HOMO JIHADICUS

eturn) is stabilising the countries of origin, since its result is the exodus
of the most radical individuals. This phenomenon is de facto in accordance
with the interests of the authorities. The case of the Northern Caucasus,
where the departure of some of the militants and shift of the stream of recruits
to Syria contributed to establishing a relative stability during recent
years, is symptomatic.
4. The impact of the phenomenon of volunteers departing to jihad in Syria and
Iraq will not necessarily lead to a rise in security threats in the post-Soviet
area in the long-term perspective, either. Many signs show, that at least
for a major part of those leaving, it is a permanent migration – even were
the conflict to end, they will not return to their homeland, but will rather
move on to another hotspot in the Muslim world. Increasing numbers of
militants who are taking their families to Syria with them implies exactly
that. The precedent which illustrates this phenomenon are the militants of
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), who at the turn of 1990’s and
2000’s migrated from Central Asia to Afghanistan, and later on to Pakistan’s
Waziristan, where they joined the global jihad. Despite the fact that
the possibility of them returning is constantly being raised, it has never
materialised. Regardless of this, the issue of militants fighting abroad will
be certainly utilised by the authorities as a scare factor in both internal
politics (as an excuse to limit civil rights or to combat the opposition) and in
geopolitical power play (for example by Moscow to justify the need of closer
security ties with particular states, or in its relations with the West), just
as it has been in the case of the IMU and the Afghan threat for Central Asia.
PRACE OSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015
5. The security challenges related to the participation of citizens of former
USSR countries in jihad in the Middle East can increase only should serious
destabilisation occur in one of the post-Soviet states (for example Uzbekistan
or Russia). This could mean some of the militants would indeed return,
while the experience and contacts with international terrorism which they
gained, could make them more dangerous than at present. Currently, however,
this scenario seems far from likely: it seems impossible to stabilise
the situation in the Middle East over the coming years, the perspective of
collapse of one of the post-Soviet states is not evident, and, finally, the main
enemy of the international Jihadists is not Russia or one of the former USSR
states, but rather the Middle Eastern regimes (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan,
Iran etc). Furthermore, the returning Jihadists cannot count on wide support
inside from their countries’ societies, which are rather critical of the
demands of the radicals.
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