IMSI Catchers and Mobile Security

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Page 1: By Joseph Ooi IMSI Catchers and Mob
Page 4 and 5: 1 INTRODUCTION IMSI catchers are ra
Page 6 and 7: Figure 1: GSM World Coverage Map [5
Page 8 and 9: Equipment Identity Register (EIR):
Page 10 and 11: 2.4.3 GSM vulnerabilities At a glan
Page 12 and 13: 3 IMSI CATCHERS 3.1 Introduction At
Page 14 and 15: Figure 4: Man-in-the-middle attack
Page 16 and 17: Digital Receiver Technology, Inc. (
Page 18 and 19: emulators more than 300 times over
Page 20 and 21: 4 COUNTERMEASURES 4.1 Detection Ind
Page 22 and 23: 4.1.6 Absence of Encryption As desc
Page 24 and 25: the near future. For calls, a new k
Page 26 and 27: Blackphone+. With these subsequent
Page 28 and 29: New cell towers suddenly appearing
Page 30 and 31: It appears that gaining access to f
Page 32 and 33: However, network operators have thu
Page 34 and 35: 6 APPENDIX 6.1 List of Federal Agen
Page 36 and 37: 6.3 Data Collection App source code
Page 38 and 39: Reset count of cell JSONObjects sig
Page 40 and 41: WORKS CITED [1] AT&T Tech Channel,
Page 42 and 43: [30] "A5/1 Decryption," [Online]. A
Page 46 and 47: [82] A. Greenberg, "There’s Now a

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