belarus executive summary - US Department of State

BELARUS 25
to include government opponents), and requires the collection of information on
users at Internet cafes. It requires service providers to store data on the Internet
use of individuals for a year and to provide that information to law enforcement
agencies upon their request.
The edict restricts access to Web sites whose content includes “extremist
activities”; materials related to illicit weapons, explosives, and drugs; trafficking in
persons; pornography; and promotion of violence. It requires service providers to
eliminate access to these subject areas from government offices, educational
facilities, and cultural institutions if ordered to do so by the KGB, prosecutor
general, the presidential administration’s Operation and Analytical Center, and
other state agencies. According to credible sources, the list, which was not
released publicly, contained approximately 60 Web sites, including opposition
portals Charter97 and Belarusian Partisan. Internet service providers are required
to update the list on a daily basis. Decisions to restrict access to Internet sources
may be appealed to the courts. In addition to restrictive actions, authorities made
frequent statements during the year on the need for further control of the Internet.
On June 17, Lukashenka attempted to justify limitations on Internet access
nationwide, stating he was “fine with the Internet” but claiming that he had to “get
engaged [in Internet monitoring] to protect our stability, security, and the country.”
On August 29, he ordered the government to restrict students’ access to
“destructive” Web sites, including social networking portals, at educational
institutions. The day after the December 2010 demonstrations, Lukashenka
pledged to “reform the Internet,” which he asserted was used to “mock authorities
and the people.”
State companies and organizations, which included the workplaces of 80 percent of
the country’s workers, reportedly had Internet filters. On occasion government
providers blocked independent and opposition Web sites during major political
events. In response to the government’s interference and Internet restrictions,
many opposition groups and independent newspapers switched to Internet domains
operating outside the country. The few remaining independent media sites with
domestic “BY” (Belarus) domains practiced self-censorship.
On several occasions during the year, cyberattacks of unknown origin led to the
temporary disabling of independent news portals and social networking sites,
including the following: Web sites of Charter97, independent news agency
BelaPAN, Radio Liberty, Belarusian Partisan, Vyasna, Belarusian Christian
Democracy, electroname.com, citizenby.org, Salidarnasc, Twitter, Facebook, and
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011
United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor