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Naturally, a number of questions remain unanswered. On certain
points the archives contain no information, such as, in the matter of
secret weapons deliveries to Israel. Nor were interviews always capable of
filling these lacunae. Furthermore, the oil companies involved declined to
allow us access to their company archives, because of which, in part, we
have had to set ourselves several limits and have deliberately left (indeed,
have had to leave) some aspects unconsidered.
In addition, we pay scant attention to the financial-monetary aspects
of the Dutch position or to the long-term consequences for the Dutch
economy. Nevertheless, this study does, in our view, embrace several new
points of view on Dutch foreign policy and, not least, on the policy of the
Den Uyl Cabinet.
In the end, we decided to write a case study focusing mainly on the political
actions of the government, concentrating mainly on those ministers
and ministries most significantly involved. The construction of the
book is such that we try in each chapter to deal with a particular aspect of
the oil crisis: Dutch Middle East politics, Dutch European politics, domestic
measures, and so on.
We are most grateful to the following (archive) assistants and civil servants
who provided help: Francien van Anrooy and Sierk Plantinga of
The National Archives; Fred van den Kieboom and Radjen Gangapersadsing
at the Cabinet Office; Hans den Hollander, Henja Korsten, Peter
van Velzen, Marco Verhaar and Ton van Zeeland at the Foreign Ministry;
Sam Martijn of the Central Archives Depot at the Ministry of Defence;
Th.J.N. Knops, Henrietta Kruse and J. Zuurmond at the Ministry for
Economic Affairs; Ella Molenaar, Monique van der Pal, Cees Smit,
Willeke Tijssen and Mieke IJzermans of the International Institute for
Social History and Jaap van Doorn and Maarten van Rijn at the Ministry
of Justice.
We would also like to thank those individuals involved at different
stages who have been prepared to read (parts of) the manuscript and offer
constructive criticism. These were: F.E. Kruimink (then Co-ordinator of
the Dutch Intelligence and Security Services), J.P. Pronk (Minister of
Development Cooperation), A. Stemerdink (Under-Secretary of Defence),
M. van der Stoel (Minister of Foreign Affairs), H. Vredeling (Minister
of Defence), W.Q.J. Willemsen (Secretary of the Co-ordination
Group for Oil Crisis Management and of the Ministerial Commission on
the Oil Crisis) and G.A. Wagner (Chief executive of the Royal/Shell
Group). We also wish to thank Paul Aarts (University of Amsterdam) for
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