belarus executive summary - US Department of State
belarus executive summary - US Department of State
belarus executive summary - US Department of State
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BELAR<strong>US</strong> 17<br />
The law prohibits authorities from intercepting telephone and other<br />
communications without a prosecutor’s order. In practice authorities routinely<br />
monitored residences, telephones, and computers. Nearly all opposition political<br />
figures and many prominent members <strong>of</strong> civil society groups reported that<br />
authorities monitored their conversations and activities.<br />
The law allows the KGB, Ministry <strong>of</strong> Internal Affairs, special security services,<br />
financial intelligence personnel, and certain border guard detachments to use<br />
wiretaps. Wiretaps require the permission <strong>of</strong> a prosecutor; however, the lack <strong>of</strong><br />
prosecutorial independence rendered this requirement meaningless.<br />
The Ministry <strong>of</strong> Communications has the authority to terminate the telephone<br />
service <strong>of</strong> persons who violate their telephone contracts, and such contracts<br />
prohibit the use <strong>of</strong> telephone services for purposes contrary to state interests and<br />
public order.<br />
There were numerous reports that the government employed a number <strong>of</strong> means to<br />
coerce young persons, including university students and military conscripts, to join<br />
the state-funded Belarusian Republican Youth Union (BRYU) with a reported<br />
membership <strong>of</strong> 500,000 persons. To this end the government reportedly employed<br />
a widespread system <strong>of</strong> BRYU civilian patrol squads whose objective was to<br />
recruit youths and students for various projects around the country in the name <strong>of</strong><br />
good citizenship.<br />
During the year authorities continued to harass family members <strong>of</strong> NGO leaders<br />
and civil society and opposition activists, including political prisoners. For<br />
example, on January 13, KGB <strong>of</strong>ficers prevented Milana Mikhalevich, spouse <strong>of</strong><br />
political prisoner and presidential candidate Ales Mikhalevich, from going to<br />
Poland for hearings on Belarus. They first detained her by conducting a lengthy<br />
search <strong>of</strong> her residence and later stopped her vehicle on the way to Warsaw with<br />
the warning that she was banned from traveling out <strong>of</strong> the country and would be<br />
turned away at the border.<br />
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:<br />
a. Freedom <strong>of</strong> Speech and Press<br />
Status <strong>of</strong> Freedom <strong>of</strong> Speech and Press<br />
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011<br />
United <strong>State</strong>s <strong>Department</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>State</strong> • Bureau <strong>of</strong> Democracy, Human Rights and Labor