HOMO JIHADICUS

of new mosques and religious schools, creating an informal network of supporters,
including high government officials and military circles) due to the
enthusiasm present in Azerbaijan (shared also by the authorities) towards cooperation
with Turkey. Baku’s relations towards the movement, and more generally
towards Turkish social, religious and cultural activities in Azerbaijan,
took a downward turn when the AKP came to power in Ankara in 2002. It was
caused by fears of the dissemination of the AKP’s Islamic agenda in Azerbaijan,
and resulted in the rise of an animus not only towards Turkey as such, but also
towards the institutions associated with Turkey (including the Gülen movement).
Repressions targeting institutions and individuals linked the Gülen
movement visibly increased by the end of 2013 when in Turkey itself an open
conflict between Erdogan and Gülen erupted. These actions did not thus meet
with a negative reaction from Ankara 226 .
Salafi communities are also growing dynamically, with numbers estimated at
between 10-25,000 people across the country 227 . They are concentrated mainly
in Baku (groups linked to the two, currently closed, mosques – the so called
Lezgin mosque and Abu Bakr mosque, led by charismatic leader Qamet Suleymanov),
as well as in northern and north-western Azerbaijan, where Sunnis
dominate (Zaqatala, Qakh, Khachmaz, Qusar, Quba, Sheki). The growth of
Salafism in regions bordering Russia is closely linked to the proximity of Dagestan
and the problem of ethnic minorities living in north Azerbaijan (Lezgins,
Avars, Tzakhurs, Rutuls; about 3-400,000 thousand people in total), who in the
face of a forced Azerbaijanisation policy and ethnically motivated persecutions,
turn to Salafism and Islamic radicalism (mainly young people). The city
of Sumgait (400 inhabitants, located about 30 kilometres north of Baku) is another
important centre of Salafism in Azerbaijan. Here the social problems are
the bedrock for Salafism (for example unemployment). These were caused by
the closures of petrochemical factories operating during Soviet times. The settlement
of the socially marginalised refugees from the Karabakh conflict zone
is another cause of the Salafism’s growth there 228 .
PRACE OSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015
226
The culmination of the actions aimed against the Fethullah Gülen movement was the state
closing Gülen-linked schools in Azerbaijan (beginning of 2014); http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/azerbaijan-shuts-down-gulen-linked-schools-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=67988&
NewsCatID=355. More on the Gülen movement in Azerbaijan: http://www.hudson.org/
research/9864-the-gulen-movement-in-azerbaijan
227
http://almanac.afpc.org/Azerbaijan
228
Sumgait has also a small community of the so-called Harijis, whose Salafi views are much
more radical than those of the general Salafi public (for example they do not recognise the
state’s laws and view participation in the global jihad as mandatory). In 2013 clashes be-
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