ISSUE 123 : Mar/Apr - 1997 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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4 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 123 MARCH/APRIL 1997resources it entailed was fmstrating. They faced thereal threat: the Battle of the Atlantic, and desperatelyneeded to build up landing craft, transport aircraft andother equipment for the invasion of Europe. By 1944the bomber could get through and in increasinglylarge numbers, but that year saw Allied armiesrecapture much of the occupied territories, with theirindustries and forward radar stations, demonstrate thatGerman invincibility was no longer, and shattered theWehnnacht in a series of land battles. By the end ofthe war it is true that increasing amounts of bombswere dropped and these did devastate many populatedareas, but the targets that were being attacked werealso becoming less and less relevant - and themorality of continued bombing even questionable.The Allied bombing did not do what some of itspre-war advocates had hoped - provide a quick andunambiguous victory which would not need to beshared with the other Services. The CombinedBomber Offensive at best can be described as acontributor to a successful campaign rather than asuccess in its own right. It achieved what it didbecause the industrial muscle of the West, particularlythe United States, proved so overwhelming whileGermany only started to mobilise its industrialcapacity when it was too late (possibly even later hadit not been for bombing). In campaigns of attrition italways helps to have more resources than the otherbloke. As with the even bigger and bloodier mill ofthe Eastern Front, the bomber campaign causedGerman losses but it wasn't clean, simple or safe.Martin DunnAlive and Well (Author's Reply)Dear EditorI suspect that the majority of authors regard anymisunderstanding or misrepresentation of their workas an occupational hazard, and in most instancessimply shake their heads more in sorrow than in angerand get back to serious matters. However, the extentof Martin Dunn's misrepresentation is such that I feelobliged briefly to put aside more useful endeavoursand respond.I was not "deliberately waving a red rag",notwithstanding Mr Dunn's self-important assertionto the contrary. My intention, as I stated, was toexplain what the combined bomber offensiveachieved in fact rather than myth. Nor did I claim thatthe offensive won the war by itself, but rather that itwas "one of the decisive elements in Allied victory".Mr Dunn seems unaware of the shortcomings ofthe United States Strategic Bombing Survey and, byassociation, John Kenneth Galbraith's role as one ofthe survey's senior authors. The survey wasconducted in haste at the end of World War II: itswork was to all intents and purposes finished by1946. Its findingsdepended heavily on interviews andstatements from senior German officials, rather thanthe academic rigor of archival research. And finally,its membership was narrow, as a consequence ofwhich so too was its perspective.For all those failings, the survey remains anessential reference. Notwithstanding Galbraith'swidely publicised dissenting view, the survey'smajority conclusion was unequivocal: "Allied airpower was decisive in the war in Western Europe ...its power and superiority made possible the success ofthe invasion. It brought the economy which sustainedthe enemy's armed forces to virtual collapse ..." myarticle claimed no more and no less.The final point of fact I wish to raise, concerns theeffort directed by the Allies to the combined bomberoffensive. Mr Dunn states that air forces absorbedabout 40 per cent of the war effort of the majorprotagonists. That is correct, but it is misleading inthat it refers to the total air effort: that is. the figure of40 per cent includes air defence, maritime patrol,close air support, reconnaissance, transport, and soon. According to official British surveys, the RAF'scontribution to the combined bomber offensiveaccounted for only seven per cent of Britain's wareffort. Whether or not that seven percent justified theconclusion that strategic bombing was "decisive" is.of course up to the individual to decide.My remaining concern is with Mr Dunn's attemptto belittle Richard Overy. By quoting one retiredUSAF Colonel who condemns those who supportstrategic bombing as "non-analytical historians", doesMartin Dunn seriously believe he is making acredible point? In fact, anyone who by inferenceattaches that definition to Overy runs dangerouslyclose to exhausting his own claim to credibility with asingle, self-inflicted blow. Regardless of what onemay think of Professor Overy's judgements, he is byany standard an analyst of the very highest order,considered by many to be the pre-eminent scholarcurrently writing on the Second World War. It isdifficult to find a charitable explanation for theinclusion of such a cheap throwaway line: perhapsunfamiliarity with the subject might be the kindestverdict.The essence of good history is to move forward asnew information and new judgements becomeavailable. No useful purpose is served by clingingdoggedly to pet prejudices, regardless of howpersonally comforting they may be. 1 suspect thatconstructive comment on the issues I raised will most
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 5probably address the contemporary aspects ofstrategic air operations presented in the latter sectionsof my article.Dr Alan StephensAir Power Studies CentreAlive and WellDear EditorDr Alan Stephens hits the nail squarely on thehead (Alive and Well: The Air School of StrategicThought, ADFJ No. 121 Nov/Dec 96) when he drawsthe reader to the "new" clarity regarding the nature ofthe word "strategic". 1 applaud the attention he drawsto misconceptions associated with long-range targets,enemy homelands, and the image of the machine andmission taking precedence over the nature of thetarget.I am then disappointed by the editorial decision toillustrate his article with a photograph of six F-lllaircraft labelled "Strike Force". I also believe AlStephens could risk perpetuating the samemisconceptions by his statement: "long-range aircraftequipped with precision missiles remain the preeminentexpression of strategic strike". I fear ourdesire to identify capability with one particularairframe could lead us to place retention andpreservation of a platform above this new cleardefinition of strategic thought and. by the way, at verygreat expense.Alive and Well (Author's Reply)Wing Commander J. QuaifeRAAF Base WilliamtownWing Commander Quaife has properly drawnattention to one of the most critical issues in defenceplanning. As he notes, platforms, weapons, distancesflown (or sailed, or walked) and so on have littlebearing on the classification of a particular mission. Itis the objective of the mission which is thedeterminant. Thus, a target which is "tactical" todaycould, depending on circumstances, be "strategic"tomorrow.It is, however, necessary to translate theory intopractice; and, in my opinion, long-range aircraftarmed with precision missiles currently represent theadvanced economies' best option for strategic strikeoperations. I should stress that that situation is nomore than an accident of timing and technology, aswere the combat dominance conferred in previouseras by, say. rifled firearms and iron-clad warships.Dr Alan StephensAir Power Studies CentreMilitary EthicsDear EditorIn issue number 117 of the Australian DefenceForce Journal Lieutenant G. Swinden RAN takesissue with many of the points in my article in issuenumber 115 on the teaching of military ethics. Heasks if "the debate on ethics and morality in theDefence Force [has] reached a point where they willtake precedence over tactical and military skill?"The essence of Lieutenant Swinden's letter seemsencapsulated in the statement that "those incommand, and those who expound the righteousnessof morality and ethics (such as Chaplains, academicsat various training institutions, medical personnel)should realise that in the split seconds that a leaderhas to make a decision, it should be the sound militaryone that takes precedence". This statement, it seemsto me, sums up where Lieutenant Swinden is missingthe point. Firstly, medical personnel more thananyone else currently serving in the ADF are cruciallyaware of the need for split second decision making -and they are also crucially aware of the moralimplications involved. One only needs to look at theproblems we faced in Rwanda to observe this.Secondly. "Chaplains, academics" and so on are quiteaware that a black and white approach to moralitywill not work. We live in a world where the oldcertainties of righteousness are breaking down.Far more crucially, however, we have to ask whatis meant by the term "sound military decisions".Lieutenant Swinden seems to assume that there issome sort of unambiguous military decision which iscorrect, and that it is often not going to be the"moral" decision.In this, I fear he is missing the point both aboutmorality and military decision making. A militarydecision is always going to be directed towards somesort of end - and it is not necessarily ensuring that themaximum number of enemy die for the minimumloss of your own men. The exercise of military poweris not an end in itself. You do not win a war simplyby killing more of them than they kill of you -arguably, some American commanders missed thispoint in Vietnam. Rather, there are specific strategicobjectives, which tactical operations are meant towork towards. 1 can think of no strategic objectivesthat the armed forces of a democracy might be tryingto achieve, which would be served by tacticaloperations that were conducted without concern forethical principles. Indeed, even the aimed forces oftotalitarian nations can suffer significantly if theiroperations are conducted in dubious moralcircumstances. So, leaving aside the crucial idea ofdoing the right thing for its own sake, is the idea of
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