That said, in gauging the impact of lifting these restrictions, we should be measured and realistic.These funds represent the bulk of Iran’s foreign reserves — they are the country’s long-termsavings, not its annual budgetary allowance, and as a matter of financial management, Irancannot simply spend them. Of the portion that Iran spends, we assess that Iran will use the vastmajority to attempt to redress its stark economic needs. President Rouhani was elected on aplatform of economic revitalization and faces a political imperative to meet those unfulfilledpromises. Iran’s needs are vast — President Rouhani faces well over half a trillion dollars inpressing investment requirements and government obligations. And Iran’s economy continues tosuffer from immense challenges — including perennial budget deficits, rampant corruption, andone of the worst business environments in the world. Put simply, Iran is in a massive hole fromwhich it will take years to climb out.In any event, we will aggressively target any attempts by Iran to use funds gained from sanctionsrelief to support militant proxies, including by continuing to enhance our cooperation with Israeland our partners in the Gulf.ConclusionThe <strong>JCPOA</strong> is a strong deal — with phased relief in exchange for Iranian compliance and apowerful snap-back built in. Backing away from this deal, on the notion that it would be feasibleand preferable to escalate the economic pressure and somehow obtain a capitulation — whetheron the nuclear, regional, terrorism, or human rights fronts — would be a mistake. Even if onebelieved that continuing sanctions pressure was a better course than resolving the threat of Iran’snuclear program, that choice is not available.The UN Security Council and our partners around the world agreed to impose costly sanctionsagainst Iran for one reason — to put a stop to its illicit nuclear program. If we changed our termsnow and insisted that these countries continue to impose those sanctions on Iran, despite theavailability of a diplomatic solution to its nuclear program, they would balk. And we would beleft with neither a nuclear deal nor effective sanctions. It is unrealistic to think that additionalsanctions pressure would force Iran to totally capitulate — and impractical to believe that wecould marshal a global coalition of partners to impose such pressure, after turning down a dealthat our partners believe is a good one.The terms of this deal achieve the purpose they were meant to achieve: blocking Iran’s paths toa nuclear bomb. That is an overriding national security priority, and its achievement should notbe put at risk — not when the prospect of an unconstrained Iranian nuclear program presentssuch a threat to America and the world.4
Secretary Ernest MonizTestimony before the Senate Foreign Affairs CommitteeWashington, DCJuly 23, 2015Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin and Members of the Committee, thankyou for the opportunity to discuss the historic Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action(<strong>JCPOA</strong>) reached between the E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, Russia, theUnited Kingdom, the European Union, and the United States) and Iran.The <strong>JCPOA</strong> prevents Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, provides strongverification measures that give us ample time to respond if Iran chose to violate itsterms, and takes none of our options off the tableAmerica’s leading nuclear experts at the Department of Energy were involvedthroughout these negotiations. The list of labs and sites that provided support islong, including Argonne National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore NationalLaboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory,Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory, SavannahRiver National Laboratory, the Y-12 National Security Complex, and the KansasCity Plant.These nuclear experts were essential to evaluating and developing technicalproposals in support of the U.S. delegation. As a result of their work, I amconfident that the technical underpinnings of this deal are solid and the Departmentof Energy stands ready to assist in its implementation.This deal clearly meets the President’s objectives: verification of an Iranian nuclearprogram that is exclusively peaceful and sufficient lead time to respond if it provesotherwise. The <strong>JCPOA</strong> will extend for at least ten years the time it would take forIran to produce enough fissile material for a first nuclear explosive device to atleast one year from the current breakout time of just two to three months.Let me take a moment to walk through how the <strong>JCPOA</strong> blocks each of Iran’spathways to the fissile material for a nuclear weapon: the high enriched uraniumpathways through the Natanz and Fordow enrichment facilities, the plutoniumpathway at the Arak reactor, and the covert pathway.1
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THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL:WHAT YOU NEED
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THE DETAILSOF THE JCPOA
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Blocking the Pathways toa Nuclear W
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Snapping Back Sanctions on IranIran
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Q:A:Aren’t “anytime, anywhere
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Q:A:Shouldn’t we just go back to
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Q:A:Why didn’t the deal stick to
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JCPOA Does Not Simply Delayan Irani
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Multilateral Tools••We will sti
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Designation AuthoritiesMissiles:Aut
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Iran Faces Large and Pressing Domes
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WINEP BenchmarksAdvanced Centrifuge
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√Commitment Satisfied in the JCPO
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√√Commitment Satisfied in the J
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WHAT THEY’RE SAYINGABOUT THE JCPO
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“The nuclear deal advances wester
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Regional Editorials on the Iran Dea
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Implementation Is What Will Determi
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FloridaFor Those Who Accuse Preside
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IdahoNegotiations Produced Nuclear
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MarylandIf The Standard Is That No
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MissouriIran Nuclear Deal Is A Path
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New YorkAn Iran Nuclear Deal That R
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The Agreement Reflects A Calculated
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TennesseeIt Is Also A Beginning Tha
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