Decision Making using Game Theory: An introduction for managers

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Decision Making Using Game TheoryAn
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CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESSCambridge
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viContents4 Sequential decision mak
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MMMM
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xPreface∑∑∑To Wnd new solutio
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2Introductionvying for business fro
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5TerminologyTable 1.1 The union’s
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7Classifying gamesGAME THEORYGames
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9A brief history of game theoryIn 1
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11A brief history of game theoryano
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13A brief history of game theoryIt
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15Layoutexplained. Games involving
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2 Games of skillIt is not from the
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19Linear programming, optimisation
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27The Lagrange method of partial de
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33An introduction to basic probabil
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35An introduction to basic probabil
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37Games of chance involving riskV(X
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39Games of chance involving riskthe
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41Games of chance involving riskyu(
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43Games of chance involving riskExa
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45Games of chance involving uncerta
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47Games of chance involving uncerta
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49Representing sequential decision
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51Representing sequential decision
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53Sequential decision making in sin
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67Sequential decision making in two
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73Cooperative two-person gamesapply
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75Cooperative two-person games∑it
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5 Two-person zero-sum games ofstrat
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79Representing zero-sum gamesPlayer
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81Games with saddle pointsFigure 5.
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83Games with saddle pointsSurgeonSt
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85Games with saddle pointsPlayer 1a
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87Games with no saddle pointsPlayer
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89Games with no saddle pointsStrate
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91Large matrices generallybigger th
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93Interval and ordinal scales for p
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99Representing mixed-motive games a
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101Representing mixed-motive games
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103Mixed-motive games without singl
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113Summary of features of mixed-mot
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115The Cournot, von Stackelberg and
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129Solving games without Nash equil
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7 Repeated gamesLife is an offensiv
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137Infinitely repeated gamesincenti
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141Finitely repeated gamescontinuou
Page 154 and 155: 143Finitely repeated gamesBUPALarge
Page 156 and 157: 145Finitely repeated gamesGHGLarge
Page 158 and 159: 147Finitely repeated gamesNatureGHG
Page 160 and 161: 8 Multi-person games, coalitions an
Page 162 and 163: 151Mixed-motive multi-person gamesp
Page 164 and 165: 153Partially cooperative multi-pers
Page 166 and 167: 155Indices of power: measuring infl
Page 186 and 187: 175Rationalityexperimental evidence
Page 188 and 189: 177Indeterminacygot locked into a l
Page 190 and 191: 179Inconsistencythe pot of £49 at
Page 192 and 193: 181Conclusionpost-industrial econom
Page 194 and 195: 183Appendix APlayer 1 wants to maxi
Page 196 and 197: 185Appendix APlayer 1choosesrow 1Pl
Page 198 and 199: 187Appendix Aon the straight line b
Page 200 and 201: 189Appendix Amax p min q Σw ij p i
Page 202 and 203: 191Appendix Bandp(B/A 2 )·p(A 2 )p
Page 206 and 207: 195BibliographyJenkinson, T. (Ed.)
Page 208 and 209: 197BibliographyRobinson, M. (1975)
Page 210 and 211: Indexancestors and descendants 49ap
Page 212 and 213: 201Indexmaximin principle, in chanc
Page 214 and 215: 203Indexschool buses college cooper
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