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THE HISTORY OF THE DARKSEOUL GROUP AND THE SONY INTRUSION MALWARE DESTOVER

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CONCLUSION<br />

The attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment incorporated the use of malware which contained a number of<br />

commonalities with malware used in previously known attacks.<br />

These previous attacks were mainly focused against South Korean entities such as financial institutions,<br />

government sites, think tanks and other important functions. Targets outside South Korea have also been affected,<br />

albeit to a lesser extent: Apart from the Sony intrusion, the Dozer DDOS attacks of 2009 were also directed towards<br />

US websites.<br />

The amount of common factors between the different incidents makes it in our opinion very likely that these<br />

incidents are perpetrated by the same group, or at least cooperating groups.<br />

In this paper, we are not commenting on geographical attribution for the Sony attack. We note that a number of<br />

the mentioned previous attacks (Dozer (15), Koredos, Korhigh (16), DarkSeoul (17)) have been associated with<br />

North Korean involvement, but these associations have not been examined or validated by us.<br />

It is worth noting that this threat actor is still active. We have seen Destover-samples compiled as recently as<br />

January 2016. DarkSeoul should be considered a constant risk factor, particularly for South Korean institutions.<br />

The Destover malware family seems to be the information gathering workhorse of this group – adapted and<br />

changed to fit the purpose du jour, but retaining a lot of the same overall design and methodology. For specific<br />

targets more customized malware is often deployed.<br />

Command and control connections are almost always going to raw IP addresses, and different malware generations<br />

tend to use different sets of addresses. It is our assumption that most of these IP’s are compromised computers<br />

which probably are running proxies, and as such are easily disposable.<br />

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