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Foreign Ministry Denial
In October 1973, Kruimink thought it would be impossible to keep the
arms supplies a secret. The transport and loading would involve hundreds
of military personnel. Peijnenburg was less pessimistic since previously,
in 1967, the public had successfully been kept in the dark. And Peijnenburg
was for a long time right. The arms deliveries of the October War did
indeed escape public attention. When this became no longer feasible, first
Stemerdink and subsequently Vredeling took personal responsibility.
Den Uyl and Van der Stoel, let alone other members of the government,
had known nothing.
However, different individuals involved in the affair are of the opinion
that it is highly unlikely that Den Uyl and Van der Stoel did not know.
That, too, is the verdict of ex-Ambassador Bar On. He recalls that Van der
Stoel was indeed initially unresponsive in his assessment. That was shortly
after the outbreak of the war, but when the situation became more serious
for Israel, the government – i.e. Den Uyl, Van der Stoel and Vredeling
– decided to look at the Dutch position again. An actual airlift, they decided,
was not possible. ‘But the Dutch government did agree to the possibility
of Israel purchasing ammunition, particularly artillery ammunition
and shells’. On his own admission, Bar On had constant contact over
the affair with both Van der Stoel and Den Uyl as well as Vredeling. 78
The Foreign Ministry and Van der Stoel furthermore played a remarkable
role when psp member of the Second Chamber F. Van der Spek began
to make trouble. On October 26, Van der Spek tabled written questions
on the matter of arms deliveries. According to him, on October 12,
13 and 14, unmarked b-747’s had landed at Schiphol to refuel and to
transport weapons to the Middle East. Van der Spek wanted to know
whether great risks had been taken. Was it likewise the case that on October
19 military aircraft had landed on their way to the Middle East?
This was close to the truth, and the answer to these parliamentary
questions caused a number of problems. In a memo of November 2, Van
der Stoel was informed that the draft reply should already by the beginning
of the week, and with the utmost haste, be submitted to the Dutch
Minister of Economic Affairs, Lubbers, and the Minister of Defence. But
co-ordination led to considerable delay. Vredeling was meanwhile in
agreement. In Economic Affairs and in Defence it was felt that, because
of the political nature of the questions, Van de Stoel should be the first to
sign it. The Minister was also informed that the Ministry of Economic
Affairs wanted it borne in mind when framing the answer that ‘no li-
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