Setting of Fines for Cartels in ICN Jurisdictions - International ...
Setting of Fines for Cartels in ICN Jurisdictions - International ...
Setting of Fines for Cartels in ICN Jurisdictions - International ...
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24 6. AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING ELEMENTS<br />
6.1.4 Refusal to cooperate – obstruction 42<br />
The questionnaire asked how cooperation by the defendant is taken <strong>in</strong>to consideration both <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> aggravat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
and mitigat<strong>in</strong>g the amount <strong>of</strong> f<strong>in</strong>e. Altogether 15 f<strong>in</strong>e calculation methods consider these elements <strong>in</strong><br />
one way or another.<br />
Refusal to cooperate could lead to <strong>in</strong>crease the f<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> 15 competition f<strong>in</strong>e calculation systems. As an <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g<br />
solution, the Dutch f<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g guidel<strong>in</strong>es allow the NMa to impose a separate f<strong>in</strong>e <strong>for</strong> refusal to cooperate up<br />
to 450 000 euro or 1% <strong>of</strong> the total annual turnover <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fender, whichever the bigger.<br />
Obstruction leads to <strong>in</strong>creases <strong>in</strong> the level <strong>of</strong> the f<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> 13 f<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g regimes (e.g. <strong>in</strong> the US, EU, Jordan, Korea,<br />
Netherlands, Turkey, Serbia, New Zealand and Switzerland). In the US wilful obstruction or attempted obstruction<br />
<strong>of</strong> justice dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>vestigation, prosecution or sentenc<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>of</strong>fence can be considered as aggravat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
factor or charged as a separate crim<strong>in</strong>al <strong>of</strong>fence where appropriate.<br />
To note that non-compliance with procedural obligations (e.g. late provision <strong>of</strong> requested <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation, false<br />
or <strong>in</strong>complete provision <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation, lack <strong>of</strong> notice, lack <strong>of</strong> disclosure, obstruction <strong>of</strong> justice, destruction<br />
<strong>of</strong> evidence, challeng<strong>in</strong>g the validity <strong>of</strong> documents authoriz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>vestigative measures, etc.) can be subject to<br />
autonomous sanctions, whether or not a f<strong>in</strong>al decision on a substantive <strong>in</strong>fr<strong>in</strong>gement is reached. Where a decision<br />
on a substantive <strong>in</strong>fr<strong>in</strong>gement is eventually reached, the procedural (mis)behaviour <strong>of</strong> the party can still be<br />
considered as an aggravat<strong>in</strong>g factor, whether or not it attracted separate procedural sanctions. The existence<br />
and the application <strong>of</strong> such procedural sanctions do not normally prevent the application <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>creases to the<br />
f<strong>in</strong>e applied <strong>in</strong> a f<strong>in</strong>al decision on the merits (e.g. EU).<br />
6.1.5 Others<br />
A wide variety <strong>of</strong> factors are mentioned <strong>in</strong> the “others” category:<br />
■ If the <strong>of</strong>fence <strong>in</strong>volved vulnerable victims, this may be taken <strong>in</strong>to account <strong>in</strong> determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the amount <strong>of</strong> the<br />
f<strong>in</strong>e with<strong>in</strong> the applicable f<strong>in</strong>e range (US, Canada);<br />
■ the degree <strong>of</strong> premeditation is considered by Mexico, but Germany also takes <strong>in</strong>to account “serious <strong>for</strong>ms<br />
<strong>of</strong> deliberate <strong>in</strong>tent and negligence”;<br />
■ the cont<strong>in</strong>uation <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>fr<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g conduct qualifies as aggravat<strong>in</strong>g situation by the Russian, Korean and Turkish<br />
competition authorities;<br />
■ if the <strong>of</strong>fender made ef<strong>for</strong>ts to control the compliance <strong>of</strong> the illegal conduct it is deemed as basis <strong>for</strong> aggravation<br />
by the Dutch and also by the Turkish competition authorities;<br />
■ the high rank<strong>in</strong>g or seniority <strong>of</strong> the personnel <strong>in</strong>volved are contemplated by the US, Korea and New<br />
Zealand;<br />
■ some jurisdictions (e.g. Turkey) attribute an aggravat<strong>in</strong>g/attenuat<strong>in</strong>g effect to the importance <strong>of</strong> the affected<br />
product or the overall f<strong>in</strong>ancial/economic strength <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fender;<br />
■ Brazil considers the “extent <strong>of</strong> damages or potential damages to competition, to the Brazilian economy, to<br />
consumers or to third parties”.<br />
6.2 Mitigat<strong>in</strong>g elements<br />
6.2.1 Effective cooperation<br />
The most accepted mitigat<strong>in</strong>g factor is if the defendant shows will<strong>in</strong>gness <strong>of</strong> cooperation. In different <strong>for</strong>ms<br />
this is taken <strong>in</strong>to consideration <strong>in</strong> 12 f<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g policies. In the US reply “report<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>of</strong>fence to the government<br />
42 The General Framework Subgroup <strong>of</strong> the Cartel Work<strong>in</strong>g Group has already reviewed the issue <strong>of</strong> obstruction (see<br />
the report under: http://www.<strong>in</strong>ternationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/conference_5th_capetown_2006/<br />
ObstructionPaper-with-cover.pdf)<br />
<strong>ICN</strong> — SETTING OF FINES FOR CARTELS IN <strong>ICN</strong> JURISDICTIONS