TELECOM ITALIA GROUP1. Company descriptionTelecom Italia is a business which operates in every sector of advanced communications. Its activities range fromfixed-line to mobile telephony, from the Internet to media. The group operates both in Italy and abroad, throughwell-known brands such as Telecom Italia, Alice, TIM, Olivetti, La7 and APCom.The Telecom Italia Group is a leading force in fixed-line and mobile telephony, the Internet, the media sector andoffice & systems solutions, and is currently investing heavily with the aim of expanding broadband and opening theway for a new generation of interactive and multimedia services, systems and advanced solutions for both familiesand the business world.Cabling, extensive network infrastructure and leading-edge technologies also underpin the Group's internationalpresence. In Europe, Telecom Italia is currently expanding broadband in France and Germany, and carries 60% of alltraffic between major Mediterranean basin countries. In South America, TIM Brasil has become the country's leadingnationwide GSM line provider, and is the country's number two carrier overall.Where turnover is concerned, revenue in the first nine months of 2006 was € 23 104 million, a 5.2% increasecompared with the first nine months of 2005.This very positive revenue picture is offset, however, by a high level of debt. The Group's net borrowings as at 30September 2006 were € 39 504 m, € 1 811 m less than the position as at 30 June 2006 (€ 41 315 m); this wasattributable to cash generation in the third quarter. Even given this substantial improvement, Telecom Italia stillcarries a mountain of debt. This is the result of a series of events which led to the explosive growth of a level of debtwhich was modest until 10 years ago. The reasons are to be found in a particularly turbulent decade in which therewere many changes both in the ownership structure and at the head of the Group.Chronologically, the most recent change goes back to September 2006, when Marco Tronchetti Provera, the thenChairman and leading shareholder in Telecom Italia, through Pirelli, resigned from the board of directors followingthe Government's outright rejection of his reorganisation plan. He handed over to the lawyer, Guido Rossi, whoreturned to head Telecom Italia, as he had for a few months in 1997.But what are the reasons for the explosion in the Group's indebtedness? To understand this, we need to go back to thetime when the business, having been a public undertaking, moved into private ownership.2. Economic and social effects2.1 Description of LBO (offshore base, activity focus, etc.)It was in 1997, during the Prodi Government, that the need arose to privatise Telecom Italia, a State-owned giantwhich at that time boasted a turnover equivalent to more than € 22 million, a workforce of 124 000 and holdings invarious companies throughout the world, and was the first mobile telephony operator in Italy and the country's firstInternet service provider. It was no easy matter to privatise such a huge group, but the Treasury Minister and theMinister of Industry, in conjunction with the Minister of Telecommunications, had a specific political idea, namelythat Telecom Italia would become the first Italian public company to bring together small savers and the capitalmarket, which at that point was under-developed by comparison with its European partners. There were two types ofownership structure which could be used as a basis: the Anglo-Saxon public company and the typically French 'hardcore' structure. While the first would ensure widespread share ownership with good protection for minorityshareholders, it would also have made the Telecom Italia Group excessively vulnerable, exposing it to acquisitionsby foreign companies (something that the Government did not welcome in such a strategic sector). The publiccompany model also had many negative aspects with regard to corporate governance, such as the agency costsassociated with the marked separation between ownership and control, which could lead to opportunistic behaviouron the part of management. Adoption of the 'hard core' structure, on the other hand, would undoubtedly have broughtabout greater involvement of a stable shareholder base in the company's performance, but would have run counter tothe principle underlying privatisation itself.Although the privatisation of Telecom Italia was adjudged a success from the purely technical point of view, giventhe large number of savers who bought into it, the same cannot be said about the choice of ownership structure.Negative signs of instability, unmanageability, and the lack of a leading shareholder with experience of the industrywho would pursue a clear, agreed goal all emerged in short order.
In October 1998, although the company still actually benefited from a monopoly position and high cash flow, it wasvalued at a multiple of only 1.9 times its net worth, compared with a figure of 3 for Deutsche Telekom (DT) andmore than 4 for France Télécom (FT) and British Telecom (BT). The P/E ratio 6 was 19, compared with 22 for BTand 28 for FT and DT. Franco Bernabè took the helm at the Telecom Italia Group in January 1999; he was a managerwhom the market appeared to favour, given his previous success with restructuring ENI. However, internationalinvestors criticised the Group's financial structure, which carried too little debt by comparison with what could beregarded as the optimum level. The Group's low level of debt, together with its high and stable cash flow (from TIM,especially), were the factors which opened up the possibility of a stock market raid, using high financial leverage.This situation thus made Telecom Italia a potential target. Towards the end of November 1998 it attracted theattention of Roberto Colaninno, the Managing Director of Olivetti; in February 1999, following a series of rumoursof a possible stock market raid, he launched a hostile takeover bid.2.2 Debt structure, alteration of company capital management fees required by LBOThe operation envisaged the involvement of a new company (Tecnost), to be used as vehicle to take on the debtsgenerated by the operation, which would then be transferred to Telecom Italia through a future merger, which thennever took place.In theory the acquisition should have been followed by the merger between Tecnost and Telecom Italia, resulting inthe latter shouldering the debt used to acquire it. According to the analyses carried out by the advisers the debt takenon by 'new Telecom' was supposed to be € 38 billion (€ 5.5 inherited from the pre-acquisition situation, and €32.5 bnfrom the bank loans and bonds constituting the Tecnost 'dowry'). Net borrowings are now close to € 40 000 m.2.3 Management policies and shareholder activismBernabè deployed a range of counter-measures to fight off the takeover bid. The first was a public exchange shareoffer between Telecom Italia ordinary shares and TIM ordinary and savings shares. The official aim was to carry outa merger by incorporation, so as to speed up implementation of the strategy of integrating fixed-line and mobiletelephony, the primary objective of Bernabè's strategic plan. The actual aim was to make Telecom Italia too big amouthful to swallow. If TIM had been incorporated into Telecom Italia this would actually have produced a biggercompany than its predecessor, with more capitalisation, which would then be more difficult to bid for.Colaninno resumed the attack by increasing the offer price (from € 10 per share to € 11.50), and the shareholders'meeting convened by Bernabè for the purpose of rejecting the bid, since it failed to achieve the quorum of 30% of thecapital being represented there, broke up having come to nothing. The Government, which did not support thedefence being deployed by Bernabè, consequently supported Colaninno's operation. The Treasury Ministry wasactually the biggest shareholder and, as such, nominated two members of the Board of Directors. The key point wasthat Government approval was needed for shareholdings of more than 3%; that approval was one of a series of'special rights' which are usually referred to as golden shares. The final defensive measure attempted by Bernabè,namely a merger between Telecom Italia and Deutsche Telekom, was simply dismissed by the market. Theoperation, which was, in fact, a leveraged buy-out of Telecom Italia by Olivetti, was successfully completed andbecame the biggest takeover ever carried out in Europe, and is still one of the biggest in the world in terms of value.However, the price paid has been a high one, namely net borrowings of nearly €40 000 m.2.4 Effects on job creation, labour forceTelecom Italia remains one of the biggest businesses in Italy in terms of both the size of its workforce and itsturnover. However, where jobs are concerned, whereas Telecom Italia Group employed 124 000 people in 1997, by31 December 2005 the workforce had shrunk to 86 531. More than 84% of the Group's workforce is employed inItaly.6 Price/earnings ratio: derives from the ratio between the stock market capitalisation and net profit. Indicates the levelat which the market values earnings.
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HEDGE FUNDSAND PRIVATE EQUITY -A CR
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The need for long-term investmentTh
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The pension fundsWhere does all the
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In most of the case studies, PE inv
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huge tax advantages when the rate o
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known to bank supervisors. Those da
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The demand for change and better re
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industrial policy, focusing on know
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AcknowledgementsThis report has bec
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The situation we are facing now is
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market to promote the knowledge-eco
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Typically a single strategy HF oper
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In most European countries, fund ma
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Institutional investorsCurrent and
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leverage in order to benefit from s
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1.6 The costs, the management fees
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only remaining way to boost returns
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A majority of hedge funds have limi
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Our analysis is that these concerns
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Average annual returnsTremont HF in
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1.11. Tendency of crowdingDespite t
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• Corporate governance:“In the
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Onshore FoHFsCountryUnitedKingdomGe
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ItalyBank ofItaly•Specializedasse
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Investments are often in individual
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employed 21 . Leverage effect expla
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Investments are sold off to other c
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Private Equity: European trends in
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time because of the longer holding
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Bain CapitalPartners 74.7 9Thomas H
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Sources of new funds raised (2005)C
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The private equity manager virtuall
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ownership transfers. But buyout cap
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equity value chain. The main areas
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of the table but that less mature c
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UCITS (Undertakings for Collective
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Article 49Within the framework of t
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open and secure retail markets and
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offeree company must give its views
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In its Communication on worker info
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destabilising the financial markets
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& LBOs invest. It increases financi
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privatised with a view to stimulati
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asset stripping, and the offering o
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dividend to Valentia.The second pub
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eturns well below those achieved by
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investment funds - in the UK alone
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5.3 Short sellingHistorically, hedg
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global financial markets. In 1998 t
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I talk to have got a prayer in the
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clearly destructive must be prevent
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European Union.Part III is going to
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International Settlements in Switze
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In our view, if we want to promote
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investors.The EC should set up an i
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Alternative investment fund manager
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widely differing impacts of PE acti
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estrict investment to specific asse
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Clearly the governance authorities
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- Page 184 and 185: ANNEX 1 - Case studiesANNEX 1 - Cas
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- Page 188 and 189: AA1. Company descriptionThe Automob
- Page 190 and 191: Autoteile Unger1. Company descripti
- Page 192 and 193: Bulgarian Telecommunications Compan
- Page 194 and 195: Deutsche Börse1. Company descripti
- Page 196 and 197: DIS1. Company descriptionThe DIS De
- Page 198 and 199: DT-GROUP1. Company descriptionDT Gr
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- Page 202 and 203: FRANS BONHOMME1. Company descriptio
- Page 204 and 205: Friedrich Grohe AG1. Company descri
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- Page 210 and 211: Linde1. Company descriptionLinde is
- Page 212 and 213: 2.5 Protection of minority sharehol
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- Page 218 and 219: Peguform1. Company descriptionThe h
- Page 220 and 221: PICARD1. Company descriptionPicard
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- Page 232 and 233: Viterra1. Company descriptionViterr
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