Decision Making using Game Theory: An introduction for managers

More documents

Recommendations

Info

195BibliographyJenkinson, T. (Ed.) (2000) Readings in Microeconomics (Oxford, Oxford University Press).[Papers originally published in the Wrst fourteen volumes of the Oxford Review ofEconomic Policy.]Johnston, R.J. (1978) On the measurement of power: some reactions to Laver, Environmentand Planning A, Vol.10, No.8, pp.907–14.Kagel, J.H. & Roth, A.E. (1995) The Handbook of Experimental Economics (Princeton, NJ,Princeton University Press).Kelley, H.H., Thibaut, J.W., RadloV, R. & Mundy, D. (1962) The development of cooperationin the ‘minimal social situation’, Psychological Monographs, Vol.76, No.19, WholeNo. 538.Kuhn, H.W. (1953) Extensive games and the problem of information, in: H.W. Kuhn &A.Tucker (Eds) Contributions to the Theory of Games Vol.II, Annals of Mathematics StudiesNumber 28, pp.193–216 (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press).Kreps, D.M. (1990) Game Theory and Economic Modelling (Oxford, Clarendon Press).Kreps, D.M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J. & Wilson, R. (1982) Rational cooperation in theWnitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.27, No.2, pp.245–52.Leonard, R.J. (1992), Creating a context for game theory, in: E.R. Weintraub (Ed.) Towarda History of Game Theory (Durham, NC, Duke University Press).Lewis, D.K. (1969) Convention: a Philosophical Study (Cambridge, MA, Harvard UniversityPress).Luce, R.D. & RaiVa, H. (1989) Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey (NewYork, Dover). [Originally published, 1957, New York, Wiley.]Lyons, B. & Varoufakis, Y. (1989) Game theory, oligopoly and bargaining, in: J.D. Hey(Ed.) Current Issues in Microeconomics (Basingstoke, Macmillan).Mann, I. & Shapley, L.S. (1964) The a priori voting strength of the electoral college, in: M.Shubik (Ed.) Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social Behaviour, pp.151–64 (NewYork, Wiley).Mas-Colell, A. (1977) Competitive and value allocations of large exchange economies,Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.14, No.2, pp.419–38.Maynard Smith, J. (1982) Evolution and the Theory of Games (Cambridge, CambridgeUniversity Press).McKelvey, R.D. & Niemi, R.G. (1978) A multistage game representation of sophisticatedvoting for binary procedures, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.18, No.1, pp.1–22.McKelvey, R.D. & Palfrey, T.R. (1992) An experimental study of the centipede game,Econometrica, Vol.60, No.4, pp.803–36.Megiddo, N. (1986) Remarks on Bounded Rationality, Technical Report, IBM ResearchReport, RJ 54310, Computer Science. [Quoted in McKelvey & Palfrey (1992).]Milnor, J. & Shapley, L.S. (1957) On games of survival, in: M. Dresher, A.W. Tucker & P.Wolfe (Eds) Contributions to the Theory of Games Vol.III, Annals of Mathematics StudiesNumber 39, pp.15–45 (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press).Mirowski, P. (1991) When games grow deadly serious: the military inXuence on theevolution of game theory, in: C.D. Goodwin (Ed.) Economics and National Security(Durham, NC, Duke University Press).
196BibliographyMitchell, C.R. & Banks, M. (1996) Handbook of ConXict Resolution: the Analytical Problem-Solving Approach (London, Pinter).Morgenstern, O. (1976) The collaboration between Oskar Morgenstern and John vonNeumann on the theory of games, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol.14, No.3, pp.805–16.Myerson, R.B. (1984) Cooperative games with incomplete information, InternationalJournal of Game Theory, Vol.13, No.2, pp.69–96.Nasar, S. (1998) A Beautiful Mind: The Life of Mathematical Genius and Nobel LaureateJohn Nash (London, Faber).Nash, J.F. (1950) Equilibrium points in n-person games, Proceedings of the National cademyof Sciences of the United States of America, Vol.36, No.1, pp.48–9.Nash, J. (1951) Non co-operative games, Annals of Mathematics, Vol.54, No.2, pp.286–95.O’Neill, B. (1987) Nonmetric test of the minimax theory of two-person zerosum games,Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol.84,No.7, pp.2106–9.Peleg, B. (1963) Solutions to cooperative games without side payments, Transactions of theAmerican Mathematical Society, Vol.106, pp.280–92.Phlips, L. (1995) Competition policy: a Game Theoretic Perspective (Cambridge, CambridgeUniversity Press).Plon, M. (1974) On the meaning of the notion of conXict and its study in social psychology,European Journal of Social Psychology, Vol.4, pp.389–436.Poundstone, W. (1993) Prisoner’s Dilemma: John von Neumann, Game Theory, and thePuzzle of the Bomb (Oxford, Oxford University Press). [First published, 1922, New York,Doubleday.]Radner, R. (1980) Collusive behaviour in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolieswith long but Wnite lives, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.22, No.2, pp.136–56.Rapoport, A. (1967a) Exploiter, leader, hero and martyr: the four archetypes of the 2 2game, Behavioral Science, Vol.12, pp.81–4.Rapoport, A. (1967b) Escape from paradox, ScientiWc American, Vol.217, No.1, pp.50–6.Rapoport, A (1989) Prisoner’s dilemma, in: J. Eatwell, M. Milgate & P. Newman (Eds) TheNew Palgrave: Game Theory (London, Macmillan). [Originally published as The NewPalgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, 1987.]Rapoport, A. & Guyer, M. (1966) A taxonomy of 2 2 games, General Systems, Vol.11,Part V, pp.203–14.Rapoport, A. & Orwant, C. (1962) Experimental games: a review, Behavioral Science, Vol.7,pp.1–37.Rees, R. (1993) Tacit collusion, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol.9, No.2, pp.27–40.Riker, W.H. (1962) The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven, CT, Yale UniversityPress).Riker, W.H. (1992) The entry of game theory into political science, in: E.R. Weintraub(Ed.) Toward a History of Game Theory (Durham, NC, Duke University Press).Riker, W.H. & Ordeshook, P.C. (1973) An Introduction to Positive Political Theory (EnglewoodCliVs, NJ, Prentice Hall).
Page 2 and 3:
Decision Making Using Game TheoryAn
Page 5 and 6:
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESSCambridge
Page 7 and 8:
viContents4 Sequential decision mak
Page 9 and 10:
MMMM
Page 11 and 12:
xPreface∑∑∑To Wnd new solutio
Page 13 and 14:
2Introductionvying for business fro
Page 16 and 17:
5TerminologyTable 1.1 The union’s
Page 18 and 19:
7Classifying gamesGAME THEORYGames
Page 20 and 21:
9A brief history of game theoryIn 1
Page 22 and 23:
11A brief history of game theoryano
Page 24 and 25:
13A brief history of game theoryIt
Page 26 and 27:
15Layoutexplained. Games involving
Page 28 and 29:
2 Games of skillIt is not from the
Page 30 and 31:
19Linear programming, optimisation
Page 32 and 33:
Page 34 and 35:
Page 36 and 37:
Page 38 and 39:
27The Lagrange method of partial de
Page 40 and 41:
Page 42 and 43:
Page 44 and 45:
33An introduction to basic probabil
Page 46 and 47:
35An introduction to basic probabil
Page 48 and 49:
37Games of chance involving riskV(X
Page 50 and 51:
39Games of chance involving riskthe
Page 52 and 53:
41Games of chance involving riskyu(
Page 54 and 55:
43Games of chance involving riskExa
Page 56 and 57:
45Games of chance involving uncerta
Page 58 and 59:
47Games of chance involving uncerta
Page 60 and 61:
49Representing sequential decision
Page 62 and 63:
51Representing sequential decision
Page 64 and 65:
53Sequential decision making in sin
Page 66 and 67:
Page 68 and 69:
Page 70 and 71:
Page 72 and 73:
Page 74 and 75:
Page 76 and 77:
Page 78 and 79:
67Sequential decision making in two
Page 80 and 81:
Page 82 and 83:
Page 84 and 85:
73Cooperative two-person gamesapply
Page 86 and 87:
75Cooperative two-person games∑it
Page 88 and 89:
5 Two-person zero-sum games ofstrat
Page 90 and 91:
79Representing zero-sum gamesPlayer
Page 92 and 93:
81Games with saddle pointsFigure 5.
Page 94 and 95:
83Games with saddle pointsSurgeonSt
Page 96 and 97:
85Games with saddle pointsPlayer 1a
Page 98 and 99:
87Games with no saddle pointsPlayer
Page 100 and 101:
89Games with no saddle pointsStrate
Page 102 and 103:
91Large matrices generallybigger th
Page 104 and 105:
93Interval and ordinal scales for p
Page 106 and 107:
Page 108 and 109:
Page 110 and 111:
99Representing mixed-motive games a
Page 112 and 113:
101Representing mixed-motive games
Page 114 and 115:
103Mixed-motive games without singl
Page 116 and 117:
Page 118 and 119:
Page 120 and 121:
Page 122 and 123:
Page 124 and 125:
113Summary of features of mixed-mot
Page 126 and 127:
115The Cournot, von Stackelberg and
Page 128 and 129:
Page 130 and 131:
Page 132 and 133:
Page 134 and 135:
Page 136 and 137:
Page 138 and 139:
Page 140 and 141:
129Solving games without Nash equil
Page 142 and 143:
Page 144 and 145:
Page 146 and 147:
7 Repeated gamesLife is an offensiv
Page 148 and 149:
137Infinitely repeated gamesincenti
Page 152 and 153:
141Finitely repeated gamescontinuou
Page 154 and 155:
143Finitely repeated gamesBUPALarge
Page 156 and 157: 145Finitely repeated gamesGHGLarge
Page 158 and 159: 147Finitely repeated gamesNatureGHG
Page 160 and 161: 8 Multi-person games, coalitions an
Page 162 and 163: 151Mixed-motive multi-person gamesp
Page 164 and 165: 153Partially cooperative multi-pers
Page 166 and 167: 155Indices of power: measuring infl
Page 186 and 187: 175Rationalityexperimental evidence
Page 188 and 189: 177Indeterminacygot locked into a l
Page 190 and 191: 179Inconsistencythe pot of £49 at
Page 192 and 193: 181Conclusionpost-industrial econom
Page 194 and 195: 183Appendix APlayer 1 wants to maxi
Page 196 and 197: 185Appendix APlayer 1choosesrow 1Pl
Page 198 and 199: 187Appendix Aon the straight line b
Page 200 and 201: 189Appendix Amax p min q Σw ij p i
Page 202 and 203: 191Appendix Bandp(B/A 2 )·p(A 2 )p
Page 204 and 205: 193BibliographyBenoit, J.P. & Krish
Page 208 and 209: 197BibliographyRobinson, M. (1975)
Page 210 and 211: Indexancestors and descendants 49ap
Page 212 and 213: 201Indexmaximin principle, in chanc
Page 214 and 215: 203Indexschool buses college cooper
show all

Decision Making using Game Theory: An introduction for managers

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?