340249

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Contents Foreword 9 1 War in the Middle East 13 The Netherlands and the Middle East 17 Support for Israel 18 Military Support 22 Arms Deliveries 27 Foreign Ministry Denial 31 European Political Cooperation 35 Conclusion 38 2 Difficulties 41 Turf War in The Hague 47 The First Signs 50 The Oil Weapon Brought to Bear 52 Nationalization in Iraq 55 A New Government Statement 56 The Embargo Spreads 58 The De Lavalette Mission 63 The Second Chamber 66 klm 68 Conclusion 71 3 European Divisions 73 The Netherlands and European Integration 74 France 77 Great Britain 79 The Neighbouring ec Countries 81 5
The oecd 83 The ec 84 A Declaration by the Nine 88 Reactions in The Netherlands 92 Conclusion 95 4 Domestic Measures 97 The Den Uyl Cabinet 97 The Importance of Oil 98 Uncertainty 100 Reducing consumption 103 The First Car-Free Sunday 107 Shell Helps 109 The Co-ordination Group 114 Conclusion 115 5 A European Summit 117 The Embargo 117 The Van Roijen Mission 120 An Incident in The Hague 123 The European Community 126 Two Oil Ministers in Europe 131 American Support 134 Divisions within the ec 137 Den Uyl and Van der Stoel 140 Visible or Invisible 144 Copenhagen 150 Conclusion 153 6 Rationing 157 Car-Free Sundays 158 Estimates 160 Export Restrictions 165 Preparations for Rationing 170 The Enabling Act 174 Doubt and Postponement 177 The Cabinet Ploughs on 179 Three Weeks Rationing 181 Conclusion 188 6
Page 1 and 2: Duco Hellema | Cees Wiebes | Toby W
Page 4 and 5: The Netherlands and the Oil Crisis
Page 8: 7 From Copenhagen to Washington 191
Page 11 and 12: Yet the affair of the oil embargo w
Page 13 and 14: his advice; and to extend thanks to
Page 15 and 16: After about four days, however, eve
Page 17 and 18: Early in 1973, Moscow decided to su
Page 19 and 20: nel carriers, the m-113’s; Israel
Page 21 and 22: tion (dgis). This arose from the fa
Page 23 and 24: Military Support As we said earlier
Page 25 and 26: formed. 43 Stemerdink, however, was
Page 27 and 28: consultation with Britain. It was t
Page 29 and 30: ing and Stemerdink subsequently alw
Page 31 and 32: Each of the 707’s would have made
Page 33 and 34: cences for the export of arms had b
Page 35 and 36: Foreign Ministry; for the whole aim
Page 37 and 38: draft declaration was drawn up that
Page 39 and 40: West European allies. When the new
Page 41 and 42: had never asked his Defence Ministe
Page 43 and 44: pendence on imports was far less th
Page 45 and 46: that would call for extra capital i
Page 47 and 48: ut these need not be insuperable. T
Page 49 and 50: necessary, together to prepare step
Page 51 and 52: ters. W.J.G. Gevers, the Ambasssado
Page 53 and 54: he was not favourably impressed by
Page 55 and 56: League’s Boycott Bureau the very
Page 57 and 58:
haps diplomatic steps might procure
Page 59 and 60:
and Oman, Wagner said he would be g
Page 61 and 62:
In Cairo, Dutch Ambassador F. Von O
Page 63 and 64:
go, though other reports seemed to
Page 65 and 66:
It was soon clear, however, that De
Page 67 and 68:
can buyer, so long as they were pre
Page 69 and 70:
understanding of the Arab side and
Page 71 and 72:
oycott demanded by Syria. The Jorda
Page 73 and 74:
a purely political sanction against
Page 75 and 76:
the embargo in place against The Ne
Page 77 and 78:
heads of state and government leade
Page 79 and 80:
certain degree of solidarity was ca
Page 81 and 82:
to it, Heath had threatened, by iss
Page 83 and 84:
legal form of this agreement was no
Page 85 and 86:
also the usa played a ‘delaying
Page 87 and 88:
Lynden emphasized that the Dutch ef
Page 89 and 90:
ners in the ec should come to some
Page 91 and 92:
could be ‘linked’ to a common e
Page 93 and 94:
the embargo against Rotterdam and t
Page 95 and 96:
nerable position which, according t
Page 97 and 98:
those involved in Economic Affairs
Page 99 and 100:
Defence, Finance and Development Co
Page 101 and 102:
pendent on the supply of crude oil.
Page 103 and 104:
therefore prepared to request the o
Page 105 and 106:
that The Netherlands’ ec partners
Page 107 and 108:
Sunday, November 4. The following d
Page 109 and 110:
foreign motorists (to whom the Sund
Page 111 and 112:
places between the oil companies an
Page 113 and 114:
ution by rescheduling to Rotterdam
Page 115 and 116:
The Co-ordination Group Slowly, The
Page 117 and 118:
plies of petroleum to market garden
Page 119 and 120:
ier in their own country. They were
Page 121 and 122:
Various offers were also arriving i
Page 123 and 124:
out on July 6 in Algeria on the ass
Page 125 and 126:
views of the First Chamber, Den Uyl
Page 127 and 128:
clarification of the November 6 sta
Page 129 and 130:
At the time, however, the Conservat
Page 131 and 132:
In the context of Europe, the epc m
Page 133 and 134:
omy. Lubbers contested this. He sai
Page 135 and 136:
Lubbers and Van Lynden therefore we
Page 137 and 138:
Indeed, there were even more doubts
Page 139 and 140:
exactly this Summit should have and
Page 141 and 142:
the Rotterdam-Antwerp pipeline to s
Page 143 and 144:
isterial session of November 5 and
Page 145 and 146:
aside. Nor did it look as though th
Page 147 and 148:
while providing no guarantees for t
Page 149 and 150:
The visible hand was therefore whol
Page 151 and 152:
Copenhagen The Summit began on Dece
Page 153 and 154:
not been rejected, and, furthermore
Page 155 and 156:
of The Netherlands, West Germany, D
Page 158 and 159:
6 Rationing In this chapter we shal
Page 160 and 161:
companies wanted Economic Affairs t
Page 162 and 163:
istry of Economic Affairs on the ba
Page 164 and 165:
25%, and for this reason Lubbers th
Page 166 and 167:
figures over oil supplies was conce
Page 168 and 169:
The Dutch Cabinet blamed the Britis
Page 170 and 171:
had directed member states to lay i
Page 172 and 173:
position, the Dutch Cabinet was the
Page 174 and 175:
nomic Affairs, but would have to wa
Page 176 and 177:
In the spring of 1973, differences
Page 178 and 179:
erably), possibly requiring the int
Page 180 and 181:
Analysing this policy - if policy i
Page 182 and 183:
The majority of the Cabinet, for a
Page 184 and 185:
last beyond three weeks. There were
Page 186 and 187:
‘that maintenance of the ban on s
Page 188 and 189:
Garage Owners (bovag), and a prosec
Page 190 and 191:
scarcely encouraging. In that month
Page 192 and 193:
7 From Copenhagen to Washington In
Page 194 and 195:
comed the American initiative. Amer
Page 196 and 197:
the suggestion of the Shah of Persi
Page 198 and 199:
among other countries that hitherto
Page 200 and 201:
parent that Parisian governing circ
Page 202 and 203:
send a mission, led by Vice Premier
Page 204 and 205:
from normally available quantities.
Page 206 and 207:
ers’s construction of the situati
Page 208 and 209:
Ministers’ job would be to put to
Page 210 and 211:
Van der Stoel’s earlier circular,
Page 212 and 213:
ility with regard to relations with
Page 214 and 215:
the Director-General for Political
Page 216 and 217:
energy problems in a special sessio
Page 218 and 219:
Lubbers disagreed. In his view, the
Page 220:
Pronk should follow the argument of
Page 223 and 224:
to achieve international redistribu
Page 225 and 226:
The Cabinet based its position on r
Page 227 and 228:
with what it considered unjust disc
Page 229 and 230:
eginning involve both producer coun
Page 231 and 232:
French there were two major problem
Page 233 and 234:
sembly, generating the impression t
Page 235 and 236:
logue further, agreeing, at least a
Page 237 and 238:
that the epc chairman should be ent
Page 239 and 240:
his interlocutor from the West Germ
Page 241 and 242:
The appended text was in his view c
Page 243 and 244:
We have to try to provide a realist
Page 245 and 246:
Permanent Representative stressed t
Page 247 and 248:
divided’. 69 It was also clear fr
Page 249 and 250:
To the End The oapec decision of Ju
Page 251 and 252:
point in pursuing a dialogue with t
Page 253 and 254:
Within the Den Uyl government in Th
Page 256 and 257:
Conclusion In many respects, The Ne
Page 258 and 259:
the Dutch policy over the Middle Ea
Page 260 and 261:
The Dutch oil interests were of cou
Page 262 and 263:
place with the support of the usa a
Page 264 and 265:
had primacy in matters internationa
Page 266 and 267:
Notes Notes Chapter 1 1 nmfa, Embas
Page 268 and 269:
35 Every American embassy houses a
Page 270 and 271:
83 nova interview with Van der Stoe
Page 272 and 273:
24 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Vol
Page 274 and 275:
68 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 570
Page 276 and 277:
Page 278 and 279:
66 ‘The use of the oil weapon spe
Page 280 and 281:
47 Grünfeld, 1991, p. 93. Grünfel
Page 282 and 283:
Page 284 and 285:
Page 286 and 287:
15 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes o
Page 288 and 289:
Page 290 and 291:
4 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 7806, a
Page 292 and 293:
Page 294 and 295:
Page 296 and 297:
73 nmfa, Code 912.2, Folder 1013, D
Page 298 and 299:
Archival Records A large number of
Page 300 and 301:
g 165 Modern Military Field Branch
Page 302 and 303:
List of Acronyms and Terms aaw aaz
Page 304 and 305:
oapec ofe opec pa plan plo ppr psp
Page 306 and 307:
Boon, H.N., Afscheidsaudiëntie. Ti
Page 308 and 309:
International Economic Report of th
Page 310 and 311:
Conflict, 1967-1976, Berkely: Unive
Page 312 and 313:
Newspapers Algemeen Dagblad Elsevie
Page 314 and 315:
Index of Names Abdessalam, B. 131,
Page 316 and 317:
Rashid al Rashid, A. 64, 227 Renard
Page 318 and 319:
European Monetary Union 141 Europea
Page 320 and 321:
Shell 9, 10, 40, 46, 51, 53, 55-58,
show all

340249

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?