8 months ago


The 2015 ISIS Attacks on

The 2015 ISIS Attacks on Paris: Assessment and Lessons Learned By George Lane The coordinated attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015 left 130 people dead and hundreds wounded. There were nine attackers, each wearing a suicide vest. The attackers targeted a soccer stadium, bars and restaurants, and a concert hall, all venues ISIS knew would be crowded on a Friday evening. November 13 is now considered “11/13”, France’s “9/11”. 1 ISIS has designated France as the European country they hate most. France has been an enthusiastic participant in the U.S.-led coalition that is bombarding Islamic State positions in Syria and Iraq. ISIS also has focused on France because it has the largest Muslim population in Western Europe and has become Europe’s biggest source of recruits. 2 In response to the attacks, President Francois Hollande declared a state of emergency. France’s borders were closed and an additional 1,500 troops were deployed to Paris. The state of emergency granted security forces and police the ability to search homes and place suspects under house arrest without judicial approval. Within 48 George Lane hours of the attacks, 168 homes had been raided and 104 people placed under house arrest. The Paris law enforcement community responded well to coordinated, simultaneous attacks. The death toll likely would have been much higher if not for several key decisions made immediately after the attacks began. 3 Incident Management Overview: The lessons learned from assessment of the Paris attacks focus on six key areas: (1) intelligence, (2) community engagement, (3) investigation, (4) incident command, (5) crisis communication, and (6) training/equipment. In each of these areas, findings specific to the Paris attacks highlight the challenges and opportunities facing the French law enforcement and public safety communities. Intelligence: The attacks in Paris in 2015 caught authorities off guard for several reasons. Previously fighters had relied on a single mode of attack: a shooting, an explosion, or hostagetaking. In Paris, the attackers did all three, overwhelming the country’s emergency response capabilities. The 20 terrorists employed new tactics, exploited weaknesses in Europe’s border controls and demonstrated a desire for maximum carnage, as opposed to directing attacks at symbolic targets. In many ways, the Paris attacks closely resembled the Mumbai attacks in 2008, which required “precise planning, detailed reconnaissance and thorough preparation, both physical and mental. It relied on surprise, creating confusion and overwhelming the ability of the authorities to respond.” 4 As in Mumbai, the Paris attackers had carefully planned, carried heavy firepower along with explosives, and divided into teams, simultaneously attacking different locations to prevent the authorities from developing an accurate assessment of the situation. The attackers’ goal was mass murder rather than targeted killings. At the Bataclan night club, they knew to kill the security guard first and then took large numbers of hostages, creating a siege. This suggests that the terrorists studied Mumbai and replicated what worked. While the Paris attackers were organized into blind cells, they had extensive logistical support. Investigators believe that ISIS terrorists used the Sony PlayStation 4

game network to avoid detection of communication before and during the attacks. The PlayStation 4 Network allows video game players from across the globe to virtually meet and talk with one another. Players can send text messages or place calls through the PlayStation network, spelling out messages to one another within video games almost impossible to track. 5 However French authorities do not believe technological intelligence could have prevented these attacks. They said that human intelligence is the most effective form of counterterrorism, and the best intelligence comes from community engagement, not coercion. But gaining the necessary trust to build human intelligence sources within the European Muslim community has proved particularly difficult for French authorities. 6 Community Engagement: France has the largest Muslim population in the European Union. The Pew Center for Research estimates that 4.8 million people, or approximately 7.5% of French residents, are of Muslim descent. 7 By law the French government is prohibited from asking or keeping data on its citizens’ race and religion so exact demographic data is hard to obtain. France has a complicated colonial past that leaves many Muslims today feeling isolated and discriminated. Many of France’s Muslim immigrants come from the former French colonies of Morocco and Algeria. In the mid-eighteenth century, France invaded Algeria and began efforts to convert the indigenous Muslims to Christianity. Algeria remained under French colonial rule for the next century, not gaining independence until 1962 after a brutal eight-year war. Hundreds of thousands died, and nearly one million refugees fled to France. But assimilation was difficult, especially for practicing Muslims who found France to be openly hostile to their 21 religious beliefs. France is a deeply secular country. This tension has increased in recent decades. In 2004, France banned the wearing of veils, crosses and yarmulkes in schools. In 2010, France banned public wearing of a face veil worn by some Muslim women. Today many Muslims live in the Parisian suburbs known as the “banlieues”. While the word literally means “suburbs,” it has become a pejorative term synonymous with poor, immigrant, crime-ridden areas. France has 717 “sensitive urban zones” in which unemployment is over twice the national rate. Over a third live below the poverty line and the unemployment rate is near 40% for young Muslim men. 8 There are direct connections between youth, unemployment, and a rise in Sunni extremism. Investigation: While the style and ferocity of the November attacks caught law enforcement off-guard,

Government Security News 2016 Digital Yearbook
Government Security News January 2017 Digital Edition
Government Security News July 2016 Digital Edition