THE HISTORY OF THE DARKSEOUL GROUP AND THE SONY INTRUSION MALWARE DESTOVER

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IP longint returned in the DNS response is XOR’ed with a dword integer. This bogus DNS response can be used in an interesting fashion. The domain mx1.mefound.com has resolved to the bogus IP 44.58.156.86. When this IP is converted using the corresponding XOR key 0x579C3A53 it becomes 127.0.0.1 – i.e. localhost. Presumably this is done when the bot is not active. The IP 44.58.156.86 belongs to University of California at San Diego (UCSD) and have as far as I can tell never been used to host any publicly available domain. Still, passive DNS data shows that this IP has been the DNS response of a number of DynDNS domains; many of which we had not seen before. We may thus assume that these domains are used in backdoors containing the same XOR key as this particular Destover sample. This applies to the following additional domains: update03.compress.to baid.otzo.com mx2.mefound.com facebok.mrbasic.com report01.onedumb.com appinfo.yourtrap.com gupdate.yourtrap.com status01.instanthq.com eschool.toythieves.com gogle.jungleheart.com mycompany.moneyhome.biz
Since we know the XOR key used, we can also translate any other IP’s associated with these domains to presumably correct C&C IP addresses (see appendix). If we repeat this process with the other XOR key we know of - 0x1AB9C2D8 - we end up with the localhost IP 127.0.0.1 translating to the bogus IP of 167.194.185.27. No additional data was found at this time using this method, but any DynDNS domain resolving to this IP in the future might be interesting to look at.
Page 1 and 2: FROM SEOUL TO SONY: THE HISTORY OF
Page 3 and 4: INTRODUCTION Much has been written
Page 5 and 6: MALWARE ARCHEOLOGY As research into
Page 7 and 8: THE KORDLLBOT BACKDOOR FAMILY KorDl
Page 9 and 10: THE MicrosoftCodeSigningPCA CERTIFI
Page 11 and 12: KORDLLBOT-RELATED SMB WORMS The mal
Page 13 and 14: THE DOZER (AKA 7.7 DDOS) ATTACK The
Page 15 and 16: THE JOONGANG ILBO ATTACK In 2012, t
Page 17 and 18: THE KORHIGH MALWARE The Korhigh mal
Page 19 and 20: File timestamp matching function co
Page 21 and 22: NOV 2014: SONY ATTACK DESTOVER BACK
Page 23 and 24: THE KIMSUKY SYSTEM The Kimsuky malw
Page 25 and 26: WORKS CITED 1. FBI. FBI Liaison Ale
Page 27 and 28: APPENDIX: TECHNICAL DETAILS Note: D
Page 29 and 30: JOANAP.B WORM, OCT 2009 This malwar
Page 31 and 32: JOANAP.C BACKDOOR, JUL 2010 The ins
Page 33 and 34: JOANAP.E WORM, AUG-SEP 2011 Joanap.
Page 35 and 36: THE DESTOVER FAMILY DESTOVER “B07
Page 37: DESTOVER “WINDOWSUPDATETRACING”
Page 41 and 42: DESTOVER “B8AC0905” BACKDOOR, M
Page 43: DESTOVER “DUUZER” BACKDOORS, MA
Page 46 and 47: Decoy documents used by the “e400
Page 48 and 49: DESTOVER “BASICHWP” BACKDOOR, S
Page 50 and 51: DESTOVER “VOLGMER2” BACKDOOR, J
Page 52 and 53: APPENDIX: ALGORITHMS AND OTHER INDI
Page 54 and 55: XOR-XX-SUB-XX obfuscation This is a
Page 56 and 57: DB-SUB API Obfuscation This is a fo
Page 58 and 59: Intbox encoding This encoding is us
Page 60 and 61: KorDllbot / Joanap AES keys “Bb10
Page 62 and 63: Destover “Volgmer2” SSL remote
Page 64 and 65: 3d2a7ea04d2247b49e2dcad63a179ae6a47
Page 66 and 67: 6d5d706f5356e087f5961ba2ed808c51876
Page 68 and 69: APPENDIX: MALWARE HASHES KorDllbot-
Page 70 and 71: Destover “b076e058” samples Dro
Page 72 and 73: Destover “Duuzer” samples X86 s
Page 74 and 75: APPENDIX: C&C DATA Joanap-related C
Page 76 and 77: Destover “Duuzer” C&C IP addres
Page 78: ule DarkSeoul_Obf_Caracachs : Backd

THE HISTORY OF THE DARKSEOUL GROUP AND THE SONY INTRUSION MALWARE DESTOVER

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