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had to be investigated was whether improved relations with the oil countries
would promote the secure future provision of oil. 24
In the spring of 1973, the policy unit (plan) of the Foreign Ministry
was asked to draw up a memorandum on this question. Subsequently and
after extensive preliminary discussions, a couple of papers were submitted
by H.Ch. Posthumus Meyes, advisor to the plan Policy Unit, to Foreign
Minister Van der Stoel in May 1973: The oil crisis and Dutch foreign
policy and The use of the oil weapon for political purposes. 25 In these papers,
Posthumus Meyes reached the conclusion that, where oil supplies
were concerned, the ‘careless period’ of the past was over. Oil would become
an increasingly important subject of government interference.
Complete abstention by the state was no longer tenable, though governments
should not assume the role of the oil companies at the negotiation
table. More active involvement on the part of the consumer countries
would also involve risks, such as rivalries in the ‘scramble for oil’ and the
use of oil as a tool for applying political pressure. Care should also be taken
to avoid a buyers’ cartel being set up that might lead to a dangerous
confrontation with the producer countries. Consultation between consumer
countries should, among other things, look at controlling competition,
promoting the diversification of supply and energy, emergency provisions
and activities to channel the enormous financial resources of the
producer countries advantageously. Although The Netherlands, according
to Posthumus Meyes, was well situated, given its North Sea natural
gas fields, its major oil industry and the position of Rotterdam, it was
nevertheless too weak to pursue an independent course in matters of oil.
In The use of the oil weapon for political purposes, Posthumus Meyes
particularly pointed out the possibility of oil being deployed as a weapon
in any Middle Eastern conflict. During such a conflict, the threat to the oil
supply could be exerted to force the West to take a different attitude toward
Israel. There was also the possibility that dependence on Arab oil
might be exploited to incite Western countries into military support
against the Arab countries. In any such situation, the memorandum proposed,
‘the Netherlands would also be involved’. The role of the usa in
the Middle East was still dominant. The question that arose was whether
Western Europe should not take its own, independent line, such as up to
that point had not been possible. It was a better idea to lend support to
‘any American turn toward a rather more balanced treatment of the Middle
East question.’ 26
plan’s memoranda were sent to various Ambassadors with the request
for feedback, provoking a reassuring response from several quar-
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