Army - Stimulating Simulation

The Magazine of the Association of the United States Army 

ARMY 

March 2016 www.ausa.org $3.00 

Stimulating Simulation 

Realism Expands in Soldier Training 

ArmyU 

Education System Could 

Gain Respect, Prestige 

Page 27 

Reserve Generals 

What Professionalism 

Means for Part-Timers 

Page 30

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ARMY 

The Magazine of the Association of the United States Army 

March 2016 www.ausa.org Vol. 66, No. 3 

DEPARTMENTS 

LETTERS....................................................3 

SEVEN QUESTIONS ..................................5 

WASHINGTON REPORT ...........................7 

NEWS CALL ..............................................9 

FRONT & CENTER 

The Risk of Another Unsuccessful War 

By Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen, USA Ret. 

Page 13 

Definition of ‘Decisive’ 

Depends on Context 

By Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, USA Ret. 

Page 14 

Refugees Display Courage 

To Move Forward 

By Emma Sky 

Page 16 

Draft a Bad Idea, With 

Or Without Women 

By Lt. Col. James Jay Carafano, USA Ret. 

Page 17 

Bond of Brothers: Infantrymen 

Stand Alone but Are Uniquely United 

By Col. Keith Nightingale, USA Ret. 

Page 19 

Millennials: Understanding This 

Generation and the Military 

By Capt. David Dixon 

Page 21 

In Mideast Conflicts, at What 

Price Victory? 

By Lt. Col. Thomas D. Morgan, USA Ret. 

Page 22 

HE’S THE ARMY......................................26 

THE OUTPOST........................................57 

SOLDIER ARMED....................................59 

HISTORICALLY SPEAKING.....................61 

SUSTAINING MEMBER PROFILE ...........64 

REVIEWS.................................................65 

FINAL SHOT ...........................................72 

ON THE COVER 

FEATURES 

Army University: Will Education System 

Earn Prestige With Improvements 

And a New Name? 

By Rick Maze 

Army University is an ambitious plan to 

boost the quality and respect of the 

service’s expansive professional education 

network with symbolic and substantive 

changes. Page 27 

Reserve Component Generals: True Professionals 

By Brig. Gen. Raymond E. Bell Jr., USA Ret. 

General officers of the 

Army Reserve and 

Army National 

Guard have 

successfully 

served for 

extended 

periods on 

active duty in an 

array of challenging 

positions, including 

combat. Page 30 

Stimulating Simulation: 

Technology Advances and 

Upgrades Boost Realism in 

Soldier Training 

By Scott R. Gourley 

With simulation technologies a 

ubiquitous element of modern life, it’s 

not surprising that today’s soldiers are 

encountering the expanded use of 

simulation technologies across the 

military experience. Page 36 

Cover Photo: Pfc. Shante Sapp, Headquarters 

and Headquarters Company, 

35th Engineer Brigade, Missouri Army National 

Guard, uses the Dismounted Soldier 

Training System during a virtual training 

simulation at Fort Leonard Wood, Mo. 

U.S. Army/Pfc. Samantha J. Whitehead 

March 2016 ■ ARMY 1

Germany Committed to Common Defense 

By Lt. Gen. Jorg Vollmer 

The German Army chief of staff describes how and why 

his country is fully committed to NATO and the 

common defense of Germany’s partners. Page 32 

32 

40 

12-Step Plan for Curing a Toxic Team 

By Keith H. Ferguson 

A toxic team is a group of people who 

conspire to work against the direction 

desired by leadership. The first step 

toward fixing a toxic team is to admit the 

problem exists. Page 40 

For Brain-Injured Vets, 

COMPASS Offers Direction 

By Mitch Mirkin 

A VA research program called Community 

Participation through Self-Efficacy Skills 

Development, or COMPASS, is aiding 

veterans with brain injuries by teaching 

them skills that help them manage their 

condition. Page 43 

Peer Pressure: Attorney Evaluation 

System Might Benefit All Officers 

By Col. William M. Connor 

An Army Reserve officer who is an attorney 

in civilian life describes how the legal 

profession’s system of peer evaluation 

offers an efficient, fair and equitable 

alternative for military use. Page 47 

47 

43 

Facebook Embedded in Family Life 

By Rebecca Alwine 

Military families use Facebook for myriad reasons, 

including staying in touch with family and friends, 

obtaining up-to-the minute news, and gathering 

information to help with transitions and moves. 

Page 52 

52 

Counseling Can Uncover Oppressive Climate 

By Capt. Gary M. Klein and 1st Lt. Brock J. Young 

Regular counseling not only builds trust but can also 

uncover command climate issues. Page 54 

54 

49 

Reading: The Key to 

Critical Thinking 

By Lt. Col. C. Richard Nelson, USA Ret. 

As part of the process of 

connecting ends and means, 

Army leaders must be broadly 

educated and read accordingly— 

beyond briefing books prepared 

by their staffs. Page 49 

2 ARMY ■ March 2016

Letters 

A Fight We Can’t Afford to Lose 

■ Usually, in boxing, a one-two punch 

is good for a knockout, but the one-twothree 

punch in the first three articles in 

the Front & Center section of the January 

issue should certainly foster a wakeup. 

Retired Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen 

(“America: Step Up, Wake Up, Wise 

Up”), Emma Sky (“What Lessons 

Should We Take From the Iraq War?”) 

and retired Lt. Col. James Jay Carafano 

(“Syria Operations Sending All the 

Wrong Signals”) put in perspective the 

absolutely critical situation that faces 

our country, the dangers thereof, and 

the tough road to recovery. Such discussions 

are long overdue and, unfortunately, 

muted. 

I have been around for 93 years and 

have seen the results of our lack of preparedness 

in two world wars, and I do 

not want it to happen again. You have 

made a good start with these splendid 

articles, but the bugle must be sounded 

louder. Please take a deep breath before 

the next issue. 

Maj. Gen. Chet McKeen, USA Ret. 

Fort Worth, Texas 

Recruiting Saw Many Changes 

■ In his January article, “Let’s Solve 

the Army’s Recruiting Challenges,” retired 

Col. Bob Phillips omits mention of 

a third advertising campaign that preceded 

Maj. Gen. Maxwell R. Thurman’s 

arrival as head of the U.S. Army Recruiting 

Command. Recruiting always gets 

tougher when the economy improves and 

inevitably, advertising is looked to as a 

partial solution. I was deputy director of 

advertising and sales promotion for Recruiting 

Command from June 1973 until 

January 1993 and believe knowledge of 

earlier hits and misses can be helpful to 

those now in charge of using advertising 

to help provide the strength. 

The advertising program effectively 

began in 1971 with a campaign designed 

to make young people rethink traditional 

objections to Army life. The slogan “Today’s 

Army Wants to Join You” suggested 

a kindlier welcoming than the average 

new recruit was liable to encounter, 

and aspirations of the Army’s Modern 

Volunteer Army office that were never 

widely implemented were publicized. 

Old soldiers saw it as a threat to good 

order and discipline. Civilian critics wondered 

if it was a misrepresentation. It was 

pulled after two years and replaced with 

“Join the People Who’ve Joined the 

Army,” which ran until 1978. That it did 

so without controversy was mostly because 

lessons learned with the earlier 

campaign had been taken to heart by the 

advertising agency and Army officials responsible 

for approving the ads, but also 

because it was less visible. “Today’s Army” 

had burst on the scene with a major television 

buy, but Congress kept Army advertising 

off TV, the most intrusive (and 

effective) medium, from 1973 to 1978. 

Then, Army recruiting was put on the 

defensive by a congressional staff report 

containing quotes by soldiers in Europe 

alleging lies by recruiters and misleading 

impressions in the advertising. The contract 

advertising agency, N.W. Ayer, addressed 

the problem by creating the 

“This is the Army” campaign, which 

promised a “warts and all” view of Army 

service. This approach was welcomed in 

the Pentagon and the halls of Congress 

but found few fans among struggling recruiters, 

who observed that some of the 

“warts” were mainly helpful to their 

competitors in the other services. 

This was the advertising that Thurman 

found when he arrived at Recruiting 

Command. In an early meeting, he 

told agency executives he wanted it replaced 

with something more upbeat to 

match the many changes in recruiting he 

was about to introduce. They outlined, 

and he approved, an approach that entailed 

best industry practices and catered 

to his formidable analytical demands. 

Unlike his predecessors in command, he 

took an intense interest in the yearlong 

process, reviewing progress in grueling 

monthly sessions and educating the 

agency in important aspects of the “product,” 

notably the Army modernization 

program that would make credible the 

copy line: “In the Army, the Cavalry flies, 

the Infantry rides, and the Artillery can 

hit a fly in the eye 15 miles away.” 

The somewhat dispirited recruiters 

U.S. Army National Guard/1st Lt. Jessica Donnelly 

Members of the South Carolina Army National Guard graduate from the Recruit Sustainment Program. 


Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan, USA Ret. 

President and CEO, AUSA 

Lt. Gen. Guy C. Swan III, USA Ret. 

Vice President, Education, AUSA 

Rick Maze 

Editor-in-Chief 

Liz Rathbun Managing Editor 

Joseph L. Broderick Art Director 

Ferdinand H. Thomas II Sr. Staff Writer 

Toni Eugene 

Associate Editor 

Christopher Wright Production Artist 

Laura Stassi Assistant Managing Editor 

Thomas B. Spincic Assistant Editor 

Contributing Editors 

Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen, USA Ret.; 

Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, USA Ret.; Lt. 

Gen. Daniel P. Bolger, USA Ret.; and 

Brig. Gen. John S. Brown, USA Ret. 

Contributing Writers 

Scott R. Gourley and Rebecca Alwine 

Lt. Gen. Jerry L. Sinn, USA Ret. 

Vice President, Finance and 

Administration, AUSA 

Desiree Hurlocker 

Advertising Production and 

Fulfillment Manager 

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of the military arts and sciences and representing the in terests 

of the U.S. Army. Copyright©2016, by the Association of 

the United States Army. ■ ARTICLES appearing in 

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members of the Council of Trustees of AUSA, or its editors. 

Articles are expressions of personal opin ion and should not 

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Manager, P.O. Box 101560, Arlington, VA 22210-0860. 

got a preview of the new campaign in 

mid-December 1980, a few weeks before 

the first commercials aired, in the form 

of a short film that began with Thurman 

outlining his vision for the recruiting future 

and proceeding to display the first 

two TV spots. They tolerated the lecture 

and applauded the commercials. Spirits 

all around were lifted when jingle writer 

Jake Holmes was heard singing the little 

anthem he had composed, scored and 

recorded over a weekend after the winning 

slogan had been chosen. 

“Be All You Can Be” evolved over the 

next 20 years—a long run for an ad campaign—and 

played an important part in 

recruiting success. In its millennial issue, 

Advertising Age ranked it No. 18 among 

the best 100 ad campaigns of the 20th 

century. 

But the Army is given a large advertising 

budget for finding the very best way 

to convince young people they should 

meet with a recruiter. That must remain 

the main focus of the effort. 

Capt. Thomas W. Evans, 

U.S. Naval Reserve retired 

Mundelein, Ill. 

AUSA FAX NUMBERS 

ARMY magazine welcomes letters to 

the editor. Short letters are more 

likely to be published, and all letters 

may be edited for reasons of style, 

accuracy or space limitations. Letters 

should be exclusive to ARMY magazine. 

All letters must include the 

writer’s full name, address and daytime 

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of letters we receive makes individual 

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send letters to The Editor, ARMY magazine, 

AUSA, 2425 Wilson Blvd., Arlington, 

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be faxed to 703- 841-3505 or sent via 

email to armymag@ausa.org. 

Take Mideast Warnings to Heart 

■ It was interesting to find the sharp 

contrast in the Middle East perspectives 

of Emma Sky, director of Yale World 

Fellows, and retired Lt. Col. James Jay 

Carafano, a Heritage Foundation vice 

president, in the January issue of ARMY 

magazine. 

In “What Lessons Should We Take 

From the Iraq War?” Sky stated that she 

was opposed to the 2003 Iraq War and 

then without specifying blame, succinctly 

wrote a factual sequence of the events 

and consequences. She then provided insightful 

suggestions that are conducive to 

discussion and reflection. 

Carafano wrote an exceedingly critical 

critique of U.S. involvement in the Middle 

East in “Syria Operations Sending 

All the Wrong Signals.” The focus and 

target of his criticism was specific, with 

over a dozen references to President 

Barack Obama and “the administration.” 

Carafano referenced the leadership styles 

of eight presidents, starting with George 

Washington and ending with Ronald 

Reagan, but neglected to mention the 

administration that passed on to Obama 

two active wars and an economy that was 

in the greatest recession since the Great 

Depression. 

It is a complex world. It is my hope 

that all commanders in chief, in concert 

with the American people, will take 

Sky’s warning to heart: “If we don’t learn 

anything from the Iraq War, then all 

that sacrifice, all that loss of blood and 

treasure, will have been for nothing.” 

Col. Tyrone L. Steen, AUS Ret. 

Colorado Springs, Colo. 

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Seven Questions 

Scarce Resource for Soldiers: Good Night’s Sleep 

Lt. Col. Ingrid Lim is the sleep lead for the Army’s Performance 

Triad Division, System for Health Directorate. 

1. When did the Army start studying soldiers’ sleep, and why? 

There is a long tradition of sleep research going back to the 

1950s at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research looking 

at sleep deprivation, fatigue modeling, 

and the impact of various patterns of 

sleep restriction on cognitive performance. 

The Army recognized that sleep 

is a valuable resource. Scientific studies 

and tools are required to optimize soldiers’ 

performance. 

The current interest in studying clinical 

sleep disorders with soldiers came to 

the forefront recently for several reasons. 

Sleep is markedly disturbed from wounds 

sustained in combat such as traumatic 

brain injuries, post-traumatic stress disorder, 

and orthopedic injuries with associated 

pain. Further, the operational tempo 

of combat operations was such that soldiers 

frequently obtained insufficient 

sleep and lacked standard education on 

sleep management and countermeasures. 

2. What have been some of the major 

findings about soldiers’ sleep habits? 

Overall, it is fairly common for soldiers to forgo sleep for military 

duties, poor sleep practices, or the inappropriate perception 

that sleeping is for lazy or weak individuals. 

Texting, watching television or using the computer before 

bed, or not having a bedtime routine, add to the challenges of 

obtaining healthy sleep. Excessive caffeine intake from energy 

drinks, sodas and coffee also plays a role. … Soldiers who perform 

non-daytime duties may choose to spend time with their 

family instead of sleeping. 

3. What methods does the Army use to study sleep? 

Traditional methods used in a sleep lab include observation; 

actigraphy [continuous monitoring by means of a body-worn 

device, often on the wrist] and polysomnography [recording of 

brain waves, oxygen levels in the blood, heart rate and breathing, 

and eye and leg movements]. Sleep is also studied based on 

self-report questionnaires regarding various aspects such as 

sleep quality and duration. 

4. What are some of the next steps planned as a result of the 

findings? 

U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command, the 

Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, and the Biotechnology 

High Performance Computing Software Applications Institute 

are developing tools for individual soldiers and units to 

U.S. Army 

Lt. Col. Ingrid Lim 

help them better manage fatigue and implement sleep-management 

strategies down to the squad level. The Army is also 

determining ways to prevent sleep loss, identify sleep problems 

and sleep disorders, and optimally treat and manage sleep disorders 

in soldiers. 

Despite increased awareness regarding the importance of 

sleep, it is clear that further education is 

required on the health and performance 

benefits of sleep—education that will lead 

to recommendations for Army policies 

that establish appropriate guidelines for 

sleep duration in soldiers, as well as safetyrelated 

policies when adequate sleep is not 

obtained. 

5. What have the Iraq and Afghanistan 

wars shown us about sleep? 

The wars have demonstrated the effectiveness 

of sleep-management planning. 

When soldiers are provided with guidance 

on appropriate sleep management, 

they tend to get better sleep and perform 

their military duties better. A soldier who 

sleeps well is more resilient. 

6. What partnerships has the Army 

formed in the study of sleep? 

We currently have several partnerships 

both within and outside of the Army, 

and are working to proliferate sleep knowledge that is intuitively 

easy to access. The Office of the Surgeon General recently 

hosted a Sleep Summit with representation from major 

Army commands; civilian and Army scientists; clinicians; and 

academics from Harvard University, the University of Pittsburgh, 

the University of Virginia and RAND Corp. This collection 

of renowned sleep experts not only identified specific 

sleep priorities within the Army but developed a way forward to 

accomplish these priorities. 

7. Can you predict what sleep science will look like in the 

coming years? 

As Yogi Berra once observed, “Predictions are hard, especially 

about the future.” It is likely that the future of sleep research 

will include an increased focus on the long-term effects of 

sleep loss on health and an ever-expanding array of issues such 

as post-traumatic stress disorder, Alzheimer’s disease, cancer 

and autoimmune disorders; the short-term negative consequences 

of sleep loss and the positive effects of sleep enhancement 

and/or supplementation on resilience to both psychological 

and physical trauma; and the increased development and 

improvement of technologies that can maximize soldiers’ alertness, 

performance, health and well-being. 

—Thomas B. Spincic 


Washington Report 

Commission: Rough Terrain Ahead for Army 

The final report of the National Commission on the Future 

of the Army fuels a growing concern in Washington, D.C., 

that the Army and the nation could be in trouble and without 

any short-term fixes. 

“Even with budgets permitting a force of 980,000, the Army 

faces significant shortfalls,” the report says, adding that current 

and planned “aviation assets cannot meet 

expected wartime capacity requirements.” 

There are no short-range air defense 

battalions in the Regular Army, and many 

assets in the National Guard are dedicated 

to protecting the nation’s capital, “leaving 

precious little capability for other global 

contingencies, including high-threat areas 

in northeast Asia, southwest Asia, Eastern 

Europe or the Baltics,” the report says. 

Shortfalls also exist in military police, 

field artillery, fuel distribution, water purification, 

missile defense, tactical mobility 

and watercraft; and with chemical, biological, 

radiological and nuclear capabilities. 

“Remedying these shortfalls within a 

980,000-soldier Army will require hard 

choices and difficult trade-offs,” the report says. 

Retired Army Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan, president and CEO 

of the Association of the U.S. Army, said he believes the report 

“provides a rare opportunity to address risky capability 

shortfalls, reinforce the Total Force concept, and convince a 

skeptical Congress and American public there are limits to 

how small the Army should shrink.” 

The commission, headed by retired Gen. Carter F. Ham, 

was established by the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2015. It was tasked with examining the size and 

force structure of the Army’s active and reserve components. 

For political and budgetary reasons, the report says it is “unlikely, 

at least for the next few years,” for the Army to have 

combined active, Army Guard and Army Reserve forces of 

more than 980,000 soldiers. The smart course may be to take 

two infantry brigade combat teams out of the Regular Army to 

free active-duty space for the expanded manning of aviation, 

short-range air defense and other capabilities in short supply. 

Shifting soldiers doesn’t solve all of the problems, the report 

says. “Even if end-strength constraints can be met, the Army 

will need significant additional funding,” it says. The Army will 

be in a better position to ask for and receive money if it works 

with DoD, the White House and Congress on cost-cutting initiatives 

to reduce redundancies and improve efficiency. These efforts 

“will not be enough” to pay for everything. “Added funding 

will eventually be needed if major shortfalls are to be eliminated.” 

The other members of the panel were retired Sgt. Maj. of 

the Army Raymond F. Chandler III; retired Gens. Larry R. 

Ellis and James D. Thurman; retired Lt. Gen. Jack C. Stultz; 

Thomas R. Lamont, a former assistant secretary of the Army; 

Robert F. Hale, a former undersecretary of defense; and 

Kathleen H. Hicks of the Center for Strategic and International 

Studies. 

“Although the commission acknowledges 

the impossibility of precisely predicting 

the future, the commission is certain 

that U.S. leaders will face a variety of simultaneous, 

diverse threats to our national interests 

from both state and non-state actors 

as well as natural and man-made disasters,” 

the report says. 

The commissioners also warn against any 

deeper cuts. A total force of 980,000 uniformed 

personnel “is the minimum sufficient 

force necessary to meet the challenges 

of the future strategic environment,” the report 

says, listing six things the Army could 

emphasize to be better ready to tackle the 

unknown: 

■ Adaptive and flexible leaders are 

needed to respond to new technology and unanticipated enemy 

action. “Army leaders will need to adapt available capabilities 

and technology to unexpected missions,” the report says. 

■ Cyber capabilities need to be improved “due to the 

Army’s increasing reliance on computer networks and the 

growth of cyber capabilities by state and non-state actors.” 

■ Capabilities need to be expanded for urban warfare and 

operations in big cities. 

■ Flexible and smaller unit formations are needed for future 

operations. 

■ Defenses against air, rocket and missile attacks need to be 

improved. 

■ More investment is needed in “game-changing technologies,” 

and also in preparing leaders to know how to exploit the 

new technologies to the fullest advantage. 

A crucial part of the report deals with relations between the 

Regular Army and the reserve components, a situation soured 

by tight budgets that have caused competition for resources 

and attention. The commission has a novel idea for having 

everyone get along, proposing a pilot program that would integrate 

recruiting of active, Army National Guard and Army 

Reserve forces into a single effort. This might result in the 

components better understanding each other, and may also 

save money. 

A tight budget led the Army to cancel combat-training rotations; 

as a result, four Army National Guard units were not 

deployed overseas in 2013, the report notes. 


News Call 

U.S. Air National Guard/Master Sgt. Toby Valadie 

Weather, Events Keep National Guard Busy 

From helping people deal with extreme 

weather to providing security for 

the visiting pope and other special events 

in the U.S., 2015 was a busy year for the 

Army National Guard. And 2016 is 

keeping pace. 

Extreme weather alone made 2015 

the National Guard’s busiest year since 

2011, but the start of 2016 suggested it 

might equal or even eclipse 2015 in 

terms of weather conditions requiring 

National Guard assistance, with a historic 

blizzard blanketing the mid-Atlantic 

states and a shift in the El Nino 

weather pattern bringing record rain 

and historic flooding to states from California 

to Louisiana. 

“On average, about 1,500 Guard 

members were on duty each day” in 2015, 

said Gen. Frank J. Grass, chief of the 

National Guard Bureau. 

In January, Michigan Gov. Rick Snyder 

activated his state’s National Guard 

to distribute drinking water and filters to 

the residents of Flint, a city with a population 

of about 100,000. The city had 

switched its supply source from Lake 

Huron water treated by the Detroit Water 

and Sewerage Department to Flint 

River water treated at the Flint water 

treatment plant. The plant did not add 

corrosion-control chemicals to the water 

A stuck ambulance gets help from Maryland Army National Guard troops during Winter Storm Jonas. 

and it was rendered undrinkable when it 

was contaminated by lead leaching into 

it from pipes and fixtures. 

The National Guard manned five distribution 

sites at fire stations in Flint, 

and was planning to stay active as long as 

necessary. 

Also in January, Winter Storm Jonas 

dropped more than 2 feet of snow and 

packed 70 mph wind gusts in the mid- 

Atlantic region, closing the federal government 

as well as local governments 

and hundreds of schools for days. Governors 

from 11 states including Georgia, 

North Carolina, New York and 

New Jersey called up more than 2,200 

National Guard personnel. The soldiers 

transported medical patients and 

providers and helped transport emergency 

responders to their calls. 

The year 2015 began with snowstorms 

smothering the South and Midwest 

while Western forests burned to the 

ground. Storms raged through Massachusetts, 

Virginia and Tennessee. Spring 

brought a record fire season in states 

from North Dakota to New York, and 

more flooding in Texas and Oklahoma. 

In September, National Guard units 

in New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey 

and Washington, D.C., helped provide 

security and traffic assistance for Pope 

Francis’s visit. National Guard members 

from several other states including 

West Virginia, Massachusetts, Alaska, 

With flooding expected in January, soldiers from 

the Louisiana Army National Guard repair a levee. 

Maryland Army National Guard 


Kentucky, Delaware, Nebraska, Maryland 

and California also supported the 

mission. 

As 2015 ended, National Guard soldiers 

from New Mexico to Missouri 

were still cleaning up snow, transporting 

patients to doctors, and fighting flooding. 

More than 600 members of the 

Missouri National Guard assisted emergency 

responders in that state. Then, a 

series of record storms dropped snow 

and rain on California, sparking flash 

floods and mudslides. 

The El Nino phenomenon, when the 

central Pacific Ocean warms, disrupted 

established weather patterns around the 

world. Meteorologists have rated the 

current El Nino as strong as the one that 

occurred in 1997–98, when California 

and Southern states were deluged and 

the Northern half of the country suffered 

record-breaking cold. 

Report: Delaying Modernization 

Leads to Higher Price Tags 

A new report about the affordability of 

military modernization programs projects 

the Army will increase weapons 

spending 28 percent by fiscal year 2022, 

with an increase in spending on ground 

systems but a “sharp reduction” in aircraft. 

The Center for Strategic and International 

Studies report, by analyst Todd 

Harrison, discusses the so-called “bow 

wave” effect of constantly delaying weapons 

modernization, resulting in the cumulative 

price tag slowly rising. “The 

modernization bow wave cannot be pushing 

into the future indefinitely,” Harrison 

warns in “Defense Modernization Plans 

Through the 2020s: Addressing the Bow 

Wave.” “Difficult choices lie ahead if the 

modernization bow wave proves too 

steep to climb,” he writes. 

Army acquisition funding is low because 

of the cancellation of the Future 

Combat Systems and the Ground Combat 

Vehicle, and the winding down of 

building MRAPs, Harrison writes. Now, 

the Army is ramping up funding for five 

major vehicle programs over the next five 

years and modernizing several communications 

systems. The Joint Light Tactical 

Vehicle program is the largest program, 

with production expected through fiscal 

year 2040 at a rate of about 2,200 vehicles 

a year. 

SoldierSpeak 

On Challenges 

“I distinctly remember challenging myself to work harder, to be as fast or as 

strong or as skilled or as smart as many of you. It was a healthy competition that inspired 

me to be better every single day,” said Brig. Gen. Diana M. Holland upon 

assuming command as the first female officer to serve as commandant of cadets at 

the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y. 

On Leading the Pack 

“We need resilient, mentally and physically fit soldiers of character who can become 

competent, committed, agile and adaptive leaders who can perform for 

these cohesive teams of trusted professionals and represent the diversity of America,” 

said Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, Lt. Gen. James C. McConville during a visit 

to Fort Leonard Wood, Mo. “Young people want to be on a team that does important 

stuff. They’re the type of soldiers we want in our Army.” 

On Family Role Models 

“I want to feel the same pride and responsibility as my father has shown,” said 

Kerrigan B. Head as her dad, a 10th Mountain Division chief warrant officer, swore 

her in at a Military Entrance Processing Station in Syracuse, N.Y. “I enlisted in the 

Army out of all the other branches because I’ve already lived the Army life since I 

was 3 years old, and I have seen what can be offered to me through the work of my 

father. I want to continue my education and create my own adventures.” 

On Imagination as Secret Ingredient 

“I wish I had these dishes in basic” training, said Pvt. Yorby Fernandez, a culinary 

specialist with the 145th Maintenance Company, New York Army National 

Guard, and a judge in a contest for Hudson Valley high school students to 

turn randomly chosen MRE components into creative, tasty meals complete with 

drink and dessert. “They did an amazing job,” Fernandez said. 

On Being Prepared 

“The worst thing you can ever do in any situation is not do anything at all,” said 

Spc. Jake Planatscher, a medic with the 705th Military Police Detention Battalion, 

Fort Leavenworth, Kan., who was named a “Hero of the Month” for his 

contributions to the Joint Regional Correctional Facility for military inmates. 

On Helping Neighbors 

“What I’ve enjoyed the most is seeing the reactions from the senior citizens and 

all veterans we’ve been helping,” said Pfc. Nestor Renteria when the 717th 

Brigade Support Battalion, New Mexico Army National Guard, based in 

Roswell, helped fellow residents and local emergency services recover after a 

historic blizzard crippled the town. 

On Suicide Intervention 

“A person at risk feels like they have nothing to live for,” said Sgt. Charles 

Stokes, motor transport operator with the 1st Armored Division, who was recognized 

at Fort Bliss, Texas, for successful suicide interventions. “So you have to 

help that person find a turning point, a reason to live. You find that from hearing 

out their story.” 

On Unmanned Aerial Systems 

“One of the drawbacks is that UAVs can’t get people to come out because they 

can’t see them,” said Chief Warrant Officer 3 Jason Richards, a Kiowa pilot with 

the 82nd Airborne Division, during the helicopter’s last rotation at Fort Polk, La. 

“They see us and we scare them, and that forces them to come out and fight, then 

we shoot them.” 


GENERAL OFFICER CHANGES* 

Maj. Gen. M.A. 

Bills from CG, 1st 

Cavalry Div., Fort 

Hood, Texas, to 

Asst. CoS, C-3/J-3, 

UNC/CFC/USFK, 

ROK. 

Maj. Gen. J.C. 

Thomson III from 

Cmdt. of Cadets, 

USMA, West Point, 

N.Y., to CG, 1st 

Cavalry Div., Fort 

Hood. 

Brigadier Generals: P. Bontrager from Cmdr., 

TAAC-S, RSM, NATO, OFS, Afghanistan, to Dep. 

CG, 10th Mountain Div. (Light) and Acting Senior 

Cmdr., Fort Drum, N.Y.; D.M. Holland 

from Dep. CG, Spt., 10th Mountain Div., Fort 

Drum, to Cmdr. of Cadets, USMA. 

■ CG—Commanding General; CoS—Chief of 

Staff; OFS—Operation Freedom’s Sentinel; 

ROK—Republic of Korea; RSM—Resolute Support 

Mission; Spt.—Support; TAAC-S—Train Advise 

Assist Cmd.-South; UNC/CFC/USFK—United 

Nations Cmd./Combined Forces Cmd./U.S. Forces 

Korea; USMA—U.S. Military Academy. 

*Assignments to general officer slots announced 

by the General Officer Management Office, Department 

of the Army. Some officers are listed at 

the grade to which they are nominated, promotable 

or eligible to be frocked. The reporting 

dates for some officers may not yet be determined. 

Army Fatalities in Iraq 

The following U.S. Army soldier 

died supporting Operation Inherent 

Resolve from Jan. 1-31. His 

name was released through DoD; 

his family has been notified. 

Sgt. Joseph F. Stifter, 30 

Army Fatalities in Afghanistan 

The following U.S. Army soldier 

died supporting Operation Freedom’s 

Sentinel from Jan. 1–31. 

His name was released through 

DoD; his family has been notified. 

Staff Sgt. Matthew Q. McClintock, 

30 

Also in development is the Armored 

Multi-Purpose Vehicle, a replacement 

for the Paladin 155 mm self-propelled 

artillery, upgrading Abrams tanks, and 

improvements in Bradley Infantry Fighting 

Vehicles. “Together these programs 

will increase funding for the Army’s major 

ground systems learning threefold between 

FY 2015 and FY 2021,” Harrison 

writes. 

Aviation funding is declining, Harrison 

says, because several major aircraft 

programs are ending, including the MQ- 

1C Grey Eagle, CH-47F Chinook, 

AH-64E Apache and UH-60M Black 

Hawk. The Army is still spending on 

aviation procurement, with upgraded 

turbine engines for the Apache and 

Black Hawk helicopters and development 

of vertical lift helicopters. 

The Army is just a small part of acquisition 

expansion, Harrison says, noting 

there are 120 major programs underway 

or planned to start in the next 15 years, 

not including classified programs. 

‘Health of the Force’ Report 

Prescribes Performance Progress 

Active-duty soldiers could greatly improve 

their personal performance—and 

with it the Army’s readiness—by getting 

more sleep, increasing their physical activity, 

and eating healthier foods, according 

to the U.S. Army Medical Command. 

The first-of-its-kind report, called 

Health of the Force, tracks chronic disease, 

obesity, tobacco use and numerous other 

health factors as well as the Performance 

Triad of sleep, physical activity and nutrition 

to create a snapshot of soldiers’ 

health across 30 major installations. 

The Army focuses on the Performance 

Triad, or P3, as a way to proactively promote 

health and prevention instead of 

dealing with chronic problems that develop 

over time. Given 100 as a perfect 

P3 score, the Army targeted 85 as an acceptable 

score for soldiers. No installation 

made the cut. They averaged 67 in 

sleep, 81 in activity, and 69 in nutrition. 

The lack of any one of the three critical 

factors has a major impact on Army 

readiness. More than a third of newly accessioned 

soldiers fail to complete their 

first enlistment term. About 17 percent 

of active-duty soldiers cannot be medically 

ready to deploy with three days’ 

notice; simple failure to keep up with 

dental and medical checkups accounts 

for one-third of that number. Each 

month, some 1,400 soldiers are unavailable 

to deploy due to medical factors. 

According to the report, which uses 

2014 data and was released in December, 

78,000 soldiers are clinically obese, 

and it costs the Army more than 

$75,000 per new recruit to replace soldiers 

discharged due to weight control. 

Briefs 

Driverless Army Trucks Appear 

At North American Auto Show 

The U.S. Army had an attention-getting 

display at the 2016 North American 

International Auto Show in Detroit: two 

example of driverless technology exhibited 

by the U.S. Army Tank Automotive 

Research, Development and Engineering 

Center. 

There was, of course, a Google autonomous 

car at the show, but the Army 

showed off its own driverless vehicles. 

They are a Peterbilt Class 8 semitractor 

commercial vehicle and an M915, a heavy 

truck used for long-distance logistics. 

The Warren, Mich.-based Army automotive 

command has been testing driverless 

truck technology for several years. 

Rather than starting from scratch, the 

Army has joined in research with commercial 

truck manufacturers and automakers 

that also see a future in driverless vehicles, 

if a few hurdles can be overcome. The 

Army has been making steady progress in 

research, with hopes of fielding the first 

driverless convoy around 2025. 

The U.S. Army has had convoys of 

self-driving vehicles in testing for years. 

Sending driverless vehicles into combat 

creates problems that don’t appear on 

interstate highways, but the Army continues 

to explore the possibility of selfdriving 

trucks to deliver supplies on humanitarian 

missions and resupply some 

troops in the field, with the potential of 

lower costs and fewer accidents. 

Paul D. Rogers, director of the Army 

program, has described driverless vehicles 

as a potentially significant safety 

measure. That is because many attacks 

on soldiers happen along supply routes. 

A convoy of driverless vehicles could deliver 

the same amount of material as a 

convoy with drivers, without concern 

about fatigued soldiers or injuries. 

First Multicomponent Army Unit, 

2nd BCT Support Inherent Resolve 

The headquarters of 101st Airborne 

Division (Air Assault), the first multicomponent 

unit in the Army, and the 


COMMAND SERGEANTS MAJOR 

and 

SERGEANTS MAJOR CHANGES* 

*Command sergeants major and 

sergeants major positions assigned to 

general officer commands. 

Command Sgt. 

Maj. M.T. Brady 

from U.S. Army 

WTC to RHC-A (P), 

Fort Belvoir, Va. 

Sgt. Maj. J. Cecil 

from PRMC Ops., 

Honolulu, to MED- 

COM G-3/5/7, 

Falls Church, Va. 

Command Sgt. 

Maj. M.L. Cosper 

from USAG Fort 

Hood, Texas, to 

JTF-Guantanamo 

Bay, Cuba. 

Command Sgt. Maj. 

V.G. Culp from 7th 

Transportation Bde. 

(Expeditionary), Fort 

Eustis, Va., to U.S. 

Army Transportation 

Corps and School, 

Fort Lee, Va. 

Command Sgt. 

Maj. D. Curry from 

311th Signal Cmd. 

(T), Fort Shafter, 

Hawaii, to NETCOM, 

Fort Huachuca, Ariz. 

Command Sgt. 

Maj. H.E. Dunn 

from 20th CBRNE 

Cmd., APG, Md., to 

Sgt. Maj., FORSCOM 

G-3, Fort Bragg, N.C. 

Command Sgt. 

Maj. R.C. Luciano 

from PRMC, Honolulu, 

to DHA, Falls 

Church. 

Command Sgt. 

Maj. L. Thomas Jr. 

from USAR to Sgt. 

Maj., Senior Enlisted 

Advisor to 

the ASD (M&RA). 

Command Sgt. 

Maj. J.P. Wills 

from 99th Regional 

Support Cmd., JB 

McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, 

N.J., to USAR. 

■ APG—Aberdeen Proving Ground; ASD (M&RA)—Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; Bde.—Brigade; CBRNE—Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives Cmd.; DHA—Defense Health Agency; FORSCOM—U.S. Army Forces Cmd.; JB—Joint Base; JTF—Joint Task Force; MEDCOM—U.S. 

Army Medical Cmd.; NETCOM—U.S. Army Network Enterprise Technology Cmd.; PRMC—Pacific Regional Medical Cmd.; RHC-A (P)—Regional Health Cmd.-Atlantic 

(Provisional); T—Theater; USAG—U.S. Army Garrison; USAR—U.S. Army Reserve; WTC—Warrior Transition Cmd. 

SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE 

ANNOUNCEMENTS 

G. Garcia, Tier 2, 

from Exec. Dir., ITA, 

OAASA, to Dir. for 

Corp. Info., Office 

of the USACE, 

Washington, D.C. 

D. Jimenez, Tier 2, 

from Exec. Technical 

Dir./Dep. to the 

Cmdr., HQ, ATEC, 

APG, Md., to Asst. 

to the DUSA/Dir. of 

Test and Eval., Office 

of the DUSA, 

Washington, D.C. 

Tier 1: G. Kitkowski to Regional Business Dir., 

USACE, Pacific Ocean Div., Fort Shafter, Hawaii. 

■ APG—Aberdeen Proving Ground; ATEC— 

U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Cmd.; DUSA— 

Deputy Undersecretary of the Army; ITA—U.S. 

Army Information Technology Agency; 

OAASA—Office of the Administrative Assistant 

to the Secretary of the Army; USACE—U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers. 

2nd Brigade Combat Team are deploying 

this spring to support Operation Inherent 

Resolve and will train Iraqi security 

forces in the fight against the Islamic 

State group. Last June, about 65 members 

of the Wisconsin Army National 

Guard became part of the 101st’s headquarters, 

and in January they boarded 

buses to Fort Campbell, Ky., to take part 

in predeployment training there. 

Joining them at Fort Campbell were 

53 intelligence soldiers from the Utah 

National Guard who are also part of the 

new unit and will provide technical support. 

Approximately 500 101st soldiers 

complete the headquarters, which is part 

of the Army initiative to integrate reserve 

component soldiers with activeduty 

soldiers while increasing specific 

areas of expertise or filling gaps in specialties 

such as intelligence. The 2nd 

BCT will deploy with about 1,300 soldiers; 

the deployment is a routine rotation 

of nine months. 

Secretary of Defense Ash Carter spoke 

to the soldiers in January at Fort Campbell. 

He outlined an accelerated campaign 

against the Islamic State that will include 

retaking their headquarters city of Mosul. 

The task “will not be easy, and it will not 

be quick,” Carter said. “The training you 

will provide … will be critical.” 

AUSA Simplifies Membership 

Fees, Offers 2-Year Discount 

The Association of the U.S. Army has 

announced a new, streamlined membership 

fee structure, one that allows new 

and renewing members to pay $30 for a 

two-year membership and $50 for a fiveyear 

membership. 

The cost of an AUSA Life membership 

is $300. A discounted rate of $10 for two 

years is available for E-1s to E-4s (private 

through corporal/specialist), and for U.S. 

Military Academy and ROTC cadets. 

AUSA is a 66-year-old educational 

nonprofit organization supporting the 

Army, including soldiers and civilian 

workers, all active and reserve component 

members, veterans and retirees, family 

members and defense industry partners. 

“Now more than ever, America’s Army 

needs AUSA, and AUSA needs your 

membership support,” said retired Sgt. 

Maj. of the Army Kenneth O. Preston, 

director of AUSA’s Noncommissioned 

Officer and Soldier Programs, noting the 

turbulent times facing the Army and the 

many national security risks facing the 

United States. 

AUSA hosts national and local programs, 

including professional development 

forums and exhibitions. Membership includes 

subscriptions to the nationally 

recognized ARMY magazine and AUSA 

News, and weekly email updates about 

Army-related news and events. 

—Stories by Toni Eugene 


Front & Center 

The Risk of Another Unsuccessful War 

By Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen, U.S. Army retired 

The Jan. 10 New York Times Magazine 

article “The Empty Threat of ‘Boots 

on the Ground’” raises again the question 

of how to fight modern wars, comparing 

two “very long, very costly … not 

very successful wars”—Iraq and Afghanistan—with 

1995, when President Bill 

Clinton “managed to end the fighting 

in Bosnia … through air power alone.” 

Upon reading that, retired Gen. Gordon 

Sullivan, president and CEO of the 

Association of the U.S. Army, added, 

“but only when the NATO allies had 

fielded a 57,000 NATO implementation 

force ready to invade the area.” The air 

campaign set the stage and the cease-fire 

precluded an immediate combat assault, 

but that NATO force then crossed the 

Bosnian border, quelled the conflict and 

achieved the objectives initially sought. 

Final success depended on occupying the 

land and controlling the population. 

Nevertheless, “boots on the ground” 

ever since have had to deal with the perception 

that air power such as bombing 

and drone strikes can win modern wars. 

Boots on the ground promise a return to 

long, drawn-out conflicts, serious casualty 

rates for both soldiers and civilians, 

and inconclusive declarations of mission 

accomplishment. The wars in Korea, 

Vietnam and Iraq are examples of such 

campaigns. 

The argument is not new. It began a 

century ago when the fledgling air forces 

of the World War I Allies demonstrated 

long-range bombers, sank a U.S. warship, 

then promised that air power could 

win World War II. Even after the end of 

hostilities in Europe, air power advocates 

believed that a few more months of the 

air campaign would have negated the 

need for the land forces’ D-Day invasion. 

Then the atomic bombs ended hostilities 

with Japan, but the war objectives 

were achieved only during the five years 

of occupation that followed. 

The land power argument is anchored 

on the realization that wars are won 

when soldiers occupy terrain, dominate 

populations, and achieve the political objectives 

of their parent government. 

Cease-fires, truces, armistices and even 

surrenders do not end wars; only the creation 

of new governments or new lasting 

allegiances bring finality to the total 

campaign. Conquest is the ultimate solution, 

but it’s not always the objective. 

U.S. Army/Spc. Steven Hitchcock 

Land power advocates point to World 

War II, Operation Just Cause in Panama 

and Operation Desert Storm as examples 

of when properly organized, manned, 

equipped and trained forces ended conflicts 

and achieved objectives in good 

time and with minimum casualties— 

though minimum is a relative term. 

Compare, for example, the casualty 

count from 1939 to May 1944 with 

those of the next year, when land power 

forces adequate to the task had been 

built and committed. 

Resolution of the argument is not imminent, 

but an understanding of the 

costs, time required and objectives associated 

with any contemplated military 

campaign is vital in today’s world. The 

presidential candidates for our upcoming 

election are all being asked about their 

solutions for the current Middle East situation. 

Their answers offer carpet bombing, 

no-fly zones, varying ground force 

scenarios, or a continuation of current 

actions. None seems to give evidence of 

understanding the need to identify the 

objectives to be sought, the costs, the 

forces necessary, and the time to prepare 

for a major effort. 

Presidents never ask “Are you ready?” 

They should understand that the current 

Army can respond to a crisis overnight, 

but that sustaining a major operation requires 

an immediate start to build the total 

force essential for the campaign. In 

World War II, that took two and a half 

years. For the Kuwait liberation, it required 

six months to organize the allied 

force of more than 500,000 that finished 

its combat job in 100 hours. For the Iraq 

invasion, when then-Army Chief of 

Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki expressed a 

need for 300,000 soldiers to satisfy the 

mission requirements, his recommendation 

was rebuffed and the Iraq War 

never reached a satisfactory conclusion. 

The Afghanistan War is being pursued 

in like fashion, and its conclusion will 

most likely end in like fashion. 

This article is not an effort to influence 

a political decision to initiate or 

participate in a military campaign in the 

Middle East. It is not an attempt to reconcile 

the differing views concerning air 

and land force campaigns. It is, instead, a 

hope that those who generate conceptions 

for conducting our next military excursion 

will fully consider the costs, the 

forces, the sustaining means, the time, 

the risks to achieving the objectives desired, 

and the pre- and post-activities 

that will be required to ensure we will 

not be adding another “not very successful 

war” to our list. 

■ 

Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen, USA Ret., formerly 

served as vice chief of staff of the 

U.S. Army and commander in chief of 

U.S. Army Europe. He is a senior fellow 

of AUSA’s Institute of Land Warfare. 


Definition of ‘Decisive’ Depends on Context 

By Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, U.S. Army retired 

Words matter, for they reflect the 

quality of thinking and affect the 

judgments we make and the actions we 

take. In our everyday speech about the 

Army and what it does, the term “decisive” 

is often used as an absolute. For example, 

“The Army is the decisive force.” 

The problem is, decisive is a relative 

term in three important and relevant 

senses. First, decisive is relative to context; 

second, to combinations; and third, 

to proper use. 

Every branch of service claims it is decisive. 

Most of the time in war, though, 

each service contributes importantly to 

achieving objectives. “Jointness” is the 

idea that in any given tactical or operational 

situation, a commander should 

select the service capabilities necessary 

to achieve the objectives assigned, but 

these capabilities are only sufficient 

when they are combined and employed 

properly. 

This reminds us all that each service’s 

capabilities and the proper employment 

of these capabilities are most often necessary, 

but not sufficient. Individually, 

each can rarely guarantee the outcome, 

but together they can. They are decisive 

only in properly used combinations. 

When the term decisive is used in an 

absolute way, it hides the reality of 

fighting. 

Everything said of jointness is also 

true of combined arms warfare. Many 

tactical matters are settled only by a 

proper mix of direct and indirect fires, 

and of fire and maneuver. Further, producing 

a definite result in tactical matters 

often rests on the quality and use of 

intelligence and effective logistics planning 

and execution. Fire, maneuver, intelligence 

and logistics are each absolutely 

necessary, but they are sufficient 

only when properly combined. 

At this point, many veterans of Iraq 

and Afghanistan would be right to point 

out that in multiple cases, fighting was 

resolved only when kinetic, combined 

arms were mixed with nonkinetic action. 

In these cases, even properly mixed 

combined arms could not be decisive in 

the sense of producing a definite result; 

depending on the objective, nonkinetic 

actions were also necessary. 

Simply put, decisiveness is a function 

of at least these elements: the level of 

war, the type of war, the aim or objective, 

and the period of the war. Perhaps 

equally important, producing a decisive 

result requires not only the right component 

capabilities—military and nonmilitary—but 

also their proper use. With respect 

to decisiveness, the quality of the 

decision and its execution matter as much 

as having the right parts. 

Level of War 

Even though complexity and ambiguity 

at the tactical level are often quite 

high, tactical examples are relatively easy 

to grasp. Actions that have decisive results 

at the tactical level do not, however, 

merely aggregate to the operational 

or strategic levels. The art, science and 

logic of good tactics are different from 

campaigning at the operational level, 

and different still at the strategic level of 

war. A good tactician is unlikely to succeed 

as an operational artist if he or she 

merely expands tactical thinking and 

procedures to campaigns. 

Military campaigns unfold over time. 

The dynamic nature of war assures that 

the conditions at the start of a campaign 

will not be the same as those at the end. 

So proper use of a particular campaign’s 

elements requires an adaptive decisionmaking 

process. Such a process involves 

the ability to sense the gap between the 

realities unfolding on the battlefield and 

the desired outcomes of the campaign, 

and then the issuing of instructions to 

adapt actions to reality. 

A military campaign is designed to attain 

part of a strategic aim, or set the 

conditions for the attainment of a strategic 

aim. So decisiveness at the operational 

level may mean not settling a 

matter, but producing a definitive result 

that, in turn, sets the conditions for 

other acts—whether military or not—to 

settle an issue. 

Decisiveness at the strategic level is 

even more difficult. Strategic leaders use 

campaigns, but the art, science and logic 

of attaining strategic aims are different 

from that of campaigning. Settling a war 

involves much more than settling a fight. 

The elements necessary to produce a decisive 

wartime strategic result include, 

but are not limited to, military capabilities. 

And the proper use of strategic elements 

requires information gathering 

and analysis, decisionmaking processes 

and adaptive methodologies wider than 

just military. Further, because war is essentially 

dynamic, using existing bureaucracies—inherently 

not good at doing 

anything new or fast—often decreases 

the quality of strategic-level understanding, 

deciding, acting and adapting. 

Types of War 

Decisive actions, or actions that produce 

a definitive result and settle a matter 

at each level of war, change with the 

type of war that is being waged. In a 

conventional war, military force— 

whether combined arms or joint—can 

often be decisive at the tactical and operational 

levels. Such a use of force can 

settle much of the matter at hand and 

set the conditions for complete settlement 

at the strategic level. But not all 

wars are conventional. 

In many irregular wars, military 

force—regardless of how skillfully used— 

is merely necessary but not sufficient 

even at the tactical and operational levels. 

In an irregular war, decisive force 

takes on an entirely different hue. The 

meaning of “force” itself changes to 

“forces”; that is, military force becomes 

one of many types of forces necessary to 

produce a decisive result—diplomatic, 

economic and informational forces, for 

example. The term “proper use” also 

changes. An irregular war requires that 

the varieties of forces involved be sufficiently 

integrated from the tactical 

through the strategic levels because in 

irregular war, the levels of understanding, 

deciding, acting and adapting differ 

from those of conventional wars. 

Aim or Objective 

Unconditional surrender, the aim relative 

to both Germany and Japan in 

World War II, differs from the Korean 

War’s aim of re-establishing the 38th 

Parallel border between North and 


South Korea. These two aims differ 

from enforcing the Dayton Accords in 

Bosnia or sustaining a free, democratic 

and non-Communist South Vietnam— 

and all differ from the aim of destroying 

al-Qaida or the Islamic State group. As 

military strategist Carl von Clausewitz 

explains in On War, “The smaller the 

penalty you demand from your opponent, 

the less you can expect him to try 

and deny it to you; the smaller the effort 

he makes, the less you need to make 

yourself. … The political object … will 

thus determine both the military objective 

to be reached and the amount of effort 

it requires.” 

Producing decisive results—whether 

at the tactical, operational or strategic 

level—differs according to the war’s aim, 

as do the elements necessary to produce 

those results. Different aims also require 

adjustments to methodologies and organizations 

necessary to understand, decide, 

act and adapt. 

Period of War 

Wars have a beginning, middle and 

end, and decisiveness changes at each 

point. The Iraq War provides a good example. 

The actions necessary to produce 

decisive results at the beginning of the 

war, which was the period focused on 

removing the Saddam Hussein regime, 

changed when that task was accomplished. 

The Surge of 2007–08 provides 

another good example. The mix of 

forces—military and nonmilitary—that 

were tactically and operationally decisive 

could not be decisive strategically. Yet 

because many leaders equated war with 

fighting, the belief was that the war was 

over when the fighting seemed to be 

mostly over. 

This false belief was fed by at least 

three intellectual errors: not recognizing 

that tactical and operational decisiveness, 

in this case, meant only that 

the conditions were set for strategic 

decisive action; not recognizing that 

tactical and operational decisive action 

closed the middle of the war, but not 

the end; and not recognizing that to 

achieve decisive action strategically and 

end the war, both the mix of forces and 

how they would be used should have 

changed. 

Having the right mix of military and 

nonmilitary forces is one thing; proper 

use—in other words, using them well— 

is quite another. Whether at the tactical, 

operational or strategic level, using forces 

involves at least three dimensions. 

The first is an intellectual dimension. 

Here, the task is to align the objective 

with the ways and means that success at 

attaining that objective requires. The 

second, an organizational dimension, 

recognizes that plans have to be turned 

into action and thus, includes the need 

for proper organizations and methodologies 

for understanding, deciding, acting 

and adapting. Execution matters, 

and unity of effort in execution does not 

happen by chance. War is dynamic at 

each of its levels so regardless of level, 

having systems and organizations in 

place that will allow continual realignment 

of ends, ways and means and sufficiently 

cohesive action throughout increases 

the probability of success. 

Last, proper use includes the dimension 

of moral and social legitimacy. Americans 

hold soldiers and their leaders responsible 

for the decisions and actions they take 


even in the midst of battle. In combat, the 

hardest decisions are often made by those 

on the spot, under the harshest conditions 

and at the highest risks. Certainly, some 

circumstances might mitigate judgment, 

explaining why we might accept behaviors 

in combat that would be unacceptable in 

other situations. 

Mitigations Prove the Rule 

These mitigations, however, prove the 

rule. Reactions to the My Lai Massacre 

in Vietnam, the abuses in the Abu 

Ghraib prison in Iraq, the killing of civilians 

in the Iraqi city of Haditha, the “kill 

team” murders in Afghanistan and the 

Marines urinating on Taliban corpses 

also highlight the rule, not the exception. 

We not only held responsible those who 

committed these acts, but also their leaders 

who knew of these actions but did 

nothing to prevent them or said nothing 

afterward. We may understand the difficulty, 

uncertainty and urgency under 

which soldiers and leaders make difficult 

decisions and take actions, but this understanding 

has limits and does not erase 

the expectation of moral agency. 

Legitimacy has a strategic aspect, too. 

The American people expect senior political 

and military leaders to succeed. 

According to research done by multiple 

scholars in 2005 and 2006, Americans 

will support a war and the casualties it 

produces under three conditions: They 

generally believe the war is right, that we 

can succeed, and that we are making 

progress toward success. Legitimacy on 

the battlefield and in the capital are 

equally important. 

For the use of force to be decisive, all 

elements must come into play as a sufficiently 

coherent set. No doubt achieving 

decisive results at all levels of war is 

complex and difficult, but complexity 

and difficulty don’t change the reality of 

leadership requirements. Understanding 

decisiveness accurately matters in how 

the military profession teaches itself and 

prepares leaders to fulfill their responsibilities. 

An accurate understanding is helpful, 

too, in constructing education and training 

programs as well as in making decisions 

about force structure and composition. 

It is also helpful in how senior 

leaders offer military advice to their 

civilian bosses. And an accurate understanding 

of decisiveness is very helpful 

in waging war well. Words matter. ■ 

Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, USA Ret., 

Ph.D., is a former commander of Multi- 

National Security Transition Command- 

Iraq and a senior fellow of AUSA’s Institute 

of Land Warfare. 

Refugees Display Courage to Move Forward 

By Emma Sky 

Despite the harsh winter weather, 

around 3,000 refugees a day are still 

arriving on the shores of Greece, fleeing 

the wars in the Middle East. At the beginning 

of the year, I followed their journey 

through Europe. I started out at Edomeni, 

near the Greece-Macedonia border. 

At a nearby gas station, some young 

Afghan men sat in the cafe. They gave 

the names of the cities and provinces 

they came from in Afghanistan. I had 

visited each place during my deployment 

to their country but did not tell 

them so. I pulled up a chair at a table 

outside in the cold with some Syrian 

men and their kids. 

One told me he was a Kurd from Dera 

who had escaped to Iraqi Kurdistan, 

across Turkey, to Greece. He had been 

on the road for a month. He was running 

short of money but hoped to make 

it to Germany. The other, a Syrian Arab, 

told me he was against both the Syrian 

regime and the Free Syrian Army. “They 

are all bad,” he said. 

The refugees’ hopes and dreams appeared 

to be so basic: to live their lives, 

feel safe, feel wanted. One of the Syrians 

offered me a cigarette. No thank you, I 

declined. He insisted, but I refused. 

Even there, in the cold unknown, the 

Syrians tried to show me, the stranger in 

their midst, the hospitality of home. 

I approached the border crossing, 

watching as refugees walked down the 

railway tracks and into a tent to have 

their papers checked. A flap of the tent 

lifted and a girl, perhaps about 8 years 

old and wearing a red hijab, poked her 

head through. 

“What’s your name?” I asked her. 

“Raghed,” she responded. “Where are 

you from?” “Iraq!” she said before she 

disappeared again into the tent. 

Minutes later, I watched her and her 

family exit the tent through a barbedwire 

corridor and cross over the rail 

tracks and into Macedonia. Only Syrians, 

Iraqis and Afghans were being allowed 

to cross the border into Macedonia. 

The rest were sent back to Athens. 

After the shambles over the summer, a 

more systematic way had been found to 

control the movement of refugees—and 

to stop them from going to places where 

they were not welcome. They no longer 

needed to walk. Now, they were being 

provided with transport to move quickly 

onward, at staggered intervals, to countries 

that had agreed to take them in. 

Once in Macedonia, the refugees were 

put on buses that took them across the 

country to Serbia. In Serbia, they were 

then bused through to the town of Sid, 

west of Belgrade, and transferred to 

trains on toward Croatia. 

It was dark and snowing by the time I 

crossed the Croatian border and found 

the refugee transit camp at Slavonski 

Brod, thanks to the precise directions of 

an official from the United Nations 

refugee agency, UNHCR. The refugees 

had disembarked from the train and entered 

a tent where they were fingerprinted 

and processed before being allowed 

to travel on to Slovenia. In a larger 

tent, a number of nongovernmental organization 

workers were handing out 

cups of hot tea, a satchel to one child per 

family, and warm clothes and blankets. 

Each refugee was handed a bag that contained 

food and water. 

It was well below freezing, but the 

refugees showed tremendous resilience 

and good spirits. I saw lots of young men 

in small groups. Some were related, 

some had gotten to know each other on 

the road. I also saw husbands and wives 

with their young children. There were 

very few old people and very few teenage 


girls or unmarried women. The most 

vulnerable refugees were identified and 

given extra care. Children were mostly 

well-wrapped in warm coats, hats and 

scarves. A couple of women looked exhausted. 

One wanted to find a place 

where she could breastfeed her baby. 

Most of those I talked to were from 

Syria, but one or two were Iraqi. 

They had all fled to Turkey, taken boats 

to Greece, and from there had bused and 

trained up to here. “Weren’t you afraid of 

the sea?” I asked one man. “Yes, I was 

very afraid,” he responded. Most had used 

their savings to pay smugglers to take 

them in small dinghies from Turkey to 

the Greek islands. This trip was perilous, 

with thousands drowning. But still they 

came. As the Kenyan-born, U.K.-based 

poet Warsan Shire wrote in “Home”: 

You have to understand, 

that no one puts their children in a boat 

unless the water is safer than the land. 

Little official information seemed available. 

But details went back and forth over 

the mobile messaging app WhatsApp 

with relatives and friends who had made 

the trip before them. When I asked 

refugees where they were headed, most 

had their eyes set on Germany. 

In 2015, Germany accepted over a 

million migrants, half of whom were 

Syrians. In her New Year’s address, German 

Chancellor Angela Merkel urged 

Germans to welcome refugees and to be 

“self-confident and free, humanitarian 

and open to the world.” She told them 

not to listen to racists who harbor “hatred 

in their hearts.” She acknowledged 

that coping with immigration will cost 

Germany “time, effort and money,” but 

she pledged that handled right, the challenges 

of today would be the “opportunities 

of tomorrow.” 

Merkel did not make the decision to 

accept so many refugees based on opinion 

polls or to curry favor. She is doing 

what she believes is the right thing to do, 

consistent with her values as well as Germany’s 

long-term interests to address 

their declining population numbers. The 

path ahead is fraught with risks from 

fearmongers opposed to immigration, as 

well as from terrorists who might hide 

among the refugee population. However, 

if the integration of the refugees is successful, 

Merkel will be remembered for 

her great courage, and Germans for their 

generosity and humanity. 

When I arrived back at John F. 

Kennedy International Airport in New 

York, I was picked up by my regular taxi 

driver, a former Iraqi fighter pilot. He 

had arrived as a refugee in the U.S. with 

$700 to his name, but through hard 

work had succeeded in buying a house 

and a car. He had built a life for himself 

and his family here, safe from the violence 

ravaging the Middle East but far 

from the grave of his son, who had been 

murdered in the civil war. As we drove 

E 

very 

toward Connecticut, I thought how 

much refugees and veterans have in common: 

the sense of alienation, the experience 

of trauma, and the courage to move 

forward with their lives. ■ 

Emma Sky, director of Yale World Fellows, 

is author of The Unraveling: High Hopes 

and Missed Opportunities in Iraq. She 

served in Iraq from 2003 to 2004 as the 

governorate coordinator of Kirkuk, and 

from 2007 to 2010 as political adviser to 

Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, then-commanding 

general of U.S. Forces in Iraq. 

Draft a Bad Idea, 

With or Without Women 

By Lt. Col. James Jay Carafano, U.S. Army retired 

year or two, the draft comes in 

from the cold as a matter of public 

discussion. In December, Defense Secretary 

Ash Carter’s announcement that the 

Pentagon was opening all combat roles 

to women immediately raised the question 

of whether the Selective Service Act 

should be revised to include women. 

But the draft is not warfare, and including 

women in the draft is an issue 

quite distinct from—and with far different 

considerations in play—than the issue 

of placing women in combat. Each issue 

should be considered on its own merit. 

One fact is pertinent to both issues: The 

Selective Service Act is largely an anachronism 

that has scant relevance to how 

America fields its modern military. From a 

practical standpoint, it makes little difference 

whether women are included or not. 

Indeed, the debate over whether 

women should be included in the draft is 

just the latest example of calls for national 

service that are more referenda on 

American culture and social attitudes 

than policy geared to field an effective 

military as efficiently as possible. 

Four months before Carter’s announcement, 

retired Gen. Stanley Mc- 

Chrystal and John McCain, R-Ariz., 

chairman of the Senate Armed Services 

Committee, floated another trial balloon. 

In a commentary for CNN.com, they argued 

for compulsory national service. 

Debates over the draft or other forms 

of compulsory service are nothing new. 

President James Madison wanted a military 

draft in 1812 to defend the young 

republic from the British invasion. Congress 

said no. The government did authorize 

conscription during the Civil 

War; draftees accounted for less than 10 

percent of the Union Army. 

In 1917, barely a month after the U.S. 

entered World War I, Congress enacted 

a law establishing the national Selective 

Service. During that conflict, more than 

half of the 4.7 million Americans in uniform 

were conscripts. 

In 1940, Congress once again authorized 

the use of the Selective Service System. 

About 10 million were called during 

the course of World War II. At the 

height of the war, draftees comprised 

about half of the more than 16 million in 

uniform. 

After World War II, the nation had 

its fullest debate over creating a requirement 

for Universal Military Training. 

Gen. George C. Marshall Jr. argued that 

all young males should be required to 

serve in the military for one year. President 

Harry Truman agreed, but Congress 

didn’t. Marshall tried again during 

his tenure as secretary of defense. Again, 

Congress said no. 

Congress did reinstate the Selective 

Service System in 1948 as concerns 

about the Cold War heated up. Of the 

approximately 5 million in uniform during 

the Korean War, about 1.5 million 

were draftees. 


Over the next decade, the draft was 

used to help fill out the ranks of the armed 

forces, but that was not the primary purpose 

intended by the 1948 law. The goal 

was to build a larger pool of manpower 

with military experience that could be 

brought back if the U.S. had to fight 

World War III with the Soviet Union. 

Relatively few draftees fought or died 

during the Eisenhower presidency. Indeed, 

only a very small proportion of the 

eligible population was actually drafted. 

Consequently, conscription was generally 

tolerated by a public worried about 

the red menace behind the Iron Curtain. 

A little over 9 million served in the 

armed forces during the Vietnam War; 

total draftees for that period were under 

2 million. This was not a disproportionate 

number compared to other modern 

wars. Nevertheless, the controversy over 

conscription proved unprecedented. 

In To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes 

to Modern America, John Whiteclay 

Chambers argues that the draft became a 

contentious issue because then-President 

Lyndon Johnson and his national security 

managers overextended use of it beyond 

the consensus established in the world 

wars and the early Cold War. As the 

Vietnam War became increasingly unpopular, 

the draft became the major focus 

of dissent. President Richard Nixon 

ended the draft in 1973, though the Selective 

Service System remains in force. 

There are two important points to extract 

from the American conscription experience. 

First, the argument for it was 

based on military necessity: generating 

the forces necessary for the government 

to fulfill its obligation for the common 

defense. For example, Marshall made 

the case for Universal Military Training 

based on operational requirements. He 

assumed the military model employed 

for the next world war would be similar 

to that of the first two: Armed forces 

would be drastically reduced in peacetime, 

then rapidly mobilized for war. 

Marshall saw Universal Military Training 

as an efficient way to speed mobilization 

for future conflicts. 

Second, conscription works when 

there is broad, bipartisan support for it. 

The draft riots of 1863 reflected, in part, 

growing frustration with President Abraham 

Lincoln’s handling of the war, similar 

to the backlash that built up against 

the Johnson administration in the 1960s. 

The argument for the all-volunteer 

force laid out by the Gates Commission 

in 1970 was that an all-volunteer military, 

with a mix of active and reserve component 

armed forces, was more efficient as 

well as more cost-effective than sustaining 

a peacetime draft. The rationale of the 

commission remains largely sound. Generally, 

the U.S. military does not have a 

recruiting and retention problem. 

While it is true that the cost of human 

capital is spiraling uncomfortably 

upward, the draft is not a credible 

solution for this problem. Shortservice 

conscripts are not going to meet 

the high-performance standards required 

of today’s military personnel. 

Conscription is a manpower model designed 

for mass mobilization. 

Nor is there anything resembling a 

national consensus that would tolerate 

national service. In 2001, in the wake of 

the horrific terrorist attacks on New 

York and Washington, D.C., Rep. Nick 

Smith, R-Mich., introduced a bill requiring 

Universal Military Training and 

Service. It went exactly nowhere. 

That’s telling. The American polity is 

far more divided now than it was in the 

aftermath of 9/11. If Smith’s idea was a 

nonstarter then, it is even more of a 

nonstarter now. 

What makes McChrystal and Mc- 

Cain’s idea even worse is that it’s not 

based on a practical rationale. They see 

national service as a mandatory tool for 

teaching citizenship. They believe national 

service would serve as a “civic rite 

of passage.” 

There is certainly a case to be made 

that civic virtue is a vital component of a 

healthy society. That notion is infused in 

the Greco-Roman tradition of civil society. 

But by the time of America’s founding, 

liberal philosophers had concluded 

that the best way to build a virtuous civil 

society is to maximize the freedom of the 

individual. 

The concept of freedom that was established 

in the liberal ideas of thinkers 

like John Locke and Adam Smith remains 

relevant today. Habitual conscription 

has no role in sustaining a free society. 

That was certainly the conclusion 

reached by the Gates Commission. Economist 

Milton Friedman, who served on 

the commission, argued that rather than 

inspire civic virtue, the draftee model inspired 

quite the opposite. Friedman saw 

as key the distinction between being 

forced to serve and volunteering to serve. 

McChrystal and McCain argue for 

more than just another government program. 

They advocate a fundamental reimagining 

of the government’s role in 

creating a healthy society. That’s a big 

step. They are spot-on in recognizing 

that national service offers an important 

venue for those who wish to live a life of 

service. But there are plenty of opportunities 

for national service, including paid 

and volunteer programs like Teach For 

America and the Peace Corps. 

Still, there does seem to be a lack of 

young people who want to pursue some 

form of national service. According to 

government statistics, in 2013, the number 

of people in government service under 

30 years old hit an all-time low—just 

7 percent, compared to over 25 percent 

in the private sector. “Without a pipeline 

of young talent,” Rachel Feintzeig reported 

in The Wall Street Journal in June 

2014, “the government risks falling behind 

in an increasingly digital world.” 

Arguably, the decline of youth interest 

in national service has more to do with 

the nature of it rather than a lack of civic 

virtue. Government hiring practices and 

human capital management are arcane 

compared to those of cutting-edge companies 

in the private sector. Mandatory 

federal service could well exacerbate the 

problem. If government doesn’t have to 

compete for people, it will lose incentives 

to improve recruiting and retention, 

making it more likely that talented youth 

will flee federal jobs as soon as they can. 

Further, it is far from clear how 

mandatory national service would teach 

civic virtue. Arguably, the act of voluntarily 

participating in federal service is 

an act of civic virtue. That suggests the 

inculcation of the nature and responsibilities 

of citizenship happens mostly 

before individuals enter the workforce. 

Also, making service mandatory removes 

the signature opportunity for 

youth to make the individual commitment 

to serve others. 

In addition, there is the issue of the 

appropriateness and effectiveness of giving 

government the preponderance of 

responsibility for defining and teaching 


civic virtue. There is already a raging debate 

in the nation over federal government 

intruding ever more deeply into 

the state and local role in education. National 

civics training would generate 

even more controversy. Indeed, that is 

just what happened when Truman proposed 

Universal Military Training. Reacting 

to the proposal, historian Charles 

Beard told Congress that it would “violate 

every liberty to which our nation has 

been dedicated” since its foundation. 

During the anxious years of the early 

Cold War, the Army tried to take a 

greater role in engineering patriotism 

among service members to prepare them 

for the long struggle against communism. 

Despite the best of intentions, the 

results were largely a disaster, Lori L. 

Bogle concludes in The Pentagon’s Battle 

for the American Mind. The Army abandoned 

the program after it became apparent 

its impact was to spur the formation 

of right-wing activist groups at 

some military installations. 

There were many reasons the program 

bogged down, including controversies 

over what to teach and how 

to teach it. Without question, a federal 

program that sought to take on the responsibility 

of inculcating civic virtue 

would face similar challenges. 

Finally, a debate on national service 

can’t be held without considering fiscal 

issues. Will youth displace federal workers? 

Will they compete with nonprofits 

and philanthropic organizations? What 

costs would a national program incur? In 

a 2013 study of the demise of Universal 

Military Training, historian John Sager 

noted that once the potential costs of the 

program became apparent, congressional 

support for the notion diminished. 

Is there a need to build greater civic 

virtue among future generations? That’s a 

debate well worth having. But rather than 

start with an answer—“mandatory service 

for all”—there ought to be a much broader 

discussion of what is to be accomplished 

and the options for achieving those goals. 

Faith, family, education, physical fitness 

and mentoring all play a role in building 

better citizens. Why aren’t these practices 

and institutions front and center in the 

conversation of what produces the most 

virtuous citizen? 

■ 

Lt. Col. James Jay Carafano, USA Ret., a 

25-year Army veteran, is a Heritage 

Foundation vice president in charge of 

the think tank’s policy research in defense 

and foreign affairs. 

Bond of Brothers 

Infantrymen Stand Alone but Are Uniquely United 

By Col. Keith Nightingale, U.S. Army retired 

The media reports daily on actions in 

Fallujah, Iraq; or Marjah, Afghanistan; 

or Location X. These reports are 

usually quite impersonal, allowing us to 

ignore the humanity behind the news. 

But at every location, named and unnamed, 

mortality is a daily and instantaneous 

issue, and the reason for the report 

is usually the actions of an infantryman. 

The people behind those humanless 

reports have borne our national bayonet 

since our founding. They have a name. 

They are a person. They are us. 

We owe them the decency and courtesy 

to try and understand who they are, 

though we may not know their names 

other than as a group: combat soldiers, 

infantrymen, grunts. Why they do what 

they do is because of their commitment 

to us. That is one of our greatest national 

strengths, misunderstood and underappreciated 

as it may be. 

Unlike the rest of our nation, the infantryman 

has no race, color, creed or 

specific origin. He is totally colorless and 

transparent. He has become a unique entity 

called “infantry.” This is a transformation 

he will retain the rest of his life, 

regardless of external attempts to recover 

and remold him to whatever niche people 

may have assigned to him before. 

He and his brothers were thrown into 

a group that never would have naturally 

coalesced in our society. They have been 

bonded and transformed by their mutual 

environment and become a family that 

will transcend any future noncombat relationships. 

He and they are a unique society 

open only to themselves. 

One percent of our nation’s population 

supports 100 percent of the present 

military structure. This is truly a small 

band of brothers and sisters that we 

send off to preserve whatever national 

interest du jour may arise. Though it is 

ostensibly open to all, the people who 

populate the very small percent of the 1 

percent that we call infantry are a 

unique set of Americans. 

While we owe them immeasurable reward—and 

we consistently say that—we 

probably do not really understand them. 

They are different, unique onto themselves 

and a true cult. Their experience in 

this microcosm of America is relatively 

short but forever changes them. When 

they assimilate back into the 99 percent, 

much of what they have become will go 

with them, albeit subliminally. 

The infantryman has no interest or 

valuation in the preceding individual 

makeup of his unit. His sole interest is in 

the quality and reliability of the present 

members. They are his insurance for return, 

and he for theirs. He is remarkably 

unaffected by our historic societal prejudices 

but is ruthlessly judgmental about 

any weak, hesitating or undedicated 

member of his immediate clan. He 

clearly understands teams and goes to 

great lengths to ensure he is on one. 

The infantryman believes that if any 

self-declared enemy of America encounters 

his unit, it will be the worst day in 

that person’s life insofar as he and his 

unit can make it. In his lexicon, someone’s 

health record will get a lot thicker 

or be closed out entirely. 

He deeply believes it without the 

slightest concern for its meaning. Mortality 

of the enemy is viewed as his salvation 

and managed as a common bodily 

act. It’s all very simple. 

Within his small unit—and all combat 

is small unit—he and his companions are 

immutably steadfast and consistent on 

any given subject regardless of what you 


Soldiers from the 178th 

Infantry Regiment, 

Illinois Army National 

Guard, patrol a road 

in Kapisa Province, 

Afghanistan, in 2009. 

think or care—and he will tell you “with 

the bark on.” Quality of work, dedication 

and demonstrated effort are the simple 

lodestones of his life. 

If the term “politically correct” is mentioned, 

you can expect an expletive followed 

by a clear description of how he 

would adjust that political correctness. In 

his quiet solitude, he will hold any PCcentric 

personality in pure disdain. In his 

environment, crystal clarity and intent 

are sacrosanct. There are no feelings, nor 

interests, beyond survival issues. 

He gathers personal strength from his 

unit and develops a certain rigidity toward 

executing actions and holding 

thoughts. He looks at occasional temporary 

entrants to his space with great caution 

and concern for his own survival in 

their presence. He is contemptuous of 

people who bend with the wind while 

looking as confused as a dog watching a 

ceiling fan, knowing their lack of focus 

and hesitation could get him killed. Visiting 

leadership is particularly susceptible 

to this judgment. 

He considers that the honor of his unit 

and his immediate associates, tempered 

in combat, is a personal and sacred trust 

for him to defend. He wields an inviolate 

emotional shield for their protection; this 

will remain with him for his lifetime. 

He takes some pride and satisfaction 

that 99 percent of the U.S. population 

doesn’t have a clue as to what makes him 

tick. That was forged when he was asked 

to function on the very tip of the nation’s 

bayonet and earned the spot. If we did 

know his thoughts of the moment, they 

would probably be very unsettling. This 

is a defense mechanism, and one of the 

tools that keeps him functioning in a 

dysfunctional environment. 

He takes further pride in knowing 

that dozens of his friends at home have 

said they would want to be like him and 

do what he does but do not possess the 

inner heart to actually make it happen. 

This builds an even stronger bond with 

his immediate brothers. 

He and his associates have their own 

language, rituals, tattoos and customs 

that could never be transferred to a nonmember. 

These will remain for a lifetime, 

to be renewed by an unexpected 

encounter in a bar or at a sports event or 

otherwise peaceful gathering. He will 

never altogether be at peace, nor will his 

associates with the same language and 

accoutrements. While things may be 

suppressed, they can’t be forgotten. 

The deepest and most pointed personal 

insult is the common mother’s 

milk of their bonding. The association 

and the camaraderie of the shared experience 

form the deepest love a man may 

hold. These people in this place will remain 

forever etched in the deepest and 

most visceral aspects of his mind. 

He and his element have developed a 

catlike sensitivity to impending danger 

or events. At the slightest electrical 

impulse, the unit goes on primordial 

alert and maneuvers itself as if guided by 

a strong but unseen source. 

If observed in action, he is able to 

transmit myriad actions, requirements 

and orders with simple grunts, eye gestures 

and simplified signals. Conversations 

are transmitted absent the most basic 

of sounds. He has a subtlety of 

sensing that no actor’s studio could replicate. 

Silence is often its own reward 

compared to the alternative. 

His acceptable comfort levels and personal 

expectations are both exceedingly 

low by an outsider’s standards. This is a 

U.S. Army/Spc. Phoebe R. Allport 

condition created by repetitive experience 

and the necessity to endure that 

which he cannot control. 

Some aspects of his culture and cult 

will remain forever, both to identify him 

as a member and for him to use as identifier 

with others. They are used in the 

heat of battle to acknowledge an order or 

as part of a more elaborate password and 

challenge to both a perimeter and a life’s 

passage. These stay well beyond the uniform 

and the government check. 

He will always take care of his brothers 

in arms, well past any mandated obligation 

to do so. On a rainy, stormy afternoon, 

he will be at a graveside or a bedside 

without the slightest hesitation. 

Family events will take second place in 

any conflict of events. He will always 

have his extended brother’s 6 o’clock— 

sometimes to his spouse’s chagrin. 

His ability to communicate or receive 

communication with noninfantry is highly 

truncated. Anyone associating with him 

will know immediately where he or she 

stands. In his world, there is no gray or 

middle ground. There are only missions, 

objectives and facts. Clouding those with 

additional dialogue only irritates him. 

While he appreciates technology on the 

battlefield, he is not led by it. Humans 

lead him, and he wants to see a face and 

look into the eyes of a superior who is 

sending him on a mortal mission. If he 

doesn’t see that face, doesn’t understand 

the eyes behind the order and can’t judge 

the quality of the person transmitting, his 

ability to perform becomes significantly 

reduced. Combat is always primordial and 

very much a people program. Technology 

is not always helpful in this regard. 

Instinctively, he appreciates that America 

holds him and his unit members in 

the highest esteem and that they know 

they can count on him to locate, close 

with and destroy those who would harm 

us. He may not have understood that 

when he agreed to join but he knows it 

now, and that is as ingrained as is breathing. 

This is a source of the greatest inner 

pride and drive. He cannot enunciate 

that, but he knows that. And this is all 

that matters. 

He may appear to the 99 percent to be 

cocky, but it is really newly earned confidence. 

He has been places and done 

things no one else can go or do, and 

these have changed him forever. What 


is seen by some as arrogance is instead a 

manifestation of hard-won personal capability. 

On the home front, some may accuse 

him and his brethren of being radical 

and extreme. He will take great satisfaction 

in that and consider it a compliment 

from those who are clueless. He is 

not dangerous; he is just clear and uncompromising. 

Over time, he may soften 

the externals but internally, he remains 

stark in his judgments. 

He reads the various service publications 

in his deployed outpost and reaches 

a conclusion shared by his friends: No 

amount of uniform change, headgear, 

brassard or tool will make the slightest 

difference in fighting efficiency, morale 

or competence. What he is doing with 

what he is wearing and holding are the 

only items that develop, test and prove 

true combat quality. 

Unlike many, he will never wonder 

throughout his life if he made a difference. 

He knows he did. His last vision 

will include the small circle of faces he 

saw in a far distant place under trying 

circumstances so long ago. He knows 

that now but cannot say it. 

He is an infantryman first and always 

will be. Regardless of age, race, creed, 

color, sex and national origin, if you 

were with him, you are forever in his 

mind and one of his deepest loves. It 

doesn’t matter how long you served, 

what rank you held or whether your 

post-service goals were achieved. What 

deeply matters is that you were part of 

something larger than yourself, did your 

very best, and gained personal associations 

with him for a lifetime. What he 

did and who he did it with are immutable 

to death. 

In later years, he will be humbled to 

walk among his newer peers, and they 

with him. The enemy and the terrain 

will be different, but the service and the 

character it creates are the same—points 

appreciated by both. He and his brethren 

throughout our history are truly the glue 

that has bound our nation. ■ 

Col. Keith Nightingale, USA Ret., commanded 

four infantry companies as well 

as three battalions and two brigades. 

His military career included two tours 

in Vietnam; the Dominican Republic 

and Grenada invasions; and the reconstitution 

of Panama. He also served in 

several classified counterterrorist Middle 

East and Latin American operations. 

He is the author of two books. 

Millennials 

Understanding This Generation and the Military By Capt. David Dixon 

Where were you on 9/11? What were 

you doing when you first saw that 

unbelievable footage of passenger planes 

crashing into the World Trade Center? 

At what point did the awful reality of 

that day dawn on you? 

Sept. 11 is one of the most seminal 

events in U.S. history and for many people—especially 

those of us who have deployed 

and fought in Afghanistan or 

Iraq—it is the most seminal event to occur 

in our lifetime. Understanding Sept. 

11 and its cultural impact is crucial to 

understanding almost every foreign policy 

and military decision that has happened 

since. Sept. 11 is critical not only 

to understanding policy, but also to understanding 

an entire generation: the 

millennials, or those born in 1982 

through 2004. 

At first glance, the idea may seem absurd. 

What does a group of Islamic extremists 

flying planes into buildings have 

to do with understanding a generation 

often knocked for being entitled and 

spending far too much time on their 

smartphones? What do al-Qaida’s actions 

on a beautiful Tuesday in September 

have to do with the new soldiers in 

my troop wanting to “friend” me, their 

troop commander, on Facebook? The 

answer isn’t obvious but with a little perspective, 

it makes perfect sense. 

Almost everyone understands that the 

Vietnam War changed the country. Repeated 

disconnects between what citizens 

heard from the president and saw 

on the evening news called into question 

the reliability and trustworthiness of the 

U.S. government. For the youth who 

fought in Vietnam, questions about the 

purpose and the bloody cost piled up 

without answers and left a generation 

bitter and cynical about the government, 

the Army, the press—or all three. Understanding 

the cultural impact of Vietnam 

is a key to understanding the baby 

boom generation. 

So, too, with 9/11 and the millennial 

generation. There have been other surprise 

attacks in U.S. history—Pearl Harbor 

comes to mind—but none has been 

so visceral, so shared, as Sept. 11. The 

entire country watched it happen in real 

time on television. People filmed the 

Twin Towers coming down, filmed other 

people’s reactions to the attack, and 

filmed their own reactions. Email and 

cellphones collapsed distances of both 

time and space. Everything was magnified, 

expanded, analyzed and looped. 

Sept. 11 happened in a continuous collective 

“now” that was not possible before 

the current age. 

Many millennials say Sept. 11 was the 

day they “grew up,” even though most 

were in high school or elementary school 

at the time. Is it any surprise that the 

generation that came of age on that fateful 

day was permanently imprinted—for 

good and bad—by the experience? 

Jonathan Safran Foer’s novel Extremely 

Loud and Incredibly Close describes the 

Sept. 11 experiences of one boy, but the 

book’s title is relevant to an entire generation. 

For millennials, the 9/11 attacks 

were a cultural moment magnified in 

their parents’ fear and shock and by the 

national media’s relentless focus. For the 

millennials, all history turns with that 

September day as its axis. 

They are a generation steeped in what 

the Pentagon once called, in a moment 

of remarkable honesty, The Long War. 

Millennials are a wartime generation but 

unlike the silent generation (born mid- 

1920s through early 1940s) of World 

War II and the baby boom generation 

(born 1946 through 1964) of Vietnam, 

millennials have been bombarded with 

information about the dangers and messy 

realities of warfare and its aftermath. In 

World War II, news from the front was 


generally sanitized for public consumption; 

during the Korean War, it was 

much the same. Even Vietnam, America’s 

first televised war, had far fewer 

photos and videos of the average soldiers’ 

experience than are available today. 

Millennials have access to more 

combat footage on the U.K.-based video 

sharing website LiveLeak alone than 

their parents ever saw from Vietnam 

and, via other Internet resources, unfettered, 

uncensored and immediate access 

to soldiers’ attitudes and frustrations 

while deployed. 

Previous generations like to bring up 

differences between service rates among 

the silent generation or the baby boom 

generation and millennials as an illustration 

that the millennials “just don’t get 

it.” But the criticism falls less on millennials 

than on baby boomers. Their political 

actions in both the streets and voting 

booths undid the draft and ushered in 

the all-volunteer force. Unsurprisingly, 

the baby boom generation’s participation 

in the military was 18 percent, compared 

to the silent generation’s 35 percent, according 

to U.S. Census Bureau figures. 

For Generation X, or those born in 

1965 through 1984, military participation 

ranges from 5 to 7 percent, making 

millennials’ lower service rates—approximately 

3 percent—not an anomaly, but 

part of the trend that began with the creation 

of the all-volunteer force. 

Perhaps even more important, consider 

where Sept. 11 is in the millennial consciousness. 

At their generation’s defining 

moment, government leaders said everyone 

should continue with their daily lives 

as if nothing had happened—and keep 

shopping. So the country did. The millennial 

generation has continued to do as 

asked. 

Boomers and Gen Xers also like to 

criticize millennials for being too involved 

in social media, for not understanding 

professional distance, and for 

wearing their emotions and desires too 

much on their sleeves—what the millennials 

might call “oversharing.” The millennial 

term for what previous generations 

consider too much information is 

particularly apt, though, because seen 

through the lens of 9/11, millennials are 

not revealing too much. Instead, they are 

sharing. During their generation’s moment, 

there was no such thing as “too 

much information.” Instead, the media 

shared stories of victims’ final phone 

calls, last acts—every intimate, personal 

detail that can be imagined. With an 

outpouring of shared grief and emotion 

as the millennials’ earliest cultural touchstone, 

is it any wonder they continue the 

practice? 

Some have criticized the millennial 

generation as being too entitled, as 

acting as if they are somehow special in a 

way that previous generations were not. 

Why should they not act that way? Their 

generation’s first collective memory was 

of the world changing, of the beginning 

of an era of American cooperation and 

shared resolve that was not simply to defeat 

the enemy but permanently make us 

better, more thoughtful, more loving 

people. Their first cultural memory is 

“the day the world changed.” Is that any 

different than the dawning of the Age of 

Aquarius? 

The millennial generation is accused 

of never growing up; “30 is the new 20” 

is not a reassurance but an indictment. 

This criticism misses the point that the 

generation “grew up” too young—on 

that fateful day in September, which the 

country collectively remembers in a 

shared outpouring of emotion and ceremony 

every year. The millennials are a 

generation stuck in time, at that point 

where their childhood disappeared into 

adulthood with flashes of flame and 

black smoke against a clear blue sky. 

Want to understand millennials if 

you’re a Gen Xer, like me, or a baby 

boomer? Want to know why those “kids” 

in your troop or squadron or firm act the 

way they do? Before writing off an entire 

generation as entitled or overly emotional, 

think back to those days in September 

over a decade ago and the mood 

of the country—and look at yourself. 

The millennials, with all their faults and 

promise, will be staring back at you. ■ 

Capt. David Dixon, South Carolina Army 

National Guard, served as an armor officer 

after graduating from the U.S. Military 

Academy in 2003. He deployed three 

times to Iraq as a platoon leader, military 

transition team officer and troop commander. 

In Mideast Conflicts, at What Price Victory? 

By Lt. Col. Thomas D. Morgan, U.S. Army retired 

We are in the centennial observance strength and resolve in the face of Adolf 

days of World War I. Perhaps Hitler’s aggression 25 years later, and 

some of the lessons from that great we can see some similarities in the current 

Middle East conflicts, including in 

struggle still apply. The 10-month battle 

in 1916 for the fortress town of Verdun Afghanistan. The price of our post-9/11 

was key to the French defense against military actions in the Middle East 

the German invasion. To quote France’s threatens to weaken the U.S. beyond redemption—especially 

because of the 

then-president, Raymond Poincare, “If 

Verdun is taken one day, what a disaster! 

If it is saved, how can we ever forget erations in that part of the world. 

tremendous cost of pursuing military op- 

the price?” 

The Iraq War has cost us over $2 trillion, 

$25 billion alone since 2011 when 

Well, France was saved, and France 

has never forgotten the price. The cost we started to build up a 200,000-man 

of saving Verdun fueled the nation’s Iraqi army that fled from the Islamic 

State group and abandoned the equipment 

the U.S. had given them as soon 

as they went into combat. We may 

never forget that price. In Afghanistan, 

the waste and corruption involving U.S. 

funds have prompted Marine Corps 

Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., the chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to say 

that we still have years of work ahead of 

us in that forlorn country. 

Where did all the money go in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, and what did we get for 

it? When World War I started, France 

was confident of victory and had prepared 


for a short war. Although ultimately victorious, 

France sacrificed the lives of its 

young, exhausted the nation’s resources, 

and mortgaged its future. In our case, we 

are mired in expensive combat and combat 

support operations in both Iraq and 

Afghanistan—although both wars are 

now “officially” ended and we are supposedly 

just helping our allies—and we are 

getting involved in Africa. 

It is estimated that Afghanistan will 

cost the U.S. $10 billion in fiscal year 

2016, at least $20 billion in fiscal year 

2017, and anywhere from $10 billion to 

$15 billion a year after that for the foreseeable 

future. Part of that expense will 

be buying Afghanistan about 48,000 new 

tactical vehicles at a cost of approximately 

$3.4 billion. In view of the past 

and present rampant corruption in 

Afghanistan, do we really think those vehicles 

will be used effectively against the 

Islamic State by the Afghan government, 

or will the warlords use them to further 

their narcotics trade? According to John 

Sopko, the U.S. inspector general overseeing 

U.S. reconstruction efforts there, 

“Corruption undermines every single endeavor 

we undertake in Afghanistan.” 

Also very questionable and inappropriate 

is an estimated cost of almost 

$150 million for private villa accommodations 

and security arrangements for 

U.S. Army/Spc. Tia P. Sokimson 

visitors to Kabul, bypassing government 

facilities that have already been constructed. 

This comes on the heels of the 

Pentagon spending $572 million for 

Russian military helicopters that the 

Afghans can’t even fly. 

Iraq is also a financial sinkhole. During 

the last dozen or so years, we have 

plowed billions into that failed state, and 

the country isn’t even grateful for the 

handout. The Iraqis complain that we 

have not given them enough. Plus, the 

Senate Armed Service Committee thinks 

someone in U.S. Central Command has 

cooked the intelligence books to make it 

look as if our efforts there are succeeding, 

according to several news reports. 

War is more complex than just “shock 

and awe” or “surgical.” When the guns 

begin to speak, coalition warfare is not 

what it is cracked up to be. About all we 

really control in Iraq is the 104-acre, 

billion-dollar U.S. embassy in Baghdad. 

We also have been expanding our 

presence in Africa. Officially, we have 

only one major base: Camp Lemonnier, 

in Djibouti. However, we have been establishing 

for future operations a network 

of “lily pad” bases, compounds and other 

sites. These are called cooperative security 

locations and are located throughout 

Africa—especially in the Sahel, south of 

the Sahara. All of this is going on as our 

overall troop strength is declining because, 

we are told, we cannot afford it. 

Land Warfare Papers 

• LWP 108 – Are U.S. Army Capabilities for 

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction at 

Risk? by Thomas C. Westen (September 2015) 

• LWP 107 – Integrating Landpower in 

the Indo– 

Asia–Pacific Through 2020: Analysiss of a Theater 

Army Campaign Design by Benjamin A. Bennett 

(May 2015) 

• LWP 106 – American Landpower and the 

Two-war Construct by Richard D. Hooker, 

Jr. 

(May 2015) 

• LWP 105W – Operations Research and the 

United States Army: A 75th Anniversary 

Perspective 1 by Greg H. Parlier (January 2015) 

National Security Watch 

• NSW 16-1 – African Horizons: The United States 

Army Working Toward a Secure and Stable 

Africa by Douglas W. Merritt (February 2016) 

• NSW 15-4 – These Are the Drones You Are 

Looking For: 

Manned–Unmanned Te 

eaming and 

the U.S. Army by Richard Lim (December 2015) 

• NSW 15-3 – Innovation and Invention: 

Equipping 

the Army for Current and Future Conflicts 

by Richard Lim (September 2015) 

• NSW 15-2 – Malaysia, 

Singapore and the United 

States: Harmony or Hegemony? by Richard Lim 

(May 2015) 

• NSW 15-1 – U.S. Army Regionally Aligned 

Forces: An Effective Way to Compensate for 

a Strategy/Resourcess Mismatch by Thomas C. 

Westen (February 2015) 

NCO Update 

• Brainpower is the Next Frontier in Army’s 

Arsenal 2 (1st Quarter 2016) 

• Mark Milley, 

39th Chief of Staff, Army 2 

(4th Quarter 2015) 

Special Reports 

• AUSA + 1st Session, 114th Congress = Some 

Good News 

(Decembe 

er 2015) 

• Profile of the U.S. Army 2014/2015: a reference 

handbook (October 2014) 

• Your Soldier, 

Your Army: 

A Parents’ Guide 

by Vicki Cody (also available in Spanish) 

Torchbearer National Security Reports 

• U.S. Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense 

Capabilities: 

Enabling Joint Force 2020 and 

Beyond (May 2014) 

Torchbearer Issue Papers 

• Strategically Responsive Logistics: A Game- 

Changer 

(October 2015) 

• The U. S. Army in Europe: Strategic Landpower in 

Action (October 2015) 

• Rapid Equipping and the U.S. Army’s Quick- 

Reacti 

on Capability 

(October 2015) 

• Enabling Reserve Component Readiness to 

Ensure 

National Security (September 2015) 

• The U. S. Army’s Expeditionary Mission Command 

Capability: 

Winning in a Complex World 

(September 2015) 

Defensee Reports 

• DR 16-1 – Until They All Come Home! The 

Defense Prisoner of War/Missing in Action 

Accounting Agency (February 2016) 

• DR 15-2 – Building Readiness to Sustain Global 

Responsiveness and Regional Engagement 

(April 2015) 

Landpower Essays 

• LPE 15-1 – Strategic Landpower in the 21st 

Century: 

A Conceptual Framework by Brian M. 

Michelson (March 2015) 

To 

order these and other ILW 

publications, visit the Institute of Land Warfare at 

the AUSA website (www.ausa.org); send 

an e-mail to ILWPublications@ausa. 

org; call (800) 336-4570, ext. 4630; or write to AUSA’s Institute of Land Warfare, 

ATTN: Publication Requests, 2425 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA 

22201-3326. 

All publications are available free of charge at: 

www.ausa.org/publications/ilw. 

1 

2 

Available ONLY on the AUSA website at www.ausa.org/ilw. 

Lead story. 


We have wasted billions in seeking 

high-tech solutions to relatively 

low-tech military problems: $20 billion 

on Boeing’s failed future combat system 

concept, $6.9 billion on the Comanche 

armed helicopter that never flew, and 

further billions on the gigantic “spy in 

the sky” aerostat that was supposed to 

keep Washington, D.C., safe, but blew 

away in a windstorm last October. 

Defense equipment seems to cost way 

too much. The military industrial complex 

is making a killing with the horrible 

cost of the F-35 fighter-bomber and 

the estimated $500 billion to develop 

and produce a new B-52 replacement 

called the long-range strike bomber. 

Now, the Army is trying to launch a 

ground combat vehicle program. It’s 

also attempting to repair the damage 

done in 2004 when it reorganized combat 

brigades into a new “modular” configuration 

at a cost of about $75 billion. 

All of this cannot be laid at the feet of 

the generals, but they do share a lot of 

the responsibility. Many have never 

seen a new plane, gun system or vehicle 

that they did not like. 

In World War I, military costs were 

defined in millions of dollars, francs and 

pounds. Now, we are talking billions for 

the same types of things. Gen. Joseph 

Joffre, chief of the French General Staff 

from 1911 to 1916, prepared to fight a 

short offensive war with drafted soldiers. 

His doctrine stated that only offense 

would break the will of the adversary 

and ensure victory. But there were 

problems with this theory and doctrine. 

The French had not prepared for a 

long, destructive and costly war. It took 

a couple of years of fighting to figure 

out how to win, and that almost bankrupted 

the country. 

We need to take a long, hard look at 

that history and decide if our Middle 

East wars are worth it, and if the tactics 

we are using without a viable strategy 

are just noise before defeat. Will our 

current conflicts turn into what historian 

Robert Doughty called a “Pyrrhic 

victory” of the French and the mess 

Great Britain made of the Middle East 

after a world war? 

Our enemies in the Muslim world 

want us to overreach and go overseas to 

fight. Drawing us into conventional battles 

plays to their long suit, not ours. 

Sending more troops to fight them will 

only keep their home fires burning, supporting 

their cause. 

Our overall strategy is not clear. It is 

someplace between a minimalist approach, 

where other nations step up to 

help us; and going into Iraq full-bore 

alone, letting the U.S. really assert itself. 

If we do either of those, what’s next? Do 

we expend the resources to revisit a place 

that does not seem to be concerned 

about its own long-term interests, or do 

we save ourselves from another Pyrrhic 

victory? Just as perhaps Britain should 

have stayed out of World War I, we 

should get out of the Middle East. ■ 

Lt. Col. Thomas D. Morgan, USA Ret., is 

a West Point graduate who served in field 

artillery, Special Forces, civil affairs, community/public 

affairs and force development. 

He also worked as a civilian contractor 

for the Battle Command Training 

Program until retiring in 2002. He is the 

recording secretary/photographer of the 

Society for Military History. 


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ANNUAL MEETING 

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Participate in panel discussions on the state of the Army and the future of national defense 

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He’s the Army 

Military Is This Soldier-Novelist’s Muse 

When Capt. Frank Wacholtz isn’t soldiering, he writes. A 

logistics planner in U.S. Army South, G-4 plans, at 

Joint Base San Antonio-Fort Sam Houston, Texas, Wacholtz 

has already written and self-published three science-fiction 

and fantasy novels and is currently writing his fourth. 

Wacholtz was deployed to Afghanistan in 2012 as part of a 

security force assistance team. “I forced myself to sit down and 

write for at least two hours a day … at least four days a week,” 

he said. “You’d be amazed how much that piles up over the 

course of a deployment.” 

Wacholtz, who grew up mostly in Colorado Springs, Colo., 

developed a love of stories at a young age. “I come from a long 

line of language people, and I’ve always loved books,” he said. 

His father, a retired Air Force colonel, would tell highly embellished 

river-rafting stories before putting Wacholtz and his 

two brothers to bed at night, and “these might have been what 

really ingrained my love for stories,” he said. “I still remember 

when my dad read me The Hobbit when I was just 10.” 

J.R.R. Tolkien’s classic fantasy, which was first published 

in 1937, had a profound impact on Wacholtz, who cited 

Tolkien as the strongest influencer of his style. His brother 

Luke, a well-known video game creator also known as Lun 

Calsari, “is the one who taught me editing.” (Wacholtz’s other 

brother, Matthew, is an Army chief warrant officer 1 and helicopter 

pilot.) 

Wacholtz, 37, has been serving in the Army since 2008. He 

said military service has not only taught him to push himself 

as a soldier but also has added more realism to his writing. 

Getting hit on the head in basic training and bruising a rib in 

the combatives competition during Officer Candidate School, 

for example, gave him an idea of what his characters might experience 

in a fight. “I would frequently pose myself while writing 

just to make sure certain maneuvers could be realistically 

done,” he said. 

Duty is lived and breathed in the Army, and Wacholtz understands 

how much of a motivator it can be. “Taking care of 

people is the core of what we do,” he said, though it’s “not always 

in the most obvious ways. … I don’t think I could avoid 

including it” in his writing, “even if I tried.” 

And just as some soldiers fare better than others in real life, 

the same is true of Wacholtz’s characters. Wacholtz also incorporates 

some of the less brutal details of being a warfighter 

into his novels. “My time in a beautiful valley in Afghanistan 

also inspired the desert town” in his third book, End of Innocents. 

“I even borrowed some of the language for names and 

places.” 

Wacholtz is married and has four children. While he loves 

being a soldier and a father, he acknowledged that juggling the 

two roles can be demanding. “If I want reality, I simply open 

Capt. Frank Wacholtz 

my eyes,” he said, adding that sci-fi and fantasy are “an escape, 

so to speak.” 

Writing also allows him to go somewhere he’s never been 

before. “The other real advantage of sci-fi and fantasy is that it 

allows you to present concepts that would ordinarily be rejected 

upon contact if written in nonfiction historical style,” he 

said. “People enter your universe with a natural suspension of 

disbelief that makes this possible.” 

As for future pursuits, he has an idea for a short nonfiction 

work drawing on his experiences with his four children and 

people in general. “They have taught me a lot over the past 

few years,” he said. 

Wacholtz said his father instilled in him the belief that he 

should spend time on things that matter, and it’s evident in 

how he feels about his soldiers, his writing and his family. He 

even has continued his father’s tradition of reading aloud. 

“At night, I read to my four children a chapter out of the 

Bible in my reader’s voice—I can sound like the guy from the 

training videos, when I want to—and explain it to them,” he 

said. “This naturally calms my own mind before bed and allows 

me to sleep well, wake up refreshed, and do it all again 

with a smile.” 

—Thomas B. Spincic 



Army 

University 

Will Education System Earn Prestige 

With Improvements and a New Name? 

Joe Broderick 

By Rick Maze, Editor-in-Chief 

An ambitious Army plan to boost the quality and respect 

of its expansive professional education network 

attempts to capture the symbolism of America’s 

big-name schools. If university systems like 

Harvard, Stanford, Columbia and Princeton hold prestigious 

positions in society because of their rigorous admission, accreditation 

and academic standards, Army leaders hope they 

can do the same with symbolic and substantive changes in 

military education called Army University. 

Army University is a brand, with officials sometimes calling 

it The Army University but also referring to it as ArmyU. Like 

major national universities that have a wide reach of affiliated 

colleges and schools, Army University will provide big-name 

identity to a collaborative network of 70 separate schools and 

additional independent research libraries, while also working 

with more than 90 public and private colleges and universities. 

Its “campuses” will range from basic training classes to education 

classes for officers, warrant officers, NCOs and civilians— 

basically everything under control of the U.S. Army Training 

and Doctrine Command, plus a few additions. 

There are three key parts to Army University, according to 

planning documents: 

■ Increasing academic rigor and relevance is a goal for institutions 

that Army officials concede have sometimes seemed 

more interested in test scores and attrition rather than preparing 

soldiers for real-world problems. This requires faculty development, 

curriculum changes, and perhaps even different 

ways of accessing educational performance. It also means 

working to become accredited. 

■ Improving respect and prestige has many benefits, including 

encouraging soldiers to attend the schools, helping to 

recruit talented faculty, and aiding in the transition to civilian 

life by giving more credit to graduates. 

■ Better and shared management practices could make the 

Army’s education system more efficient, with savings poured 

back into making the schools better. 

Because nothing is ever simple when making sweeping 

changes, there are outliers in the Army University consolidation. 

For example, the U.S. Military Academy is not under the 

Army University umbrella. It is described as an 

“affiliate,” following the overall plan of building 

world-class faculty and relevant curriculum along with taking 

other steps to gain more prestige for the already well-regarded 

institution. 

The Army War College, located in Carlisle, Pa., will remain 

a separately accredited college, but the commandant 

will be vice chancellor for strategic education of Army University, 

shaping education and research programs. 

Name Recognition Needed 

Name recognition is a big part of the change. Though 

training and education are a core part of the Army, the number 

and variety of schools as well as diverse approaches to education 

and credit have resulted in soldiers and outsiders undervaluing 

the education system, according to a white paper 

on the Army University concept. Army University, with the 

name and accompanying changes, is an attempt to get soldiers 

who attend the schools and the faculty who teach at 

them the respect Army leaders believe they are due. 

One element of building prestige is for soldiers to have an 

Army University transcript listing the academic credit received 

across all education programs. That transcript will be part of a 

soldier’s military record to show accomplishments; it also will 

be useful outside the Army to show in one document all the 

education a soldier achieved during his or her military career. 

It is not easy. The prestige of attending and completing 

Army schools has not had the same standing as education 

from nonmilitary schools, something the white paper says is 

partly the result of the lack of name recognition and partly 

because Army programs lack the academic rigor of civilian institutions 

and often are not accredited. Less than a quarter of 

Army education programs are accredited by agencies recognized 

by the U.S. Department of Education. 

Brig. Gen. John S. Kem, provost of ArmyU, said improving 

faculty is a key part of improving the reputation of Army 

schools. “Better faculty means a better outcome in the classroom,” 

he said. “We have said you have to be good to teach 

for us. We have never said that you have to have a certain 


U.S. Army/Dan Neal 

Brig. Gen. John S. Kem, provost of Army University, speaks to educators during a 

symposium at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. 

level of academic credentials.” Having better-qualified faculty 

members who are recognized as experts in their respective 

fields makes the education more prestigious and helps with 

accreditation, Kem said. 

Accreditation and faculty quality are important to soldiers, 

Army officials said, because not being accredited means soldiers 

don’t get credit for military education and training. 

“This generates an enormous hidden cost as soldiers pursuing 

degrees must complete courses in civilian institutions similar 

to instruction that they already mastered in the military,” the 

white paper says. “It is not uncommon to find career noncommissioned 

officers with ample credit hours of education but no 

academic degree because those credit hours were acquired 

across a career in different programs at different 

installations.” 

Having credits earned by Army University would 

reduce this problem, although it wouldn’t necessarily 

guarantee that public and private schools would agree 

to apply those credits toward a degree. 

‘Most Fundamental Change … Since 1881’ 

“We want to better Army education, provide accredited 

sources for our present and future soldiers, 

and increase the quality of our faculty,” said Lt. Gen. 

Robert B. Brown, commanding general of the U.S. 

Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, 

Kan. Brown also serves as commandant of the Leavenworth-based 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff 

College, an institution established in 1881. In the 

Army University integration of schools, Brown is the 

executive vice chancellor for training and education. 

At a December conference about the initiative, 

Brown said, “This is the most fundamental change 

in Army education since 1881.” 

A big part of the effort is aimed at enlisted soldiers, 

attempting to get them more credit—especially 

college credit—for military education. 

Separate from the Army University effort, the 

Army also has a backlog of about 14,000 soldiers 

overdue to attend leadership classes. ArmyU is 

working on ways to better manage these classes. Completing 

advanced and senior leadership courses is becoming a mandatory 

promotion requirement. In 2016, completion is a prerequisite 

for promotion to sergeant first class. In 2017, it will be 

a requirement for promotion to master sergeant. 

The U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy at Fort Bliss, 

Texas, will be one of the first programs to attempt accreditation, 

Sgt. Maj. of the Army Daniel Dailey said. “We have a 

five-year plan to accredit the academy at the master’s degree 

level,” Dailey said. “Our academy has 1,490 hours of academic 

exposure time. How many graduate-level students have that 

level of exposure to their professors? I don’t think there are any.” 

Fuller Hall at Fort 

Leavenworth, Kan., is 

the headquarters of 

the ArmyU provost. 

U.S. Army/Dan Neal 


Command sergeants major work 

on problems during a course at 

Fort Leavenworth, Kan. 

U.S. Army/Jonathan ‘Jay’ Koester 

Accreditation of the academy, which has graduated more 

than 120,000 soldiers since its founding in 1972, is “long 

overdue,” Dailey said. “For years, we’ve been providing excellent 

training to our soldiers by way of tactical and technical 

education, but we haven’t done them justice in regards to certifying 

those courses within the equivalent civilian certifications 

and college credits. Army University is going to help us 

accomplish that goal.” 

Representatives of about 80 colleges and universities attended 

a December symposium to talk about ways of getting 

more credit for soldiers for the professional education they receive 

and how to increase rigor in training. Another meeting 

is planned for June. 

Schools represented at the meeting are already involved 

with training soldiers, with some offering distance-learning 

courses for college credit and others operating on-post. One 

of the vexing and unresolved issues facing soldiers is that 

credits earned through Army training and from schools affiliated 

with the Army do not always transfer to other colleges 

and universities, especially prestigious four-year schools. Improving 

the academic standing of the classes available to soldiers 

is seen as a way of trying to resolve this problem. 

Army Not Alone 

However, this is not an Army-only problem. Nonmilitary 

students transferring from community colleges to four-year 

schools face similar problems receiving full credit for courses 

already taken. A 2015 Pell Institute study on inequities in 

higher education in the U.S. says transferring from one college 

to another is one of the factors affecting equity in education. 

The report called for state governments and schools to 

“do more to ensure that students can transfer across higher 

education institutions without loss of academic credit.” 

Columbia University’s Community College Research Center 

reports that students who transfer credits in efforts to earn 

a bachelor’s degree are less likely to complete the degree and 

take longer to complete the degree if they do finish, a problem 

well-known to soldiers who 

move from post to post collecting 

college credits. Taking longer to 

complete a degree is part of a nationwide 

trend that goes beyond 

the Army. A November report 

from the National Student Clearinghouse 

Research Center found 

just 53 percent of students who 

enrolled in college in 2009 completed 

a degree within six years. 

There are gains in getting credit. 

For example, the U.S. Army Prime 

Power School at Fort Leonard 

Wood, Mo., provides up to 38 

college credits in math, applied 

physics, mechanical engineering and electrical engineering for 

graduates, something possible because the instructors are professors 

from nearby Lincoln University. The partnership created 

at Prime Power is an example of what the Army wants 

to duplicate in other professional education courses. 

Army University is not a new idea. It was first raised in 1949 

by Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy, a former instructor and later 

commandant of the Army’s Command and General Staff College, 

who pushed the idea to the War Department’s Military 

Education Board as part of a postwar overhaul. The Air Force 

had created Air University in 1946, essentially for the same 

reasons the Army is considering today. 

“It was hoped that the re-designation would help to correct 

the numerous problems that plagued the pre-war military education 

system,” according to Air University’s official history. 

“The schools that comprised the old system had operated independently 

and were poorly coordinated in scope, doctrine 

and curriculum.” Marine Corps University was established in 

1989; like ArmyU, it includes professional education for both 

officers and enlisted personnel. 

It is no coincidence that the Army, like the Air Force, is 

undertaking a postwar transformation of its education system. 

“History reveals that some of the best and longest-lasting 

transformations in military education occur in the aftermath 

of sustained conflicts,” the white paper notes. “The Army today 

is a veteran force with real-world experience derived from 

years of sustained combat. This experience informs our judgment 

and gives us a deep appreciation for the complex and 

unpredictable challenges ahead.” 

Since the Army isn’t building a physical university, costs for 

the initiative are low: around $4 million in fiscal 2016 and $3.7 

million in FY 2017, according to the business plan estimate. 

Dailey said he hopes for quick improvements. “I want to 

accomplish these goals in 18 months,” he said of the effort to 

get the Sergeants Major Academy accredited. “That’s really 

aggressive, but I feel like we are 240 years behind on this.” ✭ 

—Ferdinand H. Thomas II contributed to this report. 


Reserve Component Generals: 

Can Army National Guard and Army Reserve generals 

be considered professional military officers at this 

critical time in the war on terror? General officers of 

the two Army reserve components have served for 

extended periods on active duty in an array of challenging positions, 

including combat. They have been called on to perform 

at the same level of competency as their counterparts in 

the active Army. While some have failed, many others have 

performed well enough to have greatly erased a perceived 

stigma of past years. 

Consider Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant. He graduated from the 

U.S. Military Academy in 1843 and fought in the Mexican- 

American War before resigning his commission in 1854. When 

the Civil War broke out, he volunteered for military 

duty and served as colonel of the 21st Illinois 

Volunteer Infantry before rising to brigadier 

general of U.S. Volunteers. He became not 

only the Army’s highest-ranking Civil 

War general, but president of the U.S. 

for two terms. Was he a professional 

general in spite of limited active duty in 

the regular Army? 

Another two-term president, Gen. 

Dwight D. Eisenhower, graduated 

from West Point in 1915 and had one 

command in peacetime, but saw no combat 

until 1942. Few will contest this activeduty 

general’s professionalism at the highest 

level. Did his lack of battle experience diminish 

him as a professional military officer when he was put 

to the ultimate test? 

The comparison between the professionalism of general officers 

who serve on active duty for their entire career, and 

those who may have actively served for a few years and then 

left for civilian life while serving in the reserve components, is 

deserving of serious consideration. In any case, active-duty 

generals’ professionalism serves as the benchmark for reserve 

component generals. 

Before the early 1980s, there was no specific requirement in 

either the Army National Guard or Army Reserve for a general 

officer to have anything more than a basic military education. 

Even today, with regard to the Army National Guard, a 

governor can appoint anyone for the position of his or her 

state’s adjutant general regardless of the candidate’s military 

education (except in South Carolina, Vermont and the District 

of Columbia). 

Federal Recognition Required 

Army National Guard generals who command units or hold 

general officer positions must be federally recognized to draw 

U.S. government pay. Such generals are usually nominated by 

the state adjutant general, confirmed by the governor, and 

federally recognized at the Department of the Army level after 

U.S. Senate confirmation. Yet in the 1970s, there was no 

specific requirement that general officers receive a high-level, 

senior service professional education. 

Nor was high-level, professional education development a 

requirement for Army Reserve generals. Attendance at one of 

the war colleges was not a prerequisite for promotion to general 

officer, although it was desirable. Actual residential attendance 

at one of the war colleges in the 1970s was relatively rare. 

Admittance to the Army War College for a reserve component 

officer was possible, but not easy. Early in the 1970s, a 

first-time applicant to attend the nonresident course was often 

rejected. Those who were admitted had to devote a large 

amount of time to it, including submitting many papers 

that were graded and commented on in great detail 

by the resident faculty. It was very easy for 

a nonresident student to get behind in the 

work; the dropout rate was by no means 

small. But since attendance at the war 

college level was not required to be eligible 

for promotion to the rank of general 

officer, there was no stigma attached to 

not completing the demanding course. 

Unfortunately, a common opinion 

among active Army general officers in 

those days was that reserve component 

generals were not “real” generals. If they 

were not “real” generals, then, could they be 

considered professional general officers? 

By 1978, however, two Army reserve component 

officers were attending the resident course of the National 

War College: an Army Reserve lieutenant colonel who had already 

completed the Army War College’s nonresident course 

and an Army National Guard brigadier general. 

Significant Progress 

In the next decade, significant progress in managing reserve 

component general officer selection was made. For example, a 

command eligibility list for promotion to reserve component 

general officer positions was established in 1989. One of the 

criteria was for the selectee to either have commanded at the 

reserve component battalion level for two years, or to have 

submitted a letter stating that he or she had held a position 

equivalent in responsibility at the colonel level, such as division 

chief of staff. There was still no requirement for a war 

college-level education, although both the Army National 

Guard and Army Reserve nominated selected officers to 

attend the resident senior service college. 

Operation Desert Shield saw brigade-level Army reserve 

component units being activated for federal service. However, 

this did not mean that reserve component generals commanding 

major formations under programs such as the active 


True Professionals 

By 

Brig. Gen. Raymond E. Bell Jr., 

U.S. Army retired 

Army division “round-out” brigades, or echelons above corps 

units such the 352nd Civil Affairs Command and 335th Signal 

Command, would necessarily be called up to deploy with 

their units. 

The Army National Guard round-out brigades were kept 

stateside and did not deploy for the subsequent Operation 

Desert Storm. The rumor was that the Army chief of staff did 

not want any reserve component generals in the combat theater. 

While some of these generals were accused of deliberately 

avoiding deployment, a noticeable exception was Brig. Gen. 

Joseph F. Conlon III, the commanding general of the 800th 

Military Police Brigade, which was responsible for enemy 

prisoner of war operations. 

A Vietnam combat veteran, he and his command 

performed brilliantly and won universal praise 

for how the thousands of Iraqi prisoners were 

handled. If a case could be made for Army 

reserve component generals being professional 

military officers capable of performing 

well in a combat environment, 

Conlon certainly proved it to be true. 

New Set of Scenarios 

After Operation Desert Storm, there 

was a reshuffling of Army reserve component 

units with a downsizing of the 

entire U.S. Army, which resulted in the 

elimination of commands. Reserve component 

general officer professionalism was not 

soon to be tested again but when it was, entirely 

different circumstances were obtained. After the Sept. 11 

terrorist attacks, a whole new set of scenarios presented themselves. 

In the meantime, the active Army was busy in Bosnia 

and Kosovo, where the Army reserve components were not 

yet major participants. 

When Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched in 2003, the 

Army, now downsized but still the most potent fighting force in 

the world, did not foresee a major role for the reserve components. 

However, the attitude toward these units had changed 

markedly. Reserve component general officers had yet to prove 

themselves in combat, but there was little doubt they had become 

more professional. Part of this was because of the decreased 

size of the active Army. Captains with combat experience 

who had left the active Army found themselves sought 

after in reserve component formations. There, they became battalion 

commanders and then commanders at the brigade level. 

Brig. Gen. Raymond E. Bell Jr., USA Ret., is a 1957 graduate of 

the U.S. Military Academy. He commanded the 220th Military 

Police Brigade and the 5th Psychological Operations Group. He 

holds a master’s degree from Middlebury College and a Ph.D. 

from New York University. 

How, then, has the present situation affected the professionalism 

of general officers in the Army reserve components? 

First, there is a closer integration of the active Army with the 

reserve components. For example, the presence of civil affairs 

units, previously in the Army Reserve, has been markedly increased 

in the active Army. Professionalism required by such 

integration is now demanded equally in members of all components, 

so there is also greater opportunity for those in the active 

Army to accept reserve component generals as professionals. 

Under Constant Scrutiny 

Second, reserve component generals are now compelled to 

perform with competence commensurate with that of active 

Army generals. They are under constant scrutiny by 

their active Army counterparts, and risk relief and 

demotion for failing to perform. Reserve component 

generals must meet high standards 

of performance and conduct to be viable. 

Third, selection of reserve component 

general officers is more centralized 

than it previously had been. Army 

National Guard generals are nominated 

by state governors, while those 

in the Army Reserve are nominated at 

the Department of the Army level upon 

application for a general officer position 

by qualified colonels, before U.S. Senate 

confirmation. Federal recognition is still accorded 

at the Department of the Army level for 

both the Army Guard and Reserve. 

Also, because an Army Reserve general may serve anywhere 

in the U.S., the competition for these positions is much 

greater than it was when the pool of selectees was usually limited 

to a specific geographical location and the individual’s 

availability at that location. Because the operational tempo is 

much greater today than it was when the Army reserve components 

were basically a strategic reserve, those selected for 

general officer positions must be able to devote much more 

time to their jobs. In fact, for many, occupying a general officer 

position is a full-time occupation. 

Finally, with greater quotas for reserve component lieutenant 

colonels and colonels to attend senior service schools, professional, 

high-level military education is now readily available to 

those who are able to take the time away from their civilian occupations. 

Candidates for general officer positions who formerly 

had to have only a baccalaureate degree now must compete 

not only with senior service school graduates but also with 

those having master’s degrees and even doctorates. 

What this all adds up to is that today’s Army National 

Guard and Army Reserve generals have no choice to be anything 

but professional military officers. They cannot afford to 

be anything less. 

✭ 


Germany Committed to 

The deputy secretary general of NATO, Alexander 

Vershbow, describes the security challenges facing the 

Euro-Atlantic community after the collapse of the 

Soviet Union as follows: “The world had changed. ... 

The specific threat had subsided—from a real and present 

danger, to a more abstract notion of a potential threat from an 

unknown aggressor.” 

This uncertainty led to a significant shift from collective defense 

in Europe to a much more flexible global deployment of 

armed forces. This also applied to the German Army as reflected 

in its deployments to Somalia, in 1992; Bosnia and Herzegovina, 

in 1996; Kosovo, in 1999; and Afghanistan, in 2001. 

Since 2014, however, largely due to Russia’s aggressive demeanor, 

the operational environment has become substantially 

more complex and thus, more difficult. At the NATO summit 

in Wales that year, NATO gave a clear and unanimous answer: 

The commitment to a combined will for collective defense 

was convincingly communicated by NATO’s Readiness 

Action Plan and the regular presence of NATO forces from 

several member states in Poland and the Baltic States. 

NATO’s objective is to increase responsiveness and, at the 

same time, show our partners in the East with our regular 

presence that NATO still stands as one, in solidarity with its 

Bundeswehr/Wilke 

Bundeswehr/Bienert 


Common Defense By 

Lt. Gen. Jorg Vollmer 

PIZ Kunduz 

U.S. Army/Cpl. Ali Cooley 

Clockwise from top left: A German infantry combat vehicle patrols with 

Afghan villagers in Kunduz Province in 2007; then-Lt. Gen. Donald 

Campbell Jr. places a U.S. Army Europe shoulder patch on the uniform 

of Brig. Gen. Markus Laubenthal, the first German officer to serve as the 

command’s chief of staff, in August 2014; a German soldier, left, and a 

U.S. soldier meet on the road in Afghanistan; German and peshmerga 

soldiers train in northern Iraq in May. 

friends. I assume that the continuance of this commitment 

will be one of the topics of the NATO summit in July in 

Warsaw, Poland. 

At the same time, however, we are threatened by terrorism 

fed by Islamic extremism and fostered by poor governance and 

state disintegrations, from the Middle East to the African 

Maghreb. As a consequence, we have witnessed a dramatic 

refugee movement toward Europe and a direct threat to our 

security by Islamic terrorists. Europe and its partners are not 

indifferent to this threat. 

Challenges Have Consequences 

The resulting challenges have consequences, particularly for 

the German Army. The challenges start with the implementation 

of land forces-focused measures agreed upon by NATO 

in Wales. A multitude of units and formations of the German 

Army deployed in exercises and training missions in Poland 

and the Baltic States are aimed at demonstrating our presence, 

increasing the capabilities of allied partners and enhancing interoperability. 

The most important project of these initiatives is the very 

rapid response force of NATO, the so-called Very High Readi- 


Bundeswehr/Neumann 

German and Malian soldiers prepare for urban warfare training during a European Union training 

mission in Koulikoro, Mali. 

ness Joint Task Force. In a 2015 test phase, the focus was on the 

German-Netherlands corps with maneuver units from Germany, 

Norway and the Netherlands. 

In this phase, the German Army demonstrated its capability 

to set up, train and deploy a task force within a short period of 

time. The findings gained in this project serve as the basis for 

repeating this task. This time, over a period of three years starting 

in 2018, an army brigade in different NATO readiness 

states will be identified and certified as a rapid response force. 

Norway and the Netherlands have already indicated their general 

willingness to make a contribution again. This demonstrates 

that Europe is increasing its response capability within 

the alliance. 

At the same time and prior to the upcoming NATO summit 

in Warsaw, the Multinational Corps North East in Szczecin, 

Poland, was augmented to become a high-readiness headquarters 

with a regional focus on commanding forces deployed in 

exercises and missions in the east of the NATO territory. These 

include the newly formed NATO force-integration units that in 

peacetime serve to prepare the reception of reinforcement 

forces. The German Army has made substantial contributions 

by its very rapid provision of qualified personnel. Full readiness 

was achieved prior to the NATO summit in Wales. 

In 2015, approximately 4,700 German Army service members 

were repeatedly employed in exercises, joint training, 

training support missions or as part of bilateral cooperation 

projects—some of them for several months in Estonia, 

Lt. Gen. Jorg Vollmer is the German Army chief of staff. Since 

joining the Bundeswehr, his assignments have included commanding 

a paratroop battalion, a mechanized infantry brigade 

and the Specialized Operations Division. Twice, he commanded 

the International Security Assistance Force Regional Command 

North in Afghanistan. He participated in the Advanced Operational 

Art Studies Fellowship at the School of Advanced Military 

Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. 

Latvia, Lithuania and Poland—to 

fulfill national and alliance defense 

tasks. This contribution will be continued 

this year. 

Simultaneously, in its missions 

abroad, the German Army contributes 

to countering the direct threat 

to our common security interests. 

In Mali, we take part in a European 

Union training mission to support 

the Malian armed forces—again as 

lead nation until later this year. Our 

commitment with the U.N. Multidimensional 

Integrated Stabilization 

Mission in the north of Mali will be 

increased to relieve Dutch forces. 

Given the considerably increased 

threat situation, such a commitment 

will require a substantially more robust 

mandate for our forces. 

In Iraq we have, on very short notice, 

given our consent to support the 

Kurdish peshmerga in their fight against the Islamic State 

group by conducting training in Erbil as well as in Germany. 

The good training results have exceeded our expectations; we 

will continue this training mission. 

Afghanistan Mission Continues 

In Afghanistan, we will continue our commitment started 

in 2001. It is important to continue the successful buildup of 

the Afghan National Security Forces achieved in the preceding 

years. We will support them on a long-term basis to enable 

them to independently provide for security in their country. 

The shift toward Operation Resolute Support that started 

in early 2015, and in which we will continue to make a significant 

contribution as a framework nation, constitutes an important 

prerequisite for achieving this goal. We even increased 

forces in our area of responsibility. 

In Kosovo, we are making a major contribution to stabilizing 

a region that has not found peace. Our commitment guarantees 

that diplomatic and civil-societal measures still take effect 

to ensure a long-lasting peaceful future in Europe for 

Kosovo and its neighbors. 

Our NATO commitments and our missions remain the 

German Army’s main effort. Taking over additional tasks in 

coping with the refugee situation will not change this. Army 

members, along with a large number of volunteer helpers, do 

excellent work in supporting civilian institutions. 

Finally, the German Army is an important actor for multinational 

cooperation in Europe. This comprises the cooperation 

with France that has lasted more than 25 years; the mutual 

attachment of units of the Dutch and Polish armies; and 

an intensive cooperation with U.S. forces stationed in Europe. 

The U.S. remains our most important partner within NATO 

as well as in our missions abroad. 

This U.S.-German partnership, on one hand, manifests itself 

in the very close cooperation of our land forces, mainly in 

Afghanistan, with the U.S. supporting German operations in 


the north with high-value capabilities. The U.S. also draws on 

German Army capabilities that it no longer has available in 

Europe, as is the case with the M3 Amphibious Rig. In joint 

exercises such as Swift Response 2015, both nations again and 

again gave proof of their increased efficiency through effective 

partnership. 

A unique highlight of the mutual trust that has grown over 

the decades of close cooperation is the appointment of a German 

general as chief of staff to U.S. Army Europe headquarters 

in Wiesbaden. Additionally, both nations synchronize 

their efforts in their support of other states. 

The Transatlantic Capability Enhancement and Training 

Initiative, with the U.S. and Germany jointly coordinating 

their training and equipment initiatives for other NATO 

member states, is an important part of these efforts. In this 

context, Germany is notably supporting Poland with Leopard 

2 main battle tanks, and we are supporting Lithuania with 

modern, self-propelled howitzers. 

Multinational cooperation, however, is not an end in itself. 

Rather, it aims to enhance interoperability with our most important 

partners as it constitutes an indispensable prerequisite 

for successful joint missions. We have to step up efforts to 

prove this in exercises. 

We are capable of accomplishing the tasks arising from all 

these obligations because of our robust structure that, although 

developed under entirely different framework conditions 

in 2011, still proves to be right on target and so will thus 

be maintained until 2017. 

With six mechanized brigades subdivided into two mechanized 

divisions—the German elements of the Franco-German 

Brigade and the Rapid Response Forces Division—we are capable 

of accomplishing and sustaining all tasks, including national 

crisis prevention. In addition, brigades and divisions are 

the direct link to international cooperation. Currently in 

peacetime, for example, the Rapid Response Forces Division 

is in command of a Dutch airborne brigade. Our participation 

in three multinational corps activities allows the conduct of 

complex operations under German command as well. 

Army an Attractive Employer 

Our personnel are prepared for these tasks. The decision to 

suspend universal conscription has proven right. All doubts 

concerning quantity and quality of our personnel were unfounded. 

In fact, the army now has in its ranks experienced 

and rank-and-file soldiers who, following their training, remain 

in their units for a longer period of time. With a current 

average service time of nine years, they constitute the backbone 

of our German Army and are led by senior NCOs and 

officers experienced in missions and combat. The German 

Army is an attractive employer. 

Structure and personnel, however, can have the desired effects 

only if the army is equipped with modern materiel 

needed to fulfill its tasks. In operations, this is ensured at any 

time. It is in support of our operations that we can draw on 

the world’s latest generation of combat vehicles. They have 

stood the test, especially in Afghanistan. 

Modern equipment is available to the German Army for national 

and alliance defense, although not always in sufficient 

numbers. What is required is equipment adapted to our structure 

and our tasks. The additional procurement of 100 Leopard 

2A7 main battle tanks and the BOXER Multirole Armored 

Vehicle, and the fielding of the Puma Armored Infantry Fighting 

Vehicle, will provide relief in this area. Even though this 

goal might not be achieved overnight, we are on the right track. 

We must better reflect alliance defense in training. We will 

continue fulfilling tasks across the entire spectrum of missions 

abroad, from stability operations to training missions. When 

we train our men and women we have to focus, above all, on 

basic military skills. Physical and psychological resilience are 

just as important as soldier fundamentals. 

Units and formations must be able to conduct traditional 

types of operation—attack, defense and delay—as part of composite 

land force operations. Those 

who create a solid basis will be capable 

of mastering other tasks in 

operations of lower intensities as 

well. The fact that we can do so, 

even in peacetime, in conjunction 

with U.S. Army units stationed in 

Europe, is an important prerequisite 

for successful operations. 

The number of missions will not 

decrease. Nor will they become 

easier. We must prepare for them 

in the best possible way; prepared, 

we will be. 

✭ 

Bundeswehr/PIZ Heer 

A Leopard 2A6 main battle tank powers 

through a waterway during an exercise. 


Stimulating Simulation 

Technology Advances and Upgrades 

Boost Realism in Soldier Training 

By Scott R. Gourley, Contributing Writer 

From virtual reality gaming and color-coded traffic 

maps to tomorrow’s weather forecast via radar image 

and the televised reality of football first-down lines, 

simulation technologies have become ubiquitous elements 

of modern life. It’s not surprising, then, that today’s 

soldiers are also encountering the expanded use of simulation 

technologies across the military experience. 

Historical foundations for the Army’s embrace of simulation 

systems and technologies can be traced to the early 1930s 

and the Army Air Corps’ acquisition of the first pilot trainers 

from the Link Co. In parallel with the dramatically changing 

technologies over the past eight decades, the Army’s appreciation 

for the value of simulations—both in initial training and 

proficiency maintenance—has also grown exponentially. Today, 

the Army is expanding and upgrading its use of simulations 

in both individual and organizational environments 

while simultaneously crafting the supporting architectures 

that will change the nature of military training in the future. 

One example can be found in Army small arms training. 

For several years, the first time a young soldier encountered 

simulation was likely with the Engagement Skills Trainer 

(EST) 2000. Manufactured by Cubic Corp., the system was 

fielded at the Army’s five initial entry training sites in the mid- 

1990s to provide initial weapon instruction before soldiers 

went to live-fire ranges. The system, 

which replaced an earlier Weaponeer 

marksmanship training aid, was subsequently 

expanded to other sites across 

the Army. 

According to Darren Shavers, director 

of subject matter experts for Meggitt 

Training Systems, the Army’s embrace 

of EST 2000 was a significant milestone 

in that it marked the first time a small 

arms simulator experience was mandated 

for basic trainees. 

“They learned it in the simulator, and 

then they went out and applied what 

they learned on the real-world ranges,” 

he said. 

Upgraded Replacement System 

The next milestone in Army small 

arms simulation was the arrival of a replacement 

system, EST II. Meggitt received 

the Army’s EST II contract in June 2014 and is delivering 

initial systems for customer acceptance testing starting this 

month. 

“The EST II will bring some pretty significant upgrades,” 

Shavers said, citing the elimination of the weapon tether as 

greatly enhancing things like the quick-reaction drills that have 

been part of initial training over the last decade. New BlueFire 

weapon simulation technology “talks to the system wirelessly,” 

he said. 

Other enhancements that will be delivered under EST II 

range from a new Crytek 3-D visual environment to instructor 

tablet devices. The EST II’s new 3-D visual environment 

“not only gives you higher-fidelity pictures, but also provides 

a moving eye point. In the past, you always had the target 

move to the shooter. But now, with Crytek, we can actually 

move the target to the shooter and move the shooter to the 

target by simulating that moving eye point through the 

scene,” Shavers said. 

The money the Army has already spent on Bohemia Interactive 

Simulations’ Virtual Battlespace 3, or VBS3, is being 

leveraged “by using VBS3 as our collective engine,” he added. 

VBS3 is a 3-D, first-person games-for-training platform that 

provides realistic semi-immersive environments; large, dynamic 

terrain areas; hundreds of simulated military and civilian enti- 



Clockwise: Soldiers practice marksmanship 

using an Engagement Skills Trainer 2000; 

Air Cavalry Leaders Course students use 

simulation technology in Virtual Battlespace 

3; the Link Trainer, an early flight 

simulator, in 1942. 

U.S. Army/Doug Schaub 

entities; and a range of geotypical, or generic, terrain areas as 

well as geospecific terrains from U.S. Army areas of operation. 

As the Army’s flagship training game, it has been accredited 

to support more than 100 combined arms training 

tasks from the individual soldier level to company collective. 

“The Army already has terrains and scenarios built in 

VBS3, so we’re going to use that in things like force-on-force 

training,” Shavers said. Also, the new EST II instructor tablets 

provide real-time feedback and an automatic coaching tool to 

help improve student marksmanship. 

U.S. Army/Kelly Morris 

‘We Can See if You Are Breathing’ 

“Our system knows what you are doing 

all the time,” he said. “We can see how 

you aim at the target. We can see if you 

are breathing or not. We can see how you 

manipulate the trigger. And we can see 

how you put the weapon on your shoulder. 

And since we can see all that now, I 

can tie it to Army doctrine and tell the 

student what they were doing wrong.” 

The tablets will not only “flag” individual 

shooter variance from the marksmanship 

fundamentals found in Army 

Field Manual 3-22.9, Rifle Marksmanship, 

but also provide a video clip of the 

specific corrections needed. 

Based on the result of upcoming customer 

acceptance testing, it is anticipated 

that the Army will order between 

842 and 900 EST II systems. That’s just 


one example of the growing use of simulation in support of 

soldier training and proficiency. 

Another example is seen in programs like the Dismounted 

Soldier Training System, or DSTS. According to system developer 

Intelligent Decisions Inc., this is the first fully immersive 

virtual simulation training system for soldiers. It includes a helmet-mounted 

display with integrated head tracker, stereo 

speakers, voice and radio communications, a computer backpack 

for processing and projecting the 3-D virtual environment 

within the helmet-mounted display, sensors for tracking body 

position, and instrumented weapons. It allows soldiers to operate 

in a virtual environment with members of their squad, platoon 

or company. 

for unique platform skills. They’re used for dozens of other 

skills and capabilities as well as convoy, vehicle-maintenance, 

flight and helicopter-maintenance training. 

Simulation is also present in military immersive environments 

including the Joint Fires and Effects Training System 

at the Army’s Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill, Okla. 

This system provides a suite of state-of-the-art immersive virtual 

reality environments designed to help soldiers make critical 

decisions under stress, and allows for collective team training 

and cultural awareness lessons. Developed by the University 

of Southern California’s Institute for Creative Technologies, 

Training as a Unit 

“We train 30,000 soldiers a year on DSTS,” said Clarence 

Pape, vice president of simulation and training for Intelligent 

Decisions. The Army had been looking at the concept “for 

the better part of 10 years, as they looked to find a virtual 

training device for soldiers to train as a cohesive unit,” he 

said. “And they wanted it to be mobile, so it wouldn’t be a 

fixed capability,” he said. “It could be moved around as the 

Army needed it.” 

That basic concept was followed by requirements definition 

and further concept development and creation. Accompanied 

by industry partnering, the final design included a combination 

of commercial off-the-shelf hardware and custom-developed 

equipment. 

“From requirements through first delivery was about a year, 

and we’ve been deploying it ever since,” Pape said. Fifty-one 

DSTS systems have been deployed across the total Army in 

both standard and enhanced versions. 

Asked about the unique abilities the system provides to 

warfighters, Pape highlighted “the ability to shoot, move and 

communicate as a cohesive squad in a virtual environment. And 

they can take it wherever they want. We have actually had it being 

used in the field right before a live-fire training exercise.” 

The system also allows soldiers to “practice the various tactics, 

techniques and procedures—things like defensive postures, 

patrols, reaction to fire or ambush. You can do a medevac. 

You can do a [helicopter] insert and extract. You can get 

inside a vehicle and do force movement, and then dismount 

the vehicle in the virtual environment and do ground tactics. It 

allows you to do myriad infantry-level tactics.” 

The system is not used just for infantry task training, Pape 

said. It’s employed in both engineer and military police training 

as well. 

“Those types of combat service support folks use it to refine 

their tactical capability,” he said. “It helps with their communication. 

It helps with their understanding of the environment. 

And certainly it helps them to practice how they would 

move as individuals and as a group.” 

Broader Applications 

The broad U.S. Army application of simulation technologies 

is hardly restricted to individual and small-group training 

and proficiency. In addition to those representative examples, 

simulation systems are used for driver training and modified 

U.S. Army/Rachael Tolliver 

Cadets use a virtual simulator to 

practice patrolling as a squad. 

the program was successfully transitioned to the Army’s Program 

Executive Office for Simulation, Training and Instrumentation 

(PEO STRI) in 2008. 

Another area of significant simulation growth and emphasis 

over the past several years involves medical simulation. A 

stand-alone software application called Tactical Combat Casualty 

Care Simulation was delivered to the U.S. Army Medical 

Department Center and School at Fort Sam Houston, 

Texas, in 2007. 

Frank Colletti is vice president for training and education at 

Engineering & Computer Simulations, the company that fulfilled 

the software application contract. According to Colletti, 

the software focuses on the “functionality that would be used 

by a medic or combat lifesaver to practice the ‘what and when’ 


of treating casualties: Given what you see in front of you, what 

do you do and when do you do it?” 

Launching a demonstration on a nearby desktop, Colletti explained, 

“Here’s a soldier that has just sustained an injury. We’ll 

‘walk’ over to him and see what happened. In this case, it might 

involve a traumatic amputation. As the caregiver, I point to the 

leg, and I am given a screen interface that allows me to make a 

decision as to what to do. It gives me a number of possible actions—all 

of which are valid, but some are better than others.” 

Colletti demonstrated a series of selected interventions, 

from tourniquet application to ascertaining the extent of other 

injuries through a “blood sweep” of the wounded soldier, all 

while maintaining tactical situational awareness. 

Shared Gaming Environment 

One recent company effort has moved the capability from a 

stand-alone use into a shared gaming environment, Colletti 

said. 

“We took that functionality and created a plug-in that can 

be embedded into VBS3,” he said. “Now the soldiers are 

working through this virtual engagement, and an incident 

happens: A sniper engages them, or an IED detonates. We 

have six different injury types that can occur within the context 

of the VBS3 simulation.” 

A more immersive approach to medical simulation is seen 

in PEO STRI’s medical simulation training centers. Located 

at 18 Army installations, the centers deliver effective medical 

training through an immersive platform that includes a standardized 

family of supporting component systems and supporting 

training devices. 

Related training devices include the Virtual Patient System’s 

tetherless, “bleed-breathe” mannequin that is weighted 

and airway-equipped; partial task trainers; the Instruction 

Support System; Medical Training Command and Control 

System; and the Medical Training Evaluation System. 

The Army’s medical simulation emphasis isn’t limited to 

human needs. One example of the specialized training and 

proficiency possible through medical simulation was seen at a 

recent modeling and simulation gathering, where TraumaFX 

highlighted its K9 HERO medical trainer, a 50-pound medical 

mannequin sculpted to mimic a Belgian Malinois shepherd. 

It enables military working dog handlers to practice on a 

simulator many critical lifesaving tasks for canines, including 

maintaining an airway, CPR, tracheostomy and bandaging. 

Three Environments Linked 

In parallel with the growth of simulation technologies in the 

virtual world, the last few years have witnessed Army training 

planners increasing their emphasis on the development of socalled 

live, virtual and constructive (LVC) capabilities, in 

which live training is combined with training in virtual as well 

as constructive, or computer-generated, environments. The simultaneous 

linkage of these three environments is widely seen 

as offering significant cost and performance benefits for military 

training and proficiency retention. 

One key to this vision has been the development of something 

called an LVC-Integrating Architecture. However, the 

program executive office is also looking beyond this architecture 

and toward the development of “leap ahead” technologies 

to integrate the LVC spectrum. 

“Our ultimate goal is to enhance realistic training in complex 

environments to help build cohesive teams who not just survive, 

but thrive in conditions of chaos and ambiguity,” said Maj. 

Gen. Jon Maddux, PEO STRI’s program executive officer. 

The main effort to achieve that ultimate goal is bringing a 

new program into the training portfolio called the synthetic 

training environment, which will enhance the currently fielded 

LVC-Integrating Architecture and provide a center of gravity 

for the Army’s future. 

The synthetic training environment “will include ‘leap ahead’ 

and ‘disruptive’ technologies not available in the current LVC- 

[Integrating Architecture] program to facilitate the creation of 

the complex conditions found in any operational environment,” 

Maddux said, “enabling commanders to develop agile, adaptive 

leaders and versatile units capable of operating in any complex 

situation.” 

The synthetic training environment will converge the virtual, 

constructive and gaming training environments into a single 

environment that will provide training services to ground, dismounted 

and aerial platforms and command post operations. 

Additionally, PEO STRI is exploring cybersecurity training 

and the challenges and possibilities involved in cyber simulation. 

✭ 


12-Step Plan 

For Curing 

A Toxic Team 

By Keith H. Ferguson 

Alcoholics Anonymous has a 12-step program for beating alcohol addiction. 

The first step can be paraphrased as: Recognize that you have a 

problem and confess it in some public way. Applying the 12-step process 

to my own circumstances, here goes: I was a member of a toxic team. 

This toxic team no longer exists. A majority of the members moved on. For 

some members, this meant incurring large financial costs as they changed locations, 

although they stayed with the same organization. For others, it meant 

looking for new work and for a few, it meant staying on and working with the 

new team to create a better atmosphere and a productive team. 

For me, it meant moving away. More than a year later, I 

still lament the breaking up of the team. I have spent this time 

studying toxic teams and what causes them. 

Although there are many times when a group of people work 

together, this togetherness doesn’t necessarily constitute a team. 

“Team” indicates there is a conscious effort by members to 

identify themselves as part of a collective with common goals. 

The Army understands the concept of teams well; it takes 

many teams of people working together to meet the mission. 

There are many different performance skills, but the task or 

the mission can be completed only through the coordinated 

efforts of many people. 

A true team member subverts personal wishes and identifies 

with the team goal. There are times when the team’s goal 

seems contrary to one’s personal wishes, but that member puts 

aside pride and redirects his or her self-interest for the good of 

the team. This is not always an easy thing to do. 

What Is a Toxic Team? 

A toxic team is a group of people who conspiratorially work 

together counter to the direction that leadership desires. A 

toxic team is constantly at odds with leadership, and seeks to 

undermine the direction that leadership attempts to move them. 

A toxic team may still have the perspective of benefiting the 

organization or meeting organizational goals but is subversive 

nevertheless. Toxic teams have their own agendas, and actually 

sabotage some short-term goals of leadership or an organization. 

This sabotage may not be a formal and planned conspiracy, 

but the lack of formality does not lessen the teamwork involved 

in the toxicity. Team members may not have discussed 

their negative influence, but there is a sense of camaraderie. A 

toxic team will justify its bad behavior and blame the organization 

or leadership as being completely responsible for the 

problems that exist. 

Several factors can influence or move a team toward toxicity. 

The first is a lack of trust in leadership. If a majority lacks 

trust in leadership, these team members will band together in 

a negative way. Team members feel that they can trust each 

other and have each other’s backs, but for some reason fail to 

find leadership as having their best interests in mind. A lack of 

trust will undermine a leader’s ability to lead. 

A second influencer is the feeling of powerlessness. If team 

members feel they have nowhere to go to express their concerns, 

they will lament collectively that they have no place to 

go. By banding together, they hope to accomplish what an individual 

is unable to accomplish. 

Third, a lack of communication or meaningful dialogue 

with leadership also contributes to team toxicity. Communication 

is one of the most important things that leadership can do 

for a team. The perception that leadership does not communicate 

reinforces bad attitudes. Failure to communicate indicates 

that leadership doesn’t consider team members important 

enough to be part of a larger dialogue about organizational direction 

or new initiatives. 

Another issue is perception of a lack of support. When a 

team member feels abandoned, it is better to be part of a 

group than to suffer as an individual. If more than one team 

member feels similarly, the perception snowballs and becomes 

larger than life. 

Finally, reinforced negative perceptions of leadership will 

grow if team members can find repeated examples of negative 

leadership behavior that support team premises. Team members 

will play and replay examples that they see, and will feed those 

negative perceptions with stories from other team members. 


There may be many other factors contributing to team toxicity. 

These were the main ones that had direct influence on 

the toxic team of which I was a member. 

Keith H. Ferguson has been an educator for more than 30 years. 

He is a staff and faculty instructor and developer for Army Logistics 

University, Fort Lee, Va., where he was named ALU 

Civilian Instructor of the Year for 2015. He received his master’s 

degree from Plymouth State College and has been involved in 

experiential education with the Army and the New Hampshire 

Police Standards and Training Council. 

U.S. Air Force/Staff Sgt. Shawn Weismiller 

Spread Positivity 

Perception is not necessarily reality. Individual team members 

must remember that people view the world from their 

own perspective. It is as if every toxic team member has on a 

pair of dark glasses and instead of seeing the world through 

rose-colored glasses, sees only blackness or dimmed reality. 

Team members need to individually remove the dark glasses 

and change their own perspective of the job they hold. The 

darkness a member sees clouds vision. Just because you see 

something one way doesn’t mean it really is that way. Team 

members need to work to illuminate areas where there are 

problems, and recognize their own role within the problem. 

Like alcoholics, the first step toward fixing a toxic team is to 

admit that the problem exists. It takes time for teams to become 

toxic. No team member made a purposeful decision to 

become a toxic individual. If you see that you personally have 

become toxic or extremely negative, take responsibility for 

your own behavior and determine that you will not individually 

contribute to overall negativity. 

Negativity and negative cliques can thrive in an office culture 

and can spread from individual to individual. Bruna Martinuzzi 

of Clarion Enterprises Ltd., a business consulting 

company, says unchecked negativity can impact an entire organization. 

Just as negativity can spread, so can positivity. Individuals 

need to decide to become part of a positive culture. 

Open communication and honesty within the team will 

open doors to discuss perceptions within the group and with 

leadership. Teams often fail to communicate with leadership. 

A decision needs to be made that only open and honest communication 

can solve this type of problem. Team members 

need to divorce themselves from strong emotional attachments 

to the opinions and perspectives they hold individually. Although 

we all have emotional attachments to our own particular 

position, we need to view the situation dispassionately so 

we can see reality as it is. Separate opinion from facts, and then 

deal with only the facts. 

Teams should also strive to think strategically rather than 

locally. Large organizations such as the Army need to look at 

the big picture so that missions can be accomplished. Teams 

tend to be myopic, seeing only their immediate needs while 

discounting the needs of others. Teams need to stand back 

and look beyond their own realm to get the big picture. They 

need to put themselves in the shoes of their leadership so they 

can understand all the problems that must be addressed. Recognize 

that leadership must prioritize problem-solving and 

that your team’s specific problem may not be the most important, 

even though it seems to you that it is. 

Seek Mutuality 

Perhaps the most important thing a toxic team can do to fix 

its own negative culture is to look for mutuality. Mutuality 

means focusing on the similarities of your team goals with the 

goals of leadership. You might be surprised at how similar 

they are. Many people have a tendency to focus on the differences 

rather than the similarities. Find places where you can 

have mutual respect for people in leadership and their positions. 

Maintain this respect even when it is difficult to do. 

Recognize that all people—including you—have weaknesses. 

If you look for a commonality, you will make a major step toward 

detoxifying your team. 

Lastly, overcome paranoia. People have a tendency toward 

self-centeredness; we often think that everything is about us. 

Management is not out to get you, even if that is your perception. 

Diminish your own unrealistic self-importance and look 

outside yourself. Everyone has challenges at work; very few 

people like everything about their job. You will have problems, 

but they are solvable if you are willing to work to solve them. 

I don’t know everything there is to know about toxic teams, 

but I do know my own story of being part of one. Our team 

was very talented, had a lot of experience, and was particularly 

creative and intensely loyal to each other. However, the myopia 

of seeing only our own team and our own needs damaged 

us beyond repair. 

Over time, we became toxic and as a result, we were miserable. 

None of us acknowledged our individual contributions to 

the problem. Had we dealt with some of the problems as suggested 

here, we may have been able to detoxify. We, and the 

organization, would have been better for it. ✭ 


For Brain-Injured 

Vets, COMPASS 

Offers Direction 


By Mitch Mirkin 

For Brian Hart, missed medical appointments used to 

be the norm. The former staff sergeant recalls showing 

up at a VA community-based outpatient clinic near his 

Maryland home, only to be informed he was supposed 

to be at the Washington, D.C., VA Medical Center that 

morning. 

“They told me I had to cancel, that I was a no-show,” recalls 

the lanky, soft-spoken 37-year-old, who was 

medically retired in 2008 after 13 years of 

service and five deployments. “I said 

to myself, ‘Something’s not right.’ I 

thought I was on top of it. I sat 

in the car and just cried.” 

Hart knew he had a mild 

traumatic brain injury. An 

IED had struck his Humvee 

during a supply run 

near Fallujah, Iraq, in 

2005. But coming to grips 

with the impact on his 

daily life was another matter. 

“I was in denial,” he 

admits. 

These days, Hart is more 

self-aware—and he is gaining 

tools and skills to better manage 

the condition. Part of that is thanks 

to a VA research program he enrolled 

in. The program is called Community Participation 

through Self-Efficacy Skills Development, 

or COMPASS. The study is funded through VA Rehabilitation 

Research and Development and is the brainchild of 

VA psychologist Alexander Libin. His team described it in the 

journal Military Medical Research in November. 

Setting Goals 

In a nutshell, the program teaches goal-setting, breaking it 

down step by step and reinforcing the skills with a coach. 

Ideally, veterans leave the program not only able to implement 

the skills on their own, but also motivated 

to do so. 

“We’re teaching them how to set 

up their goals,” Libin said. “The 

entire framework is based on this 

idea. It’s like driving: If you teach 

someone how to do it, he can drive 

any car.” 

Most people go about goal-setting 

without any conscious effort, Libin said. 

The process is basic to life, and we do it 

all the time. “This is how we move 

through life as humans. Regardless 

of whether we’re aware of it or not, 

we’re setting goals every day, 

every hour.” 

Traumatic brain injury, or 

TBI, can disrupt the thought 

process required for goal-setting 

because it often damages the 

frontal lobe, the main brain area 

involved in making plans and carrying 

them out. The process can 

also be jammed by sheer emotional 

stress. Libin believes that in most 

TBI cases, a person’s innate goal-setting 

capacity stays intact and can be reengaged. 

He said brain pathways unaffected 

by the trauma come into play. 

“COMPASS basically takes this automatic process, 

slows it down, and fleshes it out step by step,” he said. 

The program doesn’t aim to specifically treat depression, 

anxiety or post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), although 

these issues are often in the mix for the veterans who participate. 

Many are concurrently receiving various treatments. 

“The approach is generally compatible with treatment,” said 

study coordinator Ellen Danford. “Virtually all the veterans in 

the program are involved with something, either on the physical 

side or on the psychosocial or mental health side.” 


Mitch Mirkin 

VA psychologist Alexander Libin 

Sometimes, improvements are also seen in areas such as depression 

or PTSD, even for study participants who are not in 

treatment per se. 

Dr. Joel Scholten, who directs the polytrauma clinic at the 

Washington, D.C., VA Medical Center and serves as a coprincipal 

investigator for COMPASS, called this “the beauty 

of COMPASS. It focuses on a symptom or issue the participant 

is interested in improving and is not dependent on the 

underlying diagnosis.” (Manon Schladen, an implementation 

scientist, is the study’s other lead investigator, along with Libin 

and Scholten.) 

For research purposes, the study excludes those who, at 

baseline, are taking medication to treat severe mental health 

conditions. The philosophy of COMPASS, though, is to not 

wait for participants’ clinical challenges to be solved before 

they get on with their goals and thereby re-engage with everyday 

life. That also goes for TBI symptoms such as poor memory 

or attention. 

Flipping the Paradigm 

“Some clinicians think, how can these veterans do goal-setting? 

That’s a high-level cognitive process,” Libin said. “They 

Mitch Mirkin, based in Baltimore, is the senior writer and editor 

for the VA’s Office of Research and Development. 

say we need to first fix their brains, fix their memory. We say 

that isn’t necessarily so. You find a goal, the person gets engaged. 

All the other things will fall into place. In the process 

of working toward their goals, they will work on those areas of 

function. We’re turning around the community reintegration 

paradigm.” 

Though participants like Hart report progress, COMPASS 

is still being studied. Libin’s team will analyze the outcomes of 

COMPASS participants against those of a control group. The 

team will also compare the outcomes with those obtained 

from other rehab approaches, such as one emphasizing physical 

activity as a path to social engagement. 

COMPASS aims to enroll a total of 110 volunteers. All 

must be veterans of Iraq or Afghanistan who have a history of 

mild TBI and deficits in their day-to-day function. 

According to an August report from the Congressional Research 

Service, approximately 327,000 deployed and non-deployed 

troops have suffered a TBI since 2000, with 82 percent 

of those injuries classified as mild. Most mild TBIs resolve after 

a few months with no lingering symptoms, but some veterans 

will continue to experience problems long after—even 10 

or 20 years down the road. 

“Memory, that’s the No. 1 complaint,” said Hart, who 

started his Army career as a military policeman and then 

switched to logistics after a couple of years. “When I think 

back to the [military] schools I’ve been to and the training I 

had, there’s no way I could have done that [with a TBI]. In logistics, 

and in the MP corps, one thing you’ve got to have is a 

good memory.” 

He said since his TBI, he has a hard time recalling names 

and faces. “If I look back to when I first came in, some people 

that I deployed with or that I was an MP with, or the ones I 

went downrange with and did certain missions, I can’t place 

them at that point. I place them at Fort Knox [Ky.] instead,” 

he said. 

Job Struggles 

Post-military, Hart has struggled with jobs and relationships. 

Amid the TBI and several surgeries, most of which 

were related to his blast injury, Hart strained to keep up. His 

most recent job was as a civilian logistics analyst at a defense 

agency in Northern Virginia. He lasted a few years but resigned 

when he felt he could no longer keep up. He felt himself 

becoming socially isolated and floundering in the office. 

“I wasn’t doing well. I was sinking. I would get in early and 

leave late and was still falling behind,” he said. “I was getting 

aggravated and letting little things bother me. And then anxiety 

started building up. I just crashed one day.” 

Like a lot of other veterans with mild TBI, Hart has also 

struggled with headaches, insomnia and balance problems. He 

started to make some progress working with VA clinicians. 

The study moved him further along. 

“I got some good tools from VA in general,” he said. “The 

COMPASS program sharpened it.” 

The veterans in the program meet with a coach, also known 

as a participant adviser, once a week for eight weeks. The 

coach follows a loosely scripted manual based on motivational 

interviewing. The aim is to get at what the client is interested 


in achieving. Together, coach and client hash out goals. 

“After we had a couple of conversations, time management 

seemed to be a big issue,” COMPASS coach Dwan Bruner 

said of her work with Hart. “He was not getting enough sleep. 

He was missing appointments.” 

She helped him find a useful calendar app for his phone, 

with an alarm feature. Together, they identified other areas 

where he could tweak his time-management skills, such as 

limiting the length of phone conversations when appropriate. 

The process relied on planning sheets, charts and logs in 

which Hart could write his daily and weekly objectives and 

make notes on what he accomplished and how he could do 

better next time. 

“Each participant decides which tool works best for him or 

her,” Bruner said, but the main goal is to instill goal-setting 

habits. 

“They decide on a task, commit to the details of it, and then 

reflect on what worked and what didn’t,” Bruner said. “Then 

they discuss it with the adviser and begin to learn the skill of 

repeating what works best for them and making it into a routine. 

We want to give them skills they can use going forward.” 

Therapist Is Partner 

The give-and-take between coach and client is different 

than what happens in therapy sessions, Libin said. “The sessions 

build on the person’s reactions,” he explained. “It’s almost 

like a dialogue between coach and patient. When you go 

for psychotherapy or even mindfulness, the therapist is more 

like a teacher, teaching you techniques and skills. In our case, 

[the therapist] is your partner. You’re sort of on the same level. 

It’s a two-way process.” 

The goals span areas such as relationships, health, career 

and daily responsibilities. The veteran learns to break down 

each goal into objectives that are “SMART”: significant, measurable, 

affirmative—“I will” instead of “I won’t”—realistic 

and time-limited. 

‘Memory Pad’ Helps 

For Hart, building some stretching into his daily routine 

and eating right were two other important goals. The timemanagement 

routine he’s now settled into involves his phone, a 

monthly calendar he carries around folded up in his back 

pocket, and a small notebook he calls his memory pad. 

“The notebook helps me a lot,” he said. “I don’t try to commit 

anything to memory anymore. I look at the pad all the 

time. I’ll put simple things on there like ‘work out,’ ‘drink water.’ 

It reminds me to do different things I wasn’t doing. As 

soon as I look at the pad, I know what I have to do. I’ll put the 

date when it was completed, or write in parentheses ‘working.’” 

Libin’s team doesn’t rely on anecdotal reports from Hart 

and the other participants. They administer a battery of validated 

tests and questionnaires before a veteran’s participation 

and twice afterward, measuring everything from TBI- and 

PTSD-related symptoms to progress in areas including work 

and relationships. Libin hopes the data will support a wide 

rollout of the program across VA. 

Relationships is one area where Hart feels he has made 

gains. He said that by regularly writing down in his pad “call 

Mom” or “reach out” to his brother, he has done a better job 

of staying in touch with those who matter most to him. 

“My mother lives in North Carolina,” he said. “When I 

would start calling her more, she was surprised. She’d say, ‘Are 

you OK?’ I’d say, ‘Yeah, Ma, I just realized I haven’t been calling 

you like I should.’” 

✭ 

Mitch Mirkin 

COMPASS coach Dwan Bruner, left, works with Army veteran Brian Hart. 


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Peer Pressure 

iStock 

Attorney Evaluation System 

Might Benefit All Officers 

By Col. William M. Connor 

In a 2003 letter to the leadership of the U.S. Army War 

College, then-Secretary of the Army Thomas White 

wrote: “Given an institutional objective to establish and 

maintain effective command climate, how can the Army 

effectively assess leaders to prevent those with destructive 

leadership styles?” 

Many articles have since argued for a better method of 

evaluating Army leaders, particularly officers, but published 

studies have shown a critical problem: Relying solely on superior-officer 

evaluation is insufficient as a means of determining 

best leadership potential. 

In 2008, the Army began the Multi-Source Assessment and 

Feedback (MSAF), a “360-degree assessment.” In 2011, MSAF 

initiation became mandatory for all officer evaluations. 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2014 directed the secretary of defense to assess “the feasibility 

of including a 360-degree assessment approach … as part of 

performance evaluation reports” and report back to Congress 

with the findings. The RAND Corp. was commissioned and 

produced the 2015 report “360-Degree Assessments: Are 

They the Right Tool for the U.S. Military?” This study involved 

extensive research on the subject of 360-degree assessments 

like the MSAF. 

The overall findings by RAND recommended against using 

the 360-degree assessment for purposes of evaluation. Indeed, 

multiple studies have shown that MSAF is suitable 

solely for self-development and not for evaluation. 

“Based on our research on 360s, both within and outside a 

military setting, we advise against incorporating 360s in the 

officer evaluation system at this time,” RAND said. 

Need to Prevent Sabotage 

Various studies, including RAND’s, stress the importance 

of moving beyond superior-only evaluations to better choose 

leaders. The 360 evaluations were found to create problems 

with trust and unit cohesion. Due to congressional mandates 

and DoD regulations, any documented evaluation used by the 

rating or senior rating officer would also be provided to promotion 

boards. An issue comes with the opportunities for 

disgruntled subordinates or “enemy” peers to sabotage an officer’s 

career or establish an incentive for those with clear bias 

in favor of the rated officer. Further, the results of the MSAF 

would substantially increase the number of documents in 

front of boards, becoming impractical with the limited time 

available to review each file. 

Fortunately, the legal profession, which is my civilian career, 

has a solution to the most efficient, fair and equitable 

way to conduct peer evaluations. It’s a method that alleviates 


the issues inherent with using the MSAF for evaluation, yet 

with a far better way to determine our best future leaders and 

help end what the Army refers to as toxic leadership. 

The legal profession’s system of peer evaluations is a simple 

albeit proven one that negates many of the problems with using 

the MSAF and other 360-degree evaluation. How does it 

work? Martindale-Hubbell is perhaps the largest and bestknown 

agency administering attorney peer evaluations. These 

reviews are generated on the voluntary request of an individual 

attorney. Attorneys are not required to request a peer review. 

The rating becomes public record, establishing credibility 

to the attorney among clients and the bar. 

Most requesting attorneys will not achieve the scores required 

to receive one of the two best ratings (BV or AV): On 

a scale of 1–5, a “BV Distinguished” rating is 3.0–4.4. B denotes 

superior competency, and V means top in ethics. The 

top ratings in ethics and competency are achieved with a 

peer-review score of 4.5–5. This is the rating of “AV Preeminent”: 

A for top in competency, and V for top in ethics. 

The ratings are determined by the evaluations of a number 

of fellow attorneys, and judges, who must have personal 

knowledge of those they are evaluating. The evaluators must 

have practiced with the attorney in their respective jurisdiction, 

and must attest to personal knowledge of his or her abilities 

and ethics. Attorneys send multiple evaluation requests. 

Usually, they select those whom they have tried cases against, 

or otherwise worked together. Lawyers within an attorney’s 

own firm cannot complete evaluations. 

Peer Pool Is Wide-Ranging 

Applying this system to the Army would diminish the 

chances of any disgruntled “enemy” destroying the ranking. 

Yet the peer pool is wide-ranging enough for a fair evaluation 

by those who know the officer best. It also would eliminate 

issues with trust and cohesion, as those rating the officer 

could not sabotage his or her career. Again, not attaining a 

rating would be the norm, and boards would not be able to 

put greater weight on whether or not an officer requested a 

peer evaluation. 

In my case, I requested a peer evaluation after six years of 

practicing law. The resulting AV Preeminent ranking has 

been quite helpful. Though I chose which peers would rate 

me, the ratings were anonymous, and all I was able to view 

later were anonymous comments. On the flip side, I’ve had 

no reason not to provide the most objective assessment I 

could muster when I have been asked to rate fellow attorneys. 

This system could readily be adapted by the Army. Officers 

would be permitted, but not required, to apply for a peerevaluation 

rating for each rank, with the rating in place until 

Col. William M. Connor, USAR, is on the South Carolina Emergency 

Preparedness Liaison Team under Region 4 Defense Coordinating 

Element, U.S. Army North. In civilian life, he is an 

attorney. While on active duty, he deployed twice to the Middle 

East and once to the Sinai. As an infantry officer in the Army 

Reserve, he has served as senior intermediate-level education 

instructor and state coordinator for South Carolina. He is a 

graduate of The Citadel. 

the officer reaches the next rank. The ratings could be similar 

to the Martindale-Hubbell system of multiple ratings—possibly 

three levels up to pre-eminent peers. If an officer requests 

a peer evaluation without receiving a rating, neither the superior 

officer writing the officer evaluation report nor the boards 

would be provided with the results. However, the rated officer 

would not be eligible for another peer evaluation until rising 

to the next higher rank. The boards would be offered guidance 

to give the same weight on peer evaluations to all officers 

without a peer-review rating. This provides incentive for officers 

to apply for peer evaluations, as they would not be penalized 

for trying. 

If an officer attained a superior peer-evaluation rating, that 

information would be provided to the officer’s promotion 

board as a supplement to traditional officer-evaluation reports. 

This would not necessitate a new officer evaluation report, 

but would require an outside agency, or a body within the 

Human Resources Command, to help administer the peer 

evaluations. The boards would not have to review anything 

more than the documentation that is currently reviewed. 

However, they would have notice of any peer-review rating 

an officer had attained. That rating could be considered along 

with the officer evaluation reports and other standard board 

material concerning the officer. 

What we call the peer-evaluation ratings and the metrics 

used to determine them could be specified by the Human Resources 

Command. This would require more analysis, but the 

command should be able to follow the same pattern as that 

used by Martindale-Hubbell for attorney peer reviews. 

‘Career Suicide’ Not a Risk 

It’s important to reiterate that officers would not risk career 

suicide due to retaliation by a disgruntled peer or subordinate. 

The average officer would not obtain a peer-evaluation ranking 

but could still remain competitive. When competing for 

the ranks of lieutenant colonel and above, boards would likely 

consider the lack of rating. The critical positive is that boards 

would have a useful tool with which to choose the very best 

leadership. 

A clear advantage to boards would be the additional information 

for evaluating performance and potential. Those who 

“spotlight” for superiors would not be likely to obtain superior 

peer-evaluation ratings. Additionally, those officers who may 

have experienced the proverbial “personality conflict” with a 

superior could survive a marginal evaluation. The board 

would be able to consider the full circumstances of a top peerevaluation 

rating with the anecdotal evaluation by a superior, 

along with other evaluation records. It would be much easier 

to recognize when the board should not put weight on one 

marginal officer evaluation report. 

Clearly, enacting this system would require more analysis 

to determine how to best adapt it to the needs of the current 

personnel and promotion system. It would require clear metrics 

and decisions about ratings we would use for peer 

reviews. But it is time to fix what potentially may be fueling 

any toxic leadership. The legal profession has an effective and 

equitable way to make peer evaluations work. Our soldiers 

deserve nothing less. 

✭ 


Reading: 

The Key 

To Critical 

Thinking 

By Lt. Col. C. Richard Nelson, U.S. Army retired 

Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, former chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, posed the rhetorical question, “They 

can read, can’t they?” during a meeting with the assistant 

commandant of the U.S. Army Command 

and General Staff College in the mid-1970s. Taylor had been 

invited to address students and prior to his presentation, he was 

briefed on recent changes in the curriculum. These changes reflected 

a new focus on tactical-level operations, with a corresponding 

reduction in strategic studies and other subjects. 

Taylor became agitated during the briefing and finally interrupted 

with a comment that in his opinion, the college was 

going in the wrong direction. The assistant commandant defended 

the curriculum changes by arguing that new technologies 

and weapons were not familiar to most of the students. 

Taylor, who had experienced the Army evolving from horse 

cavalry to nuclear weapons, was not impressed. “My God, they 

can read, can’t they?” Taylor responded forcefully. 

Of course they could, but Taylor’s question reflected a nagging 

concern that officers may not be reading as much as they 

should. More than a lack of reading, however, Taylor was reacting 

against a tendency in the Army to focus on the battlefield 

at the expense of strategic thinking. Taylor noted that the 

college traditionally prepared officers to serve at the next two 

higher levels of responsibility. 

One of the consequences of focusing on the tactical and operational 

levels is that the U.S. has excelled at winning battles, 

but not at winning wars. In retrospect, challenges like Vietnam 

and Iraq were not well thought through. Our top-level leaders 

too often seem to suffer from strategic shortsightedness. 

Unfortunately, too many colonels and generals continue to 

think like captains. Higher ranks require broader and more integrated 

thinking. Captains should think primarily about 

fighting battles. Colonels and generals must think about priorities, 

task-organizing formations, providing support for the 

captains, and selecting decisive objectives. 

In addition, colonels and generals are responsible for providing 

their best thoughts on critical linkages between the battlefield 

and the national purpose. As part of the process of 

connecting ends and means, colonels and generals must be 

broadly educated and read accordingly—well beyond briefing 

books prepared by their staffs. 

Working with civilian leaders, colonels and generals should 

think about what, exactly, is meant by winning a war and, 

more importantly, what it takes to win a sustainable peace. 

Gen. George C. Marshall Jr. was already thinking about winning 

the peace in the early stages of World War II when he 

established the U.S. Army Civil Affairs School to deal more 

effectively with the aftermath of war, in part by learning from 

the mistakes made in concluding World War I. Similarly, 

when he was Army chief of staff, Gen. Eric Shinseki thought 

beyond the battlefield in estimating the size of the residual 

force needed in Iraq. Unfortunately, his thoughts were not 

welcome because higher-level thinking focused almost exclusively 

on regime change. 

Taylor’s concern about the lack of appropriate reading was 

Joe Broderick 


Books included on the 

Army Chief of Staff’s 

Professional Reading 

List are shelved together 

at the Camp 

Casey library, Dongduchen, 

South Korea. 

U.S. Army/Staff Sgt. Mark A. Kauffman 

on target. That concern lingers, reinforced by a persistent bias 

in American culture that views reading as an intellectual pursuit. 

This bias is reflected in the prevalence of false dichotomies 

such as “doers vs. thinkers,” and stereotypes of scholars sitting 

smugly in “ivory towers” out of touch with realities such as war. 

Institutionally, the Army is not anti-intellectual. In fact, the 

Army highly values education and encourages soldier-scholars. 

Army officers are likely to spend more time in school than 

many other professionals. Senior officers are likely to have 

graduate degrees. 

Reading List for Professionals 

Nevertheless, an unofficial anti-intellectual bias remains 

that undervalues reading. In addressing the problem, then- 

Chief of Staff Gen. Raymond T. Odierno highlighted the important 

connection between critical thinking and reading 

when he wrote the introduction to his Chief of Staff’s Professional 

Reading List. Critical thinking is necessary to think 

through complex problems well. Indeed, Marshall believed the 

capacity for independent thought was the most important criterion 

in selecting officers for promotion to brigadier general. 

According to the U.S. Army Center of Military History, 

Shinseki started the reading list in 2000 and made the center 

the executive agent for the program. The program previously 

existed as the Contemporary Military Reading List, which began 

in 1959. 

Lt. Col. C. Richard Nelson, USA Ret., Ph.D., was late in acquiring a 

reading habit after serving in Vietnam and on the Army Staff, and 

teaching at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. 

The West Point graduate earned a master’s degree from the University 

of Michigan, and a Ph.D. from the University of Kansas. 

Reading can help critical thinking in many ways. Reading 

can compensate for a lack of firsthand experience in addressing 

the wide range of circumstances confronted by national security 

operations. Furthermore, reading is essential to understanding 

the constantly changing environment. Reading also 

provides opportunities to become knowledgeable about adversaries 

and the political context of a conflict. Finally, reading 

provides a time- and cost-efficient way of learning. 

The Chief of Staff’s Professional Reading List is a good 

starting point. Merely reading, however, is not enough. When 

Odierno was chief of staff, he recommended that the list be 

used to stimulate critical thinking by subjecting the ideas 

raised in these books to careful and reflective thought, discussion 

and debate. Different individuals reading the same text 

are likely to derive different understandings. Reading groups 

can help hone critical thinking skills. 

The reading list provides many resources for improving critical 

thinking (although often in the form of examples of the 

lack of such thinking) such as Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster’s 

Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam. Although 

it is natural to blame those in charge for major failures, it is 

not sufficient. Beyond blaming responsible individuals, we 

should examine both conceptual and institutional factors that 

contributed to ultimate failures. 

Examples of sound critical thinking at the strategic level are 

relatively few, but they do exist. One instructive example is 

Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway’s conclusion in 1954 that Vietnam 

was devoid of decisive strategic objectives at a time when the 

U.S. was being pressured to help French forces besieged at 

Dien Bien Phu. Ridgway disagreed with the other joint chiefs, 

who favored more direct U.S. intervention including the possi- 


le use of nuclear weapons. Even President Dwight D. Eisenhower 

was concerned about the domino effect of losing Vietnam. 

But Ridgway’s argument prevailed. He had sent a team to 

Vietnam to study the situation, and had thought the problem 

through in a more convincing manner than the other chiefs. 

Fifteen years later, a different set of generals and admirals 

came to a different conclusion about appropriate U.S. roles. 

Their shortsighted “can-do” attitude prevailed in an atmosphere 

focused on the battlefield and almost devoid of critical 

thinking about the long term. 

To be successful, generals must be able to think through 

complex issues at the highest levels. Eisenhower was exceptionally 

insightful at this. In his first few months as president, 

he developed a competitive, long-term Cold War strategy that 

pitted the strengths of the U.S. and its allies against the weaknesses 

of the Soviet Union in a manner that was sustainable 

indefinitely. This grew out of a rigorous process of thinking 

through options in his Solarium Project. 

Pfc. Kyle Somerlot of the 82nd Airborne Division enjoys a book while waiting 

to make a jump during an airborne insertion exercise. 

Too Soon Old, Too Late Wise 

Reading is an acquired habit. However, for too many military 

professionals, reading becomes a significant habit only after 

we retire. By then, it may be too late to make a real difference. 

Nevertheless, even retirees can encourage more reading. 

Some people say finding time to read is a challenge. Smartphones 

and tablets are helpful but also distracting. About half 

of American adults own a tablet or electronic reader, and more 

than 76 percent have read a book in the last 12 months, according 

to the Pew Research Center. The typical American 

adult reads about 12 books each year; about half of readers 

read only printed books. Of those reading books electronically, 

87 percent also read printed books, suggesting that hard copy 

remains the main source for more thoughtful reading. 

Of course, reading on its own will not provide simple solutions 

to the complex problems we face. But reading can provide 

a broad background for placing challenges into perspective. 

What we read should not be limited to sources that share 

our own biases. And thoughtful reading can help us think 

more critically—like Ridgway about decisive strategic objectives, 

Eisenhower in terms of long-term competitive strategies, 

and Marshall about winning the peace. Otherwise, the 

norm will be shortsighted generals. Given the tragic consequences 

of poorly informed decisions, our soldiers deserve to 

be led by better-informed critical thinkers. ✭ 

U.S. Air Force/Staff Sgt. Angelita M. Lawrence 

U.S. Army National Guard/Sgt. William Hill 

Vietnam veteran 

Terry Whittaker 

hands out donated 

books at Camp Atterbury 

Joint Maneuver 

Training Center, Ind. 


Facebook Embedded in 

Military families and Facebook 

seem like a perfect 

match. Military families 

want a lot of information, 

both official and unofficial, and 

they want it immediately. And Facebook 

is one of the Internet’s most 

popular sites for accessing all kinds 

of information. 

“I’m really not sure what I would 

do without Facebook,” said Ashley 

McCarty, an Army veteran and military 

spouse whose husband is stationed 

at Fort Huachuca, Ariz. Besides 

being a useful site for official 

information, “I love Facebook because 

I am able to stay in touch with 

family,” she said. Through posting 

photos, “my family is able to see my 

kids and family grow.” 

She can also stay in touch with her 

husband when he deploys, and check 

out unit updates and photos on the 

unit’s official Facebook page. In addition, 

“I love knowing I can ask other spouses who are stationed 

at the same place as me questions about things that are 

going on and [for] updates on things,” said McCarty, who 

searches for unofficial spouse group pages on Facebook and 

then makes friends with those spouses. 

An informal tour of official Army websites shows the service 

recognizes the importance of reaching all ages, demographics, 

families and soldiers with effective communication. That communication 

is clearly made much easier through social media 

sites, particularly Facebook. According to The Associated 

Press, Facebook is the world’s most popular social network. 

“By engaging our audiences in social media, we get a good 

sense of what is working well in the community” and what 

isn’t, said Tanja Linton, media relations officer in the Fort 

Huachuca Public Affairs Office, which launched its Facebook 

page in 2009. Social media also “allows people to bring concerns 

to our attention that we may not have been previously 

aware of,” Linton said. 

In a crisis like the Monument Fire in 2011, which destroyed 

almost 30,000 acres across the Huachuca Mountains in Arizona, 

social media “proved to be particularly useful in a community 

where the nearest TV stations are 75 miles away, in 

Tucson, and there is no live radio coverage in the afternoon 

and evenings,” Linton said. During the fire, Fort Huachuca 

residents turned to the post’s Facebook site for up-to-theminute 

information on which neighborhoods were being evacuated. 

This reduced hours of telephone calls and knocking on 

doors to keep people informed. 

Military spouses use Facebook for several reasons. The most 

common is to connect with family and friends, including those 

deployed or stationed overseas. Facebook makes it easier to stay 

connected despite moves every few years that require frequent 

home telephone number and address changes, spouses said. 

Cyndi Smucker has been an Army wife for eight years; she 

joined Facebook shortly after her marriage. Now stationed at 

Fort Belvoir, Va., Smucker uses Facebook to keep in touch 

with family. “The grandparents are not able to participate in 

our kids’ lives as much as we would like since we are a military 

family,” Smucker said, she so posts “a lot of pictures and 

videos of the kids so they can feel a little more connected.” 

And when Smucker’s husband travels, either for temporary 

duty or deployment, she can keep him up-to-date with pictures 

and information via Facebook. 

Helpful for Moves 

During transitions and moves, military spouses on Facebook 

said they especially rely on the Facebook pages maintained by 

privatized housing companies; the Directorate of Family, 

Morale, Welfare and Recreation; local schools; Army Community 

Services; and even medical and dental commands. 

Other reasons why Army families use Facebook vary, but 

common ones are to access official information quickly, research 

their next duty station, search for jobs, and advertise 

their business. Melissa Mulloy, owner of Bee Gifted Boutique, 

uses Facebook and other social media platforms to promote 

her home-based business, which offers custom-made gifts. 

U.S. Army/Sgt. David Bruce 


Family Life By 

Rebecca Alwine, Contributing Writer 

She enjoys working from home and looks forward to taking 

her business with her when her husband, a captain recently 

named to the major list, is transferred from Fort Huachuca. 

It Really Is That Popular 

Facebook statistics show that in 2015, 82 percent of people 

ages 18–29 who were online accessed Facebook daily. Significant 

percentages of Facebook users were also seen in other age 

groups that were online: 79 percent of people 30–49, 64 percent 

of those 50–64, and 48 percent of people over the age of 65. 

In 2014, 70 percent of all Facebook users accessed the website 

daily, with 45 percent of them doing so several times a day, 

according to the Pew Internet & American Life Project, which 

studies social media use. 

In the Army, community information used to be conveyed 

during a monthly meeting, often hosted by the garrison. It 

served as a place for all organizations, units and groups to discuss 

upcoming events. With Facebook, these meetings are fading 

away, according to conversations with community leaders 

at Fort Huachuca. The assumption is that everyone is checking 

Facebook at regular intervals for information. 

Now, protocol offices send electronic invitations to events. 

Installations update residents on the status of road conditions 

and closures via Facebook pages. News events break on Facebook, 

with casualty assistance officers rushing to beat social 

media to deliver notifications. 

Not everyone is a Facebook fan. For example, one general’s 

spouse is not on Facebook, Twitter or social media of any kind, 

and she doesn’t plan to join. 

“I’ve been a spouse for over 20 years, and I’ve never understood 

why I need to be on Facebook in order to receive information,” 

she said. “I always received reliable information via 

phone trees and official [Family Readiness Group] emails, and 

I’ve heard about the drama on Facebook. I don’t need that.” 

As of now, she has no way to get information through 

channels other than her spouse. 

A ‘Time-Waster’ 

Army spouse Lindsay Jobe, whose husband is stationed at 

Fort Huachuca, deactivated her Facebook account because she 

felt it was a time-waster. However, “I do feel like I miss out on 

some things that are accessible through Facebook, such as 

Army events and information, interest groups, and networking 

and meeting people,” she said. 

Another senior spouse acknowledges that Facebook is helpful 

in difficult situations: “It’s much easier and faster to keep in 

touch when there are urgent needs. But it should not be relied 

upon as the only way to get official information,” she said. 

“Official information should be given to everyone, regardless 

of their choice to use Facebook. They should be contacted via 

other channels to ensure that everyone receives it.” 

Others are concerned about posting sensitive information. 

“I feel like we share a little too much when it comes to security 

issues, soldiers and families alike,” said Chastity Kishpaugh, 

an Army wife stationed remotely. “Even posts that seem 

harmless can reveal information.” 

The Army has written guidance about social media and on 

the official Facebook page of Joint Base Lewis-McChord, 

Wash., there’s a list of things that should not be posted. The 

list was written in conjunction with DoD, the Army and Air 

Force. Information that is considered to be in violation of operational 

security includes casualty information, classified information, 

information protected by the Privacy Act or the 

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, personally 

identifiable information and sensitive information, according 

to the DoD Social Media User Agreement. 

Reliability, Relevance Concerns 

With spouses looking to Army public affairs and official Facebook 

pages comes additional concerns about the reliability and 

relevance of things being shared. Laurel Frock at Fort Huachuca 

has been an Army wife for nine years, and has seen the good and 

the unreliable when it comes to official Facebook pages. “A great 

example of a highly professional Facebook page is Fort Meade 

[Md.]. I don’t question anything they post because they’ve 

proven their reliability and relevance. When I see pictures celebrating 

National Cat Day from other garrison Facebook pages, 

it’s harder to take them seriously when they post about real 

topics. It’s all about presentation and professionalism.” 

However, National Cat Day may be part of a successful social 

media plan. According to the Social Media Examiner: 

Your Guide to the Social Media Jungle, a website for businesses, 

engaging followers increases the visibility of a Facebook 

page. Constant, relevant and engaging posts keep people 

coming back to the page, which is imperative in the case of 

emergencies. 

One example of using Facebook in an emergency was during 

Hurricane Joaquin in fall 2015. The 3rd Battalion, 60th 

Infantry Regiment “River Raiders” at Fort Jackson, S.C., had 

to cancel graduation. The unit posted the news on its official 

Facebook page and fielded questions and comments. It also 

used Facebook to update families, soldiers, civilians and the 

general public about school closures, curfews, and which gates 

would be open immediately following the storm. 

The Public Affairs Office at Fort Huachuca utilizes other 

social media outlets, outside of Facebook, in order to connect 

with people who may not have Facebook accounts, Linton 

said. These include YouTube, Vimeo, Twitter, Pinterest and 

Flickr. 

However, “if there is a plan to communicate with me outside 

of social media, I don’t know about it,” one spouse at Fort 

Huachuca said. “I’ve never been asked for my phone number 

or email since moving here a few years ago. I’m not sure how 

they would contact me.” 

✭ 


Counseling Can Uncover 

By Capt. Gary M. Klein and 

1st Lt. Brock J. Young 

U.S. Army/Capt. Cody Gallo 

Leaders talk about trust as a component of team building 

and a requirement for Mission Command, but what are 

some of the elements that help build trust? 

One of the most common and effective ways to build trust 

is to “lead from the front.” However, that means different 

things in different contexts. One of the easiest and most effective 

ways to lead from the front is to be present during training 

exercises by either participating or providing decisions and 

guidance as necessary. However, it is not practical to be present 

at all of these events, and doing so might actually be 

harmful. To build trust, leaders must balance supervision with 

autonomy and create opportunities for subordinates to exercise 

their initiative and operate independently. 

A recent article on The Military Leader website offered a 

number of recommendations for establishing trust, including 

building personal and professional relationships, recognizing 

hard work, and counseling. 

What effect does counseling have on trust? What about senior 

rater counseling? If done correctly, the counseling process 

builds trust and creates a positive command climate because it 

strengthens relationships. It is important to remember that 

building relationships is an art, though, with different solutions 

for each leader, organization and situation. Therefore, 

leaders must learn to calibrate their counseling style and leadership 

instead of seeking a one-size-fits-all solution. 

Many leaders struggle to conduct routine, quality counseling. 

According to Field Manual 6-22, Army Leadership, and Army 

Techniques Publication 6-22.1, The Counseling Process, counseling 

is the process used by leaders to review with a subordinate 

the subordinate’s demonstrated performance and potential. 

Counseling: Just Do It 

Regardless of how leaders counsel, or how effective we are 

at counseling, the most important thing is to do it. According 

to Army Regulation 623-3 Evaluation Reporting System, all 

NCOs, warrant officers and chief warrant officer 2s, lieutenants 

and captains must receive initial counseling within 30 

days of the beginning of the rating period, and quarterly thereafter. 

However, leaders should be careful to avoid making 

counseling a check-the-block exercise. 

The time needed to conduct counseling has to compete 

with myriad mandatory and priority tasks. Combined with 

minimal training in counseling and the counseling process, 

leaders often lack the communication skills and experience to 

counsel effectively. These are not excuses; they are reality. 

There is no question that counseling is important, evident 


Oppressive Climate 

Clockwise from far left: Army leaders 

mentor soldiers during a live-fire exercise 

at Fort Hunter Liggett, Calif.; in Southern 

Afghanistan; and in Iraq. 

U.S. Army/Sgt. Ashley Curtis 

by the fact that nearly half of Army leaders—46 percent of the 

active component, and 47 percent of the reserve component— 

indicate that they receive performance counseling too infrequently. 

Additionally, 39 percent of leaders say counseling has 

small, very little or no positive impact. If we honestly assessed 

our own performance in regards to counseling, most of us 

would admit that we have room to improve. 

Capt. Gary M. Klein is a small-group leader at the Maneuver Captains 

Career Course. His previous assignments include headquarters 

troop observer/coach trainer at the Joint Readiness Training 

Center, and cavalry troop commander in the 101st Airborne Division. 

He has served combat tours in Iraq, Afghanistan and 

Africa. First Lt. Brock J. Young is the full-time operations officer 

for the 185th Military Police Battalion, California Army National 

Guard. His previous assignments include military police 

platoon leader and aide-de-camp, and he was an NCO prior to 

becoming an officer. He served a combat tour in Iraq and peacekeeping 

deployments in Kosovo and Bosnia, and was assistant officer 

in charge of a detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 

Uncovering Toxic Leadership 

Considering our challenges with counseling, what should we 

think about senior rater counseling, something that happens 

even less frequently? Though there is no regulatory requirement 

to conduct senior rater counseling, it does have benefits. 

The most obvious one is the greater breadth of experience that 

a senior rater can share, but another potential benefit is uncovering 

and addressing toxic leadership. 

For example, let’s say a company commander (rater) regularly 

counseled his or her platoon leaders (rated officers) to review 

their performance and potential. One platoon leader consistently 

performed above and beyond the commander’s expectations, 

so the commander rated this platoon leader as “most 

qualified.” However, the company commander did not have an 

accurate understanding of the platoon’s command climate, so 

this evaluation was based primarily on results. Unfortunately, 

and unknown to the commander, this platoon leader achieved 

these results at the expense of his or her soldiers, creating an oppressive 

and toxic command climate within the platoon. 

How would this scenario change if the commander conducted 

senior rater counseling with the platoon sergeant? If that same 

company commander regularly conducted senior rater counseling 

with his or her platoon sergeants, this might have revealed 

the command climate issues. More importantly, if these issues 

are discovered early in the leader’s career and/or rated period, the 

chain of command can coach corrections to assist subordinates in 

learning and experimenting with leadership styles. The same 

concept applies at all levels of command with the realization that 

the earlier these potential issues are identified, the better. 

Preventing and combating toxic leadership is a significant 

and complex challenge, similar to and related to the challenges 

of counseling and building trust. Senior rater counseling alone 

will not solve the problem of toxic leadership, but it is a benefit 

that leaders might not have considered previously. ✭ 

U.S. Army/Staff Sgt. Mark Burrell 


The Outpost 

Despite Theatrics, Safwan Didn’t Settle Much 

By Lt. Gen. Daniel P. Bolger, U.S. Army retired 

We often hear that wars don’t end the way they once did. 

Just as our enemies today prefer to wear civilian clothes, 

hide among restless villagers and resort to ambushes and 

booby traps, so it has become hard—some say impossible—to 

find a hostile leader willing to come in and sign a quit slip. We 

can kill some; we can capture others. But we can’t seem to get 

the rest to stop. President Barack Obama summarized it well 

in a May 23, 2013, speech at Fort McNair in Washington, 

D.C., when he said, “Our victory against terrorism won’t be 

measured in a surrender ceremony on a battleship.” His predecessor 

had said much the same thing. 

Yet within the experience of men and women still in uniform, 

there has been just the kind of event that our current 

strategic leaders see as so unlikely. A quarter-century ago, an 

American-led coalition confronted and smashed a hostile armed 

force of a half-million men. It seemed to wrap up nice and neat, 

in the traditional way. But even when we got some of our enemies 

to admit they were beaten, we missed the bigger picture. 

An old-school formal surrender was part of our style of warfare, 

not theirs. They knew it. We found out the hard way in the 

wake of our smashing victory in Operation Desert Storm. 

When the cease-fire came on Feb. 28, 1991, after just 42 days 

of conflict in Kuwait and Iraq, Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf 

Jr., commander in chief of U.S. Central Command, 

moved immediately to meet with the enemy commander. He 

chose a site near Safwan, Iraq, a crossroads just north of the 

Kuwaiti border. In truth, Schwarzkopf’s counterpart was Iraqi 

supreme leader Saddam Hussein himself. Like his idol Adolf 

Hitler did in the Nazi German Wolfschanze (Wolf’s Lair) 

bunker in mid-1944, sticking pins in the map and issuing detailed 

orders to individual battalions as Allied forces closed the 

ring, Saddam ran the whole show. In what he grandiosely labeled 

“the mother of all battles,” Saddam alone directed the 

movements of Iraqi units great and small. He owned this disaster. 

In a just world, he would have answered for it. 

Yet as an ultimate survivor, Saddam did not trust Schwarzkopf’s 

flag of truce. The Iraqi dictator did not wish to risk 

getting snagged in Safwan, clapped into handcuffs, zipped into 

an orange jumpsuit and follow the likes of former Panamanian 

strongman Manuel Noriega into the docket of a U.S. courtroom. 

Already beset with rebellions in the Kurdish north and Shiite 

Arab south, the Iraqi president squatted safely in his Baghdad 

enclave. He dispatched two senior representatives: Lt. 

Gen. Sultan Hashim Ahmad, deputy chief of the general staff, 

and Lt. Gen. Salah Abud Mahmud, commander of III 

Corps—or what remained of it. It wasn’t quite the Japanese 

motoring out to the battleship USS Missouri to meet Gen. 

Douglas MacArthur on Sept. 2, 1945, but it would do. 

At half past 11 on the morning of March 3, the two Iraqis 

arrived to meet Schwarzkopf and Lt. Gen. Khalid bin Sultan, 

the Saudi Arabian co-commander. American soldiers of the 

1st Infantry Division, the famous “Big Red One,” escorted the 

Iraqis. The cowed opponents walked past lines of U.S. tanks 

and tracked infantry carriers. Ranks of hard-eyed GIs fronted 

the slab-sided armored vehicles. Apache attack helicopters 

clattered overhead. To the wary Americans, the Iraqi generals 

looked small, old and nervous. 

The Iraqis walked into the designated meeting tent and sat 

where they were directed. Behind the Iraqi generals, a few of 

their subordinate staff officers, notebooks in hand, crowded 

into folding chairs. Schwarzkopf and Khalid entered and took 

their seats. They also had their people arrayed behind them. 

After some photographs for posterity, the big American 

spoke first. It was 11:34 a.m. “The purpose of this meeting,” 

Schwarzkopf said, “is to discuss and resolve conditions that we 

feel are necessary to ensure that we continue the suspension of 

offensive operations on the part of the coalition.” The agenda 

adhered to military matters. Someday, Schwarzkopf assumed, 

the diplomats would hammer out a true peace treaty or a pact 

or a convention, or whatever. It never happened. 

“We are authorized,” Ahmad replied, “to make this meeting 

a successful one in an atmosphere of cooperation.” He spoke 

deliberately, careful to make eye contact. 

Schwarzkopf nodded and pressed on. He talked about the 

cease-fire boundary, referring to a map. The Iraqis leaned forward 

as the American confirmed their fears. The coalition 

held the southern fifth of Iraq. Schwarzkopf made it clear that 

the U.S. had no permanent territorial designs as long as the 

Iraqis met their obligations regarding withdrawal of the surviving 

Iraqi forces, return of prisoners, transfer of the dead, 

and marking of minefields. “But until that time, we intend to 

remain where we are,” he said. 

Discussion continued for a while on details of unit positions 

and movements, then broadened into the other agenda items as 

Schwarzkopf went down the list. Those present remembered 

that the U.S. general did almost all of the talking. The Iraqis 

listened. Subordinates took notes. The tent heated up. The air 

grew stuffy. Finally, Schwarzkopf completed his points. 

Ahmad spoke up. He pressed on the prisoners. How many? 

“We have, as of last night, 60,000,” Schwarzkopf replied, 

“60,000-plus.” Ahmad looked stunned. 

His comrade Mahmud, who had watched his units get 

pounded by U.S. Air Force and Navy jets and shredded by 

U.S. Army and Marine battalions, offered: “It’s possible. I 

don’t know.” 


Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf Jr., commander 

in chief of U.S. Central Command, left, and 

Saudi Arabian co-commander Lt. Gen. Khalid 

bin Sultan discuss cease-fire conditions with 

Iraqi generals at Safwan, Iraq. 

An awkward silence ensued. Schwarzkopf 

broke it, trying to wrap up. “Are 

there any other matters the general 

would like to discuss?” 

Ahmad did. “We have a point, one 

point.” 

Schwarzkopf waited. 

“You might very well know,” Ahmad 

continued, “the situation of our roads 

and bridges and communications.” 

Schwarzkopf definitely knew. On his 

orders, coalition airmen had severed 

most of those links. 

Ahmad went on. “We would like 

to agree,” he offered, “that helicopter 

flights sometimes are needed to carry 

officials from one place to the other because the roads and 

bridges are out.” That seemed reasonable, but it was anything 

but an idle request. 

Thus far, the Safwan conference had been all about sticking 

it to the Iraqis in a most public way. It featured Vietnam 

veteran Schwarzkopf making sure that this time, war ended 

in the old style, with the beaten foe hangdog and helpless at 

the mercy of the victor. Americans had suffered through the 

humiliation of North Korean and Chinese propaganda ploys 

at the truce talks in Panmunjom, Korea, in 1951–53; and the 

North Vietnamese bluster and circumlocutions in Paris from 

1968–1973. In those endless meetings, working from battlefield 

parity or worse, the Americans got bamboozled and 

hoodwinked over and over, strung along, embarrassed, and 

played for fools and suckers by the much more savvy enemy 

negotiators who followed a simple formula: What was theirs 

was theirs, but what was the U.S.’s was negotiable. Well, in 

Desert Storm, the U.S. had crushed Iraq. This time, nobody 

would play Schwarzkopf for a fool or sucker. Or would they? 

The Iraqis were placing markers for a much longer game. 

They saw an opening. Ahmad and Mahmud, well-briefed in 

Baghdad, figured on a bit of magnanimity from Schwarzkopf 

as long as they asked for only one thing. After all, in the 

iconic surrender at Appomattox, Va., on April 9, 1865, hadn’t 

Union Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant allowed Confederate Gen. 

Robert E. Lee to let his men keep their horses for the spring 

Lt. Gen. Daniel P. Bolger, USA Ret., was the commander of Combined 

Security Transition Command-Afghanistan and NATO 

Training Mission-Afghanistan. Previously, he served as the 

deputy chief of staff, G-3/5/7, and as the commanding general, 

1st Cavalry Division/commanding general, Multinational Division-Baghdad, 

Operation Iraqi Freedom. He holds a doctorate 

in Russian history from the University of Chicago and has published 

a number of books on military subjects. He is a senior fellow 

of the AUSA Institute of Land Warfare. 

plowing? The Iraqis wanted to keep their modern horses, the 

helicopters. But they wouldn’t be used for agriculture. 

Schwarzkopf walked right into the snare. “As long as the 

flights are not over the part we are in, that is absolutely no 

problem.” Ahmad pushed a bit: “So you mean even armed helicopters 

can fly in Iraqi skies?” Schwarzkopf agreed. “You have 

my word,” he said. That settled it. 

As the meeting concluded, Ahmad saluted and offered his 

open palm. Schwarzkopf returned the salute and shook the 

Iraqi general’s hand. “As an Arab,” Ahmad said, “I hold no 

hate in my heart.” 

He did hold those helicopters, though. The Americans were 

leaving. The Iraqis weren’t going anywhere. Soon enough, as 

the U.S. and coalition forces backed out, Iraqi heliborne 

troops went in hard against Shiite rebels in the south and Kurdish 

militias in the north. Within a few days, the U.S. and its 

allies, notably the neighboring Turks, imposed a no-fly zone 

up north to protect the Kurds. The Kurds became grateful 

American friends from 1991 until the present. 

It took until well into 1992 for a similar, and less effective, 

aerial screen to go up over the Shiite south. By that time, the 

Iraqi Shia communities had lost tens of thousands, and the 

survivors resented and distrusted the Americans as quick to 

encourage revolt but way too late to help. 

Their fellow Shiites next door in Iran proved much more 

sympathetic. That unhappy relationship also persists. A lot of 

bad things flowed from one concession by an American general. 

More trouble followed. Because he had weathered Desert 

Storm and the rebellions that followed, Saddam proclaimed 

himself the victor of the 1990–91 war. When the 1992 U.S. 

election saw President George H.W. Bush turned out of office, 

wags snorted. “Saddam still has his job. How about you?” 

Twelve years of shadowboxing, threats, “incidents,” air patrols 

and airstrikes followed. Iraq remained unfinished business. 

Despite the theatrics, the armistice meeting at Safwan 

hadn’t really settled all that much. There would be another 

round. It would not end well for either side. ✭ 

DoD 


Soldier Armed 

Assault Breacher Vehicle By Scott R. Gourley, Contributing Writer 

Some say that it looks like something out of a James Bond 

movie. Others tie its appearance to Mad Max. Regardless 

of first impressions, the Assault Breacher Vehicle provides U.S. 

Army warfighters with an exceptional capability to conduct 

mounted breaching of minefields and other combat obstacles. 

First, what it’s not: The Assault Breacher Vehicle (ABV) is 

not the Army Grizzly Breaching Vehicle. The Grizzly requirement 

had emerged, in part, from lessons learned during 

the First Gulf War. There were similarities. For example, 

based on an M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank chassis, the Grizzly 

would have integrated multiple subsystems to provide instride—or 

maneuvering on the move—underarmor breaching 

capability for heavy divisions. At one time, the Army envisioned 

buying up to 900 Grizzly vehicles, with the first unit to 

be equipped in fiscal year 2004. However, that program was 

canceled in 2001. 

Not a Grizzly Replacement 

“I certainly wouldn’t call the Assault Breacher Vehicle the replacement” 

for the Grizzly program, said Lt. Col. Jeff Biggans, 

Army product manager for bridging. “But it’s definitely 

the affordable and economic version.” Biggans said the ABV 

“doesn’t do everything that Grizzly was supposed to do. But 

in some cases, it does even more.” 

According to Eric Noyes, program integrator for assault 

bridging in the product management office, the ABV system 

consists of an M1A1 tank hull with a unique turret that is fabricated 

at Anniston Army Depot, Ala. That basic chassis is then 

equipped with interchangeable front-end equipment, including 

a full-width mine plow and combat dozer 

blade, an integrated vision system with 

day/night cameras and a 360-degree field 

of view, a lane-marking system, and two 

mine-clearing line charge (MCLIC) linear 

demolition systems atop the turret. 

“This really allows the combat engineers 

to keep up with their maneuver 

brothers and sisters,” Biggans said. He 

added that typically, combat engineers 

had M113s, or armored personnel carriers, 

towing a trailer with an MCLIC on 

it. The MCLIC’s reliability “wasn’t all 

that great,” he said, “and the maneuverability 

of the M113 trying to keep up 

with its Abrams and Bradley partners was not that easy to do. 

But now, this piece of equipment allows them to be at the 

leading edge of the breaches and assaults.” 

Two rocket-launched, 1,700-pound plastic explosive line 

charges on the rear of the hull are examples of a capability that 

was not part of the Grizzly concept. 

Today’s ABV design emerged from a 2002 Marine Corps 

requirement to provide in-stride breaching for the Marine 

Air-Ground Task Force, the basic organizational concept of 

the Marine Corps. The M1A1 base hull was selected because 

the Marines wanted something common with their tank fleet. 

“Then the Army saw it,” Noyes said, and in 2006 formally 

adopted it as a requirement. 

The program characterizes “the goodness of government,” 

Biggans said. It highlights cooperation not only with the Marine 

Corps but also with Anniston Army Depot, which manufactures 

the vehicles, and the depot’s “capability development 

colleagues” at the U.S. Army Engineer School at Fort 

Leonard Wood, Mo. 

Industry participation includes the government-furnished 

equipment that is purchased by the product management office 

and then delivered to Anniston Army Depot for integration. 

For example, Pearson Engineering LLC provides the 

mine plow, dozer blade and obstacle marking system used on 

the ABV. 

But if you’re looking for a manufacturer of the ABV, that 

would be Anniston Army Depot. The depot’s range of capabilities 

become quickly apparent—not only to the Army, but 

also to the Marine Corps. 

Three ‘arms’ with ski surfaces attached to the 

front of an Assault Breacher Vehicle provide 

depth control. 

Scott R. Gourley 


Scott R. Gourley 

U.S. Army/Spc. Erik Anderson 

Above: An Assault Breacher Vehicle clears a path for assault forces training at Fort 

Benning, Ga.; left: a newly manufactured ABV turret at Anniston Army Depot, Ala. 

According to Joey Edwards, ABV program manager at Anniston, 

the Marine Corps contacted the depot in 2002 “to newly 

manufacture turrets and convert M1A1 chassis into a prototype—which 

was the breacher vehicle as it’s known today.” 

Anniston started with technical drawing packages for 

unique components and in fiscal year 2006 manufactured five 

prototypes for Marine Corps testing. Successful testing led to 

full-rate production of 52 ABVs for that service. The last of 

those vehicles came off the Anniston production line in February 

2012. Meanwhile, Army ABV production began in FY 

2009 for a total of 111 vehicles. 

“Basically, we’ve been manufacturing 12 to 15 of the Army 

vehicles each year,” Edwards said, adding that as of December, 

104 had been delivered. 

According to Edwards, vehicles initially arrive at Anniston 

Army Depot’s Combat Disassembly and Overhaul Facility as 

an M1A1 Abrams chassis. Workers “overhaul all legacy components 

and then do ABV-unique conversion and modification 

to the hull,” he said. 

As part of the process, the original M1A1 turret is eliminated, 

and a new ABV turret is manufactured in-house. 

“It’s not a gun-type turret,” Edwards said. “It’s basically a 

command-type, central location turret with a mine-clearing 

line charge on the back. So they launch the MCLIC from inside 

the turret.” 

Asked how the Army and Marine Corps vehicles differ, 

Edwards pointed to the services’ different communications 

system and the Marines’ decision to install a stabilized commander’s 

weapon station not found on the Army’s version. 

Warfighter ‘Pit Crew’ 

“Anniston Army Depot is tremendously proud to be known 

as the original equipment manufacturer for the ABV,” said 

Col. Martine Kidd, commander of Anniston Army Depot. 

“We know the important capability this vehicle provides to 

our ground forces and are focused on ensuring sustainable 

readiness for our Army—not only this platform, but for all of 

the combat vehicles we repair. All of our employees are honored 

to serve and to be known as the pit crew of the American 

warfighter.” 

When fielded, three ABVs are delivered to each of the two 

combat engineer companies of an armored brigade combat 

team’s brigade engineer battalion. 

To see what might be of further interest to the Army, the 

Army product office is monitoring some Marine Corps ideas 

and is also working with the U.S. Army Engineer School. 

“We work closely with the M1 Abrams product office team 

as well,” Biggans said. “And as they are doing their engineering 

change proposals to modernize and upgrade their platforms, 

we keep pace as appropriate for this M1A1-based platform.” 

He also said there is significant “partner-nation interest” in 

the ABV that could lead to international sales. 

Biggans highlighted unique aspects of system employment 

by the combat engineers, including the tactical, operational 

and maintenance challenges of operating the system with a 

crew of only two soldiers, instead of three or four, on a tank. 

To address these challenges, the engineer school has created 

a new program of instruction to train operators on the Assault 

Breacher Vehicle, M9 Armored Combat Earthmover and Armored 

Vehicle Launch Bridge. Successful course completion 

results in the additional skill identifier B6. 

Noyes said an additional capability of the engineer school 

“involves six ABV simulators. They are based on the common 

driver trainer platform, and the simulators are ostensibly for 

training drivers.” 

“But it’s the driver who operates the plow and dozer blade,” 

he said. “And then the vehicle commander can participate 

from desktop. And they can link the simulators together, 

which is a big benefit for training ABV crews.” ✭ 


Historically Speaking 

250 Years Later, Declaratory Act Still Relevant 

By Brig. Gen. John S. Brown, U.S. Army retired 

March 18 marks the 250th anniversary of “An Act for the 

better securing the Dependency of His Majesty’s Dominions 

in America upon the Crown and Parliament of Great 

Britain.” This is also known as the American Colonies Act of 

1766, but it is best known as the Declaratory Act. Whichever 

title is chosen, the act and American reaction to it proved an 

important waypoint in our evolution as a nation. 

Within a decade, we ceased to think of ourselves as a discrete 

number of colonies each separately connected to the 

mother country, and instead thought of ourselves as a common 

people with a shared destiny. This turn of mind may 

have come within a relatively brief span of time, but the approach 

march to it had taken generations—as did bringing its 

consequences to fruition. Mindfulness of this episode in our 

own past may make us a bit more wary if trying to quickly 

conjure up robust national identities in others. 

In 1763, Great Britain emerged triumphant in the French 

and Indian War, the North American component of the 

globe-straddling Seven Years’ War (1754–63). The Peace of 

Paris evicted France from North America and Spain from 

Florida. British possession extended from the Atlantic Ocean 

to the Mississippi River in what is now the U.S., and to the 

Rocky Mountains in what is now Canada. Frontier security 

was disturbed by Pontiac’s Rebellion, also in 1763, but for the 

vast majority of English colonists, the existential threat posed 

by France or Spain had disappeared. For generations, the 

colonists had been utterly dependent upon Great Britain to 

secure them from being crushed as the tectonic plates of empires 

ground against each other. Now there was only one 

plate, and it was British. 

It was true that Pontiac and other hostile American Indians 

continued to pose risks to Western settlers on the frontier, but 

the colonists were equivocal as to the extent and nature of the 

British military assistance they still desired. Absent French or 

Spanish collusion and support, the tribes were far less of a 

threat than they had been before. Ever-increasing numbers of 

well-armed settlers would prove more than a match for them. 

Prompted by British colonial officials, King George III issued 

a proclamation forbidding colonial settlement beyond the 

crest of the Appalachian Mountains. The idea was to keep the 

settlers and the Indians out of each other’s way, and to protect 

the fur trade. British troops stationed beyond the Appalachians 

would, of course, be expected to enforce the edict. This 

did not sit well with the rising tide of settlers aspiring to carve 

homesteads out of what they perceived as wilderness. 

Wherever the British troops were stationed, someone would 

have to pay for them. British Prime Minister George 

Grenville and Parliament made the reasonable assumption 

that the colonists should contribute to their own defense. The 

need to raise money was rendered particularly acute by the expenses 

of the Seven Years’ War, which had doubled the national 

debt. The Sugar Act of 1764 imposed new duties on 

colonial imports of sugar, indigo, coffee, pimento, wine and 

textiles. The Currency Act of 1764 prohibited the colonies 

from using their paper money 

as legal tender. The Stamp Act 

of 1765 taxed legal documents, 

newspapers, almanacs, playing 

cards and dice. The Quartering 

Act of 1765 stipulated that 

colonies in which British troops 

were quartered had to provide 

them with quarters; candles; 

vinegar; salt; bedding; and beer, 

cider or rum. Given the taxes 

that already existed in Great 

Britain at the time, none of 

these was regarded by Parliament 

as particularly onerous. 

Library of Congress 

A wood engraving depicts colonists 

in Boston protesting the Britishimposed 

Stamp Act of 1765. 


Library of Congress 

This 1767 etching emphasizes America’s poverty as a result of the Stamp Act. 

Beyond not wanting new taxes—few do—the colonists 

were particularly upset by several aspects of Grenville’s program. 

They had not been allowed to participate in the process 

whereby the taxes were derived. This was “taxation without 

representation.” Infractions of the Sugar and Stamp Acts were 

to be tried in British admiralty courts. These featured royally 

appointed judges and no juries. 

A representative government and trial by jury were concepts 

highly prized by the colonists. They considered them among 

their rights as Englishmen. Established with local legislatures 

in an era of loose, ramshackle and permissive royal governance, 

the colonists now faced centrist parliamentary governance 

determined to assert itself. As Parliament became more 

organized and effective, the colonists became more estranged. 

The term “Americans,” curiously derived from the contributions 

of Florentine explorer Amerigo Vespucci, was used to 

describe American Indians alone for over a century. Its first 

recorded use in English to describe European settlers, “English-Americans,” 

was in 1648. 

Over the 18th century, the term compressed to Americans, 

and was increasingly used to describe British colonists and their 

descendants. This usage was hardly universal, however. As late 

as the Albany Congress in 1754, Americans identified far more 

strongly with their individual colonies than with each other. 

Collective sentiment was minimal. Outrage over Grenville’s 

taxation plans changed that. 

A transcolonial Stamp Act Congress met in New York in 

October 1765. It declared “all due subordination” to Parliament, 

but avowed that this did not include taxation without 

representation or trial without jury. Many colonists avoided 

Brig. Gen. John S. Brown, USA Ret., was chief of military history 

at the U.S. Army Center of Military History from December 

1998 to October 2005. He commanded the 2nd Battalion, 66th 

Armor, in Iraq and Kuwait during the Gulf War and returned 

to Kuwait as commander of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, 

in 1995. Author of Kevlar Legions: The Transformation 

of the U.S. Army, 1989–2005, he has a doctorate in history from 

Indiana University. 

business that would have required stamps. Even more boycotted 

British goods, as did prominent merchants. Mob violence, 

much of it under the auspices of the self-appointed Sons 

of Liberty, broke out to intimidate officials attempting to enforce 

the Stamp and Sugar Acts. British troops policed restive 

cities rather than colonial frontiers. 

Grenville was dismissed. His successor, Charles Watson- 

Wentworth, the Second Marquess of Rockingham, listened to 

English merchants stung by the economic perturbations and 

committed to make peace. The Stamp Act was repealed and 

the Sugar Act gutted. 

The colonists exulted in the happy results of their collective 

efforts and seemed well on the way to reconciliation with the 

mother country. However, Parliament did not recognize the 

forest as it dealt with individual trees. It accompanied the removal 

of the offending legislation with a Declaratory Act stipulating 

that it alone had the authority to “make laws and statutes 

… to bind the colonies and people of America … in all cases 

whatsoever.” It ignored core American concerns with respect to 

representation, trial by jury, and the rights of Englishmen, and 

instead tinkered with details of what to tax and when. It did not 

help that the Declaratory Act was an almost verbatim lift from 

the Irish Declaratory Act of 1719, which colonists viewed as 

having reduced Ireland to servitude and penury. 

Colonial opinion leaders instinctively opposed the Declaratory 

Act, but most colonists were content to leave well enough 

alone as long as the act remained hypothetical. They had already 

acted together to sweep away one assault on their rights 

and were emboldened by the success of their collective efforts. 

The Declaratory Act became a fuse waiting to be lit. When 

Parliament actually acted on the theory that it could tax the 

colonists without consulting them and abridge such rights as 

jury trial or representative government, the pushback was immediate 

and formidable. Confrontation spiraled in the face of 

the successive Townshend Acts, Intolerable Acts and Quebec 

Act. A decade after the Declaratory Act, the Second Continental 

Congress declared an independent United States of 

America. 

Lessons from the Declaratory Act should remain with us. 

From the British perspective, these could include hubris, failure 

to appreciate local sentiment, and imperial overreach. 

From the American perspective, these could include the long 

slog toward a shared national identity, ideological pivot points, 

and the significance of shared values to nation-building. 

Now we are a mature and powerful nation. We might do well 

to remember how the world looked to us when we were not. ✭ 

Additional Reading 

Blum, John M., et al., The National Experience: A 

History of the United States (New York: Harcourt Brace 

Jovanovich, 1981) 

Middlekauff, Robert, The Glorious Cause: The American 

Revolution 1763–1789 (Oxford: Oxford University 

Press, 2007) 

Wood, Gordon S., The American Revolution: A History 

(New York: Modern Library, 2003) 


AUSA Sustaining Member Profile 

PRIDE Industries 

Corporate Structure—President and CEO: Michael Ziegler. 

Headquarters: 10030 Foothills Blvd., Roseville, CA 95747. 

Telephone: 800-550-6005. Website: www.prideindustries.com. 

PRIDE Industries provides outsourcing solutions that 

meet the manufacturing and service needs of Fortune 500 

companies and government agencies nationwide while 

creating meaningful employment for people with disabilities, 

including our nation’s veterans. 

Founded in 1966, PRIDE Industries operates in 14 states 

and the nation’s capital and employs more than 5,300 people, 

including more than 2,900 with disabilities. As a 

501(c)(3) nonprofit entity, PRIDE embraces a model of social 

enterprise, preparing and placing individuals with disabilities 

in employment in its business enterprises 

and with community partners. 

PRIDE Industries’ full range of services 

and capabilities are specifically designed 

to support distinct customer needs— 

from small businesses and local government 

offices to Fortune 50 companies, 

large federal agencies, and secure military 

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Because client operations are diverse and complex, customized 

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Every project begins by developing an in-depth understanding 

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PRIDE provides a full line of facilities services to publicand 

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Accredited by the Commission on Accreditation of Rehabilitation 

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and group service supports that help prepare, place and 

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Reviews 

1862 West Point Class Serves As Case Study 

For How the Civil War Divided the Nation 

For Brotherhood & Duty: The Civil 

War History of the West Point Class 

of 1862. Brian R. McEnany. University 

Press of Kentucky. An AUSA title. 508 

pages. $45. 

By Col. Cole C. Kingseed 


In recent decades, a number of prominent 

authors including John C. Waugh 

and Michael Haskew have written excellent 

histories of individual West 

Point classes. Retired Lt. Col. Brian R. 

McEnany, a 1962 graduate of the U.S. 

Military Academy, adds his literary talents 

to the mix in For Brotherhood & 

Duty: The Civil War History of the West 

Point Class of 1862. McEnany’s work is 

part of the American Warriors Series, 

which is designed to promote a deeper 

and more comprehensive understanding 

of the U.S. armed forces. 

Why this particular class? McEnany, 

who has written historical articles about 

West Point during the Civil War era, 

writes that he became interested in the 

Class of 1862 while searching for information 

about the class that graduated 

100 years before his own. After exhaustive 

research in the cadet archives in the 

West Point Library, McEnany discovered 

a group of extraordinary young men 

who sparked his interest. One of the 

original members of the class, Henry S. 

Farley, was a second lieutenant when he 

fired the first round at Fort Sumter, 

S.C.; classmate Lt. Col. William C. 

Bartlett accepted the surrender of the last 

Confederate unit in the mountains of 

North Carolina. Another, Maj. Gen. 

George Gillespie, was a first lieutenant 

when he performed the battlefield actions 

that led to the award of the Medal 

of Honor in 1897, and he helped design 

the medal that is awarded today. 

Between Abraham Lincoln’s election 

to the presidency in November 1860 and 

the end of the summer of 1861, the Class 

of 1862 saw their superintendent and 

commandant change three times and half 

their classmates resign. The 28 cadets 

who remained witnessed their class motto 

embodied in the words “In Causam Communem 

Conjuncti”—translated as Joined 

in a Common Cause—and were severely 

tested in the crucible in combat. 

McEnany divides the story of the 

Class of 1862 into two parts. The first 

section describes life at West Point during 

the class’s cadet years; the second 

summarizes the actions and exploits of 

16 classmates over the course of the 

war. In writing the second half, McEnany 

concentrates on 12 Union and 

four Confederate classmates during various 

campaigns. Two key protagonists 

are portrayed multiple times. Ranald S. 

Mackenzie, the No. 1 graduate of the 

Class of 1862, ended the war as a Union 

brevet major general of cavalry. James 

Dearling resigned in April 1861 to serve 

as an artilleryman in the Confederate 

army, ending the war as a brigadier general 

of cavalry. 

McEnany is superb in analyzing the 

West Point experience on the eve of 

the Civil War. He posits that John 

Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry, W.Va., 

in October 1859 was the critical event 

that “polarized the cadets.” The voices 

and views of Southern cadets became 

more strident after Brown’s raid, and 

cadets frequently settled their political 

differences with fists. Emotions then 

escalated following Lincoln’s election 

and the Confederate bombardment of 

Fort Sumter, S.C., in April 1861. 

In outlining the class’s participation in 

the conflict, McEnany notes that the 

West Point class served as junior officers 

in both command and staff assignments. 

The most distinguished member of the 

Class of 1862 was undoubtedly Mackenzie, 

whom Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant 

touted as “the most promising young officer 

in the Army.” Wounded six times 

during the war and once during later cavalry 

campaigns in the Southwest, Mackenzie 

“was appointed brigadier general 

in the regular Army within two years of 

graduation and brevetted to major general, 

[U.S. Volunteers], in command of a 

cavalry division before the war was over.” 

To facilitate the reader’s comprehension 

of the contributions of the class, 

McEnany includes an appendix that 

features biographical sketches of each 

of the original class members. Not only 

does this appendix greatly enhance 

McEnany’s text, but it also provides a 

complete listing of Civil War assignments 

of every classmate. Of particular 

interest is Tully McCrea, who graduated 

14th and retired as a brigadier general 41 

years later. He returned to West Point in 

1864 to teach mathematics while recovering 

from a serious wound. McEnany 


notes in his preface that McCrea “was a 

prodigious letter writer—more than 250 

of his letters are held by the Special Collections 

and Archives Division at the 

West Point Library.” In compiling this 

history, McEnany relied extensively on 

McCrea’s correspondence. 

By the time McCrea departed West 

Point for a subsequent assignment in 

June 1866, he recorded that “the senior 

professors had completed their review of 

the war and strongly believed that the institution’s 

core principles were validated 

by the war.” In a sense, the American 

Civil War validated West Point as an institution, 

and the Class of 1862 contributed 

mightily to that legacy. 

McEnany offers his personal assessment 

of his class’s centennial alumni. 

“On balance, the Class of 1862 was a 

gallant bunch—courageous and dedicated 

to restoring the Union,” he writes. 

“The brotherhood that was born at the 

outset of the war truly served their country 

well and in a manner that made them 

more than worthy of the current motto 

of the U.S. Military Academy: ‘Duty, 

Honor, Country.’” 

Col. Cole C. Kingseed, USA Ret., Ph.D., a 

former professor of history at the U.S. Military 

Academy, is a writer and consultant. 

Tips Offered for Facing Life’s Challenges 

Three Points of Contact: 12.5 Ways to 

Jumpstart Your Life and Weather 

Any Storm. Gregory Q. Cheek. Create- 

Space. 269 pages. $14.95. 

By Lt. Col. Chad Storlie 


Gregory Q. Cheek has an impressive 

resume as an author, speaker, college 

professor, retired Army officer and 

DoD employee. It is another resume 

item as Stage III cancer survivor that created 

his drive and passion to help others. 

In Three Points of Contact, he endeavors 

to inspire readers to strength, action and 

compassion. 

The three points of contact in Cheek’s 

motivational and self-help book are optimism, 

visualization and action. Most 

importantly, enthusiasm and a love of 

life and learning flavor Three Points of 

Contact throughout. This book is more 

than a typical self-help book. It is first 

and foremost a story of inspiration, 

passion and zest of a life well-lived. 

Cheek aims to teach others to adopt 

the strength that propelled him from a 

suffering Stage III cancer patient to a 

person with boundless energy and optimism. 

The audience for this book is anyone 

who is about to undertake a transforming 

life or health challenge. Cheek writes 

about how he conquered and overcame 

his cancer and suffering over a period of 

years. If you have never experienced the 

fear and gnawing dread of an unknown 

and unseen enemy (cancer or another 

life-threatening ailment), then Cheek’s 

advice could easily be ignored. Anyone 

who is going through such a life challenge 

will undoubtedly appreciate and 

take to Cheek’s advice. 

The book’s organization and simplicity 

make it a fun, easy and actionable 

read. Each of the 13 chapters starts 

with a motivational quote from a leading 

business person, politician, author 

or celebrity. Each chapter contains immediate, 

easy to understand and useful 

information illustrated with Cheek’s 

life experiences. Then, each chapter concludes 

with a summary and five key points 

for action. 

The book’s other strength is its advice 

on life’s common challenges. Cheek offers 

tips on how to be a better, more 

powerful public speaker, including the 

importance of rehearsal. I found his advice 

on how often to write effective 

thank-you notes to be one of Three 

Points of Contact’s best pieces of advice. 

Finally, Cheek’s love of travel brought 

back great memories of when I first 

saw the cobblestones of small German 

towns, and I really enjoyed his piece on 

Budapest, Hungary. 

Cheek’s writing style is fast and powerful. 

Readers who enjoy authors who 

take several pages to develop their concepts 

in a slow, methodical and meticulous 

manner may not enjoy Cheek’s style 

of simplicity, personalization and immediacy. 

Additionally, a reader who is not 

as well-traveled or worldly as Cheek may 

struggle to see the connection to health 

and well-being as Cheek rapidly ties disparate 

concepts of German language, 

yoga, meditation and Eastern philosophies 

into a unique worldview focused 

on positive thought, health, well-being, 

and action directed toward personal happiness. 

At heart, Cheek is a teacher who 

wants to help others understand that a 

major health challenge can be a transformative 

opportunity leading to even 

greater successes and happiness after the 

crisis. 

Lt. Col. Chad Storlie, USA Ret., is a retired 

U.S. Army Special Forces officer 

with more than 20 years of active and 

Reserve service. In addition to teaching, 

he is a midlevel marketing executive and 

has worked for various companies, including 

General Electric, Comcast and 

Manugistics. He has a bachelor’s degree 

from Northwestern University and a 

master’s degree from Georgetown University. 


Veteran’s Strength Makes for Inspiring Story 

Tough as They Come. SSG Travis Mills 

with Marcus Brotherton. Convergent 

Books. 272 pages. $25. 

By Maj. Joe Byerly 

Today, we are constantly bombarded 

with images of the negative impacts 

of war on our veteran community. Television 

news stories, magazine articles 

and movies all depict a population struggling 

to make sense of their experiences. 

These snapshots combine to create the 

narrative of the veteran who no longer 

connects with society. Fortunately, medically 

retired Staff Sgt. Travis Mills has 

provided readers with a counternarrative, 

one of triumph over adversity that 

shows that our wounded warriors are 

not damaged goods; they can be sources 

of inspiration. 

Tough as They Come is Mills’ autobiography, 

co-authored with Marcus Brotherton. 

The book tells the first-person story 

of Mills’ remarkable recovery from losing 

all four limbs during combat action in 

Afghanistan. Mills is one of only five soldiers 

who fought in Afghanistan and Iraq 

to survive a quadruple amputation. 

The narrative is told through Mills’ 

voice and is complemented by excerpts 

from his wife’s diary and statements 

from his family and friends. Mills does 

an excellent job of setting the stage for 

his military service by spending some 

time discussing his teenage years. Most 

readers in uniform will quickly connect 

with Mills because his story is so similar 

to many of those who joined the military 

following either high school or college. 

He did not join the Army because that 

was the only option available to him; he 

joined because he felt something was 

missing in his life. “Joining the military 

felt like joining a sports team. With the 

military came camaraderie. The job itself 

took a lot of drive,” he writes. 

Many autobiographies from the wars 

in Iraq and Afghanistan make the authors 

seem like they are 10 feet tall and if 

the U.S. would have only followed their 

lead, we would have been successful in 

both conflicts. It is for this reason that 

Tough as They Come will appeal to readers. 

Mills shares his highs, his lows, and 

even some comedic moments throughout 

his deployments. At no time is he 

critical of the U.S. role in Afghanistan 

and he sticks to the deployments as he 

experienced them—at the squad level. 

His biography reflects the strength of the 

NCO corps and his humility as a leader. 

In the portions of the book covering 

his injury and subsequent recovery, Mills 

does not pull any punches. Readers get a 

raw glimpse into the mind of a soldier 

who’s coming to grips with the fact that 

his way of life is forever altered. He discusses 

the dark moments following his 

medical evacuation from Afghanistan 

Efficiency Guru McNair 

Managed Army Growth 

General Lesley J. McNair: Unsung 

Architect of the U.S. Army. Mark T. 

Calhoun. University Press of Kansas. 

429 pages. $39.95. 

By Col. Gregory Fontenot 


Mark T. Calhoun’s biography of Gen. 

Lesley J. McNair is both overdue 

and timely. McNair’s contribution is often 

misunderstood and maligned. Mc- 

when he was too embarrassed to see his 

wife, because he felt helpless for the first 

time in his life. Some of the more emotional 

moments of the book take place in 

his hospital room at Walter Reed National 

Military Medical Center when he 

describes interactions with his parents, 

wife and baby daughter. Just as quickly as 

the tone of the book goes dark, Mills 

emerges with accounts of his inspirational 

recovery. 

Tough as They Come is the perfect book 

for young service members to learn about 

leadership in combat, selfless service and 

resiliency. For those who have suffered a 

major life setback, this book provides an 

inspirational story of overcoming the 

odds. Finally, for those who have not 

served in the military, Mills’ story provides 

a counternarrative to the fractured 

veteran. Even after he lost his arms and 

legs, he continued to serve his country by 

helping others. 

Maj. Joe Byerly is an armor officer and the 

operations officer for the 2nd Squadron, 1st 

Cavalry Regiment, 1st Stryker Brigade 

Combat Team. He also has commanded a 

cavalry troop and a headquarters company 

at Fort Stewart, Ga. He holds a bachelor’s 

degree from North Georgia College and 

State University and a master’s degree 

from the U.S. Naval War College. He frequently 

writes about leadership and leader 

development on his website, www.From 

TheGreenNotebook.com. 

Nair had the dubious and fatal distinction 

of being one of the few general officers 

routinely too far forward when visiting 

troops. His determination to see for himself 

resulted in wounds in North Africa 

and death in Normandy. The youngest 

man promoted to brigadier general in 

World War I, McNair lagged behind officers 

who were effective self-promoters. 

He was a brilliant analyst, effective trainer 

and critical thinker committed to achieving 

efficiency and effectiveness. 


In some ways, McNair resembled 

Navy Adm. Joseph Mason Reeves, the 

man responsible for conceiving carrier 

tactics, in operating outside and above 

service politics. He, too, was comparatively 

taciturn. And, like Reeves, McNair 

left little in the way of personal records. 

Calhoun’s effort to illuminate McNair’s 

thinking and how he affected the Army 

suffers as a consequence. 

Calhoun became an associate professor 

at the U.S. Army School of Advanced 

Military Studies after a 20-year 

career as an Army aviator and operational 

planner. Despite the lack of direct 

sources, he delivers a workmanlike 

account. This is a good narrative, 

though primarily focused on McNair’s 

work during World War II. McNair’s 

convictions about organization, along 

with training and equipping the Army 

during the war, deserve deeper consideration. 

As commander of Army Ground 

Forces, McNair managed astounding 

growth of the force with far fewer resources 

than his counterparts in the 

Army Air Forces and Services of Supply 

demanded. 

McNair’s career warrants review today 

because many of the same institutional 

hurdles to organizing and equipping 

effectively remain. Low manning 

levels, branch parochialism, and muddled 

lines of responsibility challenged 

McNair during the transition from the 

interwar period and can be seen at work 

today. When mobilization began, Mc- 

Nair served as chief of staff of the Army 

General Headquarters (GHQ). Organized 

to “oversee the organization, training 

and equipping of all mobilizing field 

forces with the continental United 

States,” then-Army Chief of Staff Gen. 

George C. Marshall Jr. initially commanded 

the GHQ. 

According to Calhoun and the official 

history, Marshall intended for McNair to 

command. The War Department General 

Staff effectively precluded him from 

having the authority to do as Marshall 

asked. The staff worked vigorously to 

weaken GHQ and ultimately get rid of it. 

What is remarkable is how much Mc- 

Nair managed without the requisite authority 

to do what Marshall imagined. 

McNair’s experience raises a question for 

today. Does the Army achieve synergy 

among the staff, U.S. Army Training 

and Doctrine Command and U.S. Army 

Forces Command, or do unnecessary 

friction, redundancy and bureaucratic infighting 

remain? 

In 1942, the Army eliminated the 

GHQ in favor of three functional commands, 

including the Army Ground 

Forces. As commander of Army Ground 

Forces, McNair organized, equipped 

and trained the field Army. Calhoun argues 

convincingly that McNair developed 

insight and the approach to the 

task in the long years between the wars. 

McNair’s work first in testing new artillery 

weapons, examining structure as 

part of a study redesigning the division in 

the late 1930s, and commandant at Fort 

Leavenworth, Kan., equipped him for the 

task he confronted during the war. 

McNair succeeded brilliantly, not in 

producing the very best organization or 

fielding the best weapons, but in getting 

the job done as effectively and efficiently 

as the scale of the problem permitted. At 

one point during the war, McNair expanded 

the Army threefold with a staff 

that was a fraction of the size of the current 

Army G-3—and without the “benefit” 

of PowerPoint. 

This book is a must-read for those 

seeking context to contemporary problems 

in force structure. Calhoun effectively 

describes the man at the center of 

much of the history central to how the 

Army organizes to this day. 

Col. Gregory Fontenot, USA Ret., commanded 

a tank battalion in Operation 

Desert Storm and an armor brigade in 

Bosnia. A former director of the School of 

Advanced Military Studies and the 

University of Foreign Military and 

Cultural Studies, he is co-author of On 

Point: The United States Army in 

Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

Advisor Was National Security 

Fixer, White House Strategist 

The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft and 

the Call of National Security. Bartholomew 

Sparrow. PublicAffairs. 752 

pages. $37.50. 

By Lt. Col. Todd J. Johnson 

The national security advisor is arguably 

one of the most important appointments 

in any presidential administration. 

The NSA, officially known as 

assistant to the president for national security 

affairs, is not subject to Senate 

confirmation and is a vital member of 

the National Security Council, responsible 

for controlling the flow of debate on 

security issues while simultaneously serving 

as a highly influential adviser to the 

president. Since the position was created 

in 1953, only 24 men and women have 

served in this critical staff billet. 

During that time frame, only one person 

has served two presidents as the 

NSA, and he is widely considered by 

many national security professionals— 

both Democratic and Republican—to 

be one of the most successful practitioners 

in the history of the United States. 

He is retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Brent 

Scowcroft. 

Bartholomew Sparrow, a government 

professor at the University of Texas, has 

produced The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft 

and the Call of National Security. This en- 


gaging and well-documented tome— 

with over 100 pages of footnotes encompassing 

primary and secondary sources as 

well as scores of oral interviews—is about 

a man who has been at the epicenter of 

some of the most critical U.S. national 

security decisions over the last 50 years. 

Sparrow’s ambitious endeavor is successful 

because it sheds light not only on 

Scowcroft as a transformative figure in 

the policy arena but also on the events 

and institutions that made up this environment. 

Written in chronological order, the 

early portion of the book chronicles 

the exploits of Scowcroft as a young 

man in Utah, his time as a cadet at West 

Point, and his early career as an airman 

in the Army Air Corps. 

A seminal event during this time frame 

was Scowcroft’s admission to graduate 

school at Columbia University and his 

subsequent tour as a professor at West 

Point. Exposed to a “sophisticated realm 

of ideas and a larger intellectual universe,” 

including classes on the realist 

school of international affairs, Scowcroft 

blossomed as a student. He forged relationships 

with many prominent members 

of the faculty before graduating 

with a master’s degree in economics, but 

his time in school really served as the 

catalyst for his subsequent career as a 

foreign and military policymaking professional. 

Assignments in Yugoslavia and at the 

U.S. Air Force Academy and the Pentagon 

enabled Scowcroft to put into action 

what he learned and taught at school. 

The Pentagon posting was especially 

valuable because he learned how to be an 

effective staff officer and also learned the 

intricacies of working in a bureaucracy, 

lessons he was able to apply later on in 

his career. 

The book then shifts to Scowcroft’s 

early years in the White House, where he 

served in multiple administrations. He 

started as military assistant to President 

Richard Nixon in 1972; a year later, he 

became deputy assistant for national security 

affairs under Henry Kissinger; and 

in 1975 was named the NSA for President 

Gerald Ford. Scowcroft retired from 

the Air Force in December of that year. 

During this turbulent time in geopolitics, 

Scowcroft earned a well-deserved 

reputation for being a team player as well 

as being one of the hardest workers on 

the staff. It’s also when he learned how 

to be “a policy implementer and bureaucratic 

operator—a ‘fixer’—before he became 

a strategist.” 

Following Ford’s defeat, Scowcroft focused 

his energies on consulting, writing 

on national security issues, and serving 

on multiple commissions including the 

Commission on Strategic Forces in 1983 

and the Tower Commission, which examined 

the Iran-Contra scandal, in 

1986. However, Scowcroft’s contributions 

to the nation were not over. 

Scowcroft’s four-year stint as the NSA 

for President George H.W. Bush is 

where Sparrow does his best work. He 

captures Scowcroft’s decisionmaking, 

leadership, resoluteness, quiet resolve 

and attention-to-details approach during 

this dynamic period in American foreign 

policy, which included the Tiananmen 

Square protests, the end of the Cold 

War, the reunification of Germany and 

the Gulf War. 

Sparrow writes that Scowcroft’s “sense 

of organizational politics, his willingness 

to act as the president’s agent, the control 

he exercised” on the National Security 

Council process, and “his respect for 

the views of others in government had, 

in combination, that much more effect 

because his actions were infused by his 

ability as a strategist.” 

Scowcroft’s approach produced many 

positive results, but there were other issues 

around the globe that flared up, including 

the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, 

terrorism concerns in Afghanistan, 

and the breakup of Yugoslavia. 

While Scowcroft addressed these 

problems by stating that “the administration 

‘didn’t have a comprehensive strategy’ 

for the world that was developing all 

too quickly,” it must be remembered that 

the construct for American policy from 

1945 up to Bush’s term was viewed 

through a Cold War lens. As we have 

seen in recent actions in both Iraq and 

Afghanistan, it can be a challenge for the 

U.S. government to formulate and implement 

a grand strategy in a short period 

of time. 

Sparrow’s volume is a significant contribution 

to the national security arena. 

However, the addition of detailed maps 

covering Europe, the Middle East, 

Southeast Asia and Africa would have 

enhanced readers’ understanding of the 

challenges facing Scowcroft and other 

U.S. policymakers during and after the 

Cold War period. 

Some potential readers may be intimidated 

by the breadth of this biography. If 

they are willing to put in the time, they 

will be rewarded with a comprehensive 

understanding of a man who has left an 

indelible mark on the national and foreign 

security affairs arena. 

Lt. Col. Todd J. Johnson is an instructor in 

the National Security Affairs Department 

at the U.S. Naval War College. His 

most recent Army assignment was commanding 

a battalion in the 25th Infantry 

Division, and he served in various 

other command and staff positions. A 

graduate of Ripon College and the School 

of Advanced Military Studies, he has 

written for multiple publications and 

professional journals. 

1-855-246-6269 

That’s the toll-free number to call 

AUSA national headquarters. The AUSA 

Action Line is open 8 a.m.–5 p.m. Monday 

through Thursday, and 8 a.m.–1:30 

p.m. Friday, except holidays. If you have 

a question about AUSA, give us a call. 


ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 

Membership Benefi ts* 

AUSA Platinum Visa 

With the AUSA Platinum Visa from First Command Bank, 

you’ll enjoy a low variable interest rate, no annual fee, and great 

rewards. Call 855-565-AUSA (2872) for additional information. 

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Final Shot 

U.S. Army/Staff Sgt. Lance Pounds 

Maj. Gen. Darryl A. Williams, U.S. Army 

Africa commanding general, gets a 

two-year renovation project off to a 

smashing start for his command’s 

new headquarters in Vicenza, Italy. 


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