2, 2);and the results from Wnitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games, althoughthey reveal a predisposition towards unselWshness (3, 3), canalso be explained by theory and by the somewhat contrived nature ofthe situation.Summary of features of mixed-motive prototypesLeadership games∑ There are no dominant or inadmissible strategies.∑ There is a minimax solution, but it is not stable. There is a temptationto deviate.∑ There are two asymmetrical equilibrium points, which are unstablebecause the players do not agree on preferability. The value of thegame is not constant.∑ The worst case scenario comes about when both players deviate fromthe minimax.∑ There is no formal solution.∑ The player who deviates from the minimax strategy beneWts both selfand the other player, but self more.∑ It is in the interests of both players to communicate.Heroic games∑ There are no dominant or inadmissible strategies.∑ There is a minimax solution, but it is not stable. There is a temptationto deviate.∑ There are two asymmetrical equilibrium points, which are unstable