2. U.N. Security Council (UNSC) SanctionsUNSC restrictions on Iran’s purchases and sales of conventional arms and related material and ballistic missile-relateditems and technology will remain in place for 5 and 8 years, respectively, or until the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) confirms the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier.There are current UN arms embargoes on the Houthis in Yemen, non-state actors in Lebanon (including Hizbullah),Afghanistan (the Taliban), Iraq (including Shi’a militias), North Korea, and Libya, as well as on several states in Africa.Sanctions Relief – CounteringIran’s Regional ActivitiesThe U.S. sees Iran clearly for what it is: the world’s foremost state sponsor of terrorism; asupporter of terrorist groups such as Hizballah and Hamas; a backer of the Asad regime’sbrutality in Syria; and a force for instability in Yemen. That is why, regardless of whetheror not there is a deal, we will maintain and continue to aggressively enforce our sanctionsagainst Iran’s support for terrorism, human rights abuses, and destabilizing activities in theregion. And, if Iran intensifies these efforts, we — along with our partners — will combat Iran’sinterventions.U.S. support to our regional partners will continue to be key to countering Iranian aggressionin the region. That is why we are working to expand our cooperation across the board withregional partners that share our concerns over Iran, as the President agreed with regionalleaders at the Camp David summit in May. This effort will strengthen our regional partnersacross a range of areas, while making clear we will not accept Iranian efforts to spreadinstability and strengthen its terrorist proxies.An Unconstrained Iran Would Pose an Even Greater ThreatA nuclear-armed Iran, or an Iran with an uncheckednuclear program, would be able to project even greaterpower in the region. That is precisely why the Presidenthas said we will not allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon.To that end, we reserve the right to take whatever stepsnecessary to protect America’s security. At the sametime, a diplomatic solution is by far the most preferableand sustainable solution. A nuclear deal that effectivelycuts off all Iranian pathways to a bomb leaves us far betterpositioned to address concerns about Iran’s terroristactivities and support for regional destabilization.
Iran Faces Large and Pressing Domestic Spending NeedsOf Iran’s approximately $100 billion in overseas foreign reserves, we estimate that, after sanctions relief, Iran will be able tofreely access slightly more than half — a little over $50 billion. That is because over $20 billion is dedicated to projects withChina, where it cannot be freely spent, and tens of billions in additional funds are effectively non-performing loans to Iran’senergy and banking sector that are unlikely to be repaid, at least not in the next few years.Our sanctions, which we imposed together with the international community, have exacted a major toll on Iran’s economy.Consider:Iran needs about half a trillion dollars to meet pressing investment needs, including at least:••Energy: $170 billion to develop oil and gas potentialand replace lost capacity••Agriculture: $100 billion for agriculturalrehabilitation, irrigation, and environmentalremediation••Infrastructure: $100 billion to complete unfinishedinfrastructure projects••Power: $50 billion over next seven years to satisfyanticipated demand and invest in renewable energyIran also needs about $100 billion to satisfy pressing government obligations, including unfundedstate and military pensions, debts to the domestic banking sector and government contractors, andto plug shortfalls in the National Development Fund.Iran’s economy remains 15-20 percent smaller today than it would have been had it remained on itspre-2011 growth trajectory.Even if Iran returns to its pre-2012 growth trajectory, it would take until 2020 for Iran’s GDP toreach the level it would have been last year had it not been for our oil sanctions.The $100 billion in Iran’s reserves now restricted overseas is unlikely to be repatriated to Iran. Asa matter of prudent economic management, Iran will need to keep most of this money overseas tofacilitate foreign trade and avoid making its currency too expensive.Moreover, the Iranian people — and its leadership — aredesperate to see the economic benefits of a deal. Rouhaniwas elected on a platform of economic revitalization, andfaces a political imperative to live up to his promises.In fact, if you look at the released funds from the JPOA,instead of using these funds to support terrorists, Iran mostlyused them to buy gold, prop up its currency and hedgeagainst inflation.It’s also important to note that Iran’s ability to supportterrorism relies less on monetary funds, and more on militaryand other political influence since terrorism and Iran’s othermalign regional activities are, unfortunately, not expensive.The constraints on greater Iranian activities in the region areprimarily non-financial — and we will continue to raise thecosts to Iran of these activities.Iran Will Remain Exposed to Our Sanctions and SnapbackTo take meaningful advantage of the sanctions relief, Iran willneed to engage with the international community in a waythat sustains our significant leverage. Iran will rely on accessto the international banking system, to import goods andservices and attract foreign capital. As a result, if there is adeal and Iran fails to abide by its nuclear obligations, will be ina position to reimpose enormous pressure.
- Page 1 and 2: THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL:WHAT YOU NEED
- Page 3 and 4: THE DETAILSOF THE JCPOA
- Page 5 and 6: Blocking the Pathways toa Nuclear W
- Page 8 and 9: Snapping Back Sanctions on IranIran
- Page 10 and 11: Q:A:Aren’t “anytime, anywhere
- Page 12 and 13: Q:A:Shouldn’t we just go back to
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- Page 18: JCPOA Does Not Simply Delayan Irani
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- Page 27 and 28: WINEP BenchmarksAdvanced Centrifuge
- Page 29 and 30: √Commitment Satisfied in the JCPO
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- Page 33 and 34: WHAT THEY’RE SAYINGABOUT THE JCPO
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- Page 39 and 40: Implementation Is What Will Determi
- Page 41 and 42: FloridaFor Those Who Accuse Preside
- Page 43 and 44: IdahoNegotiations Produced Nuclear
- Page 45 and 46: MarylandIf The Standard Is That No
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- Page 49 and 50: New YorkAn Iran Nuclear Deal That R
- Page 51 and 52: The Agreement Reflects A Calculated
- Page 53 and 54: TennesseeIt Is Also A Beginning Tha
- Page 55 and 56: What the World is Saying about the
- Page 57 and 58: China“The achievement of a compre
- Page 59 and 60: Other World Leaders“I warmly welc
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- Page 63 and 64: THE IRAN PROJECTwww.theiranproject.
- Page 65 and 66: THE IRAN PROJECTwww.theiranproject.
- Page 67 and 68: Letter to the President from over 1
- Page 69 and 70: Amb. (ret.) Ulric Haynes, Jr. Ambas
- Page 71 and 72: JULY 17, 2015Atlantic Council Iran
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Because there is so little trust th
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Committee on International Justice
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THE WHITE HOUSEOffice of the Press
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As Iran takes steps to implement th
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We do not have to accept an inevita
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Key Excerpts of the Joint Comprehen
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• Iran will allow the IAEA to mon
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Press Availability on Nuclear Deal
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purposes. And Iran will not build a
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So let me make a couple of points c
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his team, while tough, always profe
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WASHINGTON POST OP-EDJohn Kerry and
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President Obama has said clearly th
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Remember that, two years ago, when
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Written Testimony of Jacob J. Lew,
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The United States will also maintai
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Secretary Ernest MonizTestimony bef
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contribute to the development of a
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DAVID CAMERON, PRIME MINISTER OF GR