Iran will reduce its stockpile of up-to-5 percent enriched uranium hexafluoride,which is equivalent now to almost 12,000 kg, by nearly 98 percent to only 300kilograms of low (3.67 percent) enriched uranium hexafluoride, and will notexceed this level for fifteen years. In particular, Iran will be required to get rid ofits 20 percent enriched uranium that is not fabricated into fuel for the TehranResearch Reactor. This is important because excess 20 percent enriched uraniumcould be converted into feed for centrifuges, which would be about 90 percent ofthe way to bomb material.Iran’s installed centrifuges will be reduced by two thirds, leaving it with just over5,000 operating centrifuges at Natanz – its only enrichment facility – undercontinuous IAEA monitoring. For the next 10 years, only the oldest and leastcapable centrifuges, the IR-1, will be allowed to operate.Iran has an established R&D program for a number of advanced centrifuges (IR-2,IR-5, IR-6, IR-8). This pace of the program will be slowed substantially and willbe carried out only at Natanz for 15 years, under close International AtomicEnergy Agency (IAEA) monitoring. Iran will not pursue other approaches touranium enrichment.The underground uranium enrichment facility at Fordow will be converted to anuclear, physics, and technology center where specific projects such as stableisotope production are undertaken. There will be no uranium enrichment, nouranium enrichment research and development, and no nuclear material at the siteat all for 15 years. In cooperation with Russia, Iran will pursue a limited programfor production of stable isotopes, such as those used for medical applications. Andthe IAEA will have a right to daily access at Fordow as well.All of these reasons taken together establish the one year breakout timeline foraccumulating high enriched uranium.In addition, Iran will have no source of weapons-grade plutonium. The Arakreactor, which according to its original design could have been a source ofplutonium for a nuclear weapon, will be transformed to produce far less plutoniumoverall and no weapons-grade plutonium when operated normally. All spent fuelfrom the reactor that could be reprocessed to recover plutonium will be sent out ofthe country, and all of this will be under a rigorous IAEA inspection regime.This deal goes beyond the parameters established in Lausanne in a very importantarea. Under this deal, Iran will not engage in several activities that could2
contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device, including multiplepoint explosive systems. These commitments are indefinite. In addition, Iran willnot pursue plutonium or uranium (or its alloys) metallurgy for fifteen years.Because Iran will not engage in activities needed to use weapons grade material foran explosive device, an additional period can be added to the breakout timeline.To be clear, this deal is not built on trust. It is built on hard-nosed requirementsthat will limit Iran’s activities and ensure inspections, transparency, andverification. To preclude cheating, international inspectors will be givenunprecedented access to all of Iran’s declared nuclear facilities and any other sitesof concern, as well as the entire nuclear supply chain, from uranium supply tocentrifuge manufacturing and operation. And this access to the uranium supplychain comes with a 25 year commitment.The IAEA will be permitted to use advanced technologies, such as enrichmentmonitoring devices and electronic seals. DOE national laboratories havedeveloped many such technologies.If the international community suspects that Iran is trying to cheat, the IAEA canrequest access to any suspicious location. Much has been made about a 24 dayprocess for ensuring that IAEA inspectors can get access to undeclared nuclearsites. In fact, the IAEA can request access to any suspicious location with 24hours’ notice under the Additional Protocol, which Iran will implement under thisdeal. This deal does not change that baseline. The <strong>JCPOA</strong> goes beyond thatbaseline, recognizing that disputes could arise regarding IAEA access to sensitivefacilities, and provides a crucial new tool for resolving such disputes within a shortperiod of time so that the IAEA gets the access it needs in a timely fashion —within 24 days. Most important, environmental sampling can detect microscopictraces of nuclear materials even after attempts are made to remove the nuclearmaterial.In fact, Iran’s history provides a good example. In February 2003, the IAEArequested access to a suspicious facility in Tehran suspected of undeclared nuclearactivities. Negotiations over access to the site dragged on for six months, but evenafter that long delay, environmental samples taken by the IAEA revealed nuclearactivity even though Iran had made a substantial effort to remove and cover up theevidence. This deal dramatically shortens the period over which Iran could dragout an access dispute.3
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THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL:WHAT YOU NEED
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THE DETAILSOF THE JCPOA
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Blocking the Pathways toa Nuclear W
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Snapping Back Sanctions on IranIran
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Q:A:Aren’t “anytime, anywhere
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Q:A:Shouldn’t we just go back to
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Q:A:Why didn’t the deal stick to
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JCPOA Does Not Simply Delayan Irani
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Multilateral Tools••We will sti
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Designation AuthoritiesMissiles:Aut
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Iran Faces Large and Pressing Domes
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WINEP BenchmarksAdvanced Centrifuge
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√Commitment Satisfied in the JCPO
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√√Commitment Satisfied in the J
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WHAT THEY’RE SAYINGABOUT THE JCPO
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“The nuclear deal advances wester
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Regional Editorials on the Iran Dea
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Implementation Is What Will Determi
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FloridaFor Those Who Accuse Preside
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IdahoNegotiations Produced Nuclear
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MarylandIf The Standard Is That No
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MissouriIran Nuclear Deal Is A Path
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New YorkAn Iran Nuclear Deal That R
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The Agreement Reflects A Calculated
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TennesseeIt Is Also A Beginning Tha
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What the World is Saying about the
- Page 57 and 58: China“The achievement of a compre
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- Page 61 and 62: Public statements of support from t
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- Page 65 and 66: THE IRAN PROJECTwww.theiranproject.
- Page 67 and 68: Letter to the President from over 1
- Page 69 and 70: Amb. (ret.) Ulric Haynes, Jr. Ambas
- Page 71 and 72: JULY 17, 2015Atlantic Council Iran
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- Page 75 and 76: Because there is so little trust th
- Page 77 and 78: Committee on International Justice
- Page 79 and 80: THE WHITE HOUSEOffice of the Press
- Page 81 and 82: As Iran takes steps to implement th
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- Page 85 and 86: Key Excerpts of the Joint Comprehen
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- Page 97 and 98: WASHINGTON POST OP-EDJohn Kerry and
- Page 99 and 100: President Obama has said clearly th
- Page 101 and 102: Remember that, two years ago, when
- Page 103 and 104: Written Testimony of Jacob J. Lew,
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