© 2013 WUPJ, September 2013, Volume 1 CognitionHow Much do We Really Remember About 9/11?A Critical Analysis of the Neuroscience Behind Flashbulb MemoriesMichael Salna*“I remember it like it was yesterday” is a phrase often heard in relation to anemotional and vivid memory of some episode. Brown and Kulik (1977) definedthese memories in the context of momentous public events as “flashbulbmemories.” Many remember where they were or who they were with when theyheard of the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001. However, an emerging bodyof literature suggests that the defining characteristic of these flashbulb memories isthe confidence in their accurate recall, rather than their true accuracy. This paperexamines the issues of confidence and memory as they relate to 9/11 and whetherstress at the time of encoding merely improves the confidence of recall.Do you recall where you were when youfirst heard about the September 11th events?Who first told you? How they described it?Flashbulb memories (FBMs) are long-lastingand exceptionally vivid autobiographicalmemories of emotional events. Brown andKulik coined the term “flashbulb memories” in1977 and described these memories as if themind had taken “snapshots” of thecircumstances in which the memory took place(Brown & Kulik, 1977). FBMs are consideredepisodic memories (memories of pastexperiences) rather than event memories (morefactual and semantically-based; Tulving, 1972)because of the large role an individual’semotional involvement in the originalexperience plays (Curci et al., 2006). Vivid,flashbulb-like memories have been reported inthe assassinations of President John F. Kennedyand Martin Luther King, Jr., the Challengerexplosion, and most recently, the terroristattacks of September 11th, 2001 (Talarico &Rubin, 2003).Cognitive neuroscientists study FBMsbecause they can illustrate the influence ofemotions, particularly stress, on episodicmemory recall confidence and accuracy.Considerable work has been done on how stressmodulates memory. After task-learning, stressfacilitates memory retention in rodents(McGaugh, Cahill, & Roozendaal, 1996).Similarly, amygdalar arousal in humans hasbeen found to enhance retrieval for emotionalepisodic memories (Hamann, Ely, Grafton, &Kilts, 1999). The intense shock and negativevalence of FBM events is believed to accountfor the vivid, detailed recollection andconfidence individuals have in these memories.However, an emerging body of evidencesuggests that it is the “feeling of remembering,”rather than accurate factual recall (declarativememory), that is augmented with highlyemotional memories (Rimmele et al., 2011;Sharot et al., 2004). Due to the infrequency ofevents such as 9/11, little work has been done toexamine the accuracy and underlyingneuroscience of FBMs. This report will exploretwo papers that speak to these parameters andanalyze the discrepancies in arousal, confidence,and recall within the context of 9/11 FBMs.Sharot et al. (2007) explored themechanisms underlying FBMs usingneuroimaging techniques on 24 New York Cityresidents who were in Manhattan during theSeptember 11th attacks. Structural MRI scans ofsubjects’ brains were performed and followedby three fMRI scans. During the fMRI scans,participants were shown 20 pairs of words, eachconsisting of a “cue” word and a “trial” word.The cue words came from a list of 60 wordsdesigned to elicit subjective memories (eg.“building,” “radio,” and “photograph”) and thetrial words put the cue words into context usingeither “September” (suggesting the 9/11 attacks)or “summer” (referring to events experienced*Initially submitted for <strong>Psychology</strong> 3224A at the University of <strong>Western</strong> Ontario. For inquiries regarding thearticle, please email the author at msalna@uwo.ca.
HOW MUCH DO WE REALLY REMEMBERduring the summer). After scanning,participants rated their memories on six factorsselected to characterize their recollectiveexperiences: arousal, vividness, reliving,remember/know, confidence, and valence. Theycompleted the study by writing narratives oftheir 9/11 and summer memories.Proximity to the World Trade Center(WTC) at the time of the attack proved to be themost significant factor in recollectiveexperience measures. Those participants whowere Downtown, and thus closer to the WTC,not only recalled 9/11 memories with morecoherent and vivid narratives than those whowere Midtown, but also reported higher levelsof negative valence related to the 9/11 attacksrelative to summer events. Within theDowntown group, 41% mentioned a directpersonal threat from the attacks, such asavoiding falling debris, while none of theMidtown group participants mentioned anythreats. Moreover, the entire Downtown groupreported seeing or hearing the buildings collapsewith only 60% of the Midtown groupmentioning similar experiences. No differenceswere found between the Downtown andMidtown groups for summer memories, thoughDowntown participants were more confident intheir recalls and provided greater detail of 9/11memories than the Midtown group.The aforementioned memoryrecollection differences illustrate that thequantity and quality of recollected 9/11memories were enhanced in participants closerto the danger. Therefore, fMRI scans wereexpected to show increased activation of neuralcircuits related to the recollection of emotionalmemories in Downtown participants. Theamygdala, a limbic structure that generatesstress responses and modulates emotionalmemory, proved to be significantly more activein the Downtown group than the Midtown groupduring recall of 9/11 memories relative tosummer memories. The differences in memoryrecollection and the increased activation of theamygdala suggest that memories of theseemotional evens are more vivid, however, notnecessarily more accurate.Sharot and her colleagues (2007) alsofound a decrease in parahippocampal cortex(PHC) activity during the retrieval of 9/11memories from the Downtown group relative tothe Midtown group. The PHC is believed tohave a role in the processing and recognition ofscene details in episodic memory (Kohler,Crane, & Milner, 2002). During arousal,attention may be focused on the central arousingaspects of the event (for example, falling debrisor the collapse of the towers) rather thanperipheral details of the environment. Thiswould result in a failure to encode such details.Though not addressed by Sharot et al., studieson false memories have revealed correlationsbetween decreased parahippocampal activityand false memory recall (Cabeza et al., 2001).These data suggest that the decreased PHCactivity observed during 9/11 memory retrievalmay correspond with false memory recollectionfor specific environmental details.Sharot et al. (2007) acknowledged thepractical constraints in measuring memoryaccuracy due to their study taking place threeyears after 9/11. This confounding variablecould have been compensated for by examiningrelative hippocampal activation between 9/11and summer memories in their Downtown andMidtown groups. The hippocampus has longbeen known to be involved in the encoding andlong-term storage of episodic memories, andincreased hippocampal activation has beenreported when information is correctlyrecollected (Eldridge, Knowlton, Furmanski,Bookheimer, & Engel, 2000). Therefore,analyzing hippocampal activation would haveafforded some inferences of recall accuracydespite the long time period separating encodingand recall.Jennifer Talarico and David Rubin(2003) challenged the accuracy of 9/11 FBMsby probing the memories of 54 Duke Universitystudents on September 12, 2001, one day afterthe terrorist attacks. These students completedopen-ended questionnaires designed to probeboth their memories of the circumstancessurrounding their first hearing of the 9/11terrorist attacks and memories of a recent every
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