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Army - Stimulating Simulation

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Over the next decade, the draft was<br />

used to help fill out the ranks of the armed<br />

forces, but that was not the primary purpose<br />

intended by the 1948 law. The goal<br />

was to build a larger pool of manpower<br />

with military experience that could be<br />

brought back if the U.S. had to fight<br />

World War III with the Soviet Union.<br />

Relatively few draftees fought or died<br />

during the Eisenhower presidency. Indeed,<br />

only a very small proportion of the<br />

eligible population was actually drafted.<br />

Consequently, conscription was generally<br />

tolerated by a public worried about<br />

the red menace behind the Iron Curtain.<br />

A little over 9 million served in the<br />

armed forces during the Vietnam War;<br />

total draftees for that period were under<br />

2 million. This was not a disproportionate<br />

number compared to other modern<br />

wars. Nevertheless, the controversy over<br />

conscription proved unprecedented.<br />

In To Raise an <strong>Army</strong>: The Draft Comes<br />

to Modern America, John Whiteclay<br />

Chambers argues that the draft became a<br />

contentious issue because then-President<br />

Lyndon Johnson and his national security<br />

managers overextended use of it beyond<br />

the consensus established in the world<br />

wars and the early Cold War. As the<br />

Vietnam War became increasingly unpopular,<br />

the draft became the major focus<br />

of dissent. President Richard Nixon<br />

ended the draft in 1973, though the Selective<br />

Service System remains in force.<br />

There are two important points to extract<br />

from the American conscription experience.<br />

First, the argument for it was<br />

based on military necessity: generating<br />

the forces necessary for the government<br />

to fulfill its obligation for the common<br />

defense. For example, Marshall made<br />

the case for Universal Military Training<br />

based on operational requirements. He<br />

assumed the military model employed<br />

for the next world war would be similar<br />

to that of the first two: Armed forces<br />

would be drastically reduced in peacetime,<br />

then rapidly mobilized for war.<br />

Marshall saw Universal Military Training<br />

as an efficient way to speed mobilization<br />

for future conflicts.<br />

Second, conscription works when<br />

there is broad, bipartisan support for it.<br />

The draft riots of 1863 reflected, in part,<br />

growing frustration with President Abraham<br />

Lincoln’s handling of the war, similar<br />

to the backlash that built up against<br />

the Johnson administration in the 1960s.<br />

The argument for the all-volunteer<br />

force laid out by the Gates Commission<br />

in 1970 was that an all-volunteer military,<br />

with a mix of active and reserve component<br />

armed forces, was more efficient as<br />

well as more cost-effective than sustaining<br />

a peacetime draft. The rationale of the<br />

commission remains largely sound. Generally,<br />

the U.S. military does not have a<br />

recruiting and retention problem.<br />

While it is true that the cost of human<br />

capital is spiraling uncomfortably<br />

upward, the draft is not a credible<br />

solution for this problem. Shortservice<br />

conscripts are not going to meet<br />

the high-performance standards required<br />

of today’s military personnel.<br />

Conscription is a manpower model designed<br />

for mass mobilization.<br />

Nor is there anything resembling a<br />

national consensus that would tolerate<br />

national service. In 2001, in the wake of<br />

the horrific terrorist attacks on New<br />

York and Washington, D.C., Rep. Nick<br />

Smith, R-Mich., introduced a bill requiring<br />

Universal Military Training and<br />

Service. It went exactly nowhere.<br />

That’s telling. The American polity is<br />

far more divided now than it was in the<br />

aftermath of 9/11. If Smith’s idea was a<br />

nonstarter then, it is even more of a<br />

nonstarter now.<br />

What makes McChrystal and Mc-<br />

Cain’s idea even worse is that it’s not<br />

based on a practical rationale. They see<br />

national service as a mandatory tool for<br />

teaching citizenship. They believe national<br />

service would serve as a “civic rite<br />

of passage.”<br />

There is certainly a case to be made<br />

that civic virtue is a vital component of a<br />

healthy society. That notion is infused in<br />

the Greco-Roman tradition of civil society.<br />

But by the time of America’s founding,<br />

liberal philosophers had concluded<br />

that the best way to build a virtuous civil<br />

society is to maximize the freedom of the<br />

individual.<br />

The concept of freedom that was established<br />

in the liberal ideas of thinkers<br />

like John Locke and Adam Smith remains<br />

relevant today. Habitual conscription<br />

has no role in sustaining a free society.<br />

That was certainly the conclusion<br />

reached by the Gates Commission. Economist<br />

Milton Friedman, who served on<br />

the commission, argued that rather than<br />

inspire civic virtue, the draftee model inspired<br />

quite the opposite. Friedman saw<br />

as key the distinction between being<br />

forced to serve and volunteering to serve.<br />

McChrystal and McCain argue for<br />

more than just another government program.<br />

They advocate a fundamental reimagining<br />

of the government’s role in<br />

creating a healthy society. That’s a big<br />

step. They are spot-on in recognizing<br />

that national service offers an important<br />

venue for those who wish to live a life of<br />

service. But there are plenty of opportunities<br />

for national service, including paid<br />

and volunteer programs like Teach For<br />

America and the Peace Corps.<br />

Still, there does seem to be a lack of<br />

young people who want to pursue some<br />

form of national service. According to<br />

government statistics, in 2013, the number<br />

of people in government service under<br />

30 years old hit an all-time low—just<br />

7 percent, compared to over 25 percent<br />

in the private sector. “Without a pipeline<br />

of young talent,” Rachel Feintzeig reported<br />

in The Wall Street Journal in June<br />

2014, “the government risks falling behind<br />

in an increasingly digital world.”<br />

Arguably, the decline of youth interest<br />

in national service has more to do with<br />

the nature of it rather than a lack of civic<br />

virtue. Government hiring practices and<br />

human capital management are arcane<br />

compared to those of cutting-edge companies<br />

in the private sector. Mandatory<br />

federal service could well exacerbate the<br />

problem. If government doesn’t have to<br />

compete for people, it will lose incentives<br />

to improve recruiting and retention,<br />

making it more likely that talented youth<br />

will flee federal jobs as soon as they can.<br />

Further, it is far from clear how<br />

mandatory national service would teach<br />

civic virtue. Arguably, the act of voluntarily<br />

participating in federal service is<br />

an act of civic virtue. That suggests the<br />

inculcation of the nature and responsibilities<br />

of citizenship happens mostly<br />

before individuals enter the workforce.<br />

Also, making service mandatory removes<br />

the signature opportunity for<br />

youth to make the individual commitment<br />

to serve others.<br />

In addition, there is the issue of the<br />

appropriateness and effectiveness of giving<br />

government the preponderance of<br />

responsibility for defining and teaching<br />

18 ARMY ■ March 2016

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