HOMO JIHADICUS

of public life. Except for the cultural/ritual aspects (obeying the religious commandments
and rituals is becoming increasingly common) and the institutional
aspects (the establishment of new mosques, Islamic schools, universities
and media), its important element is a progressing shariatisation (a spontaneous
diffusion of the Islamic law into the legal framework, except in Chechnya,
where it was inspired by the authorities 215 ) and an increasingly strong presence
of Islam in the politics (politicians accommodating or even appealing to
religion, the role of official and informal leaders and religious milieus/groups
in political life, etc. 216 ).
Salafism is burgeoning in the entire region, especially amongst young people.
This process takes place both in the eastern and western parts of the region,
and its intensity is strongest in the republic of Dagestan with its three million
population. The radicalisation of youth is taking place despite federal and local
repressions (which vary in severity depending on time 217 ) and efforts undertaken
by the official Islamic clergy and Sufi groups (these latter are interconnected
with official Islam). In Chechnya, which is ruled in a dictatorial manner
by President Ramzan Kadyrov, a peculiar situation is in place – Sufi Islam
is de facto the official Islam (a local branch of the Qadiriya order, which was
established in the 12 th century in Baghdad, and initiated in the Caucasus by
a 19 th century Chechen Sheikh Kunta-haji Kishiev). Other forms of Islam are
either limited or even combated (for example: the present informal coercion to
participate in Qadiriya rites, especially Dhikr; the persecution of men growing
Salafi-style beards and women wearing hijabs, which are thought to be Salafi
PRACE OSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015
215
For example sharia courts, which settle private law disputes, operate in all of the republic’s
regions; the informal order for women employed in public institutions and studying at university
to wear head scarfs; substantial limits imposed on the sale of alcohol, Chechen authorities’
de facto support of polygamy (which is theoretically penalised under Russian law).
216
Besides Chechnya, an especially strong influence of political Islam can be seen in Dagestan.
Despite there being no Islamic political parties active there, many Dagestani politicians refer
to Islam. Other Islamic actors also play an important political role. These include both
the Sufi leaders, who gather informal religious, political and business groups around themselves,
often with their own armed wing (militants); and the official clergy within the Spiritual
Board of Dagestan’s Muslims (SBDM).
217
In 2010 an unprecedented, formalised Sufi-Salafi dialogue was initiated by the Dagestani
leader Magomedsalam Magomedov. Representatives of the SBDM and Salafi organisation
Association of Ahlus Sunna Scholars took part reoccurring meetings and theological debates.
The dialog helped to partially calm the situation in Dagestan. It was halted due Kremlin’s
pressure following the death of key Dagestani Sufi leader – Sheikh Said Effendi Chirkeyski
(who was killed in an attack probably executed by the militants in August of 2012),
and forced resignation of Magomedov, whose successor was a radical opponent of soft policies
– Ramazan Abdulatipov. A new wave of repressions took place afterwards, moving in
line with other radical steps undertaken in the security sphere prior to the Sochi Olympics.
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