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WESTERN UNDERGRADUATEψPSYCHOLOGY JOURNALVolume 1 September 2013Featured AuthorsSaralyn RussellTaylor SalisburyAndrew A. NicholsonBryanna LucykKevin M. StubbsMichael SalnaNguyen NguyenSamik DoshiKabir DaljeetNiki Hosseini-KamkarKristin H. G. MaichAmanda KohlerJeremy M. ReinblattPavlina FaltynekGrace S. KiJimmie ZhangEditor-in-Chief

http://westernpsychclub.com/ September 2013, Volume 1Foreword“You know, it’s too bad” as I complained to Dr. Hazlewood after class one night,communicating my disappointment in the lack of an undergraduate psychology journal at Western.Every year so many students write great papers, but few, if any resurface after being submitted formarking. Continuing our discussion, I pointed out how some of the Ivy League schools haveundergraduate academic journals that not only recognize great writing, but also encourage students totake risks and write something innovative.Instead of an equally lengthy response from Dr.Hazlewood, he said the following magical words,“Why don’t you start one?” I stood there stunned, shocked by the simplicity of his suggestion. Quicklythanking him for his words of wisdom, I rushed home in excitement to write down my ideas on how tostart the perfect undergraduate journal.Rather than boring you with the details on how the logistics of the journal were designed andimplemented, I would like to spend the rest of this page thanking the large list of people that made thispossible.First of all, I would like to thank Dr. Hazlewood, not only for his fantastic suggestion, but alsohis continued support as a faculty editor with the journal. Next, I would like to thank the various facultymembers who took on positions as faculty editors for the journal. Needless to say, without theircontinuous support and advice, this journal would not have been possible. Additionally, there were alsomany faculty members along the way that tolerated my non-stop questioning to get the journal started,especially Dr. Swartzman, the Psychology Undergraduate Chair. Furthermore, I would like to thank mystudent editorial team for their hard work, determination, and resilience in making this possible. Lastly, Iwould like to thank everyone else from the school community that participated in this process (i.e., all ofthose that submitted a manuscript, the numerous teacher assistants that helped spread the word about thejournal).Jimmie Zhang, Editor-in-ChiefStudent Editorial Team, 2012-2013

http://westernpsychclub.com/ September 2013, Volume 1Copyright © 2013 Western Undergraduate Psychology Journal (WUPJ). All rights reserved. TheWestern Undergraduate Psychology Journal and its editors are not responsible for the opinionsexpressed in this journal. The sole responsibility for the content of this publication lies with the authors.Its contents do not reflect the opinion of the University Students’ Council (USC). The USC assumes noresponsibility or liability for any error, inaccuracy, omission or comment contained in this publication orfor any use that may be made of such information by the reader.No part of this journal may be reproduced in any form without the expressed consent of the WUPJ.All enquiries should be made to:Western Psychology AssociationSocial Science, Room 31151151 Richmond StreetLondon, ON, N6A 3K7uwopsychjournal@gmail.com

http://westernpsychclub.com/ September 2013, Volume 1Student Editorial Board, 2012-2013*NameConstantine LaiJimmie ZhangKristina WaclawikGrace KiChelsea DeGuzmanAmanda ShamblawNigar (Nicole) AzizliHelen JooSherry MaAnnie ZhaoClayton SouthSaralyn RussellHolly BaughmanMonica DaSilvaWhat are they doing now?McMaster School of MedicineStudying for the LSATContinuing UndergradA Real JobA Real JobClinical Psychology at QueensAdler School of Professional PsychologyA Real JobContinuing UndergradContinuing UndergradContinuing UndergradContinuing UndergradPersonality Psychology at WesternDevelopmental Psychology at Western*Names are ordered from bottom to top, and left to right, in accordance to the picture from the previouspage.Faculty EditorsNamePatrick BrownJason PerryStephen LupkerLynne ZarbatanyHelen LeeDaniel AnsariArea of ExpertiseCognition and PerceptionCognition and PerceptionCognition and PerceptionDevelopmentalIndustrial/OrganizationNeuroscience

http://westernpsychclub.com/ September 2013, Volume 1Bruce MortonTony VernonChristopher VigerDouglas HazlewoodJames OlsonLorne CampbellNeurosciencePersonalityPhilosophy of MindSocialSocialSocialUndergraduate ChairLeora SwartzmanSpecial ThanksThe Western Undergraduate Psychology Journal owes its publication to the University Western OntarioSocial Science Student Council’s Student Organization Grant. Without its generous grant, the expensivepublication of this journal would have never been possible.

http://westernpsychclub.com/ September 2013, Volume 1Clinical1 Deconstructing a DSM Diagnosis: Gender Identity Disorder (GID) in Adolescents and Adults.Saralyn Russell2 The Relationship Between Oppositional Defiant Disorder, Conduct Disorder, AntisocialPersonality Disorder and Psychopathy: A Proposed Trajectory.Taylor Salisbury3 Society’s Negative Impact on the Mental Health of Homosexuals.Andrew A. Nicholson4 Afraid of the Therapist: The Value of Internet-Based Treatments for Social Anxiety.Bryanna Lucyk5 Match-and-Motivation Model Applied: Factors Preventing Nontraditional Victims fromReporting Rape.CognitionKevin M. Stubbs6 How Much do We Really Remember About 9/11? A Critical Analysis of the NeuroscienceBehind Flashbulb Memories.Michael Salna7 The Effect of Interlingual Homophones in Vietnamese-English Bilinguals.Nguyen Nguyen8 Grasping and Manual Estimation of the Muller-Lyer Illusion at Different Exposure Times.Samik DoshiIndustrial/Organization9 Is There a Downside to Engagement for Employees?NeuroscienceKabir Daljeet10 The A1 Allele of the Taq1 A Polymorphism in Association with Addiction: A Review.Niki Hosseini-Kamkar

http://westernpsychclub.com/ September 2013, Volume 1Social11 Reducing Cognitive Dissonance Through Effort Justification.Kristin H. G. Maich12 A Review of Literature on Mate Poaching.Amanda Kohler13 Test Taking: A Research Proposal to Examine the Pressures to Conform on High and Low Self-Monitors.Jeremy M. Reinblatt14 Religiosity and its Relationship to Organ Donation Acceptability.Pavlina Faltynek15 Mirror Neuron System and Social Cognition: Understanding Others by EmbodimentGrace S. Ki

© 2013 WUPJ, September 2013, Volume 1 ClinicalDeconstructing a DSM Diagnosis: Gender Identity Disorder (GID) in Adolescents and AdultsSaralyn Russell*The present article discusses the DSM-IV-TR diagnosis of gender identity disorder(GID) in adolescent and adults. A brief summary of GID’s historical evolution isprovided, followed by an extensive literature review. Peer reviewed articles wereselected for relevance and rates of citation. It is acknowledged that high citationrates do not directly translate into article quality, and therefore some references maynot meet the highest research standards. In an effort to acknowledge other relevantperspectives, additional sources included writing by individuals with GID andreports released by invested organizations. Ten topics were identified: gatekeeping,post-operative patient satisfaction and regret, theoretical criticisms, reliability andvalidity, criterion C (absence of an intersex condition), criterion D (presence ofdistress or impairment), prevalence, comorbidity, homosexuality, and specifiers.Conflicting findings were acknowledged and implications were discussed whenappropriate. Although the GID diagnosis underwent several changes with therelease of the DSM-V in May 2013, this article only briefly touches upon thatprocess. Ultimately, the present article focuses on the literature’s state immediatelybefore the DSM-V release in May 2013.Gender identity, or one’s internal sense ofgender, is a complex and multi-faceted construct.Most people’s gender identity aligns with theirexternal anatomy; however, in some cases it doesnot. Many psychologists and sexologists havehistorically studied this issue, such as Hirshfeld(1923) and Cauldwell (1949). Perhaps one of themost influential contributions to this topic wasoffered by Dr. Harry Benjamin, who publishedThe Transsexual Phenomenon in 1966. Rejectingpsychotherapy as a valid form of treatment,Benjamin helped to pioneer hormonal andsurgical methods that are still used today (Person,2008).Fourteen years after The TranssexualPhenomenon, gender identity disorder ofchildhood (GIDC) and transsexualism appeared inthe Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of MentalDisorders (DSM-III; American PsychiatricAssociation, 1980). Seven years after that, genderidentity disorder of adolescence and adulthood(nontranssexual type) was introduced, buttranssexualism was retained (DSM-III-R; APA,1987). Next, GID for adolescents/adults replacedtranssexualism (DSM-IV; APA, 1994). Six yearslater, the DSM was revised to include only GIDfor children, GID for adolescents/adults, and GIDNot Otherwise Specified (GIDNOS) (DSM-IV-TR; APA, 2000a). Despite these distinctions, thepresent article will employ the term “GID” inreference to the lengthier “gender identitydisorder in adolescents and adults”. This is notmeant to diminish the significance of others GIDtypes. Rather, it reflects the article’s limited scopeand a goal of maintaining clear terminology.Interested readers may refer to Zucker (2010) fora discussion of GID in children, or else Rachlin,Dhejne, & Brown (2010) for more informationabout GIDNOS.GID currently has four diagnostic criteria.As would be expected, Criterion A requires across-gender identification. Criterion B requiresthat the individual is also uncomfortable with theircurrent assigned sex. Criterion C states that thediagnosis cannot be made with a concurrentphysical intersex condition. Lastly, as with mostdiagnoses in the DSM-IV-TR, the individual mustexperience distress or impaired functioning.The topic of GID is controversial and mayelicit extreme opinions. The present article aimsto maintain balance by situating the diagnosis in acritical framework that acknowledges the*Initially submitted for Psychology 4791G at the University of Western Ontario. For inquiries regarding thearticle, please email the author at srusse44@uwo.ca.

DECONSTRUCTING A DSM DIAGNOSISperspectives of several interested parties. This willbe achieved with a thorough literature review thataddresses conflicting findings. Ten subtopics willbe discussed: gatekeeping, post-operative patientsatisfaction and regret, theoretical criticisms,reliability and validity, criterion C, criterion D,prevalence, comorbidity, homosexuality, andspecifiers. These topics represent the crux of mostcontroversies and will allow for a deconstructionof the diagnosis’ underlying assumptions. As aresult, questions may be raised concerning itssocial, cultural, biological and psychologicalimplications. Although focus will be placed onwidely cited articles in peer reviewed psychologyjournals, some references to other sources willalso be used. This is meant to provide a voice togender variant individuals and other interestedparties who may not be able to publish in peerreviewed journals.Literature ReviewGatekeepingNot all individuals who are diagnosed withGID wish to alter their body through hormonetherapy or surgery. However, there are guidelinesin place for those who do. The World ProfessionalAssociation for Transgender Health (WPATH)recently released the seventh edition of itsStandards of Care (SOC) (2012). Although sometrans-activists have criticized the SOC (e.g. STP,2012), it is widely referred to by psychologistsand other health care providers. The SOCprovides different criteria to be met for hormonetherapy, breast/chest surgery, and genital surgery(sex reassignment surgery (SRS)). For example,criteria for metoidioplasty or phalloplasty (inFemale to Male, or FtM, candidates) andvaginoplasty (in Male to Female, or MtF,candidates) include: two referrals by medicalprofessionals, well-documented gender dysphoria,informed consent and age of majority, one year ofhormones, and one year of living in the genderrole that matches internal gender identity. The lastcriterion is sometimes referred to as real-lifeexperience (RLE). The SOC also recommend thatthese patients have regular sessions with a mentalhealth professional, and psychotherapy is indeedoften an integral part of treatment. WPATHjustifies their strict criteria by stating: “changinggender role can have profound personal and socialconsequences, and the decision to do so shouldinclude an awareness of what the familial,interpersonal, educational, vocational, economic,and legal challenges are likely to be” (p. 61).However, as with most systems, glitchesmay arise. Stone (1991) asserted that somecandidates are familiar with the criteria, andpurposely display behavior that will result in adiagnosis and subsequent treatment. Anotherproblem, which is arguably more serious, is theroute taken by individuals who are unable tonavigate the system. They may resort to unsafemethods of self-treatment such as illegal or nonprescribedhormones (Ray, 2006). In addition todangers stemming from improper doses, suchhormones may be injected with shared needlesand thus increase the risk of HIV infection(Nemoto, Luke, Mamo, Ching & Patria, 1999).Such individuals may also inject silicone in aneffort to achieve a more feminine or masculineappearance (Ray, 2006). Sadly, one study foundthat 2.4% of male identifying participants and9.4% of female identifying participants hadperformed self-mutilation of the genitals or thechest (Dixen, Maddever, Van Maasdam, Edwards,1984). However, it should be noted that this studywas published before the present editions of theSOC and DSM.Post-Operative Satisfaction and RegretThe definition of “success” in the contextof post-operative transsexuals is difficult toestablish, although there has been a recent shift tomeasure it in terms of patient satisfaction. Caroll(1999) found that several of the WPATH criteriadid indeed predict patient satisfaction. Theseincluded one year of RLE, use of hormones, andpsychological treatment. Other predictors weresocial support and good surgical outcomes.Interestingly, Lawrence (2003) surveyed 232transsexuals and found that good surgicaloutcome was the most important predictor of postoperativesatisfaction. She reported that adherenceto the WPATH (at that time, the Harry BenjaminInternational Gender Dysphoria Association)criteria were not associated with more positive

DECONSTRUCTING A DSM DIAGNOSISoutcomes. However, it should be noted that theWPATH criteria have changed since theLawrence study. Currently, it is still widelyassumed that the WPATH should be adhered to.In any case, there is a general consensusthat SRS has a beneficial effect on patients (DeCuypere et al., 2005; Garaffa, Christopher, &Ralph, 2010). It has consistently been found to befollowed by low rates of regret (Rehman, Lazer,Benet, Schaefer, & Melman, 1999; Krege, Bex,Lümmen, & Rübben, 2001). One study extendedthis retrospective evidence by assessing 325 adultand adolescent participants before and after SRS(Smith, Van Goozen, Kuiper, & Cohen-Kettenis,2005). The researchers reported several positiveoutcomes and a regret rate lower than 2%. Thus,although some health care professionals disagreeon the actual criteria that should be met, SRSitself is accepted as a useful treatment option forpatients with GID who wish to pursue that route.Theoretical CriticismsSeveral authors have critiques the GIDdiagnosis on a theoretical basis. For example, Lev(2005) argues that the issue must be approachedby acknowledging the historical, social andpolitical implications of diagnostic classificationsystems. More specifically, she draws uponFoucault (1978) to argue that the GID diagnosisserves as a tool of social control. Lev points outthat cross-gender identity have existed in othercultures and times without being pathologized(i.e., specifically defined), and that the presentdiagnostic criteria support sexist ideologies.Dr. Kelley Winters is a passionate andvocal advocate for GID reform. She published anarticle in 2005, arguing that the current diagnosticcriteria emphasize differences from cultural normsinstead of distress and impairment. Winters wrotethat the diagnosis is stigmatizing, and that thisresults in distress. She also pointed out that thewords “identity disorder” imply that anindividual’s identity is itself defective; a linebetween symptoms and the actual individual isblurred in the case of GID. Indeed, someindividuals deem the word “disorder” stigmatizingand insulting, and also urge for the depsychopathologisationof gender variance (e.g.WPATH, 2010). For these reasons, some havecalled for a complete removal of the diagnosis(e.g. Isay, 1997).In addition to the word “disorder”, somepeople have considered implications ofterminology used in the actual APA text. Cohen-Ketennis and Pfafflin (2010) argue that phrasessuch as “the other sex” and “cross-genderidentification” assume the existence of twoopposite and complimentary sexes. Some gendervariant individuals endorse a perspective thatmoves beyond binaries to conceptualize gender asmulti-dimensional and ultimately indefinable (e.g.Butler, 1990; Bornstein, 1994). Indeed, someindividuals describe their identity as “3rd gender”,“gender fluid”, “bigender/two-spirit”,“genderless” or “pan-/poly-/omnigendered”(Bockting, 2008, p. 214). Individuals whounderstand their own gender through this lensmay reject a diagnosis of GID but still desiresome combination of hormones or surgery.Reliability and ValidityConsidering the permanence andmagnitude of some treatments for GID, validityand reliability of the diagnostic criteria areimportant. Unfortunately, formal assessments ofthese constructs have not been completed. As of2006, “no one ha[d] ever conducted a formalreliability study for the GID diagnosis as itpertains to adolescents (or adults for that matter)”(Zucker, 2006, p. 541). Four years later, Cohen-Kettenis and Pfafflin (2010) noted that this hadnot changed. According to these authors, no interraterreliability studies or structured interviewsassessing DSM-IV-TR GID had been conducted.The same article also acknowledged that there is alack of studies examining the validity of themeasures in the area. GID’s controversial naturedoes not lend itself to validity studies; it isdifficult to determine the validity of shiftingcriteria that are widely contested for multiplereasons. The authors suggested using the successof SRS as an indirect test of the diagnosis’validity. This success has indeed beendemonstrated, as already discussed in the presentarticle.

DECONSTRUCTING A DSM DIAGNOSISCriterion C: Absence of a Concurrent PhysicalIntersex ConditionAs noted earlier, criterion C requires thatthe person does not have a concurrent physicalintersex condition (or disorder of sex developmentor DSD; Hughes, I. A., Houk, C., Ahmed, S. F.,Lee, P. A., & LWPES/ESPE, 2006). Anindividual with DSD who satisfies all othercriteria would be diagnosed with GIDNOS. Thiswas added as a criterion because people with DSDdiffer in some relevant ways from those withoutDSD. For example, Meyer-Bahlburg (1994)reported differences in age of onset, sex ratio,prevalence and predictive factors between groupsof transsexuals with and without DSD. Cohen-Kettenis and Pfafflin (2010) acknowledged thatsome people believe this leads to the performanceof unnecessary physically invasive exams in aneffort to ensure that DSD is not present. Theauthors promptly dismissed this concern bystating that this rarely occurs, since a brief noninvasiveexamination usually confirms theabsence of indications of DSD. Richter-Appeltand Sandberg (2010) also defended the criterion,concluding that the distinction should bemaintained in the fifth edition of the DSM. Theauthors argued that this would allow moreindividualized and beneficial care. The generalconsensus seems to be that criterion C is justified.Criterion D: Distress and/or ImpairmentIn order for a condition to qualify as amental disorder in the DSM-IV-TR, there must beevidence of impairment and/or distress. Thiscriterion was originally added to the DSM III toavoid labeling individuals with mental disorderswhen unnecessary. However, in the case of GID,this criterion can take on a new meaning. Itimplies that individuals must be distressed orexperiencing impaired functioning in order toqualify for SRS. This is usually not a barrier inclinical settings, as most clinicians assumedistress is inherent in the “dysphoria” aspect ofthe diagnosis (Cohen-Kettenis & Pfafflin, 2010).However, Meyer-Bahlburg (2010) reviewed thisissue and ultimately disagreed with thisassumption. He stated that patients in clinicalsettings vary in their stress levels and copingstrategies, just as non-gender variant individuals.Furthermore, he noted that distress varied acrosstime, and it is therefore inappropriate to assumeall individuals who wish to change gender aredistressed.Slippery Statistics: Prevalence andEpidemiologyUnfortunately, it has proven difficult toaccurately determine the prevalence of GID. TheDSM-IV (APA, 1994) states that the prevalence is1:30,000 adult males and 1:100,000 adult females.However, these numbers are likely based onoutdated European data collected by Hoenig andKenna (1974). When work began on the seventhedition of the SOC, WPATH commissioned anarticle on the epidemiology of GID. The resultwas an up-to-date summary submitted by Zuckerand Lawrence (2009). Notably, the authorsreported that there have been absolutely no formalstudies that accurately determine the prevalenceof GID in adults and adolescents. They explainedthat researchers have mainly attempted todetermine prevalence by assessing the amount ofpatients who visit clinics with the goal ofreceiving hormones or SRS. The authors clearlystated that this method of sampling likelyunderestimates GID prevalence. Nevertheless,they attempted to draw tentative conclusionsusing data from 25 clinics. Several overarchingtrends were identified, including: more MtFtranssexuals than FtM transsexuals, a lower age ofpresentation for FtM transsexuals than MtFtranssexuals, and a significant increase in numberof patients in recent years. They concluded byaccepting that GID is rare, while acknowledgingthat their data are informed estimates at best.ComorbidityComorbid disorders in GID seem to becommon. Although causation is difficult todetermine, it is likely that these figures arepartially attributable to societal stigmaexperienced by individuals with GID. One studyassessed a sample of 31 patients treated for GID,reporting that 71% of the participants also met thecriteria for a current or lifetime Axis I diagnosis(Hepp, Kraemer, Schnyder, Miller, & Delsignore,

DECONSTRUCTING A DSM DIAGNOSIS2005). Axis I diagnoses can be quite serious, asthey include clinical disorders and developmentaland learning disorders. Another study examinedpsychological functioning in 13 FtM and 22 MtFtranssexuals in Belgium after their transitions.Although high rates of comorbid mental disorderswere found in both groups, higher rates emergedin the MtF group (De Cuypere, Jannes, & Rubens,1995).Of particular importance are comorbidpsychotic disorders such as schizophrenia. In thecurrent practice, an individual can be diagnosedwith both GID and schizophrenia (APA, 2000a, p.537). The relationship between the two disordersis complicated. Some individuals withschizophrenia have delusions involving genderchange (Borras, Huguenet, & Eytan, 2007).Maderson and Kumar (2001) described a case inwhich GID manifested along with schizophrenia.This is not to say that all individuals with GID arepsychotic; rather, it is presented as information toconsider when making diagnoses and treatmentrecommendations. It is unwise for a diagnosis tobe made during an acute psychotic episode, andcare should also be taken in the case of morechronic presentation.GID and Homosexuality: Parallel Diagnoses?Homosexuality was replaced in the DSMby ego-dystonic homosexuality in 1973, with thelatter subsequently being removed in 1986. Recallthat gender identity disorder of children (GIDC)and transsexualism were introduced in 1980,which laid the groundwork for the presentdiagnosis of GID. This timing led some critics tomake an intriguing argument that GID and itsrelated diagnoses were a covert way of “catching”individuals who would have been diagnosed withhomosexuality before 1973. A summary of thiscriticism in the literature, as well as a rebuttal,was provided by Zucker and Spitzer (2005).Some people draw parallels betweenhomosexuality and GID, arguing that GID shouldbe removed from the DSM because itpathologizes natural variance just as thehomosexuality diagnosis did (e.g. Ault & Brzuzy,2009). This is a view that is particularly endorsedby many activists. While this argument does havesome merits, it draws an oversimplified parallelbetween the two diagnoses. Homosexualitycannot be treated (APA, 2000b), but someindividuals with GID seek out and benefit fromtreatment. Thus, “while removal from the DSMled to a liberating and immediate ‘cure’ formembers of the gay community, a similarapproach with GID could have adverse treatmentconsequences, particularly for the anatomicallydysphoric transgender individuals seeking or inneed of medical transition” (Drescher, 2010, p.446). In other words, if hormones or surgery wereno longer medically necessary to treat a disorder,insurance coverage in some areas could cease.Although this may appear to be a mere practicalsnag, it would potentially have far-reaching andserious consequences. This is a concern that hasbeen echoed by non-psychologists invested in theissue. For example, Vance et al. (2010) surveyed43 organizations concerned with the welfare ofgender variant people. While 55.8% agreed thatGID should be excluded from the DSM V, thosewho thought it should be maintained cited healthcare reimbursement as the most common reason.In addition, Green et al. (2011) noted that thediagnosis can help establish legal identity rightsfor individuals with GID. Thus, removing thediagnosis would not be the simple cure that someactivists advocate for. Forty years after theremoval of homosexuality from the DSM, theissue of GID removal is still muddled and capableof eliciting passionate opinions among investedparties.SpecifiersAs seen in the previous section, sexualityand gender identity often cross paths in the DSM.Interestingly, sexuality is implicated in GID in adirect way through four specifiers: sexuallyattracted to males, females, both, or neither. Thespecifiers originally emerged in the DSM-IV(APA, 1994) and are based on work published byRay Blanchard (e.g., Blanchard, 1989; Blanchard,Clemmensen, & Steiner, 1987).Cohen-Kettenis and Pfafflin (2010) notedthat although no clinical decisions are based onthe subtypes, distinguishing between them may beuseful for research purposes. However, they also

DECONSTRUCTING A DSM DIAGNOSISnoted that applicants may not be truthful whenreporting their sexual orientation clinically.Lawrence (2010) strongly supported retention ofthe sexual orientation subtypes in the upcomingversion of the DSM. She argued that the subtypesare useful for several reasons: they “can be easilyascertained”, they “facilitate concise,comprehensive clinical description”, they “offerprognostic value for treatment-related outcomes”,they “offer predictive value for comorbidpsychopathology”, they “facilitate research andoffer heuristic value”, and they are“unambiguous” (p. 530). Despite these interestingpoints, the sexual orientation specifier was deletedin the DSM V because it was “not consideredclinically useful” (APA, 2013b, p.15).Brief Commentary on DSM VThe present article offers a review of theliterature concerning GID up to 2012. However,significant new developments have occurred withthe publication of the DSM V in May 2013. Inpreparation for the new DSM, the APA created aWork Group for Sexual and Gender IdentityDisorders. The group was chaired by Dr. KennethZucker. The Gender Identity Disorders sub-workgroup consisted of Dr. Peggy Cohen-Kettenis, Dr.Jack Drescher, Dr. Heino Meyer-Bahlburg, andDr. Friedemann Pfafflin. These individuals, all ofwhom were cited in the present literature review,were charged with the task of reviewing literatureand making recommendations. They wiselysought out opinions from activists by surveyinginvested organizations that are active withtransgendered individuals (Zucker, 2009). Afterworking for several years on the issue, decisionswere finalized and the process came to a close.Gender identity disorder has been replaced by thearguably more respectful diagnosis of GenderDysphoria, defined as “a marked incongruencebetween one's experienced/expressed gender andassigned gender” (DSM V; APA, 2013a). A fulldiscussion of the issues surrounding this newdiagnosis is beyond the scope of this article.Interested readers can refer to an article written bythe APA which summarizes the DSM V changes(APA, 2013b, p. 14-15).ConclusionThe present article has reviewed severaltopics that are relevant to GID. These includepsychologists’ role as gatekeepers, post-operativepatient satisfaction and regret, theoreticalcriticisms, reliability and validity, criterion C,criterion D, prevalence, comorbidity,homosexuality, and specifiers. As this review hasperhaps demonstrated, GID is one of the mostcontroversial disorders in modern daypsychology. Its diagnostic criteria have evolvedwith each new edition of the DSM and willcontinue to do so in the future.History suggests that our understanding ofgender shifts based on social factors, such aspolitical and cultural influences. It is thereforeunderstandable that critics both within and outsidethe field of psychology have questioned thediagnosis of GID, which has now been replacedwith gender dysphoria. It is important toacknowledge the views of all stakeholders,although this author believes that the mostimportant stakeholders are the clients themselves.Despite the passionate disagreements which ariseat times, all parties share the same goal ofimproving patients’ quality of life. Dialogue andfuture research will facilitate the achievement ofthat goal.First Received: 1/23/2013Final Revision Received: 4/7/2013

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DECONSTRUCTING A DSM DIAGNOSISRichter-Appelt, H., & Sandberg, D. E. (2010).Should disorders of sex development be anexclusion criterion for gender identitydisorder in DSM 5? International Journalof Transgenderism, 12(2), 94-99. doi:10.1080/15532739.2010.515181Smith, Y. L. S., Van Goozen, Stephanie H. M.,Kuiper, A. J., & Cohen-Kettenis, P.(2005). Sex reassignment: Outcomes andpredictors of treatment for adolescent andadult transsexuals. PsychologicalMedicine, 35(1), 89-99. doi:10.1017/S0033291704002776Stone, A. R. (as Sandy Stone) (1991). The empirestrikes back: A posttranssexual manifesto.In: Body Guards: The Cultural Politics ofGender Ambiguity, eds. J. Epstein & K.Straub. New York: Routeledge, p. 280-304.STP (Stop Trans Pathologisation). (2012).Reflections on the SOC-7. Retrieved fromhttp://www.stp2012.info/STP2012_Reflections_SOC7.pdfVance, S. R., Cohen-Kettenis, P., Drescher, J.,Meyer-Bahlburg, H., Pfäfflin, F., &Zucker, K. J. (2010). Opinions about theDSM gender identity disorder diagnosis:Results from an international surveyadministered to organizations concernedwith the welfare of transgender people.International Journal of Transgenderism,12(1), 1-14.doi:10.1080/15532731003749087Winters, K. (2005). Gender dissonance:Diagnostic reform of gender identitydisorder for adults. Journal of Psychology& Human Sexuality, 17(3-4), 71-89. doi:10.1300/J056v17n03_04WPATH Board of Directors. (2010). Depsychopathologisationstatement releasedMay 26, 2010. Retrieved fromhttp://www.wpath.org/announcements_detail.cfm?pk_announcement=17WPATH. (2012). Standards of Care for the Healthof Transsexual, Transgender, and GenderNonconforming People. (7th ed.).Retrieved fromhttp://www.wpath.org/documents/SOC%20V7%2003-17-12.pdfZucker, K. J., & Spitzer, R. L. (2005). Was thegender identity disorder of childhooddiagnosis introduced into DSM-III as abackdoor maneuver to replacehomosexuality? A historical note. Journalof Sex & Marital Therapy, 31(1), 31-42.doi: 10.1080/00926230590475251Zucker, K. J. (2006). Commentary on Langer andMartin's (2004) "how dresses can makeyou mentally ill: Examining genderidentity disorder in children". Child &Adolescent Social Work Journal, 23(5-6),533-555. doi: 10.1007/s10560-006-0074-5Zucker, K. J. (2009). Report of the DSM-5Sexual and Gender Identity DisordersWork Group. Retrieved fromhttp://www.dsm5.org/progressreports/pages/0904reportofthedsmvsexualandgenderidentitydisordersworkgroup.aspxZucker, K. J. (2010). The DSM diagnostic criteriafor gender identity disorder in children.Archives of Sexual Behavior, 39(2), 477-498. doi: 10.1007/s10508-009-9540-4Zucker, K. J., & Lawrence, A. A. (2009).Epidemiology of gender identity disorder:Recommendations for the standards ofcare of the world professional associationfor transgender health. InternationalJournal of Transgenderism, 11(1), 8-18.doi: 10.1080/15532730902799946

© 2013 WUPJ, September 2013, Volume 1 ClinicalThe Relationship Between Oppositional Defiant Disorder, Conduct Disorder, AntisocialPersonality Disorder and Psychopathy: A Proposed TrajectoryTaylor Salisbury*This review paper critically examines the literature on oppositional defiant disorder(ODD), conduct disorder (CD), antisocial personality disorder (APD) and psychopathy.Through examining diagnostic criteria laid out in the DSM-IV along with statistics relatedto diagnosis and prognosis, the idea that ODD, CD, and APD may fall on a developmentaltrajectory as opposed to being distinct, categorical entities is proposed. Additionally, thenotion that these three disorders may represent narrow, behavioural indicators of a generalpsychopathic personality is suggested using comparisons to Hare’s Psychopathy ChecklistRevised (PCL-R). Several implications related to child development, family instabilityand violence, as well as labeling and stigma are discussed and the importance of familyintervention and involvement is highlighted. Finally, a number of implications related tothe criminal justice system, including the prediction of conviction and recidivism rates,are explored.The construct of psychopathy has had along history within the literature of clinical andforensic psychopathology, constantly evolvingthrough revisions of the Diagnostic andStatistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)used extensively by psychologists. It wasidentified by clinical psychologists as one of thefirst acknowledged personality disorders, called‘Psychopathic Personalities’ and was publishedin the first edition of the DSM as ‘SociopathicPersonality Disorders’ (Ogloff, 2006). TheDSM-II changed this label to ‘PersonalityDisorder, Antisocial Type’ in 1968 (Ogloff,2006), which has ultimately progressed to thecurrent title ‘Antisocial Personality Disorder(APD)’ in the most recent version, the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychological Association,2000). Historically, the terms asocial, sociopath,psychopath, and APD have been usedinterchangeably; however, recent improvementsin nosology have helped to clarify thedistinction between them. The largely casestudy/clinical description-based format of theDSM-II evoked criticisms of poor inter-raterreliability which led to the development of thespecific-criteria approach used in currentversions of the DSM today (Ogloff, 2006).Now, criteria in the DSM are based on overtbehavioural traits that can be observed andmeasured instead of relying on the oftenambiguous interpersonal and affectivepersonality characteristics used to inferdiagnoses in the past (Coid & Ullrich, 2010).This improvement helped distinguish betweenAPD and general psychopathy, with the formerconstruct focusing on the overt antisocialbehaviours of such individuals and the lattercharacterizing a more overarching personalitystyle involving interpersonal, affective, andbehavioural dimensions (Ogloff). Drawing thisdistinction between behavioural and personalityfactors undoubtedly helped resolve some of theinter-rater reliability criticisms from the past.However, in doing so, it has generated thenotion that overt behaviours can actually beseparated from personality factors, and thatmental disorders and personality disorders arereal and distinct categorical entities withindependent characteristics. That being said, alarge body of literature supports the idea thatAPD, and several other disorders diagnosed inchildhood and adolescence, are actually on acontinuum with psychopathy and may bespecific points along a developmental trajectoryrather than distinct diagnostic categories (Burke,Waldman, & Lahey, 2010; Coid & Ullrich). Adiagnosis of Oppositional Defiant Disorder(ODD) and/or Conduct Disorder (CD) inchildhood or adolescence often precedes the*Initially submitted for Psychology 3310F at the University of Western Ontario. For inquiries regarding thearticle, please email the author at tsalisb4@uwo.ca.

ODD.CD.APDdevelopment of APD in adulthood, all of whichmay serve as narrow, behavioural indicators of ageneral psychopathic personality. Examiningthese behavioural disorders from adevelopmental standpoint is important asseveral implications related to childdevelopment and the criminal justice system canbe drawn.The DSM-IV-TR describes ODD as apattern of “negativistic, defiant, disobedient, andhostile behaviour towards authority figures”(Rowe, Costello, Angold, Copeland, &Maughan, 2010, p. 726) lasting at least sixmonths and causing significant distress orimpairment in the child’s life. Some typicalbehaviours include irritability, frequently losinghis or her temper, arguing with adults,deliberately provoking people, and blamingothers for his or her own misbehaviour(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Thisbehavioural disorder usually onsets early inchildhood, around two to four years of age, andis characterized by a display of oppositionalbehaviours and emotions in contexts involvingother people, particularly those in positions ofauthority (Hofvander, Ossowwki, Lundstrom, &Anckarsater, 2009). There has been somespeculation as to whether these behaviours areindicative of an actual disorder or are merelytypical childhood acts of rebellion (Hofvander etal., 2009). However, it is the persistence ofthese behaviours (i.e., lasting at least sixmonths) and their ability to cause significantdistress in a child’s life that distinguishesbetween such normal acts of rebellion andclinically-disordered behaviour (AmericanPsychiatric Association, 2000). Additionally,several longitudinal studies have noted strikingsimilarities between ODD and other childhooddisruptive behaviour disorders (e.g., ADHD,CD) and have proposed that they may reflectmanifestations of the same behavioural disorderat different stages in development (Burke et al.,2010).Rowe et al. (2010) assessed cohorts ofchildren aged three to seven to examine thepredictive validity of ODD to CD. They foundthat ODD was a significant predictor of childonsetCD with 79% of the children diagnosedwith CD meeting diagnostic criteria for ODDdirectly before, or at the same time as the CDdiagnosis. Other longitudinal evidence confirmsthat ODD typically has an earlier onset and ismore prevalent than CD, with ODD childrenbeing at greater risk of being diagnosed with CDlater in life (Burke et al., 2010).It is important to note that in order to bediagnosed with ODD, the child must not meetcriteria for CD (American PsychiatricAssociation, 2000). However, clinical studieshave demonstrated that 60 to 95% of CD casesinclude a comorbid ODD diagnosis (Rowe etal., 2010). Such a high rate of comorbidity inCD patients suggests that CD may be a moreserious form of ODD along the samebehavioural trajectory. It is also significant tonote that ODD has been shown to predict lateronset of CD, but there has been no confirmingevidence of a reciprocal relationship (i.e., CDleading to ODD), thereby lending more supportto the developmental pathway of thesedisruptive behavioural disorders.Since CD is often seen as a more seriousform of ODD, it is not surprising that many, ifnot all, of the features of ODD are usuallypresent in cases of CD. CD is characterized bygeneral violation of the basic rights of others,with other defining features includingaggression towards people and animals,destruction of property, deceitfulness, theft,rule-breaking, and serious violation of societalnorms (American Psychiatric Association,2000). CD has an age of onset similar to ODD,with symptoms emerging as young as four tofive years old, and can be diagnosed inchildhood, adolescence, or adulthood(Hofvander et al., 2009). Of course, not allchildren diagnosed with ODD go on to developCD (American Psychiatric Association, 2000);however, child-onset cases of CD are typicallypreceded by ODD and patterns of physicalviolence and family instability appear to beimportant factors in the transition (AmericanPsychiatric Association, 2000; Rowe et al.,2010).Milan and Pinderhughes (2006)examined the relationship between familyinstability and child development and suggested

ODD.CD.APDthat early patterns of instability are related toexternalizing behaviour problems (e.g.,outwardly defiant behaviour). The authors alsofound that:“high levels of family instabilityincreased the likelihood that a child would meetcriteria for diagnosis [of a disorder in the DSM-IV] in third grade, beyond the predictiveaccuracy attained through early measures ofbehaviour problems from teachers and mothers(p. 53)”.Furthermore, Campbell, Shaw, andGilliom (2000) found that an early childhoodenvironment with negative parenting and familystress combined with patterns of hyperactivityand aggression may exacerbate the progressionof externalizing behaviour problems. Finally,Skodol et al. (2007) determined that positivechildhood experiences (e.g., achievements,positive relationships, and competentcaretakers) were associated with betterprognoses and remission from certainpersonality disorders. The results of thesestudies lend support to the notion that anunstable family environment may be acontributing factor in the progression from ODDto child-onset CD. However, the relationshipbetween ODD and adolescent-onset CD is lessclear and further research is necessary tounderstand how they are related (Burke et al.,2010).The relationship between CD and APD,however, is quite well understood inpsychopathological literature. In fact, one of thediagnostic criteria for APD, as laid out in theDSM-IV-TR, is evidence of conduct disorderbefore the age of 15 (American PsychiatricAssociation, 2000). The fact that the DSMarranged these disorders in a hierarchicalfashion suggests that they are at the very leastrelated, if not variations of the same underlyingdisorder. Similar to the way ODD and CD arerelated, all of the behavioural manifestations ofCD are present in APD on a more extreme scale.Other diagnostic criteria of APD includeviolations of social norms with respect to thelaw, persistent deceitfulness, impulsivity,recklessness, irresponsibility, and lack ofremorse (Ogloff, 2006). Violence andcriminality are two defining features of thisdisorder, with a significant proportion of peoplewith APD engaging in a criminal lifestyle (Coid& Ullrich, 2010). The main theme underlyingAPD is a general disregard for the rights ofothers, often to the extent of manipulation forpersonal benefit. Both CD and APD arecharacterized by disruptive behaviour violatingthe rights of others, with APD beingdistinguished by a more encompassingantisocial lifestyle.Not all cases of CD progress to adiagnosis of APD; however, numerousempirical studies have demonstrated a stronglink between the two. Gelhorn, Sakai, Price, andCrowley (2007) noted that generally, around40% of people with CD move on to developAPD. They tested this figure by examining asample from the National Epidemiologic Surveyon Alcohol and Related Conditions (NESARC)and found the percentage to be significantlyhigher, with 75% of their sample of CD patientsalso meeting diagnostic criteria for APD at theage of 18 (Gelhorn et al.). Hofvander et al.(2009) suggested that approximately half ofchildren with CD develop APD in adulthood,while another longitudinal study demonstratedthat around one third of their sample of CDcases progressed to APD, which wasinterestingly around the same percentage ofchildren with ODD that went on to develop CD(Burke et al., 2010).Although many children and adolescentswith ODD or CD outgrow their disorder andhave symptoms that persist only at a subclinicallevel, the relationship of these two childhooddisorders to APD is pronounced. The significantoverlap in behavioural criteria needed todiagnose these three disorders and the fact thatthey are arranged hierarchically in the DSM-IV-TR suggests that they may be age-dependentmanifestations of the same behavioural disorderalong distinct points of a developmentaltrajectory ending in APD.That being said, as previously discussed,the DSM-IV-TR utilizes a behavioural approachin developing diagnostic criteria to eliminateconfusion and improve reliability of diagnosisbetween clinicians (Coid & Ullrich, 2010).

ODD.CD.APDSince diagnoses of ODD, CD, or APD arerestricted to observing only the behaviouralmanifestations of the disorder, it is plausible tosuggest that all three of these disorders arerelated to the construct of psychopathy whichencompasses behavioural, interpersonal, andaffective characteristics of the antisocialpersonality not otherwise taken into account byclinicians using the DSM-IV-TR.The Psychopathy Checklist Revised(PCL-R) developed by Robert Hare is avalidated 20- item measurement tool used toassess a person’s level of psychopathy based onthese behavioural, interpersonal and affectivetraits. Many of the behavioural dimensionsassessed in the PCL-R are consistent with thediagnostic criteria laid out for APD (e.g.,irresponsibility, impulsivity, violation of socialnorms). Interpersonally, psychopathicindividuals come off as “grandiose, arrogant,callous, dominant, superficial, deceptive, andmanipulative. Affectively, they are shorttempered,unable to form strong emotionalbonds with others, and lacking in empathy,guilt, remorse, or deep-seated emotions.” (Hare,Clark, Grann, & Thornton, 2000, p. 624). It hasbeen noted that certain items on the PCL-R alsorelate directly to ODD and CD (Coid & Ullrich,2010). For example, criteria for diagnosingODD in the DSM-IV, such as ‘often losestemper’, ‘argues with adults’, and ‘blamesothers for his or her mistakes or misbehaviour’are directly related to ‘poor behaviouralcontrols’ (item 3 on the social deviance factor)and ‘failure to accept responsibility for ownactions’ (item 8 on the interpersonal/affectivefactor) on the PCL-R (American PsychiatricAssociation, 2000; Hare, 2003). Similarly, thecriteria ‘deceitfulness or theft’ and ‘often lies toobtain goods or favours or to avoid obligations(i.e., “cons” others)’ necessary for a CDdiagnosis are directly related to items 3 and 4 onthe interpersonal/affective dimension of Hare’sPCL-R: ‘pathological lying’ and‘conning/manipulative’ (American PsychiatricAssociation, 2000; Hare, 2003). Finally, CDcriteria such as ‘often stays out at night, despiteparental prohibitions, beginning before age 13years’ and ‘is often truant from school,beginning before age 13 years’ directlycorrespond to ‘early behavioural problems’ and‘juvenile delinquency’ in the PCL-R (i.e., items4 and 8 on the social deviance dimension;American Psychiatric Association, 2000; Hare,2003).Coid and Ullrich (2010) also found asignificant correlation between severity of APDand severity of psychopathy as measured byscores on the PCL-R, thereby supporting thenotion that the two constructs are on acontinuum. They noted that some of the criteriaused to diagnose APD in the DSM-IV-TR (e.g.,deceitfulness, irritability, aggressiveness, andrecklessness) are essentially measuring the samethings assessed in the PCL-R (e.g., beingconning, manipulation, poor behaviouralcontrols, and irresponsibility). Despite thesignificant correlation, not all individuals withAPD are considered psychopathic. Because ofthe DSM-IV- TR’s focus on overt behaviours,all individuals with APD would satisfy at leastsome of the criteria laid out in the PCL-R, withthe interpersonal and affective dimensionsdistinguishing the psychopathic vs.nonpsychopathic APD individuals. Thesefindings suggest that APD may be a moderateform of psychopathy based upon a narrowsubset of behavioural traits. Those individualswith APD also possessing the interpersonal andaffective characteristics would score higher onthe PCL-R and be considered psychopathic if ascore of 25 or more was obtained (Coid &Ullrich, 2010).These findings have several implicationswithin the criminal justice system. Aspreviously discussed, violence and criminalityare two defining features of APD and thereforepsychopathy (Coid & Ullrich, 2010). Heinzen,Kohler, Godt, Geiger, and Huchzermeier (2011)noted that IQ was an important factor inpredicting conviction rates of antisocialindividuals. They found that “individualsscoring high on interpersonal features ofpsychopathy are more intelligent than thosescoring high on antisocial features” (Heinzen etal., 2011, p. 336). Applying this finding couldhelp predict conviction and recidivism rates ofantisocial offenders. Those individuals

ODD.CD.APDachieving higher interpersonal scores on thePCL-R would be more intelligent, moremanipulative, and be better at planning theircriminal endeavors (Heinzen et al., 2011).Individuals scoring high on the antisocialfeatures component, however, would probablyoffend more impulsively and have a greaterchance of getting caught.A number of researchers havedemonstrated a significant correlation betweenrecidivism rates and psychopathy as measuredby the PCL-R. The DSM-IV-TR recognizes inthe associated features section of APD that theconstruct of psychopathy has greater predictivevalidity in relation to recidivism, especially inprison settings (American PsychiatricAssociation, 2000). Laurell and Daderman(2005) also demonstrated this by looking at asample of convicted homicide offenders toassess their psychopathy level and rates ofrecidivism after getting out of prison. Theyfound that individuals scoring higher on thePCL-R reoffended more frequently than thoseachieving lower scores (Laurell & Daderman).Understanding how ODD, CD, APD, andpsychopathy are related is very important interms of predicting developmental pathways ofdisruptive children, as well as conviction andrecidivism rates of antisocial adults.The extensive body of literatureattempting to describe, understand, and predictthe lives of individuals with a psychopathicpersonality has been ongoing and constantlychanging within the last century (Ogloff, 2006).Although the shift to a behaviourally-basedclassification system of mental disorders hasimproved the reliability of diagnosis betweenclinicians using the DSM- IV-TR (Coid &Ullrich, 2010), it has arguably also created theperception that the diagnostic categories laid outare real and distinct. Many have suggested thatAPD may actually be on developmentaltrajectory with childhood disruptive behaviouraldisorders ODD and CD, rather than beingdiscrete categorical entities (Burke et al., 2010).Since DSM-IV-TR personality disorder criteriaare based solely on overt behaviours, many havealso suggested that the three disorders beingdiscussed are developmental indicators ofpsychopathy, a construct encompassingbehavioural but also interpersonal and affectiveantisocial characteristics (Coid & Ullrich).Generally speaking, many children meetdiagnostic criteria for ODD as young as age 3,with only a small percentage progressing to CDin childhood or adolescence and an even smallerproportion going on to develop APD inadulthood (American PsychologicalAssociation, 2000). With the three disordershaving overlapping behavioural criterianecessary for diagnosis, and a significantproportion of APD and CD cases containing acomorbid CD or ODD diagnosis respectively, itbecomes clear that ODD, CD, and APD may beage-dependent manifestations of the sameunderlying disorder.Understanding this pathway is importantfor children diagnosed at a young age sincefamily education and therapy efforts can be usedto control disruptive behaviours and potentiallyintervene the developmental progression.Roberts (1984) highlighted the importance ofparental involvement in treatment outcomes andsuggested that the “effect of the parents’deployment of action positions has been detailedboth in terms of effective management of theproblems in the patient and in the production ofan emotional crisis in the adolescent” (Roberts,p. 74). Wells and Egan (1988) found that asocial learning- based parent training therapywas more effective at decreasing some of themain disruptive behaviours that characterizeODD than a traditional systems family therapyapproach. Elias (1997) went on to suggest thattreatment approaches in which parents aretrained to be ‘primary agents of change’ maycontribute to this greater efficacy througheducation about the nature of their child’sproblems, clarifying responsibility, andfacilitating the transition of knowledge intoeffective action. Finally, he found thatemphasizing work with parents as the mainfocus of social learning family therapy mayhave positive effects on the treatment of CD aswell.That being said, it is important tohighlight the interaction of environmental andgenetic factors in the manifestation of

ODD.CD.APDbehavioural disorders such as ODD and CD.Inasmuch as patterns of family instability maycontribute to the progression of a mentaldisorder, the initial development is more likelyto occur in someone with a geneticpredisposition to that behaviour. The reverse isalso true. For example, Foley et al. (2004)examined a gene-environment interactioninvolving the monoamine oxidase A genotype inorder to predict risk of conduct disorder inantisocial boys. They found that the merepresence of the monoamine oxidase A genotypeonly slightly increased the risk of developmentof CD; however, being exposed to an adversechildhood environment (such as familyadversity, inter-parental violence, parentalneglect, and inconsistent discipline)significantly increased the risk of a CDdiagnosis. Complicating the effects even more,many behavioural disorders (i.e., ADHD, CD,and ODD) are inherited through a combinationof multiple genes, not just a single one(Comings, 2000). This means that genes mayexert their combined effects on variousneurotransmitter systems and receptor sites(e.g., dopamine, serotonin, monoamine oxidase,and gamma-aminobutyric acid) and interact tocharacterize the behavioural patterns of ODD,CD, or APD. Separating out the effects may bedifficult; however, it is important toacknowledge the interaction of both genetic andenvironmental factors in the development ofbehavioural disorders and their treatment.Understanding this developmentalpathway is also important in terms of labeling.The possibility of incorrect diagnoses at a youngage is dangerous in terms of the negativeimplications that such a label may have on achild’s self-identity and development. However,there are potential benefits of diagnosis andlabeling that can be applied to the criminaljustice system. Understanding how thesebehavioural disorders relate to psychopathy, asmeasured by scores on Hare’s PCL-R can helpto predict conviction and recidivism rates ofantisocial offenders (Laurell & Daderman,2005). As previously mentioned, thoseoffenders scoring higher on the ‘socially deviantlifestyle’ dimension may be more likely toreoffend due to boredom and poor behaviouralcontrols than those scoring higher on the‘personality aggressive narcissism’ dimension.This kind of information may be helpful duringconviction or after an offender is released onparole.The DSM-IV-TR has supported thisnotion that APD may be related to psychopathy.The American Psychiatric Association has evensuggested the addition of an“Antisocial/Psychopathic Type” category in thepersonality disorders section of the DSM-V withan emphasis on personality and character(American Psychiatric Association, 2000).Additionally, researchers have also noted thatthe inhibitory control deficits and patterns ofbrain activity observed in individuals withAttention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder(ADHD) are similar to those deficits present inindividuals with CD, ODD, and APD. Thisfinding has allowed some to speculate thatADHD may be another behavioural disorderfalling somewhere along this spectrum (Barkley,1997), which may prove to be another excitingavenue of future research.As this paper presents, it is veryimportant to be critical of psychologicalclassification efforts and the implications thatthey may have on individuals. As ourunderstanding of mental disorders changes overtime, the corresponding nosology must also beupdated and improved. It is this kind of analysisthat has ultimately moved the DSM forward tothe more reliable and valid classification systemthat it is today.First Received: 1/13/2013Final Revision Received: 3/1/2013

ODD.CD.APDReferencesAmerican Psychiatric Association. (2000).Diagnostic and statistical manual ofmental disorders (4th ed., text revision).Washington, DC: Author.Barkley, R. (1997). Behavioural inhibition,sustained attention, and executivefunctions: Constructing a unifyingtheory of ADHD. PsychologicalBulletin, 121(1), 65-94.Burke, J., Waldman, I., & Lahey, B. (2010).Predictive validity of childhoodoppositional defiant disorder andconduct disorder: Implications for theDSM-V. Journal of AbnormalPsychology, 119(4), 739-751.Campbell, S., Shaw, D., & Gilliom, M. (2000).Early externalizing behaviour problems:Toddlers and preschoolers at risk forlater maladjustment. Development andPsychopathology, 12(3), 467-488.Coid, J., & Ullrich, S. (2010). Antisocialpersonality disorder is on a continuumwith psychopathy. ComprehensivePsychiatry, 51, 426-433.Comings D. (2000). The role of genetics inADHD and conduct disorder - relevanceto the treatment of recidivistic antisocialbehaviours. Kingston, NJ: CivicResearch Institute.Elias, M. (1997). Social learning family therapyand the treatment of conduct disorder inearly childhood: Premise, procedures,and prospects. Early Child Developmentand Care, 139, 29-41.Foley, D., Eaves, L., Wormley, B., Silberg, J.,Maes, H., Kuhn, J., & Riley, B. (2004).Childhood adversity, monoamineoxidase A, genotype, and risk forconduct disorder. Archives of GeneralPsychiatry, 61(7), 738-744.Gelhorn, H., Sakai, J., Price, R., & Crowley, T.(2007). DSM-IV conduct disordercriteria as predictors of antisocialpersonality disorder. ComprehensivePsychiatry, 48, 529-538.Hare, R. (2003). Manual for the RevisedPsychopathy Checklist (2nd ed.).Toronto, ON, Canada: Multi-HealthSystems.Hare, R., Clark, D., Grann, M., & Thornton, D.(2000). Psychopathy and the predictivevalidity of the PCL-R: An internationalperspective. Behavioural Sciences andthe Law, 18, 623-645.Heinzen, H., Kohler, D., Godt, N., Geiger, F., &Huchzermeier, C. (2011). Psychopathy,intelligence and conviction history.International Journal of Law andPsychiatry, 34, 336-340.Hofvander, B., Ossowski, D., Lundstrom, S., &Anckarsater, H. (2009). Continuity ofaggressive antisocial behaviour fromchildhood to adulthood: The question ofphenotype definition. InternationalJournal of Law and Psychiatry, 32, 224-234.Laurell, J., & Daderman, A. (2005). Recidivismis related to psychopathy (PCL-R) in agroup of men convicted of homicide.International Journal of Law andPsychiatry, 28, 255-268.Milan, S., Pinderhughes, E., & The ConductProblems Prevention Research Group.(2006).Family instability and childmaladjustment trajectories duringelementary school. Journal of AbnormalChild Psychology, 34(1), 43-56.Ogloff, J. (2006). Psychopathy/antisocialpersonality disorder conundrum.Australian and New Zealand Journal ofPsychiatry, 40, 519-528.Roberts, R. (1984). Psychoeducationalconsultations with parents of conductdisorderedolder adolescents.Psychotherapy, 21(1), 63-75.Rowe, R., Costello, E., Angold, A., Copeland,W., & Maughan, B. (2010).Developmental pathways in oppositionaldefiant disorder and conduct disorder.Journal of Abnormal Psychology,119(4), 726-738.Skodol, A., Bender, D., Pagano, M., Shea, T.,Yen, S., et al. (2007). Positive childhoodexperiences: Resilience and recoveryfrom personality disorder in early

adulthood. Journal of ClinicalPsychiatry, 68(7), 1102-1108.Wells, K., & Egan, J. (1988). Social learningand systems family therapy forchildhood oppositional disorder:Comparative treatment outcome.Comprehensive Psychiatry, 29(2), 138-146.ODD.CD.APD

© 2013 WUPJ, September 2013, Volume 1 ClinicalSociety’s Negative Impact on the Mental Health of HomosexualsAndrew A. Nicholson*The current paper’s aim is to facilitate the understanding of how cultural normsembodied by society can have incontrovertible effects on the mental health of those whodo not conform. Embedded cultural terms of masculinity and femininity remain cognizantin a way which recognizes that these terms are simply created by culture. Internalizedhomo-negativity studies conclude that internalized homo-negativity is correlated withsevere depression on all three clinical scales of depression, overall sexual health,psychosexual maturation, comfort with sexual orientation, peer socialization, comfortwith sexual acts and social integration. Narcissistic tendencies in male homosexuals werefound to be significantly correlated with homosexuality when considering the RorschachReflection scale. Eating disorders were found to be highly correlated with bodydissatisfaction, which were more prevalent among homosexuals, where femininity wasfound to not significantly contribute to body dissatisfaction. Furthermore bodydissatisfaction among heterosexuals and homosexuals was found to be related to highbody mass index, high pressure from society and peers, low masculinity and fromperceived societal and peer pressure due to sexual orientation. Studies investigatingsuicide attempt prevalence among homosexuals in the United States concluded that thosewho attempted suicide felt more victimized by peers and society, physically and verbally,and acknowledged more mental health problems. In conclusion, the significance of thispaper is to contribute to the understanding, and by extension reconstruction of oppressiveattitudes and behaviours towards homosexuals.Societal pressure due to ingrainedcultural notions is often stratified so deeply intosociety that they can be extremely problematicto change. These societal pressures are oftenlearned behaviours through enculturation of thepopulation. Homosexuality is often stigmatizedin Western culture and around the world. Thisstigmatization is habitually reinforced bysocietal pressures and in turn, these pressurescan have a negative impact on an individualwho identifies as homosexual, specifically interms of their mental health. In the analysis ofsocietal implications on the mental health ofhomosexuals, the phenomenon of homonegativitywill first be examined. Subsequently,narcissism and eating disorder prevalence inhomosexuals will be addressed, followed bysuicide prevalence among homosexuals.Consequently, the implications of negativesocietal pressures on the individual mentalhealth of homosexuals will be elucidated, anddiscussed further in relation to the minoritystress hypothesis. However, it is first importantto define gender and homosexuality in terms ofWestern culture, as these terms are socialconstructs which inevitably vary betweencultures. Furthermore, it should be noted thatthere is a bias towards investigating malehomosexuals in the literature related to thistopic. This does not reflect a study selection biasfrom the author.Homosexuality in Western SocietyHomosexuality, and by extensionheterosexuality, is a recent ideology in Westernculture (Lancaster & Leonardo, 1997). Inmodern Western society, one’s identity is partlyconstructed by means of their sexual orientation.This externally produced identity not onlyaffects how one thinks and behaves, but alsohow society perceives that individual. Thesesocial constructs, which are responsible formolding identity, emerged approximatelyaround the same time the United States enforceda sobering segregation between people who are*Initially submitted for Psychology 2228F at the University of Western Ontario. For inquiries regarding thearticle, please email the author at anicho58@uwo.ca.

SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS ON THE MENTAL HEALTH OF HOMOSEXUALS“Black” and people who are “White” (Lancaster& Leonardo, 1997).Due to the fact that people are stronglydefined by their sexuality in modernWesternized society, individuals are encouragedto view themselves, and thus to behave in termsof their sexual orientation (Caplan, 1997). InWestern society, heterosexuality, that is sexualattraction to the opposite sex, is the norm, andindividuals whom do not conform to thisideology experience prejudice, as “nonconformityto the norms of heterosexualitythreatens the dominant ideology’s view of sexas ‘innate’ and ‘natural’” (Caplan, 1997, p. 37).Male homosexuality is thought to underminemale domination and superiority, while femalehomosexuality is thought to defy cultural normsof the traditionally submissive women.Theoretically, sex differences are consideredbiologically differentiable, and society has thustried to categorize gender and sexuality in thesame way. This can be viewed as a universaltendency among humans. To facilitateunderstanding, humans map their perceptionsinto theoretical cognitive categories (Caplan,1997). Non-conformance to normative sexualorientation categories and gender roles arediscouraged, while sex-change operations aregenerally not discouraged because it removessexual abnormalities and allows one to easily fitinto the social categories culture has assigned(Caplan, 1997).What is masculine and what is feminine?These terms are merely social constructs that aredeveloped and maintained within a specificculture. In Western society, a primary aspect ofone’s identity is gender (Bonvillain, 1998), thisis why gender roles are learned and reinforced ata young age. Socialization teaches childrenappropriate behaviour specific to their gender.Especially in modern Westernized culture, thesecategories are mutually exclusive to sex, andleave little to no room for modification orindividuality. The English language, whichincludes only two genders, she and he, furtherreinforces a gender dichotomy, as does manyother languages. Individuals therefore acquiresocial identities, insinuating that society has asubstantial impact on one’s behaviour andexpectations of that behaviour within a culture.Different cultures have differentdefinitions and beliefs about gender andsexuality (or lack thereof), so for the purpose ofthis analysis, homosexuality will be examined interms of modern Western society which hasalso been defined to participants prior toconducting the experiments that willsubsequently be discussed. That is,homosexuality is defined as the consistency ofbeing sexually attracted to individuals of thesame sex or consistently engaging in sexualintercourse with members of the same sex(Lancaster and Leonardo, 1997). For most ofthese studies, bisexual individuals, “those whomdirect sexual desires toward members of bothsexes” (Lancaster and Leonardo, 1997, p. 52),were excluded because the degree to which theywould experience homosexual societalstigmatization is unknown. Furthermore, thereare also discrepancies when taking intoconsideration the gender with which anindividual identifies, especially when examiningcultures with more than one gender.To begin the discussion of societalstigmatization and its effect on mental health,internalized homo-negativity will first beanalyzed.Homo-negativity StudyIn a study conducted by Rosser et al.(2008), results showed that internalized homonegativityplays a key role in the mental healthof homosexuals. In this study, internalizedhomo-negativity is defined as “a basic mistrustfor one’s sexual and interpersonal identity”(Stein & Cohen, 1984, p. 182). Although thestudy showed that identification of beinghomosexual does illustrate acceptance fromsociety, it does not dissolve heterosexism, thatis, “external societal discrimination favouringheterosexuals” (Neisen, 1993, p. 5). In fact,Neison argues that these individuals may bemore susceptible to mental health abnormalities,and that homo-negativity and culturalvictimization may be in concordance with theeffects of sexual and physical abuse.

SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS ON THE MENTAL HEALTH OF HOMOSEXUALSIn this study, 442 males were recruitedfrom a homosexual health seminar. To beeligible they must have identified as “either ahomosexual engaging in homosexual activity”or “as being attracted to other men” (Rosser etal., 2008, p. 153). Exclusively heterosexual menwere excluded from the study because theywould theoretically not experience internalizedhomo-negativity on the same scale ashomosexual men. Sexual identification,internalized homo-negativity (including comfortof publicly identifying as homosexual,perceived stigmatization for being homosexual,comfort level with other homosexuals, moralhomo-negativity and religious homo-negativity),mental health, sexual health and socialintegration were all measured via questionnaireanalysis.It was found that the degree ofhomosexuality across a continuum scale was notassociated with any of the measured cognitivefactors mentioned above. However, homonegativitywas found to be negatively correlatedto mental health, sexual health and socialintegration. High degrees of homosexualitywere found to be related to depression onlywhen coupled with high levels of homonegativity.Thus because internalized homonegativity,not homosexuality, is associated withoverall sexual health, psychosexual maturation,comfort with sexual orientation, peersocialization, depression, comfort with sexualacts as well as social integration, it is suggestedthat homo-negativity plays a significant role inone’s mental health.Although this study demonstrates howingrained cultural values can have a negativeimpact on the mental health of homosexuals, italso has a number of limitations. First, thesample consists of selection and sample bias.All participants were recruited from an all-malehomosexual seminar. Severely homo-negativeindividuals may be unlikely to attend theseseminars where they are publicly identified ashomosexual. Last, not all homosexuals genderidentify as male. Lesbians and transgenderedindividuals are not represented in this study.Therefore, Rosser arguably does not have anaccurate representation of the gay communityand these results can only be generalized tomale homosexuals. Apart from these limitations,it is apparent that society can have a negativeimpact on mental health, specificallydepression, as numerous other studies havesupported this relationship (e.g., Ingartua &Karine, 2003).In a study conducted by Ingartua andKarine et al. (2003), the effects of internalizedhomophobia on depression, anxiety and suicidewere examined. 220 participants were recruitedin order to complete two self-reportquestionnaires. The first questionnaire examinedinternalized homophobia (the degree of aversionto homosexual tendencies directed towards theself), depression, anxiety, suicide, and substanceabuse, while the second analyzed the timeperiod through one’s life in which they wouldbe most vulnerable to suicide. Note thatinternalized homophobia refers to a basicmistrust for one’s sexual and interpersonalidentity, while internalized homophobia refersto an aversion. It should also be noted that thesetwo constructs are not mutually exclusive.Finding a representative sample of thehomosexual population was challenging forIngartia and colleagues for two reasons. Thefirst being that it is difficult to determine who ishomosexual and who is not. Secondly, sexualorientation is not two mutually exclusivecategories of homosexual and heterosexual, butrather a continuum. Nonetheless, participantswere chosen using multiple samplingtechniques. They were chosen from McGillUniversity’s Sexual Identity Centre, apsychiatric out-patient clinic catering to the gay,lesbian and transgender population, as well asthose questioning their sexuality. Surveys weredistributed to university queer discussiongroups, gay and lesbian film festivals, gay andlesbian bookstores, sports teams, McGillUniversity’s Health Clinic and finally,restaurants, bars and cafes in the gay village.Participants were also recruited through varioussocial networks in order to gather input fromindividuals who are homosexual but notinvolved in the gay community.

SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS ON THE MENTAL HEALTH OF HOMOSEXUALSPsychological distress, alcohol abuse,sexual orientation and internalized homophobiawere all assessed via separate scales within thequestionnaires. To determine proper variationwithin the sample, descriptive statistics werefirst extracted for socioeconomic status,religion, ethnicity and education, which werefound to be nonsignificant.Analysis of data shows that internalizedhomophobia is significantly correlated withlevels of depression, anxiety and suicidalimpulses. Most interestingly, the self-sub-scalemeasuring negative emotional cognition ofone’s own homosexuality was the best predictorof distress. However, this study did not find anycorrelation between alcohol abuse andhomosexuality, perhaps because the majority ofthe participants were relatively young. A moreage-diverse longitudinal study may haverevealed different results. However, internalizedhomophobia failed to predict suicidal tendenciesonce other psychological distress factors wereaccounted for. Thus, it seems likely thatinternalized homophobia has an indirect effecton suicide by significantly contributing todepression. Interestingly, societal stigmatizationhas also been found to be correlated withnarcissistic defense mechanisms (Alexander,1996).Narcissism and Male HomosexualityUsing a Rorschach test, which haveproven to be a reliable indicator of narcissism,Alexander (1996) found that reflectionresponses were to be two and a half times morelikely in homosexual men (i.e., higher reflectionscores indicate higher narcissistic tendencies).Based on Alexander’s clinical experience,where majority of gay men seek mental help toestablish a positive self-image and self-esteem,he argued that homosexual men might seek selfassuranceto convince themselves that they arenot inherently damaged. He also found that inhomosexual men, low self-esteem andinternalized homophobia are correlated withsevere anxiety, depression, sexual dysfunctionand relationship failures. In lieu ofexternal/internal validation, Alexander inferredthat it may be difficult for one to develop selfesteem.Therefore, homosexual men may oftenuse defense mechanisms to mask feelings ofdepression, guilt and shame. Furthermore it hasbeen suggested that those who are willing toundergo lengthy series of psychological testsmay have more narcissistic tendencies. It isapparent that there is some narcissisticvulnerability in homosexual men, but to whatdegree and to how much the vulnerabilitymanifests into narcissism remains unknown.However, some insight into this question wasprovided by a study over a decade later(Rubinstein, 2010).In the study carried out by Rubinstein(2010), multiple measures of narcissism wereadministered to the participants includingPincus et al.’s (2008) Pathological NarcissismInventory and Raskin and Hall’s (1981)Narcissistic Personality Inventory. Significantlyhigher scores of narcissism were found amonghomosexual men compared to that ofheterosexual men on both scales. Furthermorehigher scores of narcissism were found to benegatively correlated to self-esteem.Rubinstein’s explanation for these findingsincludes an environmental attribute. Rubinsteinsuggests that these narcissistic tendencies maybe a result of “the oppressive homophobicpower of the heterosexual society” (Rubinstein,2010, p. 15). Moreover it is suggested that thehomosexual community may create additionalpressure among its members due to its emphasison appearance, which might augment anarcissistic tendency.Another cognitive abnormality mediatedby societal stigmatization worth of interest toexamine is the eating disorder prevalenceamong homosexual men.Eating Disorder PrevalenceIt was discovered that, in the UnitedStates, there is an over-representation ofhomosexual men in eating disorder clinics thanthere is in the general population. In fact, about20-40 percent of individuals enrolled in eatingdisorder clinics are homosexual (Russell &Keel, 2002). Therefore, the question arises, what

SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS ON THE MENTAL HEALTH OF HOMOSEXUALSabout male homosexuality makes males moresusceptible to eating disorders? The mostcommon theory in the literature is that bodydissatisfaction are more prevalent amonghomosexual males, which plays an instrumentalrole in the prognosis of eating disorders.Furthermore, the body dissatisfaction amonghomosexuals differed from that of heterosexual.Body dissatisfaction in homosexual meninvolved not only idealized low body mass, butalso muscularity. Thus, there is an increaseddemand among homosexuals in conforming tothe perfect model of the male form, henceresulting in increasing socio-cultural pressure onhomosexuals and body dissatisfaction.Some researchers attempt to attributehigh body dissatisfaction among homosexuals totheir more “feminine characteristics,” comparedto that of heterosexual men, as there is a heavycultural influence on females in Western societyto be thin. However, homosexuality in malesdoes not cause femininity, as femininity andmasculinity are mere social construct, hence,culturally relative. Therefore it cannot beconcluded that a higher prevalence of bodydissatisfaction is a direct result of sexualorientation due to characterized gender roles(Meyer et al., 2001; Strong et al. 2000).A more likely account for the lowerbody satisfaction among homosexuals is theirlower self-esteem. Supporting this account,studies found that self-esteem was negativelycorrelated with body dissatisfaction (Cervera etal., 2003), a significantly lower amount of selfesteemin homosexual men (Yellond &Tiggenann, 2003), and that self-esteem isgreatly influenced by homo-negativity(Williamson & Hartley, 1998).Taking these previously mentionedfactors related to body dissatisfaction intoaccount, Hospers and Jansen (2005) conducted astudy investigating the relationship betweenmale homosexuality and eating disorders, whilealso examining factors of masculinity,femininity and peer pressure in the gaycommunity.In this study, male participants wererecruited in two ways. First, being anadvertisement poster on a popular Dutchhomosexual website, allowing anonymousparticipation in the study via onlinequestionnaire. Secondly, participants wererecruited from the Maastricht University toparticipate in an eating disorder and behaviourquestionnaire. This method of recruitment andobtaining a sample is appropriate for threereasons. First, it allows researchers to samplemen who might shy away from the studybecause they do not want to be publicly labeledas homosexual, as their anonymity is maintainedwith the online questionnaire. Secondly, bynaming the study an “Eating BehaviourQuestionnaire”, it allowed one to sample thosewho would originally be reluctant to participatein a questionnaire under a homosexual label.Lastly, Hospers and Jansen used twoadministration methods, which add to therepresentativeness of the sample. In total, thesample size was substantial, 241 participants, 70being exclusively attracted to men, and 169exclusively attracted to women.The results of the study suggest thateating disorder prevalence is highly correlatedto body dissatisfaction and not self-esteem. Byfurther examining body dissatisfaction, it wasfound that body dissatisfaction was related tobody mass index, and among homosexuals,pressure from peers to conform to an ideal bodytype. Body dissatisfaction was more prevalent inhomosexuals, and femininity did not play a rolein body dissatisfaction. Also, among bothheterosexuals and homosexuals, prevalence ofbody dissatisfaction was related to high bodymass index, low masculinity, and fromperceived societal and peer pressure due tosexual orientation. However, this study doeshave a number of limitations, the first being thatbecause of the cross analysis of the multiplevariables, it is difficult to determine thecausality of the relationship. Furthermore, notall scales used were validated by homosexualmen.Nonetheless, this study clearly illustrateshow societal pressures to conform can have anegative impact on the individual. Specificallyhigh pressure due to being a sexual minority can

SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS ON THE MENTAL HEALTH OF HOMOSEXUALShave a negative impact on one’s mental health,whether they are homosexual or heterosexual.Not conforming to dominant gender roles andheterosexism can have a negative impact for allthose whom rebel, whether gay or straight.Furthermore, it is now apparent that thesepsychological stressors can result in majorhealth implications, including suicide.Psychological Stressors Contributing toSuicide Among HomosexualsSexual minority groups are exposed tostressors youth commonly experience as well asother categories of stressors related tostigmatization of their sexual orientation. Fearof the outcomes of sexual disclosure to familyand friends also has a negative impact on sexualminorities (Boxer et al., 1991). In a studyconducted by D’Augelli and Hashberger (1993),over half of the participants (all homosexuals)studied reported fear in disclosing their sexualorientation to their families, and about a quarterreported the prospect to be extremely troubling.Of those sexual minorities who disclosed theirsexual orientation to their families, eight percentof mothers were intolerant but not rejecting,while 12 percent were rejecting. Furthermore,20 percent of fathers were intolerant but notrejecting, while 18 percent were rejecting.Among sexual minorities, rejection by friendswas also found to be a major psychologicalstressor. Additionally, 33 percent of theparticipants studied feared losing friends upondisclosure, and 46 percent reported they had lostfriends when disclosing their sexual orientation.In another study, 41 percent of their sample wasfound to experience strong negative reactionsfrom members of their social group upondisclosing (Remafedi, 1987).Apart from psychological stressors ofsexual disclosure, it was found that sexualminority groups experience substantial verbaland physical abuse. In a study conducted byPilkinton and D’Augelli (1995), 80 percent ofthe sample experienced verbal insults based ontheir sexual orientation, 44 percent experiencedphysical threats, 33 percent had objects thrownat them with intent to injure, 31 percent hadbeen chased or followed, 13 percent reportedbeing spat on, 20 percent had been physicallyassaulted and 22 percent reported at least onesexual assault. These findings by Pilkinton andD’Augelli are consistent with other studiesinvestigating verbal and physical abuse tohomosexual individuals (Berrill, 1990; Deon,Wu and Martin, 1992; Gross, Aurand, andAdessa, 1998; Hunter, 1990).In a study conducted by Alexander(2005), the over representation of homosexualsin suicide attempt statistics were examined.Participants from 14 gay and lesbian youthgroups in metropolitan cities across the UnitedStates were recruited. The final sampleconsisted of 194 participants, 73 percent male,27 percent female, ranging from 15 to 20 yearsold with the average age being 18.86. There wasalso considerable variation among ethnic groupsin this study, 61 percent being Caucasian, 15percent African American, five percent AsianAmerican, five percent Hispanic American, andfour percent Native American.Via questionnaire analysis, the results ofthis study showed that 42 percent of the samplehad attempted suicide on at least one occasion,ranging from one to 15 attempts, methods ofwhich varied. Notably, no differences in menand women were found in attempts of suicide.Of the sample, 60 percent reported havingthoughts about killing themselves, while eightpercent reported having these thoughts often.However, males reported more dissatisfaction insexual activity, more depression, more anxietyand more worry about HIV/AIDS. From thoseparticipants who attempted suicide, they werefound to be more open to disclosing their sexualorientation, had greater numbers of same sexpartners, engaged in more social activities, hadmore lesbian/gay friends, and overall morepositive relations with their families.Furthermore, those that had attempted suicidehad parents whom were more acknowledging oftheir sexual orientation then those who had notattempted suicide. Thus this study suggests thatacceptance from one’s family has a lessimportant role, and that acceptance from one’speers and societal attitudes are instrumental in

SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS ON THE MENTAL HEALTH OF HOMOSEXUALSthe prevalence of suicide attempts among sexualminorities, and in turn their mental health.ConclusionBased on previous research, it isapparent that negative views of homosexualityfrom society can have serious implications onone’s mental health. This is also predicted bythe minority stress hypothesis, which states thatminorities within a society are culturallypredisposed to more psychological stress as theyare subjected to more prejudice andstigmatization (Meyer, 2010). It is through thisview that sexual minorities are predicted to be ata greater risk to mental illness.In modern Westernized society, whereidentity is partly based on one’s sexualorientation, one’s sexual orientationsignificantly affects how society in turn viewsthat individual (Caplan, 1997). Internalizedhomo-negativity studies conclude that embodiedinternalized homo-negativity is correlated withsevere depression on all clinical scales ofdepression, overall sexual health, psychosexualmaturation, comfort with sexual orientation,peer socialization, depression, comfort withsexual acts and social integration. Thussuggesting that homo-negativity plays asignificant role in one’s mental health (Rosser etal., 2008). Furthermore, internalizedhomophobia was found to be significantlycorrelated to levels of depression, anxiety, andsuicidal impulses by Ingartua and Karine et al.(2003). These negative thoughts abouthomosexuality were found to only have animpact on mental health when they were inregards to the individual themselves, and notothers regardless of sexual orientation. Thissuggests that society can have a negative impacton an individual regardless of their sexualorientation when stereotyped behaviours arestigmatized by society. Narcissistic tendenciesin male homosexuals were also found to besignificantly correlated to homosexuality whenconsidering the Rorschach Reflection scale. It issuggested that narcissistic tendencies amonghomosexuals results from the absence ofinternal and external validation; homosexualmen then seek self-assurance that they are notinherently damaged. Eating disorders were alsofound to be highly correlated with bodydissatisfaction, both of which were moreprevalent among homosexuals (Hosper &Jansen, 2009). Furthermore body dissatisfactionamong heterosexuals and homosexuals wasrelated to high body mass index, high pressurefrom society and peers, low masculinity andfrom perceived societal and peer pressure due tosexual orientation.Lastly, suicide attempt prevalenceamong homosexuals in the United States wasexamined, where 42 percent of the sample hadtried on at least one occasion, ranging from oneto 15 attempts of suicide. Notably there were nodifferences among gender, and 60 percent of thesample reported having suicidal thoughts, whileeight percent report having these thoughts often.Those who had attempted suicide felt morevictimized by peers and society, physically andverbally, and acknowledged more mental healthproblems. This study therefore suggests thatacceptance from society and peers play a majorrole in the prevalence of suicide attempts amonghomosexuals. After exploring these maincomponents of mental health abnormalitiesamong sexual minorities, it is apparent thatsocietal pressures and ideologies cansignificantly influence the mental health ofhomosexuals.First Received: 1/13/2013Final Revision Received: 4/12/2013

SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS ON THE MENTAL HEALTH OF HOMOSEXUALSReferencesAlexander, C. (1996) Gay and Lesbian MentalHealth. Haworth Press Inc. New YorkBerrill, K. (1990). Anti-gay violence andvictimization in the United States: Anoverview. Journal of InterpersonalViolence, 5: 274-294.Boxer, A. M., Cook, J. A., and Herdt, G. (1991).Double Jeopardy: Identity transitionsand parent-child relations among gayand lesbian youth. In K. Pillemer and K.McCartney (eds.) Parent-child relationsthroughout life, pp. 59-92. Hillsdale, NJ:Erlbaum.Bonvillain, N. (1998) Women and Men:Cultural Constructs of Gender. NewJersey: Prentice-Hell Inc.Caplan, P. (1997) The Cultural Construction ofSexuality, The Gender and SexualityReader: Culture, History, PoliticalEconomy. Lancaster, R. & Leonardo, M.New York: Portledge. 37-55.D’Augelli, A. R. and Herschberger, S. L.(1993). Lesbian, gay, and bisexual youthin community settings: Personalchallenges and mental health problems.American Journal of CommunityPsychology. 21:1-28.Dean, L., Wu, S. and MArtin, J.L. (1992).Trends in violence and discriminationagainst gay men in New York City: 1984to 19990. In G .M. Herek and K. T.Berril (eds.) Hate Crimes:Confronting violence against lesbiansand gay men. 46-64.Greenberg, D. (1997) Transformations ofHomosexuality-Based Classifications,The Gender and Sexuality Reader:Culture, History, Political EconomyLancaster, R. & Leonardo, M.. NewYork: Portledge. 37-55.Gross, L., Aurand, S., and Adessa, R. (1988).Violence and discrimination againstlesbian and gay people in Philadelphiaand the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.Unpublished report, PhiladelphiaLesbian and Gay Task Force.Herek, G. M., & Garnets, L. D. (2007). Sexualorientation and mental health. AnnualReview of Clinical Psychology, 3, 353–375.Hospers, J. (1996) Why Homosexuality is aRisk Factor for Eating Disorders inMales, Gay and Lesbian Mental Health.Alexander, C. Haworth Press Inc. NewYork.Hunter, J. (1990). Violence against lesbians andgay male youths. Journal ofHomosexuality. 12:111-117.Igartua, K. J., Gill, K., & Montoro, R. (2003).Internalized homophobia: A factor indepression, anxiety, and suicide in thegay and lesbian population. CanadianJournal of Community Mental Health.22(2). 15-30.Lancaster, R. & Leonardo, M. (1997) TheGender and Sexuality Reader: Culture,History, Political Economy. New York:Portledge. 15-33Meyer, I. H. (2010). The right comparisons intesting the minority stress hypothesis:Comment on savin-williams, cohen,joyner, and rieger (2010). Archives ofSexual Behavior, 39(6), 1217-9. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10508-010-9670-8Neisen, J. H. (1993). Healing from culturalvictimization: Recovery from shame dueto heterosexism. Journal of Gay andLesbian Psychotherapy. 2(1). 49–64.Pilkington, N. W. and D’Augelli, A.R. (1995).Victimization of lesbian, gay andbisexual youth in community settings.Journal of Community Psychology.23:33-56.Pincus, A. L., Ansell, E. B., Pimentel, C. A.,Cain, N. M., Wright, A. G. C., &Levy,K. N. (in press). Initialconstruction and validation of thePathological Narcissism Inventory.Psychological AssessmentsRaskin, R., & Hall, C. S. (1981). A narcissisticpersonality inventory. PsychologicalReports, 45, 590.

SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS ON THE MENTAL HEALTH OF HOMOSEXUALSRamafedi, G. (1987). Male Homosexuality: Theadolescent’s perspective. Pediatrics.79:326-330.Rosser, B. R. S., Bockting, W. O., Ross, M. W.,Miner, M. H., & Coleman, E. (2008).The relationship between homosexuality,internalized homo-negativity, and mentalhealth in men who have sex with men.Journal of Homosexuality. 55(2). 185-203. doi:10.1080/00918360802129394.Rubinstein, G. (2010). Narcissism and selfesteemamong homosexual andheterosexual male students. Journal ofSex & Marital Therapy, 36(1), 24-34.doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00926230903375594Siobhai, S. (1997) The Scientific Racism andthe Invention of the Homosexual Body,The Gender and Sexuality Reader:Culture, History, Political EconomyLancaster, R. & Leonardo, M.. NewYork: Portledge. 37-55.Stein, T. S., & Cohen, C. J. (1984).Psychotherapy with gay men andlesbians: An examination ofhomophobia, coming out, and identity.In E. S. Hetrick and T. S. Stein (Eds.),Psychotherapy with homosexuals (pp.59–74). Washington, DC: AmericanPsychiatric Press.

© 2013 WUPJ, September 2013, Volume 1 ClinicalAfraid of the Therapist: The Value of Internet-Based Treatments for Social AnxietyBryanna Lucyk*Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD) is one of the most common mental disorders, withlifetime prevalence rates reportedly reaching 13% of the general population. Thedisorder impairs personal and occupational functioning, and has created a largeeconomic burden. An estimated 80% of individuals with SAD do not seektreatment, deterred by financial barriers, lack of awareness about treatment options,and fears about contacting health professionals. In the past decade, Internet-BasedTherapies (IBTs) have been developed to eliminate some of the obstaclespreventing sufferers from seeking treatment. The present paper argues that there isa clear need to develop and raise awareness about IBTs, discussing how thesetreatments may be more cost-effective, accessible, and appealing to individuals whohave SAD. The paper also cites recent findings demonstrating the efficacy of IBTsfor treating SAD, and notes suggestions for how these therapies can be improved toincrease effectiveness.Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD), alsocalled Social Phobia, is considered to be one ofthe most prevalent mental disorders, affectingan estimated three to 13% of the population(American Psychiatric Association, 2000).Despite the existence of empirically validatedtherapies and medications, approximately 80%of sufferers still do not seek treatment (Grant etal., 2005). Thus, in the last decade, focus hasshifted to developing treatments that may bemore appealing and available to individuals withSAD. For example, recent investigations intothe benefits of Internet-Based Therapies (IBTs)for SAD have been shown to be more costeffectiveand accessible than other treatments,while still being just as efficacious.Consequently, the present paper argues that ifresearchers and clinicians continue to refine andraise awareness about IBTs, the number ofsufferers who acquire treatment for SAD can beincreased.Social Anxiety DisorderAccording to the DSM-IV-TR,individuals with SAD feel intense emotionaldiscomfort in social situations due to fears ofbeing ridiculed, judged or embarrassed byothers (American Psychiatric Association,2000). In addition, individuals may experiencephysical symptoms,such as sweating, shaking, muscle tension,blushing, confusion, and gastrointestinaldiscomfort (American Psychiatric Association,2000). As a result, many people with SADavoid anxiety-provoking situations or anticipatesuch situations with dread (AmericanPsychiatric Association, 2000). A diagnosis ofSAD is assigned if the anxiety interferes withpersonal, occupational or social functioning, orcauses a great deal of distress (AmericanPsychiatric Association, 2000). If an individualexperiences anxiety in nearly all socialsituations, he or she is classified as havingGeneralized SAD (American PsychiatricAssociation, 2000). Conversely, if an individualfeels anxious in certain situations, such asduring public speaking commitments, he or sheis classified as having Specific orNongeneralized SAD (American PsychiatricAssociation, 2000).The anxiety experienced by individualswith SAD can also create financial andoccupational complications. For example,individuals with SAD may avoid promotions oradvancements, fearing the social demandsaccompanying increased responsibility (Bruch,Fallon, & Heimberg, 2003). They may also befrequently absent from work (Wittchen &Beloch, 1996) or school (Lee & Miltenberger,1996), resulting in lost productivity. Moreover,*Initially submitted for Psychology 3310G at the University of Western Ontario. For inquiries regarding thearticle, please email the author at blucyk@uwo.ca.

SOCIAL ANXIETYthe high prevalence rate of SAD has created alarge economic burden on society (Hedman etal., 2011b). The lifetime prevalence rates ofSAD are reportedly 10.3% for females and 8.7%for males, and the disorder most often has itsonset in adolescence (McLean, Asnaani, Litz, &Hofmann, 2011). It is estimated that theassociated costs of SAD amount to $385 millionper million people (Acarturk et al., 2009;Hedman et al., 2011b).It is rare for SAD to remit on its own(Rapee & Spence, 2004). More often,individuals require therapeutic orpharmacotherapeutic intervention to treat thedisorder. Medications such as Benzodiazepines(BDZs), Monamine Oxidise Inhibitors(MAOIs), and Selective-Serotonin ReuptakeInhibitors (SSRIs) are considered to be some ofthe most effective treatments of SAD in theshort-term, although few follow-up studies haveassessed their long-term effects (Acarturk,Cuijpers, van Straten, & de Graaf, 2009). Forindividuals who do not wish to take medicationor for whom medication does not work, thereare a number of therapies available. Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (CBT), Cognitive-Behavioural Group Therapy (CBGT), ExposureTherapy (ET), Acceptance and CommitmentTherapy (ACT) and Interpersonal Therapy (IPT)are some of the more common forms of therapyused to treat SAD. These empirically-validatedtreatments have been shown to be helpful forindividuals willing or able to access them.Nevertheless, an aforementioned 80% (Grant etal., 2005) of SAD sufferers do not receive anyform of treatment.In general, it is common for individualswith mental disorders to be apprehensive aboutobtaining treatment (Butcher, Rouse, and Perry,1998). However, for an individual with SAD,the disorder itself may be a deterrent.Contacting mental health professionals mayrequire individuals to endure situations in whichthey experience anxiety. In order to avoid theseuncomfortable social situations, such ascontacting physicians by telephone orinteracting with therapists, sufferers may choosenot to seek treatment. Olfson et al. (2000)surveyed individuals with SAD and found thatmany had not sought therapy due to financialconcerns, lack of information about the optionsavailable to them, or fear of judgment.In-person modalities of treatment do notaddress the deterrents for treatment of SAD andthus do not reduce the large number ofindividuals who remain untreated for thesereasons. Alternately, IBTs may minimize manyof the deterrents preventing clients from seekingtherapy. There is evidence that manyindividuals with SAD may be avid Internetusers and thus IBTs may be more accessiblethan other forms of treatment. Indeed, twonational American surveys (National PublicRadio, 2000; Nie & Hillygus, 2002) haveassociated time spent online with decreased timespent in face-to-face interactions. Researchershave proposed the “social compensationhypothesis” (Tian, 2011) to account for thisphenomenon. Proponents of this hypothesissuggest that individuals who are isolated, lonelyor have a mental illness may use the Internet todistract from or replace inadequate offlineinteractions. In particular, individuals withSAD may prefer online rather than face-to-facecommunication due to increased anonymity,greater control of conversation pace andcontent, and a reduction in nonverbal social cues(Tian, 2011). Individuals with SAD reportfeeling safer and more comfortable in onlineinteractions (Weidman et al., 2012) andexperience decreased symptoms of anxietyoverall (Yen et al., 2012). Reportedly, Internetuse has been positively correlated with socialanxiety (Erwin, Turk, Heimberg, Fresco, &Hantula, 2004; Pierce, 2009), depression(Caplan, 2002; Weidman et al., 20l2), loneliness(Caplan, 2002), low quality of life (Weidman etal., 2012; Caplan, 2002), lack of social skills,and motivation for social compensation (Peter,Valkenburg, & Schouten, 2005). Furthermore,Statistics Canada (2009) has reported that over90% of Canadians aged 15-24 are Internet users,which corresponds with the average age of onsetof SAD (McLean, Asnaani, Litz, & Hofmann,2011). To assist a population inclined to spendtime and seek information online, researchers

SOCIAL ANXIETYhave developed resources and therapies for SADthat can be offered on the Internet (Erwin, Turk,Heimberg, Fresco, & Hantula, 2004).In addition to being more accessible thanin-person therapies, IBTs also appear to behighly effective. Over the past decade,numerous studies have demonstrated the clinicalsignificance of IBTs by assessing their effectsizes. Researchers have commonly usedCohen’s d as a measure of effect size whencomparing symptom reduction in groupsreceiving an IBT to groups receiving notreatment or an alternative treatment. It isimportant to note that the meaning of themagnitude of Cohen’s d is dependent upon thecontext of the study, and thus it is necessary toconsult the relevant literature for typicaltreatment effect sizes. The authors of a metaanalysisof psychological and pharmacologicaltreatments of SAD (Acarturk, Cuijpers, vanStraten, & de Graaf, 2009) suggest that effectsizes of d = 0 to d = 0.32 are to be consideredsmall, effect sizes ranging from d = 0.33 to d =0.55 are to be considered moderate, and effectsof d = 0.56 and above are to be consideredlarge. Hedges’g is another measure of effect sizeused in the literature that provides a moreconservative value, and uses the same ratingsystem of small, moderate and large as Cohen’sd.Numerous studies have found InternetCognitive-Behavioral Therapy (ICBT) to beeffective in reducing symptoms of SAD (e.g.Andersson, Carlbring, & Furmark, 2012;Andersson et al., 2012; Berger, Hohl, &Caspar, 2009; Botella et al., 2009; Furmark etal., 2009; Hedman et al., 2011a; Hedman et al.,2011b; Hedman et al., 2011c; Tillfors et al,2013; Titov, Andrews, Choi, Schwencke, &Mahoney, 2008; Titov, Andrews, & Schwencke,2008; Titov, Andrews, Schwencke, Drobny, &Einstein, 2008). The effect sizes found in thesestudies were large, ranging from d = 0.63(Furmark et al., 2009) to d = 1.28 (Tillfors et al.,2013). For studies which reported Hedge’s g,effect sizes for ICBT were found to be moderateand large, ranging from g = 0.5 (Hedman,2011b) to g = 0.75 (Andersson, Carlbring, &Furmark, 2012). These effect sizes are similarto those achieved with in-person therapies; forexample, Fedoroff and Taylor (2001) reportedthe effect sizes for CBT to be d = 0.94, exposuretherapy to be d = 1.31, and cognitive therapy tobe d = 0.78. ICBT has also been found to beeffective for treating adults (Titov, Andrews,Kemp, & Robinson, 2010) and high schoolstudents (Tillfors et al., 2013). Moreover,studies have shown that improvements inquality of life (QOL), and reductions insymptoms of SAD, depression and generalanxiety were maintained for 12 months (Botellaet al., 2009), 30 months (Carlbring, Nordgren,Furmark & Andersson, 2009) and five years(Hedman et al., 2011c), after treatment.Researchers have worried that thetherapeutic alliance may be compromised inIBTs as clients spend significantly less timeconferring with therapists, and may never meettheir therapists in person (Andersson et al.,2012). However, a study assessing therapeuticalliance in ICBT treatments for depression,Generalized Anxiety Disorder, and SAD foundthat the mean ratings of therapeutic alliancereported by participants receiving ICBT weresimilar to those reported by individualsreceiving in-person treatments (Andersson et al.,2012). Furthermore, even though theresearchers found large treatment effects forICBT, there was a non-significant correlationbetween clients’ ratings of therapeutic allianceand treatment outcomes. This suggests thestrength of the therapeutic alliance may notnecessarily affect the outcomes of ICBT, andtherefore its success depends on other factors.This is supported by a study by Furmark et al.(2009), which found that the effect size ofguided ICBT was comparable to unguidedbibliotherapy. However, two others studies(Nordgreen et al., 2012; Titov et al., 2008) havefound that guided ICBT increased participants’adherence to the self-help modules better thanunguided ICBT, and resulted in the completionof more modules. Although therapist guidanceincreases the cost of treatment, it alsoencourages individuals to complete moremodules, thereby increasing the likelihood they

SOCIAL ANXIETYwill benefit from treatment. Thus, guided IBTsmay reduce the overall economic burden ofSAD better than unguided IBTs.Further research is clearly required toassess the necessity of therapist guidance inICBT, as it may be an additional cost that detersindividuals from seeking help. Nevertheless,therapist-led ICBT is still much less expensivethan face-to-face CBT and CBGT. Indeed, anexamination of the cost-effectiveness oftherapist-guided ICBT to CGBT (Hedman et al.,2011b) found that both therapies equallyreduced the economic burden associated withthe disorder. However, because ICBT also hadlower intervention costs, the researchersconsidered it to be more cost-effective.Furthermore, since CGBT is generally lessexpensive than CBT, it suggests that ICBT ismore cost-effective than CBT.Virtual Reality Therapy (VRT) isanother type of therapy for SAD that has beensuccessfully delivered on the Internet. Indeed,Yuen et al. (2013) report that Acceptance BasedBehavioral Therapy (ABBT) can be effectivelyoffered using a free, online, interactive gamecalled “Second Life”. In the game, clientscommunicate through headsets or typedmessages to therapists, and participate inexposure exercises that appear to be as effectiveas real-life exposure. Yuen et al. (2013), forinstance, demonstrated that VRT yielded verylarge effect sizes of d = 1.14 to d = 1.50 on posttreatmentmeasures of SAD. Although the studywas conducted with only 14 participants andtherefore has insufficient statistical power, theresults are consistent with other preliminarystudies in which VRT was found to be aneffective treatment for SAD and public speakingfears (Anderson, Rothbaum, & Hodges, 2003;Anderson, Zimand, Hodges, & Rothbaum,2005; Harris, Kemmerling, & North, 2002).These studies demonstrate that online games canbe used to provide both long-distance therapy,as well as treatment to individuals reluctant toseek in-person therapy.Assisted PopulationAs with any treatment, there are certainpopulations appearing to benefit more fromICBT. For example, a study of the determinantsof treatment effects for both ICBT and CBGT(Hedman et al., 2012a) found that the clientswho showed the largest reduction in symptomswere those who worked full time, were able toadhere to treatment, and had “children”, “lessdepressive symptoms” and a “higher expectancyof treatment effectiveness” (p. 126). However,research about the assisted population remainslimited. For instance, previous studies assessingthe effectiveness of IBTs for SAD excludedparticipants who had co-morbid diagnoses orwere in immediate crisis, and thus it is notcurrently known how effective IBTs might befor individuals with more complex diagnoses.Furthermore, studies have mainlyincluded participants under the age of 64. Forthis reason, it is currently unclear whetherindividuals aged 65 years and over would findIBTs helpful. Social Anxiety Disorder is still asignificant concern in later life, with the 12-month prevalence rate reported to be 1.32% forindividuals aged 55 or older (Cairney et al.,2007). Additionally, 70% of Canadians over 55,and 51% of Canadians aged 65 to 74 areInternet users (Statistics Canada, 2009).Therefore, it would be beneficial for futurestudies to examine how an older populationmight respond to IBTs, and how treatmentsmight be modified for this population.Individuals who do not have access to acomputer or Internet cannot benefit from IBTs.However, an estimated 79% of Canadianhouseholds reportedly have Internet access(Statistics Canada, 2011). Consequently, ICBTmay be able to reach a larger and more diversepopulation compared to in-person therapies.Indeed, a study comparing a clinical populationof SAD sufferers to a group who sought helpfrom an Internet clinic revealed that individualsin the Internet group were “older, less likely tobe male” as well as “less likely to be marriedbut equally well educated and as likely to beemployed” (Titov, Andrews, Kemp &Robinson, 2010, p. 4). Individuals in the

SOCIAL ANXIETYInternet group were also found to be lessdistressed, but more disabled by the disorder.As a result, the authors suggested that theInternet group was more representative of thegeneral population of SAD sufferers, implyingIBTs do reach a more diverse population thanin-person treatments.Limitations and Future DirectionsThere are a number of limitations ofIBTs that must be noted. For example, Velting,Setzer, and Albano (2004) caution that exposurehierarchies created without therapist directionmay not be developed properly. This may resultin the client facing fears before he or she isready or dropping out of therapy altogether(Velting, Setzer, & Albano, 2004).Furthermore, Tillfors et al. (2013) assessed theeffectiveness of a CBT self-help manual thathad been adapted for use on the Internet andfound that participants only completed anaverage of 2.9 out of nine modules. Hence,researchers have focused on developing ways toincrease adherence to IBTs. For example, anassessment of a computer-based CBT programdesigned for adolescents experiencing anxietyrevealed that using a wide range of media, suchas “text, music, illustrations, audio voice-overs,cartoons, animated flow charts, interactiveforms, and live video” (Cunningham &Wuthrich, 2008, p. 13), can enhance the interestof the clients. Hudson & Kendall (2002) havealso made several other suggestions that mayimprove drop-out rates, such as not using theterm “homework”, ordering tasks from easy todifficult, and having a reward system.Implementing these and other strategies couldbolster the effectiveness of IBTs, making them avaluable alternative to in-person therapies.They are more cost-effective than in-persontreatments, more readily available, andeliminate or reduce the anxiety associated withmeeting with therapists or doctors. Internetbasedtherapies therefore appear to be apromising solution for the 80% of SADsufferers (Grant et al., 2005) who remainuntreated. Future endeavors should thereforecontinue to focus on increasing publicawareness of the availability of IBTs andcontributing to the expanding body of literatureon this important topic, as IBTs offerindividuals who would not normally seektreatment an alternative strategy for recovery.First Received: 4/22/2013Final Revision Received: 6/23/2013ConclusionDespite the aforementioned limitationsof IBTs, the benefits are profound. Numerousstudies have demonstrated that IBTs canproduce moderate to large effect sizes, makingthem as effective as other treatment strategies.Internet-based therapies also possess numerousqualities that appeal to individuals with SAD.

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© 2013 WUPJ, September 2013, Volume 1 ClinicalMatch-and-Motivation Model Applied:Factors Preventing Nontraditional Victims from Reporting RapeKevin M. Stubbs*This paper explores the possibility that rape incidence in populations other thanheterosexual females (traditional victims) may be significantly higher thangenerally tends to be acknowledged. Specific consideration is given to rape victimswho are referred to as nontraditional victims, which include homosexual females,homosexual males, heterosexual males, transsexual females, and transsexual males.An overview of research on nontraditional-victim rape is presented to illuminatepossible factors that moderate whether nontraditional victims conceptualize theirexperience as a rape and whether they subsequently report the event. These factorsare then applied within the framework of Peterson and Muehlenhard’s (2011)Match-and-Motivation model to support the possibility that nontraditional victimsare less likely to label events as rape and less likely to report events when they arelabeled as rape. Discussion concludes with comments on a potential reevaluation ofthe focus of rape research away from exclusively heterosexual females in favor ofresearch that addresses both traditional and nontraditional victims.Rape is an unfortunate and widespreadreality, which has prompted numerous studiesfocused on understanding, responding to, andpreventing the rape of heterosexual females.Research concerning rape with other victimshas, however, been extremely limited untilrecent years (Davies, 2002). Mezely and King(1992) have suggested that this neglect of thenon-female victims of rape by both the researchcommunity and the wider public is likely aresult of the attention rape receives as a feministissue, the higher reporting rates of rapes withfemale victims, and a number of widely heldfalse stereotypes and myths (i.e., males areexclusively perpetrators of rape). Rogers (1998)estimated that research, help, and support formale victims of rape are more than twenty yearsbehind that for female victims.This paper will provide an overview ofprior research, theoretical and experimental,pertaining to the rape of individuals who are notheterosexual females. These victims who are notheterosexual females will be referred to asnontraditional victims and will includehomosexual females, homosexual males,heterosexual males, transsexual females, andtranssexual males. There has not been sufficientresearch concerning rape involving bisexualindividuals to include in the current discussion.Heterosexual female victims will be referred toas traditional victims. The focus of this paperwill be on a novel application of Paterson andMuehlenhard’s (2011) Match-and-MotivationModel, a simple framework that has been verysuccessfully applied to the labeling of events as“sex” in heterosexual females. This review willapply the Match-and-Motivation Model to thelabeling of nonconsensual sexual experiences asrape and the subsequent reporting of theseevents by nontraditional victims. Emphasis willbe on the unique barriers to labeling andreporting rapes by nontraditional victims,especially increased victim blame and decreasedperceived severity. This paper will providesupport for the possibility that nontraditionalvictims are less likely than traditional victims toapply the label of rape to nonconsensual sexualexperiences and are thereby less likely to reportrapes that have occurred.Defining RapeThere is no single definition of rape thatis universally endorsed. In fact, definitions ofrape vary considerably between individuals aswell as within individuals across time (Peterson& Muehlenhard, 2011). Nonetheless, there are*Initially submitted for Psychology 4791F at the University of Western Ontario. For inquiries regarding thearticle, please email the author at kmstubbs@gmail.com.

FACTORS PREVENTING NONTRADITIONAL RAPE REPORTsome agreements on the essential elements ofwhat rape is, to which is captured by the U.SDepartment of Justice’s legal definition, andused by many researchers as their operationaldefinition. The U.S Department of Justice(2010) defines rape as:nonconsensual oral, anal, or vaginalpenetration of the victim by body partsor objects using force, threats of bodilyharm, or by taking advantage of a victimwho is incapacitated or otherwiseincapable of giving consent.Incapacitation may include mental orcognitive disability, self-induced orforced intoxication, status as minor, orany other condition defined by law thatvoids an individual’s ability to giveconsent.Rape Involving Nontraditional VictimsBefore the Match-and-Motivation Modelcan be discussed, it is vital that myths pertainingto rapes involving nontraditional victims beaddressed. Additionally, an overview of theprior research on this topic will be presented.This overview will include the findings onsocial perceptions towards nontraditionalvictims as compared to traditional victims, aswell as findings on the reporting of rapes withnontraditional victims.Incidence MythsThe first incidence myth is the notionthat rape victims are exclusively female.Whether endorsement of this myth is due to alack of non-female rape victims in the media, aphysiological misunderstanding (for example, abelief that a male could not be physicallyaroused while being sexually assaulted), a socialfactor, or an unlisted cause that is not yet fullyunderstood (Davies, 2002; White & Yamawaki,2009). Unfortunately, the reality is that malescan be and are raped. Davies’ (2002) metaanalysissuggested that the incidence of forcedsexual events with male victims may be nearlytwo-thirds that of forced sexual events withfemale victims. Incidence with homosexualmale victims was notably higher than that withheterosexual male victims. The average age ofmale victims at the time of rape was 24 whenonly adults (age 16 and older), were considered(Walker, Archer, & Davies, 2005a). In 1988,Strickman-Johnson studied male sexualvictimization in a college population and foundthat 16% of college males had been victims of atleast one forced sex episode. It is important tonote that these statistics, like those for females,are based on rapes that have been reported andon responses from participants in studies whoare willing to admit that such an event as isdescribed in the study has occurred.The second incidence myth consists ofthe belief that when a male is raped by a male,homosexuality of both the victim andperpetrator is implied. Hodge and Canter (1998)found that half of male victims of maleperpetratedrape identified themselves asheterosexual. Further, Groth and Burgess (1980)found that half of males who committed acts ofrape against other males identified themselvesas heterosexual. Although both of these studieshave rather small sample sizes (50 and 16respectively), they are still sufficient to suggestthat homosexuality of the victim and perpetratoris not implied when male-male rape occurs.However, it does appear that the incidence ofhomosexuality among male-male rape victims ishigher than that of the general population. As aresult of this high proportion of homosexualvictims, it has been suggested that males,heterosexual and homosexual, may underreportrape more so than females due to a fear of beingstigmatized as homosexual (White &Yamawaki, 2009).General MythsWakelin and Long (2003) suggested thatmany of the same rape myths surroundingfemale rape victims may be present inperceptions regarding male rape victims. Themain female rape myths involve the belief thatthe victim enjoys the event and the belief thatthe event was caused by the victim’s indiscreetbehavior. Both beliefs are associated with morenegative perceptions towards the victim, which

FACTORS PREVENTING NONTRADITIONAL RAPE REPORTmay prevent victims from choosing to labelthemselves as a victim of rape and prevent thesubsequent reporting of the event. Walkin andLong’s research suggests that these mythsnegatively influence perceptions towards malevictims and so males should, similarly tofemales, refrain from self-identifying as rapevictims and from reporting these events to avoidthe stigma that results from these false beliefs.Reporting the EventVery few male victims of rape report thecrime to authorities (Hodge & Canter, 1998). Inone study by Walker et al. (2005a), only 5 out of40 males who identified as victims of rape hadreported the crime, a rate that is notably lowerthan that of female victims. Braun, Schmidt,Gavey, and Fenaughty (2009) interviewedhomosexual and bisexual men who hadexperienced rape and found that male rapevictims have tremendous difficulty convincingauthorities that the sexual event wasnonconsensual. Through these interviews, Braunet al. were additionally able to discern five mainmethods by which males are raped: physicaloverpowering, drugs and alcohol, exploitationof inexperience, power differentials, and socialobligation (for example, meeting an individualwith the presumed purpose of sexual relationsand thereby feeling as though one has no choicebut to proceed with the agreed-upon sexualevent). It is because so few male-victim rapesare reported that researchers must ofteninterview individuals rather than consult legaldatabases, which impedes the research processand has limited the availability of informationon rapes involving male victims and othernontraditional victims.Negative OutcomesWalker et al. (2005b) investigated thelong-term psychological effects on male rapevictims and found the same negative outcomesthat are known to occur in females. Thenegative outcomes include increased incidenceof depression and anxiety disorders, increasedincidence of alcohol and drug misuse, lowerself-worth and self-esteem, social avoidance,self-harming behaviors, and related negativeoutcomes. A second study by Walker et al.(2005a) found that male rape victims who didnot seek support were more likely to attemptsuicide than those who did seek support. Thetragic reality of male rape appears to beunintuitively common and highly devastating.Social PerceptionsHoward (1984a; 1984b) was the first toconsider social perceptions of nontraditionalrape victims and, in fact, did so well before thisfield of study had begun to gain momentum.Howard had participants read depicted strangerrape scenarios in which the victim was eithermale or female, and then had participantscomplete a questionnaire measuring victimblame. This experiment yielded a higher amountof victim blame for male victims than for femalevictims. Furthermore, male victims weregenerally behaviorally blamed − blamed fortheir victimization due to action or inaction(typically, failure to escape or defend themself)− whereas female victims were generallycharacterologically blamed−blamed due to atrait possessed (typically, carelessness). Fifteenyears later, Anderson (1999) reproducedHoward’s research and found that mostparticipants did not distinguish between thesubtypes of blame, behavioral andcharacterological. Research after Anderson’sstudy has typically considered victim blame as asingle combined measure, and has used thissingle measure along with a perceived crimeseverity measure to study anti-victimperceptions.Over the last decade, numerous studieshave used victim blame measures and perceivedseverity measures to investigate anti-victimperceptions specifically towards nontraditionalvictims (Davies & Hudson, 2011; Davies &Rogers, 2006; Davies, Pollard, & Archer, 2001).The work of Davies and her colleagues in theseyears has indicated three main findings: (a)more anti-victim perceptions are directedtowards nontraditional victims than traditionalvictims, (b) heterosexual male participants havemore severe anti-victim perceptions than other

FACTORS PREVENTING NONTRADITIONAL RAPE REPORTparticipants, and (c) heterosexual maleparticipants direct significantly more anti-victimperceptions at homosexual male victims thanany other type of victim (male transvestitevictims may be an exception to this, but theresearch pertaining to these victims is not yetadequate to make any definitive conclusions).Davies and Hudson (2011) havesuggested three main theories as to whyheterosexual male participants view homosexualmale rape victims so negatively. These theoriesare:Traditional gender roles and beliefsystems. Heterosexual males may viewhomosexual males as similar to heterosexualfemales due to their similar sexual preferencesand the stereotypes pertaining to female-likebehavior. If this is the case, it is quite possiblethat similar rape myths as are endorsed withfemale victims (victim’s enjoyment of rape andindiscreet behaviors that lead to the rape)influence heterosexual males’ perceptions ofhomosexual male victims. This theory isconsistent with previously discussed findings ofWakelin and Long (2003) and, whencompounded with the factors discussed below,may explain why homosexual male victims areviewed more negatively than heterosexualfemale victims.Homophobia. A general negativeattitude towards homosexual males such as thatcommonly present in heterosexual males as aresult of homophobia may also produce thesevere anti-victim perceptions in question. Thistheory is supported by the findings of Anderson(2004), which identified a significant correlationbetween homophobia and severity of anti-victimperceptions of homosexual male rape victims.The possibility of a similar correlation betweentransphobia and anti-victim views towardstranssexual victims is currently under study(Davies & Hudson, 2011). Transphobia andhomophobia may also be correlated with rapemyth acceptance (Nagoshi et al., 2008), whichwould complicate Davies and colleagues’explanation of traditional gender roles and beliefsystems with their explanation of victim blameas a function of homophobia.Defensive-Attribution Theory. Daviesand Hudson (2011) proposed that Shaver’s(1970) hypothesis of defensive-attribution mayapply if heterosexual male participantsexaggerate the dissimilarity between themselvesand homosexual victims, and view these victimsmore negatively, as result of a defensiveresponse to distance themselves from theunfortunate reality of rape and the possibilitythat males such as themselves could be victimsof rape. There is not yet sufficient experimentalresearch on this topic to support or refute thispossibility.SummaryThere is evidence that the rape ofnontraditional victims does occur and at a rateof incidence that is cause for concern. It hasbeen demonstrated that rape has similarlycatastrophic effects for nontraditional victims asfor traditional victims. Nontraditional victimshave been shown to have particular difficultyreporting rape and often chose not to do so, evenwhen they have chosen to identify themselves asvictims of rape. Finally, while the mechanism isnot yet clear, it has been suggested thatnontraditional victims of rape are perceivedmore negatively with respect to victim blameand perceived crime severity than traditionalvictims.Match-and-Motivation ModelThe Match-and-Motivational Model is asimple framework used in research concerningfactors that influence an individual’sconceptualization of an experience as eitherconsistent or non-consistent with a particularlabel such as sex. The Match-and-MotivationalModel was selected for this review due to itsparsimony and because it has already provenuseful in research pertaining to the labeling ofevents, such as rape (Fisher, Cullen, & Turner,2000). The model describes two types of factorswhich may be thought of as acting in a series:(a) match factors, whether the event isconsistent with the individual’s operational

FACTORS PREVENTING NONTRADITIONAL RAPE REPORTdefinition of the label (referred to as theirscript), and (b) motivational factors, the sum ofperceived consequences of applying or notapplying the label (Peterson & Muehlenhard,2011). This approach is not novel and has beenused in such research as that of Fisher, Cullen,and Turner (2000), which examined factorscontributing to the labeling or non-labeling ofevents as rape, as well as in an earlier study byPeterson and Muehlenhard (2007), whichexamined factors contributing to the labeling ornon-labeling of events as sex.Application with Traditional VictimsPeterson and Muehlenhard (2011)conducted open-ended questionnaires andinterviews with female victims of rape in aneffort to better understand why individuals labeltheir experiences as rape immediately, yearsafter the event, or not at all. They were able toidentify several factors which act as barriers inthe labeling process specific to a rape label, asfollows:Match Barriers. Four primary matchfactors were associated with non-labeling of anevent as rape: (a) the perpetrator did not fit theindividual’s personal idea of a rapist (i.e., afriend), (b) the victim was intoxicated, (c) noexcessive force was employed by theperpetrator, and (d) the victim did not resist toan extent that she felt to be consistent with rape.Motivational Barriers. Five primarymotivational factors were associated with nonlabelingof an event as a rape: desire to avoid (a)labeling the perpetrator as a rapist, (b)distrusting all members of the perpetrator’s sex,(c) using such a potent word as rape, (d) feelingworse about the event, (e) having to talk aboutor report the event.While the above barriers have only beeninvestigated in traditional victims, it seemsreasonable that most if not all of these barriersshould also be present and roughly equivalent inthe labeling process for nontraditional victims.Application with Nontraditional VictimsAdditional Match Barriers. One matchfactor that is unique to nontraditional victims isthe possibility that the gender or sexualorientation of the victim or perpetrator may notbe consistent with the victim’s rape script. Forexample, a heterosexual male may not believethat he can be raped by a female. The possibilityof this barrier is supported by the endorsementof myths including the first incidence mythdiscussed previously, which consisted of thebelief that all rape victims are female and allrapists are male (Davies, 2002; White &Yamawaki, 2009). A second match factorunique to nontraditional victims pertains to firstlabeling the event as sex. It is likely that, forexample, many heterosexual males may notconsider sexual events involving another man tobe sex, and so would be further unlikely toconsider the event as rape (Peterson &Muehlenhard, 2007). It is also possible that oralsexual events may not be considered sex by bothtraditional and nontraditional victims, especiallyby homosexual males as they are known to veryfrequently engage in male-male oral sexualevents (Johnson, Wadsworth, Wellings, & Field,1994). For more discussion on the labeling ofevents as sex in the context of the Match-and-Motivational Model, see Peterson andMuehlenhard (2007).Additional Motivational Barriers.Perhaps the most important motivational barrierto consider in rape labeling and reporting withnontraditional victims is the desire to avoidbeing identified as a rape victim. The desire notto be perceived or treated as a rape victim is notunique to nontraditional victims, but there isadequate reason to suspect that this barrier maybe more severe in nontraditional victims: (a)being identified as a male rape victim may resultin stigmatization of being labeled as ahomosexual (White & Yamawaki, 2009), and(b) nontraditional rape victims are generallyperceived more negatively than traditional rapevictims (Davies & Hudson, 2011). The researchof Braun et al. (2009) supports the idea of a

FACTORS PREVENTING NONTRADITIONAL RAPE REPORTperpetrator-centered motivational barrier that isspecific to homosexual males where the victimdesires to avoid labeling the perpetrator as arapist due to gay culture social norms in whichthe coerciveness of male-male rape perpetratorsis normalized.If nontraditional victims are less likely tolabel and report rape, this would imply that thetrue incidence of such rapes is notably higherthan the current estimates, which supportsadvocacy that research concerning rape(prevention strategies, support, etc.) should shiftto be more inclusive of nontraditional victims.Research LimitationsThe study of nontraditional-victim rapeis a recent phenomenon and even more recentwas the formation of the Match-and-MotivationModel. Consequently, existing researchevidence is subject to numerous limitations andchallenges which are described below.Investigating Unreported RapeThis review focused on a behavior,unreported rape, which is not adequatelycaptured in reports or statistics. This review hadto draw upon theoretical research with limitedempirical backing. Research on transsexualvictims of rape is particularly lacking at thispoint in time. A moderate amount of research onhomosexual female rape victims has beenconducted, but has been largely unable to arriveat consistent conclusions with regard toincidence rate and barriers to labeling andreporting of rapes (Balsam, Lehavot, &Beadnell, 2011; Porter & Williams, 2011). Thepresent review limited all considerations ofvictims to those who are above sixteen years ofage due, in part, to a lack of appropriatelyrelevant research on minors.The Meaning of RapeInconsistencies in the definition of rapein victims’ scripts as well as in researchers’operational definitions complicate any researchpertaining to rape. This challenge was partiallyaddressed by utilizing a broad legal definition ofrape and by commenting on the inherentvariance in rape scripts, matching, andmotivation between individuals.The Relation between Labeling andReportingWhile research has supported thecommon requirement of labeling an experienceas a rape before the event can be reported(Layman et al., 1996; Littleton et al., 2009),labeling and reporting should not be thought ofas completely entwined. Following the labelingof an experience as rape, it is likely that thereare additional, victim-specific barriers whichmust be overcome in order to proceed with thesupport-seeking process. This relation has notyet been studied and should be the subject offuture study.Future ResearchPrevention ResearchThis review posits that rape ofnontraditional victims may be more commonthan was once thought and so it follows thatresearch should include efforts that may help toprevent such rapes. Research concerning suchprevention strategies could, for example,examine the benefits of more general (genderneutral and sexual orientation neutral)discussions of rape in schools.Replication with Nontraditional Victims andRape ReportingThe best way to evaluate the posits ofthe present review would be to reproduce theMatch-and-Motivation Model study by Petersonand Muehlenhard (2011) with nontraditionalvictims, and with a focus on match andmotivation factors contributing not only tolabeling of rape, but to reporting of rape. Theproposed study would consist of open-endedquestionnaires and interviews withnontraditional victims who have experiencedevents that are consistent with a commonoperational definition of rape. The specificquestions and measures would mirror those ofPeterson and Muehlenhard (2011) as closely aspossible, but would also include questions

FACTORS PREVENTING NONTRADITIONAL RAPE REPORTspecific to the reporting or non-reporting of theevent and any other factors found to beinvolved. This research would be extremelyuseful in future decisions regarding the scope ofresearch on rape as a whole.ConclusionThe present review has provided clearevidence that, counter to a number of myths,rapes involving nontraditional victims do occurand these rapes have similar negative outcomesas traditional-victim rapes. Not only do theserapes occur, but research supports the claim thatthese nontraditional victims are viewed morenegatively than traditional victims. It has beensuggested that this harsh stigmatizationintroduces unique match-related and motivationrelatedbarriers to the labeling and reporting ofrape in nontraditional victims. Consequently, itfollows that rape involving nontraditionalvictims is likely to be underreported incomparison to traditional victims. If this is thecase, nontraditional-victim rape may be an issueof comparable severity and commonality astraditional-victim rape. With this possibility inmind, the research community should continuethis research and consider shifting the focus ofresearch away from heterosexual-female-victimspecificstudy to a more general populationstudy.First Received: 4/30/2013Final Revision Received: 8/30/2013ReferencesAnderson, I. (1999). Characterological andbehavioral blame in conversations aboutfemale and male rape. Journal ofLanguage and Social, 18, 377-394.Anderson, I. (2004). Explaining negative rapevictim perception: Homophobia and themale rape victim. Current Research inSocial Psychology, 10, 43-57.Balsam, K., Lehavot, K., & Beadnell, B. (2011).Sexual revictimization and mentalhealth: A comparison of lesbians, gaymen, and heterosexual women. Journalof Interpersonal Violence, 26(9), 1798-1814.Braun, V., Schmidt, J., Gavey, N., & Fenaughty,J. (2009). Sexual coercion among gayand bisexual men in aotearoa/newzealand. Journal of Homosexuality, 56,336-360.Davies, M. (2002). Male sexual assault victims:A selective review of the literature andimplicationsfor support services.Aggressive and Violent Behavior, AReview Journal, 7, 203-214.Davies, M., & Hudson, J. (2011). Judgmentstoward male and transgendered victimsin a depicted stranger rape. Journal ofHomosexuality, 58, 237-247.Davies, M., & Rogers, P. (2006). Perceptions ofmale victims in depicted sexual assaults:A review of the literature. Aggressionand Violent Behavior, 11, 367-377.Davies, M., Pollard, P., & Archer, J. (2001).The influence of victim gender and sexalorientation on judgments of the victim ina depicted stranger rape. Violence andVictims, 16, 607-619.Fisher, B. S., Cullen, F. T., & Turner, M. G.(2000). The sexual victimization ofcollege women (NCJ 182369).Washington, DC: U.S. Department ofJustice. Retrieved fromhttp://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/182369.pdfGroth, N., & Burgess, A. W. (1980). Male rape:Offenders and victims. AmericanJournal of Psychiatry, 137, 806-810.

FACTORS PREVENTING NONTRADITIONAL RAPE REPORTHodge, S., & Canter, D. (1998). Victims andperpetrators of male sexual assault.Jounal of Interpersonal Violence, 13,222-239.Howard, J. (1984a). The “normal” victim: Theeffects of gender stereotypes onreactions to victims. Social PsychologyQuarterly, 47, 270-281.Howard, J. (1984b). Societal influences onattributions blaming some victims morethan others. Journal of Personality andSocial Psychology, 494-505.Johnson, A., Wadsworth, J., Wellings, K., &Field, J. (1994). Sexual attitudes andlifestyles. Oxford: Blackwell Scientific.Layman, M., Gidyez, C., & Lynn, S. (1996).Unacknowledged versus acknowledgedrape victims: Situational factors andposttraumatic stress. Journal ofAbnormal Psychology, 105, 124–131.Littleton, H., Axsom, D., & Grills-Taquechel,A. (2009). Sexual assault victims'acknowledgement status andrevictimization risk. Psychology ofWomen Quarterly, 33, 34-42.Mezey, G., & King, M. (1989). The effects ofsexual assault on men: A survey of 22victims. Psychological Medicine, 19,205-209.Nagoshi, J., Adams, K., Terrell, H., Hill, E.,Brzuzy, S., & Nagoshi, C. (2008).Gender differences in correlates ofhomophobia and transphobia. Sex Roles,59, 521-531.Peterson, Z., & Muehlenhard, C. (2007). Whatis sex and why. Journal of Sex Research,44, 256–268.Peterson, Z., & Muehlenhard, C. (2011). Amatch-and-motivation model of howwomen label their nonconsensual sexualexperiences. Psychology of WomenQuarternly, 34(4), 558-570.Porter, J., & Williams, L. (2011). Intimateviolence among underrepresented groupson a college campus. Journal ofInterpersonal Violence, 26(16), 3210-3224.Rogers, P. (1998). Call for research into malerape. Mental Health practice, 1(9), 34.Shaver, K. (1970). Defensive attributions:Effects of severity and relevance on theresponsibility assigned for an accident.Journal of Personal and SocialPsychology, 49, 101-113.Stuckman-Johnson, C. (1998). Forced sex ondates: It happens to men, too. Journal ofSex Research, 24, 234-241.U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute ofJustice. (2010). Rape and sexualviolence. Retrieved fromhttp://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/topics/crime/rape-sexual-violence/welcome.htmWakelin, A., & Long, K. M. (2003). Effects ofvictim gender and sexuality onattributions of blame to rape victims. SexRoles, 49, 477-487.Walker, J., Archer, J., & Davies, M. (2005a).Effects of rape on male survivors: Adescriptive analysis. Archives of SexualBehavior, 34, 69-80.Walker, J., Archer, J., & Davies, M. (2005b).Effects of male rape on psychologicalfunctioning. British Journal of ClinicalPsychology, 44, 445-451.White, S., & Yamawaki, N. (2009). Themoderating influence of homophobiaand gender-role traditionality onperceptions of male rape victims.Journal of Applied Social Psychology,39(5), 1116-1136.

© 2013 WUPJ, September 2013, Volume 1 CognitionHow Much do We Really Remember About 9/11?A Critical Analysis of the Neuroscience Behind Flashbulb MemoriesMichael Salna*“I remember it like it was yesterday” is a phrase often heard in relation to anemotional and vivid memory of some episode. Brown and Kulik (1977) definedthese memories in the context of momentous public events as “flashbulbmemories.” Many remember where they were or who they were with when theyheard of the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001. However, an emerging bodyof literature suggests that the defining characteristic of these flashbulb memories isthe confidence in their accurate recall, rather than their true accuracy. This paperexamines the issues of confidence and memory as they relate to 9/11 and whetherstress at the time of encoding merely improves the confidence of recall.Do you recall where you were when youfirst heard about the September 11th events?Who first told you? How they described it?Flashbulb memories (FBMs) are long-lastingand exceptionally vivid autobiographicalmemories of emotional events. Brown andKulik coined the term “flashbulb memories” in1977 and described these memories as if themind had taken “snapshots” of thecircumstances in which the memory took place(Brown & Kulik, 1977). FBMs are consideredepisodic memories (memories of pastexperiences) rather than event memories (morefactual and semantically-based; Tulving, 1972)because of the large role an individual’semotional involvement in the originalexperience plays (Curci et al., 2006). Vivid,flashbulb-like memories have been reported inthe assassinations of President John F. Kennedyand Martin Luther King, Jr., the Challengerexplosion, and most recently, the terroristattacks of September 11th, 2001 (Talarico &Rubin, 2003).Cognitive neuroscientists study FBMsbecause they can illustrate the influence ofemotions, particularly stress, on episodicmemory recall confidence and accuracy.Considerable work has been done on how stressmodulates memory. After task-learning, stressfacilitates memory retention in rodents(McGaugh, Cahill, & Roozendaal, 1996).Similarly, amygdalar arousal in humans hasbeen found to enhance retrieval for emotionalepisodic memories (Hamann, Ely, Grafton, &Kilts, 1999). The intense shock and negativevalence of FBM events is believed to accountfor the vivid, detailed recollection andconfidence individuals have in these memories.However, an emerging body of evidencesuggests that it is the “feeling of remembering,”rather than accurate factual recall (declarativememory), that is augmented with highlyemotional memories (Rimmele et al., 2011;Sharot et al., 2004). Due to the infrequency ofevents such as 9/11, little work has been done toexamine the accuracy and underlyingneuroscience of FBMs. This report will exploretwo papers that speak to these parameters andanalyze the discrepancies in arousal, confidence,and recall within the context of 9/11 FBMs.Sharot et al. (2007) explored themechanisms underlying FBMs usingneuroimaging techniques on 24 New York Cityresidents who were in Manhattan during theSeptember 11th attacks. Structural MRI scans ofsubjects’ brains were performed and followedby three fMRI scans. During the fMRI scans,participants were shown 20 pairs of words, eachconsisting of a “cue” word and a “trial” word.The cue words came from a list of 60 wordsdesigned to elicit subjective memories (eg.“building,” “radio,” and “photograph”) and thetrial words put the cue words into context usingeither “September” (suggesting the 9/11 attacks)or “summer” (referring to events experienced*Initially submitted for Psychology 3224A at the University of Western Ontario. For inquiries regarding thearticle, please email the author at msalna@uwo.ca.

HOW MUCH DO WE REALLY REMEMBERduring the summer). After scanning,participants rated their memories on six factorsselected to characterize their recollectiveexperiences: arousal, vividness, reliving,remember/know, confidence, and valence. Theycompleted the study by writing narratives oftheir 9/11 and summer memories.Proximity to the World Trade Center(WTC) at the time of the attack proved to be themost significant factor in recollectiveexperience measures. Those participants whowere Downtown, and thus closer to the WTC,not only recalled 9/11 memories with morecoherent and vivid narratives than those whowere Midtown, but also reported higher levelsof negative valence related to the 9/11 attacksrelative to summer events. Within theDowntown group, 41% mentioned a directpersonal threat from the attacks, such asavoiding falling debris, while none of theMidtown group participants mentioned anythreats. Moreover, the entire Downtown groupreported seeing or hearing the buildings collapsewith only 60% of the Midtown groupmentioning similar experiences. No differenceswere found between the Downtown andMidtown groups for summer memories, thoughDowntown participants were more confident intheir recalls and provided greater detail of 9/11memories than the Midtown group.The aforementioned memoryrecollection differences illustrate that thequantity and quality of recollected 9/11memories were enhanced in participants closerto the danger. Therefore, fMRI scans wereexpected to show increased activation of neuralcircuits related to the recollection of emotionalmemories in Downtown participants. Theamygdala, a limbic structure that generatesstress responses and modulates emotionalmemory, proved to be significantly more activein the Downtown group than the Midtown groupduring recall of 9/11 memories relative tosummer memories. The differences in memoryrecollection and the increased activation of theamygdala suggest that memories of theseemotional evens are more vivid, however, notnecessarily more accurate.Sharot and her colleagues (2007) alsofound a decrease in parahippocampal cortex(PHC) activity during the retrieval of 9/11memories from the Downtown group relative tothe Midtown group. The PHC is believed tohave a role in the processing and recognition ofscene details in episodic memory (Kohler,Crane, & Milner, 2002). During arousal,attention may be focused on the central arousingaspects of the event (for example, falling debrisor the collapse of the towers) rather thanperipheral details of the environment. Thiswould result in a failure to encode such details.Though not addressed by Sharot et al., studieson false memories have revealed correlationsbetween decreased parahippocampal activityand false memory recall (Cabeza et al., 2001).These data suggest that the decreased PHCactivity observed during 9/11 memory retrievalmay correspond with false memory recollectionfor specific environmental details.Sharot et al. (2007) acknowledged thepractical constraints in measuring memoryaccuracy due to their study taking place threeyears after 9/11. This confounding variablecould have been compensated for by examiningrelative hippocampal activation between 9/11and summer memories in their Downtown andMidtown groups. The hippocampus has longbeen known to be involved in the encoding andlong-term storage of episodic memories, andincreased hippocampal activation has beenreported when information is correctlyrecollected (Eldridge, Knowlton, Furmanski,Bookheimer, & Engel, 2000). Therefore,analyzing hippocampal activation would haveafforded some inferences of recall accuracydespite the long time period separating encodingand recall.Jennifer Talarico and David Rubin(2003) challenged the accuracy of 9/11 FBMsby probing the memories of 54 Duke Universitystudents on September 12, 2001, one day afterthe terrorist attacks. These students completedopen-ended questionnaires designed to probeboth their memories of the circumstancessurrounding their first hearing of the 9/11terrorist attacks and memories of a recent every

HOW MUCH DO WE REALLY REMEMBERday event. They also completed theAutobiographical Memory Questionnaire, arating-scale that assesses different properties ofautobiographical memories. Measurementsincluded scales of “recollection” (how muchyou “feel as if you are reliving the experience”),“belief” (belief that the event in your memoryoccurred the way you remember it), and a ratingof how much participants could “see, hear, andfeel the setting where [the memory] occurred”(Talarico & Brown, 2003). As emotion is animportant characteristic for FBMs, the studentsrated their emotional intensity, valence, andvisceral responses to the 9/11 and every dayevent memories.After the initial questionnaires,participants were randomly assigned to one ofthree follow-up groups (n=18 for each group).The same questions were asked again on eitherday seven, 42, or 242 following the initialquestioning in order to measure the memoryconsistency. During the second session, theevery-day event recall was cued with adescription participants provided in the initialsession and the flashbulb event (9/11) was cuedwith a question identical to that of the firstsession: “how you first heard about the news ofthe attacks on America on Tuesday, September11, 2001” (Talarico & Brown, 2003). Usingcues that did not provide any novel informationensured that there was no preferential memoryretrieval from suggestive questioning whenprobing participants’ memories. The recall datawere scored by two independent raters. Memorydetails were judged as consistent if participantsused the same or similar words to describe thememories in both sessions.The results elaborate on those of Sharotet al. (2007). While FBMs demonstrated higheremotional intensity, detail and negative valence,they were not immune to being forgotten. Infact, both FBMs and memories of everydayevents decayed at the same rate, with nostatistical difference between the reduction inconsistent details and increase in inconsistentdetails over time. In contrast to Brown andKulik’s (1977) emphasis on the retention ofirrelevant details in FBMs, Talarico and Brown(2003) found that 42% of the inconsistencies in9/11 memories were for distinctive details suchas the time, place, and participants’ activitiesupon first hearing the news. Interestingly,despite this decline in accuracy, the participants’reported levels of recollection and vividnessremained high and constant for FBMs whilethose for everyday memories progressivelydeclined over time. Furthermore, the 9/11memories were narrated more coherently andwere less fragmented than everyday memoriesacross all of the sessions. Together, these resultssuggest that participants believed their 9/11memories were more accurate than everydaymemories. Talarico and Rubin (2003) concludethat it is this vividness and exaggeratedconfidence in FBMs that, while unrelated toconsistency, lead to participants’ convictions ofa flashbulb’s accuracy.It must be noted that the young age ofSharot et al. (2007) and Talarico and Rubin’s(2003) subjects, 20 to 33 and 20 to 25 years ofage respectively, may limit how representativethe retrieval and memory data is of broaderdemographics. However, Wolters and Goudsmit(2007) arrived at the same set of conclusionsusing college students (M = 24.8 years of age)and healthy elderly subjects (M = 70.5 years ofage) in their ability to remember 9/11 memories.The findings of these two studiesprovide a complementary understanding of themechanisms and characteristics underlyingFBMs. Both papers speak to the highlyemotional and detailed content of FBMs relativeto everyday episodic memories. FBMs havebeen referenced as a preferential type ofepisodic memory – one with extremelyconfident recollection of details (Conway et al.,1994). While both Sharot et al. (2007) andTalarico and Rubin’s (2003) results cite thecorrelation between confident recollection andarousal, Talarico and Rubin directly illustratethat this arousal does not translate into accuraterecollection (Talarico & Rubin, 2003). Sharot etal.’s finding of decreased PHC activity inconjunction with increased amygdalar arousalmay empirically support this finding, givenprevious reports outlining the correlation

HOW MUCH DO WE REALLY REMEMBERbetween decreased PHC activity and theretention of false or distorted memories (Cabezaet al., 2001). The two papers reviewed in thisreport are now part of a growing body ofevidence that suggests the amygdala merelyenhances the confidence of recollectedmemories rather than their consistency.Specifically, amygdalar arousal during encodingincreases the vividness and subsequentconfidence in flash bulb memory accuracy.However, Sharot et al. and Talarico and Rubindemonstrate that this confidence is unjustifiedby exposing the startling inaccuracies for detailsof FBMs and the apparent disconnect betweenconfidence and accuracy in FBM recall.As a potential explanation, theamygdala’s influence in episodic memory mayfollow the Yerkes-Dodson Law, an empiricalbell-shaped relationship between arousal andperformance. Performance increases withincreased arousal but eventually declines asarousal gets too high. Both Sharot et al.’sDowntown group, who witnessed the death andfalling debris firsthand, and Talarico’s Dukestudents, who had witnessed the unfolding ofthe attacks a mere day before the study, likelyhad very stressful memories of 9/11 duringquestioning (however, this was not measured).While studies suggest that the amygdalamodulates hippocampal declarative memory byenhancing retention, extreme stress has beenshown to impair hippocampal memory(Sapolsky et al., 1990). Moreover, cortisoladministration during encoding in humans hasbeen found to impair hippocampal-mediatedautobiographical memory in subsequentretrieval trials (Buss, Wolf, Witt, &Hellhammer, 2004). In addition, experimentalarousal, even by cortisol administration, cannotmimic the stress levels felt in the lifethreateningsituations Sharot et al.’s Downtowngroup found themselves in. If extreme stress andintense amygdalar arousal interfere with amemory’s encoding its retrieval will beinaccurate. Speculatively, this may have hadadaptive significance as fight-or-flight responsesto a threat (for example, a predator), mediatedby the amygdala, necessitated that resources bespent attending to threats, rather than encodingperipheral details. Thus, the studies reviewed inthis paper may broaden neuroscience’s presentunderstanding of a potential Yerkes-Dodsonlikerelationship between amygdala activationand true memory recall after extreme stress.The enhanced understanding of stressaffectedmemory recall may explain themechanisms underlying other psychologicalphenomena. Specifically, extreme stress in thecontext of flashbulb memories has seriousimplications for eyewitness reports. Eyewitnesstestimony is some of the most compellingevidence presented in court and largely relies onmemory. In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Courtstated that the confidence of a witness should beconsidered an indicator of accuracy (Neil vs.Biggers). However, the results of Sharot et al.and Talarico and Rubin strongly suggest thatconfidence is not, in fact, a reliable indication ofrecall accuracy. The memories of witnesses inperceived life-threatening situations, where theperpetrator has a weapon, have been found to beimpaired by a phenomenon known as “TheWeapon Focus Effect.” This is explained bywitnesses giving great attention to aperpetrator’s weapon, rather than the perpetratorthemselves, during a crime. This decreasesencoding and subsequent recall of peripheraldetails, such as the culprit’s facial features oridentifying tattoos. Meta-analyses haveconfirmed this effect and cite its potentiallydamaging repercussions during unintentionalerrors in eyewitness identification (Steblay etal., 1992). The neurological basis for theWeapon Focus Effect and whether thesememories, uniquely distorted by stress, areinfluenced by the PHC and amygdalarmechanisms found by Sharot et al. in stressful9/11 memories remains to be determined.The results of Sharot et al. (2007) andTalarico and Rubin (2003) have severalimplications for the cognitive neuroscience ofmemory. First, converging evidence in thesestudies indicates that intense amygdalar arousalduring encoding merely results in vividlyremembered memories translating into FBMsbeing confidently, albeit inaccurately, recalled.

HOW MUCH DO WE REALLY REMEMBERThe increased amygdala activation andaccompanying decline in parahippocampalactivation found when Sharot’s Downtowngroup were retrieving 9/11 memories provides aneurological basis for this. These papersenhance cognitive neuroscience’s understandingof excessive arousal and the resultantimpoverished memory. This suggests a Yerkes-Dodson-like relationship between memory andarousal, whereby extreme arousal, such as in alife-threatening situation, may impair theaccuracy of memories despite a greaterconfidence in recall. Furthermore, unwarrantedconfidence in memory recall has concerningimplications in eyewitness testimony, whereconfident witnesses could mean the differencebetween a sentence and an acquittal. Inconclusion, the papers by Sharot et al. (2007)and Talarico and Rubin (2003) shed light on theneurological mechanisms underlying FBMs andthe disparities between arousal, confidence, andrecall accuracy.First Received: 1/12/2013Final Revision Received: 3/17/2013ReferencesAkirav, I., & Richter-Levin, G. (2006). Factorsthat determine the non-linear amygdalainfluence on hippocampus-dependentmemory. Dose-Response, 4(1), 22-37.Boals, A., & Rubin, D. (2008). Memory andcoping with stress: the relationshipbetween cognitive-emotionaldistinctiveness, memory valence, anddistress. Memory, 16 (6), 637-657.Brown, R., & Kulik, J. (1977). Flashbulbmemories. Cognition, 5, 73–99.Buss, C., Wolf, O. T., Witt, J., & Hellhammer,D. H. (2004). Autobiographic memoryimpairment following acute cortisoladministration.Psychoneuroendocrinology, 29(8), 1093-1096.Cabeza, R., Rao, S. M., Wagner, A. D. et al.(2001). Can medial temporal loberegions distinguish true from false? Anevent-related functional MRI study ofveridical and illusory recognitionmemory. Proceedings of the NationalAcademy of Sciences of the United Statesof America, 98(8), 4805-4810.Conway, M. A., Anderson, S. J., Larsen, S. F. etal. (1994). The formation of flashbulbmemories. Memory & Cognition, 22(3),326-343.Curci, A., & Luminet, O. (2006). Follow-up of across-national comparison on flashbulband event memory for the September11th attacks. Memory, 14(3), 329-344.Diamond, D. M., Campbell, A. M., Park, C. R.et al. (2007). The temporal dynamicsmodel of emotional memory processing:A synthesis on the neurobiological basisof stress-induced amnesia, flashbulb andtraumatic memories, and the Yerkes-Dodson law. Neural Plasticity, 2007,60803.Eldridge, L. L., Knowlton, B. J., Furmanski, C.S., Bookheimer, S. Y., & Engel, S. A.(2000). Remembering episodes: Aselective role for the hippocampusduring retrieval. Nature Neuroscience,3(11), 1149-1152.

HOW MUCH DO WE REALLY REMEMBERHamann, S. B., Ely, T. D., Grafton, S. T., &Kilts, C. D. (1999). Amygdala activityrelated to enhanced memory for pleasantand aversive stimuli. NatureNeuroscience, 2(3), 289-293.Kirschbaum, C., Wolf, O. T., May, M. et al.(1996). Stress- and treatment-inducedelevations of cortisol levels associatedwith impaired declarative memory inhealthy adults. Life Sciences, 58 (17),1475-1483.Kohler, S., Crane, J., & Milner, B. (2002).Differential contributions of theparahippocampal place area and theanterior hippocampus to human memoryfor scenes. Hippocampus, 12(6), 718-723.Luminet, O., & Curci, A. (2009). The 9/11attacks inside and outside the US:Testing four models of flashbulbmemory formation across groups and thespecific effects of social identity.Memory, 17(7), 742-759.McGaugh, J. L., Cahill, L., & Roozendaal, B.(1996). Involvement of the amygdala inmemory storage: Interaction with otherbrain systems. Proceedings of theNational Academy of Sciences of theUnited States of America, 93(24), 13508-13514.Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).Phelps, E. (2009). How our brains remember9/11. [NYU Video file]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YM4KIw_2YPw&feature=relatedde Quervain, D. J., Roozendaal, B., Nitsch, R.M. et al. (2000). Acute cortisoneadministration impairs retrieval of longtermdeclarative memory in humans.Nature Neuroscience, 3(4), 313-314.Rimmele, U., Davachi, L., Petrov, R. et al.(2011). Emotion enhances the subjectivefeeling of remembering, despite loweraccuracy for contextual details. Emotion,11(3), 553-562.Sapolsky, R. M., Uno, H., Rebert, C. S., &Finch, C. E. (1990). Hippocampaldamage associated with prolongedglucocorticoid exposure in primates. TheJournal of Neuroscience : The OfficialJournal of the Society for Neuroscience,10(9), 2897-2902.Sharot, T., Delgado, M. R., & Phelps, E. A.(2004). How emotion enhances thefeeling of remembering. NatureNeuroscience, 7(12), 1376-1380.Sharot, T., Martorella, E. A., Delgado, M. R., &Phelps, E. A. (2007). How personalexperience modulates the neuralcircuitry of memories of September 11.Proceedings of the National Academy ofSciences of the United States of America,104(1), 389-394.Steblay, N. (1992). A meta-analytic review ofthe weapon focus effect. Law andHuman Behavior, 16(4), 413-424.St. Jacques, P. L., & Levine, B. (2007). Ageingand autobiographical memory foremotional and neutral events. Memory,15(2), 129-144.Talarico, J. M., & Rubin, D. C. (2003).Confidence, not consistency,characterizes flashbulb memories.Psychological Science, 14(5), 455-461.Tulving, E. (1972). Episodic and semanticmemory. In E. Tulving & W. Donaldson(Eds.), Organization of memory. NewYork: Academic Press, 381–403.Wolters, G. & Goudsmit, JJ. (2005). Flashbulband event memory of September 11,2001: consistency, confidence and ageeffects. Psychological Reports, 96(3),605-619.

© 2013 WUPJ, September 2013, Volume 1 CognitionThe Effect of Interlingual Homophones in Vietnamese-English BilingualsNguyen Nguyen*This study examined whether bilinguals activate phonological representations fromtheir first language when reading in their second language. Specifically, the effectof interlingual homophones in Vietnamese-English bilinguals with unequalproficiencies in their respective languages was examined. Participants werecompletely fluent in English (could speak, read, and write it) with limited abilitiesin Vietnamese (could speak it, but not read or write it). Therefore, for eachinterlingual homophone, these unbalanced bilinguals were expected to have aphonological representation for both languages but an orthographic representationfor English alone. Consequences of this relationship were examined in a lexicaldecision task. The critical stimuli were Vietnamese-English interlingualhomophones and their matched English control words. Decision latencies and errordata for the critical stimuli were recorded and analyzed. A facilitative interlingualhomophone effect was predicted but only a small inhibitory effect was found in theerror data. These results indicate that the lack of a second orthographicrepresentation may reduce the inhibitory homophone effect compared to that seen inEnglish monolinguals and that a facilitative homophone effect may only be foundwhen there are many homophone mates. The results also indicate that weaker(Vietnamese) representations may have little influence on dominant language(English) processing.Bilingualism is prevalent throughout theworld’s population and is a topic of greatrelevance and importance with the continuingglobalization of many domains. The majority ofpsycholinguistic research, however, has focusedon monolinguals, or individuals who speak onlyone language. One of the reasons for this is of apractical nature, in that bilingualism research ismore difficult to conduct. Bilinguals can vary ona number of characteristics including thelanguages they speak, their proficiency in eachlanguage, the age of acquisition of the secondlanguage, and the contexts in which eachlanguage is used. Bilingualism research isimportant not only for its practical implicationsbut also because bilinguals demonstratedifferent cognitive processes than monolinguals(De Groot, 2011).Bilingualism was considered to bedetrimental to cognitive functioning until Pealand Lambert’s (1962) study on the relationbetween child bilingualism and intelligenceprovided evidence to the contrary (De Groot,2011). In this study, bilingual childrenoutperformed monolingual children on testsmeasuring both verbal and non-verbalintelligence. Compared to monolingual children,bilingual children performed better in conceptformation and tasks requiring mental flexibility.Longitudinal studies have also demonstratedthat bilingualism can improve cognitivefunctioning (Lambert, 1981). When tested yearslater, bilingual students who were provided theopportunity to receive immersion schooling in asecond language outperformed matchedmonolingual children on tests indexing variousaspects of cognitive functioning. Specifically,bilinguals tend to outperform monolinguals ontasks requiring cognitive control (De Groot,2011).Bialystok and colleagues used the Simontask in a series of studies to compare thecognitive control of bilinguals and monolinguals(Bialystok, 2006; Bialystok, Craik, Klein, &Viswanathan, 2004; Bialystok et al., 2005;Martin-Rhee & Bialystok, 2008). The Simontask is a perceptual motor task that assessesparticipants’ ability to inhibit or ignore*Initially submitted for Psychology 4850E at the University of Western Ontario. Supervised by Dr. Debra Jared.For inquiries regarding the article, please email the author at nnguye24@alumni.uwo.ca.

INTERLINGUAL HOMOPHONE EFFECTSirrelevant spatial information. Stimuli in twodifferent colours are presented on the right orleft side of a computer screen in a randomizedorder. Participants are asked to press a key onthe left side of the keyboard if the presentedstimulus is one colour and to press a key on theright side if the presented stimulus is the othercolour. In a congruent condition, the position ofthe stimulus on the screen matches the positionof the key to be pressed. In an incongruentcondition there is a mismatch between theposition of the stimulus and the position of thekey to be pressed (for example, a blue squarepresented on the right side of the screen requirespressing the left key). Incongruent trialstypically lead to longer response times and moreerrors than congruent trials. This is known asthe Simon effect. Bilinguals of various agesshowed reliably smaller Simon effects andperformed better overall on the Simon task thanmonolinguals, which suggests that bilingualshave superior inhibitory control. The use ofmore than two colours of stimuli to increaseworking memory load hampered the taskperformance of monolinguals more than that ofbilinguals. In addition, the detrimental effects ofaging on executive control were smaller forbilinguals than monolinguals. These resultssuggest that the effects of bilingualism oncognition go beyond the language domain toaffect general executive processes (Bialystok,2007).Overview of VietnamesePresently, there is limited bilingualresearch involving individuals who speakVietnamese. Studies involving Vietnamesebilinguals have examined grammaticalityjudgements (McDonald, 2000), sentenceinterpretation (Pham & Kohnert, 2008), andauditory processing (Nguyen-Hoan & Taft,2009) but much is left to be discovered. Thisstudy seeks to investigate word readingprocesses in Vietnamese-English bilinguals byexamining the effect of interlingualhomophones, which are words that share thesame sound but have different meanings acrosslanguages. Second generation CanadianVietnamese-English bilinguals are of particularinterest because they typically speak but do notread Vietnamese, and they both speak and readEnglish. These individuals allow us to examinethe impact of the phonology of a first languageon reading in a second language, without theconcurrent influence of knowledge of firstlanguage orthography.Vietnamese is an Austro-Asiaticlanguage with over 85 million speakersworldwide (Nguyen, 2001). The majority ofVietnamese speakers reside in Vietnam,Cambodia, Thailand, and Laos (Nguyen, 2001).Populations of Vietnamese speakers also existoverseas in countries such as the United States,Canada, and Australia. Vietnamese consists ofthree major dialects: Northern (Hanoi), Central(Huê), and Southern (Ho Chi Minh City)(Nguyen, 2001). Vietnamese is a tonal languagethat uses six tones (level, rising, falling,dipping-rising, creaky, constricted) todifferentiate meaning. Tone is indicated in thewritten language using diacritic marks (Nguyen,2001). The Vietnamese writing system is uniquein that Vietnamese is one of the few Asianlanguages to use the Latin alphabet. Vietnameseorthography is also extremely transparent in thatthere is a high degree of regularity in lettersoundcorrespondences (Pham, Kohnert, &Carney, 2008). Vietnamese is an isolatinglanguage. Instead of bound morphemes, such as–ness in happiness, Vietnamese uses separatefunction words and word order to expressgrammaticality (Pham et al., 2008). In terms ofsyntax, Vietnamese has a basic subject-verbobject(SVO) word order, as does English(Nguyen, 2001).Use of Homophones to Study the Role ofPhonology in ReadingWhen reading in English, individualscan activate word meanings using either thephonological or direct route to meaning. Thesetwo routes exist because English uses analphabetic writing system that encodes soundinformation. Readers are using the phonologicalroute to meaning when they translate a wordfrom its written text to its phonological

INTERLINGUAL HOMOPHONE EFFECTSrepresentation and subsequently activate themeaning of the word using this soundinformation. Alternatively, readers can alsoactivate the meaning of a word directly from itswritten form. This direct route is often necessarysince English is somewhat opaque in that itsletter-sound correspondences are not perfect(Jared, Levy, & Rayner, 1999).Homophones are useful when studyingphonology because they can differentiatewhether the phonological or direct route tomeaning is being used. Homophones are wordsthat share phonology but differ in orthographicand semantic representation. In other words,homophones are words that share the samesound but have different spellings and meanings(e.g., dye-die) (Mihalicek & Wilson, 2011). Thevisual information of a homophone will onlyactivate the meaning of the presented word (e.g.dye-“colouring”). The sound of the homophonewill activate both meanings corresponding to thehomophone pair (e.g. “colouring” and “death”).If there is evidence that both meanings of ahomophone pair were activated when only asingle member was shown, it can be concludedthat the phonological route was involved in theactivation of meaning (Jared et al., 1999). Agroup of cognitive psychologists specializing inpsycholinguistics have explored this topic in aseries of studies.Jared and colleagues (1999) usedhomophones to examine the role of phonologyin the activation of word meanings. Theyexamined whether participants noticed when ahomophone in a sentence was substituted for itshomophone mate. The manipulated variableswere the frequency of the correct and incorrecthomophones and the predictability of the correcthomophone. Reading skill was also examined asa possible moderator of task performance. Jaredand colleagues found that phonology played arole in activating meanings of low-frequencywords when correct homophones were notpredictable and reading skill was notconsidered. When reading skill was examined, itwas found that good readers tended to use thedirect route to meaning whereas poor readerstended to use the phonological route to meaning.Overall, this study demonstrated that phonologyis important in the activation of word meaningsand that its impact depends on factors such asfrequency and reading skill. What is still unclearis how printed words are translated into theirphonological representations. In addition,examining words in the context of simplesentences may not be the best method forstudying the role of phonology in the activationof word meanings because readers of differentskill levels may monitor their comprehension ofsentences in different ways (Jared et al., 1999).Rather than examining the effect ofhomophones in the context of sentences,Pexman, Lupker, and Jared (2001) examinedhomophone effects for words in isolation usinga lexical decision task (LDT). In the LDT,participants are shown letter strings and areasked to indicate whether or not the string ofletters forms a word in a given language. Thisinvolves shallower processing of words thansentence reading. Consequently, anyhomophone effects found using a LDT wouldsuggest that phonology plays a role early on inthe word-recognition process (Pexman et al.,2001). Pexman and colleagues examinedwhether homophone effects could be found in aLDT and whether individuals could strategicallycontrol the use of phonology in this task.Homophones were found to have longerdecision latencies than matched control words inthe LDT. Observation of these homophoneeffects was influenced by three factors: thefrequency of a homophone and its mate, theorthographic nature of the nonword foils, andthe phonological nature of the foils. Homophoneeffects were found to be more likely for lowfrequencywords with high-frequency mates andwhen foils were orthographically andphonologically similar to English words. Theauthors suggested that these homophone effectsare due to feedback activation from phonologyto orthography. Activation of the phonologicalrepresentation of a homophone feeds back toorthography, thereby activating bothcorresponding spellings and resulting incompetition at the orthographic level. Assumingthat lexical decisions are based primarily on

INTERLINGUAL HOMOPHONE EFFECTSorthographic activation, this competition at theorthographic level will increase decisionlatencies in the LDT due to the extra timerequired to decide upon the appropriateorthographic representation (Pexman et al.,2001). Other experiments found no evidence ofthe strategic reliance on phonology, suggestingthat phonology consistently plays a role in wordrecognition.In a follow-up study, Pexman, Lupker,and Reggin (2002) evaluated the feedbackaccount by investigating the impact of feedbackactivation in several word recognition tasks.They compared the occurrence of homophone,regularity, and homograph effects in the LDTand phonological LDT. Homographs are wordsthat share spelling but have differentpronunciations and meanings. For example, thehomograph wind is spelt the same butpronounced differently depending on whetherthe intended meaning is ‘a gust of air’ or ‘totwist’. In a phonological LDT, participants areasked to indicate whether presented stimulisound like a word. This task was expected to besensitive to competing phonologicalrepresentations whereas the visually presentedLDT is sensitive to competing orthographicrepresentations. As predicted, Pexman andcolleagues found homophone effects but notregularity or homograph effects in the visuallypresented LDT and found regularity andhomograph effects but not homophone effects inthe phonological LDT. These results provideevidence that homophone effects are the resultof feedback activation from phonology toorthography. Accordingly, phonology doesappear to play a role in visual word recognition(Pexman et al., 2002).Homophone Effects in Other LanguagesAlthough studies conducted in Englishhave found that homophones have longerdecision latencies than matched controls, studiesin other languages have found different effects.Chen, Vaid, and Wu (2009) examinedhomophone effects in Chinese. Chinese differsfrom English in that Chinese homophones aretypically quite different in written form.Furthermore, Chinese homophones typicallyhave about 10 homophonic mates whereasEnglish homophones rarely have more than one.Using lexical decision and naming tasks,Chen and colleagues found a facilitativehomophone effect in that homophones wereresponded to faster than control words. Theauthors suggest two possible mechanisms thatmay be responsible for their finding. Chinesehomophones do not share orthography the wayhomophones of alphabetic languages likeEnglish do. Therefore, Chinese homophonesmay not demonstrate the same kind oforthographic competition that causes theinhibitory homophone effects found in English.Alternatively, Chen and colleagues suggest thefacilitative homophone effect may be due to anincrease in global activation of the mentallexicon (Chen et al., 2009).Hino, Kusunose, Lupker, and Jared(2011) sought to resolve the discrepancy inresults regarding the facilitative and inhibitorynature of homophone effects across languages.Hino and colleagues examined homophoneeffects in Japanese Kanji words using a LDT.Japanese Kanji is ideal for resolving thediscrepancy in results because it sharescharacteristics with both English and Chinese.Similar to Chinese, Japanese is a logographiclanguage with homophones that can have manyhomophonic mates with quite differentorthographic forms. Similar to English,Japanese homophones can also have fewhomophonic mates. This large range in thenumber of homophonic mates makes JapaneseKanji ideal for examining homophone densityeffects. Hino and colleagues found resultsconsistent with studies of both English andChinese homophones in that inhibitoryhomophone effects were found for homophoneswith few homophonic mates whereas facilitativehomophone effects were found for homophoneswith many homophonic mates. These resultssuggest that homophone density may explain thediscrepancy in results found in studies ofEnglish and Chinese homophones.Hino and colleagues explain thefacilitative effect of increased homophone

INTERLINGUAL HOMOPHONE EFFECTSdensity using the global activation account. Theauthors suggest that when a word has manyhomophonic mates, the increased globalactivation in the lexicon facilitates one’s abilityto decide on the homophone’s status as a word.One homophonic mate is not enough to causethis increased global activation (Hino et al.,2011).Bilingual Studies of Phonology UsingInterlingual HomophonesAlthough monolingual research hasdemonstrated the importance of phonology inword recognition, considerably less research hasbeen done on the role of phonology in bilingualword recognition. Just as homophones areuseful in studying phonology in monolinguals,interlingual homophones are useful inexamining phonological processes in bilinguals.As previously mentioned, interlingualhomophones are words that share sound, but notmeaning or spelling, across languages.One of the most prominent bilingualword recognition models is the BilingualInteractive Activation (BIA+) model proposedby Dijkstra and Van Heuven (2002). The BIA+is a localist connectionist model which positsthat bilinguals have a common phonologicallexicon between their two languages. Withinthis single phonological lexicon are separatenodes for words in each language. According tothis model, there is a separate node for eachmember of an interlingual homophone pair.Nas (1983) provided early evidence ofthe shared phonological lexicon of bilinguals.Dutch-English bilinguals participated in anEnglish LDT which included nonwords andcross-language pseudohomophones. The crosslanguagepseudohomophones were created fromDutch words. The spelling of Dutch words waschanged to appear orthographically English, yetwhen read according to English spelling-tosoundconversion rules these letter stringsproduced a phonological representationcorresponding to the original Dutch word. Inother words, the cross-languagepseudohomophones were nonwords in Englishwith Dutch phonological representations. TheDutch-English bilingual participants made moreerrors on the cross-language pseudohomophonesthan the regular nonwords and were also slowerto reject them as words in the English LDT.These results indicate that phonologicalrepresentations of Dutch words were activatedduring the English task, which suggests thatbilinguals have a shared phonological lexicon(Nas, 1983).Doctor and Klein (1992) found a similarinhibitory interlingual homophone effect using ageneralized LDT. English-Afrikaans bilingualswere asked to decide whether presented letterstrings were words in either of their twolanguages. The words used in the generalizedLDT consisted of interlingual homophones,interlingual homographs, and words exclusive toeither English or Afrikaans. Nonwords includedpseudohomophones. Participants had longerdecision latencies and made more errors oninterlingual homophones than interlingualhomographs. Interlingual homographs sharespelling but not meaning across languages.Therefore, each interlingual homograph has oneorthographic representation whereas interlingualhomophones have two orthographicrepresentations, one for each language. Theseresults are consistent with monolingual Englishstudies which suggest that inhibitoryhomophone effects are due to competingorthographic representations.Haigh and Jared (2007) found aninteresting facilitatory interlingual homophoneeffect. Performance on an English LDT wascompared for interlingual homophones andmatched English control words in English-French and French-English bilinguals.Homophone effects were found for the French-English bilinguals but not for the English-French bilinguals. The homophone effects foundfor the French-English bilinguals were of afacilitative nature; however, the effects werequite small and found only in the error data. Theauthors suggest that the differing resultsbetween the two groups of participants mayhave to do with the language in which the LDTwas conducted. The task was conducted in theFrench-English bilinguals’ second language

INTERLINGUAL HOMOPHONE EFFECTSwhereas it was conducted in the English-Frenchbilinguals’ first language. Therefore, languageproficiency may influence phonologicalactivation in bilinguals (Haigh & Jared, 2007).The Present StudyThe present study explored whetherbilinguals activate phonological representationsfrom their first language (L1) when reading intheir second language (L2). Of particularinterest was the effect of interlingualhomophones in individuals with an unequalproficiency in their respective languages. It isnot uncommon for the children of immigrants tobe able to speak their native language but not beable to read or write in that language. Onereason being that these children learn theirnative language at home and continue to speak itwith their family but never go on to receiveformal education in that language because theygo to school in the language of the majority.Specifically, the present study will examine theeffect of interlingual homophones inVietnamese-English bilinguals who are veryfluent in English but have only limited abilitiesin Vietnamese, such that they can speakVietnamese but have little Vietnamese readingand writing abilities.This specific population is of interestbecause their unbalanced language proficienciesmay provide a better understanding of the roleof phonology in visual word recognitionprocesses. The inhibitory effect of homophonesin English has been explained by feedbackactivation from phonology to orthographyresulting in competition at the orthographiclevel (Pexman et al., 2001). The bilingualparticipants in this study are unique in that theycan read in English but not in Vietnamese.When reading interlingual homophones, suchbilinguals are expected to have activation at thephonological level from both languages butactivation at the orthographic level from Englishalone. The present study seeks to explorewhether interlingual homophones will have afacilitative effect on lexical decision in theseindividuals. Since these individuals have onlyone orthographic representation for eachinterlingual homophone, feedback activationfrom phonology to orthography should notcause competition at the orthographic level.MethodParticipantsThe sample consisted of 25 individualsfrom Ontario, Canada. Included were 13 malesand 12 females ranging in age from 17 to 26years (M = 21.64). All participants learnedVietnamese as their first language and Englishas their second language. Participants hadunequal proficiencies in their respectivelanguages in that they were very fluent inEnglish with limited abilities in Vietnamese.Specifically, participants were able to speak,read, and write in English but were only able tospeak in Vietnamese with limited abilities toread and write in Vietnamese. Table 1 showsparticipants’ mean language fluency asindicated on a 10-point Likert scale rangingfrom 1 (none) to 10 (very fluent). Threeparticipants were excluded because they hadVietnamese reading and writing fluencies of 8or higher.All participants had normal or correctedto normal vision. Participants were recruitedusing poster advertisements and members of theVietnamese Students Association at Westernwere invited to participate. Participants werecompensated $5 for their participation.Table 1Mean ParticipantLanguage FluencyEnglish VietnameseUnderstanding 9.92 7.64Speaking 9.92 6.56Reading 9.96 3.32Writing 9.88 2.60MaterialsThe critical stimuli consisted of 31monosyllabic interlingual homophones and theirmatched English controls (see Appendix A). Asshown in Table 2, the English control wordswere matched to the interlingual homophoneson frequency (Baayen, Piepenbrock, &

INTERLINGUAL HOMOPHONE EFFECTSGulikers, 1995), length in phonemes, length inletters, neighbourhood, and bigram frequency.Frequency, length in phonemes, length inletters, and neighbourhood statistics wereretrieved from N-Watch (Davis, 2005). Bigramfrequency was retrieved from the EnglishLexicon Project (Cognitive Psychology Lab,2009). Furthermore, mean lexical decisionlatencies and accuracy for the critical stimuliwere obtained from the English Lexicon Projectdatabase. This data was provided by a largenumber of participants in the U.S., most ofwhom would have been native English speakers.There was no significant difference in decisionlatencies between the homophones (M = 628,SE = 12.72) and controls (M = 625, SE = 12.24)for these participants, t (31) = .16, ns, nor wasthere a significant difference in accuracy databetween the homophones (M = .93, SE = .02)and controls (M = .95, SE = .01), t (31) = -1.01,ns. This data provides further evidence that thetwo groups of words were well matched.Therefore, any difference found between theinterlingual homophones and matched Englishcontrols would be due to the influence ofVietnamese. Although the English controlwords were well matched to the selectedinterlingual homophones, it should be noted thatfinding true interlingual Vietnamese-Englishhomophones is difficult due to the tonal natureof Vietnamese.In addition to the critical stimuli, 62monosyllabic English distracter words and 124pseudowords were included in the LDT.Pseudowords were created by changing lettersin existing words (see Appendix A for completelist of stimuli). A demographics questionnairewas also included (see Appendix B).Table 2Means for CriticalStimuliCharacteristicCelex Frequency(per millionwords)Interlingual ControlsHomophones340.07 384.53Log Celex 1.59 1.61FrequencyKucera-Francis 309.52 363.74FrequencyLength in2.61 3.03PhonemesLength in Letters 3.48 3.77Neighbourhood 9.71 9.35Bigram Frequency 1322.30 1282.47Log Bigram2.99 3.05FrequencyReaction Time 628 625Accuracy 0.93 0.95ProcedurePrior to the experimental task,participants completed a demographicsquestionnaire. During the experimental task,participants were seated approximately 50 cm infront of a computer screen. Participants weretold that letter strings would appear one at atime on the center of the screen and that theywere to decide as quickly and as accurately aspossible whether the letter strings formed a realEnglish word. Participants were asked toindicate their decision by pressing either a wordor nonword button. Prior to the experimentaltrials, participants completed 16 practice trials.Following the practice trials, participantscompleted 248 experimental trials. The order ofpresentation of the stimuli was randomized foreach participant.Each lexical decision trial began with afixation point (+) that appeared in the center ofthe screen for 750 ms, followed by thepresentation of a word or nonword. Thestimulus remained on the computer screen untilthe participant made a response, with anintertrial interval of 1000 ms. All stimuliappeared in lower case letters and were printedin black 18 point Courier New font. Thecomputer recorded the latency from the onset ofthe stimulus to the participant’s button press andthe accuracy of the response.ResultsThe mean decision latencies and percentaccuracy for the target stimuli are presented inTable 3. Decision latencies greater than 1500 ms

INTERLINGUAL HOMOPHONE EFFECTSor less than 300 ms (1.89% of the data) wereconsidered outliers and were not included in theanalysis. Trials in which an error was made andthose involving filler stimuli were also excludedfrom the RT analyses. A paired samples t-testwas performed on decision latency and accuracydata for homophones and controls usingparticipant (t 1 ) means as units of analysis. Anindependent samples t-test was performed ondecision latency and accuracy data for criticalstimuli using item (t 2 ) means as units ofanalysis.No significant effect of word type ondecision latencies was found, t 1 (24) = 0.94, ns,t 2 (60) = 0.66, ns. Participants were significantlyless accurate for the interlingual homophonesthan the matched controls, t 1 (24) = 3.60, p

INTERLINGUAL HOMOPHONE EFFECTSChinese homophones are orthographicallydistinct so there is little competition betweendifferent spellings (Chen et al., 2009). Inaddition, Chinese homophones typically haveabout 10 homophonic mates; unlike Englishhomophones which rarely have more than one(Chen et al., 2009). This increased homophonedensity results in greater phonological activationwhich contributes to a greater global activationof one’s lexicon, or mental dictionary, making iteasier to decide on a Chinese homophone’sstatus as a word (Hino et al., 2011). In thepresent study, any extra activation of phonologyfrom the Vietnamese mate was not sufficient toproduce a facilitatory interlingual homophoneeffect. A facilitatory effect may only be foundwhen there are many homophonic mates, as inChinese.Another explanation for the lack of afacilitatory interlingual homophone effect maybe the interlingual homophones used. TheVietnamese-English interlingual homophonesmay not have been a close enough phonologicalmatch, because Vietnamese is a tonal languagewhereas English is not. Vietnamese uses sixtones: level, rising, falling, dipping-rising,creaky, and constricted (Nguyen, 2001). Sinceno tones are used in English, true Vietnamese-English interlingual homophones may only bewords that use a level tone in Vietnamese.Furthermore, the interlingual homophones werequite high in frequency in English. Highfrequency English words may be lesssusceptible to homophone effects than lowfrequency words (Pexman et al., 2001).Finally, a facilitatory interlingualhomophone effect may not have been foundbecause participants were tested in theirdominant language. Participants in the presentstudy were unique in that their second language,English, had become their dominant, morefluent language. It is not uncommon for secondgeneration Canadians to be able to speak theirnative language but not be able to read or writeit. This is because they learn their nativelanguage at home, and continue to speak it withtheir families, but go on to receive formaleducation in English alone. The present studyincluded such individuals who were fluent inEnglish with limited abilities in Vietnamese.Haigh and Jared (2007) examinedwhether bilinguals activate phonologicalrepresentations from both their languages whenreading in one. Their study included bothEnglish-French and French-English bilinguals.In an English LDT, homophone effects werefound for the French-English bilinguals but notfor the English-French bilinguals. In otherwords, a homophone effect was found only forparticipants who were tested in their lessdominant language. Since English has becomethe dominant language for participants in thepresent study, weaker Vietnameserepresentations may have had little influence ondominant language processing.Suggestions for Future ResearchFuture research may seek to involveparticipants with the same languagecharacteristics but test them using a task in theirless dominant language. The present studycannot simply be replicated testing theparticipants in their less dominant languageinstead of their dominant language. The LDT isa reading task and the participants in this studycould not read in their less dominant language,Vietnamese. Perhaps an auditory LDT could beused. Instead of stimuli being presentedvisually, participants could listen to soundsamples of words and indicate whether or noteach clip they heard was a word in Vietnamese.Another alternative could be an ERP version ofthe LDT used. This may be more sensitive toany interlingual homophone effects.Much is left to be discovered regardinghow one’s first language influences a secondlanguage. This relationship becomes even moreinteresting when an individual’s secondlanguage has become dominant over their first.Studying such individuals may provideinteresting insights into how one’s languagesinteract.First Received: 2/7/2013Final Revision Received: 5/9/2013

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INTERLINGUAL HOMOPHONE EFFECTSAppendix AInterlingual Homophonesthem high guy sigh bye hamnew am cup bang boughsome sat gin lamb gongnow die gap thaw beakman theme jaw hack yamcome sin dumb hop eyeControl Wordsthan head goal sore bib henhow air coat boom brightsuch six gel lump gownnot dog gum thorn bootmuch throat jar hike yarncase seed debt hip earFiller Wordsadd dance fog milk said warmbag did free mine sale wavebath dose held near salt waxbliss duck hill oil scarf webborn fact ink own spoil winebox fair job page stop wolfcamp fate kit pain tail youthcard fig lag rag testchop firm lots ramp topcool fit low rare votecoy fix mice ruin vowNonwordsagian dath gonig nech relt tarshalos daw grap nen rog thridalsa deda greal nige roim thrimaog dela hame niva sair tifapto dran harf noce scaw tursbame drap heda noge scol voirdbast drore herad nrued scuth wabblic ehre hime nup sheelt wayabral elt iar nud shob wheer

INTERLINGUAL HOMOPHONE EFFECTSbrem ent kafe nuilt shouse whoilbude erle kele olny skad woobcag fen leme ols smat wourtcarst fent lesp oson smed wracim fere masp peant sneed wrickclage fid mena pefe snete wriltclead flive mipe pleft sono yaircled flul mish plize stelt yanclek fof moard pon stes yarconse frew moce point swa yeescrose frim moob prog swaldaip frist mour reays swog

INTERLINGUAL HOMOPHONE EFFECTSAppendix BLanguage Experience QuestionnaireParticipant # : ____________________________Age:_________ Gender: M F Father's Native Language: _________________Native Country: __________________________ Father's Second Languages: ________________Native Language: __________________________ Mother's Native Language: _________________Second Language: _________________________ Mother's Second Languages: ________________Region of Vietnamese family background (circle): North Central SouthList the languages you know in the order:a) in which you learned them: _____________________________________________________b) from the one you know best to the one you know least: _______________________________Language spoken most frequently at home with your family: ____________________________________What percentage of time are you currently exposed to each of the following languages in your dailyactivities?Vietnamese _________English _________French _________Other _________Experience with VietnameseFor each of the following Vietnamese language skills, please indicate the age at which you first started to acquirethe skill, the place in which you learned the skill (e.g. home, school), and rate the fluency with which you cancurrently perform the skill. (circle one number per skill).starting placefluencyagenonevery fluentUnderstanding 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Speaking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Reading 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Writing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

INTERLINGUAL HOMOPHONE EFFECTSExperience with EnglishFor each of the following English language skills, please indicate the age at which you first started to acquire theskill, the place in which you learned the skill (e.g. home, school), and rate the fluency with which you cancurrently perform the skill. (circle one number per skill).starting placefluencyagenonevery fluentUnderstanding 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Speaking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Reading 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Writing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10School ExperienceIndicate the type of schooling that you received at each grade level by placing an x in the appropriate box.English schoolin CanadaFrench ImmersionK 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 U1 U2 U3 U4Vietnamese school(no English course)Vietnamese school(an English course)Vietnamese class inCanada outsideschool hours

© 2013 WUPJ, September 2013, Volume 1 CognitionGrasping and Manual Estimation of the Muller-Lyer Illusion at Different Exposure TimesSamik Doshi*The two-stream model of visual processing describes a distinction between visionfor ‘perception’ and vision for ‘action’. The inability of visual illusions (forexample, the Ebbinghaus illusion) to affect grasping actions despite affectingmanual estimation has been used as evidence in support of this model, but thereremains disagreement about the phenomenon. Moreover, it is unclear how long ittakes the brain to process visual illusory information for both grasping andperception. The present study explores these temporal dynamics in the context ofthe Muller-Lyer illusion. Participants were presented with rectangular objectssurrounded by Muller-Lyer illusory wings on a screen for either 50 or 1500 ms,after which visual feedback was removed. In grasping conditions, participantsproceeded to reach out and pick up the object, and in perception conditionsparticipants used their thumb and index fingers to indicate the size of the object.Our data show that grasping (maximum grip aperture) was not affected by theMuller-Lyer illusion regardless of exposure duration but manual estimation wasaffected only after a long exposure duration. This suggests the existence of athreshold above 50ms at which the perceptual system begins to integrate stimulusinformation with surrounding contextual information. Additionally, the inability ofthe Muller-Lyer illusion to affect prehension and not estimation provides furtherevidence for the two-stream model of visual processing.Researchers have developed a strongcase for the hypothesis that visual processing isthe work of separate streams in the primatecerebral cortex. Melvyn Goodale and DavidMilner proposed what now is a standard modelof visual processing that divides the system intotwo streams, one for perception and one for thecontrol of action (what vs. how processing)(Goodale & Milner, 2006). Evidence for thisdissociation has come largely from patients withselective brain lesions, neuroimaging, andneurophysiology (Kroliczak, Heard, Goodale, &Gregory, 2006). The ventral stream allows us toperceive the visual world as it is and store it inour memory, while the dorsal stream operates inreal time, and allows us to guide our actions thatdepend on vision (Goodale & Milner, 2006).While the two streams may interact, it is theventral stream that is mainly concerned withobject shape and identification, whereas thedorsal stream has the purpose of planning andcontrolling visually guided actions (Goodale,Westwood, & Milner, 2004).Many studies have shown the inability ofvisual illusions to affect grasping accuracy asmuch as they affect perception (Aglioti,DeSouza, & Goodale, 1995; Haffenden &Goodale, 1998), supporting the two-streamshypothesis. The Müller-Lyer illusion – in whichthe length of two identical lines appears to bedifferent depending on the orientation of thewings attached to their ends (inward vs.outward) – is one particular visual illusion thathas been used in quite a few demonstrations(e.g. Bruno, Bernardis, & Gentilucci, 2008).Even though evidence has been presented withvisual illusions such as the Ebbinghaus illusion,there remains disagreement about this idea ofdivision of visual processing and its evidence ingrasping visual illusion studies. For example,various studies have found results that showgrasping and perception both being affected byvisual illusion (Franz, Gegenfurtner, Bulthoff, &*Initially submitted for Scholar’s Elective 3304E at the University of Western Ontario. Supervised by Dr. MelvynGoodale & Irene Sperandio. For inquiries regarding the article, please email the author atsamik.doshi1@gmail.com.

GRASPING AND MANUAL ESTIMATION OF THE MULLER-LYER ILLUSIONFahle, 2000; Franz, 2001; Pavani, Boscagli,Benvenuti, Rabuffetti, & Farnè, 1999).According to Franz & Gegenfurtner (2008),results that are congruent with the two-streamshypothesis may be products of differentexperimental measures used (i.e., experimentalartifacts), and it is likely that a single imagerepresentation is used for both processingsystems.Studying the temporal dynamics ofgrasping and perception, particularly in thecontext of visual illusions, is relevant tounderstanding how the brain processes visualinformation. Previous research withmagnetoencephalography (MEG) using theMüller-Lyer illusion found that in perceiving theillusion, activations in the early visual areasoccur between 85 and 130 ms after stimuluspresentation, and more lasting activations occurdeeper in the ventral stream at approximately200 ms (Weidner, Boers, Mathiak, Dammers, &Fink, 2009). The present study aimed to furtherexplore the temporal dynamics of the Müller-Lyer illusion to observe the effect of illusoryelements when presented for different durations.There is evidence that ‘vision for action’ hasquicker access to visual information than ‘visionfor perception’ (Pisella, Arzi, & Rossetti, 1998).In a recent study, de Wit, van der Kamp, andMasters (2011) tested for the existence of twoseparate visual time thresholds that correspondto each processing stream. In a pointing task, itwas found that when the exposure time of thestimulus (12 ms) was shorter than the suggestedperception threshold but greater than thesuggested action threshold, movements werecalibrated to the real size, not the perceived size,of the target in the context of the Müller-Lyerillusion. The purpose of the present project wasto use a paradigm similar to that used in DeWit’s study to test the effect of differentexposure times of the Müller-Lyer illusion ongrasping and manual estimation.In particular, we hoped to answer thefollowing question to elucidate the neuralprocessing underlying the Müller-Lyer illusion,by performing a grasping and manual estimationexperiment: Is there a temporal threshold for theperceptual system at which the illusory elementsdepicted by the Müller-Lyer illusion begin to beintegrated with object information? If such athreshold exists and it is higher than thethreshold for ‘vision for action’, one wouldexpect to observe an effect of the visual illusionon manual estimation (i.e. perceived line lengthwould be affected by illusory “wings”) for longbut not short exposure durations of the illusoryelements. In contrast, grasping should not beaffected by the illusion regardless of exposureduration of illusory elements; visually guidedactions such as grasping rely on more reliabledistance cues, such as vergence, in computingthe perceived size of objects. Vergence is theprocess by which the lines of vision of each eyeeither converge or diverge to accommodate achange in distance of an object, which ischanging in grasping but not perception tasks. Itis conceivable that under short exposuredurations, this vergence information is presentand consequently allows accurate grasping.To summarize, this study exploredgrasping and manual estimation tasks in thecontext of the Müller-Lyer illusion for short andlong exposure conditions, to assess the temporaldynamics of the processing of visualinformation relevant to the illusion.MethodsParticipants16 right-handed participants (averageage 18.9; 4 males) took part in this study at theUniversity of Western Ontario. Each participantwas required to fill out the Edinburghhandedness questionnaire to ensure righthandednessin everyday activities (Oldfield,1971) and had normal or corrected-to-normalvision. Participants were unaware of the purposeof the study, and received a research credit fortheir participation in the study. Our methodswere compliant with the rules and regulations ofthe University of Western Ontario EthicsReview Board.Materials/ApparatusParticipants were seated on a heightadjustablechair in front of a 32 in. NECmultisync LCD monitor (1024 by 768 pixelresolution) screen tilted at 10 degrees above the

GRASPING AND MANUAL ESTIMATION OF THE MULLER-LYER ILLUSIONplane of the floor. One of three differentbackgrounds was presented in the center at onetime: outward wings, inward wings, or parallellines perpendicular to the grasping motion (seeFigure 1). The outward and inward backgroundsgenerated the Müller-Lyer illusion, while theparallel line background represented a controlcondition. The backgrounds were red lines on agrey background, and shaft stimuli werephysically laid on the center of the screen. Thelines that made the wings were 1.5 cm wide and6.5 cm long. Six red, opaque, rectangular blockobjects were used as shaft stimuli, each withdifferent dimensions but constant surface areaand depth (see Figure 2). Two objects (6.0x2.0cm and 4.0x3.0 cm) were the focus of theanalysis and represented 60/84 trials in a block.The other four objects (3.5x3.4 cm, 4.5x2.7 cm,4.8x2.5 cm, and 5.0x2.4 cm) represented catchobjects that inhibited the learning and/ormemory effects associated with the 6.0 and 4.0height objects. As was done in a study byBrown, Halpert, and Goodale (2005), surfacearea of the objects was held constant to ensurethat brightness was not used as a means for sizediscrimination.To begin all trials, participants presseddown on a black response button that wascentered in the left-right direction and wasembedded in a metal fixture between the screenand the participant.PLATO goggles (TranslucentTechnologies, Toronto, ON, Canada) were wornby participants through all trials in order to varystimulus/illusion viewing duration and allowopen-loop grasping and estimation (no visualfeedback while making the motion/judgement).Participant hand position and other trajectorydata were recorded using an Optotrak 3Dmotion-analysis system (Northern Digital,Waterloo, ON, Canada) that determined thespatial position of three infrared emitting diodes(IREDs) placed on the index finger, thumb andthe back of the hand. Optotrak recorded data at100 Hz. IREDs were secured to the hand bytape. Sounds were played through an AltecLansing computer speaker system.ProcedureAt the beginning of each testing session,participants were asked to place a stimulusobject in what they perceived to be thehorizontal and vertical center of a Müller-Lyerneutral condition illusion. Tape was placed onthe screen in this spot in order to calibrate thelocation of the center of the illusion from thepoint of view of the participant.Trials would be started only if theparticipant was pressing down on the startingbutton with the thumb and index fingers pinchedtogether. At the beginning of a grasping trial,the PLATO goggles became transparent foreither 50 or 1500 ms, during which theparticipant viewed the Müller-Lyer illusorywings in 2d and the shaft in 3d. Following theexposure period, a visual mask was displayedfor 50 ms to remove any iconic memory effects.After the mask, a computerized sound (1000 Hzfrequency, 100 ms duration) was played fromthe speakers. The sound was the signal for theparticipant to reach out and grasp (by its lengthas shown in Fig. 3) the object that representedthe shaft of the illusion. The time between theauditory cue and the release of the buttonrepresented the reaction time of the participant.Once the button was released, the gogglesreturned to their opaque state such that thegrasping was performed in open-loop (toprevent on-line grip aperture control)(Haffenden & Goodale, 1998). The participantwas asked to grasp naturally. He or she pickedup and placed the object back down, andreturned to the start button (see Figure 3). Inmanual estimation trials, the same procedurewas used, but upon button release, participantswere instructed to adjust the separation betweenthe index finger and thumb of their right hand tomatch the size of the stimulus object. Theyperformed this above the starting button, andcreated an opening that was aligned with thefront-to-back axis. In addition, in one eighth ofmanual estimation trials, participants were askedto reach out and grasp the object after giving amanual estimation, in order to maintain hapticfeedback (Haffenden & Goodale, 1998).A custom designed Matlab program wasused to control the order of goggle opening and

GRASPING AND MANUAL ESTIMATION OF THE MULLER-LYER ILLUSIONclosing, stimulus presentation, masking, and thesound signal. For grasping trials, Optotrakrecorded for 4s (participants had 4 seconds tocomplete the trial) beginning with the openingof the goggles. For estimation trials, Optotrakwas triggered manually once the participant hada steady estimation, and it recorded for 1000 ms.DesignAll sixteen participants performed tasksunder binocular conditions. Each participant hadone 84 trial block of grasping (split into twoparts to allow a brief rest period) followed byone 84 trial block of manual estimation (alsosplit into two parts to allow a brief rest period).In a testing block, there were 2 exposuredurations (50 ms and 1500 ms), 2 objects (6.0cm and 4.0 cm heights), and 3 illusoryconditions (wings-in, wings-out, and parallellines), with 5 repetitions per condition, for atotal of 60 trials to be analysed. Each block wascompletely balanced (same number of trialswith each object, same number of trials witheach exposure duration, and same number oftrials with each illusory condition). Theremaining 24 trials were catch trials, using 4different objects, the same two exposuredurations, and the same three illusoryconditions. The presentation of the trialsfollowed a randomized order and did not includepractice trials that were completed before eachblock began. To change the object betweentrials, an experimenter removed the object fromthe previous trial and replaced it with the objectcorresponding to the next trial. Illusory elements(i.e. the wings) were varied according to a presetorder through Matlab. Each experimentalsession had a maximum duration of 60 minutes.Data AnalysisRaw data of the X, Y, and Z positions ofeach IRED (as recorded by Optotrak) wereanalyzed using a customized software written inLabView (National Instruments, Newbury, UK).The beginning and end of grasping motionswere quantified by cutting at points where theback-of-hand IRED reached a velocity of 40mm/s, while manual estimation trials were notcut. The reaction time, peak velocity, andmaximum grip aperture (MGA) of each trialwere obtained and used for further analysis. TheMGA was defined as the maximum distancebetween the thumb and index finger’s IREDpositions. A three-way analysis of variance(ANOVA) was carried out on the data withObject Length (6.0 cm vs. 4.0 cm), ExposureDuration (50 ms vs. 1500 ms), and BackgroundCondition (inward wing vs. outward wing vs.null) as main factors. Multiple post-hoccomparisons were performed with a Bonferronicorrection (p < 0.05).ResultsFigure 4 shows the mean maximum gripaperture (MGA) for each condition of thegrasping task while Figure 5 shows the meangrip aperture for each condition of the manualestimation task.For grasping trials, maximum gripaperture measurements were clearly affected bythe object length (F(1.15) = 172.769, p < 0.001):shorter objects produced smaller MGAs thanthe longer objects. No significant effects werefound for the main factors (Exposure Durationand Background), or their interaction (Fig. 4).For manual estimation trials, thumb-indexaperture measurements for shorter objects weresignificantly smaller than those for longerobjects, indicating that object length had aneffect on manual estimates (F(1.15) = 269.405,p < 0.001). Significant differences were alsofound between background conditions (F(1.15)= 8.681, p = 0.001). More importantly, theinteraction between Exposure Duration andBackground Condition reached significance(F(1.15) = 3.952, p < 0.030). Post-hoc multiplecomparisons revealed that manual estimationswere significantly different between inward andoutward conditions for both objects, and thatmanual estimations were significantly differentbetween control and outward conditions for thelonger object (Fig. 5). The results displayed inFigure 4 demonstrate that in grasping tasks,MGAs were scaled according to the real size ofthe object regardless of the surrounding context.This implies that MGAs were resistant to visualillusion for both short and long presentation tothe illusory display. In contrast, results from

GRASPING AND MANUAL ESTIMATION OF THE MULLER-LYER ILLUSIONFigure 5 show that manual estimations weresensitive to visual illusions when the illusoryelements were presented for a long exposureduration (1500 ms), suggesting that the visualillusion had a time-dependent effect on manualestimation.DiscussionThe present study was designed todetermine if illusory conditions – as created bythe Müller-Lyer illusion – exhibit a timedependenteffect on grasping and manualestimation tasks. In summary, our results werein agreement with our hypotheses: whilegrasping was not affected by the illusionregardless of exposure duration, manualestimation was affected by the illusion onlywhen the illusory context and stimulus wereviewed for a long duration. The results forgrasping tasks were also congruent with thecommon finding in literature that graspingmotions are insensitive to visual illusions. Eventhough both exposure durations used in thestudy were well above the proposed vision foraction threshold (de Wit, van der Kamp, &Masters, 2011), action movements were alwaysaccurately calibrated to the real size of theobject despite our manipulation of thesurrounding context. A reasonable explanationfor this result is that binocular information – inparticular, vergence – provides reliable distancecues that allow participants to accuratelyperform reach-to-grasp movements (Loftus etal., 2004). Nevertheless, the theory of twostreams of visual processing as well as the claimthat action movements such as grasping areinsensitive to visual illusion both have evidencecontrary to them, and are therefore stillcontroversial in literature (Bruno, 2001).However the results of the present study provideadditional evidence to the argument that visualillusions do not affect prehension, suggestingthat similar findings reported in the literature arenot simply experimental “artifacts” (Bruno,2001) and that there exists a dissociationbetween action and perception in the context ofvisual illusions.The results from the manual estimationtasks were also in agreement with ourhypothesis that the visual illusion would affectmanual estimation only in a long exposurecondition. Moreover, our findings are consistentwith the results reported by de Wit et al. (2011).In their study they found that when thesurrounding elements of the Müller-Lyer werepresented above a “threshold” (the illusion waspresented for 1500 ms in the long-exposurecondition), perceptual reports were sensitive tothe illusion. Given that in both de Wit et al. andour studies, perceptual judgments were onlyaffected in the long exposure condition, theevidence strongly suggests that there is athreshold for the brain at which the perceptualsystem begins to integrate object/stimulusinformation with surrounding contextualinformation. Our data suggest that this thresholdis higher than 50 ms. Consequently, for anexposure time lower than such a threshold, theperceptual system would not have enough timeto process contextual cues and therefore manualestimation is not affected by the illusoryelements of the Müller-Lyer illusion. Additionalexperiments, however, are necessary todetermine more specifically the critical timewindow in which context and object informationare integrated together to form size perception.Further research is also needed toinvestigate the mechanisms behind size-distanceintegration in grasping and manual estimationtasks. One way to understand this process is tostudy behaviour without binocular cues thatallow size-distance integration. Specifically,further experiments should answer the followingquestion: are monocular perception and graspingmore susceptible to visual illusion thanbinocular perception and grasping? Research inmonocular grasping and estimation of objectsize has demonstrated that when binocular cuesare not available, grasping is more affected bythe Ebbinghaus (Titchener circles) illusion(Marotta, DeSouza, Haffenden, & Goodale,1997). Moreover, it has been shown that inpatients with visual form agnosia (and thereforecannot use pictorial cues to compute objectdistance), grip scaling accuracy is reduced undermonocular viewing conditions, suggesting thatbinocular vergence cues are of primaryimportance to accurate action processing

GRASPING AND MANUAL ESTIMATION OF THE MULLER-LYER ILLUSION(Marotta, Behrmann, & Goodale, 1997).Contrary to these results, Otto-de Haart, Carey,and Milne (1999) found that under monocularviewing conditions, matching performance(perception), but not grasping, was affected byvisual illusion. The exploration of a monocularcondition will hopefully allow researchers tofurther investigate the role played by binocularvs. monocular vision in both grasping andmanual estimation, in conditions in which theexposure time of illusory elements is varied. Inagreement with previous research and the twostreamshypothesis, it is predicted that undermonocular viewing, grasping will be morevulnerable to the visual illusion for the longexposure than the short exposure. The lack ofvergence and other binocular distance cues,combined with the fact that for long exposurethe illusory elements will have been processedby the perceptual system, lead to this prediction.While there remain open questions onthe temporal dynamics of dorsal and ventralstreams in the processing of visual illusions, theresults from the present study suggest that thereis a threshold above which the brain is able tointegrate stimulus information with surroundingcontextual cues.First Received: 5/1/2013Final Revision Received: 8/19/2013ReferencesAglioti, S., DeSouza, J. F., & Goodale, M.A.(1995). Size-contrast illusions deceivethe eye but not the hand. CurrentBiology, 5, 679-685.Brown, L. E., Halpert, B. A., & Goodale, M. A.(2005). Peripheral vision for perceptionand action. Experimental BrainResearch,165, 97-106.Bruno, N. (2001). When does action resistvisual illusions? Trends in CognitiveSciences, 5, 379-382.Bruno, N., Bernardis, P., & Gentilucci, M.(2008). Visually guided pointing, theMüller-Lyer illusion, and the functionalinterpretation of the dorsal-ventral split:Conclusions from 33 independentstudies. Neuroscience and BiobehavioralReviews, 32, 423-437.de Wit, M., van der Kamp, J., Masters, R. S.(2011). Delayed pointing movements tomasked Müller-Lyer figures are affectedby target size but not the illusion.Neuropsychologia, 49, 1903-1909.Franz, V. H. (2001). Action does not resistvisual illusions. Trends in CognitiveSciences, 5, 457-459.Franz, V. H., Gegenfurtner, K.R. (2008).Grasping visual illusions: Consistentdata and no dissociation. CognitiveNeuropsychology, 25, 920-950.Franz, V. H., Gegenfurtner, K. R., Bülthoff, H.H., & Fahlè, M. (2000). Grasping visualillusions: no evidence for a dissociationbetween perception and action.Psychological Science, 11, 20-25.Goodale, M. A., & Milner, A.D. (2006). Onebrain – two visual systems. ThePsychologist, 19(11), 660-663.Goodale, M. A., Westwood, D. A., & Milner, A.D. (2004). Two distinct modes of controlfor object-directed action. Progress inBrain Research, 144, 131-144.Haffenden, A. M., & Goodale, M. A. (1998).The effect of pictorial illusion onprehension and perception. Journal ofCognitive Neuroscience, 10, 122-136.Kroliczak, G., Heard, P., Goodale, M. A., &Gregory, R. L. (2006). Dissociation of

GRASPING AND MANUAL ESTIMATION OF THE MULLER-LYER ILLUSIONperception and action unmasked by thehollow-face illusion. Brain Research,1080, 9-16.Loftus, G. R., & Masson, M. E. J. (1994). Usingconfidence intervals in within-participantdesigns. Psychonomic Bulletin &Review, 1, 476-490.Loftus, A., Servos P., Goodale, M.A.,Mendarozqueta, N., Mon-Williams, M.(2004). When two eyes are better thanone in prehension: monocular viewingand end-point variance. ExperimentalBrain Research, 158, 317-327.Marotta, J. J., Behrmann, M., Goodale, M. A.(1997). The removal of binocular cuesdisrupts the calibration of grasping inpatients with visual form agnosia.Experimental Brain Research, 116, 113-121.Marotta, J. J., DeSouza, J. F. X., Haffenden, A.M., Goodale, M. A. Does a monocularlypresented size-contrast illusion influencegrip aperture? Neuropsychologia, 36,491-497.Oldfield, R. C. (1971). The assessment andanalysis of handedness: the Edinburghinventory. Neuropsychologia, 9, 97-112.Otto-de Haart, E., Carey, D. P., Milne, A. B.(1999). More thoughts on perceiving andgrasping the Müller-Lyer illusion.Neuropsychologia, 37, 1437-1444.Pavani, F., Boscagli I., Benvenuti, F.,Rabuffetti, M., & Farnè, A. (1999). Areperception and action affected differentlyby the Titchener circles illusion?Experimental Brain Research, 127, 95-101.Pisella, L., Arzi, M., & Rossetti, Y. (1998). Thetiming of color and location processingin the motor context. Experimental BrainResearch, 121, 270-276.Weidner, R., Boers, F., Mathiak, K., Dammers,J., & Fink, G. R. (2009). The temporaldynamics of the Müller-Lyer illusion.Cerebral Cortex, 20, 1586-1595.

GRASPING AND MANUAL ESTIMATION OF THE MULLER-LYER ILLUSIONAppendixFigure 1. The outward wings (A), and inward wings (B) Muller-Lyer illusory backgrounds used inthe study. A third background of parallel lines (C) was also used as a neutral condition. The illusoryelements were all red lines on a grey background.Figure 2. The six shaft stimuli that were placed in the centerof the illusory backgrounds. The stimuli had heights of 6.0cm (A), 4.0 cm (B), 3.5 cm (C), 4.5 cm (D), 4.8 cm (E), and5.0 cm (F). Trials using objects A and B were analysed whiletrials using objects C to F represented catch trials. All stimulihad the same surface area.

GRASPING AND MANUAL ESTIMATION OF THE MULLER-LYER ILLUSIONFigure 3. The procedure of a grasping trial. The startingposition was the button on which the subject has pressed down.Once signalled to go, the subject reached outwards and graspedthe stimuli shaft as shown. The subject then released the objectand returned to the starting position (not shown). Note theinfrared light-emitting diodes attached to the thumb and indexfingers, and back of hand/bottom of index finger.

GRASPING AND MANUAL ESTIMATION OF THE MULLER-LYER ILLUSION90Maximum Grip Aperture (mm)80706050InwardControlOutwardInwardControlOutwardInwardControlOutwardInwardControlOutwardShort Long Short LongABStimulus and conditionFigure 4. Mean maximum grip aperture measurements (± WSCI 95%, Loftus & Masson, 1994) ingrasping motions for various objects, exposure durations, and background conditions. Lines betweenmeans with an asterisk above represent means that are significantly different (P < 0.05) according topost-hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferonni correction.Grip aperture (mm)9080706050** ***InwardControlOutwardInwardControlOutwardInwardControlOutwardInwardControlOutward*Short Long Short LongABStimulus and ConditionFigure 5. Mean grip aperture measurements (± WSCI 95%, Loftus & Masson, 1994) in manualestimation tasks for various objects, exposure durations, and background conditions. Lines betweenmeans with an asterisk above represent means that are significantly different (P < 0.05) according topost-hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferonni correction.

© 2013 WUPJ, September 2013, Volume 1 Industrial/OrganizationIs There a Downside to Engagement for Employees?Kabir Daljeet*For many years now, researchers and practitioners have been discovering andpromoting the numerous positive effects of engagement in the workplace. Up untilrecently, much of the research being conducted regarding engagement has focusedexclusively on its positive impact on the lives of employees. Recently, a number ofresearchers have started to pay attention to the negative impact it can have on thelives of employees. Work by Halbesleben, Harvey & Bolino, (2009), Bolino &Turnley (2005) and Kim, Shin & Swanger (2009) has explored the variety of waysengagement can have an adverse effect on an individual in the workplace; thedetails and implications of their findings are discussed in this paper.For many years now, researchers andpractitioners have been discovering andpromoting the numerous positive effects ofengagement in the workplace. Engagement hasbeen defined as “a positive, fulfilling, workrelatedstate of mind that is characterized byvigor, dedication, and absorption” (Schaufeli,Salanova, González-Romá & Bakker, 2002). Upuntil recently, much of the research beingconducted regarding engagement has focusedexclusively on its positive impact on the lives ofemployees. For example, research has foundthat engagement is related to increased jobperformance, higher self-efficacy, improvedmental and physical health, increased optimismand a number of other, generally speaking,positive outcomes (Bakker et al., 2008).However, recently, a number of researchershave started to pay attention to a side ofengagement that has been largely ignored; thenegative impact it can have on the lives ofemployees. This paper aims to present anoverview of the empirical evidence supportingthe existence of a downside to engagement forindividuals in the workplace (Halbesleben,Harvey and Bolino 2009; Bolino and Turnley2005; Kim, Shin and Swanger 2009).Much of the research on engagementrevolves around the theoretical framework ofthe job demands-resources model (JD-R;Demerouti, Bakker, Nachreiner & Schaufeli2001). Originally developed by Demerouti et al(2001) and revised by Bakker and Demerouti(2007), the JD-R model proposes thatcharacteristics of a given job can be categorizedas being either a job demand or a job resource.Job demands are components of one’s job thatcontribute to stress, strain, exhaustion andburnout; whereas job resources are componentsof one’s job that contribute to goal achievement,personal growth and development, motivation aswell as engagement (Demerouti et al., 2001;Bakker & Demerouti, 2007).In accordance with the JD-R model,Halbesleben, Harvey and Bolino (2009) arguethat individuals who are highly engaged aremore likely to find their work life interferingwith their family life. Macey and Schneider(2008) suggest that employees only have a finitequantity of resources and energy, and regularlyusing them to maintain a high level ofengagement may prove challenging in the longrun (as cited by Halbesleben, Harvey & Bolino,2009). One implication of this is that, those whoregularly invest their energy and resources intheir work-life may have little to none left fortheir family-life (Halbesleben, Harvey &Bolino, 2009). That is to say, those who aremore engaged at work will be more likely toexperience work interference with family due tohaving spent so much of their energy andresources being engaged at work. Using what isknown as Organizational Citizenship Behaviouras an index of employee engagement,Halbesleben, Harvey and Bolino (2009)examined how an employees’ family life couldbe adversely impacted by being too engaged atwork.*Initially submitted for Psychology 3690G at the University of Western Ontario. For inquiries regarding thearticle, please email the author at kabir.daljeet@hotmail.com.

A DOWNSIDE TO ENGAGEMENTDefined as “individual behaviour that isdiscretionary, not directly or explicitlyrecognized by the formal reward” (Organ,1988), research by Macey and Schneider (2008)suggests that Organizational CitizenshipBehaviors (OCBs), more specifically,interpersonally directed OCBs (OCB-Is), areperformed more frequently by an employeeswho are engaged (as cited by Halbesleben,Harvey & Bolino, 2009). As such, Halbesleben,Harvey and Bolino (2009) also proposed that therelationship between engagement and workinterference with family would be mediated byhow much an employee engages in OCB-Is.This is believed to be the case because anindividual who goes out of their way to performduties not required of them must be investingeven more resources and energy into their worklife, leaving less available for their home andfamily life (Halbesleben, Harvey & Bolino,2009).Similar to the work of Halbesleben,Harvey and Bolino (2009), Bolino and Turnley(2005) also conducted research on therelationship between OCBs and workinterference with family. They hypothesized thatOCB would be positively related to job stress,role overload, and work interference withfamily. In order to test these predictions, theycollected data from a random sample of 196university alumni using psychometrically soundmeasures of job stress, role overload, workinterference with family and OCBs (Bolino &Turnley, 2005). Supporting their predictions, itwas found that OCBs positively correlated withjob stress, role overload and work interferencewith family. If participating in OCBs is taken tobe a sign of engagement, as suggested by Maceyand Schneider (2008), the implications of thisstudy are that, too much engagement can beseen as contributing to job stress, work overloadand, again, work interference with family.Therefore it can be said that the results of thisexperiment conducted by Bolino and Turnley(2005) provide support for the argument thatthere is such a thing as a downside toengagement for individuals in the workplace.Much like OCBs, other individualdifferences, such as personality, have also beenfound to be related to employee engagement. Ina recent study by Kim, Shin and Swanger (2009)the relationship between personality andengagement was examined. Personality has along standing history of being used to predictbehavior in the workplace. Traditionally,personality has largely been used as a tool toassist with personnel selection and recruitmentby helping an employer identify and predictfavorable and unfavorable traits amongst a poolof potential employees (Barrick & Mount,1991). Using the five-factory typology ofpersonality, Kim, Shin and Swanger (2009)hypothesized that extraversion andconscientiousness would be positively related toengagement whereas neuroticism would benegatively related to engagement.In order to test their predictions, Kim, Shin andSwanger (2009) collected data from 187participants using a variety of well-establishedand psychometrically sound measures to assessparticipants’ personality, job engagement,burnout and job resources. Analyzing their datausing hierarchical regression, the results of theirstudy found that two of their predictions werecorrect; conscientiousness (i.e., I pay attentionto details) was found to be a significant, positivepredictor of engagement (β = .18, p < .01) andneuroticism (i.e., I get stressed out easily) wasfound to be a significant negative predictor ofengagement (β = - .14, p < .05). In anotherstudy, it was postulated that personality, morespecifically, conscientiousness will moderate therelationship between OCB-Is and workinterference with family. They believed this tobe the case because an individual who isdescribed as conscientious is methodical, wellorganized and more likely to perform well onthe job (Barrick & Mount, 1991). This led theresearchers to believe an individual who ishigher on this personality trait will be,accordingly, better equipped to manage theirpersonal resources such that it would mitigatethe negative effect of being highly engaged onwork interference with family. Likewise, thiswould mean an individual lower onconscientiousness would have a substantiallymore difficult time managing their personalresources, such that it would in fact exacerbate

A DOWNSIDE TO ENGAGEMENTthe negative effects of being highly engaged(i.e., interference with family; Halbesleben,Harvey & Bolino, 2009).In order to test these predictions, theycollected data from a total of 844 participantsfrom three separate work contexts at differenttime points, measuring their level ofengagement, conscientiousness, OCB-Is andwork interference with family (Halbesleben,Harvey & Bolino, 2009). It was found that, aspredicted, engagement is significantly positivelyrelated to work interference with family and thatOCB-I does, in fact, mediate the relationship. Itwas also found that conscientiousnessmoderated the relationship between OCB andwork interference with family.The findings of these studies show thatpersonality can be used to predict how andwhere an individual will choose to allocate theirenergy and various personal resources. Moreimportantly, these findings support the claimsmade by the researchers previously discussed,specifically that resources are limited and thatan individual’s decision to invest resources inbecoming more engaged reflects a strategicdecision, informed by their personality and otherindividual differences, to not invest resources inother areas of their life, such as in their familylives (Halbesleben, Harvey & Bolino, 2009;Halbesleben, 2011). Therefore the results of theexperiment conducted by Kim, Shin andSwanger (2009) provide support in favor of theargument that there is such a thing as a downside to engagement for individuals in theworkplace.In conclusion, while previous researchon engagement has focused almost exclusivelyon the positive impact it can have, the workdone by Halbesleben, Harvey & Bolino, (2009),Bolino & Turnley (2005) and Kim, Shin &Swanger (2009) has explored the variety ofways engagement can have an adverse effect onan individual in the workplace. By primarilyfocusing on the notion that one only has alimited amount of energy resources to spend ontheir life, these studies have shown that byinvesting a significant amount of energy andresources in becoming engaged often results inhaving an insufficient amount of energy andresources for the remaining domains of one’slife (Halbesleben, Harvey & Bolino, 2009;Bolino & Turnley, 2005; Kim, Shin & Swanger,2009). A result of this is, other domains of one’slife typically end up suffering in a variety ofways, the most notable domain being one’sfamily and home-life. Therefore, it can be saidthat the literature does in fact support the notionthat there is a down side to engagement forindividuals in the workplace (Halbesleben,Harvey & Bolino, 2009; Bolino & Turnley,2005; Kim, Shin & Swanger, 2009).First Received: 1/7/2013Final Revision Received: 7/4/2013

ReferencesBakker, A.B. & Demerouti, E. (2007). The jobdemands-resources model: State of theart. Journal of Managerial Psychology,22(3), 309-328.Bakker, A.B., Schaufeli, W.B., Leiter, M. P. &Taris, T. W. (2008). Work engagement:An emerging concept in occupationalhealth psychology. Work & Stress, 22(3),187-200.Barrick, M. R. & Mount, M. K. (1991). The bigfive personality dimensions and jobperformance: A meta-analysis.Personnel Psychology, 44(1), 1-26.Bolino, M. C. & Turnley, W. H. (2005). Thepersonal costs of citizenship behavior:The relationship between individualinitiative and role overload, job stress,and work-family conflict. Journal ofApplied Psychology, 90(4), 740-748.Demerouti, E., Bakker, A.B., Nachreiner, F. &Schaufeli, W.B. (2001). Job demandsresourcesmodel of burnout. Journal ofApplied Psychology, 86(3), 499-512.Halbesleben, J.R.B. (2011). The consequencesof engagement: The good, the bad, andthe ugly. European Journal of Work andOrganizational Psychology, 20(1), 68-73.Halbesleben, J.R.B., Harvey, J. & Bolino, M.(2009). Too engaged? A conservation ofresources view of the relationshipbetween work engagement and workinterference with family. Journal ofApplied Psychology, 94(6), 1452-1465.Kim, H. J., Shin, K. H. & Swanger, N. (2009).Burnout and engagement: A comparativeanalysis using the big five personalitydimensions. International Journal ofHospitality Management, 28, 96-104.Schaufeli, W.B., Salanova, M., González-Romá,V. & Bakker, A. B. (2002). Themeasurement of engagement andburnout: A two sample confirmatoryfactor analytic approach. Journal ofHappiness studies, 3, 71-92.A DOWNSIDE TO ENGAGEMENT

© 2013 WUPJ, September 2013, Volume 1 NeuroscienceThe A1 Allele of the Taq1 A Polymorphism in Association with Addiction: A ReviewNiki Hosseini-Kamkar*Substance abuse occurs when individuals move from voluntary drug use tocompulsive drug use despite significant costs to their social, psychological, andphysical well-being. Considering the adverse effects of compulsive drug use, aninvestigation of biological and environmental factors that make individualssusceptible to addiction becomes very useful. This paper will investigate onepossible biological factor that influences addiction, specifically, I review theliterature on the A1 allele of the Taq1 A polymorphism of the DRD2 gene. Theliterature on the association between the A1 allele with alcoholism reveals that theA1 allele is more prevalent in alcoholics versus non-alcoholics. However, the A1allele does not seem to be a susceptibility factor specific to alcoholism, but it maybe associated with a predisposition to addictive and impulsive behaviours ingeneral. Next, the literature on the association between the A1 allele and addictiveand impulsive behaviours in general will be reviewed. In addition, this paperattempts to find a theoretical framework that explains the A1 allele’s associationwith addictive and impulsive behaviours. In doing so, I will discuss thehypodopaminergic hypothesis and how the A1 allele may make individualssusceptible to experiencing a hypodopaminergic state. The hypodopaminergichypothesis states that individuals who are predisposed to addiction have reduceddopamine (DA) levels (a hypodopaminergic state); and in order to alleviate thishypodopaminergic state, they are motivated to seek positive reinforcers in anattempt to increase DA levels. I review evidence that supports thehypodopaminergic hypothesis by demonstrating an association between the A1allele and inefficient D2 receptor functioning. This inefficient D2 receptorfunctioning may lead to a hypodopaminergic state that motivates individuals to seekdrugs and other addictive behaviours to increase DA levels.Addiction involves a transition fromvoluntary to compulsive drug use despiteadverse psychological, social, and physicalconsequences (Everitt et al., 2008). Consideringthe adverse consequences of compulsive druguse, it is important to investigate possiblebiological factors that may make individualssusceptible to addiction. Neurons are nervecells that comprise the basic building blocks ofthe nervous system. Neurons produceneurotransmitters—chemical substances thatcarry messages to either excite or inhibit thefiring of other neurons. Neurotransmitters exerttheir influence on neurons by binding with orattaching to receptors that are large proteinmolecules embedded in the receiving neuron’scell membrane (Passer, Smith, Atkinson,Mitchell, & Muir, 2005). Dopamine (DA) is aneurotransmitter that plays a central role inmotivation, cognition, locomotion, and rewardseekingbehaviours (Bannon, Michelhaugh,Wang, & Sacchetti, 2001). In addition,dysfunctions of the dopaminergic system havebeen implicated in numerous neurological andpsychiatric disorders, including drug abuse,schizophrenia, affective disorders, attentiondeficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), obesity,pathological gambling, and post-traumatic stressdisorder (PTSD) (Blum et al., 1994). The centralrole of DA in reward-seeking behaviours makesDA and the genes involved in DA synthesis,degradation, and receptor production suitablecandidates for the investigation of the molecularbasis of addiction (Bowirrat & Oscar-Berman,*Initially submitted for Psychology 3209F at the University of Western Ontario. For inquiries regarding thearticle, please email the author at nikikamkar@gmail.com.

THE A1 ALLELE IN ASSOCIATION WITH ADDICTION2005). One gene of interest in susceptibility toaddiction is the D2 dopamine receptor (DRD2)gene, which encodes D2 subtypes of DAreceptors. The DRD2 gene may be associatedwith drug addiction because alterations in DAavailability at its receptors have been implicatedin reward mechanisms (Blum et al.,1991).Studies have shown that low D2 receptoravailability is associated with a propensity toseek drugs. This greater propensity to selfadministerdrugs is potentially an attempt toincrease the likelihood that DA will bind to thefew receptors available. Therefore, a gene thatmay alter the amount of D2 receptors availableis a candidate gene for the investigation ofbiological factors contributing to addiction(Blum et al., 1991).The A1 allele of the Taq1 A PolymorphismAssociated with AlcoholismIn 1990, Blum et al. conducted a study toinvestigate D2 receptor genes in alcoholics andnon-alcoholics. Their experiment involveddetection of restriction-fragment-lengthpolymorphisms(RFLPs) of the DRD2 gene;specifically, the researchers investigated theTaq1 A polymorphism in the DNA extractedfrom deceased alcoholics and a controlpopulation of non-alcoholics. A polymorphismrefers to phenotypic or observable variability(poly = many, morph = form). A geneticpolymorphism occurs when genetic variationresults in a difference in phenotypic form. TheDRD2 gene has a polymorphism in thenoncoding region, called the Taq1 Apolymorphism. There are four Taq1 A alleles(or genetic variants): A1, A2, A3, and A4. TheA2 allele is the most common while the A3 andA4 alleles are rare (Blum, Cull, Braverman, &Comings, 1996). In the original Blum et al.(1990) paper, 35 alcoholics and 35 nonalcoholicswere sampled. Of the alcoholics, 69%had the A1 allele; in contrast, only 20% of thenon-alcoholics had the A1 allele (Blum et al.,1990). This was the first study to report anassociation between the A1 allele of the Taq1 Apolymorphism and alcoholism.The association between the A1 allele ofthe Taq1 A polymorphism with alcoholism hasbeen replicated in numerous other experiments(Amadeo et al., 1993; Arinami et al., 1993;Hietala et al., 1997; Ovchinnikov et al., 1999;Pato, Macciardi, Pato, Verga, & Kennedy, 1993;Young et al., 2002). For example, Arinami et al.(1993) reported that the A1 allele was present in77% of severe alcoholics versus 59% of lesssevere alcoholics. Simply put, there was a strongcorrelation between participants who werehomozygous for the A1 allele and those whowere classified as severe alcoholics. (Arinamiet al., 1993). Note that an individual ishomozygous for an allele when they possess twoidentical alleles for a trait (A1/A1 genotype). Incomparison, heterozygous individuals possessonly one copy of the allele (A1/A2, A1/A3, orA1/A4 genotype in the case of the Taq1 Apolymorphism).Amadeo et al. (1993) reported similarresults with a sample of patients diagnosed withalcohol dependence (DSM-III-R criteria) innorth west (NW) and south east (SE) France.These patients were compared to matchedcontrols. The results revealed that the frequencyof the A1 allele was significantly greater in thealcoholics (24.4%) compared to non-alcoholics(8%). Simply put, the A1 allele occurred moreoften in alcoholics versus non-alcoholics. Inaddition, the proportion of the presence of theA1 allele was significantly greater in alcoholics(42.8%) compared to non-alcoholics (16.2%). Inother words, the presence of the A1 allelerelative to the A2, A3 and A4 alleles wassignificantly greater in alcoholics. Furthermore,a meta-analysis of eight studies revealed asignificant association between the A1 allele ofthe Taq1 A polymorphism and alcoholism.Additionally, the meta-analysis revealed that theincrease in susceptibility to alcoholismassociated with the A1 allele was correlatedwith severity of alcoholism (Pato et al., 1993).Based on the aforementioned studies, thereseems to be an association between the A1 alleleof the Taq1 A polymorphism and alcoholism.Interestingly, other studies suggest that the A1allele of the Taq1 A polymorphism is not onlyassociated with increased susceptibility toalcoholism but may be involved in other

THE A1 ALLELE IN ASSOCIATION WITH ADDICTIONaddictive behaviours as well (Comings et al.,1996).The A1 allele of the Taq1 A PolymorphismAssociated with Addictive BehavioursIn addition to being associated withalcoholism, the A1 allele of the Taq1 Apolymorphism may be associated with othersubstance abuse and addictive behaviours. Forexample, Noble et al. (1994) investigated the A1allele in Caucasian smokers and ex-smokers.Their experiment revealed that the prevalence ofthe A1 allele was greatest for current smokers(45.6%), followed by ex-smokers (40.0%) andwas the least prevalent in non-smokers (28.0%).Similarly, the A1 allele has been shown to beassociated with tobacco use (Comings et al.,1996), cannabinoid addiction (Nacak et al.,2012), and a preference for psychostimulantsamong polysubstance abusers (Persico, Bird,Gabbay, & Uhl, 1996). That is, homozygosityfor the A1 allele (A1/A1 genotype) wassignificantly higher in addicts compared tocontrol subjects. In addition, the frequency ofthe A1 allele was significantly higher in addictscompared to control subjects (Nacak et al.,2012).Other researchers have reported anassociation between the A1 allele of the Taq1 Apolymorphism and addiction to pathologicalgambling and obesity. In a study conducted byComings et al. (1996), 50.9% of pathologicalgamblers carried the A1 allele compared to only25.9% of control subjects (the control subjectswere screened to exclude drug and alcoholabuse). Furthermore, of the gamblers whoparticipated in the experiment, those with moresevere gambling problems (upper half of thePathological gambling Score) were more likelyto carry the A1 allele (63.8%). In contrast, only40.9% of the gamblers with less severegambling problems carried the A1 allele. Inaddition, 60.5% of the gamblers with comorbidsubstance abuse carried the A1 allele, incomparison to only 44.1% of the gamblerswithout comorbid substance abuse. Based on theevidence obtained from their study, the authorsconcluded that the A1 allele of the Taq1 Apolymorphism plays a role in pathologicalgambling, and that this variant of the DRD2gene may be a risk factor for impulsive andaddictive behaviours (Comings et al., 1996).Similarly, Noble et al. (1994)investigated the influence of the DRD2 gene onobesity. The authors reported that the A1 allelewas present in 46% of obese subjects versusonly 19% of control subjects. Noble et al.(1994) reported the following: parental historyand later onset of obesity as well ascarbohydrate preference were observed insubjects carrying the A1 allele. Finally, theauthors reported that the prevalence of the A1allele in probands carrying three risk factors(parental history, later onset of obesity, andcarbohydrate preference) was observed in 85%of obese subjects (Noble et al., 1994). Thesefindings suggest that the A1 allele is associatedwith obesity and furthermore, that the riskfactors of parental history of obesity, later onsetof obesity and carbohydrate preference areassociated with the A1 allele.The Hypodopaminergic Hypothesis—Howthe A1 allele May Make IndividualsSusceptible to Addictive BehavioursBased on the above research, it isevident that the A1 allele of the Taq1 Apolymorphism of the DRD2 gene is associatedwith impulsive and addictive behaviours. Onepossible explanation for these findings is basedon the hypodopaminergic hypothesis of drugaddiction. The hypodopaminergic hypothesisstates that dysfunctions of themesocorticolimbic dopamine system may causea hypodopaminergic state—a condition in whichthe brain has reduced, or less than normal levelsof DA (Bowirrat & Oscar-Berman, 2005). Inorder to alleviate this hypodopaminergic state,individuals are motivated to seek drugs andother positive reinforcers to activate neuronsinvolved in DA release (Bowirrat & Oscar-Berman, 2005). In other words, certain geneticfactors may influence the mesocorticolimbicdopamine system causing below normal levelsof DA, or a hypodopaminergic state. Toalleviate this hypodopaminergic state,individuals partake in behaviours such as drugabuse or gambling to increase DA levels

THE A1 ALLELE IN ASSOCIATION WITH ADDICTIONbecause neurons in the mesocorticolimbicsystem release DA in response to rewardingbehaviours. It is plausible that individuals withcertain genetic polymorphisms, like the Taq1 A,may have a deficiency in or an absence of DAreceptors. Blum et al. (2000) state that impulsiveand addictive behaviours are based on acommon genetic reduction in the D2 receptor.It is this inefficiency in the functioning of D2receptors that may induce a hypodopaminergicstate and ultimately lead to addictive behaviors(Bowirrat & Oscar-Berman, 2005). Next, theliterature on the association between the Taq1 Apolymorphism and inefficient D2 receptorfunctioning will be reviewed to provideevidence in support of this hypothesis.The A1 allele of the Taq1 A PolymorphismAssociated with Inefficient D2 ReceptorFunctioningAs stated previously, individuals withthe A1 allele may have reduced D2 receptorscausing them to experience a hypodopaminergicstate. One mechanism that may explain howreduced D2 receptors may lead to ahypodopaminergic state is through their actionson the dopamine transporter (DAT). The DATis a plasma membrane transport protein that isinvolved in the rapid reuptake of DA from theextracellular space. This is the mechanism bywhich DA is recycled via DAT; in other words,the DA transported back into the presynapticneuron can be repackaged into vesicles (Bannonet al., 2001). The DAT is densely distributed inthe striatum and nucleus accumbens and is theprimary source of DA regulation in theseregions (Gizer, Ficks, & Waldman, 2009).Kimmel, Joyce, Carroll, and Kuhur (2001)reported that in the striatum of rats, the D2receptor agonists R-(-)-propylnorapomorphinehydrochloride (NPA) and quinpirole decreasedthe half-life of DAT. By extension, this wouldmean that D2 receptor agonists would increaseDA indirectly through their effects on DAT. Onthe other hand, the D2 receptor antagonisteticlopride increased the half-life of DATthereby decreasing DA levels (Kimmel et al.,2001). This evidence provides a possiblemechanism by which reduced D2 receptorscould lead to a hypodopaminergic state.Individuals with reduced D2 receptors may besusceptible to seeking drugs and otherrewarding behaviours to alleviate this deficiencyin DA. Increasing the amount DA throughrewarding behaviours (i.e., drugs, gambling) canhelp alleviate the hypodopaminergic state byincreasing the probability that DA will bind tothe few receptors available.To investigate D2 receptor density andaffinity in patients with alcohol dependenceversus controls, Hietala et al. (1994) usedpositron emission tomography (PET). Theauthors reported a trend for decreased striatalD2 receptor affinity and density in patients withalcohol dependence in comparison to controlsubjects; however, these results were notstatistically significant. The authors theninvestigated the ratio between D2 receptordensity and affinity. The binding potential of D2receptors was significantly lower in alcoholicsversus controls (Hietala et al., 1994).Specifically, the Binding potential (Bmax/Kdratio) was 19.7% lower in alcoholics comparedto controls (Hietala et al., 1994). Bindingpotential (Bmax/Kd) is the ratio of receptordensity to affinity, receptor density being thenumber of receptors present per unit area andreceptor affinity being the strength with which asubstance binds to a receptor. The authorsconcluded that the lower Bmax/Kd ratio inalcoholics reflects a reduced accessibility for[11C]raclopride (a radiolabeled compound usedin PET that acts as a D2 antagonist) to D2receptors in the striatum (Hietala et al., 1994).Therefore, according to Hietala et al. (1994), thereduced binding potential observed in alcoholicsprovides evidence for the reduced strength ofstriatal D2 receptors in alcoholics.Wang et al. (1997) conducted a similarexperiment using PET and reported significantdecreases in D2 receptor availability in thestriatum of opiate-dependent subjects comparedto controls. The authors concluded thatindividuals who had low D2 receptor levelswere more vulnerable to drug selfadministration(Wang et al., 1997). Dalley et al.(2007) also found reduced D2 receptor

THE A1 ALLELE IN ASSOCIATION WITH ADDICTIONavailability in the ventral striatum of highimpulsiverats compared to non-impulsive rats;however, the authors reported that these effectsare independent of DA release (Dalley et al.,2007).Thompson et al. (1997) investigated theassociation between the A1 allele of the Taq1 Apolymorphism with D2 receptor binding in thestriatum. Their results revealed that individualswho were heterozygous or homozygous for theA1 allele had significantly reduced D2 receptorbinding in the striatum compared to individualshomozygous for the A2 allele. That is, thepresence of the A1 allele was associated with 30to 40% reduction in D2 receptor binding(Thompson et al., 1997). This means that theDA released in the striatum was not exerting itsinfluence to its fullest potential in individualswho possessed the A1 allele. Similarly, Ritchieand Noble (2003) reported that individualscarrying the A1 allele had significantly andapproximately 49% fewer D2 receptors (Bmax)than individuals who were not carrying the A1allele. However, binding affinity (Kd) did notdiffer between individuals with the A1 alleleand those without the A1 allele (Ritchie &Noble, 2003).Based on the aforementioned studies, itmay be tempting to conclude that the A1 alleleis certainly correlated with reduced D2 receptordensity. However, it is noteworthy to mentionthat not all researchers have been able toreplicate the association between the A1 alleleand D2 receptor density. For example, Laruelle,Gelernter, and Innis (1998) failed to replicatethe association between the A1 allele and lowerD2 receptor expression. Laruelle et al. (1998)used single photon emission computerizedtomography (SPECT) and [123I] IBZM (a DAantagonist used as the radioactive tracer inSPECT). In this experiment, [123I] IBZMbinding potential was the same in individualswith the A1 allele as compared to noncarriers ofthe A1 allele. The authors reported that theyobserved an effect of age on binding potential,but no effect of schizophrenia or A1 allele onbinding potential (Laruelle et al., 1998). In areview paper, Hitzemann (1998) concludes thatD2 receptor density is a complex phenotypeunder the regulation of many genes—all ofwhich have only a moderate effect size.Furthermore, gene by environment interactionsmust be investigated to fully understand thenature of a genetic polymorphism on a complexphenotype like D2 binding potential. Howeverthe studies that detect a correlation between theA1 allele and reduced D2 receptor density andaffinity outnumber those that do not. As such, ingeneral it seems as though the A1 allele of theTaq1 A polymorphism is likely associated withreduced D2 receptor density and affinity.Based on the research summarized, it isreasonable to conclude that the A1 allele of theTaq1 A polymorphism is associated withsusceptibility to alcoholism and other addictiveand impulsive behaviours. However, themolecular mechanisms through which the Taq1A polymorphism influences the phenotype ofaddictive-impulsive behaviours are poorlyunderstood. Nonetheless, one possibleexplanation is provided by thehypodopaminergic hypothesis. The A1 allele isassociated with reduced D2 receptor affinity anddensity. Thus, this deficiency in normal D2receptor functioning could lead to ahypodopaminergic state in the brain. That is,individuals who carry the A1 allele of the Taq1A polymorphism may have reduced DA levelsas a result of reduced or inefficient D2receptors. As such, these individuals may seekdrugs and other rewarding behaviors to alleviatethis hypodopaminergic state. Therefore, carriersof the A1 allele may be susceptible to addictionbecause they are motivated by ahypodopaminergic state to seek positivereinforcers that activate neurons involved in DArelease.First Received: 2/7/2013Final Revision Received: 7/11/2013

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© 2013 WUPJ, September 2013, Volume 1 SocialReducing Cognitive Dissonance Through EffortJustification: Evidence From Past Studies and Daily ExperienceKristin H. G. Maich*The present paper defines and examines past research in the area of cognitivedissonance and provides evidence for the occurrence of effort justification inanimals, including humans. The ways in which cognitive dissonance and effortjustification occur in everyday life are then discussed.People generally consider theexperience of tension to be both undesirable andunsustainable, thus people seek to reducetension when it occurs. The phenomenon ofcognitive dissonance occurs when an individualsimultaneously holds two inconsistentcognitions as true (Festinger, 1957).Dissonance between cognitions manifests astension-inducing psychological discomfort,which motivates an individual to reducedissonance in order to establish psychologicalconsistency. In general, people attempt to avoidsituations that may result in cognitivedissonance. According to Festinger, whendissonance does occur, people attempt to reduceit in one of three ways: change one of thedissonant cognitions; add new cognitions thatare consonant with what one already believes; ordecrease the perceived importance of thedissonant cognition.Effort justification is a way of changingthe value of existing cognitions, and is onemethod by which humans may attempt to reducedissonance. Individuals often expend mucheffort in pursuit of objectives they deem to beimportant. Previous literature has demonstratedthat the amount of energy put towards theachievement of a goal may play a role in thedevelopment or change of an individual’sattitude towards that goal. The value of anattitude target may be judged relative to theeffort expended in its acquisition (Zentall,2010); that is, one is motivated to place morevalue on a goal that has required greater effort toachieve. Axsom and Cooper (1985) posited thatif indeed an objective (or the avenue via which agoal is obtained) is not initially attractive, anindividual may later look to their own pastbehaviour to determine their attitude towardsthat goal. If much effort has been spent in theattainment of a goal, it should come to be seenas worthwhile and therefore more attractive. Areward’s perceived value is augmented in orderto justify any arduousness involved in itsacquisition (Zentall, 2010). This processminimizes cognitive dissonance.The present paper will examine pastresearch in the area of cognitive dissonance andprovide evidence for the occurrence of effortjustification in animals, including humans. Thispaper will then demonstrate how cognitivedissonance and effort justification may occur ineveryday life.Evidence for the Effort Justification EffectJustifying the Effort of Weight Loss TherapySeeking to expand upon prior research,Axsom and Cooper (1985) investigated theworkings of weight loss therapy in high and loweffort expenditure conditions. Participants wereindividuals who responded to newspaperadvertisements recruiting individuals interestedin potential new weight loss methods. Thesample consisted entirely of volunteers. Theexperimenters examined the relationshipbetween the amount of effort expended andsubsequent immediate and later weight change.It was predicted that compared to those in loweffort and control conditions, participants whofreely chose to take part in the high efforttherapy sessions would later display the greatestamount of weight loss. The researchers furtherhypothesized that the weight loss experiencedby the high effort participants would have anenduring effect over time.*Initially submitted for Psychology 3723F at the University of Western Ontario. For inquiries regarding thearticle, please email the author at kristin.maich@gmail.com.

EVIDENCE FOR EFFORT JUSTIFICATIONThe researchers had aimed to examinethe effect of choice on effort justification, but allparticipants reported a high level of freedom toparticipate. Thus, the choice manipulation didnot have an effect on reported freedom ofchoice. However, the effort justificationparadigm holds that freedom of choice shouldbe high in order for cognitive dissonance to takeplace, and since this is precisely the sentimentexpressed by the majority of the participants,Axsom and Cooper deemed the findings valid.As hypothesized, after three weeks, weight losswas significantly greater in the high effort groupcompared to the other groups. The majorfinding was that this weight loss wasmaintained, and indeed, was even greater, byparticipants in the high effort condition after 6and 12 months. In comparison, low effort andcontrol groups had not lost a significant amountof weight. Axsom and Cooper concluded thatthe high effort group’s degree of weight changewas both significant and consistent with thecognitive dissonance effect. Their findings havemajor implications for psychotherapy because ofthe long-lasting nature of the study’s results. Ifeffort justification effectively produces anenduring change in something as tangible asweight, then it may have similar effects whenapplied to other psychological concepts, suchdecrease in frequency of negative thoughts orstress reduction in therapeutic scenarios.Simply by putting much effort into a course oftherapy sessions, individuals may be assistingthe process of their own attitude change.Early Evidence Effort Justification inHumansLong before research found arelationship between effort justification andweight loss, cognitive dissonance theorist LeonFestinger and his colleague, James Carlsmithsubstantiated the effort justification effect in anexperiment involving high or low payment sumsto participants for their contribution to alengthy, boring assignment (1959). Keeping theparticipants blind to the true purpose of thestudy, the researchers asked participants to actas proponents for a tedious task they had alreadycompleted, promoting it to other possibleparticipants. As predicted, Festinger andCarlsmith found that opinion change (i.e.,enjoyability of the task from bad to good) wasthe largest in participants who were given asmaller reward (one dollar) than in those given alarger reward (20 dollars). Because there wasless external reason (i.e., less money) forparticipants to champion the study in the onedollarcondition, the researchers proposed thatthe level of cognitive dissonance was highestwhen participants did act to endorse the study inthis condition. Therefore, these participantswere more motivated than the participants in thelow dissonance (i.e., more money) condition toreduce dissonance. To reduce the dissonance,the researchers asserted, participants justifiedtheir effort by changing their own attitudetowards the experiment. Festinger and Carlsmithconcluded that the tendency to change one’sopinion according to what one was induced tosay is dependent on the amount of pressure feltby the individual. If the pressure was higher,such as in the greater monetary rewardcondition, the attitude change was weaker; if thepressure was weaker and the individuals felttheir words were voluntarily spoken, the desireto reduce dissonance drove them to change theirattitude so as to correspond to their behaviours.Effort Justification Occurs in RatsRecently, researchers have proposed thatthe occurrence of effort justification may be lessof a conscious process than previously expected.Lydall, Gilmour, and Dwyer (2010) pointed topast studies demonstrating that behaviourinducedattitude change existed in monkeys,children, and amnesiacs to support theirsuggestion that effort justification might be anautomatic, not conscious, process. To determinewhether complex cognitions are necessary forthe occurrence of effort justification processes,Lydall et al. examined dissonance reduction inrats, expanding upon preliminary findingsobserved by Lawrence and Festinger (as cited inLydall et al., 2010, p. 1135). Using 16 malerats, Lydall et al. defined high effort as thecondition in which rats had to press a lever 50times before receiving a sucrose reward, andlow effort as receiving the reward after only 10

EVIDENCE FOR EFFORT JUSTIFICATIONpresses of the lever. They also introducedwaiting time as a variable: in two otherconditions, rats were not required to press alever to receive the sucrose reward, they merelywaited the same amount of time as it took forthe other groups to complete either 10 or 50lever presses. Replicating the findings ofAxsom and Cooper (1985) and Festinger andCarlsmith (1959), Lydall et al. (2010) found thatrats in the high effort condition judged thesucrose reward to be significantly morepalatable than did rats in the low effortcondition. They further found that rats that hadto work the lever valued the sucrose rewardhigher than those who simply waited for theirreward. The researchers concluded that theeffort justification effect had indeed occurred inthe rat sample: rats valued the reward morehighly when they had worked in a high effortcondition to obtain it.Lydall et al. (2010) were wary ofattributing the rats’ effort justification to thecomplex cognitive experience of dissonance,and examined the possibility that a process of“situational contrast” was instead occurring.They suggested that an aversive negative state isproduced by the high degree of effort inputted,and that in comparison (i.e., via situationalcontrast) to this state of great exertion, the valueof the effort’s outcome (i.e., the reward) isincreased. A study of pigeons by Clement et al.was described by Lydall et al. (p. 1136), wherethey had concluded that the pigeons’ preferencefor colours that appeared following a great dealof effort during training was the result of withintrialcontrast. Lydall et al. put forward thistheory of situational contrast as a possiblealternative explanation for the effort justificationeffect in rats, suggesting that the minimizationof cognitive dissonance may be a process toocomplex to occur in non-human animals.Nevertheless, it is clear that effort justificationhad indeed occurred in the rat sample. Whetherthe justification was attributable to dissonancereduction or a simpler comparison effect is anarea for future investigation. As Lydall et al.proposed, dissonance as a cognitive mechanismin humans could perhaps be attributable to amore parsimonious contrast effect, and this is anarea of research that presently requires moreattention.Experiences of Effort JustificationPersonal ExperienceUpon graduating from university, afriend of mine, Sadie, found herself uncertainabout what career path she wanted to pursue.She took a temporary part-time job working at arestaurant. After a few months, she decided towrite the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT).Her mother was a lawyer, and all the lawyersshe knew lived comfortable lifestyles; it seemedlike a safe choice. Sadie spent the autumnstudying for the LSAT, and despised it. Sheconstantly complained about it, especially atfirst. She would always tell us that the LSATwas simply a means to an end, that it was atemporary but “necessary evil.” Sheacknowledged that the Test was a painfulexperience, and law school might be too, but itwould get her where she wanted to go.In the fall, Sadie studied very hard,hardly ever having time to see her friends, andtook the LSAT in December. Not having scoredin a high enough percentile, she doubled hereffort in January and took the test again inFebruary. Unfortunately, Sadie was notaccepted to law school that year. She decided tospend the summer continuing to practice for theLSAT and then re-apply to schools for thefollowing year. Having spent nearly 8 monthsworking towards this one goal, Sadie at thispoint began telling me that the past year and halfspent studying for the LSAT had been wellworth the time and effort, because she was muchbetter prepared for it the next time around. Bythe time she was finally accepted to Queen’sUniversity in March of 2012, she was a steadfastproponent of the LSAT. She now refers to it asa formative and important process. Though sheconcedes that she may not use all of the skillsthat she had to learn for the test, she maintainsthat the process was nonetheless useful. Sheabsolutely believes that any individual hoping toattend law school should not only be required totake the LSAT, but that it should be a difficultexperience for them. She alleges that the

EVIDENCE FOR EFFORT JUSTIFICATIONchallenging nature of the Test prepares studentsfor the arduousness of law school.In spite of the fact that Sadie had neverreally enjoyed the type of problem-solvinginvolved in the LSAT, she began to change theway she spoke, and apparently felt, about theTest after having spent many months and muchenergy studying for it. Evidently, she wasattempting to minimize the cognitive dissonanceshe was experiencing by changing her attitudetowards the LSAT. She started to talk about thelogic game component of the test, which she haddespised for months, as though it was a practicaland interesting way of thinking. Havingexpended such a great deal of effort and timeworking towards achieving a good score on theLSAT, Sadie’s values had changed. Whereasshe used to have only contempt for the Test, andregarded standardized tests to be “useless” ingeneral, she now, upon attainment of her goal,exhibits only the most respect and nearadmirationfor the LSAT and the designers ofthe test. Sadie’s experience with the LSAT wasclearly a demonstration of effort justification.To eliminate the tension of working hard for agoal she didn’t care for, Sadie changed the wayshe felt about the goal, thus reducing dissonanceand rationalizing the great amount of work shehad put into acquiring a good LSAT score.Effort justification evidence in the newsThis past December, The New YorkTimes reported the death of yet anotherAmerican soldier in Afghanistan (Semple,2011). Private Danny Chen was 19 when hedied last autumn; the reported cause wassuicide. Eight American soldiers wereimplicated in Chen’s death, and last month, anAmerican military investigator recommendedcourt-martialing four of these eight soldiers(Semple, 2012). When the story emerged inDecember, Chen’s parents claimed that he hadstruggled with a “campaign of hazing” thatinvolved, but was not limited to, insulting Chenwith racial slurs as well as physical attacks ofviolence against him.Hazing has long been a military rite ofpassage. According to Semple (2011), the U.S.Army permits the application of “correctivemeasures” as punishment by senior or higherrankingsoldiers, including reasonable amountsof forced exercise and verbal admonishments.In the case of Chen, these corrective measures,which included verbal and physical harassment,were administered because he apparently forgotto turn off the water heater after his shower.In an investigation of the hazing ofrookie athletes, Hinkle (2006) found that hazedathletes excused and even defended the practiceof hazing, which she defined as including verbalas well as sexual and physical abuse. Hinklesuggested that this dissonant behaviour on thepart of hazing victims is a way of minimizingthe cognitive dissonance experienced bywillingly taking the part of victim, an evidentlyhigh effort role. Obviously, because theseathletes had exerted much effort in the processof being hazed, and had taken part in this highlyaversive experience voluntarily, they felt theneed to justify this dissonant behaviour. Byviewing the hazing experience as ultimatelyrewarding, hazing victims were able to justifythe effort (i.e., the negative experience) involvedin their behaviour. Hazed athletes, Hinklereported, would rationalize the experience bysuggesting that hazing was a necessary rite ofpassage, and participation in it indicated acommitment to the sport.Hinkle’s findings pertaining to athletichazing can be applied to the present situation ofabusive hazing in the U.S. Army. Incomingsoldiers are hazed by their superiors. Throughthe processes involved in the effort justificationparadigm, they reduce dissonance bydownplaying the negative aspects of hazing, andcome to view it as a valuable activity. Hazedsoldiers placed greater value on hazing, becausethey had worked so hard to get through theirown experiences of hazing (Lydall et al., 2010).When these soldiers are later in a position ofsuperiority, hazing inferiors for their errors is nolonger seen as an aversive activity, but rather anecessary and positive rite of passage.Clearly, for the family of Private DannyChen, hazing is an instance in which thejustification of effort by its administrators wasnot only unwarranted, but was an undesirable,self-defeating, and highly dangerous method of

EVIDENCE FOR EFFORT JUSTIFICATIONdissonance reduction. This particular exampleof hazing as an activity that continues to exist atleast in part, due to effort justificationtechniques, demonstrates that the experience ofcognitive dissonance, though uncomfortable,may not always be a psychological experiencethat should be avoided. At any rate, coming tovalue hazing may not have been the mostdesirable way for soldiers to reduce theirdissonant tension. Had the soldiers whoharassed Danny Chen dealt with the dissonantcognition by changing their previous cognitionof hazing after experiencing it themselvesthrough behavioural modification (i.e.,concluded that due to the detrimental andaversive nature of its experience, hazing shouldnot be practiced), instead of changing theirattitude towards hazing by coming to value it,Chen may not have had to endure the same “riteof passage” that drove him to end his life.ConclusionThe experience of effort justification hasbeen demonstrated to occur in humans and nonhumananimals, in varying situations. Althoughsome suggest that justifying one’s effort occursnot to reduce the complex cognitivephenomenon of dissonance, but rather as a resultof situational contrast (Lydall et al., 2010), it isclear that justification of expended time andenergy does occur and does result in behaviourinducedvalue change.First Received: 11/7/2012Final Revision Received: 4/8/2013ReferencesAxsom, D., & Cooper, J. (1985). Cognitivedissonance and psychotherapy: The roleof effort justification in inducing weightloss. Journal of Experimental SocialPsychology, 21, 149-160.doi:10.1016/0022-1031(85)90012-5Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitivedissonance. Stanford University Press.Festinger, L., & Carlsmith, J. M. (1959).Cognitive consequences of forcedcompliance. The Journal of Abnormaland Social Psychology, 58, 203-210.doi:10.1037/h0041593Hinkle, S. L.Cognitive dissonance in athletichazing: The roles of commitment andathletic identity. Dissertation AbstractsInternational: Section B: The Sciencesand Engineering, 599.Lydall, E. S., Gilmour, G., Dwyer, D. M.(2010). Rats place greater value onrewards produced by high effort: Ananimal analogue of the “effortjustification” effect. Journal ofExperimental Social Psychology, 46,1134-1137.doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2010.05.011Semple, K. (December 21, 2011). Armycharges 8 in wake of death of a fellow G.I. The New York Times. RetrievedMarch 26, 2012 fromhttp://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/22/us/8-charged-in-death-of-fellow-soldier-usarmy-says.html?_r=1Semple, K. (December 22, 2012). Aftercharging 8, Army is scrutinized onhazing. The New York Times. RetrievedApril 7, 2012 fromhttp://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/23/nyregion/army-hazing-charges-wherediscipline-crossesline.html?ref=nyregion#Semple, K. (March 6, 2012). Army recommendscourt-martialing soldiers in death ofPrivate. The New York Times. RetrievedMarch 7, 2012 fromhttp://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/06/army-recommends-court-

martialing-4-soldiers-in-death-ofprivate/?ref=hazing#Zentall, T. R. (2010). Justification of effort byhumans and pigeons: Cognitivedissonance or contrast? CurrentDirections in Psychological Science, 19,296-300.doi:10.1177/0963721410383381EVIDENCE FOR EFFORT JUSTIFICATION

© 2013 WUPJ, September 2013, Volume 1 SocialA Review of Literature on Mate PoachingAmanda Kohler*Mate poaching is the phenomenon in which an individual expresses an interest inanother individual already in an exclusive sexual relationship for the purpose ofhaving a short or long-term sexual relationship with them. This article reviewsresearch on the evolutionary significance of mate poaching, mate retention, andmate guarding, which leads to a discussion on the motivations, costs, and benefitspresent when engaging in mate poaching behavior. Tactics for those who partake inmate poaching, when it is most successful, and the characteristics of those involvedin mate poaching are also reviewed. Recent studies seem to suggest that there arepersonality differences in the individuals who are successful at mate poaching andthe individual that is targeted by the poacher. Not surprisingly, type of relationshipis a significant factor that influences how successful mate poaching will be.Furthermore, discussion suggests that emotional and psychological pain can resultfrom mate poaching behavior, therefore coping techniques for those seeking therapyshould be developed. Similarly, the danger of contracting and spreading sexuallytransmitted infections (STI) is an important consideration that is addressed.Betsy and John have been dating for 3months. They go to the same large universitybut have different classes. Both individuals aregood looking and sociable. On the first day of anew class, Billy sits beside Betsy and they begintalking about their program. Every Monday andWednesday Billy and Betsy sit beside each otherwhile they take notes from the professor. After amidterm exam, Billy invites Betsy to grab adrink with him at the campus pub. They talkabout school, family, and Betsy’s relationship.Betsy discloses to Billy that recently things havenot been good with John (her boyfriend). Betsythinks John isn’t paying enough attention to her.Billy assures Betsy that he would always haveher on his mind if they were dating. Betsy thinksabout this and determines Billy is a nice guywhom with every drink he buys her is becomingmore appealing. When the night is over andBilly and Betsy find their ways home, Betsy stillhas Billy and his kind, caring words in hermind. The next day Betsy hangs out with Johnand they get into an argument. Betsy eventuallytells Billy about this argument. Again, Billyinforms Betsy he would never make her angry ifthey dated. Billy is attempting to mate poachBetsy from John.Defining Mate PoachingMate poaching is behavior used to luresomeone into a short or long term sexualrelationship who is already in a romanticrelationship (Buss, 2006). There are twoindividuals needed for this behavior to occur.There is the poacher, who seeks out a matealready involved in a romantic relationship for asexual encounter, and there is the poached, whois in a romantic relationship and is sought out byanother person for a sexual encounter.Experimental research on this topic is relativelynew but the phenomenon of mate poaching hasbeen prevalent. In terms of having attempted topoach someone, in a mature sample of adults,60% of men and 53% of women reported havingattempted to poach someone for a long-termrelationship (Schmitt & Buss, 2001). Similarly,60% of men and 38% of women attempted topoach other individuals for a short-termrelationship. In terms of poaching for a longtermrelationship, 93% of men and 82% ofwomen reported having received poachingattempts. Although mate poaching seems to be acommon occurrence, no known culturepromotes mate poaching or infidelity (Schmitt,2004), suggesting it to be a universal taboo. It is*Initially submitted for Psychology 4791F at the University of Western Ontario. For inquiries regarding thearticle, please email the author at akohler@alumni.uwo.ca.

MATE POACHINGof interest to determine how this deceitfulbehavior came about and what makes it flourishas a life choice for so many individuals today.An Evolutionary PerspectiveDuring the evolution of mammals therewere probably those who had mates and thosewho did not (Davies, Shackelford, & Goetz,2006). Mammals who were motivated toreproduce with only unmated mammals were ata disadvantage because many male and femaleswere probably already successfully reproducingtogether. In order to reproduce, the only otheroption would have been mating with an alreadymated individual. Thus, the response to matewith attached others would have been selectedfor and passed on to kin in order to moreefficiently reproduce (Davies et al., 2006).Those who solely chose to mate with unmatedindividuals may not have had the chance to everreproduce and therefore the genes of thesemammals would slowly wither away, as theydid not promote successful reproduction. Thismay have been how mate poaching as a matingstrategy came about. There is an abundance ofevidence showing nonhuman animals usedeceptive tactics to gain access to desirablemates (Schmitt & Shackelford, 2003). Forexample, de Waal (1986) found that subordinatemale chimpanzees hide their erection from othermales while letting females in close proximitysee it in order to entice them to mate. Amongsome fish species, males will sometimes pretendto be female to gain entry to another male’shome in attempt to fertilize the female (Gross,1982). These studies show how mate poachingtactics are not just among humans, but may alsobe a common occurrence among nonhumanspecies.Motivation for Mate PoachingIt has been shown that humans place agreat deal of emphasis on the attractiveness of apotential suitor when searching for a short termsexual interaction, and to a lesser extent whenlooking for a long term sexual relationship(Buss, 2006). It comes as no surprise then thatgood-looking individuals seem to attract manysuitors. It may also be apparent that singleindividuals are generally less attractive thanattached individuals. Therefore, in the case ofsingle individuals, there might be a largeramount of unattractive single individuals thanattractive ones. Sometimes in order to obtain adesirable and attractive mate, one has to seekout those who are already taken. Attractivepeople may symbolize good genetics, highreproductive potential, and access to resources.It might be adaptive to obtain an alreadyattached mate in order to have a better chance ofreproducing. This would be the quantity overquality argument and it applies mainly to menbecause the more women they inseminate, thebetter chance they have of reproducing. It mightalso be argued that an already attached attractivefemale is of superior quality, as she is desired byothers and has experience in relationships. Menpoaching attractive women might be a ‘winwin’situation for the men, such that men areable to mate with many desirable females ofgood quality already tested by other men andcan attempt to mate with as many as possible topass on his genes without restriction.Women do not share the samereproductive benefit in the sense that passing ontheir genes does come with restrictions. Forexample, a woman must carry a child for ninemonths before birth, and then pass through alactation period before becoming pregnantagain. It is also the case that after a certain age,women are unable to have children due tomenopause and therefore have limited time toreproduce. Women may be more likely to seekquality over quantity in a reproduction situation.In order to mate with the healthiest, mostdesirable and attractive man to produce the bestpossible child, it may be in the best interest ofthe women to obtain this man from an alreadyexistent relationship. The logic being, firstly, analready attached man is assumed to be able toprovide his mate with resources. Secondly, theattached man is most likely more attractive thanmen not in relationships, and thirdly, carriesgood genes desirable by another woman (as seenin the fact that the attached man is in arelationship).Mate poaching involves deception,secrecy, and thrill. A poacher must form a

MATE POACHINGconnection with the ideal mate in the form ofbefriending the individual, or finding them alonesomewhere. The potential mate must keep thisand further interactions secret from his or herpartner. The poacher and the potential matemight feel some sort of thrill while participatingin these situations. It may be thrilling to have arelationship behind someone’s back, or it maybe curiosity on where the relationship might gothat could also be thrilling. In a way, matepoaching is a forbidden pleasure (Josephs,2010). There is pleasure in finding another matewho takes an interest in you, and who makes anindividual feel lust and desire that maybe theindividual has not felt in a while within theirlong-term relationship.Risk as a Cost of Mate PoachingMate poaching is taking a risk in that thepoacher is trying to attract a mate that is alreadytaken and could reject the poacher. The poachedis taking a risk by starting a relationship duringor directly after another relationship that couldcause a lot of pain in their significant other.Paternity of any resulting children is threatenedfor the men involved, such that they cannot besure a given child belongs to them. However,women are always certain a child they give birthto is theirs (Buss, 2006). Women run the risk offorfeiting reliable access to resources. If they arethe poacher and are rejected, no resources willbe provided. Alternatively, if they are thepoached but the poacher has lied aboutproviding for her (in order to entice her into asexual relationship and to pass on genes), thenthe woman loses out on assured resources fromher current partner as well as the supposedresources from the poacher (Buss, 2006).Several hypothesized responses to matepoaching will be discussed below. Namely,jealousy, mate retention and mate guarding.The Development of JealousyJealousy might be a universal defenseagainst the dangers stemming from matepoaching such that it acts as an automaticresponse to clues about possible infidelity(Josephs, 2010). If mate poaching has been amating strategy in evolutionary history then itposes a problem for the victims, or the mate ofthe poached (Buss, 2006). A strategy to defendagainst this behavior may have also evolved.This strategy might have been the developmentof jealousy that would be activated whenever arelationship threat was present. For example,Buss et al., (1999) asked participants to imaginethat their partner was sexually and emotionallyinvolved with another person (relationshipthreat) and then to report which part of thebetrayal was the most upsetting. It was foundthat men reported the sexual aspect to be moreupsetting whereas women reported theemotional aspect to be more upsetting. Thisshows that men and women differ in the specificthreats that evoke jealousy. If jealousy is anevolved emotion, then there must also be abehavioral aspect individuals engage in afterfeeling this jealousy, used in order to keep amate from straying (Buss, 2006).Mate RetentionMate retention tactics are behaviors usedto ward off rival mates or to keep a mate fromleaving the relationship. The behaviors could besomething like calling a partner unexpectedly toask what they are doing (vigilance) or punchingsomeone who is flirting with their significantother (violence). Buss (2000) has found thatmen and women differ in the mate retentiontactics used; men flaunt their resources to theirmate and threaten to use violence against anyrivals, whereas women enhance their physicalappearance to seem more desirable and flirt withother men to elicit jealousy in their mate.Mate GuardingMate guarding is a type of behaviordesigned to preserve an existing relationship byholding on to the mate, preventing rivals fromentering the relationship, and maintaining accessto the mate. Mate guarding tactics are seen inseveral nonhuman animals and insects. Forexample, when male and female butterfliesencounter each other, the male flies the femaleaway in order to remove her from other malebutterflies (Buss, 2002). Other ways to conceal amate and avoid mate poaching are to mask theattractiveness of the mate, or to pretend to not

MATE POACHINGactually be in a relationship with the mate.Another mate guarding strategy might be toremain physically present with a mate in orderto ward off potential threats. In the specific caseof humans, mate guarding strategies have beenspending all free time with a mate in order toensure they do not meet anyone else, verbalizingthreats of ending the relationship if one were tocheat, using possessive ornamentation such asasking a mate to wear an article of clothing oftheirs (or wedding ring), or pointing out anotherpotential mate’s flaws (derogation). The mateguarding behaviors seen in nonhuman animalsare also seen in humans, suggesting thesebehaviors have adapted over time through allspecies. There are many mate guarding andmate retention behaviors used to preserve arelationship but there are also many behaviorsmate poachers use in order to break up arelationship.How to Engage in Mate PoachingIn many instances, mated individuals areoften kept protected from other potential mateswhich makes it hard for mate poachers to gainan audience with the targeted mate whileremaining unnoticed and avoiding costs inflictedby the regular partner (Schmitt & Buss, 2001).In order to poach a potential mate, the matepoacher must be able to demonstrate an abilityto give more than what the targeted matealready receives from his or her regular partner,and be able to protect the targeted mate fromany abuse from the regular partner stemmingfrom ending the relationship. Mate poachers cando this successfully by using tactics to displayan ability to fulfill the desires of the targetedmate more than the regular mate (Schmitt &Buss, 1996). An example might be taking atargeted mate on a trip that the regular matecould never afford or make time for. Matepoachers can also derogate a regular mate’squalities and behaviors in order to make him orher appear less desirable to the targeted mate.An example of this might be commenting onhow unattractive the regular mate is orsuggesting he or she has been cheating on thetargeted mate. An often-used tactic to gain anaudience with the targeted mate in order to thenuse the tactics discussed above is befriendingthe couple or the targeted mate, as in theopening scenario. This strategy avoids costs tothe mate poacher of violence from the regularmate or rejection from others for poachinganother’s mate. After befriending the couple ortargeted mate, the mate poacher is then involvedin the couple’s lives and can wait for anopportunity to poach (Schmitt & Buss, 2001).Schmitt and Buss (2001) askedparticipants in a preliminary experiment tosimply write down any specific acts or tacticsindividuals use to attract a mate who is alreadyinvolved in another relationship. Examples ofwhat participants wrote were: being generousand showing they care for the targeted mate,developing social ties with the targeted mate’speer groups, getting the potential mate drunk totake advantage of them, waiting around for thecouple to break up, arranging easy sexual accesssuch as showing up in a potential mate’s roomor car naked, and developing an emotionalconnection by confiding in the potential mate toget closer to them. A specific type of individualis needed to have the will to wait around for acouple to break up, or to show up naked in apotential mate’s room. It might also be the casethat an individual who transfers in and out ofrelationships due to being poached might alsohave personality characteristics different fromindividuals who have never been poached.Characteristics of the Mate Poacher and thePoachedCharacteristics of the Mate PoacherThe characteristics of a mate poacherand the poached have been studied by Schmittand Buss (2001). Participants were asked tocomplete scales indicating their frequency ofpast poaching and being poached. These resultswere compared with participants’ self-reportedpersonal characteristics. Schmitt and Buss(2001) found personality differences betweenindividuals who make mate poaching attempts(as opposed to those who do not) and those whoare successful at mate poaching (versus thosewho are unsuccessful). The authors also founddifferences in the characteristics of the

MATE POACHINGindividual who receives mate poaching attempts(as opposed to those who do not) and those whoare successfully poached away from theirregular relationship (versus those who cannot bepoached away from a relationship). Individualswho were less likely to be mate poachers ratedthemselves as high in agreeableness andconscientious, suggesting that more kind andreliable people are not likely to be matepoachers. Individuals who attempt to matepoach rated themselves as low on relationshipexclusivity and as having an erotophilicdisposition, meaning they do not have greatloyalty to their partners and are emotionallypositively disposed to sexuality. Individualswho have the most success at mate poaching arerated high on sexual attractiveness and also lowin sexual exclusivity.Characteristics of the PoachedIndividuals who receive mate poachingattempts have labeled themselves as extraverts,high on openness to experience, sexuallyattractive and emotionally investing. Theseindividuals appear to others as outgoing,adventurous, and attractive. This further showhow attractive individuals are usually already inrelationships and single individuals seek outthese attractive individuals for relationships oftheir own. Compared to those who rejectedpoaching attempts, individuals who went alongwith attempts were rated as more disagreeable,neurotic, unconscientious, mean, and unloving.They were also rated as having a moremasculine gender orientation - lower onrelationship exclusivity and emotionalinvestment, and as having an erotophilicdisposition. Therefore, the people who enter intorelationships due to being poached away froman old one do not seem to be dependent withtheir partner, do not care for them deeply, areopen about sex, and also unreliable. Althoughattractive individuals receive more matepoaching attempts than unattractive individuals,it might be that unattractive individuals are morelikely to go along with mate poachingpotentially because they do not have as manyoffers as attractive individuals. Aside from thesepersonality profiles, there must be other externalcosts and benefits associated with engaging inmate poaching, and allowing oneself to bepoached away from an existing relationship.Costs and Benefits of Mate PoachingStudies have traditionally focused onreasons why individuals engage in infidelitywhile already in an existing relationship (Treas& Giesen, 2000). These individuals are labeledhere as the poached, and there are reasons theyallow themselves to be poached. These include aneed for sexual variety, excitement, a partner’spermission to have affairs, seeking revenge on apartner who has engaged in extra-relationshipsexual contact (Bringle & Buunk, 1991) todissatisfaction in one’s current relationship(Buss & Shackelford, 1997). Drigotas,Safstrom, and Gentilia (1999) found that lowlevels of commitment toward one’s currentpartner strongly predicted relationship infidelity.However, research has only recently consideredcosts and benefits of the mate poacher’sbehavior.BenefitsBuss and Schmitt (2001) again askedparticipants in a preliminary study to record anycosts and benefits a mate poacher mightexperience when poaching for a long or shortterm mating relationship. Then another group ofparticipants was asked to rate each potential costand benefit to the degree that they personallybelieved it to be a cost or benefit of attractingsomeone who is already in a relationship.Examples of benefits of mate poaching found inthe preliminary study were having sexualityvariety, developing a special friendship, gaininga partner with physical beauty or resourceability, having a “pre-approved” mate, takingpride in the conquest and enjoying the lack ofresponsibility. In the second study whereparticipants were asked to rate how good abenefit these outcomes are, gaining sexualaccess to others, resource devotion, andacquiring a physically beautiful partner were allrated as significantly more beneficial to matepoachers than other potential benefits.

MATE POACHINGCostsCosts of mate poaching found in thepreliminary study were: having to hide when ondates with a targeted mate, having to lieconstantly, fear of the current mate hurting themate poacher, the targeted mate’s familydisliking the mate poacher if they begin a publicrelationship, and the risk of futureunfaithfulness. When participants rated howgood or costly these outcomes were, losingresources and having future commitmentconcerns were seen as significantly more costlyfor a mate poacher than other potential costs.There is literature on gender differencesin the costs and benefits of mate poaching suchthat male mate poachers are more concernedwith losing resources, and female mate poachersare concerned about gaining a bad reputation orhaving to raise a resulting child alone (Buss &Schmitt, 2001). A full discussion about this isbeyond the scope of this paper. Although certainbenefits may encourage individuals to engage inmate poaching, more than just the costs maydeter them from attempting to attract a targetedmate away form an existing relationship. Thetype of relationship a targeted mate is involvedin could influence a poacher’s decision topoach.When is Mate Poaching the Most Successful?Mate poaching attempts might be moresuccessful when the targeted mate is involved ina dating relationship rather than a marriage, or ifthe relationship is long distance as opposed toliving together. Buss and Schmitt (2001) askedparticipants to rate the effectiveness of differentmate poaching tactics in different relationshipand temporal contexts. For example, participantswere asked to rate the effectiveness of matepoaching tactics when attempting to poachsomeone in a long term dating relationship, in along distance relationship, an uncommittedrelationship, a committed relationship, arelationship that seemed to be ending soon, amarriage, a relationship where the twoindividuals lived together, or a new relationship.Mate poaching tactics were seen as more likelyto work when the relationship was longdistance, the individuals were not committed,the individuals were dating as opposed to beingmarried, and if the relationship was ending soon.There is easier access to the targeted mate ifthey are in a long distance relationship and it hasalready been shown that individuals with lowlevels of commitment are more likely to commitinfidelity. Mate poachers may feel less guiltyabout poaching someone who is unmarried, aswell as if it was known the relationship was onthe rocks and about to end.Poaching was rated to be less effectivewhen individuals were married, if they wereliving together, highly committed or if therelationship was new. Mate poachers wouldmost likely have less access to a targeted mate ifhe or she was living with their significant other,or married and highly committed. A matepoacher might also not have the opportunity tobreak up a new relationship as usually they areexciting enough already, blissful and timeconsuming. A mate poacher might attempt toattract mates who are married, or involved in anew relationship, but will most likely not besuccessful.Implications of Mate PoachingMate poaching can have painfulconsequences for all parties involved. The riskof contracting sexually transmitted infections(STI) rises with the amount of partners one has(Buss & Schmitt, 2001). It is also a worry forthe mate of the poached such that he or she isusually unaware their partner is engaging insexual behavior with another person who maypotentially have an STI. STIs can be extremelypainful and irritating to have. They can haveshort-term effects, or long-term permanenteffects as in the case of humanimmunodeficiency virus (HIV). Having an STIcan make it challenging to engage in sexualactivity with other partners if one is concernedabout spreading the infection. Other than thephysical symptoms, there may be psychologicalpain felt by all parties involved if any haveexperienced previous attachment problems oremotional injuries from past infidelity.Individuals might seek out counseling to copewith their psychological pain. Individualsinvolved in mate poaching may find a negative

MATE POACHINGpoaching experience to be challenging torecover from such that it might really damagetheir self-confidence. However, it is a matingstrategy human and other nonhuman animalsemploy in order to find the most attractive andresourceful mate.ConclusionMany classic tactics mate poachers useto attract a mate have been recorded by severalresearchers (Schmitt & Buss, 2001; Buss, 2002;Buss & Shackelford, 1997), and were reviewedin this paper. Studies have found there aredifferences in the personality dispositions ofsuccessful mate poachers and the targeted mate.These dispositions are most likely acombination of biology, genetics and theenvironment. There are also costs and benefitsassociated with mate poaching and allowingoneself to be poached, and it has been shownthat the type of relationship also influences thesuccessfulness of mate poaching. Differentindividuals may view the benefits associatedwith mate poaching as more appealing thanothers. For example, an individual who scoreshigh on openness to experience might in fact bemore likely to engage in mate poaching becauseit appears to be thrilling and something theindividual has not experienced. That sameindividual might not seek to engage in matepoaching for the potential benefit of securinggood genes for reproduction. No matter thereason, mate poaching often occurs andsuccessful prevention behaviors may be out ofthe hands of a single individual. It would behelpful to create coping techniques in order toaid those seeking counseling and therapy aftersuch a painful event occurs.First Received: 1/10/2013Final Revision Received: 3/12/2013ReferencesBringle, R. G., & Buunk, B. P. (1991).Extradyadic relationships and sexualjealousy. (pp. 135-153). Hillsdale, NJ,England: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,Inc, Hillsdale, NJ.Buss, D. M. (2000). Human mate guarding.Neuroendocrinology Letters SpecialIssue, 23(Suppl.4), 23-29.Buss, D. M. (2006). Strategies of human mating.Psihologijske Teme, 15(2), 239-260.Buss, D. M., & Shackelford, T. K.(1997). From vigilance to violence: Materetention tactics in married couples.Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology, 72, 346-361.Buss, D. M., Shackelford, T. K., Kirkpatrick, L.A., Choe, J. C., Lim, H. K., Hasegawa,M., . . . Bennett, K. (1999). Jealousy andthe nature of beliefs about infidelity:Tests of competing hypotheses about sexdifferences in the united states, korea,and japan. Personal Relationships, 6(1),125-150.Davies, A. P. C., Shackelford, T. K., & Goetz,A. T. (2006). "Attached" or"unattached": With whom do men andwomen prefer to mate, and why?Psihologijske Teme, 15(2), 297-314.de Waal, F. B. (1986). The brutal elimination ofa rival among captive male chimpanzees.Ethology & Sociobiology, 7(3-4), 237-251.Drigotas, S. M., Safstorm, A. C., & Gentilia, T.(1999). An investment model predictionof dating infidelity. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 77,509-524.Gross, M. R. (1982). Sneakers, satellites andparentals: Polymorphic mating strategiesin North American sunfishes. Zeitschriftfur Tierpsychologie, 60, 1-26.Josephs, Lawrence. 2010. The evolved functionof the oedipal conflict. The Internationaljournal of psychoanalysis 91(4): 937-958.Schmitt, D. P. (2004). Patterns and universals ofmate poaching across 53 nations: The

effects of sex, culture, and personality onromantically attracting another person'spartner. Journal of Personality andSocial Psychology, 86(4), 560-584.Schmitt, D. P., & Buss, D. M. (1996). Strategicself-promotion and competitorderogation: Sex and context effects onperceived effectiveness of mateattraction tactics. Journal of Personalityand Social Psychology, 70, 1185-1204.Schmitt, D. P., & Buss, D. M. (2001). Humanmate poaching: Tactics and temptationsfor infiltrating existing mateships.Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology, 80(6), 894-917.Schmitt, D. P., & Shackelford, T. K. (2003).Nifty ways to leave you lover: Thetactics people use to entice and disguisethe process of human mate poaching.Personality and Social PsychologyBulletin, 29(8), 1018-1035.Treas, J., & Giesen, D. (2000). Sexual infidelityamong married and cohabitingamericans. Journal of Marriage and theFamily, 62(1), 48-60.MATE POACHING

© 2013 WUPJ, September 2013, Volume 1 SocialTest Taking: A Research Proposal to Examine the Pressures to Conform on High and Low Self-MonitorsJeremy M. Reinblatt*The proposed study will add to the prior research on self-monitoring andconformity. It will investigate whether conformity can be induced in a test takingsituation, and whether people who are high or low in self-monitoring (SM) differ intheir level of conformity. Participants will be 80 undergraduate students who willcomplete the Self-Monitoring Scale (SMS; Snyder, 1974). They will then take atest consisting of 50 math questions, while in a room of confederates who leaveeither early or later. The time it takes for participants to hand in their test will bemeasured. Expected results are that participants who are high in SM will conformthe most to confederates. Implications, such as test structure, as well as limitationsand future directions are discussed.Intuition tells us, when in a test situationpeople tend to experience peer pressure tocomplete the test at the same time as others (i.e.not earlier or later than everyone else). Thisstudy is designed to empirically investigate thisintuition, by examining the effects of peerpressure on the amount of time people take tocomplete a task, by conforming to the group.This study will investigate whether or notindividuals’ own times to complete a task areaffected by the amount of time it takes others tocomplete the same task. The study will alsoexamine whether people differ in the time ittakes them to complete the task if they are highin self-monitoring or low in self-monitoring(SM). This study will attempt to add to theliterature on self-monitoring, specificallylooking at whether the distinction betweenlevels of self-monitoring affects how people areinfluenced by others in a test-taking situation.These implications are further discussed at theend of the paper.High self-monitors (HSM) areindividuals who pay close attention to socialcues and their behaviour is not based onpersonal attitudes; rather, it is based on theattitudes and beliefs of others (Snyder,Gangestad, & Simpson, 1983). Individualscategorized as low self-monitors (LSM) formtheir own attitudes and opinions anddemonstrate them in social situations. Theirbehaviour is driven by their inner attitudes andbeliefs (Snyder et al., 1983). SM is oftenmeasured by the Self-Monitoring Scale (SMS;Snyder, 1974).The SM construct has been empiricallyvalidated by many studies. In a study conductedby Snyder et al. (1983), participants were given12 pairs of choices of leisure activities andfriends. More specifically, the choices involvedengaging either in an activity with a well-likedfriend who was not a specialist in that activity ora not-well-liked friend who was a specialist inthat activity. Results showed that HSMs choseto engage in the activity with the not-well-likedfriend who was a specialist more than LSMs.This suggests that HSMs look to others todetermine their own behaviour, and theyconform by receiving behavioural cues fromothers, whereas LSMs prefer to engage in anactivity with a well-liked and similar friendtowards whom they have a favourable opinionof. These findings lay the groundwork for thepresent research which hopes to link theconstruct of SM to conformity in a test situation,where HSMs are predicted to conform to thebehaviour of others more than LSMs.Snyder et al. (1983) conducted a furtherexperiment wherein participants identifiedparticular members of their social groups andactivities they like to engage in with thoseindividuals. HSMs were found to engage in*Initially submitted for Psychology 3780F at the University of Western Ontario. For inquiries regarding thearticle, please email the author at jreinbla@uwo.ca.

PRESSURE, SELF-MONITORING AND CONFORMITYactivities with people who are not necessarilysimilar to them, whereas LSMs preferred tointeract with people who are similar to them inattitudes, opinions, beliefs, etc. This once againprovides insight into the SM construct for thecurrent study, suggesting that LSMs conform toonly similar others, whereas HSMs do not havethis preference, and receive behavioural cuesfrom everyone, including non-similar others,which further supports the previous claim thatthey are more prone to conform.In another study conducted on SM,Klein, Snyder, and Livingston (2004) hadparticipants respond to the Self-MonitoringScale (Snyder, 1974), and the Heterosexuals’Attitude towards Homosexuality survey (Larsen,Reed, & Hoffman, 1980). Participants werebrought back into the lab and expressed theirattitudes towards homosexual individuals. Twothirdsof the participants were then told that theywould discuss their attitudes with either peoplewith positive attitudes (for one-third) or withnegative attitudes (for one-third) about the sametopic. Therefore, participants were either in adiscussion with a tolerant group, a prejudicedgroup, or no group at all. It was found thatHSMs were significantly more prejudiced whenthe audience was prejudiced, whereas LSMswere not affected by the audience’s attitude.This further shows the interesting interactionbetween SM and conformity, which is what thecurrent research is attempting to extend. Thatis, the current study proposes to extend previousresearch by changing the scenario from adiscussion group to a testing situation.Similarly to SM, conformity has beenvastly researched. At the forefront of this fieldwas Solomon Asch’s (1956) line judgmentstudies. In Asch (1956), participants comparedthe length of a target line with three other lines.Results showed that when confederates said thatthe target lines matched line A, for example,when clearly it matched the length of line B,participants conformed to the confederates’ falseresponses at a significantly higher rate. Theseexperiments set the groundwork for futureconformity studies. Asch clearly demonstratedthat people conform to others’ opinions, even ifthere is strong evidence for them to be false.Since then, a number of studies have beenconducted on conformity.Recent extensions into this literaturehave been examining how conformity haschanged over time. Bond and Smith (1996)conducted a meta-analysis of 133 studies onconformity from different cultures to ascertainwhether conformity has changed over time andhow it differs from individualist cultures tocollectivist ones. They found that conformityhas decreased in the United States since theAsch (1956) studies were conducted.Furthermore, they found that collectivistcountries (i.e. many countries in Asia) exhibitedhigher levels of conformity than individualistcountries (i.e. countries in North America).Although this could lead to decreasedconformity in the current study, a significantmain effect of conformity is still predicted toexist, as many recent studies still detect asignificant conformity effect induced by peerpressure (i.e., Pivik, 2010)As illustrated, much research has beenconducted on both SM and conformity. In arecent study (Pivik, 2010), SM was examined asone of the personality variables that influencedconformity. Half of the participants were givenimages to rate after either seeing the ratings ofothers (conformity condition) and the other halfwere not (nonconformity condition). Resultsshowed that personality variables, includingSM, had no effect on conformity. This isinfluential for the current research, due to thefact that the present study will also investigateconformity and SM. However, in the studyconducted by Pivik (2010), the conformityconditions were induced online, whereas thecurrent study will use confederates in a lab,which is expected to yield significant effects ofSM on conformity, due to the physical presenceof others.Self-monitoring has also beeninvestigated in terms of its correlation withconformity. Santee and Maslach (1982) testedthis by having confederates provide solutions to20 scenarios of problems in human relations.Participants’ solutions could have been correct(or the better solution) and conformed to eitherthe majority or the minority of confederates.

PRESSURE, SELF-MONITORING AND CONFORMITYTheir solutions could have also been incorrect(or the poorer solution) and conformed to theminority of confederates. Finally, theirsolutions could have been an original solutionnot provided by the confederates. Santee andMaslach (1982) found that self-monitoring wasthe only personality variable studied (othersincluded self-esteem and social anxiety) that didnot correlate with conformity. One plausibleexplanation for the lack of correlation is the factthat participants were alone when responding,rather than in a group with the presence ofothers as they will be in the current study.Thus the current study proposes toaddress an alternative explanation of theprevious studies. That is, a person’s level of SMdoes affect a person’s willingness to conform,but the conformity has to be induced by physicalpresence.For the purposes of this study, peerpressure will be manipulated by means ofconfederates leaving a testing room either veryquickly (“leave early” condition) or not at all(“do not leave” condition) after the test ishanded out. Conformity, as the dependentvariable, will be measured by the amount oftime it takes the participants to complete andsubsequently hand in their test paper.The current study will look at thedifferences between HSMs and LSMs withrespect to how they conform to the behaviour ofconfederates in a test taking situation. There aretwo main hypotheses in this study. The first isthat participants, regardless of their level of SM,will conform to the confederates’ behaviour ofeither leaving the room early or not leaving atall. That is, participants will complete the test ina shorter amount of time when the confederatesleave early and take longer when theconfederates do not leave at all. The secondhypothesis predicts that LSMs will conform tothe confederates less extremely than HSMs.That is, LSMs will be less influenced toconform to the behaviour of the confederatesand thus, will not hand in the test paper in asshort or as long in time as HSMs, thusproducing a significant interaction between thetwo independent variables.More specifically, participants who areHSMs and in the “do not leave” condition willtake the most amount of time of all theconditions to hand in their paper. Likewise,HSMs in the “leave early” condition will takethe least amount of time to hand in their papers.MethodParticipantsParticipants will be 80 undergraduatestudents taking Introduction to Psychology atWestern University. There will be an equalnumber of males and females. The majority ofthe participants’ ages will likely range from 18-20. Participants will be randomly assigned toeither the “leave early” or “do not leave”condition. The study will have an equal numberof participants in each of the four conditions.Participants will complete the studyindividually. However, there will always beconfederates in the room creating theappearance that it is a group setting with otherparticipants completing the same task as the realparticipant. In line with prior research, therewill be seven confederates used to induceconformity (Asch, 1956). Participants will becompensated with course credit in return fortheir participation in this study.MaterialsIn this study there will be twoindependent variables. The first will be thedegree to which participants engage in SM,measured by the Self-Monitoring Scale (SMS;Snyder, 1974). The scale consists of 18 true orfalse items (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986).Sample items include: “I find it hard to imitatethe behavior of other people” and “In differentsituations and with different people, I often actlike very different persons.” Participants will bedivided into HSM or LSM by performing amedian split on the SM scores. 50% ofparticipants above the median will be classifiedas HSMs, whereas 50% of participants belowthe median will be classified as LSMs.The second independent variable will bethe pressure that the confederates elicit from theparticipants. This will be done either by theconfederates handing in their test papers and

PRESSURE, SELF-MONITORING AND CONFORMITYleaving the room quickly or not handing in thepapers and not leaving at all. In the “leaveearly” condition, the seven confederates willleave in 15 second intervals starting two minutesafter the test begins. The other requiredmaterials are one pencil and a set of mathquestions for each participant and confederate.There will be 50 math questions on the test. Thequestions will be of varying difficulty, rangingfrom simple addition and subtraction, to morecomplicated algebra questions (i.e. 8 + 9 to390/13 + 23/4).The dependent variable (conformity)will be measured by the amount of time it takesfor the participant to hand in his or her paperfrom the time the test begins.ProcedureBefore participants come to the lab, theywill have already been assigned an ID code andrandomly assigned to either the “leave early”condition or the “do not leave” condition. Theconfederates will be told what they are supposedto do for each participant. When theparticipants enter the lab, they will be greeted bythe experimenter and sat down in a room thatemulates a school classroom (i.e. there will bedesks and a chalkboard). Some confederateswill already be seated prior to the participantarriving. A few confederates will arrive afterthe participant arrives so the participant does notthink he or she is late. Two minutes after thearrival of the participant, the experimenter willtell the real participant that all the participantshave now arrived and that they can now beginthe study. The experimenter will give theconfederates and the participant a letter ofinformation to read and answer any questionsthey may have. After obtaining informedconsent, the participant and confederates willcomplete the SMS.Instructions will then be delivered by theexperimenter in a clear and concise manner.The experimenter will explain that there will bea math test for everyone to complete, and thatsome questions may be easy while others mightbe difficult. Finally, the participant will be toldthat they are free to hand in the test and leavewhenever he or she feels that he or she hasfinished the test.Shortly after the instructions, theexperimenter will begin the test. A secondexperimenter watching from a second room willstart a timer. In the “leave early” condition, thefirst confederate will hand in his or her paperand leave after 2 minutes. 15 seconds later, thesecond confederate will do the same. This trendwill continue until all seven confederates havehanded in their test papers. Once the participanthands in his or her paper, the secondexperimenter will stop the timer and record theamount of time it took for the participant tohand in his or her paper.Before being debriefed, a manipulationcheck will be done in order to ensure that thetime at which the confederates left inducedsufficient conformity. Participants will be askedto what extent they felt pressure to finish the testat the same time as everyone else in the room, orleave the room when others began to leave.Their response options will be “I felt verypressured”, “I did not feel very pressured” and“I felt somewhat pressured”. The participantwill also be asked when the first person finishedthe test and left the room, with response optionsbeing “quite early”, “quite late”, and “I didn’tnotice”. The participant will then be debriefedand told that the other participants wereconfederates and used for the purposes of thestudy.ResultsFor this study, one main effect and aninteraction effect are to be expected. The maineffect is the effect of confederates’ pressuringbehaviour on conformity such that participantswill be significantly influenced to leave theroom more quickly or more slowly dependingon the confederates’ behaviour. As seen inFigure 1, an interaction effect is also expected tooccur such that the HSMs in the “do not leave”condition will take the longest to complete thetest. Likewise, HSMs in the “leave early”condition will take the shortest amount of time.LSMs in the “do not leave” condition will takethe second longest time, followed by LSMs inthe “leave early” condition.

PRESSURE, SELF-MONITORING AND CONFORMITYDiscussionAs previously discussed, if thehypotheses of this study are significantlysupported, HSMs will take the longest amountof time to complete the test in the “do not leave”condition and take the shortest amount of timein the “leave early” condition. There arecertainly implications that this study has on reallife if the hypotheses were supported. One isthat the structure of tests and exams could belooked into further. For example, students whoare influenced by the behaviour of others mayfeel anxious and pressured to hand in their testwhen they see others doing so. Perhaps puttingtime limits on when students are allowed tohand in their exams could be used to reduce thisfeeling of pressure. Another implication is howlarge a role one’s level of SM plays in thatindividual’s social life. People who are high orlow in SM act in different ways in varying typesof social situations. This is beneficial for peopleto know about themselves and friends whenmaking social decisions, such as groups offriends. It would be especially helpful ifindividuals knew their levels of SM to knowhow to behave, cues to take, etc.This study also contains a number oflimitations. First, participants’ math abilitiescould be a confounding variable. A participantwho is not as proficient in math as anotherparticipant may take longer to complete the testfor that reason. It is also possible that he or shewould give up faster and hand in the test morequickly. Another limitation is that themanipulation to induce conformity might not bestrong enough. The confederates who left earlymay not have left early enough to inducesufficient conformity.When looking ahead to future research,there are a couple of aspects to consider. First,future research should look at other personalityvariables that may influence conformity (i.e.self-esteem) in a test taking situation.Furthermore, varying the number ofconfederates used as well as the number ofquestions on the test could affect conformity, sothis should be investigated as well. Finally,future research could also attempt to replicatethe findings of Snyder et al. (1983) bymanipulating the similarity of other test takers tosee how HSMs and LSMs behave in comparisonto similar and non-similar others (see Pivik,2010; Santee & Maslach, 1982).First Received: 1/14/2013Final Revision Received: 4/28/2013

PRESSURE, SELF-MONITORING AND CONFORMITYReferencesAsch, S. E. (1956). Studies of independence andconformity: I. A minority of one againsta unanimous majority. PsychologicalMonographs: General and Applied,70(9), 1-70.Bond, R., & Smith, P. B. (1996). Culture andconformity: A meta-analysis of studiesusing Asch’s (1952b, 1956) linejudgment task. Psychological Bulletin,119(1), 111-137.Briggs, S. R., Cheek, J. M., & Buss, A. H.(1980). An analysis of the Self-Monitoring Scale. Journal of Personalityand Social Psychology, 38, 679-686.Klein, O., Snyder, M., & Livingston, R. W.(2004). Prejudice on the stage: Selfmonitoringand the public expression ofgroup attitudes. British Journal of SocialPsychology, 43(2), 299-314.Larsen, K. S., Reed, M., & Hoffman, S. (1980).Attitudes of heterosexuals towardhomosexuality: A Likert-type scale andconstruct validity. Journal of SexResearch, 16, 245-257.Pivik, K. (2010). The influence of moralisticand egoistic biases on conformity.ProQuest Dissertation and Theses, 1-82.Santee, R. T., & Maslach, C. (1982). To agreeor not to agree: Personal dissent andsocial pressure to conform. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology,42(4), 690-700.Snyder, M. (1974). Self-monitoring ofexpressive behavior. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 30,526-537.Snyder, M., & Gangestad, S. (1986). On thenature of self-monitoring: Matters ofassessment, matters of validity. Journalof Personality and Social Psychology,51(1), 125-139.Snyder, M., Gangestad, S., & Simpson, J. A.(1983). Choosing friends as activitypartners: The role of self-monitoring.Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology, 45(5), 1061-1072.

PRESSURE, SELF-MONITORING AND CONFORMITYAppendix16Participant's Leave Time (mins)1412108642LSMsHSMs0EarlyConfederate's Leave TimeDo Not LeaveFigure 1. Expected time it will take for participants to hand in test paper as a function of time it takes forconfederates to leave the room and level of participants’ self-monitoring.

© 2013 WUPJ, September 2013, Volume 1 SocialReligiosity and its Relationship to Organ Donation AcceptabilityPavlina Faltynek*The purpose of this study was to examine if religiosity is a significant predictor oforgan donation acceptability. Specifically, to examine if religiosity is negativelycorrelated with organ donation acceptability. Furthermore it was predicted that thiscorrelation would be stronger for men compared to women. The participants of thisstudy included 18 males and 22 females for a total of 40 undergraduate studentsfrom The University of Western Ontario. Participants were given two surveyswhich measured religiosity and organ donation acceptability. As predicted, findingsfrom this study demonstrated that religiosity was negatively related to organdonation acceptability. In addition, sex moderated the relationship betweenreligiosity and organ donation acceptability. Specifically the negative relationoccurred for men but not for women. In conclusion, the hypotheses for this studywere supported. The results of the study support the need to educate religiouscommunities on organ donation with the hopes of maximizing underrepresenteddemographics in organ donor pools.Organ donation has revolutionized thehealth care field and has allowed many peopleto survive life-threatening illnesses andaccidents. However, many obstacles still remainin the fight to gain donors. Previous research hasshown that those who maintain religious viewsare less likely to become organ donors thanthose who do not (Lam & McCullough, 2000).The present study extended this line of researchby examining the relationship betweenacceptability of organ donation and strength ofreligious views when religiosity is treated as aspectrum in which people vary. Furthermore,this paper also examined whether or not therewere gender differences present in thisrelationship. This topic is of importance becausenational organ donor laws are highly specifiedand thus many willing candidates are eliminatedthrough a rigorous screening process. Withmany willing people being disqualified, it is ofthe utmost importance to maximize donor pools,such as underrepresented minority donors, astheir demand is remarkably disproportionate totheir availability (Salim, Schulman, Ley, Berry,Navarro & Chan, 2010). Determining theunderlying motivations for becoming, or moreimportantly not becoming a donor, is the firststep in reaching these demographics to helpprevent many unnecessary deaths.Canada’s vast multiculturalism is notproportionately reflected in its donor pools.Certain ethnicities are underrepresented thuslowering the chance of finding a suitable matchfor someone in need (Salim et al., 2010).Previous research has looked at how specificethnic groups feel towards organ donation. Lamand McCullough (2000) looked specifically atChinese-American religious groups andconcluded that this minority was reluctant todonate their organs, with only 23% ofparticipants willing to donate their organs, andout of these individuals, just 4.9% currentlycarrying organ donor cards. Furthermore, theyfound that people are more flexible in theirdonation views if they are donating to familymembers (95.9% said yes) versus to strangers(45.9% said yes), showing that there is someflexibility to people’s beliefs about organdonation. Furthermore, this study found ageneral trend with religious beliefs correlatingwith reluctance to donate organs. However,reluctance was specifically related to the strongConfucian beliefs held by the participants.Confucianism is a system of ethics andphilosophy that is based on the teaching of the*Initially submitted for Psychology 3892G at the University of Western Ontario. The author would like tospecially thank Dr. David Bell for his tremendous help throughout her project. For inquiries regarding the article,please email the author at pfaltyne@uwo.ca.

RELIGIOSITY AND ORGAN DONATION VIEWSChinese philosopher Confucius. One belief ofConfucianism is that upon death returning one’sbody in its original state is an important sign ofrespect to your ancestors. This view was cited asone of the strongest deterrents from organdonation by this ethnic minority (Lam &McCullough 2000). However, genderdifferences were not examined in this study sono predictions about gender can be made fromthis data.Similar beliefs are found in HispanicAmericans, another minority in the UnitedStates. Through random voluntary telephoneinterviews, Salin et al. (2010) found that themajor concerns this population had regardingorgan donation were: lack of knowledge,language barriers, religious conflicts, andmisconceptions about organ allocation.Furthermore, these researchers found that thosewho named religious concerns as a reason fornot becoming an organ donor were least likelyof all participants to donate their organs. Thissuggests that religious views have a stronginfluence on people’s willingness to donate theirorgans. However it is important to note that inthis study the sample only consisted of thosewho were of low socioeconomic status (SES).Low SES is often correlated with less education.Individuals with less education may rely moreheavily on their religious beliefs to guide theirdecisions. Thus, the authors suggested it is notreligion itself per se that cautions people againstorgan donation, but that their perception of theirbelief system to include a belief against organdonation, when in reality, no well-establishedreligion openly condemns organ donations.Thus the authors argued that these wrongly heldbeliefs can be corrected by improving education.This area could to be further examined bydetermining if strength of religious views affectstheir decisions as well, because as Lam andMcCullough (2000) found, there is a broadrange of opinions when it comes to theacceptability of donating organs and religiosity.One third of America’s population isestimated to be Hispanic by the end of thecentury. This population has increased in theirrepresentation on the organ donor waiting list by260% in the last ten years (Salim et al. 2010).This level of rapid growth demands that moreresearch be compiled to maximize the donorpool for minority groups. Because educationinterventions are relatively cost-effective, andHispanic-American’s concerns regarding organdonation are very broad, it is important to tacklethe concerns that can be easily surmounted byeducation, such as by informing people aboutthe realities of organ donation surgery, includingaccommodation for burial and ritual services.To continue, both views on organdonation in general and the relationship betweenreligion and organ donation may not be similaracross genders. It is important to understandwhether or not there are gender differences inorder to effectively target individuals who maybenefit from educational intervention. An articlewritten by a group of practicing physicians inthe United Kingdom provides some insight intopossible gender differences. Oliver, Woywodt,Ahmed and Saif (2011) examined the modernformal views on organ donation of individualsfrom multiple religions. This inquiry wasinspired by a female patient who was up forannual review on the renal transplant waitinglist. She was of Muslim faith and, although shecould have received a kidney from one of themembers of her family, she was on the waitinglist because the family refused believing thatorgan donation is not condoned by Islam. Sheherself was comfortable with organ donation butwas ignorant of Islam’s formal view on thesubject. These authors found that no religionspecifically prohibits organ donation; in fact,many of them see it as an act of great value.Furthermore, the physicians specifically statethat in 1996 a religious ruling was passed by theUK Muslim Law Council that “organtransplantation is entirely in keeping withIslam.” (Oliver et al., 2011 p.438). However,21% of doctors in Turkey listed patient’sreligious concerns as a reason for why theyweren’t more proactive about organ donationwith their patients. This is consistent withprevious research (e.g., Lam & McCullough,2000) which has found that religious beliefs canact as a deterrent when it comes to organdonation. Although it was concluded thatdonation is acceptable in Islam, this case study

RELIGIOSITY AND ORGAN DONATION VIEWSreflects how both differential interpretation ofreligious scripts and gender may influencepeople’s beliefs on the subject. It should benoted that the members of the young woman’sfamily were not identified by gender or nameand therefore the role of gender in organdonation beliefs cannot be determined.In an another study concerning Muslimviews on organ donation, Gatrad (1994)examined the specific burial and peri-mortemrequirements for those of the Muslim faith, andhow organ donation may make burial moredifficult for them as opposed to a non-Muslimindividual. Primarily, Muslims prefer to die intheir own homes, which immediately conflictswith donor interests because after death organsneed to be harvested as soon as possible(Gatrad, 1994). Furthermore, in the Muslimfaith, the human body is believed to have neverbelonged to the individual in the first place. Thebody is sacred and belongs to God himself, sopost-mortem examinations are not allowedunless required by a national law. Also, it is areligious requirement that the burial takes placeas soon as possible after death. Finally, as amark of respect, immediate family membersmay not eat until after the funeral has takenplace (Gatrad, 1994). There are also manyprotocols when it comes to preparing the bodyfor burial and rituals after death, all of whichpeople might fear would be compromised byorgan harvesting procedures. Furthermore, it isimportant to note that all of these practices areopen to a reasonable amount of interpretation.Nonetheless, a similar ruling passed by theIslamic School of Jurisprudence in Egypt alsostated that organ donation is condoned by Islam,however only if all the following conditions aremet: the only treatment option left is an organtransplant, chance of transplant success is high,the consent of the donor has been given or oncedeath is overseen by a reputable Muslim doctorconsent has been given by next of kin, organsaccepted from a non-Muslim are only usedwhen a Muslim’s organs are not available, andthat the recipient is informed of all potentialrisks associated with receiving an organtransplant (Gatrad, 1994). The Islamic School ofJurisprudence ruled that if something was forthe benefit of mankind then “necessity allowswhat is prohibited” (Ebrahim & Haffejee, 1989).This review of Muslim customs specificallyshows how “death” can lead to manycomplications in a religious community, andthat something as new as organ donation may bedifficult to integrate into religious communitiesthat have been guided by scriptures that werewritten long before organ donation was even aconcept, let alone an option. Thus, with a betterunderstanding of the influence religion has onorgan donation decisions, the medicalcommunity will be better positioned to discussthis topic with patients.As discussed, religious beliefs have beenfound to be correlated with donation views;however, the strength of this relationship has notbeen examined with religiosity and donationbeliefs placed on a continuum. Furthermore,whether this relationship can be moderated bygender has not been examined. It is important tonote that independent studies have foundnegative correlations between holding religiousbeliefs and willingness to donate organs across awide range of cultures (e.g., Oliver et al. 2011).That is, although each ethnicity has a differentbelief system, they all show a negativecorrelation, which suggests that there issomething innate about religion which cautionspeople against organ donation. Thus the presentstudy hypothesizes a negative correlationbetween religiosity and organ donationacceptability. Religiosity was defined asstrength of religious views and commitment toreligious practices. The second hypothesis statesthat the strength of this relationship will begreater for men than women. The predictorvariables are religiosity and sex, whereas thecriterion variable is organ donationacceptability. The explanation behind ourhypothesis is that as religiosity increases peopleare more likely to hold more weight on theminor aspects of scriptures that deal with bodypreservation and post mortem integrity.Subsequently these views will be believed to beless flexible, leading to greater apprehensionsabout organ donation.

RELIGIOSITY AND ORGAN DONATION VIEWSMethodParticipantsThe participants for this study consistedof 18 males and 22 females for a total of 40participants, with an age range of 18 to 29 yearsold. Mean age was found to be M = 21.15, SD =2.24. All participants used were undergraduateuniversity students from King’s UniversityCollege. There were no restrictions on religiousaffiliation or background for the purpose of thisstudy.MaterialsTwo surveys were created for thepurpose of this study: the first asks questionsabout a person’s comfort level with organdonation, the second asks questions specificallyabout strength of spiritual beliefs andimportance of religious practices. To create thequestionnaire on organ donation acceptabilitysix questions were taken from the “Examinationof organ-donation comfort level from the socialdistance perspective” and “Religious andspiritual objections to organ donation”questionnaire by Lam and McCullough (2000).Questions from Lam and McCullough are 1, 4,5, 8, 10 and 11. The remainder (2, 3, 6, 7 and 9)were created specifically for this study by theresearcher based on previous research. Tomeasure the strength of spiritual beliefs andimportance of religious practices, all questionswere taken from the Brief MultidimensionalMeasure of Religiousness/Spirituality (Masters,Carey, Maisto, Caldwell, Wolfe & Hackney,2009). A copy of the two part survey can befound in the Appendix. Participants respondedto the survey using a 5-point scale with someitems reverse coded.ProcedureParticipants were approached in thelibrary or cafeteria and asked to complete thesurvey. Participants who agreed were providedwith information about the survey and signedthe consent form. There was an unlimitedamount of time given to complete the survey.Surveys were given out to approximately equalnumbers of men and women. Upon completionof the survey, participants were thanked for theirparticipation and debriefed.ResultsA regression analysis was conductedwith religiosity as the predictor variable andorgan donation acceptability as the criterionvariable. Religiosity (β = -.34, p = .032) was asignificant predictor of organ donationacceptability. In other words, greater religiositypredicted less favorable attitudes toward organdonation.A second regression analysis wasconducted with sex as the predictor variable andorgan donation acceptability as the criterionvariable. Sex (β = .38, p = .016) was asignificant predictor of organ donationacceptability. Specifically, females held morefavorable attitudes toward organ donationcompared to men.A third regression analysis wasconducted with both religiosity and sex aspredictor variables and organ donationacceptability as the criterion variable. Bothreligiosity (β = -.40, p =.007) and sex (β =.43, p=.003) were significant predictors of organdonation acceptability. In other words, both areindependent predictors of organ donationacceptability.To test for moderation an interactionterm was created by multiplying religiosity andsex. A regression analysis was conducted withreligiosity, sex, and the interaction term aspredictor variables and organ donationacceptability as the criterion variable. The betafor the interaction term was significant (β =1.90, p = .007) which indicates that sexmoderated the relation between religiosity andorgan donation acceptability. To examine thismoderation, two further regressions wereconducted.Using the sample of men, a regressionwas conducted with religiosity as the predictorvariable and organ donation acceptability as thecriterion variable. Religiosity (β = -.67, p =.002)was a significant predictor of organ donationacceptability. A similar regression analysis wasconducted with the female participants, whichrevealed that religiosity (β = -.33, p = .136) was

RELIGIOSITY AND ORGAN DONATION VIEWSnot a significant predictor of organ donationacceptability. Therefore, it can be assumed thatfor the initial regression analysis which used allof the participants, the significance of theregression can be accounted for by the maleparticipants.DiscussionThe first hypothesis of the present studywas that religiosity would significantly predictpeople’s organ donation views. The secondhypothesis was that this relationship would bestronger for men than for women. Bothhypotheses were supported. A person’s level ofreligiosity was found to be negatively correlatedto their views on organ donation acceptability.Furthermore as predicted, men were affectedmore by this relationship than women. In fact,there was no significant relationship betweenreligiosity and organ donation views with thefemale participants. A potential reason behindthe lack of relationship in women could beexplained by women’s natural maternalinstincts. Since their bodies at some point (ifthey have children) will in a way belong tosomeone else for nine months, after death theymay be more comfortable with donating theirorgans to someone else. Also in religiouscultures that are patriarchal, it may be that menhold themselves to a more rigorousinterpretation of scriptures, specifically thosethat apply to complete body integrity after death(Stopler, 2008). Both of these explanations areplausible because both sex and religiosityindependently predicted organ donationacceptability.In light of the medical ‘miracle’ of organdonation, the UK Organ Donation Taskforceconducted a study involving one-on-oneinterviews with faith leaders from the UnitedKingdom in order to better understand how amodern concept can meld with religious beliefs.David Katz, Board of Deputies of British Jews,stated that for Judaism “There is no particularJewish position on receiving organs”(Randhawa, Brocklehurst, Pateman, Kinsella &Parry, 2010 p. 142). The Hindu faith leader whowas interviewed however had a very straightforwardresponse. Dr. Raj Pandit Sharma of theHindu Priest Association (UK) and HinduCouncil (UK) stated that donation (alsointerpreted as selfless giving) is third on the listof virtuous acts in sacred Hindu scripture, andthat organ donation is strongly supported by hiscommunity (Randhawa et al. 2010). The generalview for Christianity and Catholicism is thatorgan donation is acceptable. However it isambiguously neither condemned nor openlysupported. Furthermore, Christian and Catholicleaders task it upon the individual to come totheir own conclusions about the subject. Thefindings of the present study are in line withthis. Specifically, how degree of religiositypredicts people’s perception of organ donationacceptability. That is, highly religiousindividuals may interpret scriptures in a strictermanner, thus increasing their caution aboutorgan donation.Similarly, differences in theinterpretation of religious texts could accountfor the gender differences found in the presentstudy, because although men and womensubscribe to the same religions there aresignificant differences in their views on organdonation. Specifically, men and women mayplace differential value on ideals. Furthermore,because there are no direct references to organdonation in original religious texts, it is hard totake one leader’s opinion and extrapolate it to anentire religious community. With this in mind, itis important to educate individuals who viewthemselves as religious on differential meaningsof scriptures.Furthermore, research has shown thatconcerns about post mortem body integritycause serious apprehension towards organdonation in religious individuals. This followsclosely with the proposed theory that those whoare higher in religiosity are more likely to holdstrongly to all aspects of scripture, specificallythose related to death and care of the body.However, the finding that religiosity is not asignificant predictor of organ donationacceptability for women requires furtherexploration.Another complication that exists in therealm of organ donations is the definition ofdeath, or the point at which an individual is

RELIGIOSITY AND ORGAN DONATION VIEWSconsidered dead. Death can be defined as a lackof neural activity or irregular or no heartbeat,and the advancements of modern medicine onlyexacerbate the issues of what death is definedas. As previously examined, many differentcultures like Islam have specific guidelinessurrounding death (Gatrad, 1994). A legitimateconcern is that many organs could be leftunusable while waiting for what is termed wholebrain, and unambiguous death.A final study worth mentioning exploredthe concept of organ donation in Malaysia, amulticultural society. Malaysia has seriousproblems with illegal organ trafficking as theneed for organ donation surpasses the supply.Organ transplant surgeries have only beenperformed actively in Malaysia since 1997(Zurani, Robson, Razack & Dublin, 2010).Therefore there is a particularly high call foreducation about many of the logistics involvedin organ donation in Malaysia. Current issuesfacing people of areas like Malaysia are: whowill get priority, can you allocate your organs,and will people be able to purchase organs fromothers. We think many of these issues have beenresolved in areas like Canada because we havelong standing medical communities. However,research suggests that despite establishedmedical communities in developed countries,such as the United States and Canada, manysimilar issues remain (Salim et al., 2010).The practical implications of thesefindings, along with previous research, showthat with the right compassionate educationmany donor demographics can be capitalized onto increase the chances of someone in needfinding the most appropriate match.A few limitations of the present studywarrant attention. Participants were not askedto identify which religion they subscribe to orwhether or not both of their parents are of thesame religion in this study. Therefore, specificreligious influences could not be examined. Asecond limitation is the correlational nature ofthe study which precludes making inferencesabout a causal relationship as temporalprecedence has not been established.Furthermore this study was conducted solely onundergraduate students and therefore the sampleis not representative of a larger community.Thus future research should examine views onorgan donation acceptability within differentreligions, while controlling for religiousinfluences such as parents, communities andlocation.In conclusion, it was found thatreligiosity is a significant predictor of organdonation acceptability and that this relationshipcould be moderated by gender, with womenbeing less affected by this correlation than men.First Received: 5/3/2013Final Revision Received: 6/30/2013

RELIGIOSITY AND ORGAN DONATION VIEWSReferencesEbrahim, A.M. & Haffejee, A.A. (1989) TheShari’ah and organ transplant.Johannesburg: Islamic MedicalAssociation of South Africa.Gatrad, A.R. (1994) Muslim customssurrounding death, bereavement, postmortemexaminations, and organtransplants. British Medical Journal,309, 521-523.Lam, WA. & McCullough, L.B. (2000)Influence of religious and spiritualvalues on the willingness of Chinese-Americans to donate organs fortransplantation. Clinical Transplant, 14,449-456.Masters, K., Carey, K., Maisto, S., Caldwell, P.,Wolfe, T. & Hackney, H. (2009)Psychometric examination of the BriefMultidimensional Measure ofReligiousness/Spirituality AmongCollege Students. The InternationalJournal for the Psychology of Religion,19, 106-120.Oliver, M., Woywodt, A., Ahmed, A. and Saif,A. (2011) Organ donation,transplantation and religion. NephrolDialysis Transplant, 26, 437-444.Randhawa, G., Brocklehurst, A., Pateman, R.,Kinsella, S. & Parry, V. (2010) Faithleaders united in their support for organdonation: Findings from the UK organdonation taskforce study. EuropeanSociety for Organ Transplantation, 23,140-146.Salim, A., Schulman, D., Ley, E., Berry, C.,Navarro, S. & Chan, L. (2010)Contributing factors for the willingnessto donate organs in the HispanicAmerican population. Arch Surgical,145, 684-689.Stopler, G. (2008) “Rank usurpation of power”-the role of patriarchal religion andculture in the subordination of women.Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy,15, 365-397.Zurani, N., Robson, H., Razack, A.H. & Dublin,N. (2010) Organ transplants: ethical,social, and religious issues in amulticultural society. Asia-PacificJournal of Public Health, 22, 271-278.

RELIGIOSITY AND ORGAN DONATION VIEWSAppendixParticipant Survey Male Female Age________For the following questions please rate how strongly you agree or disagree for each question (1-stronglydisagree and 5-strongly agree)If a distant relative of mine, such as my great aunt 1 2 3 4 5needed an organ transplant to live, I would have myorgans donated after my death if I knew they would go to her.I have no problem donating my organs after death 1 2 3 4 5regardless of who they go toI don’t support organ donation, many of the people who 1 2 3 4 5need organs have made choices that have led them toneed transplantsI would donate my organs to a stranger only if their life 1 2 3 4 5depended on itIf an immediate family member of mine, such as my1 2 3 4 5brother, needed an organ transplant to live I would havemy organs donated after death if I knew they would go to himI support organ donation but don’t believe it is the 1 2 3 4 5right choice for meI’m only comfortable donating my organs if they 1 2 3 4 5are going to someone I knowTaking organs from a person who has just died will 1 2 3 4 5still cause him great pain and disturb his dying processbefore he is born againOrgan donation is a wonderful thing that one human 1 2 3 4 5being can do for another human beingI would donate my organs after my death if I knew they 1 2 3 4 5would go to someone from my home country whose lifedepended on itIt is wrong to donate the organs of a person who has just 1 2 3 4 5died because the person will be incomplete at death

RELIGIOSITY AND ORGAN DONATION VIEWSParticipant SurveyMale Female Age_______For the following survey please rate how strongly you agree or disagree for each question (1-stronglydisagree/never and 5- strongly agree/frequently)Within your religious or spiritual beliefs how often do you 1 2 3 4 5meditate/pray?I try hard to carry my religious beliefs over into all my 1 2 3 4 5other dealings in lifeI try to make sense of the situation and decide what to do 1 2 3 4 5without relying on GodI desire to be closer to or in union with God 1 2 3 4 5How often do you read sacred religious texts (e.g. Bible, 1 2 3 4 5Torah, Koran etc.)I feel God’s love for me, directly or through others 1 2 3 4 5Besides religious services, how often do you take part in 1 2 3 4 5other activities of a religious nature?I feel a deep sense of responsibility for reducing the pain 1 2 3 4 5and suffering in the worldBecause of my religious or spiritual beliefs I have forgiven 1 2 3 4 5those who hurt meHow often are prayers or grace said before or after meals 1 2 3 4 5in your home?I look to God for strength, support and guidance 1 2 3 4 5I wonder whether God has abandoned me 1 2 3 4 5

© 2013 WUPJ, September 2013, Volume 1 SocialMirror Neuron System and Social Cognition: Understanding Others by EmbodimentGrace S. Ki*The theory of embodied cognition states that embodied cognition is the process ofthe motor system and the body influencing the mind: playing a role in knowledgeacquisition, understanding, and emotions, just as the mind influences the body. Thispaper provides an introduction to the theory of embodied cognition by examiningthe development of the theory, how concept formation may be enabled by embodiedcognition, and introduce the neural mechanism suggested to be responsible forembodied cognition. This paper also explores the role of embodiment in emotions,how embodied cognition may enable first person perspective, and whetherembodied cognition is inherent or acquired. Further on, this paper will showcasehow embodied cognition may enable intention understanding, the influence of loveon embodied understanding, and whether embodied cognition can be used tounderstand those strikingly different from self.Embodied cognition is the cognition thatis deeply rooted in the visceral body states andsensory experiences. Some researchers claimthat embodied cognition is not our onlycognition, but it is the only affective cognitionand thus serves as our main cognition (Zajonc,1980). Many researchers found that affects,judgment formation, and even social cognitionmay be based on bodily sensations. Damasioand Damasio (2006) proposed thatunderstanding the physical states of our bodyenables understanding of ourselves and thisunderstanding can even be extended to others.They suggested that this is extension is possiblebecause we are all humans who share a similarbody and a similar governing neural network,living in relatively similar environments.Recently, various researchers focused onfinding the neural mechanism that underliesembodiment. A network of neurons wasdiscovered where the same neurons respondedboth when the subject executed a specific actionand when the subject observed someone elseperforming the same action (Rizollati &Sinigaglia, 2010). This network was named themirror neuron system (MNS). The mirrorneuron system is the proposed neuralmechanism that matches representations ofobserved actions with the observer’s catalogueof actions, as the same neurons fire both whendoing an action and when observing the sameaction performed by another person. Rizollatiand Sinigaglia (2010) proposed that thismatching process leads to understanding theactions and intentions of the actor.In this review paper, we will look atwhat embodiment cognition is and explore indetail the most recent model, the mirror neuronsystem. We will also showcase embodiment atwork in various social settings, observing howembodied cognition enables communicationwith others. We will first review evidence ofsocial cognition in early childhood viaembodiment and the importance of intentions.Then, we will examine the proposed theory isthat embodied cognition is at work even whenwe interact with strangers, but the effect isstrongest when we have a strong personalconnection with the other, such as in a romanticrelationship. That is, there are research findingsthat suggest that understanding of othersthrough embodied cognition can only be fullyutilized when we can mentally recognize themto be similar enough to ourselves. Thus we willalso examine how we may sometimes opt outfrom using embodied cognition and employ asecondary cognition when we interact withthose we judge to be significantly dissimilarfrom ourselves.*Initially submitted for Psychology 4999G at the University of Western Ontario. For inquiries regarding thearticle, please email the author at gracesujungki@gmail.com.

UNDERSTANDING OTHERS BY EMBODIMENTEmbodied Cognition and Concept FormationMany modern psychologists believethere are two major types of cognition, each fora different purpose: one that is strictlyinformation processing and another that isembodied. Embodied cognition is more rapidthan the information processing cognition. Onthe other hand, information processingcognition, though slower in processing speed,may have developed later in evolution forsituations that require more elaborate analysisand thus serve an important purpose (Damasio& Damasio, 2006). Miller and Johnson-Laird(1976) remarked that this more recent systemcan assemble information, process it and laterrecall it, but it is limited because it isdispassionate, with no emotional component.However, social interactions are ladled withemotions and require fast and continualresponses, so we rely most heavily on embodiedcognition as our main social cognition. Thus thisis why information processing cognition wasoften referred to as “cold” cognition−because itwas without affect−and in contrast, embodiedcognition was often referred to as “hot”cognition−as it was a cognition with affect(Zajonc, 1980).Zajonc (1980) suggested that prior toinformation processing and inference forming,our body already influenced us to formpreferences in our minds on the stimulus we areinteracting with. Along the same line, Keenanand Bailett (1979) argued that the crucial factorin our memory of a stimulus is not the wealth ofinformation we have, but our affect towards it.Thus, embodied cognition, which is ourcognition with imbedded emotions, may also bethe foundation of our concept formation, whichis the basis of how we judge others. A conceptformation process, called scaffolding, is aprocess through which humans readily integrateincoming information with extant knowledgestructures (Williams, Huang, and Bargh, 2009).Williams et al. (2009) argued that the primaryfoundation of knowledge is bodily sensation andthus concept formation must be primarily basedon bodily sensations. They emphasized thatscaffolding is a general practice in humancognition, but it is most significant duringfunctional interactions with others and theenvironment (Williams et al., 2009). Theseresearchers agree with Zajonc (1980) in thathow we perceive the world is based on our bodyand what our body gives preference to usuallyhas evolutionary survival value. Asch (1946)was able to provide experimental evidence ofhow concept formation and judgment formationmay be based on bodily sensations. In hisexperiments, Asch found that participants’judgment of a person changed dramaticallydepending on whether the person was describedto be “warm” or “cold”, which are wordsdescribing bodily sensations. More specifically,when all the other details were the same andambiguously described, participantsinstantaneously favoured a “warm” person overa “cold” person.We may have associated warmth withgood characteristics because as infants, we hadthe experience of being held by our mothers andcaregivers who first gave us the sense of warmthin combination with characteristics such ascaring and kindness that improve our wellbeing.So, we associate warmth withcharacteristics that are beneficial to us. We areable to form black or white judgements even inambiguous circumstances due to embodiedcognition. Embodied cognition enables suchconcept formation and judgment formationbased on our sensory information withoutrequiring the effort from our prefrontal cortex tomanually assess different situations. What,then, is the neural mechanism that enables thisprocess?Mirror Neuron System: Encoding of Goalsand IntentionsThrough single-neuron recording,researchers found a group of neurons that firedboth when the monkey performed a motor actand when the monkey only observed someoneelse performing the same motor act (Rizrolatti,Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001). The exact sameneurons fired in both occasions. Since theseneurons were activated by the observation ofaction, as if mirroring them, they were named“mirror neurons” the network of these neuronswas called mirror neuron system (Rizzolatti &

UNDERSTANDING OTHERS BY EMBODIMENTSinigaglia, 2010). Mirror neurons were firstfound in area F5 in the ventral pre-motor cortexof macaque monkeys (Rizrolatti, Fogassi, &Gallese, 2001). The findings with the primatesubjects were soon replicated with humansubjects. Prather et al. (2008) were the first toestablish the evidence of mirror neurons in nonprimates,providing empirical evidence ofgroups of neurons that responded in a strikinglysimilar way as the mirror neurons in themacaque money brain.Research in the brains of macaquemonkey subjects are done with single neuronrecording – where a single neuron is stimulatedand the effect is observed, or the effect of anobservation is measured as the response or firingfrom the single neuron. However, single neuronrecording requires open brain surgery, thussingle neuron recording is usually not possiblewith human subjects due to ethical reasons.Instead, many researchers used fMRI in researchwith human subjects, measuring the bloodoxygen level-dependent (BOLD) signals whilethey observed another person performingspecific actions. Certain brain areas wereactivated during this action-observation processand these areas share significant overlaps withthe MNS (Grafton, 2009).Figure 1. Mirror neuron activation in humaninferior parietal cortex.It is notable that mirror neurons werefound in humans in the human inferior parietalcortex (Chong, Cunnington, Williams,Kanwisher, & Mattingley, 2008). The parietalcortex is actually known for constructing mapsof physical space that are egocentric(Yamakawa, Kanai, Matsumura, & Naito,2009). Neggers, Van der Lubbe, Ramsey, andPostma (2006) found that the parietal cortex wasonly activated when a subject made a spacialjudgement of two stimuli relative to them. Theseevidences suggest that how we perceive the selfand others is rooted in our concept of physicalspace. Using a more anecdotal example,physical distance is even linguistically used todescribe relationships in terms of socialdistance, with terms such as “close friends” and“growing apart”. In addition to the parietalcortex, the human mirror neuron system (MNS)also includes the caudal sector (pars opercularis)of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), the premotorcortex, and other neural areas, but we currentlyhave the most empirical data of mirror neuronsin the parietal cortex (Gallese et al., 2004).Figure 2. fMRI of BOLD activities in mirrorneuron system areaThese areas include the bilateral posteriorsuperior temporal sulcus (STS), inferior parietallobule (IPL), dorsal premotor cortex and ventralpremotor cortex (Grafton, 2009). Many of theseareas that were activated during observation areactually areas of motor execution. The inferiorparietal lobule was where the mirror neuronswere first found, responding both to action andobservation of action. Also, the premotorcortex, which was previously thought to besolely for motor execution, was found to beinvolved in action observation as well (Grafton,2009). The mirror mechanism, centrally locatedin the inferior parietal lobule, appeared to givethe observer’s premotor cortex the sensation ofactually performing the actions in a first personperspective.Not only that, the mirror neurons wereremarkable in that they only fired when theobserved act was goal-oriented. A movement

UNDERSTANDING OTHERS BY EMBODIMENTthat is goal-oriented, such as grasping an object,is called a “motor act”, as opposed to an actionwithout an intention, which is called a simplemovement, even if the appearance of themovement may resemble a motor act such asclosing the thumb and fingers around the airwhen there is no object to grasp. The mirrorneurons in Figure 3 did not fire when the subjectobserved someone making a simple movementvery similar in appearance to a motor act such asgrasping, but without an actual object to grasp.This evidence supports the claim that monkeymirror neurons are able to distinguish between amotor act and a simple movement (Figure 3;Gallese, Keysers and Rizzolatti, 2004).(a)(b)Figure 3. Compilation of 10 trials of monkeyF5 neuron response during (a) action or (b)movement observation(a)(b)Figure 4. Monkey F5 neuron response across 10trials during (a) action or (b) movementobservation in hidden conditionThe same experiment shown in Figure 3 wasrepeated with the final action or movementpartially obscured from the monkey with ascreen (Figure 4). Even when the visualstimulus of the end result was hidden in Figure4, the mirror neurons in the monkey brain wereable to distinguish from the sequences prior tothe screen whether it was an action or amovement and responded only when theperceived motion was a goal-oriented actionwith intention.Not surprisingly, the human mirrorneuron system is even more sensitive than themonkey mirror neuron system at understandingthe meaning of observed actions and deducingintentions. The presence of a partially obscuredobject seemed to be necessary for the monkeymirror neuron system to understand theintention of the actor. However, the humanmirror neuron system was responsive even whenobserving intransitive actions and mimedactions without objects, provided that the mimedactions were not absent minded and were theresult of intentions (Gallese et al., 2004). Wecan extrapolate from the empirical evidence thatboth human and monkey mirror neurons do notfire during observation of movements whenthere are no goals or intentions encoded in themovements that the mirror neurons couldinternalize. But embodiment is not limited onlyto motor actions. Researchers found evidence ofembodiment in emotions and pain, which willbe discussed in the following section.Embodying Others’ Emotions: The InsularCortex and DisgustResearchers have found a system similarto the MNS in the insular cortex that enablesembodying emotions. The insular cortex ismore complex than the motor cortex. Whenmotor areas of the brain are stimulated,movements are produced in specific body parts.However, when the anterior insula is stimulated,not only are movements evoked, but there isalso a cascade of autonomic and viscera-motorresponses (Gallese et al., 2004). The insula is amap of the body similar to the motor cortex’shomunculus and it is the centre of viscera-motorintegration as well (Gallese et al., 2004). So, wefeel and physically experience the informationencoded by the insula. In many studies, theinsular cortex−left anterior insula inparticular−is associated with the emotion ofdisgust. Experiments were first conducted withmonkey brains, but the findings were laterconfirmed by the renowned neurosurgeon Dr.Penfield in a few rare cases of human brainstudy with patients undergoing neurosurgery.When Penfield and Faulk (1955)stimulated the patients’ anterior insula duringneurosurgery, the patients reported that they feltnauseous, which is a visceral sensation ofdisgust. Subsequent studies found that the insula

UNDERSTANDING OTHERS BY EMBODIMENTis linked to the cognitive processing of disgustand that it plays an important role in recognizingthe facial expression of disgust. Calder, Keane,Manes, Antoun, and Young (2000) reported thecase of patient NK who had damages in his leftinsula. NK was unable to fully experiencedisgust emotionally, could not read others’facial expressions of disgust, and could not evenrelate to sounds of disgust such as retching.Calder et al. (2000)’s research supports that theneural mechanism that relays the emotion ofdisgust is likely housed in the insula and that weuse this neural mechanism to embody howothers experience disgust, much like how weexperience disgust ourselves. Similar to theinsula, many brain areas directly connected fromsensory input may also be involved inevaluating motor and emotional informationwithout involving information processingcognition. It is reasonable to infer that we usethese neural networks to rapidly embody andunderstand others’ emotions in socialinteractions.So far, there has been a lot of researchfocused on the embodiment of the emotion ofdisgust, but it is not the only emotion we canembody. The embodiment theory suggests thatwe can embody all the emotions of others as we,too, are capable of those emotions. In fact, thevisual information that encoded the emotions ofothers was found to be stored directly in thesame viscera-motor neural structures andpathways that allow the observer to experiencethe same emotions (Gallese et al., 2004). Thisprocess occurred even when participants werejust imagining others’ emotions and thus it wasreasoned that imagination alone may beadequate to understand others’ emotions in afirst person perspective (Singer, Seymour,O'Doherty, Kaube, Dolan, & Frith, 2004).Further research is needed to investigateempirically how we embody various emotionsand which other brain areas are involved.Embodied Cognition: First-PersonPerspectiveWe have a wealth of information aboutourselves that our body continually maps andkeeps as a template. For situations similar toones previously experienced, the templatesallow us to respond appropriately by recallingand simulating the stored states rapidly withoutprocessing new sensorimotor or emotionalinformation every time (Damasio & Damasio,2006). So, when we embody others, we can pullup our own templates to understand others witha first-person perspective. In this way,embodiment can bridge the gap between selfand other to enable understanding. Gallese,Keysers and Rizzolatti (2004) linked actionobservation to emotion observation in socialcognition. They proposed that we do not justperceive an action or an emotion, but weinternalize representations of physical andneural states associated with it. That is, duringsocial cognition, the mirror neurons cause thevisual information we receive to be integratedinto our own experiences so that we experienceour observation as “first-person” and not as“third-person” (Gallese et al., 2004).Experiencing other’s actions in firstpersonwas found to be crucial to embodimentbecause effects of embodiment diminished whenwe perceive something with a third-personperspective. Gianelli et al. (2011) recently gaveevidence that when perspective was shifted fromreading a sentence in first person to third person,motor embodied mechanisms were prevented.Interestingly, motor embodied mechanisms werereengaged when there a virtual body−in theform of a circle−was introduced so that theparticipants could imagine themselves to be thesubject in the sentence, thereby taking a firstpersonperspective (Gianelli et al., 2011).Another recent study that used a dualelectroencephalogram (EEG) setup may havefound the neural rhythm underlying how we canunderstand others in first-person perspective.Evidence of two participants’ brainssynchronizing was found during simpleinteractions (Dumas, Nadel, Soussignan,Martinerie, & Garnero, 2010). Nine pairs ofparticipants did turn-taking while copying eachother’s simple hand motions. EEG recordingsof right centroparietal regions of the nine pairsshowed alpha-mu signal synchronization(Dumas et al., 2010). Alpha waves brainoscillations originating predominantly from the

UNDERSTANDING OTHERS BY EMBODIMENToccipital lobes, and thus related to vision, thatcan be detected during EEG recordings. Muwaves are a variant of alpha waves that appearover motor areas of the brain, thus related tomotor movements, and can also be detected byEEG. The alpha-mu wave synchronization maybe the explanation that bridges the gap in ourbrain between self and other. But how isembodied cognition activated in the first place?Many researchers have been focused on findingout the answer to this question, which will beexplored in the subsequent section.Activating Embodied CognitionIs embodied cognition inherent orlearned? There is an ongoing debate betweenresearchers who support both sides. This paperwill explore the arguments presented in bothsides starting with the premises that embodiedcognition−like language and many otherabilities−may be an inherent capacity that wasactivated and improved with learning. The firstlearning takes place between a parent and achild. A mother and her child share afundamental physiological connection throughthe cradle of life: the womb. This physiologicalconnection then expands into the first evermental connection for the fetus. As such, it isessential to have high quality interactionbetween the parent and their child in the earlystages of the child’s life.Shai and Belsky (2011) introduced theconcept of parent embodied mentalizing (PEM).PEM is the ability of a parent to useembodiment to implicitly understand thepreverbal child’s mental states from their wholebodymovement and the ability to use thisunderstanding to adjust parent’s own kinematicsto dynamically respond to the child’s needs.Sahi and Belsky (2011) stressed that relyingonly on head-centric kinesthetic communicationsuch as facial expressions are insufficient.Fraiberg (1979) found that mothers of blindinfants who only paid attention to facialexpressions noticed little emotional signallingand mistakenly judged their babies to be justbored. However, when these mothers weretrained to pay attention to whole-bodymovement, they were able to notice and identifythat their babies’ mental states were in factengaged. This finding supported that it isimportant to take the entire body into account inorder to fully embody and understand nonverbalcommunication.Tronick and Cohn (1989) observed thatparents with high PEM actually did notnecessarily automatically understand theirchildren’s needs, but they were successful inadjusting their interactive miscoordination,which established secure attachment in thechildren. Sahi and Belsky (2011) hypothesizedthat as the parent embodied their child’s mentalstates, the child understood that they havemental states that can be embodied. This childwould then have the confidence to communicatetheir mental states with others and respond toothers’ mental states in the same embodiedfashion.Meltzoff (2007) found that even a veryyoung child is able to understand other’s mindsby mapping the similarities and differencesbetween the self and the other via imitation. Ininfancy and early childhood, imitation functionsas a foundation for communication andunderstanding others (Meltzoff & Williamson,2010). Even newborns are capable of imitation.It was found in hospital settings that eveninfants who are just 42 minutes old can begin toimitate facial expressions and infants 12 to 21days old imitated adults’ facial expressions suchas tongue protrusion (Meltzoff and Moore,1989, 1997).As they grow older, infants get better atimitation and can even imitate after a period ofdelay from observation of the action. Meltzoff(1988) conducted an experiment where an adulttaught 14-month-olds an act, but allow them toonly observe the act and not imitate it. Whentested four months later, they were able toimitate the act, even when the adult whodemonstrated the act was passive and did notgive a template for them to copy. This showedthat the infants did not simply copy what theysaw, but a possible explanation is that theinfants have embodied that action duringobservation and stored it in their long termmemory. Thus, it appears that mirror neuronsystem underlying embodiment does not simply

UNDERSTANDING OTHERS BY EMBODIMENTcopy actions. Instead, the mirror neurons appearto store useful movements associated with theactions for later application.Importance of IntentionsWhen children are developmentallymature enough to understand intentions, they donot simply embody and imitate the actions theyobserved, but they actually infer the intendedaction and imitate the goal of the act, not theliteral sequence of movements (Marshall &Meltzoff, 2011). In one study, infants saw anadult struggling and failing to pull apart adumbbell-shaped object. When infants wereactually given that object, they did not copy theexact movements the adult actor used, but useda different method to successfully pull apart theobject (Marshall & Meltzoff, 2011). The infantsunderstood that the intention of the adult’saction was to pull apart the dumbbell-shapedobject and on the other hand, the strugglingprocess was only the adult’s attempt ataccomplishing the goal, that the strugglingmovements themselves were not intendedmotions. The infants’ ability to understandintentions in this experiment supports that we donot merely embody sequences of movementsothers make.Intentions are an essential part of socialcommunication. In a recent study, Gray (2012)found that participants who perceived thatothers had good intentions found more pleasurein receiving messages from them and evenreported that unpleasant situations such asexperiencing pain became more bearable. Whatis more interesting is that when good intentionswere perceived, they reported that food eventasted better. We can infer from the variousempirical findings that intentions are deeplyintegrated and enhance the understanding ofothers through embodied cognition.Influence of Love on EmbodiedUnderstandingThough embodied cognition may notnecessarily require learning, it is enhanced whenfamiliarity and love is present. When one fallsin love, their already well-functioning embodiedcognition machinery extends to include theirbeloved. This is even reflected in the languagecouples use. Those in a relationship use theword “we” significantly more to describethemselves compared to those not inrelationships, even if their partner is not therewith them (Ortigue et al., 2010). Due to thisextension of self that includes our partners,Ortigue et al. (2010) proposed that weunderstand the intentions of our partnerssignificantly better than that of strangers orfriends. For example, we notice first when ourbeloved is not feeling very well and weunderstand the meaning and intentions of ourbeloved’s incomplete sentences or utterancesthat makes little sense to others (Ortigue et al.2010).There is consistent evidence thatsupports that we understand our partner muchlike we understand ourselves because they areso integrated into our own body schemas. Weeven feel pain when our significant others are inpain. In a fascinating fMRI study, Singer et al.(2004) found that female participantsexperienced pain when they saw their partnerexperiencing pain. Researchers gave painfulelectrical stimulation to either the femaleparticipant or to their partner. The fMRI resultsshowed that the response in the brain to whenonly their partner was given pain stimulationwas actually similar to when they themselveswere given the pain stimulation (Ortigue et al.,2010). Thus, we can mentally experience ourbeloved’s pain as if it is our own. Niedenthal(2007), who also extensively studied embodiedcognition, described embodiment asunderstanding others’ actions by reexperiencingfirst-hand the perceptual, somatovisceral,and motor aspects of the acts. Thus, itappears that complete embodiment would occurwhen we lose the boundary in between self andother and experience what others experience.Ortigue et al. (2010) argued that this isbecause love primes embodiment. Theargument was based on the evidence that loveand embodiment are actually mediated by manyof the same brain areas (Ortigue et al., 2007).Some of these areas are the middle insula,superior parietal lobule, and the angular gyrus(Ortigue et al., 2007; Ortigue et al., 2010). The

UNDERSTANDING OTHERS BY EMBODIMENTinsula is related to embodiment of emotions andthe parietal lobule is covered by the parietalcortex where the mirror neurons are found. Theangular gyrus is activated when a person falls inlove, but it is also critical in integratinginformation that is about the self (Ortigue et al.,2010).Understanding and Empathising withDissimilar OthersIt was first proposed that we canunderstand others because we assumed that theyare much like us and we saw how we may betterunderstand those we know and love. However,how do we understand and empathize withothers who we judge to be different from us? Inan interesting study, Lam, Meltzoff, and Decety(2009) showed participants photographs ofpeople in two different groups and asked themto report feelings of empathy when the twogroups are described to experience pain. Thefirst group was described to have a medicalcondition unrelated to sensory functions, thusable to have sensory experiences just like theparticipants. The second group was described tohave a medical condition that distorted theirsensory experiences. The participants judged thesecond group to be dissimilar from them andthus could not use embodiment to understandthem. They ended up using informationprocessing to empathize that the pain that thesecond group must be feeling, but they failed tounderstand the second group’s pain in a firstperson perspective. The participants in thestudy reported more empathy for the first groupbecause they were able to internalize the painand feel it in a first person perspective.Nonetheless, the participants reported empathyfor the second group, but to a lesser degree.Nonetheless, embodied cognition is notthe only mechanism fundamental to understandthe kinematics of an action. In Lam et al.’s(2009) experiment, participants were able to usethis alternate, strictly information based,cognitive pathway to understand others sincethey were unable to actually relate to them usingtheir own past experiences. However, as Zajonc(1980) proposed, since the affective embodiedcognition is much stronger than the informationprocessing cognition, a significant differencewas still observed between empathising withothers who were perceived to be similar to selfand others who were perceived to be different.We could understand dissimilar others in theory,by processing the information we are given, butis not the same as feeling their pain as our own.We automatically rely on embodied cognition insocial interactions as it is our defaultmechanism. However, in cases where wesocially interact with those who we perceive tobe far too different from ourselves, we may needto override the default mechanism by using theinformation processing cognition.SummaryMost recent research supports the mirrorneuron system to be the neural network thatenables embodied cognition. And currentresearch findings suggest the parietal region ofthe brain to play a central role in the mirrorneuron system. The mirror neurons, neuronsthat fire in response to both actions andobservations, in the human brain were found inthe inferior parietal lobule and evidences ofinter-brain synchronization was found in theright centroparietal regions. The brain areas thatare activated during egocentric distancedetermination are in the parietal cortex and soare some of the brain areas activated during thefeeling of love.Embodied cognition is not our onlycognition, but it is certainly the most activecognition, especially during social interactions.We show signs of embodied cognition as infantsand it develops as we develop. We useembodied cognition to understand the actions,intentions and emotions of those who weperceive to be similar to us. Usually, thisincludes everyone, as we all have the sameneural network that governs a body living ingravitational field. However, when we perceivesomeone to be too different from ourselves orwhen we have a neural deficit that makes usunable to use embodied cognition, we can resortto the slower information processing cognition.

UNDERSTANDING OTHERS BY EMBODIMENTFuture DirectionsCurrently, neuroscience studiesinvolving brain scans are still very muchseparated from more studies that are moreoriented in the social psychology direction. Infuture research, a real time experiment on brainsynchronization during action and actionobservation with a variety of participants usingfMRI could prove to be an important source ofempirical support for the role of mirror neuronsin embodied cognition. It would be significantto look at mirror neuron activation of couples –those theoretically with a better understandingof one another – and compare that to mirrorneuron activation between strangers ordissimilar others. It would also be valuableevidence to study brain synchronization ofparent and child to monitor the role of mirrorneurons in connection between a child and theirmain caregiver, which may be one of the closestneural connections that can be found.First Received: 7/2/2013Final Revision Received: 9/12/2013ReferencesAsch, S. E. (1946). Forming impressions ofpersonality. Journal of Abnormal andSocial Psychology, 41, 258–290.Calder, A.J., Keane, J., Manes, F., Antoun, N.,& Young, A.W. (2000). Impairedrecognition and experience of disgustfollowing brain injury. NaturalNeuroscience, 3, 1077–1078.Chong, T.-J., Cunnington, R., Williams, M. A.,Kanwisher, N., & Mattingley, J. B.(2008). fMRI Adaptation Reveals MirrorNeurons in Human Inferior ParietalCortex. Current Biology, 18, 1576–1580.Damasio, A., & Damasio, H. (2006). Mindingthe body. Daedalus, 135(3), 15–22.Dumas, G., Nadel, J., Soussignan, R.,Martinerie, J., & Garnero, L. (2010).Inter-brain synchronization during socialinteraction. PLoS ONE, 5(8), 278–288.Fraiberg, S. (1979). Blind infants and theirmothers: An examination of the signsystem. In M. Bullowa (Ed.), Beforespeech: The beginning of interpersonalcommunication (pp. 149–169). London:Cambridge University Press.Gallese, V., Keysers, C., & Rizzolatti, G.(2004). A unifying view of the basis ofsocial cognition. Cognitive Sciences,8(9), 396–403.Gallese, V., & Sinigaglia, C. (2011). What is sospecial about embodied simulation?Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12(11),512–519.Gianelli, C., Farnè, A., Salemme, R., Jeannerod,M., & Roy, A. C. (2011). The agent isright: When motor embodied cognitionis space-dependent. PLoS ONE, 6(9).Grafton, S. T. (2009). Embodied cognition andthe simulation of action to understandothers. Annals of the New York Academyof Sciences, 1156, 97–117.Gray, K. (2012). The power of good intentions:Perceived benevolence soothes pain,increases pleasure, and improves taste.Social Psychological and PersonalityScience, 1–7.Keenan, J. M., & Bailett, S. D. Memory forpersonally and socially significant

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