HOMO JIHADICUS

wal Muhajireen, which recognises the authority of the emir of the Caucasus).
Despite grave differences and fierce disputes in the informational sphere (for
example between Islamic State’s militants from the Caucasus and the groups
remaining in the Caucasus Emirate), conflicts between the post-Soviet units
take place on a limited scale. There are no reports of fratricidal infighting or
ethnic tensions between the militants from the various post-Soviet ethnicities,
who in their home countries are often in conflict with each other (for example
between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz, or Chechens and Dagestanis), or between
the post-Soviet volunteers and the militants from other regions. The feeling
of community is dominant, as well as the feeling of being in a group (within
particular organisations) and Jihadi solidarity (fighting the “infidel”), as well
as a more widely, peculiarly defined Muslim unity, which is based on the internationalist
ideology of the global jihad.
Furthermore, despite being divided and engaged in rivalry between their patron
groups, the Jihadists from the former USSR states constitute an informal
community, the basis of which is the similar cultural code, mentality, the system
of mutually-comprehensible Soviet-based references, and also the Russian
language – which just as in the case of Salafists in the former USSR area, serves
as a lingua franca and is the language of jihad. It is not only the language of
communication in Syria and Iraq (the majority of the post-Soviet volunteers
have no proficiency in Arabic), but also the language of propaganda and recruitment,
allowing for contact with the countries of origin. Almost all of the
websites and profiles in the social media are in Russian. Other languages, such
as Chechen, Uzbek, Azeri or Tajik, are utilised to a much lesser extent, mainly
to reinforce the propaganda’s message when the target audience is a specific
ethnic group in the country of origin.
The informal community of post-Soviet Jihadists is at times used by their patron
organisations as a channel of communication. One example of this is the
failed negotiation attempts between Islamic State and al-Nusra (November of
2014), the aim of which was to end the conflict between these organisations 154 .
During the talks both sides were represented by Chechens: JMA’s emir, Salahuddin
Shishani (for Jabhat al-Nusra) and Omar Shishani (for Islamic State) 155 .
It shows both the level of hostility between al-Nusra and Islamic State (the lack
154
http://www.beladusham.com/0798.html
155
https://ia802604.us.archive.org/5/items/RazjasnenieAmiraDmaSalahuddinaShishaniVSvjaziSPoezdkojVGorodRakka/jma_emir_explanation_raqqa_visit_2014.mp4
PRACE OSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015
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