U.S. Justice Department Report on the Ferguson Police Department

As directed, FPD supervisors and line officers have undertaken the aggressive code
enforcement required to meet the City’s revenue generation expectations. As discussed below in
Part III.A., FPD officers routinely conduct stops that have little relation to public safety and a
questionable basis in law. FPD officers routinely issue multiple citations during a single stop,
often for the same violation. Issuing three or four charges in one stop is not uncommon in
Ferguson. Officers sometimes write six, eight, or, in at least one instance, fourteen citations for a
single encounter. Indeed, officers told us that some compete to see who can issue the largest
number of citations during a single stop.
The February 2011 report to the City Council notes that the acting prosecutor—with the
apparent approval of the Police Chief—“talked with police officers about ensuring all necessary
summonses are written for each incident, i.e. when DWI charges are issued, are the correct
companion charges being issued, such as speeding, failure to maintain a single lane, no
insurance, and no seat belt, etc.” The prosecutor noted that “[t]his is done to ensure that a proper
resolution to all cases is being achieved and that the court is maintaining the correct volume for
offenses occurring within the city.” Notably, the “correct volume” of law enforcement is
uniformly presented in City documents as related to revenue generation, rather than in terms of
what is necessary to promote public safety. 9 Each month, the municipal court provides FPD
supervisors with a list of the number of tickets issued by each officer and each squad.
Supervisors have posted the list inside the police station, a tactic officers say is meant to push
them to write more citations.
The Captain of FPD’s Patrol Division regularly communicates with his Division
commanders regarding the need to increase traffic “productivity,” and productivity is a common
topic at squad meetings. Patrol Division supervisors monitor productivity through monthly
“self-initiated activity reports” and instruct officers to increase production when those reports
show they have not issued enough citations. In April 2010, for example, a patrol supervisor
criticized a sergeant for his squad only issuing 25 tickets in a month, including one officer who
issued “a grand total” of 11 tickets to six people on three days “devoted to traffic stops.” In
November 2011, the same patrol supervisor wrote to his patrol lieutenants and sergeants that
“[t]he monthly self-initiated activity totals just came out,” and they “may want to advise [their]
officers who may be interested in the open detective position that one of the categories to be
considered when deciding on the eligibility list will be self-initiated activity.” The supervisor
continued: “Have any of you heard comments such as, why should I produce when I know I’m
not getting a raise? Well, some people are about to find out why.” The email concludes with the
instruction to “[k]eep in mind, productivity (self-initiated activity) cannot decline for next year.”
FPD has communicated to officers not only that they must focus on bringing in revenue,
but that the department has little concern with how officers do this. FPD’s weak systems of
supervision, review, and accountability, discussed below in Part III.A., have sent a potent
message to officers that their violations of law and policy will be tolerated, provided that officers
9 FPD’s financial focus has also led FPD to elevate municipal enforcement over state-law enforcement. Even where
individuals commit violations of state law, if there is an analogous municipal code provision, the police department
will nearly always charge the offense under municipal law. A senior member of FPD’s command told us that all
Ferguson police officers understand that, when a fine is the likely punishment, municipal rather than state charges
should be pursued so that Ferguson will reap the financial benefit.
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