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Duco Hellema | Cees Wiebes | Toby Witte<br />
The Netherlands<br />
and the Oil Crisis<br />
Business as Usual<br />
A MSTERDAM U NIVERSITY P RESS
The Netherlands and the Oil Crisis
The Netherlands and the Oil Crisis<br />
Business as Usual<br />
Duco Hellema<br />
Cees Wiebes<br />
Toby Witte<br />
amsterdam university press
The translation of this publication was funded by the Netherlands<br />
Organisation for Scientific Research (nwo).<br />
The Netherlands and the Oil Crisis: Business as Usual is a translation<br />
of Doelwit Rotterdam: Nederland en de oliecrisis, Den Haag: Sdu,<br />
1998.<br />
English translation: Murray Pearson<br />
Cover illustration: © Freek van Arkel/Hollandse Hoogte<br />
Cover design: Sabine Mannel, n.a.p., Amsterdam<br />
Lay-out: Adriaan de Jonge, Amsterdam<br />
isbn 90 5356 485 3<br />
nur 697<br />
© Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam 2004<br />
All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved<br />
above, no part of this book may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into<br />
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic,<br />
mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the written<br />
permission of both the copyright owner and the author of the book.
Contents<br />
Foreword 9<br />
1 War in the Middle East 13<br />
The Netherlands and the Middle East 17<br />
Support for Israel 18<br />
Military Support 22<br />
Arms Deliveries 27<br />
Foreign Ministry Denial 31<br />
European Political Cooperation 35<br />
Conclusion 38<br />
2 Difficulties 41<br />
Turf War in The Hague 47<br />
The First Signs 50<br />
The Oil Weapon Brought to Bear 52<br />
Nationalization in Iraq 55<br />
A New Government Statement 56<br />
The Embargo Spreads 58<br />
The De Lavalette Mission 63<br />
The Second Chamber 66<br />
klm 68<br />
Conclusion 71<br />
3 European Divisions 73<br />
The Netherlands and European Integration 74<br />
France 77<br />
Great Britain 79<br />
The Neighbouring ec Countries 81<br />
5
The oecd 83<br />
The ec 84<br />
A Declaration by the Nine 88<br />
Reactions in The Netherlands 92<br />
Conclusion 95<br />
4 Domestic Measures 97<br />
The Den Uyl Cabinet 97<br />
The Importance of Oil 98<br />
Uncertainty 100<br />
Reducing consumption 103<br />
The First Car-Free Sunday 107<br />
Shell Helps 109<br />
The Co-ordination Group 114<br />
Conclusion 115<br />
5 A European Summit 117<br />
The Embargo 117<br />
The Van Roijen Mission 120<br />
An Incident in The Hague 123<br />
The European Community 126<br />
Two Oil Ministers in Europe 131<br />
American Support 134<br />
Divisions within the ec 137<br />
Den Uyl and Van der Stoel 140<br />
Visible or Invisible 144<br />
Copenhagen 150<br />
Conclusion 153<br />
6 Rationing 157<br />
Car-Free Sundays 158<br />
Estimates 160<br />
Export Restrictions 165<br />
Preparations for Rationing 170<br />
The Enabling Act 174<br />
Doubt and Postponement 177<br />
The Cabinet Ploughs on 179<br />
Three Weeks Rationing 181<br />
Conclusion 188<br />
6
7 From Copenhagen to Washington 191<br />
American Leadership 191<br />
Production Limits and Oil Prices 193<br />
The Embargo 195<br />
Oil for Arms 200<br />
An Invitation from Nixon 205<br />
French Obstruction 209<br />
Deliberations in European Political Cooperation 212<br />
The Washington Conference 214<br />
Conclusion 218<br />
8 Sweating it out 221<br />
A Second Letter to King Feisal 222<br />
The Lifting of the Embargo against the usa 225<br />
Plans for a United Nations Conference 227<br />
The Sequel to Washington 231<br />
The Euro-Arab Dialogue 232<br />
The Supply Recovers 236<br />
‘Sweating it out’ 237<br />
The Special General Assembly 241<br />
Saudi Arabia Stands Firm 245<br />
To the End 248<br />
The Energy Co-ordination Group 249<br />
Conclusion 251<br />
Conclusion 255<br />
Notes 265<br />
Archival Records 297<br />
List of Acronyms and Terms 301<br />
Bibliography 304<br />
Index of Names 313<br />
Index of Subjects 316<br />
7
Foreword<br />
October 2003 marked the 30 th anniversary of the Arab oil embargo levied<br />
against The Netherlands as a ‘punishment’ for its pro-Israeli stance in the<br />
October War. On October 6, 1973, Egyptian and Syrian troops attacked<br />
Israel in an attempt to regain the land occupied by Israel since 1967, and<br />
for several days the Israeli army had its back against the wall. In The<br />
Netherlands, the first reports of the war aroused great concern: Israel<br />
must be helped as in 1956 and in 1967.<br />
The Dutch government led by Prime Minister Joop den Uyl had been in<br />
power in The Netherlands since May 1973, a coalition consisting of, on<br />
the one hand, three progressive parties, the Dutch Labour Party (Partij<br />
van de Arbeid, PvdA) and two smaller parties: the progressive-liberal<br />
d’66 and the Radical Party (ppr), and on the other hand, the Catholic<br />
People’s Party (the Katholieke Volkspartij, kvp) and the protestant Anti-<br />
Revolutionary Party (arp). After the outbreak of the October War, the<br />
Den Uyl Cabinet left no doubt as to its pro-Israeli sympathies, making it<br />
clear in a governmental statement that it held Egypt and Syria responsible<br />
for initiating hostilities and for unilaterally violating the truce. In the European<br />
Community, too, The Netherlands took a more emphatically pro-<br />
Israeli stand than did other member states, so much so that for a while<br />
The Hague found itself isolated.<br />
Nor was this merely a matter of words. Under conditions of strict secrecy,<br />
a considerable quantity of ammunitions and spare parts was sent<br />
to Israel, an extensive military operation in Dutch terms, which it has<br />
long been maintained was undertaken without the knowledge of the Cabinet.<br />
This political and military support for Israel would subsequently be<br />
given as the reason for an oil embargo levied against The Netherlands.<br />
Yamani, the Saudi Minister responsible for oil matters, himself declared<br />
that this was the main motive for the embargo.<br />
9
Yet the affair of the oil embargo was by no means merely a response<br />
to the help lent to Israel. The oil crisis was also part of, or rather an expression<br />
of, an intense power struggle in the international oil sector. The<br />
radical Arab oil producers were intent on breaking down the traditional<br />
relations in this sector in which The Netherlands occupied an important<br />
position. It was the homeport of Shell, one of the largest of the oil multinationals.<br />
Furthermore, Rotterdam was a crucial switch-point in the<br />
whole circuit of the processing and distribution of oil in Western Europe.<br />
An embargo against The Netherlands seemed to affect half of North-West<br />
Europe.<br />
In various respects, the oil crisis was a first test case for the Den Uyl<br />
Cabinet, for it presented enormous problems, not only of foreign policy<br />
but also with regard to domestic and socio-economic affairs. In the arena<br />
of international politics, the oil crisis demanded that fundamental choices<br />
be made concerning relations between North and South, the American-European<br />
relationship and relations within the European Community.<br />
The oil crisis had a huge influence on Dutch domestic politics. The<br />
Central Planning Bureau predicted a marked rise in unemployment,<br />
slackening economic growth, increased inflation and possibly great damage<br />
to the port of Rotterdam and Dutch business life. For on paper, as one<br />
newspaper wrote a few days after the announcement of the embargo,<br />
turning off the oil tap was nothing short of a national disaster. The Dutch<br />
public was confronted with the prospect of Sundays without cars, of<br />
petrol rationing and restrictions on the use of electricity.<br />
What above all prompted us to write this book was the fascinating and<br />
at the same time complex totality of the oil crisis. In addition to which,<br />
this crisis suddenly placed The Netherlands centre stage in the theatre of<br />
international politics. The oil embargo focused all eyes on The Hague. So<br />
far, relatively little has been written on the role of The Netherlands during<br />
the oil crisis. Several studies have appeared, but an extensive study covering<br />
the whole range of different aspects has been lacking. More curious is<br />
the fact that no one has hitherto undertaken a thorough investigation of<br />
the archives of those ministries most involved in the oil crisis.<br />
Thanks to the Dutch Freedom of Information Act, we were allowed<br />
ample access to the most restricted records that had a bearing on the crisis;<br />
which is to say that those ministries closely involved in the crisis – Foreign<br />
Affairs and Economic Affairs – made their records freely available.<br />
Abroad too, specifically in the United States, we were granted access to<br />
relevant archival documents, often for the first time.<br />
10
Naturally, a number of questions remain unanswered. On certain<br />
points the archives contain no information, such as, in the matter of<br />
secret weapons deliveries to Israel. Nor were interviews always capable of<br />
filling these lacunae. Furthermore, the oil companies involved declined to<br />
allow us access to their company archives, because of which, in part, we<br />
have had to set ourselves several limits and have deliberately left (indeed,<br />
have had to leave) some aspects unconsidered.<br />
In addition, we pay scant attention to the financial-monetary aspects<br />
of the Dutch position or to the long-term consequences for the Dutch<br />
economy. Nevertheless, this study does, in our view, embrace several new<br />
points of view on Dutch foreign policy and, not least, on the policy of the<br />
Den Uyl Cabinet.<br />
In the end, we decided to write a case study focusing mainly on the political<br />
actions of the government, concentrating mainly on those ministers<br />
and ministries most significantly involved. The construction of the<br />
book is such that we try in each chapter to deal with a particular aspect of<br />
the oil crisis: Dutch Middle East politics, Dutch European politics, domestic<br />
measures, and so on.<br />
We are most grateful to the following (archive) assistants and civil servants<br />
who provided help: Francien van Anrooy and Sierk Plantinga of<br />
The National Archives; Fred van den Kieboom and Radjen Gangapersadsing<br />
at the Cabinet Office; Hans den Hollander, Henja Korsten, Peter<br />
van Velzen, Marco Verhaar and Ton van Zeeland at the Foreign Ministry;<br />
Sam Martijn of the Central Archives Depot at the Ministry of Defence;<br />
Th.J.N. Knops, Henrietta Kruse and J. Zuurmond at the Ministry for<br />
Economic Affairs; Ella Molenaar, Monique van der Pal, Cees Smit,<br />
Willeke Tijssen and Mieke IJzermans of the International Institute for<br />
Social History and Jaap van Doorn and Maarten van Rijn at the Ministry<br />
of Justice.<br />
We would also like to thank those individuals involved at different<br />
stages who have been prepared to read (parts of) the manuscript and offer<br />
constructive criticism. These were: F.E. Kruimink (then Co-ordinator of<br />
the Dutch Intelligence and Security Services), J.P. Pronk (Minister of<br />
Development Cooperation), A. Stemerdink (Under-Secretary of Defence),<br />
M. van der Stoel (Minister of Foreign Affairs), H. Vredeling (Minister<br />
of Defence), W.Q.J. Willemsen (Secretary of the Co-ordination<br />
Group for Oil Crisis Management and of the Ministerial Commission on<br />
the Oil Crisis) and G.A. Wagner (Chief executive of the Royal/Shell<br />
Group). We also wish to thank Paul Aarts (University of Amsterdam) for<br />
11
his advice; and to extend thanks to all those who were ready to give us<br />
their time in interviews or to provide written answers to our questions. Of<br />
course, we as authors take full responsibility for the final text of this<br />
book.<br />
Amsterdam, September 2004<br />
Duco Hellema, Cees Wiebes and Toby Witte<br />
12
1<br />
War in the Middle East<br />
On 6 Ocober 1973, large numbers of Egyptian and Syrian military units<br />
crossed the frontiers with Israel that had held since 1970. Around 240<br />
Egyptian warplanes crossed radar installations. At the same time, some<br />
1800 artillery and mortar positions opened up along the whole front and<br />
700 Syrian tanks attacked the Golan Heights where the Israeli land forces<br />
had only been able to deploy some 150 tanks. Although reports had already<br />
been circulating throughout the summer of an Egyptian-Syrian attack,<br />
the Israeli army command appeared to be caught by surprise. It<br />
seems that they were only convinced that the threat was serious a few days<br />
before the actual outbreak of the war. The possibility of a pre-emptive<br />
strike was briefly considered, but there was insufficient time for the necessary<br />
preparations. And furthermore, Israel would then be branded in international<br />
opinion as the aggressor. The decision therefore, as the Dutch<br />
Ambassador G.J. Jongejans reported to The Hague, was to wait whilst at<br />
the same time ‘seeking the full moral and political advantage’ of that restraint.<br />
1<br />
The question is whether the aggressors really had set themselves the<br />
aim of ‘wiping Israel from the map’. Possibly their intention was merely<br />
to realise limited military objectives and to cause an international crisis<br />
which would make the Great Powers realise that continued political impasse<br />
was unsustainable. Whatever the case, the Arab advance was an<br />
impressive success, and the Israeli military situation rapidly became serious.<br />
Within a very short time, the Egyptian forces had crossed the Suez<br />
Canal and broken through the Israeli line of defence. The Egyptian Army<br />
was able to re-take most of the Suez East Bank, occupied by Israel ever<br />
since the 1967 war, while at the same time the Syrian army succeeded in<br />
occupying a large part of the strategically important Golan Heights. It<br />
seemed that a real disaster for Israel was taking shape.<br />
13
After about four days, however, events began to turn. Israel managed<br />
to halt the offensive and began its own counter-attack. Israeli forces managed<br />
to regroup on the Golan, and on October 10, tank units broke<br />
through the Syrian defences, bringing Damascus within range of Israel’s<br />
artillery. Tel Aviv decided, however, not to pursue this course, since the<br />
Soviet Union had made it clear that any attack on Damascus would not be<br />
tolerated. In addition, further advance would be likely to incur unacceptable<br />
losses and would also run the risk that Jordan might become more actively<br />
involved. In the Sinai, the Egyptian army was managing for the time<br />
being to stand its ground, but during the night of October 15, Israeli tank<br />
units crossed the Suez Canal with the aim of isolating the Egyptian 3 rd<br />
army. The plan worked, and on October 21 this army corps was almost<br />
completely cut off from the outside world. 2<br />
On October 16,whenitbecameapparentthat Egypt and Syria were in<br />
deep trouble, Soviet premier Alexei N.KosyginflewtoCairotourgethe<br />
Egyptian president Anwar Sadat to call acease-fire.HeshowedSadat<br />
satellite photos of the Israeli advance, and on October 18,whentheIsraeli<br />
army had established a bridgehead on the western bank of the Suez Canal,<br />
Sadat agreed. Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, informed Kissinger and<br />
Nixon (who were at the time totally preoccupied by the Watergate affair)<br />
of Sadat’s willingness, and because Washington did not immediately respond,<br />
Brezhnev invited Kissinger to Moscow for further talks. This delay<br />
allowed Israel time to advance further against Egypt. 3<br />
On October 22, the Security Council adopted a resolution calling for a<br />
cease-fire. Although the two sides accepted this resolution, the fighting in<br />
fact continued. In the night of October 24– 25, the Security Council again<br />
called for a cease-fire and further demanded that the belligerent parties<br />
withdraw to the positions held on 22 October. International tension increased.<br />
The Soviet Union threatened direct military intervention if the<br />
Israeli advance were not halted. Washington reacted on October 25 by<br />
putting into operation Defense Condition 3 (DEFCON III) which meant<br />
that the American armed forces were put on a higher alert, including the<br />
announcement of a nuclear alert. 4 To the annoyance of West European<br />
countries, this also involved the American troops in Europe, even though<br />
there had been no discussion of this within nato. Emotions were quickly<br />
calmed, however, when Washington withdrew DEFCON III on October<br />
26. One day later, the first meeting took place between Israeli and Egyptian<br />
officers. Three days later an agreement was reached on the exchange<br />
of prisoners of war. 5<br />
The October war was not the first confrontation between Israel and its<br />
14
neighbouring Arab states. There had been wars in 1948, 1956 and again<br />
in 1967, all of them decided in Israel’s favour. In the Six-Day War, in particular,<br />
Israel had succeeded in considerably expanding its territory, taking<br />
in the Sinai desert (which led to the closure of the Suez Canal), the<br />
Gaza strip, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank of the Jordan. The end<br />
of the war initiated a period of protracted and fruitless diplomatic manoeuvrings<br />
in search of a peace accord, the starting point for which<br />
would necessarily have to be an end to this Israeli territorial expansion.<br />
To this end, on 22 November 1967, the Security Council adopted resolution<br />
242, a resolution which in subsequent years was to give rise regularly<br />
to diplomatic differences of interpretation, even within the ec. While the<br />
English version called for ‘withdrawal of Israel’s armed forces from territories<br />
occupied in the recent conflict’ the French version demanded that<br />
Israel withdraw from the territories occupied (‘retrait des forces armées<br />
israeliennes des terrritoires occupés’).<br />
The failure to find a political solution to the Middle East conflict ensured<br />
continuous tension in the area from 1967 to 1973, with the differences<br />
between the Soviet Union and the United States playing an increasingly<br />
important role. Time and again, hostilities flared between Israel and<br />
an Egypt enjoying large-scale military and economic support from<br />
Moscow. In the summer of 1970, after long and delicate negotiations, a<br />
cease-fire was agreed, but it proved impossible to reach agreement over a<br />
peace accord. In the Arab world, this impasse served to increase frustration.<br />
In January 1973, Sadat warned that a new war was beginning to<br />
look inevitable unless a political solution could be found soon. On October<br />
6, he was vindicated.<br />
The outbreak of the October War brought the two Great Powers, the<br />
Soviet Union and the United States, unexpectedly and sharply into conflict.<br />
From the early 1970s on, relations had improved between the Soviet<br />
Union and the usa. In May 1972, Brezhnev and Nixon had met in<br />
Moscow and jointly signed the salt-i treaty. In the meantime, the Conference<br />
over Security and Cooperation in Europe (csce) had been set up.<br />
It seemed that a new period of détente had begun.<br />
Egyptian and Syrian dissatisfaction with the situation in the Middle<br />
East was well-known. Rumours had circulated earlier of a possible<br />
Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel, and in January the joint armed forces of<br />
Egypt, Syria and Jordan were put under the command of the Egyptian<br />
Minister for War. Nonetheless, most informed opinion held that the three<br />
nations possessed insufficient military resources to see such a venture<br />
through successfully. 6 15
Early in 1973, Moscow decided to supply Egypt with extra military<br />
material whilst at the same time, in Cairo, continuing to press for a diplomatic<br />
solution. Moscow’s strategy failed, for on October 4 the Soviet<br />
leaders were informed of Egypt’s intention to attack Israel within a few<br />
days. Immediately, the Kremlin sent transport planes to both Cairo and<br />
Damascus to collect the families of advisors and diplomats. Washington,<br />
however, remained convinced that Sadat would not start a war. 7 Once<br />
war had broken out, both Washington and Moscow immediately set up<br />
an airlift. The Soviet airlift came into operation the third day of the war,<br />
in spite of the fact that the Soviet military leadership expected Arab successes<br />
to be of only a temporary nature. On October 9, the airlift was concentrated<br />
solely on Syria, since the Syrian military situation was rapidly<br />
deteriorating. Supplies were still modest: no tanks or aircraft, only fuel<br />
and ammunition; but on October 10, Antonov-12 and the gigantic<br />
Antonov-22 transport planes began flights to Egypt. 8<br />
On October 14, several days after the Soviets began provisioning and<br />
after a week of hesitancy and differences of opinion, the usa announced<br />
that it was beginning delivery of weapons to Israel. The American airlift<br />
ran via the Azores. In all probability, however, the Americans began supplying<br />
Israel earlier, albeit on a limited scale. For example, as soon as the<br />
war broke out, American supplies were redirected from West Germany.<br />
The major West European countries were reticent in their response to<br />
the Middle Eastern war. Both French and British governments called for<br />
an arms embargo and refused to provide the belligerent parties with materials,<br />
an attitude which rapidly assumed an anti-Israeli complexion, at<br />
least partly as a result of statements from both countries over who was to<br />
blame. In addition to which, France continued to supply other Arabic<br />
countries, for example Libya, without specifying that such supplies<br />
should not find their way to Egypt or Syria. 9 West Germany adopted a<br />
much less outspoken approach. Bonn declared that it was not wholly in<br />
sympathy with Israel, but turned a blind eye to the movement of American<br />
supplies to Israel from West German soil. Within the European Community,<br />
not only did a majority seem disinclined to come out openly or<br />
actively in support of Israel, there was also unease over the role played by<br />
the Americans in the war and over the lack of consultation, particularly<br />
when Nixon put American troops on a high alert. In this regard, however,<br />
The Netherlands was the exception.<br />
16
The Netherlands and the Middle East<br />
As during the 1967 war, the first reports of the war in the Middle East<br />
caused great concern in The Netherlands. In its assessment of developments<br />
in the Middle East, The Netherlands had firmly allied itself with Israel<br />
over two decades. Originally, the Dutch had vacillated for some time<br />
before recognising the Jewish state, careful lest Islamic Arab countries<br />
should be antagonised in view of the problems with Indonesia. 10 But during<br />
the 1950s and 1960s, a ‘special alliance’ developed between the two<br />
countries. During the wars of 1956 and 1967, the Netherlands supplied<br />
Israel with military materials, though it should be added that policy in<br />
1956 was heavily influenced by the desire to see Nasser’s Egypt brought<br />
to heel. 11 The government also tried to offer Israel diplomatic support on<br />
various other occasions, in particular in the 1960s over the question of<br />
the Israeli-occupied territories.<br />
In the diplomatic battles over the question of whether Israel should return<br />
all of the occupied territories to the surrounding Arab nations, The<br />
Netherlands always interpreted resolution 242 in such a way that the possibility<br />
of strategic ‘border corrections’ would remain open. It was frequently<br />
emphasised in The Hague that Israel had the right to secure borders.<br />
On the Palestinian question, too, The Hague came out in support of<br />
Israel: the position and status of the Palestinians were a humanitarian and<br />
not a political issue. In the General Assembly of the un, The Netherlands<br />
voted against resolutions calling for the Palestinian people’s right to selfdetermination.<br />
The period in office of the Foreign Minister, W.K.N. Schmelzer (1971-<br />
1973), saw a cautious change of political direction. In the General Assembly<br />
in December 1972, The Netherlands backed the famous resolution<br />
2949 which recognised the rights of the Palestinians as an inseparable<br />
part of the peace process, in spite of both Israeli and American dissent.<br />
In the same year, Schmelzer declared that border corrections were only<br />
possible if all parties accepted them. Inevitably, such views introduced an<br />
element of estrangement into Dutch-Israeli relations. 12 These developments<br />
were accompanied by a closer rapprochement with the Arab countries,<br />
a process already begun in the late 1960s.<br />
During this period, although it became increasingly more difficult for<br />
the Foreign Ministry to consent to arms deliveries to Israel, 13 Dutch-Israeli<br />
military contacts were never completely broken. Israeli soldiers, for<br />
example, trained in The Netherlands in 1971 and 1972. Military instructors<br />
familiarised their Israeli colleagues with the lightly armoured person-<br />
17
nel carriers, the m-113’s; Israelis learned to shoot, drive, manoeuvre and<br />
navigate the m-113’s, and for this purpose they received secret training at<br />
the Royal Engineers Training School for Navigation and Diving. An exercise<br />
involving crossing the Maas with an m-113 was held near Zaltbommel.<br />
14 The m-113’s were to be used in crossing the Suez Canal in October<br />
1973. According to the Military Intelligence Service (mid) documents,<br />
the Israelis conducted their exercises in The Netherlands because ‘in the<br />
circumstances instruction from the American side would have been too<br />
sensitive’. 15<br />
Shortly before the October War, The Netherlands and Israel were still<br />
cooperating in the modernisation of the cannons of Israel’s Centurion<br />
tanks. A number of Israeli military personnel were given training at the<br />
Army tank workshops in Amersfoort. Parts for Centurions were also<br />
flown to Israel from the Soesterberg military airfield, 16 a rather remarkable<br />
transaction since the new (PvdA) Minister, M. van der Stoel, had decided<br />
on August 30 that all military deliveries to states immediately involved<br />
in the Israeli-Arab conflict must cease. 17<br />
Support for Israel<br />
On October 6, at the request of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, the Dutch<br />
Ambassador in Jerusalem sent a communication to The Hague that there<br />
were ‘massive concentrations of Egyptian and Syrian armed forces in attack<br />
positions’ gathered on Israel’s borders. From New York it was also<br />
reported that un observers were seeing ‘strong indications’ that Syria and<br />
Egypt wanted to embark on acts of war. It was assumed in New York that<br />
the intention was probably to achieve limited military objectives in order<br />
to be able subsequently to exploit the political situation. The Ambassador<br />
in Jerusalem was of the same view, maintaining this assumption<br />
even after the outbreak of the war. It was further assumed that Israel<br />
would rapidly push back the invaders through its supremacy in the air, an<br />
assessment that soon proved overly optimistic. 18<br />
In spite of the political shifts of the preceding years, The Netherlands<br />
came out 100% behind the Israeli cause. At first, The Hague – including<br />
the Dutch Foreign Ministry – was uncertain of the situation in the Middle<br />
East. On Sunday, October 7, Van der Stoel in fact was not prepared to<br />
comment. In the meantime, it was clear that Egypt wanted to petition the<br />
General Assembly and did not want the Security Council to intervene.<br />
Van der Stoel’s preference, on the contrary, was for the Security Council<br />
18
to be brought in. The Permanent Representative in New York, R. Fack,<br />
was nevertheless instructed not to oppose a debate on the Middle East in<br />
the General Assembly. 19<br />
On October 8, a high-level discussion of the conflict took place at the<br />
Foreign Ministry between J.M. den Uyl, Justice Minister A.A.M. van<br />
Agt, Minister of Economic Affairs R.F.M. Lubbers, Van der Stoel and<br />
Defence Minister H. Vredeling. At that moment, Israel was in serious<br />
trouble. As reports of this meeting reveal, it was decided to call for a<br />
cease-fire as soon as possible on conditions acceptable to both sides,<br />
preferably on the basis of a restoration of the status quo ante. 20 The cooperation<br />
of the ec countries must be enlisted to prevent any Arab resolution<br />
which labelled Israel as the ‘aggressor’ being passed in the General<br />
Assembly. In any case, The Netherlands would vote against any such<br />
resolution, and would press for a quick meeting of the Security Council.<br />
In brief, it was decided during this consultation to lend all possible diplomatic<br />
support to Israel. 21<br />
In accordance with the conclusions of this consultation, the Permanent<br />
Representative at the un, R. Fack, was thoroughly briefed the same day.<br />
Above all, he was to oppose any resolution which condemned Israel as the<br />
aggressor. He was also instructed to vote against any resolution that demanded<br />
the implementation of resolution 242, since the situation was<br />
now very different following the breaching of existing borders. The Security<br />
Council was the appropriate organ for ending the conflict, to which<br />
end the first priority was suspension of the armed struggle, preferably on<br />
the basis of a restoration of the status quo ante. 22<br />
On Monday, October 8, the Dutch Foreign Ministry issued its first<br />
press statement on the war. According to this statement, it could be deduced<br />
from the reports of un observers that Egypt and Syria had initiated<br />
the open violence. The government hoped that the Security Council<br />
could find a formula acceptable to both parties that would lead to a<br />
cease-fire. 23 On the afternoon of October 8, thePermanentCommittee<br />
for Foreign Affairs met in emergency session. At the end of this consultation,<br />
it was given out to thepressthat all political parties, with the exception<br />
of the communist cpn and the pacifist psp, couldendorse the government’s<br />
position that restoration of the existing pre-war borders was<br />
essential. 24<br />
Meanwhile, under the instigation of the Second Chamber, a government<br />
statement was being prepared. This statement was worked out at<br />
the Foreign Ministry by the Department for International Organizations<br />
(dio), a branch of the Directorate-General for International Coopera-<br />
19
tion (dgis). This arose from the fact that, in the Netherlands at least,<br />
Middle Eastern policy had until that point always been a un affair. The<br />
Director-General for Political Affairs (dgpa), D.W. van Lynden, disagreed<br />
with what he considered an excessively pro-Israeli statement. 25<br />
This criticism of the policy pursued by the government, expressed by the<br />
dgpa, was to remain a significant factor throughout the entire period of<br />
crisis. Van Lynden, like a number of diplomats involved, continued to<br />
urge that this standpoint be modified to go some way to meet the Arab<br />
countries.<br />
On October 9, the government statement was made public. The Cabinet,<br />
it said, had noted with consternation the resumption of the acts of<br />
war initiated by Syria and Egypt, as was evident from the reports of un<br />
observers, among other sources. Egypt and Syria had thus unilaterally<br />
broken the truce that had held since 1970. The two assailants should<br />
therefore withdraw behind the armistice lines observed prior to October<br />
6. The government called on the Security Council to try to achieve a political<br />
solution based on Security Council Resolution 242.<br />
Through its choice of words, the Den Uyl Cabinet made it clear that it<br />
still stood firmly behind the interpretation of resolution 242 that the Arab<br />
countries considered pro-Israeli: Israel must withdraw from occupied areas<br />
(without the definite article). At the same time it was proposed that a<br />
political solution to the conflict had to be inseparably linked with a just<br />
and fair solution to the refugee question, meaning the question of the<br />
Palestinians. 26 What the declaration meant – as had been agreed in the<br />
ministerial discussions mentioned earlier – was support for Israel. In the<br />
event, the Dutch government statement was fairly generally supported in<br />
the Second Chamber, notwithstanding observations on the Palestinian<br />
question made by the PvdA and ppr. The PvdA leader, E. van Thijn, emphasised<br />
the need to strive for a solution to the Middle East conflict that<br />
would do justice to the political aspirations of the Palestinians. 27<br />
In New York, this government statement caused consternation among<br />
the Dutch Permanent Representation at the United Nations. Once Fack<br />
had scrutinised the statement he decided in consultation with his second<br />
man, subsequently Minister C. van der Klaauw, to give it as little publicity<br />
as possible. According to Fack, those in The Hague had been ‘unwise’<br />
since The Netherlands could not, after all, ‘maintain that a country trying<br />
to regain its own territory from a foreign occupier was committing<br />
aggression’. The position of conscientious balance and probity in the<br />
question of the Middle East, a position carefully constructed over past<br />
years, now threatened to collapse, Fack believed, like a house of cards. 28<br />
20
This was a first indication that his diplomats did not always subscribe to<br />
Van der Stoel’s viewpoint.<br />
But the government’s position could obviously be bent more towards<br />
the Arabs. On October 10, Van der Stoel had an interview with the Ambassadors<br />
of Saudi Arabia and Tunisia and with the Egyptian temporary<br />
chargé d’affairs concerning the Dutch position. It appears that at this<br />
meeting the Foreign Minister emphasised the fact that the government<br />
had called for a cease-fire based on a situation acceptable to both parties.<br />
It was not for The Netherlands, argued Van der Stoel, to say what the conditions<br />
should be before a cease-fire could be reached, although he stated<br />
his preference for a restoration of the truce boundaries of August 1970.<br />
The three Arab diplomats were evidently satisfied with this clarification.<br />
29 At that moment, it seemed that the two principles, ‘restoration of<br />
the status quo ante’ and ‘a cease-fire acceptable to both parties’, were<br />
evenly balanced. Two days later, however, during a European Political<br />
Cooperation consultation, the Dutch emphasis had shifted pre-eminently<br />
to the side of restoring the status quo ante.<br />
This did not prevent The Netherlands finding itself rapidly isolated<br />
within the ec. It was announced in the government statement that The<br />
Hague would make its attitude better understood within the consultative<br />
process with the nine member states. It was soon evident, however, that<br />
this was no easy matter, since most ec countries were not inclined to offer<br />
Israel their support. France and Italy, in particular, and to a lesser extent<br />
the uk, seemed rather to choose the Arab side. In the case of France, this<br />
became apparent during a sitting of the Security Council, when the<br />
French delegate pointed out that the current fighting was taking place in<br />
areas that had been occupied by Israel since 1967. France sought a peaceful<br />
solution to the conflict on the basis of resolution 242 (i.e. no restoration<br />
of the status quo ante) and expressed the desire that the entire Middle<br />
East problem should be involved in such a settlement. 30 It was evident in<br />
The Hague that French sympathies inclined to the side of the Arab countries.<br />
The Security Council appeared paralysed for the time being because<br />
the usa would not desert the Israelis, and furthermore neither Israel nor<br />
the Arab countries put much stock in any pronouncement from the Council.<br />
The conflict was to be decided on the battlefield.<br />
21
Military Support<br />
As we said earlier, the first reports arriving in The Hague, both from<br />
Jerusalem and New York, were still fairly optimistic over Israel’s military<br />
position. It was assumed that it was a limited military conflict in which Israel’s<br />
military superiority would ensure a swift Israeli victory. On Monday<br />
the 8th, Ambassador G.J. Jongejans reported from Jerusalem that the<br />
Israeli Cabinet had the previous day authorised crossing the existing truce<br />
boundaries. ‘As far as Israel was concerned, the war was actually already<br />
won.’ 31 But it turned out to be far from as easy as that.<br />
On October 7, the second day of the war, in a dramatic conversation<br />
the Israeli Ambassador to The Netherlands, C. Bar On, asked Minister<br />
Van der Stoel for military and material assistance. Undoubtedly, the Ambassador<br />
was fully aware that The Netherlands had assisted Israel with<br />
military material in the wars of 1956 and 1967. Bar On let it be known<br />
that Israel stood on the edge of the abyss and was desperately in need of<br />
ammunition and spare parts. The British and French governments had issued<br />
a ban on the export of arms to the warring parties as soon as the war<br />
broke out. American material support, to all appearances, was also very<br />
slow to get going during the first days of the war. Unlike Great Britain and<br />
France, the Dutch government did not ban the export of arms to the belligerents.<br />
According to the Ambassador, The Netherlands appeared to be<br />
the only remaining candidate for supplying Israel with the much-needed<br />
ammunition and spare parts. 32<br />
As Bar On recalls, Van der Stoel reacted rather coolly. Perhaps his caution<br />
was dictated by the initially optimistic reports from Jerusalem, but in<br />
any case he wanted to wait and see exactly how serious the Israeli situation<br />
was. Bar On remained in contact with Van der Stoel and with Premier<br />
Den Uyl and Vredeling, the Minister of Defence, throughout the following<br />
days. 33 The contacts with Vredeling were arranged by the PvdA<br />
Member of Parliament H. van den Bergh. Vredeling meanwhile had already<br />
intimated to him that he wished to send arms to Israel. 34<br />
As Minister of Defence, Vredeling played a central role in supplying<br />
arms to Israel. He has always stressed that his position was based on emotional,<br />
personal considerations. The events of the Second World War, the<br />
ex-resistance fighter later explained, must never be allowed to happen<br />
again. But despite all Vredeling’s noble-minded aims, the fact was that<br />
The Netherlands was being discretely pressured by the Americans.<br />
The background to this was that Foreign Minister Secretary Kissinger<br />
and Defence Minister James R. Schlesinger had clashed over extra arms<br />
22
deliveries to Israel. The initial American reaction was one of reservation,<br />
but apparently this caused considerable unrest in some quarters in Washington,<br />
given Israel’s initially threatened military situation. On Sunday<br />
morning, the cia operator at the American embassy in The Hague in<br />
charge of communications with headquarters in Langley, Virginia, received<br />
a critic from cia headquarters. Such a coded telegram requires a<br />
response within a few hours. He therefore contacted the cia Chief of Station<br />
in The Netherlands, Carlton B. Swift Jr., who had arrived in The<br />
Hague in the summer of 1973. 35<br />
Swift was instructed to approach the Dutch Cabinet to supply Israel<br />
with as many weapons and spares as possible. The critic emphasised that<br />
the political heads of the American Embassy had not been informed of<br />
these instructions. The critic that Swift received contained this brief request<br />
to the Cabinet to satisfy the Israeli requirements to whatever extent<br />
possible. 36 Swift carried out his brief in discrete fashion. On Sunday<br />
morning he contacted the Head of the Dutch Internal Security Service<br />
(the bvd), D. Kuipers, and the Intelligence and Security Co-ordinator of<br />
the Ministry of General Affairs, (the Prime Minister’s Office) F.E.<br />
Kruimink, who later confirmed that he and Kuipers were unexpectedly<br />
called at home by Swift on Sunday, October 7, to discuss a matter of great<br />
urgency. 37 Swift’s request found a receptive audience. Kruimink was to<br />
play an active role in the deliveries of arms. 38<br />
As we said earlier, a meeting on Monday, October 8, of the five Cabinet<br />
members most involved led to the conclusion that The Netherlands<br />
should support Israel. Both Van der Stoel and Vredeling deny that military<br />
support was discussed at this meeting. 39 Nonetheless, a remarkable<br />
incident occurred that same day. As the newspaper De Telegraaf reported,<br />
‘two days after the outbreak of the war’, two Israeli transport planes<br />
arrived at Gilze Rijen airport. A note in the Den Uyl archive, written by<br />
Den Uyl himself, reads: ‘Two days after the outbreak of the war in the<br />
Middle East, the Cabinet allowed several Israeli transport planes that had<br />
come to The Netherlands to fetch armaments to return empty-handed’. 40<br />
The journalist F. Peeters, who has written a book on the Dutch-Israeli<br />
military alliance, believes that the two aircraft actually left loaded. 41 Under-secretary<br />
for Defence Stemerdink confirmed that the two aircraft had<br />
indeed been loaded with American communication and detection equipment<br />
sent from West Germany. In all probability there were no Dutch<br />
materials sent; there had been at that stage inadequate preparation on the<br />
part of the Dutch. 42 In Vredeling’s view, there had been no political permission<br />
for this procedure, and in any case he himself was not fully in-<br />
23
formed. 43 Stemerdink, however, was of the opinion that no Dutch permission<br />
was necessary, since it was a matter of American transport of materials,<br />
as had often occurred before. The Dutch government had nothing<br />
to do with it. 44 Stemerdink takes a rather laconic line here, since the aircraft<br />
that collected the American materials were from Israel, a country at<br />
war. In this connection, it is even more remarkable that Den Uyl noted<br />
that the government had allowed these Israeli transport planes to return<br />
empty. This note from the Den Uyl archive may well indicate that the premier<br />
clearly knew what was going on.<br />
Meanwhile, Ambassador Bar On had convinced Vredeling, Van der<br />
Stoel as well as Den Uyl of Israel’s great need of ammunition. This request<br />
set a series of activities in motion. Vredeling asked the Secretary-General<br />
of Defence, G.H.J. Peijnenburg, to obtain information from the Israeli<br />
military mission in Paris regarding Israeli wishes. It was in the meantime<br />
known that there was a special need for 105 and 155 mm artillery. It was<br />
not only Vredeling who was trying to clarify the situation. Van der Stoel<br />
instructed his Ambassador in Washington, R.B. van Lynden, to find out<br />
what the us Government thought The Netherlands’ contribution should<br />
be. And Den Uyl requested Kruimink to draw up a memorandum over<br />
arms deliveries. 45<br />
The information requested by the Ministers was presented the following<br />
day. Vredeling received a memorandum from Peijnenburg, whose information<br />
had been obtained by the Quartermaster General, J.L. Antonissen,<br />
who in turn had been instructed by the Israeli military attaché in<br />
Paris. The Israeli reply was clear: Israel needed as much as possible 105<br />
and 155 mm ammunition of any type, both for cannons and howitzers.<br />
Antonissen informed Peijnenburg that The Netherlands had no surplus<br />
stocks of this ammunition, i.e. stocks beyond those needed for exercises<br />
and in case of war. Stocks of 105 mm in particular were still being built<br />
up. 46<br />
According to Peijnenburg, The Netherlands could nevertheless relinquish<br />
munitions and reorder replacements from Eurometaal (the former<br />
Artillery Establishment). Delivery of 155 mm shells was easier than the<br />
105 mm ammunition, because the English would be able to cite licence<br />
restrictions as an objection to their being re-exported to Israel. Antonissen<br />
thought this unlikely, however. Peijnenburg, concluding his advice,<br />
stressed that the Cabinet, or a few Ministers, must now decide whether<br />
deliveries to Israel should be permitted to go ahead. He pointed out that in<br />
1967 deliveries had been made out of Dutch stocks and that this had been<br />
successfully carried out without publicity. Peijnenburg had meanwhile let<br />
24
Bar On know by telephone that the Israeli military attaché in Paris had<br />
been contacted to establish exactly what Israel’s needs were, and that<br />
once this was known, the decision lay with the Cabinet. Bar On was told<br />
no more than this by him. 47<br />
More information arrived at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on October<br />
9.FromWashington came the news that The Netherlands must see<br />
what they themselves could do, 48 which meant that in any case there<br />
would be no Americanrepudiation.VanderStoelwaskeptinformedof<br />
activities at the Defence Ministry. A Foreign Ministry memo of October<br />
9 reported the Israeli request for ‘any type and any quantity’ of 105 and<br />
155 mm ammunition. Defence had let it be known that smaller quantities<br />
of the above calibre were availablefromsurplus stock and could in<br />
addition be supplied from stocks intended for theDutcharmy’sown<br />
use. 49<br />
The following morning, October 10, DenUylreceived a note from<br />
Kruimink titled: ‘Several factors of relevance in evaluating the question:<br />
what is the value of 11,000 tank shells for Centurion tanks.’ The note<br />
made reference to the possible delivery of 11,000 tank shells, field telephone<br />
cable, tank parts and also mines. The artillery ammunition that<br />
had been so centrally significant in the Defence papers was not even mentioned<br />
in Kruimink’s note. According to him, what was important at that<br />
time was above all spare parts and tank shells for the Israeli Centurions.<br />
50 This shift was probably linked with developments in the war, for<br />
after the first few difficult days, the Israeli army had now gone on the offensive.<br />
The Israeli interest in ammunition and spares for Centurion tanks was<br />
understandable. These tanks constituted about half the Israeli tank force,<br />
in a situation in which they were confronted on both fronts with superior<br />
numbers of Syrian and Egyptian tanks. 51 The British Centurion tank was<br />
also the standard tank in both Dutch and British armies. The British government,<br />
however, as already mentioned, had banned the export of<br />
weapons to both belligerent parties. 52 For the Dutch army, the 11,000<br />
tank shells constituted ‘ammunition for the first phase’, predestined for<br />
five days of Dutch fighting in the event of war (mainly in Germany, it was<br />
hoped), whereas this was probably sufficient to see the Israelis through<br />
three days of battle.<br />
Given the content of his note, Kruimink was assuming a secret operation.<br />
He indicates briefly how transport to Israel could be worked out<br />
practically and also made suggestions for camouflaging the necessary replenishment<br />
of stocks in The Netherlands, which would have to occur in<br />
25
consultation with Britain. It was therefore inevitable, thought Kruimink,<br />
that Britain would have to be approached over this matter of re-stocking.<br />
Contact would also have to be made with the Americans. 53<br />
The problems were resolved on Wednesday morning, October 10, in a<br />
conference at the Dutch Foreign Ministry involving Den Uyl, Van der<br />
Stoel, Vredeling and the Director-General of Political Affairs, Van Lynden.<br />
54 The position of the Foreign Affairs chiefs was immediately clear,<br />
both the Head of the Department for Africa and the Middle East (dam)<br />
and Van Lynden opposed it. The head of dam argued: ‘Unless M (the<br />
Minister) definitively decides that under the present battle circumstances<br />
Israel is to be supplied with military materials, I would ask you to consider<br />
whether in this conflict situation any material should be supplied to any<br />
warring party that might contribute to the continuation of war.’ Van Lynden<br />
also advised against supplying Israel unless Israel’s own territory was<br />
under threat. In the course of these deliberations, Van Lynden referred the<br />
three Ministers to existing policy: ‘not to supply the belligerent parties’<br />
and ‘not to supply Israel or the Arab states since the forming of the new<br />
Cabinet’. Further, Van Lynden stressed the danger of reprisals by the<br />
Arab countries when it came to oil. 55<br />
Finally, the three Ministers involved decided to withhold supplies ‘provisionally’.<br />
At least, that is what was noted on the Foreign Ministry memorandum.<br />
56 It was certainly not a definitive refusal; quite the contrary, it<br />
was a decision which, in view of the attitude and choice of words of those<br />
involved, still left everything open. Vredeling, according to what he himself<br />
said, found the decision taken wholly unsatisfactory. 57 But Van der<br />
Stoel’s subsequent account also leaves considerable room for interpretation.<br />
At the time, Dutch supplies seemed to Van der Stoel ‘personally’ unnecessary<br />
because American assistance with weaponry was already under<br />
consideration. Furthermore, as he explained some 25 years later, the<br />
ex-minister ‘made a possible exception for American armed materials<br />
that had been given us on loan’. 58 This is a remarkable addition, since the<br />
urgent Israeli interest in Centurion spare parts did in fact concern material<br />
that The Netherlands had been ‘loaned’ by the usa in the mid-1950s, at<br />
the time of American military assistance under the Mutual Defense Assistance<br />
Program (MDAP). Supplying Israel with Centurion parts and ammunition<br />
therefore, at least in part, did involve material given by the usa<br />
‘on loan’.<br />
Van der Stoel also remembered that there had been talk of a swap, i.e.<br />
deliveries in exchange for later compensation. 59 In all probability this<br />
mooted exchange concerned the Centurion shells to be supplied. The fact<br />
26
is that stocks lay ready in Great Britain, destined for Israel, already paid<br />
for, but which because of the British arms embargo could not be delivered.<br />
The solution was simple: The Netherlands would supply Israel and<br />
would later get back these materials from the stocks lying ready in Great<br />
Britain. In this way, the problem raised by Kruimink could be solved,<br />
namely, how to restore stocks to the same level without drawing attention<br />
to oneself. Through such a swap, the relevant British military authorities<br />
need never be informed of the Dutch deliveries. There is another reason<br />
for assuming that the decision-making of October 10 went further than a<br />
simple ‘provisionally not’. Den Uyl later remembered, without actually<br />
giving the date as October 10, that it was agreed it would be ‘a good idea<br />
to transport reserve ammunition from Volkel’. As he added to the Dutch<br />
historian Grünfeld, ‘in fact it never came to that’. 60 But this added remark<br />
is not correct: it most certainly did come to that.<br />
In view of the content of Kruimink’s note and the debates about an exchange,<br />
the indicators all suggest a secret operation. The decision ‘provisionally<br />
not to supply’ can also be interpreted as a decision for the time<br />
being to not officially supply, i.e. not according to all the stipulations in<br />
force. Subsequently, the Foreign Ministry would always deny that they<br />
had been involved in the surrender of arms export permits. However, an<br />
official procedure authorised by different departments was out of the<br />
question given the wording of Kruimink’s note and the decision-making<br />
of 10 October.<br />
Finally, a last point. There was a second important decision taken at<br />
that meeting. Both Van der Stoel and Den Uyl remembered that it was decided<br />
to offer the freedom of Dutch airfields for any possible American-Israeli<br />
airlift. Den Uyl later said that ‘from our side we then offered them<br />
the use of our airfields’. The airfield primarily in question was that of<br />
Soesterberg. In the end, the offer was not taken up because us transports<br />
were routed via the Azores. 61 However, there were Arab accusations that<br />
The Netherlands and Portugal were the only nato partners prepared to<br />
collaborate in setting up an American-Israeli airlift.<br />
Arms Deliveries<br />
Later on the same October 10, Vredeling informed Under-Secretary of<br />
Defence Bram Stemerdink that he had shared in the decision to supply Israel<br />
with weapons. He told Stemerdink that he had that morning thoroughly<br />
discussed the question with Van der Stoel and Den Uyl. 62 Vredel-<br />
27
ing and Stemerdink subsequently always maintained that they personally<br />
took this decision; that otherwise the whole process would have taken far<br />
too long, not least because of the anticipated opposition of Van der Stoel.<br />
But in the light of what we have already seen above, it is very much to the<br />
point to ask whether this picture is an entirely accurate one. Stemerdink<br />
has further since declared that ‘there was political consent to supply<br />
whatever was necessary’. 63<br />
Vredeling and Stemerdink came to the agreement that, if the whole<br />
matter were leaked, the latter would take responsibility and if worst came<br />
to worst he would resign to avoid bringing down the Den Uyl Cabinet in<br />
its infancy. They decided naturally to deny any knowledge of the operation.<br />
Next, Stemerdink contacted the Quartermaster General, Antonissen,<br />
who was to lead the whole operation. The Under-Secretary of Defence<br />
did not know that Antonissen had already been busy since Monday<br />
– or even Sunday – drawing up an inventory of what could be delivered to<br />
Israel. 64<br />
The question of arms deliveries preoccupied Van der Stoel, and in particular<br />
the ‘swap’ discussed on Wednesday morning. This is also rather<br />
remarkable in view of the fact that the Minister should not have been fully<br />
informed. Stemerdink recalled subsequently that he had a conversation<br />
with his fellow party member about this whole affair on Thursday, October<br />
11. Van der Stoel then returned to the question of whether The<br />
Netherlands would in fact be able to replenish stocks discretely after the<br />
war, Stemerdink setting out the reasons why this was not an insuperable<br />
problem. The stocks intended for Israel and now lying ready in Great<br />
Britain would after all be shipped to Rotterdam and with a little sleight of<br />
hand they could be unloaded. The ‘swap’ need never come to light. 65<br />
Dutch stocks would thus by the spring of 1974 be completely replenished.<br />
This happened with the assent of Stemerdink’s counterpart, the British<br />
Secretary for Defence; for by March 1974 the Labour Party had been returned<br />
to power in Britain, whereas a Conservative Defence Secretary<br />
would have undoubtedly declined to cooperate. 66<br />
Matters were efficiently expedited. According to Vredeling, the whole<br />
operation of 1973 was conducted on a need-to-know basis. At the ministry,<br />
Quartermaster General Antonissen, of course, knew about the<br />
whole operation, as did Brigadier General T. Meines, the logistics deputy<br />
working for the Quartermaster General. 67 Besides Antonissen, the<br />
Deputy Quartermaster General, General Major T.A. van Zanten, also<br />
knew about the operation. 68<br />
Meines confirmed that it was mainly tank parts and ammunition that<br />
28
were delivered to Israel, chiefly major components such as tank engines<br />
and various small spare parts for Centurions. Tank shells needed for the<br />
Israeli tanks were also sent. This material was fetched from the depots in<br />
Soesterberg and Utrecht and taken to Gilze Rijen. Material from Germany<br />
was also sent on. The ex-Israeli Ambassador Bar On has also said<br />
that it was mainly a matter of artillery ammunition, tank shells and spare<br />
parts. 69 Those directly involved later reported to Peeters that the tank<br />
shells were taken from the arsenals of the First Army Corps, and that the<br />
Centurion spare parts mainly consisted of shock-absorbers, gun turrets,<br />
caterpillar tracks, gearboxes and engines. But according to Peeters, that<br />
was not all. Machine guns and later parts for light amx-tanks were also<br />
flown to Israel, together with 0.40-canons, 22 mm ammunition for aircraft<br />
artillery and thousand-pound bombs. If it suited Israel better, these<br />
‘1,000 lbs’ were flown by the Dutch airforce, sometimes in f-27’s, to the<br />
American base Ramstein in Germany and there loaded into Israeli aircraft.<br />
70<br />
Meines points out that the Army was busy changing over to the West<br />
German Leopard tank. The Centurion material was thus becoming superfluous,<br />
and parts could readily be disposed of. The Centurions did not<br />
belong to the Dutch, they were on loan. This was also the case with the<br />
spare parts, although over time the Dutch army had also bought reserve<br />
parts themselves. 71 As far as the American-loaned material was concerned,<br />
Vredeling later emphasised that The Netherlands was not in a position<br />
to dispose freely of the relevant parts. Kruimink also accepts in retrospect<br />
that Antonissen maintained contact throughout the whole operation<br />
with a military attaché at the American embassy. 72 This was probably<br />
the mdap attaché or a functionary of the Military Assistance Advisory<br />
Group. We have already seen that there was no need to anticipate any<br />
problems from the Americans. Besides, Vredeling points out that the involvement<br />
of American Centurion material served a kind of ‘camouflage’<br />
function, for in case of discovery, it could always be maintained that the<br />
Centurions were being given back to the Americans.<br />
The material was transported to Israel in unmarked Israeli Boeing<br />
707’s from the Gilze Rijen military airfield, and according to Stemerdink<br />
also from Soesterberg, Ypenburg and Valkenburg. 73 These Boeings,<br />
which belonged to the Israeli airforce and the Israeli airline El Al, were<br />
sprayed grey to make identification more difficult. It is also possible that<br />
other 707’s were hired from European airline companies. Indeed, klm<br />
was very soon accused by the Arab side of being involved. The Israeli airforce<br />
itself commanded only seven Boeing 707’s.<br />
29
Each of the 707’s would have made an intermediate stop at the Belgian<br />
airfield Melsbroek. The transports took place at night, most probably<br />
commencing the night of October 12, and lasted several nights, possibly<br />
from October 12 to October 14, the day the American airlift openly went<br />
into operation. The military historian J. Schulten believes that the Israeli<br />
aircraft flew within nato airspace via civil flight corridors, giving<br />
Schiphol as their destination. The military personnel involved in the<br />
transport were mainly cadets of the Royal Military Academy in Breda,<br />
who were told that these were unexpected night-time exercises. 74<br />
It is not easy to establish just how important the Dutch deliveries were<br />
for Israel. Twenty years after the event, Vredeling gave his own view in a<br />
rather emotional fashion, piling on the agony and insisting on the significance<br />
of the supplies as though to justify his own actions. They were<br />
weapons, he said, that had been ‘begged and pleaded for’. It was a matter<br />
of sink or swim, and therefore, acting entirely in a personal capacity, he<br />
had decided to lend Israel a helping hand. 75 In Kruimink’s note, however,<br />
it had already been decided on October 10 that the weapons would arrive<br />
– and according to him did arrive – too late at the front to affect any ‘sink<br />
or swim’ situation. The Co-ordinator of the Intelligence and Security Services<br />
furthermore opined that Israel’s survival was no longer in question<br />
after the fourth day of the war. In view of this, he called the Dutch contribution<br />
‘valuable’, ‘more than a token gesture’, ‘but not decisive’. 76 Nevertheless,<br />
at the time, Kruimink found these comments no reason to speak<br />
out against the plans in his note. He pointed out that ‘if the Egyptians succeed<br />
in keeping parts of the Sinai’ the consequences would be seriously<br />
detrimental to Israel. 77 The Dutch transports thus may not have played so<br />
much an important role in defending the state of Israel against a threat to<br />
its survival, as Vredeling subsequently claimed, but they surely did help<br />
Israel in regaining the offensive. The Dutch government, or at least the<br />
ministers concerned, had already adopted the standpoint that a return to<br />
the status quo ante would be highly desirable for Israel, since it would allow<br />
Israel to enter peace negotiations from a position of strength. Albeit<br />
on a modest scale, through its supplies of military material The Netherlands<br />
contributed to the realisation of this goal while the war was still in<br />
progress.<br />
30
Foreign Ministry Denial<br />
In October 1973, Kruimink thought it would be impossible to keep the<br />
arms supplies a secret. The transport and loading would involve hundreds<br />
of military personnel. Peijnenburg was less pessimistic since previously,<br />
in 1967, the public had successfully been kept in the dark. And Peijnenburg<br />
was for a long time right. The arms deliveries of the October War did<br />
indeed escape public attention. When this became no longer feasible, first<br />
Stemerdink and subsequently Vredeling took personal responsibility.<br />
Den Uyl and Van der Stoel, let alone other members of the government,<br />
had known nothing.<br />
However, different individuals involved in the affair are of the opinion<br />
that it is highly unlikely that Den Uyl and Van der Stoel did not know.<br />
That, too, is the verdict of ex-Ambassador Bar On. He recalls that Van der<br />
Stoel was indeed initially unresponsive in his assessment. That was shortly<br />
after the outbreak of the war, but when the situation became more serious<br />
for Israel, the government – i.e. Den Uyl, Van der Stoel and Vredeling<br />
– decided to look at the Dutch position again. An actual airlift, they decided,<br />
was not possible. ‘But the Dutch government did agree to the possibility<br />
of Israel purchasing ammunition, particularly artillery ammunition<br />
and shells’. On his own admission, Bar On had constant contact over<br />
the affair with both Van der Stoel and Den Uyl as well as Vredeling. 78<br />
The Foreign Ministry and Van der Stoel furthermore played a remarkable<br />
role when psp member of the Second Chamber F. Van der Spek began<br />
to make trouble. On October 26, Van der Spek tabled written questions<br />
on the matter of arms deliveries. According to him, on October 12,<br />
13 and 14, unmarked b-747’s had landed at Schiphol to refuel and to<br />
transport weapons to the Middle East. Van der Spek wanted to know<br />
whether great risks had been taken. Was it likewise the case that on October<br />
19 military aircraft had landed on their way to the Middle East?<br />
This was close to the truth, and the answer to these parliamentary<br />
questions caused a number of problems. In a memo of November 2, Van<br />
der Stoel was informed that the draft reply should already by the beginning<br />
of the week, and with the utmost haste, be submitted to the Dutch<br />
Minister of Economic Affairs, Lubbers, and the Minister of Defence. But<br />
co-ordination led to considerable delay. Vredeling was meanwhile in<br />
agreement. In Economic Affairs and in Defence it was felt that, because<br />
of the political nature of the questions, Van de Stoel should be the first to<br />
sign it. The Minister was also informed that the Ministry of Economic<br />
Affairs wanted it borne in mind when framing the answer that ‘no li-<br />
31
cences for the export of arms had been issued’. Beside this, Defence had<br />
let it be known that the Gilze Rijen airfield had not been used as an intermediate<br />
stop for military aircraft on their way to the Middle East. 79<br />
In his reply to Van der Spek’s questions, Van der Stoel did not simply<br />
declare that no arms had been supplied to Israel. That would have been a<br />
lie. He answered, also on behalf of Lubbers and Vredeling, that since the<br />
outbreak of the war ‘no licences for arms exports to the Middle East had<br />
been issued’. That applied also to arms in transit. This was obviously a<br />
hypocritical answer: of course, no official export licence had been granted,<br />
since the entire operation was conducted in secrecy. The specific questions<br />
over Schiphol were answered with explicit denials. 80 The flights had<br />
in fact been from Gilze Rijen and possibly other airfields.<br />
Van der Stoel thought the formulation of the answers to Van der Spek’s<br />
questions, ‘no export licences’, was probably chosen ‘with reference to<br />
the loaned material made available by America’. 81 This is a remarkable<br />
comment, since the Dutch government had no authority to dispose of material<br />
given by the us on loan. 82 In retrospect, Van der Stoel also insisted<br />
on the formulation ‘to have been able to say in all conscience that no licence<br />
was given for the export of weapons during the Yom Kippur War’.<br />
Neither he nor Den Uyl had been informed of arms deliveries. 83 This is, in<br />
the strictest sense, true. Bar On stressed in this connection that there had<br />
been no question of delivering weapons, but the supply of ammunition<br />
and spare parts. 84 Others involved, both at the time and later, may well<br />
have relied on this tactical but dubious distinction, but if aircraft machine<br />
guns and mines were also supplied, the distinction is invalid.<br />
It is also not very plausible that Den Uyl was not immediately, or at least<br />
within a few days, fully informed. Den Uyl was certainly present at the discussions<br />
of October 10. Furthermore,hewouldinallprobabilityhave<br />
been informed of the transports soon enough byoneof the intelligence<br />
services. After all,itwasanoperationinwhich,quiteapartfromtheunrecognisable<br />
foreign aircraft, several hundred Dutch military personnel<br />
had been involved. Former member of parliament H. van den Bergh later<br />
brought to the world’s attention the story that in December 1973 Israeli<br />
Premier Golda Meir had effusively thanked Den Uyl at the Socialist International<br />
for his support, and that Den Uyl was highly surprised at this expression<br />
of gratitude. 85 But was Den Uyl surprised because he knew nothing<br />
about it (as Van den Bergh suggested) or because Meir thanked him so<br />
openly in the proximity of other witnesses? Brandt was also warmly<br />
thanked by Meir, but the reason for that show of gratitude was evident, for<br />
it was well-known that the American war materials had also been flown<br />
from West Germany.<br />
32
And indeed, Den Uyl need not have been so surprised. A week after the<br />
war broke out, the premier had received a cordial letter, dated October<br />
10, from the Israeli government warmly thanking him for the Dutch support<br />
that had been highly important to Israel. 86 Furthermore, it would be<br />
highly unlike Den Uyl to be left uncertain. Rumours were already circulating<br />
in October over Dutch arms deliveries. According to Vredeling,<br />
Den Uyl never once asked him what was going on, which in the light of<br />
Den Uyl’s curiosity, remarked on by Vredeling and others, could mean<br />
nothing other than that he was already fully informed. Bar On also claims<br />
that Den Uyl had been informed. 87 Ex-Minister of Economic Affairs Lubbers<br />
is of the opinion that Den Uyl had ‘some knowledge’ of the affair and<br />
that he suspected that Lubbers also knew. 88 Kruimink similarly thinks it<br />
highly improbable that Den Uyl knew nothing. 89<br />
These rumours were not only circulating in The Netherlands, but more<br />
significantly abroad. This was quickly evident from an undated memorandum<br />
to Van der Stoel, most probably written during the first days of<br />
the war. A report in the Dutch Foreign Ministry, most probably from a<br />
friendly intelligence service, reads: ‘The Israelis are anticipating some<br />
ammunition shortage for their artillery and have requested 105 and 155<br />
mm ammunition from The Netherlands, according to some Western Ambassador.’<br />
90 In Washington, various people were told both of the Dutch<br />
willingness to make an airfield available and of the arms deliveries. When<br />
Ambassador Van Lynden held a conversation with the Deputy Secretary<br />
of State, Kenneth Rush, on October 30, the latter expressed his appreciation<br />
of the Dutch role during the war. Rush stressed how disappointing<br />
the attitude of the other European partners and Spain had been. He admitted<br />
that the member states of Europe had not always been adequately<br />
consulted, but it was intolerable that they had denied Americans the right<br />
to use their airspace or the facilities to refuel on European airfields or to<br />
move their own American materials. Some member states on which<br />
Washington most counted had let the usa down badly – meaning, of<br />
course, the uk. The Netherlands, Rush emphasised, absolutely did not<br />
belong to this category. 91 Four days earlier, on October 26, the American<br />
Ambassador had communicated to Van der Stoel the appreciation of his<br />
government for the Dutch attitude during the October war. 92<br />
An American official would later write in the New York Times that<br />
‘the Europeans, with the exception of Portugal and The Netherlands, had<br />
refused to have anything to do with us effort to resupply Israel with<br />
weapons, in some cases denying them overflight and refueling by American<br />
planes’. But this open reference did not go down well with the Dutch<br />
33
Foreign Ministry; for the whole aim was that the Dutch attitude should<br />
remain secret. On November 6, in a request that he should inquire into<br />
various matters of world affairs, the Ambassador in Washington was<br />
asked to advise the Minister how ‘to dispel the wholly incorrect impression<br />
that we allowed overflights and refuelling’. 93<br />
Vredeling recalls that James Schlesinger, American Defense Secretary,<br />
also knew of the Dutch arms deliveries. This was evident in December<br />
1973, when Vredeling spoke with him in The Hague. Schlesinger was fulsome<br />
in his praise of The Netherlands. The American had learned the first<br />
line of the Dutch national anthem Wilhelmus by heart. 94 Van der Stoel<br />
also remembers that Schlesinger had thanked him for Dutch support<br />
‘with tears in his eyes’. 95 If Van der Stoel really did think that no weapons<br />
had been supplied, he must have wondered what on earth Schlesinger was<br />
thanking him for. 96<br />
In October, it turned out that the French government had suspected<br />
something. Why, they wondered aloud in Paris, had The Netherlands not<br />
announced an arms embargo? The Dutch Ambassador in Paris was asked<br />
by The Hague to explain that The Netherlands had indeed announced no<br />
arms embargo but that the delivery of war materials was subject to approval.<br />
The Ambassador was to declare the following:<br />
In accordance with the principle always adopted that no supplies will be<br />
delivered to the belligerent parties, no supplies have been delivered to<br />
the countries concerned since the outbreak of hostilities. 97<br />
In early November, it appeared that London was also giving credence to<br />
the rumours of Dutch arms deliveries. After Ambassador W.J.G. Gevers<br />
had reported this, Van der Stoel instructed him on November 8 to take<br />
steps, employing the cryptic denials he himself had used in his answer to<br />
the questions put by Van der Spek. 98 This Gevers did, and the Foreign<br />
Ministry appeared to regret that the impression had arisen that the British<br />
government gave any credence to suggestions of Dutch arms deliveries. 99<br />
But the British apparently did not entirely trust this, for on November 10<br />
a British diplomat asked whether The Netherlands had imposed an embargo<br />
on the export of arms and ammunition to the warring countries. 100<br />
As Van Lynden, the Director-General for Political Affairs, had<br />
stressed during the deliberations of October 10, risks had indeed been<br />
taken, particularly if Arab countries got wind of the secret arms supplies<br />
to Israel. The Saudi Oil Minister Yamani later said that he knew what had<br />
gone on and that the arms supplies were the direct reason for the oil em-<br />
34
argo being imposed against The Netherlands. 101 It is possible that Yamani<br />
was bluffing, but it is certainly true that some Arab countries accused<br />
The Netherlands at the time of giving military support to Israel. On<br />
October 16, the Dutch Ambassador in Damascus, J. van Hoeve, reported<br />
that the Syrian authorities were accusing the Royal Dutch Airlines, klm,<br />
of being involved in the transport of weapons to Israel. He was summoned<br />
for a hearing with Vice-Minister A. Rafai, who ‘wanted to draw attention<br />
to the fact that, according to Syrian intelligence, fifteen aircraft<br />
loaded with weapons and ammunition had departed from Schiphol’. 102 A<br />
day later, Van Hoeve stated specifically that it was supposed to have been<br />
Galaxy aircraft involved. This could only refer to the American airforce.<br />
The Dutch Foreign Ministry informed their Ambassador that the Minister<br />
had learned with displeasure ‘of continuing Syrian accusations against<br />
The Netherlands on the basis of completely unfounded rumours concerning<br />
arms supplies to Israel’. Van der Stoel was also to make his displeasure<br />
clear to the Syrian Ambassador. 103<br />
There were more indications that Arab states suspected something.<br />
During a conversation on October 17 with four Arab Ambassadors, according<br />
to the report of that meeting, Van der Stoel had to defend himself<br />
against accusations of arms transports. 104 In fact, it is rather remarkable<br />
that the Arab countries have never publicly accused The Netherlands of<br />
arms deliveries. There were, however, sufficient other grounds for accusing<br />
The Netherlands of adopting a pro-Israeli attitude.<br />
European Political Cooperation<br />
On October 12, the war issue was for the first time raised in the Dutch<br />
Council of Ministers. Meanwhile, the Dutch position was becoming<br />
more difficult. klm was already openly suspected of having transported<br />
persons and materials. During this Cabinet session the question of possible<br />
Arab oil sanctions was aired for speculation. Van der Stoel still had no<br />
indication that the oil supply was to be restricted, but assumed that the<br />
risk of this happening was very real if the war were to escalate.<br />
On the same day, in Copenhagen consultations were being held within<br />
the Comité Politique of the Director-Generals for Political Affairs<br />
(dgpa) of the nine ec countries. The dgpa’s considered the question of<br />
whether a declaration by the Foreign Ministers over the war was called<br />
for. This meeting took place within the framework of the European Political<br />
Cooperation (EPC) gathering of European Foreign Ministers. 105 A<br />
35
draft declaration was drawn up that was clearly based on the British and<br />
French positions. The declaration called for a cease-fire and for a political<br />
solution on the basis of the French interpretation of Security Council resolution<br />
242, which demanded that Israel withdraw from the occupied territories.<br />
In addition, in the last sentence of the declaration the uk and<br />
France were given the mandate to represent the whole ec in the Security<br />
Council.<br />
Van Lynden’s initial instructions were to block any joint statement over<br />
the MiddleEastwarintheComité Politique. The instruction held that the<br />
war intheMiddleEastdidnotlend itself to decision-making, but only to<br />
consultation. The mandate granted totheuk and France to represent the<br />
Nine in the Security Council would simply mean that these two countries<br />
would put theirownviewsintoeffect.TheDutch standpoint with regard<br />
to the cease-fire was also out of harmony with the draft text. The Hague<br />
wanted withdrawal behind the existing truce lines as a condition for a<br />
cease-fire to enable a formula acceptable to both sides to be reached. This<br />
was a further reason to withhold assent from a communal declaration. 106<br />
Van Lynden was absolutely opposed to this and further considered<br />
these instructions as having originated under the influence of his opponent,<br />
J. Meijer, Director-General for International Cooperation. Van<br />
Lynden feared, together with many officials in the Department, that The<br />
Netherlands was heading for isolation within the ec. Furthermore,<br />
blocking a communal ec standpoint would only succeed in weakening<br />
the West European position with regard to the Arab countries. Van Lynden<br />
later claimed that decision-making within the Foreign Ministry was<br />
influenced by a powerful pro-Israeli lobby, to wit from the Directorate<br />
General for International Cooperation. 107<br />
The Dutch standpoint indeed encountered serious objections in the<br />
Comité Politique, leading Van Lynden to seek contact with his Minister<br />
who, at the time, was in ministerial council. Following Van Lynden’s advice,<br />
Van der Stoel agreed to a communal epc standpoint. Van der Stoel<br />
even instructed him to go along with an appeal for an immediate ceasefire,<br />
without further reference to any restoration of the status quo ante. It<br />
should be noted at this point that Israel’s military situation had in the<br />
meantime improved considerably. Van der Stoel nevertheless continued to<br />
have great difficulty with the final passage of the proposed statement in<br />
which the nine member states empowered the uk and France to represent<br />
the ec in the Security Council.<br />
During this Cabinet session, Van der Stoel informed his colleagues that<br />
he had, meanwhile, given instructions to strike out the final passage con-<br />
36
cerning the British-French mandate. He saw no way in which the Dutch<br />
and the French visions could be brought into harmony with each other<br />
with French representation in the Security Council. In general, any initiatives<br />
in New York should preferably be taken on the basis of the old truce<br />
lines. And, it should be said, Van der Stoel was certainly not alone. Transport<br />
Minister Westerterp pointed out that Paris had meanwhile put out a<br />
statement in which the Syrian and Egyptian attack had been more or less<br />
approved. He reminded his colleagues that France had also abused such a<br />
mandate in the past: one could well guess what would happen with a new<br />
mandate. Van der Stoel agreed wholeheartedly with this point of view. 108<br />
In the Comité Politique, in accordance with the instruction from his<br />
Minister, Van Lynden stated that The Netherlands found itself unable under<br />
any condition to agree to the last sentence of the draft declaration. As<br />
a result, the Dutch Director-General for Political Affairs found himself<br />
heavily attacked, particularly by the Italians. Italy and France refused to<br />
remove the last sentence, leading to an impasse which was only broken<br />
the following day when the French and Italian governments gave their<br />
consent to dropping the mandate. When the statement was published on<br />
October 13, most Arab countries reacted with disappointment or even<br />
anger. The demand was heard almost immediately that the ec should declare<br />
itself in favour of complete implementation of resolution 242, and<br />
specifically for complete withdrawal from the occupied territories.<br />
Avetowasthusdeclared, under the responsibility of Van der Stoel and<br />
with the support of the Cabinet, on the mandate requested by Paris and<br />
London. Without doubt, this had to do with the differences of opinion<br />
concerning the Middle East conflict. However, it should be noted that European<br />
Political Cooperation (epc)inthefieldofforeign policy was still<br />
at a veryearlystage.This was one of the first times that the epc had been<br />
considered as the appropriate, co-ordinating body to act insuchanimportant<br />
matter. The Netherlands had long stood out against such political cooperationbetween<br />
the six, and subsequently the nine member states. The<br />
veto in part possibly stemmed from the usual aversion to the politicizing<br />
of European integration, although it should be added that there were fewer<br />
misgivings on this score within the Directorate-General for Political<br />
Affairs than entertained by the Minister and within the Cabinet. 109<br />
Like a true Atlanticist, Van der Stoel took for granted American leadership<br />
in the question of the Middle East conflict and advocated first of all<br />
Atlantic unity rather than political co-ordination within epc. 110 This did<br />
not prevent considerable dissatisfaction in The Hague with the American<br />
government’s policy, particularly over the lack of consultation with the<br />
37
West European allies. When the new American Ambassador in The<br />
Hague came to pay his respects to the Secretary-General of the Dutch<br />
Foreign Ministry, E.L.C. Schiff, the latter made it very clear that The<br />
Netherlands also needed to be kept in touch with the thinking and actions<br />
of the American government. Understanding and cooperation could<br />
hardly be expected of the West European allies if they were not adequately<br />
informed of American objectives and tactics. 111<br />
On October 16, the American government declared the war in the<br />
Middle East a ‘major test’ for nato. Unity was necessary in the face of<br />
the Soviet threat. Responding to this appeal for Atlantic solidarity, Van<br />
der Stoel expressed himself cautiously positive. In an instruction to Fack,<br />
the Dutch Minister stressed that, given the Soviet backing for the Arab<br />
countries, American military support for Israel was understandable. He<br />
had sympathy for the American resumption of arms deliveries and subscribed<br />
to the belief that the nato allies must do everything possible to<br />
maintain their unity. He advocated considering measures against the Soviet<br />
Union, for example within the framework of csce consultations. Unless<br />
Moscow exercised the necessary restraint in time, thought Van der<br />
Stoel, the climate in Geneva would be badly affected. 112<br />
Nevertheless, within a few days, West European resentment was again<br />
aroused by American action when Nixon, as mentioned earlier, put his<br />
troops on a state of high alert. On October 26, the nato Permanent Representatives<br />
met in Brussels. The West German government, meanwhile,<br />
had taken the decision to end its collaboration in the transport of American<br />
arms stocks to Israel. Although Israel had the winning hand, Bonn<br />
appeared to side with France and Great Britain on this point also. Both<br />
the French and Belgian Permanent Representatives sharply criticized the<br />
American conduct, specifically the lack of information given – particularly<br />
when the Americans had so shortly beforehand appealed for solidarity<br />
and cooperation. The Dutch Permanent Representative let it be known<br />
that, in spite of everything, The Netherlands could understand the American<br />
actions. 113<br />
Conclusion<br />
The Dutch government’s policy, as we said, did not go unnoticed in the<br />
Arab world. There were definite rumours of Dutch military assistance to<br />
Israel. Further, the Dutch veto of the epc mandate requested by Paris and<br />
London did not long remain a secret. On the basis of information from<br />
38
‘highly qualified sources’, The Guardian reported that ‘France and Italy<br />
privately informed Arab governments about Dutch reluctance to support<br />
a joint neutralist European stand on the Middle East’. 114<br />
That was not all. On October 13 a large demonstration had been held<br />
in Amsterdam in support of Israel, which Defence Minister Vredeling<br />
attended. On October 17 there appeared a page-sized declaration of solidarity<br />
with Israel in several newspapers, signed by many prominent public<br />
figures from Dutch society, including ex-ministers and ex-premiers.<br />
The presence of Vredeling at the October 13 th demonstration seemed to<br />
demonstrate clearly that, in this issue, the Cabinet stood squarely behind<br />
pro-Israeli public opinion. In the coming weeks, the Arab countries would<br />
return time and again to this remarkable gesture on the part of Vredeling.<br />
Why did the Den Uyl Cabinet adopt such an emphatic position? The<br />
normal alliance with Israel is a possible explanation but certainly open to<br />
doubt, for in the preceding years there had been a certain degree of estrangement.<br />
The party political composition of the Den Uyl Cabinet<br />
played a part. Those members of the government most involved were the<br />
Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) members who (more than, for example, the<br />
Catholic People’s Party, the kvp, according to ex-minister Van der<br />
Klauw) felt solidarity with Israel and certainly also with the governing<br />
Israeli Labour Party at that time. 115<br />
The Dutch government rejected the understanding of the Arab countries<br />
advocated by the French, and resisted any joint epc role, particularly<br />
in the Security Council. Indeed, Van der Stoel’s preferred orientation was<br />
pro-us rather than pro-epc, which conformed to the usual line of judgement<br />
where European Political Cooperation was concerned. Nevertheless,<br />
Van der Stoel’s policy is remarkable, given the criticism voiced by the<br />
dgpa and by diplomats. In the weeks that followed, Van der Stoel’s<br />
judgement was not always shared by his political and diplomatic advisors.<br />
Furthermore, arms were delivered, even though the Cabinet had never<br />
taken any decision on this. Vredeling always insisted that he had acted on<br />
his own initiative, together with Stemerdink; but in light of the above,<br />
that hardly appears likely. It would seem more probable that the various<br />
individuals involved were fully informed or at the least had their suspicions.<br />
Vredeling subsequently confirmed that none of his colleagues ever<br />
asked him explicitly about the arms deliveries, even though various rumours,<br />
questions and accusations were flying around. When Stemerdink<br />
years later told Den Uyl what had happened, Den Uyl said that he always<br />
suspected something of the kind. It is quite extraordinary that Den Uyl<br />
39
had never asked his Defence Minister for clarification. The inescapable<br />
conclusion is that the premier knew very well what was going on.<br />
The attitude taken by the Dutch Cabinet carried necessary risks, in the<br />
first place the risk of Arab sanctions. In the coming weeks, Van der Stoel<br />
would be confronted with Arab accusations on various occasions. However,<br />
it is remarkable that when Algeria pronounced an oil embargo<br />
against The Netherlands (the first country to do so), although a series of<br />
accusations were thrown at The Hague, these did not include any accusation<br />
of arms deliveries.<br />
The Cabinet position also carried with it problems within the ec;<br />
though at the same time the support of Washington could be relied on. Indeed,<br />
the Dutch Ambassador in Washington, Van Lynden, was told on<br />
October 30 just how highly the Americans appreciated the Dutch role.<br />
Besides, in the event of conflict in the oil sector, The Netherlands was in<br />
itself in no weak position: 116 the home base of Shell, it included Rotterdam<br />
and the huge refinery capacity in the Rijnmond area. Furthermore, it<br />
commanded considerable reserves of natural gas which it exported to Belgium,<br />
West Germany, Italy and France. This fact may well have played a<br />
role in determining policy with regard to the October war and the subsequent<br />
oil crisis.<br />
All in all, risks were taken, without a doubt, and yet at the same time<br />
the Dutch government was sailing a course in the wake of the usa with a<br />
certain accuracy. This is not to deny that there was sometimes irritation<br />
in The Hague at the lack of information provided from the American side.<br />
Van der Stoel complained of this in a conversation with the American Ambassador.<br />
117 Yet perhaps there was at the back of the minds of all the<br />
members of the Dutch government the conviction that if it came to the<br />
crunch, the Americans would not abandon their small but steadfast ally.<br />
There were times, as Van der Stoel put it, when solidarity between nato<br />
allies was essential.<br />
40
2<br />
Difficulties<br />
In the years leading up to the 1973 war, the international oil sector had<br />
undergone structural shifts against the background of a world-wide increase<br />
in the demand for oil. 1 Oil production had also increased hugely,<br />
not least in the Arab countries. Between 1950 and 1973, oil extraction in<br />
the Middle East increased fourteen-fold. 2 Western Europe and Japan in<br />
particular had become increasingly dependent on Arab oil.<br />
The West European countries had become to a significant degree dependent<br />
on oil imports for both their energy production and their petrochemical<br />
industries. In 1955, coal was still the most important energy<br />
source in Western Europe (75%), whereas in 1972 this share had fallen to<br />
23%. In contrast, oil had risen from 22% to 60% of the total energy supply.<br />
In 1955, 78% of all West European energy needs were met from within<br />
Western Europe, whereas in 1972 this figure had been drastically reduced<br />
to 35%. Energy imports had correspondingly risen from 22% to<br />
65%. 3<br />
The dependence on Arab oil imports, as a percentage of total energy<br />
requirements, rose in Western Europe from 13.4% in 1956 to 36% in<br />
1967 and 45% in 1973. This in turn had considerable consequences for<br />
the status of the oil-producing countries of the Middle East, particularly<br />
Saudi Arabia, whose share in the world’s oil production rose from 13% in<br />
1970 to 21% in 1973. This development made Saudi Arabia one of the<br />
most important political players in the Middle East. 4<br />
Even in the usa, long self-sufficient in oil, scarcity began to make itself<br />
felt on the oil market. The oil-producing areas in the usa could no longer<br />
satisfy the ever-increasing demand, with the result that oil imports grew<br />
throughout the 1960s at an average rate of 6% – rising to some 20% after<br />
1970. The squandering of reserves and increasing consumption meant<br />
that the usa had become a net importer of oil. Although American de-<br />
41
pendence on imports was far less than in most other industrial countries,<br />
the term energy crisis became securely established in the vocabulary of<br />
American politics. 5<br />
Because the countries of the industrial West were more dependent,<br />
they became more vulnerable. Furthermore, the powerful position of the<br />
traditional, international oil companies, the majors or Seven Sisters, symbols<br />
of Western domination of the world economy, appeared to be under<br />
pressure by the early 1970s. In 1972, although the Sisters, consisting of<br />
five American, one British (bp) and one Anglo-Dutch concern (Shell), still<br />
controlled 71% of oil production (excluding the usa and the communist<br />
countries), 49% of refining capacity and 54% of product-marketing, the<br />
power of these companies was on the wane. The ambitions of the oil producing<br />
countries were clearly spelled out by nationalisation in Algeria<br />
and Libya, in 1970 and 1971; ambitions which were expressed in the activities<br />
of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (opec)<br />
which had been set up in 1960. The status of the majors was further seriously<br />
affected over the years by the so-called independent American oil<br />
companies (Occidental, Phillips, Getty, Standard Oil of Indiana), as well<br />
as by the rise of national and semi-national concerns such as the French<br />
cfp and Ef-Erap and the Italian eni and Agip. The emergence of these<br />
new competitors appeared to offer the oil-producing countries new perspectives.<br />
The new rivals needed to strengthen their position and were<br />
therefore likely to show a greater willingness to meet their demands than<br />
the majors. 6<br />
The growth of independent oil concerns and of West European and<br />
Arab national oil companies was not, however, to the advantage of the oil<br />
producers in every respect. It also meant that ever more oil was coming on<br />
the market, with inevitable effects on oil prices which, initially as a result<br />
of the enormous supply in the late 1960s, gradually declined. From that<br />
moment, the opec countries, with considerable verve, tried to push<br />
through a new policy. The number of opec member countries had meanwhile<br />
sharply increased from five founder members in 1960 to thirteen<br />
countries in 1973. In particular, the entry of Algeria (1969) and the radicalisation<br />
of Libya led to an ever greater pressure on traditionally conservative<br />
oil producers like Saudi Arabia. 7 opec began to force up oil prices.<br />
This was understandable, since for decades oil prices had hardly increased<br />
at all, while the prices of Western oil products had often increased<br />
by dozens of percentages if not a hundred percent. opec also began to insist<br />
on a greater say – or ‘participation’ – in national oil extraction. Further,<br />
the opec countries wanted to manage their mineral resources intel-<br />
42
ligently and, if necessary, to limit oil production. After all, a reduced supply<br />
should raise the price of oil. 8<br />
In December 1970, by which point oil prices had fallen to an all-time<br />
low, the opec countries demanded steep rises both in the price of oil and<br />
in taxes on oil production. At first, the majors declined to cooperate with<br />
this demand; while for the first time ever, the so-called ‘parent countries’<br />
of the main oil companies – among them The Netherlands, albeit rather<br />
reluctantly – met to discuss this development in Washington. On February<br />
14, 1971, agreement was reached on the opec demands when the<br />
main companies and six Arabian Gulf states concluded an agreement that<br />
included increases in oil prices and taxes. There subsequently followed<br />
similar agreements with other oil-producing countries. A few Arab opec<br />
countries, such as Libya, were not happy with this February outcome, and<br />
negotiations were reopened. On April 2, 1971, the Tripoli agreement was<br />
signed, setting a further increase in the price of oil.<br />
Western countries’ fears that these concessions would not be the end of<br />
the matter were very quickly realized. Within months the opec countries<br />
were demanding a greater participation in national oil extraction (mainly<br />
controlled by the majors) as well as compensation for the devaluation of<br />
the dollar, the currency of payments for oil. 9 In January 1972 these aspirations<br />
led to a new agreement between the Gulf States and the companies<br />
on oil revenues and to the setting up of discussions on expanding national<br />
participation which, if opec had its way, allowed member states a 51%<br />
national share.<br />
The apparently insuperable clash of interests between opec and the<br />
oil companies began to look as though it were not, after all, entirely irreconcilable,<br />
even if certain aspects could not be resolved. The majors were<br />
thus not dissatisfied with the moderate price increases agreed in 1971 and<br />
1972. In reaching these settlements, the majors were helped by Saudi Arabia,<br />
which feared that too steep a rise in prices could perhaps lead to an<br />
uncontrollable inflation in the industrialized world, in which case Saudi<br />
investments abroad would be severely devalued. There was the further<br />
fear that the search for alternative energy sources would be stepped up in<br />
earnest.<br />
Gradual price rises suited the long-term strategy of the majors. Moderate<br />
increases coupled with a guaranteed supply could well deliver greater<br />
profits which, at the time, the majors certainly needed. Meanwhile, they<br />
were on the lookout for new oil areas in politically safe regions beyond<br />
opec’s demesne. They were also considering bringing into production<br />
such new oilfields as Alaska and the North Sea, more expensive locations<br />
43
that would call for extra capital if they were to be developed. Traditionally,<br />
the oil industry had always been able to finance its own development,<br />
but profits were no longer high enough for such large-scale operations.<br />
Deep-sea drilling in particular entailed colossal initial outlay, costs that<br />
could only be recouped by raising the price of oil. 10<br />
Nor was it only the majors who had an interest in higher oil prices. The<br />
American government, unlike the majors, had from the outset expressed<br />
no objection to higher oil prices, and in 1972/73 had informed opec accordingly.<br />
11 Such increases would ensure that the profit margins of domestic<br />
oil companies in the us would rise, making it a more attractive<br />
proposition to utilize otherwise uneconomic oil wells in Texas and elsewhere.<br />
It should not be forgotten in this connection that in the early<br />
1970s the us was dependent on foreign oil for a mere 15% of its total energy<br />
consumption. In Western Europe the situation was quite different.<br />
France depended on oil imports for 67% of its energy consumption, Italy<br />
for 74%, West Germany for 55%. 12<br />
Another effect of the hike in oil prices was that Western client states<br />
such as Iran and Saudi Arabia would acquire greater financial scope for<br />
large-scale technological and military purchases. The American presidential<br />
advisory body, the Council on International Economic Policy, anticipated<br />
that Saudi Arabia’s oil revenues would increase from 5 billion to<br />
20 billion dollars. In the mid-1970s the arms sales to Iran, Saudi Arabia<br />
and Israel amounted to more than 50% of all foreign American arms<br />
sales. Besides which, the State Department’s view of the oil price increases<br />
could only benefit American business life, since such a blow was mainly<br />
felt by America’s European and Japanese competitors, whose products<br />
would become more expensive. Washington’s stance, therefore, was initially<br />
not unsympathetic toward opec’s demands. 13<br />
However, the scenario did not unfold entirely as anticipated. The<br />
opec countries turned out to be unwilling to go along with gradual price<br />
increases, while mutual tensions between the consumer countries generated<br />
ever more problems, as became all too apparent at the time of the oil<br />
crisis. The oil market was becoming increasingly politicised. One of the<br />
first reasons for this was that the governments of the consumer countries,<br />
the parent countries, found themselves more and more embroiled in questions<br />
of oil. Against this background, and to an increasing extent, differences<br />
of viewpoint emerged between the consumer countries – and not<br />
least between the Europeans and the usa. The position of the European<br />
countries vis-à-vis the usa was even more problematic as they could not<br />
succeed in speaking with a single voice. In the years leading up to 1973<br />
44
there had been attempts within the ec to arrive at a common energy policy,<br />
but the clash of interests between member states had always stood in<br />
the way of such agreement.<br />
Oil was not the only problem aggravating relations between the usa<br />
and the European countries in this period. In fact, the oil problem cannot<br />
be seen in isolation from other politico-economic conflicts. In 1971, not<br />
only had America’s balance of payments been in deficit, but also the<br />
American balance of trade. Particularly in sectors like the motor industry,<br />
steel and electronics, European and Japanese producers had undermined<br />
the American position. Nixon’s reaction was to cancel the dollar’s convertibility<br />
to gold and to devalue the dollar, especially with a view to<br />
making exports more attractive. 14 This suggested that Washington was<br />
prepared to set off a trade war with Western Europe and Japan. Raising<br />
oil prices was a part of that trade war.<br />
The politicising of the oil market was also a consequence of the increasing<br />
self-awareness evident in the actions of the oil-producing countries<br />
who were determined to get a firmer grip on their national oil production.<br />
In the Western consumer countries, such greater participation<br />
evoked only alarm. This fear, however, was not enough to prevent an accord<br />
being signed between the major oil producers, such as Saudi Arabia<br />
and Kuwait, who wanted a step by step increase in the national share in<br />
the oil production up to a maximum of 51%. For the majors, in retrospect,<br />
the consequences of such nationalization subsequently turned out<br />
to exceed expectations at the time, for this did not affect their position in<br />
the processing and distribution sectors at all.<br />
In early 1972 the American State Department produced a secret report<br />
of some seventy pages on The Impending Oil Crisis, setting out the typical<br />
position in which the Western countries now found themselves, the<br />
usa in particular. The report assumed that around 1975, possibly earlier,<br />
the era of a permanent sellers’ market would have arrived, with any of the<br />
several major producers being able to create a supply crisis by cutting off<br />
oil supplies. It was also assumed in this report that America’s energy position<br />
would have weakened by around 1980 to the point where the usa<br />
would be forced to import more than 50% of its oil requirements. 15<br />
The consumer countries had survived the price increases carried<br />
through by opec in 1971, the report declared, as a result of mutual solidarity,<br />
but this success had been underestimated. In the view of the State<br />
Department, opec members must be convinced that long-term stability<br />
would avail them far more than complete chaos and short-term gains. It<br />
was recognized that the devaluation of the dollar had caused problems,<br />
45
ut these need not be insuperable. The problem of participation was<br />
much more difficult, however, because the differences on this point did<br />
seem to be irreconcilable. The danger of nationalization could only be<br />
prevented in the long term if a serious dialogue were initiated to discuss a<br />
new relationship between the majors and the governments of the oil-producing<br />
countries. In addition to which, according to the State Department<br />
report, the American government had to consider a possible reduction<br />
in the growth of oil consumption, an increase in domestic production<br />
and importing from safer sources. 16<br />
The question of price increases meanwhile dragged on. In June 1973, a<br />
new increase of 12% was agreed, but this was still not enough. Just before<br />
the war broke out, new negotiations were announced between opec<br />
and the major oil companies, negotiations which should have opened on<br />
October 8 in Vienna. The opec countries wanted a 100% increase in the<br />
price of oil. This was no longer a matter of gradual price increases. Shell<br />
and Exxon, wanting first to consult with Western governments over such<br />
drastic steps, insisted on postponing negotiations, since the kind of increases<br />
opec wanted would have far-reaching consequences for the<br />
economies of the West. The negotiators, George Piercy (Exxon) and Andre<br />
Bernard (Shell), therefore decided to insist to the Saudi Oil Minister<br />
Yamani that the negotiations be postponed for two weeks. 17<br />
On the eve of the October War, there were thus a number of unresolved<br />
differences within the international oil industry brewing, and concomitantly,<br />
the developing fear in the Western consumer countries that the ‘oil<br />
weapon’ would be used politically. This fear was mainly focused on the<br />
Arab opec countries who since 1968 had amalgamated in oapec. In the<br />
early 1970s, under the influence of the more radical members, oapec announced<br />
on several occasions that oil wealth would be used as a weapon<br />
against Western countries that supported Israel, warnings which were to<br />
be repeated before the outbreak of the October War. On May 15 1973,<br />
the day Israel celebrated its 25 years of existence, Iraq, Kuwait and Algeria<br />
turned off the oil tap for an hour, Libya for the entire day. Nor did the<br />
radical oil producers speak for themselves alone. In the summer, the top<br />
executives of Aramco (the daughter company of Chevron, Exxon, Texaco<br />
and Mobil) held a meeting in Geneva with King Feisal of Saudi Arabia at<br />
which the latter threatened that, if America did not change its pro-Israeli<br />
attitude, Aramco’s access to the Arabian oilfields would be withdrawn. 18<br />
A resolution passed in the Kuwaiti parliament in June 1973 in the clearest<br />
terms called for a freeze on oil production in the event that war should<br />
break out in the Middle East.<br />
46
Enough warnings had thus been sounded, and if that were not enough,<br />
the Libyan leader, Colonel Qaddafi, declared on July 10 on French tv<br />
that in future the Arabs would be able to use their oil as a political<br />
weapon against the usa and Western Europe. On September 4, too, at a<br />
meeting in Kuwait of the Foreign Ministers of the opec countries, the<br />
question of using the oil weapon was openly discussed. The claim made<br />
by Yergin, in his book The Prize, that the embargo came almost as a total<br />
surprise cannot therefore be taken seriously. 19 The use of the oil weapon<br />
most certainly did not come out of the blue. 20<br />
Turf War in The Hague<br />
During the years leading up to 1973, the possibility of restrictions on the<br />
oil supply had also preoccupied The Hague. The Dutch Ministries of Economic<br />
Affairs and Foreign Affairs in particular had been at work on this<br />
question: indeed, there had been a certain vying for recognition between<br />
these departments as to whose area of competence it was. Economic Affairs<br />
was responsible for foreign economic relations, which was taken to<br />
include the question of oil supplies. Yet to the extent that this question of<br />
oil supply was being raised increasingly often in such international organizations<br />
as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development<br />
(oecd), and the more the political nature of the whole oil question<br />
was foregrounded, the more the Foreign Ministry became involved. During<br />
the period of the Biesheuvel Cabinet (1971-1973), this led to friction<br />
between the ministers concerned, H. Langman, Minister of Economic<br />
Affairs, and W.K.N. Schmelzer, the Foreign Minister.<br />
At the Dutch Foreign Ministry, the oil problem was especially the concern<br />
of the Department for Economic Cooperation (des). The central<br />
role of des stemmed from the increasing importance of the oecd and the<br />
ec in matters of oil. In January 1971 it was decided to appoint the des as<br />
co-ordinating organ within the Foreign Ministry where matters of oil<br />
supply were concerned. Plans for emergency allocation had been debated<br />
within oecd for some years. At the beginning of 1970, prompted by the<br />
Americans, the oecd again began to pay more attention to the security<br />
aspect of the oil supply. Washington’s basic position was that within a<br />
few years the West European countries could no longer expect to be able<br />
to call on American oil reserves. In addition, the demand for crude oil on<br />
the world market was now in excess of supply. The us therefore wanted<br />
the oecd to discuss measures for reducing dependence on Arab oil and, if<br />
47
necessary, together to prepare steps in the event of a reduction in the supply<br />
of oil. 21<br />
The oecd could not agree on the issue of an allocation system in crisis<br />
situations. There was no problem in reaching accord on the need for laying<br />
in emergency supplies, but the oecd was not in a position to force<br />
member states to act on this. The ec or the European Commission were<br />
however, and although it had not been possible within the ec to agree on<br />
a common energy policy, the European Commission issued a directive<br />
that all member states were required to lay in emergency supplies: for 65<br />
days with effect from January 1, 1971, and for 90 days with effect from<br />
January 1, 1974.<br />
The change of government in 1971 brought no change in the sharing of<br />
responsibilities between the Ministries for Economic Affairs and Foreign<br />
Affairs, although Minister Langman suspected his colleague Schmelzer<br />
of wanting to take over the primary responsibility for the oil issue: not<br />
without justification, it seemed. There was indeed a level of unrest within<br />
the Foreign Ministry over the dominant role played by Economic Affairs<br />
in the matter of oil supplies. On January 4, 1972, Schmelzer informed<br />
Langman that he considered himself responsible for oil politics in the international<br />
context; but this proposal led to no revision of the division of<br />
competencies between the two ministries. Schmelzer then proposed letting<br />
the question rest. des subsequently tried to come to some arrangement<br />
with Economic Affairs separately over a ruling at the executive, but<br />
this offer was also declined by Economic Affairs. 22<br />
True to its traditions, The Netherlands had adopted a liberal attitude<br />
toward the international oil market and had spoken out against market<br />
regulations and state intervention. In 1971, the government had taken a<br />
reserved position in the consultations in Washington between the parent<br />
companies and the major oil companies. A report drafted in 1971 on the<br />
vulnerability of Western crude oil supplies reiterated this assessment. Intervention<br />
by the state would involve untold risks, not least because the<br />
opec countries would then be inclined to raise political issues. The majors<br />
would be in a better position to deal with opec than national governments,<br />
who were not only far more divided among themselves but also<br />
susceptible to the influence of domestic political interests. 23<br />
Yet the tenability of even this rather conservative standpoint was<br />
doubted. In 1972 the Head of des concluded that it was inevitable that<br />
governments would be drawn into the problems of international oil, and<br />
that the government therefore had to develop a clear international energy<br />
policy. Whether within or outside the frame of the ec, the question that<br />
48
had to be investigated was whether improved relations with the oil countries<br />
would promote the secure future provision of oil. 24<br />
In the spring of 1973, the policy unit (plan) of the Foreign Ministry<br />
was asked to draw up a memorandum on this question. Subsequently and<br />
after extensive preliminary discussions, a couple of papers were submitted<br />
by H.Ch. Posthumus Meyes, advisor to the plan Policy Unit, to Foreign<br />
Minister Van der Stoel in May 1973: The oil crisis and Dutch foreign<br />
policy and The use of the oil weapon for political purposes. 25 In these papers,<br />
Posthumus Meyes reached the conclusion that, where oil supplies<br />
were concerned, the ‘careless period’ of the past was over. Oil would become<br />
an increasingly important subject of government interference.<br />
Complete abstention by the state was no longer tenable, though governments<br />
should not assume the role of the oil companies at the negotiation<br />
table. More active involvement on the part of the consumer countries<br />
would also involve risks, such as rivalries in the ‘scramble for oil’ and the<br />
use of oil as a tool for applying political pressure. Care should also be taken<br />
to avoid a buyers’ cartel being set up that might lead to a dangerous<br />
confrontation with the producer countries. Consultation between consumer<br />
countries should, among other things, look at controlling competition,<br />
promoting the diversification of supply and energy, emergency provisions<br />
and activities to channel the enormous financial resources of the<br />
producer countries advantageously. Although The Netherlands, according<br />
to Posthumus Meyes, was well situated, given its North Sea natural<br />
gas fields, its major oil industry and the position of Rotterdam, it was<br />
nevertheless too weak to pursue an independent course in matters of oil.<br />
In The use of the oil weapon for political purposes, Posthumus Meyes<br />
particularly pointed out the possibility of oil being deployed as a weapon<br />
in any Middle Eastern conflict. During such a conflict, the threat to the oil<br />
supply could be exerted to force the West to take a different attitude toward<br />
Israel. There was also the possibility that dependence on Arab oil<br />
might be exploited to incite Western countries into military support<br />
against the Arab countries. In any such situation, the memorandum proposed,<br />
‘the Netherlands would also be involved’. The role of the usa in<br />
the Middle East was still dominant. The question that arose was whether<br />
Western Europe should not take its own, independent line, such as up to<br />
that point had not been possible. It was a better idea to lend support to<br />
‘any American turn toward a rather more balanced treatment of the Middle<br />
East question.’ 26<br />
plan’s memoranda were sent to various Ambassadors with the request<br />
for feedback, provoking a reassuring response from several quar-<br />
49
ters. W.J.G. Gevers, the Ambasssador in London, opined that in the short<br />
term there seemed to be no major problem likely to arise, and that in any<br />
case the Western countries, including The Netherlands, held stocks sufficient<br />
for ninety days. H.N. Boon in Rome likewise thought an embargo<br />
unlikely, although restrictions on production should not be ruled out. 27<br />
From Washington, D.W. van Lynden reported that the State Department,<br />
albeit in the view of Under-Secretary Kenneth Rush, considered the political<br />
use of Arab oil unlikely, particularly in view of the divisions extant in<br />
the Arab world. 28<br />
However, The Netherlands’ Permanent Representative (pr) at the<br />
oecd, J. Kaufmann, found that the plan memorandum was too reserved<br />
in its appraisal of international cooperation, and its proposals for future<br />
possible influence by The Hague too modest and self-effacing. Because of<br />
the oil companies established in The Netherlands and other sectors of<br />
business life contributing significantly to the know-how and the provision<br />
of materials for oilexploitation, he thought The Hague should have an<br />
important voice in consultations among consumer countries. 29 Ambassadors<br />
in some of the Arab countries were also asking for a more active<br />
role. Cultivating extra goodwill in these countries was a real possibility.<br />
Saudi Arabia, for example, was attempting to broaden its economic base,<br />
and Saudis therefore were highly interested in joint ventures with foreign<br />
contractors. 30<br />
Nor was it only in the Dutch Foreign Ministry that serious thought<br />
was being given to the possibility of restrictions on the oil supply. After<br />
an extensive exchange of ideas, a crisis scenario was drafted in the Ministry<br />
for Economic Affairs. Distribution plans were laid, although these<br />
were to play no further role in the weeks ahead. 31 In various places, thus,<br />
the possibility of a restriction on oil imports was being given serious attention.<br />
And yet, in the spring of 1973, The Hague appears to have been<br />
totally unaware of one acute danger, let alone the fact that Arab measures<br />
directed specifically against The Netherlands were at that very moment<br />
being considered.<br />
The First Signs<br />
Shortly before the outbreak of the October War, as we have already indicated,<br />
disturbing signals were received. Rumours concerning Arab oil<br />
measures were already circulating by early September. In addition, Libya<br />
had decided to press ahead with its nationalization of 51% of all foreign<br />
50
oil interests. One of the places where this was discussed was the ec, in the<br />
epc Middle Eastern working group as early as September 3. This discussion<br />
revealed differences of judgement and a remarkable divergence of<br />
viewpoints. On the one hand, Italy and France, countries with large state<br />
oil companies, thought that oil would play a political role within a very<br />
short time and that the ec would have to adjust to this. The traditionally<br />
liberal parent countries of Shell and bp, Great Britain and The Netherlands,<br />
however, did not share this point of view.<br />
During the first week of the war, it appeared that the threat of an embargo<br />
would not materialize despite an appeal for such a measure from<br />
the plo leadership. Lubbers and Van der Stoel confirmed in the Dutch<br />
Council of Ministers of October 12 that so far no political oil measures<br />
had been implemented, though the possibility remained. Even the radical<br />
Libyans were delivering normally. According to Lubbers, the central<br />
question determining the way the opec countries behaved was still the<br />
question of prices. After all, far-reaching demands from the Arab countries<br />
remained on the table at the Vienna negotiations which, in the meantime,<br />
had been interrupted by the war. 32<br />
As the war entered its second week, accusations began to be heard<br />
from the Arab capitals concerning Dutch political and military support<br />
for Israel. Syria in particular accused The Hague of military activities on<br />
Israel’s behalf. Further, on October 16, the Arab opec countries met in<br />
Kuwait where they were to take a series of drastic measures whose consequences,<br />
it was announced, would cost countries that supported Israel<br />
dearly. It was this announcement that triggered a much-needed sense of<br />
urgency in The Hague. This appeared to be for real.<br />
Van der Stoel himself was also now confronted with the Arab accusations.<br />
On October 17, at their request, the Minister received the Ambassadors<br />
of Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia together with the Egyptian temporary<br />
chargé d’affaires, who claimed to speak for the other Arab countries<br />
recognized by The Netherlands. At this meeting, the four diplomats<br />
appealed to the ec countries for some contribution to the resolution of the<br />
Middle Eastern conflict. In response to their plea, Van der Stoel put the<br />
case that the Nine could do little more than call on the warring parties to<br />
cease hostilities in accordance with the ec declaration of October 13.<br />
Concluding this conversation, according to the Dutch Foreign Ministry<br />
record, he informed them that<br />
51
he was not favourably impressed by exaggerated official reactions from<br />
Arab capitals to various rumours of volunteers being recruited and<br />
transported together with armaments from The Netherlands.<br />
He requested that the four Ambassadors should again advise their governments<br />
of the baselessness of these reports. 33<br />
In retrospect, with the insight provided by the Foreign Intelligence Service<br />
(idb), it would appear that, after their conversation with Van der<br />
Stoel, the Ambassadors suggested to their governments that The Netherlands<br />
should be warned against proceeding with political and military<br />
support for Israel; and that if the reaction to such a warning were negative,<br />
The Netherlands, like the usa, should receive no more oil. All Arab<br />
countries should be urged to condemn the clearly hostile attitude of The<br />
Hague. The Arab countries should furthermore blacklist all Dutch firms<br />
and threaten klm – as well as other airlines – with reprisals if they continued<br />
to ferry mercenaries and arms to Israel. 34 These reports were to reach<br />
The Hague only later. For the time being, it was not clear what concrete<br />
sanctions the Arab side could impose. If it should come to that, according<br />
to Lubbers speaking in the Second Chamber on October 18, then the consequences<br />
of such sanctions would have to be taken care of through joint<br />
action in common with the ec. 35 A few weeks, however, would be sufficient<br />
to make this judgement appear naively optimistic.<br />
The Oil Weapon Brought to Bear<br />
The situation was gradually beginning to bite deeper. A number of important<br />
decisions were taken at the conference of the oapec held in<br />
Kuwait from October 16 until October 21. To begin with, in the first<br />
place by the six Gulf States, it was decided on 16 October to raise the<br />
price of crude oil unilaterally by 70%, thus by-passing the Vienna negotiations<br />
suspended on October 9. The oil companies would have to pay<br />
henceforth not $1.80 but $3.06 a barrel in taxes and royalties. In the second<br />
place, it was agreed to use the Western dependence on oil as a political<br />
weapon in the war with Israel. Saudi Oil Minister Yamani informed<br />
the oil companies on October 16 that his country would be cutting oil<br />
production by 10% if the us continued to replenish Israeli military losses.<br />
The following day, the eleven oapec countries decided to reduce oil<br />
production by 5% each month until Israel had withdrawn from all the occupied<br />
territories and had recognized the rights of the Palestinians. At the<br />
52
same time it was announced that those consumer countries that supported<br />
Israel would have to bear the consequences of these measures while<br />
those consumer countries that supported the Arab cause would be exempted<br />
from production restrictions. 36 As Yamani later commented, the<br />
Arabs thus finally showed themselves ‘to be the masters of their own<br />
oil’. 37<br />
The American response to the Saudi threat was crystal clear. On October<br />
19 Nixon requested congressional approval for 2.2 billion dollars in<br />
emergency aid for Israel. The Arab world reacted immediately: on the<br />
very same day Libya announced an oil embargo against the usa in response<br />
to arms deliveries to Israel. The following day Saudi Arabia followed<br />
suit, and on October 21 Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrein and Dubai joined<br />
them. 38 Panic ensued in the usa, for the embargo meant that some 3.5<br />
million barrels a day would be lost. A Federal Energy Office (feo) was set<br />
up with broad powers to compel reductions in the use of oil. 39<br />
In the Dutch Council of Ministers of October 19, the situation in the<br />
Middle East was again raised for comprehensive discussion. Meanwhile,<br />
the military situation in the region had drastically altered. According to<br />
Van der Stoel, the Israeli position had radically improved, particularly on<br />
the Egyptian front. The Syrian army had not yet been defeated, but there<br />
was now little chance of any new offensive against Israel. All in all, Israel<br />
appeared no longer to be in acute danger. Indeed, the territory now under<br />
Israeli control had expanded considerably compared with the old lines of<br />
demarcation.<br />
Meanwhile, it had become clear that The Netherlands was likely to<br />
suffer the Arab sanctions. Van der Stoel recognized that relations with the<br />
Arab countries had been ‘somewhat strained’ following the Syrian accusation<br />
that The Netherlands had sent volunteer fighters to Israel. On various<br />
occasions he had protested about this, as in his meeting with the four<br />
Arab Ambassadors, but had evidently made no impression. 40<br />
Two days later, on October 21, the Arab League’s Bureau for the boycott<br />
of Israel called on its members to implement punitive measures, to<br />
boycott Dutch firms and to cut off the oil lines to Rotterdam. This request,<br />
an official of the Bureau informed the world, was in response to the<br />
wholly pro-Israeli line taken by The Hague. 41 October 21 was a black day<br />
for The Netherlands. Iraq nationalized the Shell share of an Iraqi oil company,<br />
and Syria called for a general boycott of The Netherlands and<br />
specifically of klm. The same day, Jordan declared itself ready to boycott<br />
klm.<br />
But that was not all. Algeria implemented the boycott of the Arab<br />
53
League’s Boycott Bureau the very same day. In a conversation with the<br />
head of the Western Europe and North American Bureau, Ambassador<br />
G.W. Bentinck in Algiers was given eight reasons why it been decided to<br />
impose a boycott. The first reason was the government’s pro-Israeli declaration<br />
immediately after the outbreak of the war. The second was the pro-<br />
Israeli stance taken by Van der Stoel in his meeting with the four Arab<br />
Ambassadors. Thirdly, The Netherlands had adopted a pro-Israeli posture<br />
in the un and in other international bodies. Fourthly, the government<br />
had supported Israel within the ec; and furthermore, the government<br />
had approved the recruiting of volunteers and had offered the transport<br />
facilities of klm.<br />
It also struck Bentinck that his opposite partner in this conversation<br />
was remarkably well-informed of the deliberations of the Comité Politique<br />
that preceded the epc meeting in Copenhagen. One of the ec’s<br />
member states, probably France or Italy, had evidently allowed the content<br />
of these discussions to leak. The last three Algerian arguments were<br />
not directly connected to the war, but served rather to demonstrate that<br />
The Hague had generally adopted a pro-Israeli or pro-Jewish stance. For<br />
example, the Dutch Foreign Ministry had summoned the Austrian Ambassador<br />
to protest against the announced closure of a refugee camp for<br />
Jewish emigrants from the Soviet Union. And finally, Den Uyl had openly<br />
declared that he suffered sleepless nights thinking about the Jewish victims<br />
of the Second World War. The embargo, Bentinck was told, would<br />
be swiftly followed by other Arab countries, but otherwise it was hoped<br />
that Dutch exports to Algeria would not suffer as a consequence. A few<br />
days later these arguments were reiterated in a letter from the Algerian<br />
President Boumedienne to Den Uyl. 42<br />
The Algerian move was a serious threat because it could possibly be<br />
followed by similar measures from other Arab opec countries. On October<br />
21 Kruimink, the Co-ordinator of Intelligence and Security Services,<br />
informed Den Uyl and Van der Stoel that following their audience with<br />
Van der Stoel, the Arab Ambassadors in The Hague, as we have already<br />
seen, had advised their governments to impose an embargo if the Dutch<br />
Cabinet continued its anti-Arab policy and its military support for Israel.<br />
It would seem that the Arab diplomatic codes had been cracked. 43 A day<br />
later, Kruimink further warned Van der Stoel that it was learned ‘from a<br />
reliable source’ that the Algerians were actively prevailing on other Arab<br />
countries to follow their example. It appeared that Kuwait had already<br />
decided to follow suit, thought Kruimink, and the next day confirmed his<br />
impression. 44<br />
54
A day after the Algerian decision, the Dutch Ambassador reported<br />
from Damascus that Syria had also decided to follow Algeria. A junior<br />
minister had informed him that there had been a meeting of Arab Ambassadors<br />
in Brussels at which it had been decided to advise their respective<br />
governments to declare a total boycott of Dutch interests. The embargo<br />
should be put into operation, since it was apparent that The Hague had<br />
not modified its attitude, deemed so prejudicial to the Arab world. 45<br />
Nationalization in Iraq<br />
In spite of this development, the Arab opec countries proved incapable of<br />
any unity of resolve. For different reasons, Iraq and Iran did not join the<br />
embargo. 46 At the oapec conference in Kuwait, Iraq had adopted a hard<br />
line: complete liquidation of American assets in the Arab world, withdrawal<br />
of all Arab deposits from the usa and a general hardening of the<br />
political attitude toward Washington. 47 Subsequently, Saddam Hussein<br />
would explain that although the embargo against the usa and The<br />
Netherlands was just, it was far too weak a measure. Restricting production<br />
only succeeded in damaging Arab business. The oil weapon had to be<br />
aimed effectively against Washington and crucial American interests.<br />
Iraq announced on October 21 that the Dutch share – i.e. the Shell<br />
share – in the Iraqi Basrah Petroleum Company was to be confiscated and<br />
nationalized, or rather the Dutch part (60%) of Shell’s participation. Two<br />
weeks earlier, on October 7, immediately after the outbreak of the war,<br />
Iraq had nationalized the interests of the American companies Exxon and<br />
Mobil Oil in Basrah Petroleum Company as a first step in an ‘oil battle<br />
against Israel and its supporters’. 48<br />
Explaining the decision taken against Shell, reference was made to the<br />
‘aggressive attitude toward the Arab nation’ and ‘support for our enemy’.<br />
A statement from the Iraqi press agency laid a whole series of accusations<br />
at The Hague’s door, the grievances already known. In particular, Dutch<br />
territory was being used as a bridgehead for assistance to Israel. 49 Although<br />
the Iraqi grievances were essentially political, Shell initially set<br />
no great store by any Dutch governmental move, preferring to take independent<br />
action against the nationalization decision themselves. Nevertheless,<br />
it became clear to one of Shell’s top men several days later that it<br />
would be exceptionally difficult to get the nationalization revoked. His<br />
Iraqi counterparts at negotiations were extremely negative over the hostile<br />
Dutch position, leaving the Shell representative to conclude that per-<br />
55
haps diplomatic steps might procure compensation for the nationalization.<br />
50<br />
Nonetheless, for several days there was uncertainty in The Hague over<br />
the Iraqi moves. On October 22 a spokesman let it be known that news of<br />
the nationalization had only reached The Hague via the news media. In<br />
spite of the lack of information, the Dutch government regretted the<br />
measure: ‘The Netherlands observes friendly relations with Iraq and<br />
moreover values their continuation.’ The Cabinet hoped that all misunderstandings<br />
could be cleared up, a vain hope as soon became apparent:<br />
the situation in Iraq remained alarming. It was reported from Baghdad<br />
that a boycott of klm was in the wind. 51<br />
When a Shell delegation held new discussions in Baghdad the following<br />
week, it was once more concluded that the nationalization had been a<br />
political decision. This was evident not least from the fact that the Oil<br />
Minister Saadun Hamadi was not fully informed of what was happening.<br />
During these discussions, a hard line was taken by the Iraqi side, who<br />
again referred to the hostile attitude of The Hague. As one Shell director<br />
confided, it appeared highly improbable that the decision would be revoked<br />
in the foreseeable future. On the question of compensation, too,<br />
the Iraqi attitude was far from compliant.<br />
Van der Stoel, on the other hand, was of the opinion that the political<br />
justification for the nationalization ‘should be taken with a pinch of<br />
salt’. 52 This was an understandable view, since the nationalization in Iraq<br />
was part and parcel of a whole series of comparable measures, both in<br />
Iraq and elsewhere in the Arab world. Van der Stoel thought the Dutch attitude<br />
to the October War was more likely a convenient stick to beat them<br />
with, and that this was also the case with the embargo. Shell, however,<br />
maintained the view that in Iraq it was a matter of political action, a reaction<br />
to The Hague’s Middle East policy. A member of the Shell delegation<br />
that had negotiated to no avail in Baghdad was pessimistic on his return<br />
to London, telling Ambassador Gevers that the embargo looked like being<br />
a long business. It was important to keep talking to the Arabs, but he<br />
saw the situation worsening rather than taking a turn for the better. 53<br />
A New Government Statement<br />
It was now a matter of priority to try to prevent the embargo spreading<br />
further and to head off other anti-Dutch measures. The Saudi position<br />
was most important because around one-third of Dutch oil imports came<br />
56
from Saudi Arabia. On October 22 , Director-General of Political Affairs<br />
of the Dutch Foreign Ministry, Van Lynden, had a meeting with the Saudi<br />
Ambassador, Rashad Nowilaty, at which hope was expressed on the<br />
Dutch side that King Feisal would not join an embargo. Van Lynden<br />
sought to clear up the many ‘misunderstandings’ between the two parties<br />
and in fact was partly successful. Nowilaty promised that his country<br />
would continue to supply would-be customers as long as this incurred no<br />
principles that might damage Saudi Arabia. He promised to inform King<br />
Feisal of the various currents at play in The Netherlands and also to relay<br />
expressions of sympathy for the Arab cause. Van Lynden afterwards concluded<br />
that it had been a good meeting. He had the impression that the<br />
Saudis were in no hurry to join the embargo, though the pressure exerted<br />
on them to do so should not be underestimated. 54<br />
With regard to the Algerian embargo, it was decided by Van der Stoel<br />
to make no formal protest but to react, as it was termed, ‘with dignity and<br />
moderation’. Ambassador Bentinck was instructed to respond with a demarche,<br />
to the effect that The Hague regretted the Algerian decision, all<br />
the more that it was based on incorrect information. The Jewish people<br />
and Israel perhaps enjoyed much sympathy in our country, but the government’s<br />
policy with regard to the Middle East was ‘balanced’ as was<br />
evident from its stated view that a cease-fire must be acceptable ‘to both<br />
parties’. 55 These instructions were also sent to various diplomatic posts<br />
in the other Arab countries that they might approach the governments on<br />
the spot in the appropriate way. The Algerian temporary chargé d’affaires<br />
was summoned to Foreign Affairs to draw his attention once again to The<br />
Hague’s point of view.<br />
For all these efforts, however, The Netherlands was about to find itself<br />
in serious difficulties. The situation called for close contact with the major<br />
oil companies. On October 22, Van der Spoel spoke with the chief executive<br />
of the Royal Dutch Shell Group, G.A. Wagner, who had requested<br />
the meeting mainly as a result of the nationalization of the Shell interests<br />
in Iraq. 56 Although F. Grünfeld, a Dutch expert on the Middle East,<br />
claims that Shell did not try to exert any influence on foreign policy 57 , according<br />
to the Dutch Foreign Ministry report of that meeting, Wagner did<br />
make substantial allusions to government policy. Wagner emphasized<br />
that Shell kept itself out of Middle Eastern politics, even though the sympathies<br />
of the board lay with Israel. It seemed undesirable to Shell’s president<br />
that his country should be too much identified with the usa by the<br />
Arab countries. Because Shell particularly feared that the nationalization<br />
in Iraq would be emulated by other Gulf States such as Abu Dhabi, Qatar<br />
57
and Oman, Wagner said he would be grateful to the Cabinet if, wherever<br />
possible, the emphasis could be laid on the ‘even-handedness’ of its Middle<br />
Eastern policy.<br />
Van der Stoel, according to his own testimony, was doing everything<br />
he could to refute the rumours of support given to Israel, but so far this effort<br />
had met with little success. He promised to summon the Iraqi Ambassador.<br />
Wagner appeared not entirely reassured and suggested making a<br />
statement expressing commiseration with the fate of the Palestinian<br />
refugees in order to strike a more suitable chord with the Arab world. Van<br />
der Stoel, however, did not comply with this suggestion. Finally, Wagner<br />
expressed his concerns over the consequences of the price rises, particularly<br />
for the developing countries, arguing that consultations must be initiated<br />
as a matter of some urgency. According to the Minister, this should<br />
be handled within the framework of the oecd. 58<br />
Meanwhile, a new governmental statement was being prepared, duly<br />
released on October 23, which spoke of the ‘misunderstandings’ that had<br />
arisen concerning the Dutch position with regard to the Middle East conflict.<br />
A solution would have to include all elements of resolution 242. The<br />
statement cited the recently presented explanatory memorandum on the<br />
Dutch Foreign Ministry budget, in which it was asserted that Israel<br />
would have to withdraw behind ‘secure boundaries to be agreed, to a territory<br />
approximately of the same area as her territory before the Six Day<br />
War.’ In addition to which a peace settlement would have to be based on<br />
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states in the region. Furthermore,<br />
a solution would have to be found for the refugees. 59 This contained<br />
little that was new. Nonetheless, the Shell board expressed their<br />
thanks for the new government statement, while Shell’s Arabists began<br />
preparing a translation. 60 This statement, which was sent out on October<br />
26 by the Dutch Foreign Ministry to Ambassadors in the Arab countries,<br />
was an example of effective collaboration between the Ministry and<br />
Shell.<br />
The Embargo Spreads<br />
Despite all diplomatic activities, the embargo spread, with Kuwait following<br />
the Algerian example on October 23. In explanation, the Dutch<br />
temporary chargé d’affaires in Kuwait, D.M. Schorer, was referred to his<br />
government’s pro-Israeli attitude, and in particular to the presence of<br />
Vredeling at a pro-Israeli demonstration. Schorer reported that Oil Min-<br />
58
ister Abdel Rahman al-Atiki had said that the damage could only be repaired<br />
if The Hague broke off diplomatic relations with Israel. This, according<br />
to Schorer, was also representative of Kuwaiti public opinion. 61<br />
Following Kuwait there came embargo announcements from Abu Dhabi<br />
and Qatar, and finally from Oman, while from another quarter came rumours<br />
that Libya was also about to join the embargo; and indeed, on October<br />
30 this happened.<br />
At this stage, the Dutch Foreign Ministry was under the impression<br />
that Algeria was playing a major role in spreading the embargo. Attempts<br />
to mollify Algiers came to nothing. On October 24 Bentinck offered the<br />
new government statement to the Algerian Director-General for Political<br />
Affairs, who promptly blamed The Netherlands for their<br />
evidently constant support for Israel …. without ever compensating for<br />
this attitude with the least appearance of understanding or support for<br />
the Arab or Palestinian cause.<br />
The Director-General later declared that relations could only be repaired<br />
if The Hague adopted the same point of view as its ec partners. 62 The Algerian<br />
Ambassador, Messaoud Aít Chalaal, later explained that The<br />
Hague’s attitude in nato had aroused the Algerians’ ire. Of all the nato<br />
countries, only The Netherlands had unreservedly agreed to allow overflights<br />
of American transport planes to Israel. 63<br />
On October 31 a letter signed by Den Uyl was delivered to the Algerian<br />
President Boumedienne – his reaction to the missive which had announced<br />
the embargo. Den Uyl wrote that he shared the Algerians’ concern<br />
over the conflict in the Middle East. On the outbreak of the war, the<br />
Dutch Premier emphasized, The Hague had urged an immediate end to<br />
hostilities. He went on to underline the fact that The Netherlands had always<br />
pressed for a peaceful resolution of the conflicts in the Middle East<br />
on the basis of resolution 242. 64 But this letter too was for the time being<br />
of no help.<br />
Although the embargo was spreading, there had been from the outset<br />
no united Arab front. This was evident, for instance, from the fact that<br />
various Arab countries had only joined after several days. There were<br />
other Arab countries which did not join at all, such as Iraq. Iran also remained<br />
aloof, though from a much more moderate standpoint than Iraq.<br />
The Dutch Ambassador in Tehran reported that the Shah was trying to<br />
take a softer line, declaring that it was unfair of Saudi Arabia to punish<br />
Europe for the American position. 65 59
In Cairo, Dutch Ambassador F. Von Oven reported that the Egyptian<br />
government was also unwilling to take part in the embargo, certainly as<br />
long as there was discord between the Arab nations. Egypt was a modest<br />
oil exporter, which might account for the Egyptians’ reluctance. In any<br />
case, Cairo considered the embargo an overly hasty action. 66 Later,<br />
Egypt’s temporary chargé d’affaires in The Hague, Mohammed Said El<br />
Sayed, explained that Van der Stoel’s meeting with the four Arab Ambassadors<br />
had not been the cause or the main reason for imposing the embargo.<br />
He had found the exchange reasonable and constructive. 67 This<br />
judgement would have confirmed Van der Stoel in his conviction that the<br />
embargo was not essentially a reaction to his policy, but had in all probability<br />
been in preparation for some time.<br />
As the biggest oil producer, Saudi Arabia was of course more important<br />
than Egypt. At this stage, Saudi Arabia also declined to join the embargo,<br />
though very soon reports came of steps in this direction. On October<br />
24 the Dutch First Secretary at the Embassy in Jeddah reported that<br />
an embargo decision had ‘already been prepared’. It was still possible, he<br />
learned, to turn the tide in Saudi Arabia through some positive deed – for<br />
instance if The Hague were to declare that it believed ‘that resolution 242<br />
should now be implemented without further delay’. 68<br />
Two days later the possibility for such a ‘positive deed’ seemed to present<br />
itself when Saudi Arabia gave The Hague an ultimatum, delivered by<br />
Ambassador Nowilaty on October 26 to the Dutch Director-General for<br />
Political Affairs, Van Lynden. The ultimatum contained three demands<br />
that must be satisfied if implementation of the embargo were to be averted.<br />
Firstly, the Dutch Cabinet must condemn the Israeli aggression. Secondly,<br />
it must demand Israel’s withdrawal from the occupied territories 69<br />
and thirdly, the Palestinians’ right to self-determination must be recognized.<br />
70<br />
The Dutch Council of Ministers met the same day to discuss the ultimatum.<br />
Meanwhile, it was learned that Saudi Arabia was classifying consumer<br />
countries according to three categories: friendly, neutral and hostile<br />
states, with The Netherlands in danger of finding itself ranked as a<br />
hostile state. Van der Stoel concluded that there was no point in yielding<br />
to the ultimatum. In his view, The Hague was being used as a scapegoat,<br />
mainly, he suspected, to strike at The Netherlands’ transit and refining capacity<br />
and, as result, to put pressure on the whole of Europe, although of<br />
course this was not to deny that there was considerable sympathy for Israel<br />
among the Dutch population.<br />
During this ministerial council, though in a circumspect manner, a dif-<br />
60
ference of opinion became public between Lubbers and Van der Stoel.<br />
Lubbers expressed his great concern over the situation that had arisen.<br />
There was now a danger that the oil stream might shift from Rotterdam<br />
to other countries. He believed that some Arab countries saw Washington<br />
and The Hague as too much on the same wavelength. He thought it was<br />
probably France that had depicted the Dutch position in the ec as bluntly<br />
pro-Israeli, but he was also of the view that the Cabinet itself was partly<br />
responsible for this image. He advocated that the main determining principle<br />
in the current situation should ‘not be the aggression of the Arab<br />
states’ but rather ‘the resolution of the conflict on the basis of resolution<br />
242’.<br />
Van der Stoel replied that his policy was aimed at removing misunderstandings.<br />
During the General Debate in the Second Chamber, support<br />
for Israel may have been adopted as a clear principle, but that had been<br />
with an eye to public opinion. Dutch policy continued to be based, as before,<br />
on the implementation of resolution 242 as the condition for any<br />
Middle East solution. According to Van der Stoel the government must<br />
demonstrate publicly that there was no panic. He was not pessimistic. An<br />
attempt to provide a counterweight to the growing criticism of the radical<br />
Arab countries had to be essayed, particularly through Saudi Arabia and<br />
Egypt.<br />
Lubbers replied that, given the way the Saudi position had been formulated,<br />
there was apparently room for talking, and he warned against reacting<br />
too negatively to the ultimatum. Van der Stoel agreed, but at the<br />
same time felt that it had to be made clear that the Dutch Cabinet could<br />
not be blackmailed. In any case, in conversation Ambassador Nowilaty<br />
could be referred to the declaration of October 23, which stated that Israel<br />
must withdraw to roughly the same territory as before the 1967<br />
war. 71 In the end the Cabinet decided not to comply with the ultimatum.<br />
Van der Stoel would ask Nowilaty to call on him, declare his failure to understand<br />
the content of the ultimatum, and would point out that the government<br />
also failed to understand why The Netherlands was being treated<br />
differently from other ec countries. On October 27 Nowilaty was<br />
summoned to an audience with Van der Stoel at which he was handed a<br />
brief statement referring once again to the government statement of October<br />
23. In the Dutch view, there were a number of misunderstandings,<br />
and therefore the Cabinet sought further diplomatic consultations. 72<br />
There followed several confused days during which it quickly became<br />
apparent that this response was inadequate. According to some reports,<br />
the Dutch reaction immediately provoked Saudi Arabia to join the embar-<br />
61
go, though other reports seemed to point the other way. The Dutch Ambassador<br />
in Jeddah, in a telephone conversation with a journalist from the<br />
Algemeen Dagblad on October 31, stated that in his view Saudi Arabia<br />
had not called an embargo, a judgement which the paper published the<br />
same day. 73 The Dutch Foreign Ministry was not at all happy with this<br />
statement and promptly instructed the Ambassador to make no further<br />
public pronouncements over the embargo, since these could very well<br />
prompt the Saudi government to actually join the embargo demanded by<br />
the Arab League. 74<br />
In The Hague, meanwhile, efforts were made to maintain friendly relationswiththe<br />
so far apparently moderate countries, Tunisia and Iran. To<br />
this end, Van Lynden met with the Ambassadors concerned, trying yet<br />
again to remove the ‘misunderstandings’ that had arisen. He further put it<br />
to the Iranian Ambassador that the embargo was in conflict with the conditions<br />
of gatt, and observed that his government in its reaction had for<br />
the present taken a dignified and moderate attitude. Given the position of<br />
Rotterdam, imposing the embargo meant striking at the whole ec. Van<br />
Lynden emphasized his appreciation of the position taken by Iran, which<br />
was continuing to supply oil and was not using it as a political weapon.<br />
Van Lynden expressed himself similarly on October 30 to the Tunisian<br />
Ambassador, who let it be known that his country indeed took a moderate<br />
position, but out of solidarity had to conform with the other Arab<br />
states. At that moment, Tunisia was not able to oppose the voice of the Algerians.<br />
In his view, the Arabs had been most incensed by the Dutch government’s<br />
statement of October 9, which spoke of withdrawing behind<br />
the truce lines existing before the October War. These were, after all, not<br />
recognized state boundaries but demarcation lines resulting from the illegal,<br />
six-year Israeli occupation of Arab territory. 75<br />
On November 2, the move that had been feared was finally taken: Saudi<br />
Arabia definitively joined the embargo. There had been uncertainty<br />
over Saudi intentions for several days. Kissinger later maintained that<br />
Saudi Arabia had not really themselves taken a decision over the embargo<br />
but ‘may have felt their hand tipped by published reports that the sag (the<br />
Saudi Arabian government) had or was about to take such a decision’. 76<br />
This view corresponds with Van der Stoel’s own understanding that it<br />
was public speculation over the institution of a Saudi embargo that had<br />
contributed to its actual implementation.<br />
In reaction to these developments, Van der Stoel instructed diplomatic<br />
representatives to refrain from asking for further clarification in future,<br />
either over the oil embargo or any other measures taken against their<br />
62
country. The attitude of The Hague was to be one of ‘dignity with moderation’.<br />
The impression must at all costs be avoided that there was any confusion<br />
or panic. Low key, low profile were to be the watchwords for the<br />
way The Hague would conduct itself, while all would be done to ensure<br />
business as usual. The developments in Saudi Arabia demonstrated, according<br />
to Van der Stoel, that public pronouncements over the embargo<br />
of Dutch and American business had done no one any good. 77 The Dutch<br />
government and Foreign Ministry did not adopt a completely passive position.<br />
Nowilaty in particular was at the same time requested, in secret, to<br />
see whether a special legation would be received by King Feisal. This Van<br />
Roijen mission would in any case have to wait a while. 78<br />
The De Lavalette Mission<br />
On October 26, in order to save what could be saved, the Council of Ministers<br />
agreed with the proposal of the Ambassador in Tehran, P. Renardel<br />
de Lavalette, to arrange a tour of the Gulf States, i.e. Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar<br />
and the United Arab Emirates. The preparations for such a tour had already<br />
been underway for several days in close consultation with Shell,<br />
who provided the Dutch Foreign Ministry with extensive information<br />
concerning Shell’s interests in the relevant countries. It was also Shell<br />
which suggested the sequence order of visits, although this was not entirely<br />
adhered to. During his tour, De Lavalette always had close contact<br />
with the Shell representatives on the spot. 79<br />
Although the Dutch Cabinet was later to complain of a lack of solidarity<br />
between the ec countries, this initiative was set up without the knowledge<br />
of other ec partners. Only London was informed in advance, for the<br />
reason that the English oil interests were closely bound up with the<br />
Dutch. Within the ec, however, no other member state was told by Van<br />
der Stoel what was planned. A modest press conference would be held on<br />
the day of De Lavalette’s arrival. Accordingly, the plan had to be communicated<br />
in strictest confidence to the British government. 80<br />
De Lavalette would have to travel to the Gulf States to cultivate goodwill.<br />
His most important task was to remove misunderstandings and<br />
false impressions. In connection with the anger allegedly caused by Vredeling’s<br />
presence at the pro-Israel demonstration in the Amsterdam<br />
Bourse, Van der Stoel instructed him to emphasize that although Vredeling<br />
may have been there, it was purely in a private capacity. De Lavalette<br />
should anyway ‘not return to this point of his own accord’. 81 63
It was soon clear, however, that De Lavalette’s mission was not a simple<br />
one. In preparing his trip, he spoke in Jeddah with the Ambassadors of<br />
the countries he intended to visit, who informed him that their governments<br />
were particularly furious over Vredeling’s attendance at a ‘Zionist<br />
demonstration’. They did not accept the argument that this had occurred<br />
‘in a purely private capacity’. 82 Preparing for De Lavalette’s mission in<br />
Kuwait, Ambassador Schorer was told the same: The Hague’s viewpoints,<br />
Vredeling’s presence in the Bourse and clandestine support for Israel<br />
did not contribute to good relations. Besides, it was said, the Arab<br />
world was not asking for an anti-Israeli position, but it did demand an<br />
objective approach. 83<br />
The journey began badly. When De Lavalette arrived in Kuwait on October<br />
27, he did not manage to arrange an interview with a single relevant<br />
authority. In desperation, the Ambassador journeyed on to Abu Dhabi<br />
where he had a meeting with the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs.<br />
This went rather better. The Under-Secretary informed him that the Emirates<br />
had hesitated several days over the implementation of the oil embargo,<br />
but had in the event been unable to escape joining the Arab line. After<br />
Abu Dhabi came Qatar. The meeting there with the Foreign Minister, M.<br />
Suheim, began in unpleasantness, but this was later checked, with the<br />
Minister going so far as to express regret over the embargo and promising<br />
that he would inform the Emir of his conversation with De Lavalette. 84<br />
Back in Kuwait, De Lavalette was granted a meeting with the Under-<br />
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Rashid al-Rashid. Following several emotional<br />
accusations, which De Lavalette suspected were intended for their<br />
effect in the subsequent report, Rashid admitted that the embargo had<br />
been introduced on the basis of the ‘atmospherics’ rather than any solid<br />
evidence that The Hague had actually breached the principle of neutrality.<br />
In Kuwait too, the sore point was raised of Vredeling’s action. As an illustration<br />
of Kuwait’s attitude, Rashid pointed to the great number of Palestinians<br />
working in Kuwait.HethentookupVanderStoel’spointthatthe<br />
embargo was actually aimed not so much at The Netherlands as the whole<br />
of Europe.Rashid found this argument unconvincing. The nine ec member<br />
states, after all, wanted oil as normal and therefore desired no part in<br />
the Dutch-Arab conflict. The Hague therefore stood alone. 85<br />
Subsequently, De Lavalette held conversations with the Foreign Ministers<br />
of Oman and Bahrein on November 2 and 3. Both Arab Ministers<br />
gave the impression that their countries had been more or less forced to<br />
join the embargo. In Oman, moreover, De Lavalette was reassured that in<br />
all probability The Netherlands would manage to survive through the<br />
‘rescheduling’ of oil. 86<br />
64
The last country on De Lavalette’s round was Iraq, where he was received<br />
in an ‘unexpectedly courteous’ fashion, yet at the same time was<br />
given to understand that the nationalization of oil assets was a legal fact<br />
and could no longer be reversed. De Lavalette was given the impression<br />
that Iraq was not immediately about to implement an embargo. 87<br />
In his final report, De Lavelette judged that the embargo had not been<br />
implemented with full conviction by several Arab countries, but that<br />
these had been more or less corralled out of solidarity. The basic cause, he<br />
had learned from his conversations, lay in the inadequate attention given<br />
by The Hague to the Arab side of the Middle Eastern conflict. This onesided<br />
approach was coupled with extreme pro-Israeli pronouncements –<br />
highly distressing to the Arab countries – of certain Dutch authorities. De<br />
Lavelette had the impression, therefore, that friendly words addressed to<br />
the Arab countries could do much good.<br />
The question, thought De Lavalette, was how effective the embargo<br />
was. Kuwait was apparently the sole country that had detailed plans for<br />
its effective implementation. De Lavalette was in general not pessimistic.<br />
He considered it unlikely that there would be further punitive measures<br />
taken against The Netherlands. His general impression was that matters<br />
were sure to simmer down, although the initial Egyptian military success<br />
had created a huge stir in the Arab world, and the oil weapon was now<br />
seen as a powerful resource. De Lavalette concluded that the countries he<br />
had visited would follow the Arab line, but indicated ‘that although the<br />
embargo might be formally adhered to, what further happened to the oil<br />
was otherwise a matter of no concern’.<br />
This was an important and reassuring conclusion. ‘The Netherlands<br />
would manage to survive’, was the assumption in the Arab countries,<br />
specifically through ‘rescheduling’ the oil stream to Rotterdam. If this<br />
were indeed the case, De Lavalette stated, it would be best for various reasons<br />
‘if it were revealed as little as possible to the outside world’. If it were<br />
known, ‘the shadow play would lose its value for the Arabs, and that<br />
could only serve to provoke new actions’. 88<br />
It was also assumed in the usa that the embargo was far from effective.<br />
The American Ambassador in Tripoli was already able to report on<br />
October 25, 1973, that the Libyan authorities had let it be known that<br />
they had no objection to exporting oil ‘not documented as destined directly<br />
for us ports’. It turned out that the Libyan National Oil Company<br />
was simply continuing to fill American tankers or oil tankers bound for<br />
the usa without showing the least concern for the question of the oil’s<br />
destination. The National Oil Company turned away not a single Ameri-<br />
65
can buyer, so long as they were prepared to pay high prices. 89<br />
It became apparent from other sources that even Algeria, the main instigator<br />
of the embargo, was not taking it too literally. On October 30,<br />
the American Ambassador in Algiers was able to report that the Algerian<br />
government evinced no serious interest in the ultimate destination of their<br />
oil exports. A captain of a tanker originally bound for the usa, but who<br />
had in the meantime altered his destination on the freight documents,<br />
was informed by the Algerian official that his government had absolutely<br />
no interest in what tankers did once they were on the open seas. In addition,<br />
there still remained the question of whether Algeria would reduce its<br />
oil production by 10% as agreed within the oapec. 90<br />
None of this, however, could disguise the fact that, however merely formal,<br />
an embargo had been declared against The Netherlands. It was abundantly<br />
clear that there was great irritation in various Arab countries with<br />
the attitude taken by The Hague. Ex-minister Luns, at that time Secretary-General<br />
of nato,had also noted this whilst in Turkey between October<br />
24 and November 1. According to Luns, this resentment was not so<br />
much a consequence of what The Netherlands had in fact done to favour<br />
Israel, but the public remarks of some Cabinet members. Luns pointed out<br />
to his interlocutors that The Hague had accommodated the Arab countries,<br />
in spite of the pressure brought to bear from ‘certain quarters’, by<br />
declining to supply Israel with any war materials. The present government<br />
had difficulties, according to Luns, because of the role of left-wing ‘agitators’.<br />
He assured them that Van der Stoel was certainly not anti-Arab. 91<br />
The Second Chamber<br />
Meanwhile, the seriousness of the embargo began to penetrate through to<br />
public opinion and the Second Chamber, leading in turn to a remarkable<br />
change of stance. Immediately after the outbreak of the war, the Second<br />
Chamber stood foursquare behind Israel. This now began to change, and<br />
a major role in this change was played by the party-political composition<br />
of the Den Uyl Cabinet, so recently put together. It was suggested by the<br />
conservative-liberal vvd that the government and Van der Stoel with<br />
their politics of ‘bearing witness’ had put Dutch interests in the Arab<br />
world at risk. Criticism of government policy was also expressed in the<br />
press, particularly NRC Handelsblad and De Telegraaf. NRC Handelsblad<br />
even spoke in somewhat overwrought terms of the ‘collapse of our<br />
step by step, almost completely democratized, foreign policy’. 92 Reject-<br />
66
ing this criticism at a press conference held on October 30, Van der Stoel<br />
insisted that he had never taken an anti-Arab standpoint.<br />
The standpoints taken on the October War and the Arab grievances<br />
were set out once again in an internal Foreign Ministry memorandum on<br />
the eve of a debate in the Second Chamber. The Dutch government’s position<br />
was in general balanced; Israel had to withdraw from the occupied<br />
areas, subject to minor border corrections; Israel’s security had to be<br />
guaranteed; a just solution had to be found for the position of the Palestinians.<br />
Beside this, after the outbreak of the October War, The Netherlands<br />
had never spoken of aggression against Israel. The ec declaration of<br />
October 13 was unanimously accepted and embraced all the elements of<br />
resolution 242. The only objection the Cabinet had was to a mandate<br />
granted to Great Britain and France to speak on behalf of the Nine in the<br />
Security Council.<br />
The Dutch Foreign Ministry memorandum denied most emphatically<br />
that The Hague had given Israel military support. There had been no recruitment<br />
of volunteers, and The Netherlands had not served as a bridgehead<br />
for arms transports to Israel. Since the outbreak of the war, no permits<br />
had been granted for the export of arms to the war area. klm had<br />
transported neither soldiers nor material to Israel. Only on October 9 had<br />
there been a further flight to Tel Aviv. No oil had been supplied to Israel,<br />
and Vredeling had participated in a pro-Israeli demonstration ‘in an entirely<br />
personal capacity’. It was true that the Dutch people, for historical<br />
reasons, had much sympathy for the Jewish people and for Israel, but during<br />
the war there had also appeared expressions of understanding for the<br />
Arab cause in the national press. 93<br />
On October 31, the Dutch government’s policy with regard to the October<br />
War was once more raised in the Second Chamber for further extensive<br />
discussion. The vvd spokesman, F. Portheine, opened this discussion<br />
by putting several critical questions. He thought perhaps the reporting<br />
had been rather haphazard and asked whether the De Lavalette mission<br />
that was underway could not be used to lay the ground for a visit by<br />
Van der Stoel to the Arab countries. M.W.J.M. Peijnenburg (kvp) also<br />
thought that Dutch diplomacy had not always been effective given the<br />
number of misunderstandings that had apparently arisen between The<br />
Netherlands and the Arab countries. More fundamental was the criticism<br />
of M.J.J.A. Imkamp (of the d’66 party) who asked whether the government<br />
was finally ready to underwrite the French interpretation of resolution<br />
242. The Cabinet was mainly supported by A. van der Hek (of the<br />
Labour Party, the PvdA). In general, the Chamber seemed to have a better<br />
67
understanding of the Arab side and the position of the Palestinians than<br />
they had three weeks earlier.<br />
In their replies, Den Uyl and Van der Stoel emphasized that government<br />
policy had not altered since the statement of October 9, on which<br />
occasion the Chamber had scarcely uttered a word of criticism. Van der<br />
Stoel went into the background of the embargo. The Arab countries felt<br />
that The Netherlands had manifestly not understood them for a long<br />
time, thought the Minister. On the Dutch side, despite sympathy for Israel,<br />
regular initiatives had been essayed to try to remove this feeling. In<br />
order to improve relations with the Arab countries, Van der Stoel had invited<br />
the Egyptian Foreign Minister to visit The Hague at the end of August.<br />
Dutch diplomats had used every possible opportunity to overturn<br />
the many misunderstandings current in the Arab capitals. Van der Stoel<br />
emphatically declared his conviction that the meeting with the four Arab<br />
Ambassadors had not been the cause of the embargo. The decision had in<br />
all probability been taken earlier, and it was directed against the whole of<br />
Europe. He endorsed the standpoint that the Palestinian question also deserved<br />
attention. 94<br />
The Cabinet was thus subjected to considerable criticism during this<br />
debate. During the uncertain days immediately preceding the Saudi decision<br />
to join the embargo, this disapproval was also voiced outside the<br />
Chamber. The PvdA member of the Dutch parliament, R. ter Beek, publicly<br />
stated on November 2 that, in view of the often divergent and conflicting<br />
reports concerning the attitudes and aims of various Arab countries,<br />
particularly Saudi Arabia, he had serious doubts over the quality of<br />
the diplomatic service. At a press conference on the same day, Den Uyl rejected<br />
this criticism: Dutch diplomatic representatives in Arab countries,<br />
he said, had nothing to reproach themselves with.<br />
KLM<br />
The measures taken against The Netherlands were not restricted to oil.<br />
From the moment the October war broke out, rumours began to circulate<br />
to the effect that the usa and Israel had arranged supplies of arms by<br />
means of hired European aircraft. As we saw, klm in particular was supposed<br />
to have transported military experts and volunteers to Israel. These<br />
and similar accusations were put out by – among other sources – the Arab<br />
League’s Bureau for the Boycott of Israel. It quickly became clear that<br />
various Arab countries were considering denying klm landing rights.<br />
68
klm denied all involvement from the outset. In a press statement it was<br />
firmly stated that since the outbreak of the October War, there had been<br />
no more flights to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Damascus or Amman. There had been<br />
one more flight to Tel Aviv on October 9 to pick up stranded passengers,<br />
but that was all. The Dutch Foreign Ministry sought to back up klm.<br />
Ambassadors in Beirut, Damascus, Cairo and Jerusalem received instructions<br />
to communicate the contents of the klm press conference to the respective<br />
authorities without making any public statement. 95 In spite of<br />
this, klm’s position became more difficult when accusations began to<br />
emerge over involvement in arms transport to Israel via Schiphol (Amsterdam<br />
Airport).<br />
It has also not been excluded that klm might have hired aircraft to the<br />
Israeli airforce or to El Al. An ex-member of the Mossad, the Israeli intelligence<br />
service, believes that klm flew mainly from Tehran to Tel Aviv. At<br />
the time, like Israel, Iran used weapons systems almost exclusively of<br />
American manufacture. The Shah would have sent war materials to Israel<br />
through Turkish air space, for which purpose klm transport planes<br />
would also have been used. Former officers of the Dutch secret security<br />
service claim that the Dutch Schreiner Airways and other charter companies<br />
were involved in the secret arms deliveries via Schiphol to Israel. 96<br />
On October 16 the Dutch Ambassador in Damascus, J.B.E.Ph. van<br />
Hoeve, reported that the Syrian government appeared to be endorsing one<br />
of the accusations against The Netherlands. According to Under-Secretary<br />
for Foreign Affairs Rafai, ‘fifteen aircraft loaded with weapons and<br />
ammunition left Schiphol’. 97 On October 21 the Syrian government<br />
called for a total boycott of The Netherlands, including klm. Van der<br />
Stoel maintained his policy of not reacting publicly to the accusations levelled<br />
at klm, but trying rather to resolve the matter as far as possible<br />
through diplomatic contacts. Diplomatic efforts to support klm, however,<br />
made difficult headway. In Cairo, Ambassador Von Oven was summoned<br />
by the acting Foreign Minister, Ismail Fahmi, whose communication<br />
that Dutch volunteers taken prisoner by Egypt would not be considered<br />
as prisoners of war seemed to indicate that he gave little credence to<br />
Van der Stoel’s disclaimers. And yet Von Oven came away with the impression<br />
that Fahmi wanted to give the Dutch standpoint on the Middle<br />
East the benefit of the doubt. The Boycott Bureau and the Middle East<br />
were not totally convinced by the klm statement, thought Fahmi. He offered<br />
to get both statements broadcast again on radio, tv and in the press,<br />
an offer that was gratefully accepted by Von Oven. 98<br />
It became clear on October 21 that Jordan was willing to join the klm<br />
69
oycott demanded by Syria. The Jordanian Director-General for Political<br />
Affairs informed the Dutch Ambassador, A.C. Vroon, and a klm representative<br />
that in view of the communal struggle against Israel his country,<br />
to his regret, was compelled to follow Syria. Action in Amman was pointless:<br />
The Netherlands would have to present evidence to the contrary to<br />
the Boycott Bureau. 99 But apart from this, Van der Stoel had forbidden<br />
any contact with this Bureau, since it was not recognized by the Dutch<br />
government. Two days later, news came that Iran was also about to join<br />
the boycott of klm.<br />
klm did not let matters rest there. On October 23 a letter was composed<br />
in Arabic on behalf of the President-Director in which issue was<br />
taken with ‘untruths’. klm succeeded in making direct contact with the<br />
Boycott Bureau and in seeing that no new steps against klm would be<br />
urged. A request to withdraw all punitive measures, however, would have<br />
to come from Damascus where, meanwhile, klm had already approached<br />
the Syrian Foreign Minister. 100 On October 25 the Dutch Ambassadors<br />
to the Arab countries once more received instructions to stand<br />
behind klm as far as possible.<br />
On October 26, however, the Arab League’s Boycott Bureau in Damascus<br />
let it be known that klm, together with Sabena, Lufthansa and Air<br />
France, had been informed they could only resume flights to Tel Aviv after<br />
Israel had vacated the occupied territories. This seemed a good occasion<br />
for cooperation, but klm was not in favour of joint action, as it informed<br />
Van der Stoel. klm’s position in the Middle East was stronger than that<br />
of Sabena, Air France or Lufthansa, 101 in spite of all the problems, and for<br />
this reason the Minister refrained from any initiatives involving joint action.<br />
In fact, aside from the Syrian appeal, it turned out that only the Jordanian<br />
government had announced a boycott against klm. In Amman, Ambassador<br />
Vroon tried to get this action undone at the end of October, with<br />
the Jordanians promising that klm would be allowed to resume flights to<br />
Amman once it became clear that Damascus gave permission to fly over<br />
Syrian territory. The Ambassador in Syria, in accord with the ‘low key<br />
policy’, made no direct approach but merely assumed that klm would be<br />
able to land again as soon as the Damascus airport was opened to civil<br />
traffic. 102<br />
The situation was thus a confusing one, but apart from Jordan there<br />
was no question of actual boycott. This did not altogether prevent the situation<br />
starting to become more difficult for klm at the end of October,<br />
when boycotts were called by unions and other organizations for which<br />
70
the governments of the countries concerned could not really be held responsible.<br />
In Iraq, such actions were staged by the Association of Iraqi<br />
Travel Agencies. In Libya, a workers’ boycott of American and Dutch<br />
ships and air traffic was announced by the Federation of Arab Trade<br />
Unions. On November 2 the International Federation of Arab Trade<br />
Unions adopted a severe resolution which, among its articles, recommended<br />
a total boycott of American and Dutch ships, aircraft and goods;<br />
and in fact in Libya there were boycott actions against klm. In Egypt,<br />
where the political situation was tense following the collapse of the Sinai<br />
front, similar actions were threatened. 103<br />
Conclusion<br />
Low profile or not, the situation looked particularly unpropitious for The<br />
Netherlands, although the Dutch were not entirely alone. Denmark was<br />
also subjected to an embargo. But that was of small comfort. Those states<br />
that had proclaimed an embargo against The Netherlands provided more<br />
than two-thirds of total Dutch oil imports. If these were really going to be<br />
blocked, this would undoubtedly entail complex economic consequences.<br />
Diplomatic measures taken so far had had relatively little effect. Van der<br />
Stoel was still assuming on October 6 that it would be possible to put up<br />
some resistance to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, but a week later the biggest<br />
oil producer of all had joined the embargo. In the meantime, the Minister<br />
had made it clear to his representatives that the policy must be low key,<br />
hoping to conduct business as usual as much as possible.<br />
It is not easy to establish what was the actual purpose of the Arab<br />
countries in choosing The Netherlands as their target. The reason that<br />
was served up by all the Arab states involved for imposing the oil embargo<br />
was the alleged support for Israel during the October War, but the question<br />
remains whether the embargo was really – or solely – about Dutch<br />
Middle Eastern policy. By striking at Rotterdam – and Van der Stoel was<br />
right in this – the whole of Northwest Europe was affected because of the<br />
port’s transit importance in Europe’s oil flow. The embargo therefore<br />
looked like an attempt to put pressure on the whole ec. On the other<br />
hand, the Arab measures against The Netherlands rapidly led to serious<br />
conflict within the ec, which only seemed to make any ec political involvement<br />
in the Middle East all the more unlikely.<br />
But there was certainly more at stake during the oil crisis than the Israeli<br />
question. The measures taken by the Arab opec countries were not<br />
71
a purely political sanction against those countries that had allied themselves<br />
with Israel during the war. The oil crisis was also part of a struggle<br />
in the international oil sector. The Arab countries, albeit from different<br />
perspectives and interests, had set themselves to break the mould of traditional<br />
relations within the oil sector, in which Rotterdam occupied an important<br />
position. It was the home port of one of the Seven Sisters and furthermore<br />
a crucial link in the chain of processing and distributing oil and<br />
oil derivatives in Northwest Europe. So at a quite early stage of the crisis,<br />
Van der Stoel was convinced that the embargo had already been prepared<br />
months before the outbreak of the October War.<br />
In conversation with Golda Meir on November 13, Den Uyl also emphasized<br />
that the oil weapon had been planned well in advance. PvdA<br />
leader in parliament Ed van Thijn, learned of this on November 15 in the<br />
Permanent Parliamentary Committee for Intelligence and Security Services.<br />
The parliamentary leaders of the four main political parties were<br />
told that as early as July there had been indications that an embargo had<br />
been decided on. According to Van Thijn the Dutch attitude had little to<br />
do with it. The same statement was repeated the following day in the governmental<br />
consultation between the PvdA Ministers and parliamentary<br />
party leaders. 104 These judgements do not square at all with the assertions<br />
of the ex-honorary consul for Kuwait, Mahmoud Rabbani, to the<br />
effect that the decision to boycott The Netherlands was of Van der Stoel’s<br />
fault. 105<br />
However, when it came to the boycott and other measures, such as nationalizations<br />
in Iraq, there were differences of outlook, objectives and<br />
expectation within the Arab world. 106 For some, the Palestinians for example,<br />
the primary objective was political, part of the fight against Israel.<br />
For others, the struggle was to break out of existing power and property<br />
relations in the international oil sector, for example Iraq and possibly also<br />
Algeria, even though the former did not participate while the latter did.<br />
Some countries joined in simply because they did not want to desert the<br />
Arab cause. For Saudi Arabia it was perhaps an attempt to avoid more<br />
radical measures whilst at the same time ensuring that the price hikes<br />
agreed in Kuwait would in this way be more easily accepted. As a result,<br />
the embargo assumed a more politico-symbolic aspect, based on the idea<br />
that the major oil companies would in any case supply Rotterdam with<br />
enough oil. These various points of view and different objectives made it<br />
very difficult for the Den Uyl government, and for Van der Stoel in particular,<br />
to take any effective action against the embargo.<br />
72
3<br />
European Divisions<br />
By the end of October, the situation in the Middle East had still not stabilized.<br />
During the night of October 24/25, the Security Council had called<br />
on the belligerents to comply with a cease-fire demand and to withdraw<br />
to the positions of October 22. A day later Kurt Waldheim, the un Secretary-General,<br />
submitted a plan to station a peace force of 7000 men in the<br />
conflict zone for a six-month period. The principal task of this United Nations<br />
Emergency Force would be to ensure the cease-fire along the Suez<br />
Canal, and the withdrawal of all troops behind the lines occupied on October<br />
22 (when the truce should originally have come into operation). The<br />
first Egyptian-Israeli talks were held under un auspices on the 27 th .<br />
Despite these developments, a peace accord was still remote. On November<br />
5, 1973, Kissinger left for the Middle East to help work out an Israeli-Egyptian<br />
armistice. This effort was rewarded with some success,<br />
even if only the agreement of a truce formula for the Israeli-Egyptian<br />
front. On November 11 an agreement was signed by the Israeli Major-<br />
General Aharon Yariv and his Egyptian counterpart Abdel Ghani<br />
Gamasi, under which Israel undertook to withdraw to the positions of<br />
October 22. But it quickly became apparent that further details of the<br />
truce would be more difficult to work out; and not only were the Israeli-<br />
Egyptian negotiations threatened with an impasse, agreement on the Israeli-Syrian<br />
front had not even begun. 1<br />
The war had ended but at the beginning of November, despite all diplomatic<br />
efforts, the embargo aimed at The Netherlands went ahead, although<br />
not all Arab oil-exporting countries participated. On November<br />
4, the Arab opec countries succeeded in closing ranks again with the announcement<br />
that November’s oil production would be reduced by 25%<br />
(compared with September levels). Although this was again a powerful<br />
measure, the reductions implemented earlier were discounted, including<br />
73
the embargo in place against The Netherlands, the usa and Denmark (on<br />
account of its pro-Israeli stance), so that the Arab resolutions of November<br />
4 appeared worse than they in fact were, as the Dutch Ministry of<br />
Economic Affairs observed. 2<br />
Nonetheless, serious problems were becoming apparent to the consumer<br />
countries. As stated by the Dutch Cabinet on several occasions, international<br />
cooperation was needed to deal with these developments.<br />
Such cooperation should chiefly take shape within the context of the<br />
oecd or the ec. In the event, however, it would prove difficult to achieve<br />
a common response among the consumer countries, for these countries,<br />
even in Western Europe, seemed to be more keenly competitive than cooperative.<br />
Initially, the Dutch government hoped that steps could be taken within<br />
the oecd to come to the assistance of countries affected by the embargo:<br />
in fact, the oecd had tried in the 1950s and 1960s to develop an emergency<br />
allocation system. The Dutch Cabinet also tried to move the European<br />
Commission to introduce a proportional sharing of oil within the<br />
ec, but it was quickly evident that both these attempts were fruitless.<br />
Meanwhile it was learned that the Foreign Ministers of the ec were to<br />
meet within the framework of the European Political Cooperation (epc)<br />
to discuss the situation that had arisen. This appeared to be an important<br />
conference, for it was hoped that the other ec partners would show solidarity<br />
with The Netherlands. The Hague had two objectives: proportional<br />
sharing of oil supplies for ec member states, and the maintenance of<br />
free traffic within the common market. However, it was a very open question<br />
whether the other European partners were prepared to agree on a<br />
common policy with regard to the oil crisis: interests within the ec were<br />
widely divergent, and in addition, the Arabs were threatening sanctions<br />
against countries that lent The Netherlands a helping hand. And the past,<br />
too, stood in the way of effective cooperation.<br />
The Netherlands and European Integration<br />
The process of European integration at the time of the oil crisis was in a<br />
dynamic phase. The entry of Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark in 1973<br />
had expanded the ec to nine countries. General de Gaulle had for years<br />
resisted Britain’s entry, but after the General’s departure in 1969, agreement<br />
had been reached over the Community’s expansion. After all the<br />
conflicts of the 1960s, this expansion seemed to provide European inte-<br />
74
gration with a new boost, and consequently plans were worked out<br />
around 1970 to develop the ec, in good time, into an economic union. In<br />
1971, the six government leaders and heads of state adopted a plan to introduce<br />
monetary union in 1980. 3<br />
This European revival went hand in hand with, and perhaps contributed<br />
to, a growing estrangement between America and Europe. At the<br />
time there were various conflicts and differences of opinion in play between<br />
the West European countries and the usa, not least in the monetary<br />
area and over trade. The Nixon government was reproached with its pursuit<br />
of an economic and monetary politics all too closely aimed at furthering<br />
America’s own interests, while at the same time there was increasing<br />
criticism in Western Europe and also in Japan of America’s prosecution of<br />
the war in Vietnam. This irritation in European capitals and in Tokyo<br />
was only further augmented by the lack of consultation over such matters<br />
as the détente with the Soviet Union, the salt-1 treaty (1972), the approach<br />
to China, and the Middle East. Mutual relations seemed to deteriorate<br />
so far that in 1973, Kissinger called for the Year of Europe, in an attempt<br />
to breathe new life into the Atlantic Alliance, albeit on a new foundation.<br />
4 The French historian Alfred Grosser believes, nonetheless, that<br />
1973 was the nadir of postwar American-European relations. 5<br />
The ec itself had for years been the ground of serious differences of<br />
opinion and collisions of interest. The Netherlands had played an active<br />
role in these conflicts, not least as the opponent of Gaullist France. The<br />
two countries had also opposed each other in the years 1960-63 following<br />
France’s proposal to reform the ec as a political union. Luns had stood by<br />
the principle that the Community must remain an economic community,<br />
whose aim was the free economic movement between the Six, in which<br />
the institutions created by the Treaty of Rome, and particularly the European<br />
Commission, should play a leading role. Furthermore, the Dutch argued,<br />
the politicisation of European integration threatened to undermine<br />
the unity of nato. 6 Following the breakthrough of 1969, i.e. the decision<br />
to expand the ec to nine members, various plans were mooted in the early<br />
1970s to try to get the political development of the Community moving<br />
again. One of these plans, the Davignon report in 1969, advocated more<br />
consultation and perhaps even a level of harmonization of foreign policies<br />
within the epc framework. In the second Davignon report, from July<br />
1973, it was proposed that the nine member states, after mutual consultations,<br />
should adopt a common standpoint on questions ‘in those fields<br />
where a common position would be necessary or desirable’. 7 In this same<br />
period, the need arose to give more authority to consultations between ec<br />
75
heads of state and government leaders to meet on a more regular basis and<br />
even to form an institutionalized European Council, a proposal which<br />
would be definitively decided in 1974. 8<br />
Although de Gaulle had in the meantime disappeared from the stage,<br />
the Dutch in the early 1970sremained apprehensive about political cooperation<br />
within the ec.TheNetherlandsopposedtheintensification of epc<br />
consultations, nor did The Hague look kindly on the institutionalization<br />
of the European Council – though on this point it has to be said that there<br />
was a difference of opinion within the Den Uyl Cabinet, between the Premier<br />
and his Foreign Minister, Van der Stoel. This difference of opinion<br />
was also to play a part during the oil crisis. It should be borne in mind that<br />
the institutional changes in the ec were still fresh, such as the introduction<br />
of official epc-preliminary consultations in the form of the Comité<br />
Politique of the Directors-General for Political Affairs (dgpa’s).<br />
In the years leading up to the oil crisis, there had also been clear differences<br />
of opinion between France and The Netherlands in the field of energy<br />
policy. The Hague objected to the more controlling, dirigiste, role of<br />
the ec in the provision of energy, and its greater independence from the<br />
usa, as proposed by Paris. The Netherlands stood for a free oil market in<br />
the ec and for maintaining the existing power structure in the international,<br />
and especially in the West European oil sector in which, after all,<br />
The Netherlands occupied an important position.<br />
The Dutch government had also resisted plans put forward in 1968 by<br />
the European Commission for developing a common policy on the trade<br />
in oil and oil products. These were considered at the time as being excessively<br />
dirigiste, threatening to involve the ec in all kinds of political complications.<br />
As we have said, The Netherlands – even after the formation of<br />
opec – was against direct consultations between the West European<br />
countries and the oil producers. As set out in the Explanatory Memorandum<br />
for 1972: ‘The government commits itself not to get involved in the<br />
negotiations between the producer countries and the oil companies.’ Unlike<br />
those countries with state-owned oil companies like Italy and France,<br />
the feeling in The Hague was against any direct state intervention in the<br />
negotiations between the oil companies and opec, which were seen as ‘a<br />
purely commercial matter’. 9<br />
These basic premises were set out again in a note of October 1972, on<br />
the occasion of a conference on the ec’s energy policy. According to this<br />
note, the little progress made in the preceding years toward establishing a<br />
common energy policy was mainly due to the very real differences in the<br />
energy situation of the different countries of Europe; and above all, the<br />
76
very different perceptions of The Hague and Paris. Paris wanted to promote<br />
the assurance of oil provision by obtaining direct influence over imports.<br />
In addition, it has to be said, Paris was also working to raise the<br />
status of the smaller French oil companies to the same level as Shell and<br />
bp. 10<br />
Such objectives were of course in conflict with Dutch interests. The<br />
Dutch Cabinet naturally therefore took an extremely cool stand on the<br />
French ideas over market regulation. The Hague was in general opposed<br />
to ec intervention in the oil sector. 11 The British entry into the ec was regarded<br />
in The Hague as a welcome counterweight to those member states<br />
very much in favour of market regulation and state intervention, such as<br />
France and Italy; and indeed, British membership was soon making itself<br />
felt. Shortly before the oil crisis, proposals were put before the European<br />
Commission that were far more in line with the Dutch views, based as<br />
they were on the principle of a free, communal energy market. 12 Subsequently,<br />
however, as we shall see, the role of the British government during<br />
the oil crisis was to disappoint The Hague.<br />
France<br />
In fact, from the very outset, it turned out to be exceptionally difficult<br />
during the oil crisis to achieve a common ec approach. There was no<br />
question of a common ec policy to the oil crisis itself; on the contrary, the<br />
ec proved to be the theatre of conflict and a clash of interests.<br />
Paris had already been busy before the oil crisis enhancing its competitive<br />
strength in the oil trade by improving the ports of Marseille, Dunkirk<br />
and above all Le Havre. The main objective was to try and strengthen the<br />
position of the French state oil companies. These attempts, based on<br />
large-scale government support, were at the same time aimed at undermining<br />
the position of Rotterdam as the most important centre of the oil<br />
trade and the main transit port in Europe. This of course did not go unobserved<br />
in The Hague and elsewhere. 13 The Dutch Ambassador in Paris,<br />
J.A. de Ranitz, reported that ‘quite a number of the French’ would not<br />
look askance if ‘the position of Rotterdam as the first world port [were]<br />
put in danger’, from which, it was hoped, ports like Dunkirk, Le Havre<br />
and Marseille might gain advantage. For this reason, some of the French<br />
thought their pro-Arab political stance, certainly in comparison with<br />
that of The Netherlands, was beginning to bear fruit. For the time being,<br />
thought De Ranitz, ‘the French government itself was of the view that a<br />
77
certain degree of solidarity was called for’, but despite this, it was quickly<br />
apparent in The Hague that French politicians and diplomats in different<br />
situations were adopting an attitude that was ‘incredibly lacking in solidarity’.<br />
14 In particular, the conduct of the French Foreign Minister,<br />
Michel Jobert, was followed in The Hague with rapidly growing dismay<br />
and distrust. 15<br />
During the crisis, characteristic and fundamental differences of outlook<br />
between France and The Netherlands were revealed, both over the<br />
direction of development of the ec and over the ec’s energy policy. In addition<br />
to these problems, there appeared to exist similarly antithetical positions<br />
on European political and economic cooperation, as well as the<br />
American-European relationship. Furthermore, very different conceptions<br />
of the conflict in the Middle East also played a role. In fact, all these<br />
aspects, both from the French and the Dutch viewpoints, were closely<br />
connected. The French president, Georges Pompidou, pursued a policy<br />
that might be described as ‘Gaullism without de Gaulle’, with the qualification<br />
that he had exchanged de Gaulle’s globalism for a European orientation<br />
and the ec. 16 And the Dutch-French clashes under de Gaulle were<br />
still fresh in the French memory. According to Grosser, Pompidou complained<br />
to a close confidant:<br />
Les Hollandais detestent la France: c’est la seule constante de leur histoire.<br />
Ils nous donnent les leçons sur l’Europe, mais ils ne souhaitent<br />
rien d’autre que de l’amarrer à l’Amérique. 17<br />
And in a similar vein the president told the West German Chancellor,<br />
Willy Brandt, that The Hague had never striven for European solidarity.<br />
The Netherlands was merely a place of transit: ‘un lieu de passage’. 18<br />
On October 31, De Ranitz reported that Paris did still see something in<br />
solidarity. A day later in a meeting with dgpa Van Lynden, the French<br />
Ambassador in The Hague, J. Senard, left no possibility of misunderstanding<br />
over the French attitude regarding the oil crisis and the embargo<br />
against The Netherlands. Senard stated that France was only inclined to<br />
work together for a Community solution to the oil crisis if The Netherlands<br />
was prepared to accept a Middle East statement in the epc. And in<br />
addition to this, said Senard, The Hague should endorse the principle of a<br />
common ec energy policy. According to Senard, it was clear that in times<br />
of scarcity the oil companies no longer had an adequate grip on the market<br />
mechanism. It was therefore necessary for The Netherlands to adapt<br />
to circumstances and to accept that a system of European market regulation<br />
had to be established. 19<br />
78
In several ways, Italy found itself in a position essentially in agreement<br />
with France. Italy also had major state oil companies, although there<br />
were differences of opinion on the politics of energy and oil which had become<br />
evident shortly before the oil crisis, when reports began to circulate<br />
suggesting that Shell wanted to pull out of Italy. Some European-oriented<br />
politicians opposed this, since otherwise there would have been only<br />
American and state oil companies remaining. 20 Nevertheless, it was<br />
quickly apparent that the Italian attitude toward the oil crisis was close to<br />
that of the French.<br />
Great Britain<br />
At this stage, the impression began to grow in the Hague that not only<br />
Paris but also London was prepared to go to great lengths to secure its<br />
own oil supply. This was a blow, given the expectations aroused in The<br />
Hague by Britain’s entry into the Common Market. London was having<br />
to deal with the extraordinary circumstances of a massive miners’ strike<br />
at the same time as the oil crisis, added to which Prime Minister Edward<br />
Heath had to contend with serious misgivings within his Conservative<br />
Party as to the wisdom of joining the ec at all. Here then was the opportunity<br />
for the Heath government to refute once and for all the assumption<br />
that the ec could only be expected to bring misery and misfortune.<br />
Although the differences between the Dutch and the British were less<br />
fundamental than with the French, the prospects for ‘solidarity’ from<br />
Britain now appeared equally slight. That, at least, was the message from<br />
the Dutch Ambassador in London. On November 1 he reported that the<br />
oil companies were being put under pressure ‘at the highest level’, i.e. by<br />
Heath himself,<br />
to move them to make an exception for the United Kingdom in fixing<br />
quotas for Middle Eastern oil, and to maintain unimpaired supplies to<br />
the uk; in other words to pass on the reductions applied by the producers<br />
to other countries. 21<br />
This actually happened when Heath summoned Frank McFadzean of<br />
Shell and Eric Drake of bp to a meeting as early as October 21. The Shell<br />
and bp representatives let it be known on this occasion that because of<br />
their role as international players they were unable to comply with this request.<br />
But the British government would be able to force them if it came<br />
79
to it, Heath had threatened, by issuing an Order in Council.<br />
McFadzean and Drake, however, declined to guarantee a full 100%<br />
delivery. When McFadzean remarked delicately that 60% of Royal Dutch<br />
Shell was in Dutch hands, an irritated Heath turned to Drake: the British<br />
government owned 51% of shares in bp. Drake asked Heath to put his request<br />
in writing, to which the enraged Prime Minister replied: ‘You know<br />
perfectly well that I can’t put it in writing’. Drake’s response was: ‘Then I<br />
won’t do it’. 22<br />
The Dutch Foreign Minister, Van der Stoel, wanted to discuss the<br />
whole question with his British counterpart, Douglas Home, preferably<br />
before the ec meeting of November 5 and 6, but Home had no time, he<br />
said. He did write Van der Stoel a personal letter in which he observed<br />
that it would be best for everyone if as much oil as possible continued to<br />
enter Europe. Communal action co-ordinated by the ec would not contribute<br />
to this. 23 This did not sound particularly cooperative, and Van der<br />
Stoel instructed Ambassador Gevers to issue a démarche expressing the<br />
hope that London would not take ‘unilateral definitive steps’ before the<br />
ec talks ‘which could prejudice cooperation within the ec or oecd’. On<br />
November 2 Gevers held discussions with the Permanent Under-Secretary<br />
at the British Foreign Ministry, D. Greenhill. The Dutch Ambassador<br />
indeed expressed the hope that London would take no steps before<br />
November 5, which Greenhill was able to promise. 24<br />
The following morning, Gevers had a further meeting with the Assistant<br />
Under-Secretary at the Foreign Ministry, G. Parsons, who said that<br />
Arab suspicion was the consequence of the position the Dutch had taken<br />
during the political discussions of the Nine, of which ‘the Arabs (and Israelis)<br />
were always extremely well-informed’. The Arab countries had<br />
been given the impression that The Netherlands was the major stumbling<br />
block to formulating European support for the Arab cause. Parsons wondered<br />
whether The Hague could not stress continued Dutch support for<br />
the un resolution 2949 of December 1972, one of the most pro-Arab resolutions<br />
passed by the General Assembly which The Netherlands had<br />
supported at the time. According to Parsons, this would give the leaders<br />
of the Gulf States in particular room to extricate themselves from the embargo,<br />
or at least not to apply it too rigorously. 25<br />
The Dutch were thus put under pressure from the British side as well as<br />
the French to take more account of the Arab standpoints. On November<br />
5, the first day of the ec meeting in Brussels, there occurred an incident in<br />
the House of Commons in London which was highly inconvenient to the<br />
Dutch: the Labour MP, Christopher Mayhew, said that the British gov-<br />
80
ernment should be very careful of making any agreement to ‘pool oil resources’<br />
with countries which, by supplying arms, had de facto chosen<br />
sides in the October War. The Minister of Trade, Peter Walker, did not react<br />
to this accusation, giving the impression that his government attached<br />
some credence to such rumours. Gevers asked The Hague whether it was<br />
necessary to approach the Foreign Ministry – at least, ‘assuming both assertions<br />
could be categorically denied’. The Dutch Foreign Ministry apparently<br />
had no trouble with this, for the Ambassador was instructed the<br />
following day to do just this. 26<br />
The Neighbouring EC Countries<br />
For various different reasons the conflicts with neighbouring ec member<br />
states appeared less acute than with France and Britain. There was more<br />
ec solidarity urged from the West German and the Belgian sides than by<br />
Paris or London, though neither country was always willing to acknowledge<br />
that solidarity in public. Both West Germany and Belgium were<br />
much more directly affected by an embargo against The Netherlands because<br />
of the importance of Rotterdam for their oil supply. This meant<br />
that both countries, to a degree, were in the same boat as The Netherlands.<br />
As set out in the Dutch Foreign Ministry report mentioned earlier,<br />
‘The Dutch policy during the oil crisis’, in his approach toward ec partners,<br />
Van der Stoel made ‘maximum use of the uncertainty over the question<br />
of whether oil destined for transit also fell under the embargo’. 27 And<br />
that meant mainly Belgium and West Germany.<br />
This strategy seemed to work. In Bonn there was great uncertainty<br />
over the consequences of the embargo, as the Dutch Ambassador F. Kupers<br />
reported from Bonn. 28 The embassy in Bonn in fact received many<br />
questions about the extent and the consequences of the embargo, especially<br />
over the consequences for West German oil imports via The Netherlands.<br />
The question was also asked whether the export controls on oil<br />
products announced by the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs (see<br />
chapter 4) also applied to the German emergency stocks prescribed by the<br />
ec, which in part were stored in the Botlek area in Rotterdam-Europort<br />
and were not formally imported into The Netherlands at all. An arrangement<br />
had been made between the two Economics Ministers over these<br />
stocks in December 1970, in which it was provided that they in no way<br />
whatever fell under Dutch authority, not even in case of crisis. But, as established<br />
by Dutch Economic Affairs on more businesslike grounds, the<br />
81
legal form of this agreement was no more than an administrative accord<br />
between two ministers. In other words, a new minister need not feel<br />
bound by this agreement at all. 29 And in the meantime there had been a<br />
new minister.<br />
The West German social democratic government under the leadership<br />
of Willy Brandt, in the Dutch view, assumed an attitude of far greater solidarity<br />
than either Paris or London, even if this was partly through selfinterest.<br />
Kupers reported from Bonn that high officials of the Auswärtige<br />
Amt (Foreign Affairs) and the Bundeskanzleramt (Cabinet Office) left no<br />
doubt that the common market must be maintained. Even the French, it<br />
was thought, must realize that economic decline in The Netherlands and<br />
West Germany would have serious repercussions on France itself. 30<br />
In any case, the West German understanding for the Dutch problems<br />
in the Arab world did not go unnoticed. The rumours and reports of arms<br />
transports over West Germany to Israel also played a role here. 31 The<br />
Libyan Ambassador to The Netherlands tried to incite his interlocutors<br />
against The Netherlands by declaring that if The Hague could not be<br />
forced to adopt a ‘neutral standpoint’, the Dutch should anticipate a cold<br />
winter, which would also endanger West German oil provisions. 32<br />
Belgium of course was also heavily dependent on oil supplies from<br />
Rotterdam. Some 25 million tons of crude oil passed annually through<br />
the Rotterdam-Antwerp pipeline, and the Antwerp refineries were totally<br />
dependent on this supply. It was therefore of the utmost importance for<br />
Brussels to know what exactly the embargo entailed. If it was purely directed<br />
against The Netherlands as oil consumer, the consequences for the<br />
Belgian market would be negligible, the Dutch embassy in Brussels concluded.<br />
But if it was an action taken against the exploitative companies<br />
making use of Dutch ports, then the whole question at once became more<br />
problematic in view of the fact that Belgium depended on deliveries from<br />
these ports. 33<br />
The Belgian Foreign Ministry took the position that solidarity among<br />
the Nine must be the priority. 34 This sounded good, but it did not prevent<br />
problems arising between Brussels and The Hague. On October 24,<br />
1973, a ministerial decision was announced in Belgium by which the export<br />
of a number of oil products would henceforth be subject to permits.<br />
This order also applied to exports to The Netherlands, whereas the converse<br />
had until then not been the case in The Netherlands. At the end of<br />
October, though, the Belgian policy relaxed a little, i.e. the issue of permits<br />
for exports to ec countries would in most cases be automatically<br />
granted. 35<br />
82
The OECD<br />
The circumstances that had arisen made it desirable for the Western consumer<br />
countries to work together to combat the oil crisis, but this was not<br />
so self-evident. From the Dutch viewpoint, an obvious framework for the<br />
realization of such cooperation appeared to be either the ec or the oecd.<br />
The oecd had as an additional advantage the fact that all the main,<br />
Western industrialized countries were members, making a European<br />
Alleingang – to which The Netherlands had always objected – impossible.<br />
Furthermore, the matter of emergency measures in times of crisis or of<br />
acute oil shortages had been discussed within the oecd over some years.<br />
The problems of oil supply during the Suez crisis of 1956 had led the then<br />
oeec (Organisation for European Economic Cooperation, the predecessor<br />
of the oecd) to set up a scheme for sharing the burden of a reduced oil<br />
supply between the various West European countries. The Middle East<br />
war of 1967, when England and France were affected by an oil embargo,<br />
had prompted the oecd to develop this scheme further.<br />
The ruling was only applicable to the West European countries. In the<br />
1970s, the situation on the oil market changed rather drastically as a result<br />
of rapid growth in the demand for oil and the increasing dependence<br />
of Japan and the usa. Washington was rather unwilling to put the vast oil<br />
production at home under the common oecd emergency system. In previous<br />
years, these developments had led to several fruitless attempts to<br />
come to a ruling acceptable to all oecd members. Until just before the oil<br />
crisis, ideas over such allocation schemes were still being exchanged within<br />
the oecd.<br />
Immediately following the first reports of reduced production, the<br />
Dutch Cabinet appealed to the oecd for the enforcement of a proportional<br />
sharing of oil if the embargo should go through. The embargo<br />
should be considered as a communal matter. On October 25 the oecd<br />
Oil Commission met. In a prior ec consultation, the Dutch Permanent<br />
Representative made it clear that The Hague advocated the operation of<br />
an oil-sharing scheme. If that did not work, the reactivation of the international<br />
Advisory Board would be a satisfactory alternative, a group of<br />
representatives from the main oil companies whose job it would be to help<br />
the Oil Commission to set up the sharing scheme. 36<br />
Former Secretary-General of the oecd, E. van Lennep, concluded in<br />
his memoirs that the oecd allocation system based on unanimity was not<br />
put into operation, mainly because of France and Britain. 37 It appears<br />
from a report of the oecd meeting that not only these two countries but<br />
83
also the usa played a ‘delaying’ or ‘cautious’ role. Most countries did not<br />
yet consider the oil situation dire. Reactivating the Advisory Board also<br />
encountered resistance. All that was decided was that the chairman of the<br />
Oil Commission should ask members of the Advisory Board for information.<br />
There were four reasons for the reserved attitude of most oecd countries;<br />
or so it was assumed at the Dutch Foreign Ministry. There was a<br />
pervasive lack of information; there was a fear of speculation; there was<br />
the worry that ganging up (by the West) could send exactly the wrong signal<br />
to the opec countries; and finally there was the hope entertained by<br />
some countries that they would be treated as special cases. The latter reasoning<br />
related to reports that Saudi Arabia considered the oil-consuming<br />
countries under three categories: hostile, neutral and friendly. Other considerations<br />
played a part in the usa, such as the problem of operating the<br />
distribution code. 38 The oecd was thus not mobilized.<br />
The EC<br />
Beside the oecd, The Hague also attempted to get the ec to take measures.<br />
Within the ec, too, it was a question of proportional allocation of a<br />
reduced oil supply and of organizing this within the commercial operation<br />
of the free market of the ec; a point of view which clearly ran counter<br />
to the French position. To the Dutch Cabinet, intervention on the part of<br />
the European Commission seemed the most desirable option, and in fact<br />
the Commission did propose this. At a meeting of Permanent Representatives,<br />
the Commission presented a proposal for information exchange<br />
concerning oil imports. This was a modest proposal that The Netherlands<br />
could live with. However, the Commission further urged on this occasion<br />
that proposals mooted in the summer, for a communal ec energy policy,<br />
should also be considered.<br />
While the Den Uyl Cabinet, at the end of October, was still hoping for<br />
an international solution to the oil problem, a string of Arab countries<br />
had meanwhile joined the embargo against The Netherlands. The outlook<br />
was hardly a rosy one. During an interdepartmental meeting on October<br />
29 to discuss restrictions on consumption, Economics Minister<br />
Lubbers again strongly urged European cooperation. The line of thought<br />
at the Ministry for Economic Affairs was that the European Commission<br />
would soon have to take measures to curtail oil consumption within the<br />
whole ec. If they should fail to do this, then in Lubbers’s view The<br />
84
Netherlands should feel free ‘to limit its exports of oil products and natural<br />
gas to the European partners’. It was an indication of the assertive attitude<br />
held by Economic Affairs throughout the entire crisis. The Dutch<br />
Foreign Ministry, however, objected to the threat of retaliation implicit in<br />
the point of view of the Ministry for Economic Affairs.<br />
On October 30 the European Commission was asked by The Netherlands<br />
to come up with initiatives as quickly as possible so that these could<br />
be discussed in the ec consultations of November 5 and 6.TheDutchPermanent<br />
Representative in Brussels was asked by his colleagues to press for<br />
discussion of the oil problem during the approaching conference. He was<br />
instructed at the same timetostressthatallcountries, when it came to<br />
their oil supply, were threatened with involvement. A day later, the Dutch<br />
Ambassador in Bonn was also requested to press for the oil problem to be<br />
dealt with at the Auswärtige Amt during the discussions of November 5<br />
and 6.Thesituation was, after all, sufficiently serious to justify such consultations.<br />
In the first place, then, it was a question of maintaining proportional<br />
supplies and at the same time of preserving the common market. 39<br />
Little was expected in the way of cooperation from London and Paris.<br />
There was particularly scepticism in The Hague over French readiness for<br />
communal ec action with regard to the oil problem; and any hope of<br />
French cooperation was further diminished when it was learned that<br />
Pompidou had put out a plan to convene a summit conference of government<br />
leaders, to which Heath and Brandt appeared to have pledged their<br />
cooperation. It thus seemed that the three largest ec countries were joining<br />
forces in a way that held little attraction for The Hague. Furthermore,<br />
it was feared that the political aspects of the Middle East conflict would<br />
become the main issue during such a summit rather than the oil problem.<br />
The Netherlands would then undoubtedly be put under severe pressure.<br />
At first, Pompidou’s proposal did in fact deal mainly with the discussion<br />
of the European attitude toward the Middle East. Only later did the<br />
French agree to address the oil question.<br />
During a meeting with the ec Ambassadors on October 29, Van der<br />
Stoel once again argued passionately for European cooperation in the oil<br />
crisis. He pointed to the important transit function of Rotterdam and<br />
warned of the consequences of a sauve-qui-peut devil take the hindmost<br />
mentality. For the time being, however, his message still fell on deaf ears.<br />
Otherwise, The Hague was taking good care that these efforts at European<br />
cooperation did not get in the way of relations with the usa. The<br />
very same day, the State Department in Washington was informed by<br />
Ambassador Van Lynden of the meeting with the ec ambasadors. Van<br />
85
Lynden emphasized that the Dutch effort to get some form of ec action<br />
should not be interpreted as implying any loss of interest in possible<br />
arrangements through the oecd. Washington evidently took it for granted<br />
that the Dutch should for the present be capable of solving their own<br />
problems within the ec. But that was not now the intention. 40<br />
On October 31 the European Commission made known a number of<br />
draft decisions concerning commercial trade in crude oil and oil products.<br />
These proposals came down to a procedure over the provision of information<br />
to the Commission over oil stocks and oil imports from non-ec<br />
countries, and additionally a duty to report exports to non-ec countries.<br />
And finally, the Commission proposed draft regulations relating to trade<br />
within the ec, based on the assumption that existing trade channels<br />
should be maintained. It was thought that member states would continue<br />
to issue licences automatically; but the Commission was given authority<br />
to suspend temporarily the obligation to issue export licences in cases<br />
where this would seriously endanger supplies in a member state.<br />
These proposals met with approval in the Dutch Foreign Ministry,<br />
though there were doubts as to whether Paris, Rome and Brussels would<br />
agree. For tactical reasons it therefore seemed best for The Hague not to<br />
expose itself too much. Current stocks and needs besides made it unnecessary<br />
to deviate from normal, automatic issuance of licences. It was more a<br />
matter of making an arrangement such that the issue of licences could be<br />
halted if the circumstances so required. 41<br />
In a sub-committee of the Dutch Council of Ministers, the Ministerial<br />
Council for European Affairs, Lubbers also expressed his satisfaction on<br />
November 1 over the speed of this action taken by the Commission. The<br />
embargo was now at least seen as a communal problem. But he was not<br />
entirely satisfied. Economic Affairs wanted to tackle not just the provision,<br />
but also the use of oil. The rationing of consumption should also be<br />
dealt with at the communal level, yet there was no proposal along these<br />
lines. Lubbers tended toward the holding of bilateral talks with his foreign<br />
colleagues, but that did not go down well with Van der Stoel, who<br />
warned against holding ‘premature talks’. The first step should be a meeting<br />
of Foreign Ministers in Brussels, said Van der Stoel, thus underlining<br />
that it was primarily within the competence of the Foreign Ministry to<br />
seek a solution to the international oil crisis. 42<br />
The Dutch Permanent Representative at the ec and the Ambassadors<br />
in other member countries were then instructed to act as discretely as possible<br />
in order to prevail on especially the French and the British to cooperate<br />
fully. Meanwhile it had become clear that the Commission’s propos-<br />
86
als, at France’s insistence, would be dealt with highly confidentially during<br />
the coming ec talks, possibly during a dinner for the Foreign Ministers.<br />
Discretion was therefore of the utmost importance.<br />
There were nevertheless still objections within the Ministry for Economic<br />
Affairs to the Commission’s proposals. As a result, the old differences<br />
of opinion between Economic Affairs and the Foreign Ministry surfaced<br />
anew. As observed in a memo from the Head of the Department for<br />
Economic Cooperation (des) of the Foreign Ministry to Van der Stoel,<br />
the proposals provided that export restrictions to member states would<br />
only be permitted after it had been established that oil supplies in the exporting<br />
country were ‘seriously’ endangered. This, according to the Head<br />
of des, meant that ‘The Netherlands would allow a weapon to slip from<br />
its hands to which the Ministry for Economic Affairs was rather attached’,<br />
viz. the possibility of introducing, or threatening to introduce,<br />
restrictions on export or transit goods. After consultation with Economic<br />
Affairs, therefore, the permanent representative at the ec was asked to<br />
try to get the word ‘seriously’ removed. This would leave more possibilities<br />
open for exceptions to the automatic issue of licences. A second problem<br />
was the provision of information that the Commission proposed.<br />
Economic Affairs and Shell had up till then been handling industrial information<br />
confidentially, since this information could be used as the<br />
foundation for a community policy regarding oil supplies that would<br />
move too far in the French and Italian direction. This aspect, according to<br />
des, seemed meanwhile less problematic. Shell appeared to change its<br />
position on this point. 43<br />
There were more objections from Economic Affairs. As mentioned<br />
above, the Commission also wanted to restart consultations over a common<br />
ec energy policy. Economic Affairs was not inclined, however, to<br />
cooperate on a Community market arrangement as long as it was not<br />
clear what goals such an arrangement would serve. Within the Foreign<br />
Ministry the problem was viewed very differently. In a note from the<br />
Head of the Department for European Integration (die), it was stressed<br />
that France was only willing to cooperate on finding a solution to the current<br />
oil crisis, whereas The Netherlands was ready to work out a Middle<br />
East declaration under the aegis of the epc as well as cooperate on setting<br />
up a Community energy policy. In view of the fact that the major oil companies<br />
no longer had a firm grip on the situation on the international oil<br />
market, the Committee argued, it was perhaps inevitable that the Netherlands<br />
would have to move with events and adapt to the new situation. 44<br />
Contrary to the view in Economic Affairs, that The Netherlands’ part-<br />
87
ners in the ec should come to some arrangement that would leave the import<br />
of oil by the Nine to the oil companies, die did not want to be isolated<br />
within the ec and was ready to put aside the usual Dutch principles in<br />
order to get discussions going there.<br />
A Declaration by the Nine<br />
In the meantime, several countries were arguing that the ec talks fixed for<br />
November 5 and 6 should be devoted mainly to discussion of the Middle<br />
East situation. Most member states wanted to concentrate on the political<br />
aspects of the war, not in the first place about the consequences of the<br />
Arab oil embargo. The Hague, however, was mainly interested in ec cooperation<br />
with regard to the oil crisis, not in a common Middle East policy.<br />
However, once it was settled that the oil problem would also come up<br />
for debate, Van der Stoel felt able to agree with the proposal to use the<br />
talks to discuss the war in the Middle East as well. 45<br />
Yet in the event, The Netherlands’ partners paid far more attention to<br />
the political side of the question, and consequently to the differences of<br />
opinion within the ec on this issue. And in this context, on November 1,<br />
the British again asked the Dutch Cabinet whether they would not bring<br />
Arab attention to the fact that the current Dutch government, just like its<br />
predecessor, endorsed the un resolution 2949 of December 1972. In this<br />
resolution, rejected by Israel and the usa, the rights of the Palestinians<br />
were recognized as an essential part of any peace settlement in the Middle<br />
East. Van der Stoel, who as a member of the Dutch Parliament had once<br />
criticized the Dutch support for this resolution, declined the British suggestion.<br />
46<br />
In spite of all this, in early November a new draft government statement<br />
was prepared at the Dutch Foreign Ministry, which referred to the<br />
PvdA position that the Palestinians had the right to their own political<br />
identity. According to this draft, the government should state that it<br />
shared this judgement. Largely because of the reference to a party political<br />
position, the draft was quickly put aside, and a new instruction drawn<br />
up for the Ambassadors in the Arab countries which was approved by Van<br />
der Stoel on November 5. It was observed in this document that the Arab<br />
countries were evidently pressing for further enlightenment on The<br />
Hague’s position over future Israeli borders and the Palestinian question.<br />
With regard to the first point it was said that the Israeli borders, as stated<br />
earlier, must be approximately the same as those existing before the 1967<br />
88
war. The question of whether The Netherlands adhered to the French or<br />
the British version of resolution 242 was not raised. On the Palestinian<br />
question it was specified that their political aspirations had to be embodied<br />
in some form or other as an essential part of any future peace settlement.<br />
This signified a definite sharpening of the Dutch point of view, even<br />
though nothing had been said about a Palestinian political identity, let<br />
alone a Palestinian state. 47<br />
Meanwhile, the long-awaited ec ministerial conference was approaching.<br />
The week from October 30 saw the preparations for reaching<br />
a common political standpoint in the Comité Politique. Progress was difficult,<br />
partly through fear of leaks to the press, as was later to happen during<br />
the ministerial talks of November 5 and 6. In a first draft text the Nine<br />
announced that they wished to play an active role in ending the Middle<br />
East conflict, within the framework of the United Nations, and specifically<br />
on the basis of resolution 242. But on November 4, the first car-free<br />
Sunday in The Netherlands (see Chapter 4), the British dgpa submitted<br />
an entirely new draft statement.<br />
On the Dutch side there was a major objection to a passage proposed<br />
by the British in which the Nine reasserted their support for resolution<br />
2949 and subsequently listed a whole series of ingredients that would<br />
have to be part of any peace settlement: ‘the non-acquisition of territories<br />
by force’, the ‘withdrawal of Israeli armed forced from occupied territories’,<br />
the ‘respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence<br />
of every state in the area’ and ‘the invalidity of changes carried out by<br />
Israel in the occupied territories’. The British proposal also included a<br />
recognition of the rights of the Palestinians.<br />
It appeared in the Comité Politique that The Hague objected only to<br />
this passage. At the suggestion of the Belgians, the reference to 2949 was<br />
removed: a list of ingredients essential to a peace settlement would have<br />
to be sufficient. But agreement on this list turned out to be not such a simple<br />
matter, in particular the withdrawal of forces from the occupied territories.<br />
48 From the final closing statement it seems that dgpa Van Lynden<br />
successfully resisted the passage concerning the changes to be implemented<br />
by Israel in the occupied territories. Furthermore, a passage was added<br />
on the right to secure recognized borders, undoubtedly for the benefit of<br />
Israel.<br />
Finally, Van Lynden, who had been in constant contact with the Dutch<br />
Foreign Ministry, approved the draft declaration. The Netherlands thus<br />
adopted a position of loyalty, as was also later and emphatically repeated,<br />
even if this approval was granted in the hope that an epc declaration<br />
89
could be ‘linked’ to a common ec action in response to the oil crisis. The<br />
latter was referred to the ministerial discussions, which was not a good<br />
sign.<br />
On Monday, November 5, Van der Stoel arrived in Brussels. The Benelux<br />
ministers held a meeting that afternoon and arranged to keep in contact<br />
with each other. On Monday evening, Van der Stoel spoke for an<br />
hour with his British counterpart, Douglas Home, and the British Energy<br />
Minister, Ralph Davies. It was clear in the course of this meeting that<br />
London was strongly against any ec measures relating to the trade in oil<br />
and oil products. Britain and France refused to attend to the Commission’s<br />
proposals. Home declared that Britain was still receiving a large<br />
quantity of Arab oil and that his government did not want to give the<br />
Arab countries any pretext for stopping it. The British fear that the Arab<br />
countries could exercise control over the transfer of the flow of crude oil<br />
was not shared by The Hague. From the Dutch side, it was pointed out<br />
that, according to Shell, it would be difficult to control whether in the<br />
coming period more oil entered Rotterdam from Iran and Nigeria and<br />
less into British ports, but the British stuck to their viewpoint. 49<br />
It was during this conversation, according to Grünfeld, that Douglas<br />
Home threatened that London would not hesitate in an emergency to use<br />
legal means to compel the oil companies to keep to their contracts. 50 Perhaps<br />
Home said this in reaction to a statement by Shell’s president, Wagner,<br />
who had the previous day publicly stated that the oil companies<br />
would share oil shortages in Europe between the various consumer countries.<br />
In spite of this, Van der Stoel put it to the Dutch Council of Ministers<br />
three days later that the British government would not obstruct mutual<br />
agreements made between the major oil companies. Then PvdA leader<br />
Van Thijn also noted in his diary that Douglas Home had said: ‘we will<br />
not interfere with the commercial policy of the oil companies’. 51<br />
The British Minister Davies had warned Van der Stoel about entertaining<br />
illusions concerning the role of the oil companies. Davies could<br />
see no way that influence could – or would – be exerted on the oil companies<br />
to move crude oil, despite the embargo, to Rotterdam; though with<br />
refined products it was a different matter. Van der Stoel’s argument of the<br />
threat of disintegration of the ec did not convince his British colleague.<br />
‘Even my plea to keep strictly secret any measures that might be necessary<br />
– such as those proposed by the Commission – made little impression’,<br />
Van der Stoel later reported. Home held the view that there was absolutely<br />
no possibility of secrecy in Brussels. 52<br />
The fear of leaks also turned out to play a major role later, in the dinner<br />
90
attended by the nine Foreign Ministers and the Chair of the Commission,<br />
François-Xavier Ortoli. According to Van der Stoel, it transpired that the<br />
fear of any common action drawing to itself the attention of the Arab<br />
countries was widely shared. Only those countries that depended on the<br />
movement of oil through Rotterdam declared themselves to some extent<br />
prepared to take joint action. The French Foreign Minister Jobert, above<br />
all, would not hear of any joint action, referring to the fact that the Commission<br />
proposals had meanwhile been published in the French press.<br />
Jobert did not want to discuss these proposals over dinner.<br />
The Ministers quickly agreed on the prepared epc declaration over the<br />
situation in the Middle East. The communiqué of the Nine stated that the<br />
ec wished to play a role in finding a solution to the Middle East conflict,<br />
effectively going against the Americans’ virtual monopoly, until then tacitly<br />
accepted, of Western intervention in the Middle East. The Nine expressed<br />
the hope that negotiations could be opened under the aegis of the<br />
un, and based on the implementation of all sections of resolution 242. A<br />
peace accord must be based on four fundamental principles: ‘the inadmissibility<br />
of territorial expansion through violence’; ‘an end to the territorial<br />
occupation of areas controlled by Israel since 1967; ‘respect for the sovereignty,<br />
integrity and independence of all states in the region, as well as<br />
the right to live in peace within secure and recognized borders’; and finally<br />
‘the legitimate rights of the Palestinians’.<br />
The Dutch acceptance of the second point appeared to be a volte-face.<br />
Van der Stoel subsequently said that he had made an interpretative statement<br />
on November 6 in which he had said that The Hague construed this<br />
second principle as conforming with resolution 242. ‘In any case, this<br />
back-up statement without doubt lays down that The Netherlands had<br />
not committed itself to a formal evacuation of all occupied areas.’ He also<br />
remarked here that making this information public would have perhaps<br />
made his position in regard to domestic politics rather more comfortable;<br />
but he had not done this because it would not have looked so sensible in<br />
regard to the oil countries. 53<br />
Neither during the epc meeting nor in a subsequent closed session,<br />
where occasionally ‘frank words were exchanged’, were any new viewpoints<br />
on the oil crisis raised. Only the West German Foreign Minister,<br />
Walter Scheel, called for solidarity with partners who found themselves<br />
in diffculties. Van der Stoel too urged cooperation and, in view of the<br />
Britsh fears on this score, as much secrecy as possible, but he got absolutely<br />
no support from either the French or the British sides. Jobert stated<br />
in the clearest terms that the Dutch Middle Eastern politics had led to<br />
91
the embargo against Rotterdam and therefore no appeal to the Common<br />
Market was justified.<br />
There was thus no support for The Netherlands, despite the fact that<br />
the majority public opinion in the ec was for help to member states which<br />
got into difficulties (varying from 59% in England to 70% in France and<br />
88% in Italy). 54 London seemed only interested in securing its own oil<br />
supplies. Brussels, Luxembourg and Bonn showed some understanding<br />
of the Dutch position, but this understanding would go no further than<br />
verbal support. Luxembourg and Belgium pushed for a press statement<br />
on the whole oil problem, apart from anything else to avoid the ec losing<br />
credibility.<br />
The press statement was duly issued and spoke of the mutual interdependence<br />
of member states’ economies and of the necessity to follow the<br />
situation closely. To Van der Stoel’s exasperation, however, it announced<br />
not a single concrete measure to be taken. He had, after all, agreed to a<br />
new Middle East declaration on the assumption that actual cooperation<br />
in the matter of oil supplies would also be addressed. That was evidently a<br />
mistaken assumption. The Dutch Foreign Minister wondered whether<br />
disintegration of the ec could in the end be avoided. 55<br />
Reactions in The Netherlands<br />
As indicated earlier, the policy pursued by Van der Stoel was not without<br />
its critics within the Dutch Foreign Ministry. dgpa Van Lynden and, as<br />
we saw earlier, the Department for European Integration (die) were also<br />
of the view that The Netherlands should avoid becoming too isolated<br />
within the ec. This difference of outlook also involved the general question<br />
of whether The Netherlands had to accept the epc as a European policy-determining<br />
framework more than previously. In both these respects,<br />
accepting the statement of November 6 meant a change of policy, or at<br />
least a first step in that direction. It meant acceptance of the epc as a policy-shaping<br />
and policy-co-ordinating executive body, and a provisional<br />
end to The Hague’s isolation within that body. It also meant an accommodation,<br />
albeit a cautious one, to the British and French positions,<br />
though the significance of this should not be exaggerated, given Van der<br />
Stoel’s ‘interpretative statement’ cited above. The passage concerning the<br />
occupied territories was vague (any reference to the occupied territories<br />
was avoided), and The Netherlands had earlier expressed recognition of<br />
the legitimate rights of the Palestinians by accepting resolution 2949 in<br />
the un General Assembly.<br />
92
At first, at least, the epc statement of November 6 was not well received.<br />
According to oil expert and author Daniel Yergin, Arab diplomats<br />
considered it ‘a kiss blown from afar – which is all very nice, but we would<br />
prefer something warmer and closer’. 56 Reactions in Israel, on the other<br />
hand, were bitter: it was felt that the statement was a step in the direction<br />
of the Arabs. Kissinger was also dismissive, speaking of a ‘stampede of<br />
dissociation’ and complaining of a lack of consultation on the part of the<br />
ec. He announced that his country ‘was going to pursue its own policies<br />
in the Middle East in any event’. 57 Relations between the usa and America’s<br />
European nato partners did not appear to have improved; and because<br />
of this Brandt declared a week after the signing that the Nine had<br />
gone too far. 58<br />
In The Netherlands, too, there was much criticism of the declaration.<br />
The progressive newspaper de Volkskrant concluded that the November<br />
6 communiqué made far fewer compromises to the Israeli position than<br />
the American peace plans. The declaration therefore had to be seen as a<br />
French diplomatic success. 59 Het Parool (social-democratic) also regretted<br />
that The Netherlands had signed the declaration, for it had evidently<br />
been the fruit of Arab pressure and because the Nine had been made ‘the<br />
instrument of the French Middle East policy’. 60 Trouw (protestant) spoke<br />
of a ‘bourgeois timidity hiding behind the oil stove’. 61<br />
Of all the influential Dutch newspapers, only NRC Handelsblad found<br />
little to object to, taking a rather laconic view. It was a question of a declaration<br />
from countries not directly involved in the conflict who did not<br />
want to engage in world politics, but merely wanted to defend their own<br />
regional interests. The declaration contained ‘nothing more than opinions,<br />
without indicating the means by which the proposed goals might be<br />
achieved’. 62 This was neither the first nor last time that NRC Handelsblad<br />
had tended to give prime importance to the interests of the port of Rotterdam.<br />
Three days later the paper published an open letter from the historian<br />
L. de Jong, roundly accusing Van der Stoel of having betrayed Israel<br />
and thus ending the previous solidarity with that country, which De Jong<br />
referred to as a ‘debt of honour’. NRC Handelsblad, in its editorial column,<br />
again reacted in pragmatic fashion. The paper called the ec declaration<br />
‘healthily realistic’, and it did not necessarily mean that Israel had<br />
been repudiated by The Netherlands. It was merely a question of giving a<br />
‘slight change of tack’ to Middle Eastern policy. 63 Reproaches were also<br />
voiced in the Dutch Council of Ministers, notably from Vredeling, who<br />
regretted that the ec had not condemned the use of the embargo as a<br />
weapon. By yielding to an embargo, one only put oneself in a more vul-<br />
93
nerable position which, according to him, could also be to Israel’s cost.<br />
He would have preferred to distance himself from the declaration. He regretted<br />
the British attitude and had let this be known in no uncertain<br />
terms in nato’s Nuclear Planning Group, which his British counterpart<br />
initially did not want raised for discussion, although it had eventually<br />
happened. In the future, The Netherlands should do everything possible<br />
to prevent the French line being followed. He again referred to the fact<br />
that Israel was not fighting on its own strength, but with resources of<br />
‘mainly’ American origin. All in all, Vredeling’s was a bluntly Atlanticoriented<br />
argument. The government had to put its trust in the usa. The<br />
American delegation had informed Vredeling that The Netherlands<br />
would not be left without oil. 64<br />
The Dutch Minister of Finance, W. Duisenberg, on the other hand,<br />
had only praise for Van der Stoel, whom he thought the target of a witchhunt.<br />
Lubbers too supported Van der Stoel and emphasized that the business<br />
world thoroughly approved the consistent line taken by the Cabinet,<br />
not to submit to threats, even though Dutch economic interests in the<br />
Arab region were great. Den Uyl also thought it prudent that The Netherlands<br />
had not distanced itself from the other eight, not least in connection<br />
with the embargo. Further, the limits of what was still acceptable to Israel<br />
had been properly taken into account in the declaration of the Nine. He<br />
again cited the fact that Van der Stoel had had to work with the fiercely<br />
pro-Israeli sentiment in the Second Chamber which, after the embargo,<br />
had suddenly been reversed. 65 And Den Uyl was right.<br />
Besides, before arriving at any judgement of the signing of the new ec<br />
declaration, it is important to point out that the character of the war in<br />
the Middle East had changed entirely. Israel’s position had in the meantime<br />
so improved that it was no longer endangered, however perilous<br />
those first days of the war had been. For this reason alone it would be a<br />
great oversimplification to posit that the ec, and The Netherlands too,<br />
had undergone a complete volte-face because of Arab pressure. 66<br />
94
Conclusion<br />
The embargo against The Netherlands went ahead. It was particularly<br />
difficult to raise international support for The Netherlands’ problems.<br />
On the contrary, it appeared that for the time being Britain and France<br />
were only too willing to make the most of the difficulties in which the<br />
Dutch were embroiled. Both within the oecd and the ec, it proved impossible<br />
to arrive at any common response to the oil crisis. Even the readiness<br />
of The Hague to endorse the new ec declaration on the Middle East<br />
had not been able to elicit support for the Dutch. In the ec,it was rather a<br />
bruising affair with no holds barred; and for that matter, the Cabinet also<br />
joined in. As we saw earlier, initiatives like the De Lavallette mission (see<br />
Chapter 2) were taken outside the ec. Furthermore, Lubbers threatened<br />
openly to turn off the natural gas tap, and Van der Stoel’s policy was partly<br />
based on creating uncertainty in those countries which depended on<br />
imports from The Netherlands.<br />
But so far, all this manoeuvring within the ec produced little result.<br />
The Netherlands’ ec partners, it seemed, were not inclined to a sense of<br />
‘solidarity’. It is nevertheless the question of what concrete support could<br />
have been expected from those ec partners. There was a considerable difference<br />
of opinion on this point between the Dutch ministries for Economic<br />
Affairs and Foreign Affairs. Economic Affairs mainly wanted<br />
talks to deal with concrete problems: both the supply problem and the necessity<br />
for restrictions on consumption. Should there prove to be no readiness<br />
for cooperation among the ec partners, argued Economic Affairs<br />
and Lubbers, a more clinically businesslike approach would be necessitated<br />
that would not attempt to disguise the existing conflicts of interest<br />
within the ec. The Foreign Ministry was in general more cautious and<br />
wanted to prevent such conflicts of interest being forced into the open.<br />
Foreign Affairs even went so far that it was ready to discuss – in the context<br />
of the ec – a common European energy policy if the partners, meaning<br />
specifically France, would agree to take measures to support The<br />
Netherlands if hit by an embargo.<br />
Economic Affairs took a much more cautious view of this last proposal,<br />
and here the long-standing conflict of competence in the international<br />
arena of the oil problem undoubtedly played a role. Yet it was Economic<br />
Affairs that took the more cynical view of European cooperation than did<br />
the Foreign Ministry. Secretary-General of Economic Affairs, F.W. Rutten,<br />
later said he thought that all the pleas for ec solidarity were intended<br />
purely for public opinion. In his view, such arguments were regarded by<br />
95
those involved in Economic Affairs at the time with considerable scepticism.<br />
67<br />
Meanwhile, it was clear that the oil companies wanted to divide equally<br />
the difficulties caused in Europe, including the embargo. The Netherlands<br />
was therefore not in quite such a bad position as initially thought.<br />
The Cabinet would, in fact, review its standpoint on ‘solidarity’ during<br />
the course of the following November; but the Den Uyl Cabinet was still<br />
confronted with Arab cut-backs on production and the threat of reduced<br />
oil supplies. This meant that The Netherlands, like other consumer countries,<br />
had to ready itself for rationing the domestic use of oil and oil products.<br />
In the following chapter, we shall therefore turn our attention to the<br />
wide range of domestic measures taken by the Den Uyl Cabinet in order to<br />
reduce the consumption of oil and oil products.<br />
96
4<br />
Domestic Measures<br />
In October and November of 1973, The Netherlands was confronted<br />
with a series of threatening Arab moves. Following the drastic rise in the<br />
price of oil on October 16, came the decision of the Arab opec states a<br />
day later to reduce oil production by 5% each month as long as the Western<br />
countries continued to support Israel. Almost a week later, The<br />
Hague was confronted with a full embargo, even though in the end not all<br />
the Arab oil states joined in. On October 18 Saudi Arabia itself announced<br />
that oil production would not shrink by 5% but by 10% monthly<br />
until all the Arab demands had been met with. On November 4 the situation<br />
appeared to worsen even further when the oapec countries took<br />
the decision to reduce production by 25% from September levels. By this<br />
time, it began to be clear that The Netherlands stood alone.<br />
The Den Uyl Cabinet<br />
The Den Uyl government had been in power in The Netherlands since<br />
May 1973; a coalition consisting on the one hand of the three ‘progressive’<br />
parties, the Dutch Labour Party, the Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA), the<br />
progressive-liberal D’66 and the radical Politieke Partij Radikalen<br />
(ppr), and on the other hand, the Christian Democratic parties, the Roman<br />
Catholic Katholieke Volkspartij (kvp) and the Protestant Anti-Revolutionaire<br />
Partij (arp). After lengthy and difficult negotiations this<br />
coalition was put together in the spring of 1973. With the exception of the<br />
short-lived Cals Cabinet, the PvdA had not participated in government<br />
since the collapse of the fourth Drees Cabinet in 1958. The PvdA seemed<br />
to play a central role in the Den Uyl Cabinet: apart from the premiership,<br />
PvdA party members occupied ministerial positions at Foreign Affairs,<br />
97
Defence, Finance and Development Cooperation. Furthermore, the three<br />
progressive parties, the PvdA, D’66and the ppr,together held a majority<br />
of seats in the government.<br />
The Den Uyl Cabinet would seem to have been a product of the social<br />
upheaval of the 1960s. At the elections of late 1972, the PvdA, D’66 and<br />
the ppr had presented the electorate with a common social programme,<br />
entitled Turning Point ’72, which promised structural reforms in several<br />
areas, both in domestic and foreign politics. This programme even spoke<br />
of reducing the might of big business.<br />
Turning Point ’72 was of course nopolicyforgovernment. The Cabinet<br />
was a coalition, and furthermore the Christian Democratic parties with<br />
support from the right had a majority in the Second Chamber. Nevertheless,<br />
Den Uylannounced in May that his Cabinet would try to contribute<br />
to a fairer distribution of knowledge, incomes, wealth and power, by<br />
means that included adapting the system of taxation. In the autumn of<br />
1973, variousmeasures were announced to stimulate the economy and<br />
improve the employment situation through increased government spending.<br />
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the Den Uyl Cabinet seemed to have no obvious<br />
allies among employers and big business with whom to discuss policy<br />
in times of serious political or economic crisis. Throughout the oil crisis,<br />
blame and criticism were to be heard that either directly or indirectly<br />
referred to the progressive character of the government – for having<br />
adopted a too frivolous, irresponsible position, of having paid too little<br />
attention to the interests and the viewpoint of employers. Van der Stoel<br />
was also accused of being moralistic, of having unrealistic pretensions<br />
that could actually damage real economic interests. In various ways, the<br />
oil crisis was a first major test case for the Cabinet.<br />
The Importance of Oil<br />
There can be no doubt that the steps taken by the Arab opec countries<br />
were a serious threat to the Dutch economy, and in addition a major setback<br />
for the Dutch government’s aim to stimulate the economy and<br />
achieve a more egalitarian society. The announced price rises, the restricted<br />
production and of course the embargo all contributed to this threat.<br />
The newspaper NRC Handelsblad predicted on October 20 that the dearer,<br />
scarcer oil would lead to a decline in affluence. 1 ‘Turning off the oil<br />
tap’, pronounced Het Parool few days later, was on paper no less than a<br />
national disaster. 2<br />
98
It was clear that the embargo could have far-reaching consequences. It<br />
had been calculated for Den Uyl at the end of October that The Netherlands<br />
was dependent on oil for roughly 53% of its total energy needs.<br />
Leaving aside the effects of the price rise announced on October 16, some<br />
two-thirds of this oil came from the Middle East. This meant that around<br />
40% of The Netherlands’ oil supply was now in the balance. 3<br />
On the other side of the scales, 45% of The Netherlands’ energy needs<br />
were satisfied from their own natural gas reserves. This greatly reduced<br />
the country’s vulnerability and its dependence on oil imports, which were<br />
correspondingly less than many other ec member states. The uk and<br />
West Germany with their coal and The Netherlands with its natural gas,<br />
were in fact less dependent on oil for their energy needs than France or<br />
Italy. 4 Indeed, The Netherlands could be considered ‘the most energy-rich<br />
country in Western Europe’; and so it was considered at the time by the<br />
Dutch Ministry of Economics. 5 Considerable quantities of gas were exported<br />
to West Germany, Belgium and France. In 1973, around 58 million<br />
cubic metres of natural gas were produced, a figure which rose to 70<br />
million in 1974. 6<br />
Beside natural gas, of course, the Dutch also exported refined oil products.<br />
In 1972, the total throughput of oil involving all Dutch ports was<br />
around 149 million tons, of which 81 million tons were forwarded by<br />
ship, lorries or pipeline (West Germany being the greatest purchaser).<br />
This left a net import into The Netherlands of 68 million tons. 7<br />
However, oil was also an important raw material for the Dutch oil processing<br />
and petrochemical industry. The Arab oil measures could therefore<br />
have enormous consequences and could well lead to inflation and undermine<br />
prosperity, although exactly how this would come about was, of<br />
course, difficult to tell. The dependence on oil, and the concomitant susceptibility<br />
to price rises, restricted production, and the embargo itself<br />
varied widely between different economic sectors. Road traffic and road<br />
transport, so important for the Dutch economy, were almost totally dependent<br />
on oil; and the same was true for shipping, air transport, the fishing<br />
industry and the greenhouse horticultural industry.<br />
But in fact, oil imports were not only important as a source of energy<br />
for the Dutch nation; the significance of Rotterdam and the Rijnmond<br />
area lay for a large part in the supply, processing and transit of oil. In the<br />
Rijnmond area alone, some 20,000 people were directly dependent on the<br />
influx of oil and its processing. According to first estimates, the embargo<br />
affected approximately 70% of all the oil arriving in Rotterdam. Refining<br />
and chemical industries in the Rijnmond area were also completely de-<br />
99
pendent on the supply of crude oil. More generally, oil was an important<br />
industrial raw material, particularly for the chemical industry.<br />
The Botlek or Rijnmond area (that area of Holland where the Rhine<br />
flows via its many mouths into the North Sea) and Rotterdam formed a<br />
crucial link in the provision of oil to Western Europe as a whole. In 1972,<br />
about 70% of the European oil supply came from oapec countries, about<br />
25% of which was delivered to Rotterdam. The Rijnmond area was also<br />
hugely important for oil processing. The refineries there, comprising<br />
some 10% of Europe’s refining capacity, exported approximately 75% of<br />
their product. Rotterdam was thus an extremely important centre of the<br />
oil trade, immensely significant for the whole of Northwest Europe, and<br />
furthermore one of the principal refuelling ports in the world. 8<br />
Depending on the point of view, the central role of Rotterdam and the<br />
Rijnmond area in the oil sector could be seen either as a weakness or as a<br />
strength. The dependence on oil deliveries would at first sight suggest vulnerability,<br />
wrote NRC Handelsblad, which continued to speak as a powerful<br />
champion of the interests of the Rotterdam port throughout the entire<br />
crisis: the embargo ‘could be disastrous for our image’. There was an<br />
‘enormous danger’ that Rotterdam’s dominant position as a port would<br />
be affected. The paper pointed out that the business climate for major enterprises<br />
in The Netherlands had deteriorated over recent years. If the image<br />
of The Netherlands now gained ground as a country with difficulties<br />
in the oil sector, this could be fatal for Rotterdam’s position as the largest<br />
oil port in the world. 9 De Volkskrant also feared a ‘permanent loss of<br />
Rotterdam’s position’ as a consequence of the Arab actions. 10 But Rotterdam’s<br />
crucial role at the same time allowed the possibility of restricting<br />
transit, not only in the interest of Dutch economic needs but also as a way<br />
of putting political pressure on surrounding countries. In discussions held<br />
on October 30 between the Rotterdam City Council and the Dutch Ministry<br />
of Economics, there was speculation over the possibility of curtailing<br />
the free transit of oil. 11 Natural gas was another candidate for restricting<br />
exports and applying political pressure.<br />
Uncertainty<br />
Initially, there was uncertainty over what the actual consequences of the<br />
oapec countries’ actions would be for the oil supply. In particular, because<br />
the sailing time for oil tankers from the Persian Gulf via the Cape of<br />
Good Hope to Rotterdam was about six weeks, it would be the end of<br />
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November before it became clear exactly what the effects of the embargo<br />
and restricted production would be.<br />
Clearly, it was of overriding importance to obtain accurate information.<br />
On October 16, the same day that Kuwait decided on substantial<br />
price increases, a letter was sent by the Deputy Director for Coal and Natural<br />
Gas at the Dutch Ministry of Economics, H.A.A.M. van Eupen, to<br />
the oil companies, with the message that the current arrangements for<br />
mutual exchange of information must be stepped up, and the usual<br />
monthly supply of data on deliveries, production and stocks increased. 12<br />
Indeed, there was a general intensification of consultations between the<br />
Ministry of Economics and the oil companies. The former director of<br />
Dutch Shell said later that the oil companies had had ‘the closest contact’<br />
with the Ministry ‘on a virtually daily basis’, 13 usually with the Directorate-General<br />
for Energy. 14 Connections with other agencies and organisations<br />
concerned were also strengthened by the Ministry of Economics.<br />
Thus, on October 19 the first meeting over the energy shortage took place<br />
with the gas and electricity companies and with the oil-producing and<br />
distribution companies.<br />
The Dutch Council of Ministers of October 19 was the first occasion<br />
for the exchange of ideas involving the entire Cabinet on domestic measures<br />
for rationing the use of oil. Lubbers had in the meantime suggested<br />
to the Second Chamber that a ban on driving would be a simple solution<br />
to restrict fuel use; but Den Uyl, urging restraint, argued that an appeal to<br />
exercise economies would be sufficient for the time being. Lubbers too<br />
recognised that the first stage in any programme of measures should consist<br />
of information. There seems to have been agreement that, as long as it<br />
remained unclear how grave the situation was, an informational campaign<br />
together with an appeal for everyone to economise would be sufficient.<br />
In view of the currently prevailing uncertainty, the Council of Ministers<br />
decided that Lubbers should use his own discretion. 15<br />
During a staff discussion at the Ministry of Economics several days<br />
later, it was in fact concluded that so far there was no question of any cutback<br />
in oil deliveries to Rotterdam. Although Algeria had meanwhile announced<br />
an embargo, the share of Algerian oil in the total supply was no<br />
more than 1 or 2%. Most of those present at these discussions felt that as<br />
long as there was no concrete evidence of a slow-down in the flow of oil,<br />
no compulsory measures to curb consumption should be introduced. Furthermore,<br />
domestic use in normal times amounted to only 40% of the<br />
supply. If measures did have to be introduced, for the time being Lubbers<br />
preferred that they should be limited to voluntary restrictions. He was<br />
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therefore prepared to request the oil companies to reduce deliveries to the<br />
distributors and to launch a campaign to encourage a reduction in oil<br />
use. 16<br />
This, however, according to the Ministry staff, should not disguise the<br />
fact the Dutch government had to adjust to harder times ahead. Indeed,<br />
the first steps in this direction were taken on October 22 when it was decided<br />
that the oil companies would be required to submit data weekly<br />
rather than monthly on supply, stocks, processing and export. It was further<br />
decided to subject the export of the more important oil products to licensing<br />
on the basis of the Import/Export Law, whereby the issue of licences<br />
for export to ec countries was automatic. For non-ec countries, it<br />
was a precondition for the issue of the licence that there must be no reduction<br />
in the stocks held by The Netherlands. This licence system would<br />
also apply to the other Benelux countries, though this was not a judgement<br />
immediately adopted by the Cabinet. 17<br />
As already said, it was at that time still difficult to say in real terms<br />
what the consequences of the Arab actions would be. According to some<br />
reports, there was in reality no embargo in actual operation (as we saw in<br />
Chapter 2). Reports were reaching the Dutch Foreign Ministry that once<br />
tankers had left Arab ports ‘no further control could be exercised over<br />
their destination’. 18 Elsewhere in Western Europe, there was similarly no<br />
evidence of any reduction in the flow of oil. 19<br />
Despite this, the Cabinet’s policy of restraint was challenged, even<br />
within the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The political scientists Rosenthal<br />
and Scholten believe that there were probably differences of opinion<br />
within Economic Affairs over the need for quick action; specifically, disagreement<br />
between the Directorate-General for Energy (dge) and the<br />
Directorate-General for Industry (dgi). The Directorate-General for Energy<br />
advocated immediate, sweeping, across the board measures, whereas<br />
the dgi, in view of the major importance of especially the petrochemical<br />
industry, argued for measures that would be in the first place voluntary<br />
and focused on private consumption. 20 F.W. Rutten, at the time Secretary-General<br />
of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, sees these political<br />
differences as merely reflecting differences of responsibility. According to<br />
several participants in this discussion, the dge point of view prevailed. 21<br />
Yet it was mainly the uncertainty of the situation that dictated a certain<br />
caution. Moreover, within the Cabinet there was no agreement on the necessity<br />
for any restrictive measures.<br />
The press lost no time in censuring the Cabinet for its rather laconic attitude.<br />
Trouw, on the assumption that arrangements were already in<br />
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place for introducing car-free Sundays and speed restrictions, wrote that<br />
there was no reason for not implementing them at once. Such economies<br />
could, it was argued, turn out to have other benefits. Furthermore, speed<br />
restrictions would help reduce road accidents. 22 NRC Handelsblad also<br />
reproached the Cabinet for its rather spineless attitude toward the embargo.<br />
In the view of one editorial writer, the government was simply not prepared<br />
to make an urgent appeal to the Dutch people to limit petrol consumption<br />
as much as possible.<br />
‘It would be to the Cabinet’s credit to show a greater awareness of the<br />
problems created by the identification of The Netherlands with Israel in<br />
the eyes of the world, and a more vigorous approach to the consequences<br />
of this situation’, the paper said. 23 Over the following days, the message<br />
was repeated by NRC Handelsblad that the Cabinet seemed not to be taking<br />
the Arab threat seriously enough. Other dailies had much the same<br />
criticism: de Volkskrant thought that the government had for too long<br />
shut its eyes to the situation. 24<br />
Reducing Consumption<br />
By the end of October it was becoming clear that The Netherlands was<br />
threatened with an exceptional position. Although it was uncertain just<br />
how effective the embargo would be, this position could seriously damage<br />
the economy. In a meeting held on October 30 with Lubbers at the<br />
Ministry of Economics, a delegation from the Rotterdam city council<br />
reckoned that the port was faced with considerable loss of income and<br />
that employment would be endangered. On this occasion, different methods<br />
of combating the effects of the embargo were discussed, including the<br />
reverse pumping of oil through the pipeline between Rotterdam and<br />
Antwerp. Restricting deliveries to surrounding ec countries was also discussed;<br />
although to those present the possibility of actually carrying this<br />
out seemed small. As the Alderman J. Riezenkamp emphasized, it was<br />
crucial for Rotterdam to preserve its relationship of trust with its trading<br />
partners. Lubbers concluded on this occasion that everything possible<br />
must be attempted to reach the point where the burden would be shared<br />
internationally. 25<br />
Lubbers’ view of burden sharing, however, was rather optimistic. It<br />
was established during a staff discussion at the Ministry of Economic Affairs<br />
that the oecd was for the time being not prepared to put into operation<br />
any scheme for emergency oil provision. Nor was it very plausible<br />
103
that The Netherlands’ ec partners would be prepared to switch to joint<br />
actions. Meanwhile, the oil companies, at least as far as Europe was concerned,<br />
introduced a general reduction in the oil supply of around 15%: a<br />
substantial percentage. The staff discussion group considered that this<br />
meant a necessary reduction in domestic use of about 10%. 26<br />
In order to achieve this 10% reduction, it was decided at Economic Affairs,<br />
most probably on October 29, to bring in the Rationing Law and to<br />
activate the National Bureau for Oil Products (Rijksbureau voor Aardolieproducten,<br />
rba). 27 Certainly no modern political instrument, the Rationing<br />
Law stemmed from 1939 and was intended to be used in time of<br />
war or under comparable emergency situations. Putting the Rationing<br />
Law into effect was a first step toward the actual rationing of oil and oil<br />
products, but at the same time it provided the Minister of Economic Affairs<br />
with the legal basis for less radical measures, such as a ban on using<br />
cars on certain days. During the Suez crisis of 1956, the Drees Cabinet<br />
had also introduced car-free Sundays under the Rationing Law.<br />
After consulting Den Uyl, Lubbers took up the mandate the Council of<br />
Ministers had given him the previous week. On October 30 he addressed<br />
the Dutch Second Chamber by means of a letter, in which he announced<br />
that November 4 would be the first car-free Sunday. In addition, he made<br />
various other suggestions for reducing petrol consumption, viz. through<br />
a voluntary speed limit of 100 kilometres per hour (ca. 65 mph) and by<br />
limiting the use of cars generally as far as possible. It was further important<br />
to reduce the use of heating fuels, by reducing the room temperature<br />
in homes and buildings and by closing curtains. Provided they yielded the<br />
desired results, Lubbers informed his audience, these mainly voluntary<br />
measures should obviate the need for stricter controls on distribution.<br />
Notwithstanding, the Cabinet had already prepared such rationing<br />
plans. 28<br />
On October 31, a debate was held in the Dutch Second Chamber in<br />
which both the international politics and the domestic aspects of the oil<br />
crisis were raised. Six members of the Cabinet were present at this debate:<br />
Prime Minister Den Uyl, the Ministers Lubbers, Van Agt, Van der Stoel,<br />
and the Under-Secretaries M.H.M. van Hulten of Transport and Water<br />
Management and A.P.J.M.M. van der Stee of Finance. The Cabinet took<br />
a cautious approach. Den Uyl outlined the government measures to the<br />
Chamber, characterizing them as ‘precautionary measures’. Although up<br />
till then there had been ‘not a single ton less oil arriving in Rotterdam’,<br />
Den Uyl nonetheless suggested that the Arab embargo decision had been<br />
implemented, even though there was at that time no concrete evidence<br />
104
that this was so. Den Uyl was effectively bluffing, as one anonymous<br />
reader of the Foreign Ministry report on the crisis (cited earlier) later<br />
commented. 29<br />
Van der Stoel announced that no effort had been spared to get international<br />
consultations started to find an international solution to international<br />
problems, pointing to the oecd Oil Commission and the ec consultation<br />
process. ‘It would be a very bad outlook for European business<br />
if such a common policy proved beyond reach.’ For this reason, the Cabinet<br />
had proposed to its partners that they should consider the situation<br />
that had arisen at the coming ec sessions of November 5 and 6 which, as<br />
we already know, sounded much more auspicious than in fact it was. 30<br />
Lubbers announced that his policy should not only be aimed at maintaining<br />
the national provision of oil, but also the preservation of the international<br />
function of the Dutch economy, especially Rotterdam, the Rijnmond<br />
area and Amsterdam. He recognized that discussion within the<br />
framework of the oecd had not been very fruitful. Every country would<br />
first of all have to cut back its own use: ‘only in a more drastically serious<br />
situation of real shortages would an international rationing scheme be<br />
put into effect’. The Netherlands therefore was on its own. The policy of<br />
the Cabinet was, he emphasized, primarily aimed at a 10% reduction of<br />
the national oil consumption.<br />
It was the kvp parliament member M.W.J.M Peijnenburg who again<br />
accused the Cabinet of a rashness in its approach, while the great majority<br />
of the Chamber were in sympathy with the steps taken. There was only<br />
incidental dissatisfaction, such as over the fact that mopeds did not fall<br />
under the Sunday ban. Under-Secretary Van Hulten explained that a ban<br />
on mopeds would cause an enormous fuss and have very little effect. The<br />
government, however, stuck to its guns when the SGP member C.N. van<br />
Dis vainly asked whether church incumbents might not be included under<br />
a more flexible system of exemptions. The only suggestion that was immediately<br />
adopted from the Chamber was an amendment to the hours of<br />
the ban during the night of Saturday/Sunday: instead of the ban coming<br />
into force at midnight, it was delayed until 3amon Sunday. The Second<br />
Chamber then approved the proposals for economies in fuel use by a great<br />
majority, even though there were still no concrete indications of a reduction<br />
in the oil supply. 31<br />
The Rationing Law formally came into effect on October 31, the same<br />
day that announcements appeared in the Staatscourant – the official government<br />
gazette – informing the population that oil and oil products<br />
would be considered rationed goods and announcing the driving ban for<br />
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Sunday, November 4. The following day, at the request of the Second<br />
Chamber, that announcement was supplemented by the further decision<br />
that the ban should only take effect at 3am. 32<br />
During the Council of Ministers of November 2, it became apparent<br />
that certain ministers felt that Lubbers and his Ministry were pushing<br />
things too hard. Boersma said he was surprised at the speed with which<br />
measures had been taken; but Den Uyl parried this criticism with the observation<br />
that the Council had for this reason empowered Lubbers the<br />
previous week to prepare the regulations. Lubbers had rung him during<br />
the weekend to say that policy had to switch to action. Intensive discussions<br />
at the Ministry of Economics over the Sunday and Monday led to<br />
the conclusion that a rapid introduction of rationing was inevitable. 33<br />
After further thorough discussion of various other measures, it was<br />
decided to set up an interdepartmental committee in order to look into<br />
the various aspects more closely. On this basis, the Co-ordination Group<br />
for Oil Crisis Action was instituted several days later. The Ministers also<br />
decided that there should be preliminary talks between Home Affairs,<br />
Justice, and Transport and Water Management if a legal maximum speed<br />
limit were going to be introduced. In view of the possibly drastic consequences<br />
of the crisis for the national economy, the question was also<br />
raised of the relationship between government and trade unions as social<br />
partners. The Dutch Trades Union chairman Wim Kok had already informed<br />
the Cabinet that the Social Economic Council would have to consider<br />
how they should respond to the consequences of the oil crisis and<br />
that this would have to be further discussed with the government. If it<br />
should turn out that the economic foundations of the Cabinet’s policy<br />
were affected, this could reasonably be discussed with the trade union<br />
movement. But the crisis need not necessarily interfere with the conclusion<br />
of a general agreement. 34<br />
Yet critics of the haste with which the Rationing Law was implemented<br />
were still not satisfied. The law itself was thought by some to be an antiquated<br />
and cumbersome instrument for dealing with the problems that<br />
had arisen. Van Agt sent Lubbers a letter in which he wondered whether<br />
rationing was a satisfactory instrument to control restrictions on the use<br />
of oil products.<br />
The bare fact that this law originated 35 years ago and was in principle<br />
intended for circumstances very different from those of the present may<br />
give rise to doubt.<br />
106
An important reason for exercising caution was, for him, that the Rationing<br />
Law seemed a less suitable basis for taking criminal action<br />
against infringements of the Sunday ban on motoring. Van Agt therefore<br />
would have preferred creating a one-off, short-term law for rationing and<br />
restricting the use of oil products. 35<br />
The First Car-Free Sunday<br />
Compliance with the motoring ban on November 4 was on the whole<br />
good, probably because restrictions on use of fuel were accepted as necessary<br />
by the general public and because similar measures had been announced<br />
in other countries. And furthermore, it was reasonable. The contrast<br />
between the silence and the usual commotion on the roads was much<br />
more impressive than in 1956. There also noticeably arose a certain national<br />
solidarity, partly because even Queen Juliana was publicly making<br />
use of the bicycle. In general, this first car-free Sunday was reported by the<br />
press in a lighthearted, cheerful vein.<br />
Practically the whole millions-strong army of motorists had observed<br />
the Sunday ban in exemplary fashion, reported De Telegraaf. The<br />
Netherlands railway journal, De Nederlandse Spoorwegen, remarked<br />
that the passenger total was 30% up on a normal Sunday. Church attendance<br />
scarcely suffered at all: a poll in fifty different places showed only<br />
the slightest fall in the number of worshippers. ‘In front of every church<br />
stood masses of bicycles and mopeds’, according to De Telegraaf. The<br />
border posts had no exaggerated influx of foreigners to process.<br />
Quite a few Germans were rather surprised at the empty roads and took<br />
…. no notice of the recommended maximum speed of 100 km per hour.<br />
They were unaware that practically all petrol stations were closed. 36<br />
In Amstelveen, some forty boys and girls armed with sleeping bags, blankets<br />
and musical instruments took themselves to Motorway 6 to hold a<br />
picnic. After half an hour ‘the youngsters were driven off the highway by<br />
the police’. 37<br />
‘Sunday without deaths on the road’ ran the headline of Monday’s<br />
Haagsche Courant.And indeed this was one of the remarkable aspects of<br />
the Sunday. Four passengers seated in a carriage were reported injured<br />
when their vehicle overturned after the horse bolted on the Brienenoord<br />
Bridge in Rotterdam. The Haagsche Courant was also annoyed by those<br />
107
foreign motorists (to whom the Sunday ban did not apply), remarking<br />
that<br />
the Dutch highways were made rather unsafe by foreign – more specifically<br />
German – drivers who abused the freedom of the empty roads to<br />
drive at great speed; endangering all those children who had taken over<br />
the asphalt on their roller skates. 38<br />
But apart from this, it had been fun. Not that the press had no criticism to<br />
voice; but this disapproval was more of a continuation of the view cited<br />
earlier that the government measures were too limited. Het Parool argued<br />
for oil and petrol rationing, since the car-free Sundays affected certain<br />
economic sectors disproportionately. Rationing gave the public the opportunity<br />
to choose for themselves when they wished to use their cars. 39<br />
And in the columns of NRC Handelsblad,the government was once again<br />
attacked for continuing to underestimate the gravity of the situation. 40<br />
However simple the action appeared at first sight, the first car-free<br />
Sunday did demonstrate how much administrative work was needed to<br />
restrict the use of oil and oil products. Not everyone turned out to be prepared<br />
to contribute as a matter of course; there were in all 120,000 requests<br />
for exemption. In fact, 15,000 exemptions were granted for motor<br />
vehicles. W.Q.J. Willemsen, who played an important official role in limiting<br />
oil use, can recall ‘the most grotesque reasons and shameless arguments<br />
produced’ to justify some of these requests for exemption. 41 The<br />
sheer quantity of requests and consequent orders gave an indication of<br />
the administrative rigmarole that would result if rationing were introduced.<br />
With subsequent car-free Sundays the number of requests for exemption<br />
only increased until, in the end, in the weeks leading up to the beginning<br />
of January, 74,000 exemptions had been granted.<br />
During a discussion between the Attorneys-General, however, it became<br />
evident that the first car-free Sunday had not given rise to many<br />
problems, with relatively few infringements and impounded vehicles. In<br />
his first report, Rutten, chair of the Co-ordinating Group for Oil Crisis<br />
Action, reported that there had been 301 summons issued, and 239 vehicles<br />
impounded. 42<br />
It also turned out that roughly 90% of motorists were sticking voluntarily<br />
to the 100 kms per hour speed limit, encouraging the Attorneys-<br />
General to speak out against the introduction of a compulsory speed limit.<br />
43 This latter judgement, in fact, was adopted by the Ministry of Justice,<br />
largely on the basis of the argument that the voluntary limit had<br />
108
yielded excellent results, whereas a compulsory speed limit would cause<br />
too heavy a burden on both police and the courts. 44<br />
According to the Attorneys-General, the biggest problems that occurred<br />
on the first car-free Sunday were related to traffic entering The<br />
Netherlands from abroad. Because some border posts were in fact unmanned,<br />
Dutch motorists entering the country were unable to get the necessary<br />
stamp that would allow them legitimately to proceed home via the<br />
shortest route. Another problem arose from the fact that in Limburg there<br />
were quite a few Dutch driving around in the cars of their German employers;<br />
and Dutch military personnel returning from Germany similarly<br />
caused problems because some Group Commanders had issued exemptions<br />
of questionable validity. 45<br />
Shell Helps<br />
With the implementation of the embargo, and particularly with the participation<br />
in the embargo of Saudi Arabia on November 2 plus the restrictions<br />
on production announced two days later, the Dutch government –<br />
and specifically Economic Affairs – began to prepare for the worst possible<br />
scenario. At a staff discussion meeting on November 5, it was decided,<br />
in consultation with the Central Planning Bureau, to look at what might<br />
be the consequences of a 25% reduction in oil use, and what measures<br />
would be necessary in such a situation. What would happen if the oil supply<br />
to Rotterdam and the Rijnmond were reduced by 50% also had to be<br />
calculated. 46<br />
The situation that had arisen demanded especially close cooperation<br />
with the oil companies, however distasteful this proved to some backbenchers<br />
of the progressive parties. As Den Uyl told a meeting of the<br />
PvdA party executive committee:<br />
it was unavoidable that the Cabinet should have to form a common<br />
front with the major oil companies because as far as oil provision was<br />
concerned, the country was dependent on the oil companies.<br />
Den Uyl later revealed that the government of course was concerned with<br />
procuring a fair, proportional allocation, but at the same time ‘the suspicion<br />
that the oil companies might have a positive interest in an oil scarcity<br />
and its concomitant price rises’. 47<br />
Throughout the whole oil crisis consultations were held in various<br />
109
places between the oil companies and the Dutch government; most intensively<br />
with the Directorate-General for Energy at Economic Affairs, but<br />
regularly too with the Foreign Ministry. In any case, there was a school of<br />
thought, certainly within the Foreign Ministry, that this contact was not<br />
always properly co-ordinated and sometimes led to different conclusions<br />
in different places.<br />
In the first place, these talks mainly boiled down to the fact that Shell<br />
and other companies ‘were sounding the alarm vigorously’ to get the government<br />
to act more positively. Indeed, it was partly on the basis of information<br />
passed on by the oil companies that Lubbers switched to the introduction<br />
of rationing. 48 The judgement of Rosenthal and Scholten seems<br />
correct, since on November 1 Van der Stoel informed the Dutch Ambassador<br />
in Brussels that the oil companies were suggesting that the situation<br />
was serious. 49 Other parties involved also believe that the companies<br />
pressed for use-restrictive steps to be taken urgently. 50<br />
It was clear by the beginning of November that the Dutch Cabinet was<br />
to a large extent dependent on the information provided by the oil companies.<br />
Moreover, it was in fact dependent on whatever policy the major oil<br />
companies pursued in the sharing out of the anticipated shortages. Initially,<br />
this question was regarded with the usual scepticism within the Cabinet,<br />
particularly by Van der Stoel, but on November 4 Wagner publicly<br />
gave an assurance that all consumer countries would in principle receive<br />
the same percentage less oil. This would have to be achieved by importing<br />
extra oil from those countries that had not joined the embargo nor imposed<br />
restrictions on production. 51<br />
Some of the major oil companies had besides already made preparations<br />
for limited production even before the oil crisis broke. Shell had presented<br />
most government leaders with a confidential ‘Pink Book’ identifying<br />
possible restrictions on the oil supply and outlining the chances of an<br />
‘oil scramble’. Shell was at that times of the opinion that in times of crisis<br />
stocks should be shared out fairly.<br />
Unlike the American companies, Shell had been campaigning for an intergovernmental<br />
agreement to share supplies in a crisis and, indeed, had<br />
already begun outlining, in its planning group, how such a system might<br />
work. 52<br />
With regard to the embargo against The Netherlands, the oil companies –<br />
or at least the European companies – thus in fact adopted a position of<br />
greater solidarity than The Hague’s ec partners. It was Shell and bp that<br />
110
did not walk away from The Netherlands. The supply of crude oil by the<br />
American majors probably slumped more strongly than that from Shell<br />
and bp. In The Hague it was feared that the supply from Chevron and<br />
Texaco might be withdrawn entirely and that the refineries of these companies<br />
might even be shut down. 53 But Shell and bp, indeed from the very<br />
beginning of the crisis, proved themselves solid and reliable. The British<br />
government, in fact, put pressure especially on these companies to continue<br />
supplying as per contract – and by implication therefore leaving The<br />
Netherlands to sink. The same happened – according to Wagner – in<br />
Paris. It was therefore concluded at the Dutch Foreign Ministry, as a result<br />
of a conversation between Den Uyl and Wagner, that for the time being<br />
little could be expected from The Netherlands’ ec and oecd partners.<br />
The Dutch stood alone, according to the Head of the Department<br />
for Economic Cooperation of the Foreign Ministry. 54<br />
Political-economic cooperation within the oecd or ec thus offered<br />
scarcely any point of contact for the Cabinet, whereas the attitude of the<br />
multinational oil concerns, so criticized in Turning Point ’72, seemed to<br />
offer far better perspectives: they offered good cooperation. At Economic<br />
Affairs too it was quickly assumed that The Netherlands would benefit<br />
most from a course of events that left sharing the oil between consumer<br />
countries to the oil companies. The Department for Economic Cooperation<br />
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs agreed, particularly in view of<br />
Shell’s strong position in the international oil sector. 55<br />
The Hague thus had an interest in maintaining the free trade of the<br />
main oil companies – the majors – and of course the government also took<br />
risks, for it was by no means clear how these companies would react in the<br />
event of more serious shortages. The Department for Economic Cooperation<br />
of the Foreign Ministry therefore proposed that the government<br />
ought to be consulted more in the policy and planning of Shell. It had up<br />
till then not appeared a simple matter to get a clear picture of Shell’s attitude,<br />
not least because Economic Affairs and Foreign Affairs appear to<br />
have had access to different sources which apparently did not always furnish<br />
the same information. 56<br />
November 7 brought new, reassuring, news over the policy of Shell and<br />
bp. During a meeting between Dutch Shell Director E.C. Werner and several<br />
top officials from the Dutch Foreign Ministry, it was made clear that<br />
both Shell and bp took the position, in defiance of the pressure from the<br />
British government and Prime Minister Heath personally, that the oil in<br />
Europe must be shared fairly. It was their intention to observe the measures<br />
imposed by the Arab countries, but nevertheless to achieve a redistri-<br />
111
ution by rescheduling to Rotterdam oil from Nigeria and Iran, which<br />
previously had gone to the uk. In spite of intense pressure from the new<br />
British Minister for Energy, Lord Carrington, Shell stuck to its principle<br />
of non-discrimination, a policy which caused great irritation in the uk.<br />
The London Evening Standard vented this displeasure with the headline:<br />
‘The Dutch are getting British oil’. 57<br />
Werner assured his Foreign Affairs interlocutors that Shell would not<br />
be pressurized by the British government. In the short term, however, it<br />
would be difficult to achieve an increase in production from Iran and<br />
Nigeria: in the preceding period, production in Nigeria had already been<br />
tripled and in Iran doubled. Shell had in fact decided to experiment with<br />
the transit of oil from one of the embargo countries via Rotterdam to Germany.<br />
If this worked out, Rotterdam could be rather satisfactorily organized.<br />
58<br />
This rescheduling or redistribution of the oil flow entering Western<br />
Europe was to be an important means of neutralizing the effects of the<br />
embargo in the following weeks. Of course, this rescheduling had to be<br />
done discretely. From the beginning of November, therefore, there was<br />
far more reticence in the public mention of any figures relating to the oil<br />
supply. This did not facilitate the task of keeping the public informed, but<br />
it was nonetheless considered necessary, with a view to possible problems<br />
that might arise from the rescheduling of oil. Facts and figures concerning<br />
the oil supply had an enormous political significance.<br />
In this context, it should also be pointed out that some Arab countries<br />
apparently had no interest in checking to see that oil tankers were not in<br />
fact supplying embargoed countries. Uncertainty over the source of oil<br />
also enabled the embargo to be circumvented. Subsequently, Wagner was<br />
to say that Shell had throughout observed the oil embargo and that The<br />
Netherlands was provided by countries that had not announced an embargo,<br />
59 but it certainly remains an open question whether ‘black’ oil<br />
was also arriving in Rotterdam during the embargo. After all, that also<br />
happened in the usa, which managed to obtain leaked Libyan and Saudi<br />
oil during the embargo. 60<br />
Whatever the truth of the matter, the Head of the Department for Economic<br />
Cooperation (des) at the Foreign Ministry observed that for obvious<br />
reasons Lubbers could only give the press general figures for the<br />
dependence on Middle Eastern oil; and in any case the population was<br />
sufficiently convinced of the seriousness of the situation. In confidential<br />
talks with representatives of the ec countries, figures for the inflow and<br />
transit of oil via Rotterdam had to be given, albeit general figures in the<br />
112
main, in order to demonstrate to the surrounding countries how important<br />
this supply and transit were for them. This was necessary to induce a<br />
certain degree of solidarity in these countries. Data on the division of the<br />
Arab oil supply between the European countries was highly confidential.<br />
According to des, Shell had sought<br />
not to make these figures too clear, since they can then be changed in<br />
due course in favour of supplies from countries not involved in the embargo.<br />
61<br />
Although there had initially been a feeling mainly of outrage in The<br />
Hague over London’s attitude, it has to be conceded that all the West European<br />
countries switched to the defence of their own interests. This also<br />
caused conflict within the Benelux, a conflict in which the difference of<br />
outlook between the Dutch ministries of Economic and Foreign Affairs<br />
was again revealed. As we saw earlier, Economic Affairs wanted oil exports,<br />
with particular application to the considerable export to Belgium,<br />
to be subjected to licenses. So far this had not happened, because of the<br />
provisions of the Benelux treaty, although Brussels had in the meantime<br />
taken precisely such action. Pressure for discussion with the Belgian Ministry<br />
for Economic Affairs had been in vain, so now the Dutch Ministry<br />
for Economic Affairs also wanted licences as a counter-measure: export<br />
to Belgium by the oil companies must be limited, furthermore, and thus<br />
brought into line with domestic restrictions.<br />
The Dutch Foreign Ministry, however, was not convinced of the wisdom<br />
of this kind of counter-measure. It seemed to the Head of des that a<br />
better approach would be for the Foreign Ministry, via the Dutch Ambassador<br />
in Brussels, to convey to the Belgians their disappointment with the<br />
way things had gone. He also pointed to the risky aspects of the capped<br />
export restriction that Economic Affairs advocated, given the Dutch efforts<br />
to maintain a common market. This, after all, was the very thing<br />
The Netherlands reproached the British government with: exerting pressure<br />
on the oil companies. For these reasons, the Dutch Cabinet carefully<br />
measured any actions with regard to Shell. Foreign Affairs was right: restricting<br />
transit was a very delicate question. In the following weeks, this<br />
would seldom be explicitly referred to or discussed, not even in confidential<br />
interdepartmental talks. Economic Affairs no longer raised the question<br />
because, it was assumed at Foreign Affairs, nothing could be said<br />
about this to the outside world. 62 113
The Co-ordination Group<br />
Slowly, The Netherlands began to get to grips with the logistics of the oil<br />
crisis. The Rationing Law was meanwhile in operation, and in different<br />
places official consultative bodies came into being to prepare and execute<br />
the government’s actions. In early November, in accordance with an earlier<br />
decision by the Council of Ministers, the interdepartmental Co-ordination<br />
Group for Oil Crisis Actions was created with Rutten as chairman.<br />
Meanwhile, in the Ministry of Economic Affairs the Oil Crisis<br />
Working Group was established as departmental co-ordinating body for<br />
the preparation and taking of all measures within Economic Affairs; beside<br />
which this body also served as advice group for the Economic Affairs<br />
representative in the Co-ordination Group mentioned above. The Directorate-General<br />
for Energy of Economic Affairs also served this particular<br />
task to a significant extent. 63 The Council of Ministers also prepared itself<br />
for this same function by creating a Ministerial Committee for Oil<br />
Problems, whose task was the preparation for decision-making within<br />
the Cabinet. 64<br />
November 8 saw the first gathering of the Co-ordination Group.<br />
Meanwhile, the reduction of oil production carried through by the Arab<br />
opec countries had risen to 25% compared to September levels; yet for<br />
all that, it was also acknowledged that the consumer countries had<br />
achieved no unity, partly in view of the privileged position of countries<br />
such as France and Great Britain. The oecd and the ec for the time being<br />
limited themselves to stock-taking and consultation.<br />
At this meeting of the Co-ordination Group, the following principles<br />
were established for any further measures that might need to be taken.<br />
First, priority to be given to economic activity above private transport,<br />
and concomitant preference for the industrial fuel naphtha over petrol for<br />
motors. With regard to business life, a general restriction on use was<br />
thought best combined with a system of exceptions. This ought to lead to<br />
a global reduction in deliveries of approximately 15%. In the first stage,<br />
priority would also be extended to horticulture and public transport.<br />
The Co-ordination Group argued for maintaining the Sunday ban on<br />
driving, even though it was clear that at Economic Affairs, and especially<br />
within the Directorate-General for Energy (dge), there was strong support<br />
for the more radical measure of rationing. A driving ban on Saturdays,<br />
however, was thought by the Co-ordination Group to be too damaging<br />
to the catering industry. For the time being a strict policy on exemptions<br />
would have to be enforced that would make allowance for doctors,<br />
114
invalids and public transport. On the first Sunday, the ban had not applied<br />
to foreigners, but from November 11 they too would be included.<br />
Beside these regulations, the appeal to the people must continue for a voluntary<br />
speed limit of 100 kms per hour, to use their cars as little as possible<br />
and to restrict the use of heating fuel. 65<br />
Conclusion<br />
Thus, the Cabinet prepared itself for the worst. There was great and continuing<br />
uncertainty over the actual effect of the Arab actions. Only by the<br />
third week of November would it actually be possible to say whether<br />
there was any reduction in supplies. Concerns gradually increased, however,<br />
that by the end of November would reach serious levels. But Shell, at<br />
least, had in the meantime declared its willingness to lend The Netherlands<br />
a helping hand. Although it could not be taken for granted that this<br />
pledge would be fulfilled under all circumstances, as far as the embargo<br />
against The Netherlands was concerned, the oil companies seemed to<br />
adopt a stance of solidarity that was all the more striking for its absence<br />
among ec partners.<br />
Under these unclear circumstances Lubbers and Economic Affairs decided<br />
to opt for measures that would restrict oil use. Despite all the criticism<br />
in the press at the time, in retrospect the Cabinet can therefore hardly<br />
be accused of being indecisive. There was, after all, still no certainty<br />
that the embargo against The Netherlands would be effective. Den Uyl’s<br />
suggestion in the Dutch Second Chamber that the Arab embargo was already<br />
being implemented was premature and in fact a bluff. It was mainly<br />
thanks to the influence of the Directorate-General for Energy and the oil<br />
companies that the restrictions on use were implemented so quickly. At<br />
this stage, the government’s measures were without doubt considered by<br />
the public as legitimate. Apart from the many attempts to gain exemption,<br />
there was a high degree of readiness to cooperate. The appeal for<br />
voluntary speed restriction was also given public assent on a wide scale.<br />
People and government were in accord, although this would be a rather<br />
different story later when it came to the introduction of rationing.<br />
The relative success of these counter-measures, however, could not obscure<br />
the fact that the oil restrictions hurt. On November 6, 1973, E.F.<br />
Geessink, the Director-General for Agriculture and Food Supply, of the<br />
Ministry for Agriculture and Fisheries, wrote in several letters to Economic<br />
Affairs that alarming news had reached him to the effect that sup-<br />
115
plies of petroleum to market gardeners were drying up. This meant that<br />
thousands of market gardeners were facing serious disruption to their<br />
cultivation schedules and the threat of losing their crops. Serious difficulties<br />
were also threatening the fishing industry, with consequent dwindling<br />
of the fish supply. 66<br />
116
5<br />
A European Summit<br />
Thepolitical divisions within the ec were further accentuated during November<br />
and December. France tried to exploit the crisis to press through a<br />
common ec energy policy and, moreover, with the support of London, to<br />
pursue a European-Arab dialogue. Washington also began to get more directly<br />
involved in managing the oil crisis. The differences between the<br />
Nine reached aclimaxduringtheec Summit held in Copenhagen on December<br />
14 and 15. Although there were also hopeful reports reaching The<br />
Hague,the situation for the Dutch during the weeks from November 6 to<br />
December 14 seemed worse than it had been throughout the whole crisis.<br />
It was in fact during this stage, as we shall see in Chapter 6, that tough domestic<br />
measures were decided, including the issue of rationing coupons.<br />
In this chapter, we shall look at the developments from the ec meeting of<br />
Foreign Ministers on November 5 and 6 up to the European Summit in<br />
December.<br />
The Embargo<br />
As we have seen earlier, with Van der Stoel’s signature on the ec declaration<br />
of November 6, the strongly pro-Israeli character of earlier Dutch<br />
policy had been rather watered down. It was initially assumed that signing<br />
this conscious declaration would make a favourable impression in the<br />
Arab capitals; but the report of this declaration was swiftly followed by<br />
rumours of the interpretative statement that Van de Stoel had put out the<br />
same day. The Dutch representatives in the Arab countries were instructed<br />
to emphasise the strong unity of the Nine. But despite this effort, the<br />
positive effect of the new ec declaration remained limited; nor did the position<br />
of the government and Van der Stoel, in some respects, become eas-<br />
117
ier in their own country. They were now under fire from two sides: from<br />
those who thought that Van der Stoel’s pro-Israeli gruff lack of subtlety<br />
had put the national economic interests in danger, and also from those,<br />
like the historian L. de Jong, who thought the Cabinet had laid Israel open<br />
to Arab oil blackmail. Both sides demanded further explanation from the<br />
Cabinet of the signing of the ec statement of November 6.<br />
The Arab side too, on several occasions, asked for clarification of the<br />
Dutch standpoint as a condition for any end to the embargo. In Tripoli,<br />
for example, J.J. de Roos, the Dutch Ambassador, learned that as it stood,<br />
the position was far from adequate. 1 The Dutch Ambassador to Egypt,<br />
Von Oven, was in fact doubtful whether the Dutch position had been improved<br />
at all by the ec declaration. With the approval of The Hague, he<br />
had held talks with the Secretary-General of the Arab League, M. Riad,<br />
who had suggested that it would be useful if Van der Stoel were to send a<br />
letter to the League pointing out once again that The Hague’s standpoint<br />
did not deviate from the November 6 declaration. Moreover, according to<br />
Von Oven, Van der Stoel could also pledge that The Netherlands would<br />
increase development aid to the Arab countries. 2 Three days later, Von<br />
Oven repeated his message that a separate statement should quell Arab<br />
doubts about Dutch sincerity, 3 a suggestion which evoked only a negative<br />
reaction from Van der Stoel. He declined to address himself to the Arab<br />
League separately, since he had no wish to undermine attempts to arrive<br />
at concerted ec action. 4<br />
Several days later, the International Federation of Arab Trade Unions<br />
demanded that The Netherlands should put out a separate Middle East<br />
declaration. This proposal was endorsed by Egyptian officials, claiming<br />
that The Hague had only acquiesced in the joint ec declaration under<br />
duress. From Cairo, Von Oven warned of a hardening of the Arab attitude.<br />
The Arabs saw the embargo as an effective weapon: any ‘lifting or<br />
softening its conditions would demand an even higher price’. In any case,<br />
Van der Stoel rejected this new demand just as he had declined to entertain<br />
similar Saudi demands (see the following section). The declaration of<br />
November 6 contained a common standpoint, according to Van der Stoel,<br />
and ec solidarity would only be damaged if member states began issuing<br />
their own separate statements. Syria and Jordan were also adopting a<br />
more anti-Dutch tone by mid-November, not least because of repeated<br />
expressions of sympathy for The Hague from Radio Israel. There were<br />
also various rumours circulating that served to stress the anti-Arab disposition<br />
of The Netherlands. For example, according to Le Monde, Van der<br />
Stoel had originally shown the door to the Arab Ambassadors on October<br />
118
17. When two members of the Dutch Parliament questioned the Minister<br />
on this, he retorted that the report was a malicious distortion of the<br />
facts. 5<br />
But there were also more favourable signs. On October 17 the oapec<br />
countries decided in Vienna not to go ahead with the 5% reduction of oil<br />
deliveries to Western countries projected for December. The decision was<br />
considered by various commentators as an Arab token of recognition of<br />
the November 6 declaration. At the same time, however, it was decided to<br />
continue the embargo against the usa, The Netherlands and Denmark,<br />
and a week later, at an Arab summit in Algiers, to add to the list Portugal,<br />
South Africa and Rhodesia because of the colonial or apartheid politics of<br />
those countries.<br />
The question, however, was whether the embargo against The Netherlands<br />
was effective. The Dutch Ambassador Schorer reported from<br />
Kuwait that the Kuwaiti Oil Minister Atiki had suggested at a press conference<br />
that Kuwait was not much concerned about attempts to circumvent<br />
the embargo. Kuwait, Atiki said, was in no position to control the<br />
exact destination of oil exports, or whether the destination of tankers was<br />
changed once offshore. So long as such manoeuvres were discretely carried<br />
out – ‘without irrritating anyone’ –, Kuwait had no objection. 6 Several<br />
days later, De Ranitz confirmed from Paris that both Kuwaiti and Saudi<br />
Ambassadors had let the Quay d’Orsay know that<br />
as far as they were concerned, oil originating from their countries and<br />
reaching countries affected by the embargo could be considered beyond<br />
their jurisdiction. 7<br />
Similar reports were coming out of Oman. It was a matter of assumption<br />
in Oman that The Netherlands would be able to look after itself by means<br />
of rescheduling. The same kind of reassuring communication was also<br />
coming from Bahrein; 8 all of which confirmed the conclusions drawn by<br />
De Lavalette as a result of his tour of the Arab capitals.<br />
The measures taken by the oapec countries thus appeared much more<br />
stringent than they actually were in practice; and this was true not only of<br />
the embargo but also the restrictions on production. Thus, the news from<br />
Bonn was that, according to informants from the steel concern Thyssen,<br />
there was no less oil being shipped out of the Persian Gulf than normal.<br />
Supplies to established clients were perhaps down by as much as 25%,<br />
but this 25% was now being supplied to hitherto unknown traders. This<br />
oil was being offered at fancy prices, but some West German companies,<br />
Thyssen included, were willing to comply. 9 119
Various offers were also arriving in The Netherlands. Ambassador<br />
Von Oven in Cairo, for example, was approached by an Egyptian consultant<br />
who wanted to know whether The Netherlands might be interested in<br />
250,000 tons of crude oil. According to the documents this oil should<br />
have been shipped to Romania, but in reality it could go directly to The<br />
Netherlands. 10 Even bigger offers were received: Ambassador Boon reported<br />
from Rome an offer of more than 80 million tons of oil, with<br />
Beirut as the place for concluding the contract. 11 The Ministry of Foreign<br />
Affairs archive contains a series of such propositions involving, in various<br />
cases, at first sight rather louche figures who materialised as intermediaries<br />
– arms dealers and the like. Prince Bernhard also reported connections<br />
who would be able to assist The Netherlands to locate extra fuel. 12<br />
At the end of 1973, there even came an offer from Baghdad. The brotherin-law<br />
of Saddam Hussein, Khalid M. Saloom, offered to supply two to<br />
five million tons of crude oil from the Rumailah oil field in Southern Iraq.<br />
Circles round Saddam apparently thought there had been enough pressure<br />
on The Netherlands and that the moment had now come to relax it a<br />
bit. 13 In general, however, these offers were considered by the Directorate-General<br />
for Foreign Economic Relations in Economic Affairs and<br />
by Shell as thoroughly unreliable. Nothing was done in response – which<br />
in itself would suggest that the shortage of oil was certainly not acute.<br />
But despite all the offers of oil, by the end of October the supply of oil<br />
to Rotterdam did begin to decline. The Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs<br />
anticipated that this shortfall would persist through the coming<br />
weeks, and it was even assumed that it might reach as much as 40 to 50%.<br />
In retrospect, these figures seem highly exaggerated; but the mood in The<br />
Hague at the end of November was highly pessimistic. On December 1, a<br />
sombre Den Uyl addressed the Dutch people on television. The world had<br />
irrevocably changed, he told viewers: the familiar times of before the oil<br />
crisis would never return. 14<br />
The Van Roijen Mission<br />
Meanwhile, the Dutch Cabinet had decided on November 2 to send a special<br />
mission – in a certain sense a ‘royal’ mission – to Saudi Arabia in the<br />
person of the ex-Foreign Minister and one-time Ambassador J.H. van<br />
Roijen. This mission, like that of De Lavalette, was given as little publicity<br />
as possible; nor was it discussed in advance with any of The Netherlands’<br />
ec partners. Van Roijen’s task was to convert the improvement in<br />
120
the Dutch image, possibly the result of signing the epc declaration, into<br />
more concrete advantage. On the face of it, this would seem to have been<br />
no easy task, for King Feisal had taken serious offence to The Hague’s response<br />
to the ultimatum of October 26. The intention was for Van Roijen<br />
to carry with him a letter from Queen Juliana, personally addressed to<br />
King Feisal, and whose text was discussed at great length both at the Foreign<br />
Ministry and by Shell’s Arabists.<br />
On November 15, accompanied by the head of the African and Middle<br />
Eastern Department of the Foreign Ministry, Van Roijen paid a visit to<br />
King Feisal and one of his counsellors. Van Roijen tried to elicit from the<br />
King some understanding of the Dutch position, but that was not a simple<br />
matter. Feisal maintained that The Hague had first to condemn the Israeli<br />
aggression publicly before there could be talk of any end to the embargo.<br />
Van Roijen’s reference to The Hague’s signing of the November 6 declaration<br />
made no impression. Feisal pointed out that The Hague had behaved<br />
in an ‘oppositional’ fashion in the meeting of October 13. Van Roijen<br />
denied this: The Hague had merely made ‘procedural’ objections at<br />
the settling of the October 13 declaration, and apart from that, both the<br />
October 13 and November 6 declarations of the Nine had been wholly<br />
unanimous. Feisal was not satisfied with this and laid down the standpoints<br />
that The Hague had to endorse publicly: (1) the condemnation of<br />
Israeli aggression; (2) demand for complete Israeli withdrawal from the<br />
occupied territories; and (3) support for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian<br />
people. He gave Van Roijen a letter addressed to Queen Juliana in<br />
which these demands were once more reiterated.<br />
Van Roijen also spoke again to Yamani, who adopted a less punitive<br />
attitude than his monarch. The Oil Minister emphasised that the ‘Saudis<br />
are being dragged by, rather than leading, the decisions of Arab countries<br />
concerning oil as a weapon’. In his report, Van Roijen concluded that the<br />
visit was appreciated and might perhaps contribute to Saudi Arabia refraining<br />
from any further retaliatory measures. The fact that Van Roijen<br />
had been received by King Feisal could only be of positive benefit to The<br />
Netherlands. Van der Stoel felt the same about the trip and thanked Van<br />
Roijen for his efforts. 15<br />
But the problem of the embargo was of course no nearer resolution. It<br />
was at this stage in mid-November that Van der Stoel became wholly convinced<br />
that the embargo had already been prepared well before the October<br />
war and was aimed against the whole of Western Europe. The analysis<br />
of Ambassador Boon, Dutch Ambassador in Rome, seemed to confirm<br />
such suspicions. In his analysis, the embargo plan must have been worked<br />
121
out on July 6 in Algeria on the assumption that the most effective action<br />
against Western Europe would be first to paralyse the working capacity of<br />
Rotterdam. This strategy was supposed to have been worked out under<br />
the leadership of a certain Ali Khodja, representative in The Netherlands<br />
of an Algerian oil company, Sonatrach. 16 On the basis of this information,<br />
Van der Stoel felt his view confirmed that the embargo was therefore<br />
not, or at least was not primarily, a measure aimed against The Hague’s<br />
Middle East politics. The core of the conflict concerned Rotterdam and<br />
thence the whole of Western Europe. The war had certainly begun unexpectedly,<br />
but not the embargo. ‘The scenario had long been prepared,’ according<br />
to the minister, and there was no point in pursuing any form of<br />
political rapprochement with the Arab countries. 17<br />
Some Dutch diplomats thought otherwise and advised a more conciliatory<br />
approach. Immediately after the Van Roijen mission, Ambassador<br />
Derksen sent an analysis of Dutch-Saudi relations from Jeddah, advising<br />
the Minister to follow up Feisal’s questions and his criticisms. Of course,<br />
it was questionable whether giving a single guarantee to Saudi Arabia<br />
would mean that the embargo would be lifted, but he feared that withholding<br />
all response would only further prejudice mutual relations and<br />
expose economic interests in Saudi Arabia to uncertainty. 18 For obvious<br />
reasons, given his reading of the whole crisis, Van der Stoel was not susceptible<br />
to this kind of suggestion.<br />
King Feisal’s letter was not answered till February 1974,but an initial<br />
reaction to his demands was communicated by Van der Stoel to the Saudi<br />
Ambassador Nowilaty. 19 The Dutch Foreign Minister made it clear that<br />
he was unable to satisfy Feisal’s first demand, condemnation of Israel,<br />
since The Netherlands was not party to the conflict and took a neutral position.<br />
The government had already spoken its position in the unanimous<br />
declaration of the Nine and in conformity with resolution 242. The Cabinet<br />
did not intend to reconsider this position. Van der Stoel again stressed<br />
to Nowilaty The Netherlands’ determination never to condone acts of violence.<br />
The government subscribed to the view that the Palestinian question<br />
was a political matter, but it was not for The Hague to anticipate a<br />
future peace accord by specifying Palestinian rights. 20<br />
Van Roijen’s journey did not therefore have much effect. The Dutch<br />
reputation seemed rather to have sunk to its nadir. Only Morocco, which<br />
in any case had no oil to export, seemed at this stage to adopt an attitude<br />
less unfavourably disposed toward The Netherlands. This was the message<br />
communicated by Ambassador De Vreede from Rabat following a<br />
conversation with the Moroccan Foreign Minister. According to the lat-<br />
122
ter, the problem of how to get oil to The Netherlands discretely, for example<br />
through such intermediaries as France or West Germany, was now being<br />
studied in several Arab capitals. 21 This sounded encouraging, and the<br />
message was relayed by the Dutch Foreign Ministry to all diplomatic<br />
posts in the Arab countries. At the same time, however, it was still being<br />
insisted elsewhere in the Arab world, in Beirut for example, that the<br />
Dutch Cabinet must publicly condemn Israel before any action against<br />
them could be relieved. In a conversation with dgpa Van Lynden, the<br />
Lebanese Ambassador in The Hague again repeated explicitly that The<br />
Netherlands had to acknowledge two matters in a separate statement: 1)<br />
the rights of the Palestinians, and 2) the necessity for Israel to vacate all<br />
occupied territories. 22<br />
An Incident in The Hague<br />
Meanwhile, in The Hague a second note was sent to the Second Chamber<br />
in which it was again stated that the government’s policy with regard to<br />
the Middle East was even-handed. A solution to the Middle East conflict<br />
could only be achieved on the basis of resolution 242. The declaration of<br />
November 6 contained several points that elaborated on 242, in particular<br />
with regard to the political aspirations of the Palestinians. Now that<br />
there were genuine prospects for peace negotiations, ‘the political aspirations<br />
of the Palestinians must be articulated in some shape or form’. The<br />
note proposed that the passage in the epc statement of November 6 over<br />
the ending of territorial occupation was in complete harmony with the<br />
Cabinet’s position. It was stressed that in the many contacts with the<br />
Arab countries, time and again there had been reference to the mistaken<br />
supposition that the Dutch had offered help to Israel in the form of arms<br />
deliveries or volunteers. The note repeated that the embargo had to be<br />
seen against the background of the changing economic relations within<br />
the oil sector. In other words, the embargo was therefore not, or at least<br />
not exclusively, a punitive measure directly related to The Hague’s Middle<br />
East politics. 23<br />
At the end of November the policy was raised for detailed discussion<br />
during the general debate in the First Chamber. The signing of the epc<br />
statement was in general endorsed, although ex-premier P. de Jong (kvp)<br />
thought it would have been more open and above board if a change in policy<br />
had been openly admitted. For the reality was that Van der Stoel had<br />
shifted ground for the sake of maintaining ec unity. In response to the<br />
123
views of the First Chamber, Den Uyl gave his minister his complete protection.<br />
The storm of criticism Cabinet policy was met with was in his<br />
view totally unjustified. The story in Le Monde, that Van der Stoel had<br />
more or less shown the four Arab Ambassadors the door, had no basis<br />
whatsoever. Den Uyl let it be known that one of the Arab Ambassadors<br />
concerned, on his own initiative and on behalf of his three colleagues, had<br />
approached Van der Stoel to tell him that he deeply regretted the piece in<br />
Le Monde. As far as the passage of the epc statement was concerned that<br />
spoke of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, Den Uyl acknowledged<br />
that the formulation here differed from that of resolution 242, but there<br />
had been no change of policy. 24<br />
The Foreign Affairs budget debates in the Second Chamber were<br />
scheduled for November 29. There, too, the accusation was heard that<br />
the change of policy implied by undersigning the epc statement had simply<br />
not been acknowledged. In reply to questions about the rights of the<br />
Palestinians, Van der Stoel answered that their political aspirations had<br />
to be given form, a position which had meanwhile been endorsed by The<br />
Netherlands in the un. It was self-evident, said Van der Stoel, that the<br />
Palestinians had to have some say in the realisation of their own future.<br />
How that should be done, however, was not in the Cabinet’s power to decide.<br />
25<br />
In the Parliamentary debate, Van der Stoel avoided the issue of handing<br />
back the occupied territories. Following the advice of dgpa Van Lynden,<br />
he referred to the relevant passage in the ec declaration. 26 This manoeuvring<br />
was not easy for Van der Stoel. It was being solidly maintained<br />
in the Second Chamber that there had been no change of position while,<br />
at the same time, in the higher realm of international diplomacy it had to<br />
be implied that by signing the ec declaration The Hague had indeed accepted<br />
the position demanded by the Arab countries, without this being<br />
spoken in so many words. This of course was the root of the problem: that<br />
the normally implicitly accepted diplomatic positions were not always<br />
backed by domestic or parliamentary consensus. This, in turn, led to<br />
complications like the so-called Thurkow affair.<br />
The main source of the problems that arose in The Hague in early December<br />
lay in the cryptic passage in the November declaration concerning<br />
the occupied territories. The Foreign Ministry spokesman, Chr. Th. F.<br />
Thurkow, told the press that the epc standpoint implied that Israel had to<br />
withdraw from all the occupied territories, with the qualification of possible<br />
minor border corrections. This statement was apparently made<br />
without prior consultation with his minister. Thurkow’s pronouncement<br />
124
meant ‘a shift in the Dutch position … which may well have suited the<br />
views of dgpa Van Lynden, but certainly not mine’, Van der Stoel later<br />
remarked. 27 Thurkow’s interpretation, which was moreover already being<br />
taken up in diplomatic negotiations, caused great commotion. On<br />
Christmas Day the Second Chamber called Van der Stoel to account.<br />
During the debate, although Van de Stoel insisted that his policy had<br />
undergone no change, he did not explicitly distance himself from<br />
Thurkow’s interpretation. He pledged that action would be taken to ensure<br />
that further misunderstandings would be avoided. In a television interview<br />
the same evening, he reaffirmed the remark of Den Uyl who, in an<br />
interview with the French newspaper Le Monde, had said that he thought<br />
the definite article ‘the’, defining ‘occupied territories’, was not all that important.<br />
Assuming the possibility of minor border corrections, the discussion<br />
over the English and French texts of 242 was in fact utterly pointless.<br />
28 Van der Stoel seemed tobepartlycoveringfor Thurkow, but nevertheless<br />
his spokesman was suspended the following day. There was no<br />
doubt in the press, however, and with good reason, that the whole<br />
Thurkow affair was the result of the government and Van der Stoel continuing<br />
to deny that the Dutch signature to the ec declaration involved a<br />
shift of policy. 29<br />
The day following the debate in the Second Chamber, opposition leaders<br />
H. Wiegel (vvd) and R. Kruisinga (chu) had a meeting with Den Uyl<br />
and Van der Stoel, with opposition spokesmen for foreign affairs, H.J.<br />
Koster and D.F. van der Mei, also present. The two opposition parties<br />
thought the Cabinet should be much more explicit in acknowledging that<br />
the epc statement of November 6 meant a change of policy. They expressed<br />
the hope that the coming Summit in Copenhagen would provide<br />
the opportunity to clarify the European position. According to Wiegel<br />
and Kruisinga, the Cabinet’s lack of clarity had given rise to confusion,<br />
while the epc statement was clearly a revision of resolution 242 in a pro-<br />
Arab sense. They asked:<br />
Does the government not understand that its every pronouncement is<br />
front page news in the Middle East, that our Ambassadors Bentinck in<br />
Algiers and Von Oven in Cairo – to name but two – are deeply unhappy<br />
because they increasingly find their task becoming untenable? 30<br />
Both Van der Stoel and Den Uyl rejected this criticism. The Netherlands,<br />
said Den Uyl, had conducted a pro-Israeli policy for 25 years, and this<br />
was not about to change. Van der Stoel declared that he would oppose any<br />
125
clarification of the November 6 statement at the coming Summit. This of<br />
course did nothing to remove the impression that there was indeed a deliberate<br />
vagueness, or room for manoeuvre, in the Cabinet’s attitude.<br />
The European Community<br />
At this stage, London and Paris remained resolute in their opposition to<br />
any activity aimed at sharing the brunt of the oil shortage on equal terms.<br />
In mid-November, mutual relations between ec countries appeared to become<br />
more acerbic than ever, with the Dutch Cabinet, and particularly<br />
Lubbers, contributing to this frosty climate. In the meantime, Lubbers<br />
had declared in the Second Chamber that he would not shrink from further<br />
steps, if necessary, to safeguard the national provision of oil. This<br />
could affect the export of natural gas, both the quantity exported and the<br />
price. There was no obligation on The Netherlands to be ‘holier than the<br />
Pope’ compared with other ec states. Nor did he exclude the possibility,<br />
he said, that The Netherlands might block decision-making in other areas<br />
within the ec. He did not intend this as a ‘threat’; rather, in the absence of<br />
unanimity in this question of oil supply, it was a perfectly ‘normal and<br />
level-headed observation that it would be senseless to pretend one could<br />
engage in actual, genuine consultations on other matters’. The PvdA<br />
Second Chamber member Van der Hek responded positively to this statement.<br />
There was also support for the minister in the press. 31<br />
The oil crisis opened up fundamental differences of outlook among<br />
member states over the future of the ec. True to tradition, it was above all<br />
the Dutch and the French conceptions that were at variance, as was evident<br />
when Van der Stoel paid a (long planned) visit to Paris on November<br />
8. During a tête-à-tête with Pompidou and Jobert, among other matters<br />
the future of European integration was discussed. Both French politicians<br />
made it clear that they wanted a European summit conference, in<br />
any case before the end of the year, to discuss the question of whether or<br />
not the Nine really were serious about working for European unity. Van<br />
der Stoel assured his French colleagues once again that The Hague wanted<br />
European unity, but stressed that during this crisis it was also a matter<br />
of defending what had already been achieved; for the embargo threatened<br />
that achievement with disintegration. Pompidou – more than Jobert – appeared<br />
to endorse this view. As far as the European summit was concerned,<br />
a summit much desired by the French, Jobert emphasised that this<br />
would have to give directives to a future Energy Council which were<br />
126
totally in conflict with the usual Dutch position on institutional relations<br />
within the ec. Much to Van der Stoel’s relief, Pompidou seemed to entertain<br />
less radical ideas. In the eyes of the President, it should be more of a<br />
‘tour d’horizon’. 32<br />
The points of view put to Van der Stoel at this meeting by Pompidou<br />
thus seemed less objectionable than those put by Jobert, which in fact corresponded<br />
to earlier (and subsequent) impressions that it was primarily<br />
Jobert who seemed to advocate a more extreme viewpoint. Jobert was not<br />
popular in The Netherlands in those days. Ed van Thijn noted in his diary<br />
on November 7: ‘Jobert, rien, rien, rien’. 33 Whatever the case, it was clear<br />
that little sympathy could be expected from the Parisian side for the<br />
Dutch wish for joint ec action. During the course of November, moreover,<br />
rumours began circulating to the effect that Paris intended to force<br />
the oil companies by legal means to fulfil their obligations. At this stage,<br />
evidently, Paris had no intention of introducing any measures to limit<br />
consumption. 34<br />
Little support was expected from the British side too, as Den Uyl remarked<br />
a few days later. The situation in Great Britain was additionally<br />
difficult because of serious industrial unrest among the miners, which on<br />
November 14 led the British government to declare a state of emergency.<br />
As reported earlier, this was the context in which London was considering<br />
using legal measures to force the oil companies to supply Great<br />
Britain with its oil quota in full. The British Cabinet specifically put pressure<br />
on Shell and bp not to redirect to The Netherlands the Iranian and<br />
Nigerian oil that was on its way to England. In mid-November, when it<br />
was found that these companies were sharing out the oil shortage pro<br />
rata, the British press mounted a fierce attack on the oil companies who,<br />
according to The Times, were busy ‘diverting some supplies to other customers’.<br />
The companies concerned were Shell, bp and Gulf. 35<br />
It was during a meeting of the Socialist International, for which Den<br />
Uyl had travelled to London, as mentioned in Chapter 1, that Golda Meir<br />
so warmly thanked the Dutch Premier for his government’s support. The<br />
meeting was marked by a dramatic confrontation between Meir and the<br />
majority of West Europe’s social democratic leaders, only Brandt and<br />
Den Uyl being excepted from Israeli reproaches. These were also the two<br />
countries that had actually supported Israel during the first weeks of the<br />
war. This aside, it emerged that the British Labour leader, Harold Wilson,<br />
objected to the November 6 epc statement, indicating what might be the<br />
policy of a Labour government, which was in fact voted into office the<br />
following March.<br />
127
At the time, however, the Conservative Prime Minister Heath occupied<br />
Downing Street. On November 11, DenUylheldamemorablemeeting<br />
with Heath, at which the two leaders disagreed about almost everything.<br />
Heath said the only solution to the oil problem was to persuade the Arabs<br />
through diplomatic contacts to give up their restrictions on production.<br />
Calling the Arab demands unacceptable was senseless. Nor was there any<br />
point in creating the impression that Europe was hostile to the Arab<br />
world. It was, in fact, essential that the Arab countries should have friends<br />
outside the Soviet camp. Heath declared his satisfaction with the November<br />
6 epc statement, specifically because of its direct reference to resolution<br />
242. ItwasIsrael’s desire not to implement resolution 242 which<br />
was, after all, the root cause of the war. He appreciated that The Hague<br />
had signed the declaration and expressed his view that the ec declaration<br />
should now befollowed by a suitable diplomatic mission. Den Uyl found<br />
himself entirely at odds with Heath’s pronounced views. Acommonec<br />
front would make it clear that the European countries were not prepared<br />
to bend to Arab blackmail. He stressed that the embargo against The<br />
Netherlands was in fact aimed at the whole of Western Europe.<br />
It was clear that the two premiers were starkly opposed to each other.<br />
They similarly held different views on the question of how effective a grip<br />
the Arab countries had on compliance with the embargo, which was of<br />
course an extremely important question in deciding what strategy to follow.<br />
Den Uyl, according to his own report of events, pointed out that<br />
it is highly significant that the oil companies have and continue to have<br />
the freedom to regulate the supply of oil to different countries.<br />
Heath, who may well have been astonished to hear this statement of principle<br />
from the social democrat Den Uyl, gave as his opinion that the Arab<br />
countries had a fairly good grip on the movement of tankers, but he did<br />
not contradict Den Uyl’s opinion on the oil companies’ freedom. In fact,<br />
it seemed to confirm the judgement of the British Foreign Minister,<br />
Home, who three days previously had said: ‘We will not interfere with the<br />
commercial policy of the oil companies’. 36<br />
Subsequently, in the Council of Ministers, Den Uyl declared that<br />
Heath had fully supported the Arab countries and that he found him ‘cynical’.<br />
Den Uyl believed that Heath’s attitude was largely dictated by the<br />
huge Arab investment in the British economy. Indeed, Heath had openly<br />
admitted his greatest fear: that the Arabs would pull out their Sterling<br />
credit, which would be a heavy blow to London as a financial centre. 37<br />
128
London and above all Paris were at this stage without any doubt the<br />
most important opponents of the Dutch, as was observed by Bonn with<br />
some concern; so much so that in mid-November it was being wondered<br />
in the West German Auswärtige Amt – the Foreign Ministry – whether<br />
The Hague should not seriously try to improve relations with France. The<br />
Dutch Ambassador De Beus reported from Bonn that it was being wondered<br />
there ‘whether we might not do well to be more obliging to the<br />
French in other official bodies – the un, for example’. The implicit reference<br />
here was to the question of a moratorium on nuclear tests, in which<br />
ec countries had up till then adopted a position in the un opposing<br />
France. 38 This was a suggestion which, as will become apparent, did not<br />
misfire.<br />
The differences of opinion within the ec gradually crystallised, threatening<br />
an impasse. This proved to be the case when the Permanent Representatives<br />
of the ec met for discussion of the oil situation on November<br />
19. The familiar moves were rehearsed. The Belgian representative observed<br />
that sharing the oil within the common market at that moment depended<br />
in fact on the arbitrary decisions of the oil companies. His French<br />
colleague said that these companies had insufficient political power to ensure<br />
safe supplies of oil in the longer term. Furthermore, this arbitration<br />
worked more to the advantage of the usa than the European countries.<br />
The French therefore wanted joint state intervention in a European<br />
framework and not within the oecd. The British representative concluded,<br />
however, that the problem was essentially political and therefore was<br />
only susceptible to a political solution, which should in the first place be<br />
sought at the epc meeting of November 20. The British thus supported<br />
the French only in working for a political rapprochement with the Arab<br />
countries, but not if it was a question of regulating the market or of state<br />
intervention. 39 There was therefore at this stage absolutely no advance in<br />
the question of mutually supportive action within the ec. The same was<br />
true of the oecd. 40<br />
The pressure of the oil-producing countries was increased further by<br />
another round of price hikes. On November 19 it was learned that discussions<br />
in Vienna between opec and the oil companies had failed. The<br />
opec members let it be known that henceforth they themselves would set<br />
prices. Three days later, Wagner sent Den Uyl a letter expressing his serious<br />
concerns over the anticipated price rises. He appealed to the consumer<br />
countries to restrict the race for oil through mutual consultation<br />
and to warn the opec countries of the possible collapse of the world economy.<br />
Van der Stoel immediately informed all his embassies that the Cabinet<br />
shared the deep unease like Shell. 41 129
In the context of Europe, the epc meeting of November 20 had meanwhile<br />
produced a modest breakthrough with regard to the embargo. The<br />
British delegation proposed that a common démarche be undertaken in<br />
all the Arab capitals. The plan met with scepticism from the French, but<br />
they pledged to support the proposal, at least if the ec member states<br />
withheld their support in the un General Assembly for a resolution condemning<br />
French nuclear tests, a resolution to which The Netherlands had<br />
initially given its support. This was the compromise that De Beus had earlier<br />
mentioned in his report from Bonn.<br />
Van der Stoel immediately promised that his delegation would abstain<br />
when it came to voting on the resolution. The delegation would explain<br />
the reason for its abstention subsequently by alleging that it had to do<br />
with imbalances in the text. Bonn also promised to abstain on the same<br />
grounds, and with these pledges Paris agreed to support the British plan.<br />
Van der Stoel was later to say in the Council of Ministers that his promise<br />
over the nuclear testing was bordering on the limits of the acceptable.<br />
Nevertheless, there was now for the first time a united front presented by<br />
the Nine with regard to the embargo. Den Uyl also referred to Van der<br />
Stoel’s performance as ‘balancing on a knife-edge’. 42<br />
For the purpose of the common ec démarche, a joint text was subsequently<br />
put together in which it was claimed that the Arab actions had affected<br />
the interests of the entire ec. The Arab countries had let it be<br />
known that the ec should play a role in procuring a just and lasting peace<br />
in the Middle East. The embargo threatened to divide the ec, however. As<br />
a result, there was a certain contradiction between the implications of the<br />
Arab measures and the unanimous ec attitude that they desired. 43<br />
But the démarche did not produce the desired effect. Executing such a<br />
joint move turned out to be more complicated than anticipated. In every<br />
Arab country, the most influential Ambassador was to be entrusted to<br />
carry out the démarche; but this was not always regarded with confidence.<br />
The Dutch Ambassador Van Hoeve pointed out from Damascus that the<br />
démarche there was executed by the French Ambassador; while it was<br />
very much open to question whether he really would be prepared to waive<br />
French interests for those of the other member states. The same was the<br />
case in Algiers: the French Ambassador was to execute the démarche. 44<br />
And indeed, as Dutch Ambassador De Ranitz reported from Paris, it<br />
was quickly apparent that the French had given their own interpretation<br />
to the joint démarche in some Arab capitals. Specifically, the French Ambassador<br />
in Jeddah had received instructions that did not conform with<br />
the ec arrangement. The Director for North Africa and the Levant at the<br />
130
Quay d’Orsay positively denied this to De Ranitz, who had left it at that,<br />
since he was unable to say ‘that access had been obtained to the relevant<br />
instructions, which furthermore would certainly not promote the further<br />
cooperation of the French Ambassador in Jeddah’. 45 The result of this<br />
joint action was, in fact, very little.<br />
The end product of all Van der Stoel’s diplomatic activities and the<br />
work of the Dutch Foreign Ministry were thus so far negligible. By the beginning<br />
of December, the only thing that could be positively said was that<br />
most ec countries meanwhile, albeit in a rather formal and not entirely<br />
convincing fashion, had made it clear to the Arab countries that they objected<br />
to the embargo against The Netherlands. This was at least a step,<br />
but not a great step forwards.<br />
Two Oil Ministers in Europe<br />
Shortly after the epc declaration of November 6, it was learned that two<br />
Arab ministers, the Saudi Oil Minister Yamani and the Algerian Minister<br />
of Industry, Belaid Abdessalam, were intending to visit several West European<br />
countries. There was huge agitation surrounding this projected<br />
visit, both in The Hague and in other West European capitals. As soon as<br />
the trip was known, attempts were made to persuade the two ministers to<br />
pay a visit to The Netherlands. On November 21, dgpa Van Lynden emphasized<br />
to the Algerian Ambassador to The Hague that such a visit was<br />
thought ’particularly opportune’. 46 The following day, Van der Stoel sent<br />
a coded telegram to all posts repeating that the Cabinet was eager to receive<br />
the two ministers, although he considered the chance small that they<br />
would actually visit The Hague. Van der Stoel suggested that other ec<br />
governments would be able to see that the refusal of the two to visit The<br />
Hague would cause surprise, since The Netherlands had taken absolutely<br />
no counter measure against the embargo. 47<br />
While the two ministers had already begun their journey and had<br />
called on Paris, in The Hague differences of opinion were revealed over<br />
the question of whether or not an urgent attempt should be made to<br />
arrange a meeting. During a discussion meeting between the Dutch Foreign<br />
Ministry and the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Lubbers expressed<br />
interest in meeting the two – once again an indication of Lubbers’s more<br />
flexible and pragmatic approach than Van der Stoel’s. According to the<br />
latter, Lubbers and Economic Affairs were indeed more pro-Arab, but<br />
that was hardly surprising in view of their justifiable concern for the econ-<br />
131
omy. Lubbers contested this. He said that as soon as the embargo had<br />
been announced, in a meeting with Den Uyl and Van der Stoel, he had argued<br />
‘without reservation, not to give in an inch politically’, which somewhat<br />
surprised the premier. 48 Nonetheless, the Foreign Ministry had<br />
doubts about Lubbers’s proposal, since such a meeting should in the first<br />
instance be about political demands. 49<br />
In any case, on November 26 in Paris, Yamani absolutely denied ever<br />
having received a Dutch invitation. Van Lynden later forcefully reminded<br />
the Saudi Ambassador Nowilaty that he had on two occasions made it<br />
quite clear that The Hague would highly appreciate a visit from the two<br />
ministers. 50 On the same day, the two ministers let it be known informally<br />
that they were ready to receive a Dutch delegation during their stay in<br />
Brussels. Van der Stoel was fully informed of this by his Belgian counterpart,<br />
Van Elslande. The Belgian minister thought The Hague ought to respond<br />
positively to the Arab invitation; he feared the possibility of Rotterdam<br />
being eliminated and the consequences that would have for the<br />
Belgian economy. 51<br />
The visit to Brussels for which Van Elslande was arguing was raised for<br />
extensive discussion at the Dutch Council of Ministers. Van der Stoel had<br />
little enthusiasm for a visit by himself and Lubbers to Brussels. In all<br />
probability the two Arab ministers had no mandate to negotiate, he<br />
thought, and were therefore only interested in gaining concessions. It<br />
seemed to him, at least, that it would be better if he did not go himself,<br />
thus preventing any meeting with the two ministers assuming a political<br />
nature. Furthermore, the two had not taken up earlier invitations, even<br />
denying there had been any, which was also unpromising. However, Van<br />
der Stoel had no serious objection to Lubbers going. It would probably<br />
not be a good idea to reject the invitation from the two ministers completely,<br />
the more so since that would also be likely to irritate the Belgians.<br />
Lubbers was furthermore in a better position than himself, for he could<br />
steer clear of the political aspect.<br />
Boersma (Social Affairs) and Pronk (Development Cooperation) also<br />
had little appetite for a ‘humiliating trip’ to Brussels, but on the hand, it<br />
was felt the impression should be avoided that The Hague was unwilling<br />
to talk. Pronk further thought that any visit Lubbers made would be useful<br />
in the context of the government’s image with the electorate. Lubbers<br />
himself declared that he was ready to meet the two Arab ministers. In his<br />
discussions, he would above all point out the repercussions the embargo<br />
had for the ec, because Europe was in fact an integrated entity. Den Uyl<br />
thought that undertaking this ‘humiliating visit’ was indeed a fine balanc-<br />
132
ing act. In the publicity given to the visit, it should therefore be stressed<br />
that Lubbers would visit his opposite number, the Belgian Minister for<br />
Economics, and that coincidentally there would be discussions with the<br />
Arab ministers. This was approved by the ministerial council. 52<br />
The meetings of the two Arab ministers with members of different European<br />
governments did not go off with the same facility. In particular,<br />
even though Van Elslande had meanwhile given the Belgian parliament an<br />
interpretation of the epc declaration of November 6 that was favourable<br />
to the Arabs, the Belgian-Arab meeting was rather unpleasant. 53 The two<br />
Arab ministers let it be known that they expected from Europe deeds<br />
rather than words that would force the Israelis to withdraw more quickly<br />
from the occupied territories. Van Elslande made it clear to his Arab<br />
guests that he found the discrimination against The Netherlands unjust,<br />
which scarcely improved the atmosphere of the meeting.<br />
This conversation between Van Elslande and the two ministers thus<br />
appeared to deliver very little, apart from one matter which, for The<br />
Netherlands, was highly significant. Having been informed of the Belgian<br />
ownership of the Rotterdam-Antwerp oil pipeline, Yamani showed himself<br />
interested in the possibility of getting oil to Antwerp via this pipeline.<br />
Out of consideration he said, he would like to look into this, at least if it<br />
could be guaranteed that the oil was in fact pumped to Antwerp and did<br />
not end up on the Dutch market. 54<br />
The following day saw the meeting take place between Lubbers and<br />
the two ministers. Lubbers, without a single political concession on offer,<br />
was accompanied by dgpa Van Lynden, so that in fact the Foreign Ministry<br />
was directly involved. 55 The meeting proceeded more or less along<br />
predictable lines. When the ministers once again asked for a separate<br />
statement from The Netherlands, Lubbers replied that there was no reason<br />
to assume that The Hague was not foursquare behind the statement<br />
of November 6. According to Van Lynden, this position was also set out<br />
in the note of November 16, as well as in Van der Stoel’s account to the<br />
Dutch Second Chamber on November 29. Both documents, in translation,<br />
were handed to the Arab ministers. Van Lynden stressed that the<br />
epc statement, when it came to the question of the occupied territories,<br />
left nothing to be desired as far as its clarity was concerned. To ensure<br />
that there should be no possible misunderstanding, Lubbers added to this<br />
that The Netherlands was ‘opposed to annexation’. Finally, Van Lynden<br />
declared on behalf of his minister, Van der Stoel, that the Palestinian<br />
question was not purely a humanitarian question; The Netherlands<br />
recognised the Palestinians’ legitimate rights. 56 133
Lubbers and Van Lynden therefore went some way to meet the two<br />
Arab ministers; for Van Lynden’s clarification and Lubbers’s formulation<br />
of the Dutch attitude to annexation both implied Israeli withdrawal from<br />
all occupied territories. The view of Trouw, that Lubbers’s attitude in<br />
Brussels had been ‘a model of firmness and consistency upon which more<br />
reformative brethren might reflect in admiration’, would therefore seem<br />
to be a little exaggerated. 57 Whatever the case, it was still not enough.<br />
The Algerian minister Abdessalam in particular still desired a public declaration<br />
that Israel must withdraw from all the occupied territories. Just<br />
as Van der Stoel had said, the two ministers only wanted concessions and<br />
were neither prepared nor able to offer anything in turn.<br />
American Support<br />
Throughout a large part of the whole oil crisis, there was talk of the<br />
American willingness, if it came to the crunch, to provide The Netherlands<br />
with extra oil or with the necessary financial resources. This backing<br />
was first explicitly expressed on November 7, the day after the epc<br />
gathering, when the American Defense Secretary, James Schlesinger, paid<br />
a visit to The Hague and during the course of a meeting with Van der Stoel<br />
offered assistance with oil supplies. 58 The offer was kept secret from the<br />
outside world, but almost at once the buzz of rumours could be heard.<br />
Two weeks later it was learned that<br />
‘the Americans let it be known, reliably and at the highest level, that if<br />
the worst came to the worst, proposals would be put to the us government<br />
to help The Netherlands to deal with the consequences of the embargo’.<br />
59<br />
According to Van der Stoel, Kissinger had said the various possible ways<br />
of doing this were being studied. The American ambassadorial counsellor,<br />
Steve Blodgett, informed dgpa Van Lynden that assistance would be<br />
given only if it were requested by the Dutch Cabinet. Moreover, the decision<br />
would also depend on whether or not a European oil-sharing agreement<br />
had been reached. Van Lynden assured him that such a request<br />
would only be made in the extreme case. Notwithstanding these arrangements,<br />
the Dutch Foreign Ministry was busy drawing up a damage assessment;<br />
no simple matter as it turned out, because it still remained unclear<br />
just what the effects of the embargo on The Netherlands were. 60<br />
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The American offer was made against a background of increasing<br />
American-European discord over the Middle East peace process. The gulf<br />
separating Israel and Egypt was still enormous. On November 22, the Israeli<br />
Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, had discussions in New York with<br />
Kissinger and with un Secretary-General Waldheim over a peace conference.<br />
On the same day, Israel and Egypt appeared ready to make concessions.<br />
Three days later, Tel Aviv announced that it was in principle willing<br />
to participate in a peace conference. Egypt also agreed. The peace conference<br />
would take place in Geneva on December 18. On November 13,<br />
American Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs Sisco had already informed<br />
Van der Stoel that Washington saw no role for the ec at the<br />
planned peace conference, since the content of the November 6 declaration<br />
was incompatible with ec participation as an impartial broker. On<br />
November 21, Kissinger said he could only interpret this declaration, given<br />
its content and timing, as giving way to Arab blackmail. Once again a<br />
serious difference of opinion seemed to have developed within the Atlantic<br />
Alliance.<br />
The American offer of assistance met with very different responses in<br />
the Dutch Council of Ministers, and was debated on several occasions.<br />
Although the Cabinet certainly did not warm to it, Lubbers was all for a<br />
positive response. He wanted to begin secret negotiations with the Americans<br />
in early January, so that the whole affair could still be considered in<br />
the light of an anticipated European solidarity. He realised that this was<br />
‘a political act’. 61 At the end of November, Van der Stoel put the argument<br />
that, in connection with this support, The Netherlands should not,<br />
in fact, ‘engage in any policy that would conflict with American policy’.<br />
Vredeling, however, thought it more sensible not to take up the offer in<br />
view of the fact that it would align The Netherlands even more firmly<br />
with the usa and lead to even deeper isolation within the ec. His judgement<br />
was shared by Van der Stoel, though the latter felt the offer should<br />
not immediately be rejected. But the priority was indeed to find a formula<br />
within the ec that could give definite form to mutual solidarity there. 62<br />
The offer certainly had its disadvantageous aspects. It also raised<br />
doubts within the American presidential advisory body, the National Security<br />
Council (nsc), as to the wisdom of such a step: so reported the<br />
Dutch Ambassador in Washington. A supportive action might cause tensions<br />
within the ec and give the impression that Kissinger was out to fish<br />
in troubled European waters. The question posed by nsc staff was: given<br />
this background, to what extent would The Hague appreciate such help?<br />
The consequences for the Dutch position in Europe were, after all, not<br />
easily calculated. 63 135
Indeed, there were even more doubts within the Dutch Cabinet. In any<br />
case, thought Van der Stoel, the whole affair must be kept out of the public<br />
eye. That, it turned out, was not easy. Lubbers had already publicly<br />
said that the government was in agreement with this support proposal.<br />
Furthermore, it was meanwhile learned that the us Under-Secretary, W.<br />
H. Donaldson, would come to The Hague in December. On the other<br />
hand, the offer of support strengthened The Hague’s hand within the ec.<br />
In fact, at the end of the Council of Ministers, Van der Stoel informed the<br />
press that they had learned with gratitude of the American offer and<br />
awaited Donaldson’s arrival with much interest.<br />
The side effects of this possible oil assistance were subjected to thorough<br />
study at the Dutch Foreign Ministry. American support would presumably<br />
mean the definitive end of solidarity within the ec. Accepting<br />
help, furthermore, would give the impression that The Hague would<br />
come out of the crisis rather well off. The ec partners were by now already<br />
keeping a sharp eye on The Netherlands, since although the Dutch<br />
had been harder hit by the embargo than other European countries, they<br />
were nonetheless in a position to escape much hardship because of their<br />
natural gas. The Dutch position could become uncomfortable, for The<br />
Netherlands would then be considered in ec and epc contexts as an<br />
American protégé in matters of oil and energy. In Arab eyes, The Hague<br />
would simply be seen as an American vassal. Indeed, it was not inconceivable<br />
that the Arab countries would react by instituting further punitive<br />
measures against Dutch interests. Even if everything went well, The<br />
Netherlands would henceforth always be seen by the Arabs in a poor<br />
light, separate from the rest of Europe.<br />
In short: to accept American aid would be to accept a signal change in<br />
the ‘balanced’ policy pursued so far. The priority must be therefore to<br />
urge solidarity between the Nine, and a tougher attitude if possible toward<br />
those countries that would threaten the economic life of the Dutch<br />
nation. Only when all chances of a united European front had been exhausted<br />
should The Netherlands turn to America for help. And in the<br />
meantime, of course, as Van der Stoel had recommended in the Council of<br />
Ministers, the offer should be kept alive. 64<br />
The Dutch-American rapprochement appeared to be strengthened further<br />
when on November 30 Van der Stoel received an invitation for a bilateral<br />
discussion with Kissinger on the occasion of the coming nato<br />
Council of Ministers conference. R.B. van Lynden, the Dutch Ambassador<br />
in Washington, thought Van der Stoel should accept this invitation,<br />
especially since Jobert was opposing a proposal for a meeting on Decem-<br />
136
er 9 between Kissinger and the Nine. Of course, there were also objections<br />
attached to such an American-Dutch meeting. There was always the<br />
chance that Kissinger would insist on Van der Stoel choosing whether to<br />
follow his policy openly, which would only exacerbate the tensions within<br />
the Nine. 65<br />
Naturally, this rapprochement between the usa and The Netherlands<br />
aroused considerable interest abroad. The German embassy approached<br />
the Dutch Foreign Ministry with the question of whether there were any<br />
more details to be told of the offer of oil and the discussions that Donaldson<br />
was to hold. 66 The offer of support (and of course the embargo itself)<br />
seemed to make The Netherlands the fulcrum of all the diplomacy of the<br />
oil crisis. An advisor to the Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry, H.<br />
Scheltema, had the impression that the usa, possibly during the upcoming<br />
nato session, would try to build a greater Trans-Atlantic solidarity<br />
against the Arabs using The Netherlands as its instrument. It did seem,<br />
according to Scheltema, as if The Hague was the focus of all diplomacy.<br />
The Arabs hope to pressure us, and Europe with us, into supporting<br />
their cause, the Americans, by supporting us, are trying to move Europe<br />
toward a less pro-Arab position. In this situation, I cannot see clearly<br />
what we can do for the time being other than continue to play the European<br />
card. 67<br />
And according to De Ranitz, the French Director-General for Political<br />
Affairs thought that the us had ultimate tactical intentions in offering<br />
oil, and was trying to prise The Netherlands out of the ec. 68<br />
In this connection, it is striking that the offer of assistance was regarded<br />
with considerable scepticism within the top levels of Shell. A.C. Helfrich,<br />
Director of Shell-Netherlands, later pointed out that the American<br />
market was itself threatened with the possibility of major shortages, making<br />
it extremely unlikely that Washington would actually support The<br />
Netherlands in the case of a serious reduction in oil supply. 69<br />
Divisions within the EC<br />
As we saw earlier, Paris still wanted to call a European Summit conference<br />
before the end of the year – that is, a gathering of the leaders of ec<br />
governments (and the French Head of State). On various occasions during<br />
the second part of November, the question was raised of what status<br />
137
exactly this Summit should have and what should be on the agenda. In the<br />
French view, discussions should not be limited to the oil crisis. As Pompidou<br />
had told Van der Stoel on November 8, priority should be given to the<br />
principle question of whether the Nine were actually working toward<br />
eventual European integration or not. In addition, the questions of a<br />
communal energy and a communal defence policy should also be raised<br />
for discussion. Among several matters, the future of the nuclear industry<br />
was at issue because of the rivalry between the two competing enrichment<br />
plants: the French uranium enrichment concern Eurodif and the<br />
British-German-Dutch ultracentrifuge project. The oil crisis, in the<br />
French view, should be discussed merely as a part of these wider perspectives.<br />
Furthermore, it was becoming clearer by early December that the<br />
French government wanted to use the Summit in Copenhagen to get a dialogue<br />
started between the ec and the Arab countries. At the beginning of<br />
December, Jobert delivered a speech to the French parliament in which he<br />
argued for cooperation and dialogue with the Middle Eastern states. Approaching<br />
the Arabs now on the basis of the inconvenience Europe was<br />
suffering as a result of the embargo would not go down well in the Middle<br />
East. It seemed to him more sensible to try to engage Arab interest in a<br />
longer-term dialogue. The French Prime Minister P. Messmer also argued<br />
that the oil-consuming states should henceforth themselves come to a direct<br />
understanding with the producer countries without the intermediation<br />
of the oil companies. 70<br />
It was clear that Paris thought The Hague had called down the embargo<br />
upon itself, and further considered the Dutch energy situation much<br />
healthier than had been officially suggested. France’s position, as also<br />
represented to De Ranitz, was actually more vulnerable, and it was therefore<br />
with good reason that France did not want to forfeit good will in the<br />
Arab countries. And finally, it was thought that The Hague, more than<br />
anyone else, was responsible for blocking any step towards a common energy<br />
policy. 71 Taking everything together, France stood directly opposed<br />
to The Netherlands on virtually every point. It was still the question<br />
whether the other ec countries would support the French outlook and the<br />
French plan. France could probably expect most sympathy from London;<br />
yet in several respects the French and British viewpoints diverged sharply.<br />
London was highly doubtful of plans for a communal ec energy policy.<br />
There was also no consensus between the two countries on the question<br />
of a common defence policy. Only when it came to a European-Arab political<br />
rapprochement was Britain likely to take the French side.<br />
138
Initially, the Dutch feared that the West German government, and<br />
specifically the Chancellor, Willy Brandt, were inclined to share the<br />
French orientation, but this began to change during the course of events<br />
during November. Brandt’s policy began to move more in the Atlantic direction.<br />
Differences of opinion between Bonn and Paris were accentuated<br />
when the West German Minister of Defence, Leber, emphasized the significance<br />
of the Eurogroup within nato at a meeting of the West European<br />
Union. Jobert, on the contrary, preferred a European defence policy<br />
independent of nato, under the aegis of the weu. Bonn, Leber responded,<br />
found the idea of a European defence outside the Atlantic framework<br />
unthinkable. 72<br />
On November 19, in conversation with Van der Stoel, the West German<br />
Foreign Minister Scheel commented negatively on Pompidou’s proposals.<br />
It was still too early to take decisions on such issues as nuclear energy.<br />
Under the present circumstances, the first matter was to share the oil<br />
shortage on a pro rata basis. Scheel’s views no doubt were seized on by<br />
Van der Stoel. During this conversation he was not above referring once<br />
again to the key role of the Dutch in the oil sector and the West German<br />
dependence on natural gas: ‘should the need for oil increase and other<br />
members of the Community, meaning specifically France and England,<br />
refuse to draw the consequences of European solidarity, the pressure in<br />
The Netherlands to adopt independent restrictive measures would become<br />
irresistible, which would affect the principle of solidarity and lead<br />
to a crisis in the Community’. 73<br />
West Germany was partly dependent on The Netherlands for its energy<br />
needs. As Van der Stoel had earlier concluded in a business-like fashion,<br />
this was an important reason for West German (and Belgian) willingness<br />
to support The Hague. Van der Stoel was probably right. Simonian,<br />
the author of a book on French-German relations during this period, also<br />
holds the view that the West German change of course was largely the result<br />
of the fear of losing Rotterdam as its main transit port. 74<br />
Belgium and Luxembourg seem also to have responded rather coolly to<br />
the French plan. Both governments had been generally supportive of The<br />
Hague’s struggle for solidarity, despite Belgian irritation with the Dutch<br />
attitude, not least because of the threat to restrict the flow of oil and the<br />
export of natural gas. Over this latter question, as was remarked in the<br />
Dutch Council of Ministers, there had developed what was even referred<br />
to as a ‘hostile tone’. 75 There was, in addition, another delicate problem<br />
between The Netherlands and Belgium. During their visit to Brussels, the<br />
two Arab ministers had said they had no objection to unhindered use of<br />
139
the Rotterdam-Antwerp pipeline to supply Belgium with oil. But in such<br />
an eventuality the oil would have to be monitored at the beginning of the<br />
pipeline, for example by officials from an Arab embassy. As far as this<br />
scheme was concerned, however, the Belgians complained that they could<br />
expect little cooperation from the Dutch. 76<br />
Italy seemed a doubtful case. There was undoubtedly a good deal of<br />
Italian hostility towards The Netherlands, the Corriere della Sera in particular<br />
taking a viciously anti-Dutch line in its reporting of The Hague’s<br />
role in the oil crisis. This paper depicted Van der Stoel’s role as that of<br />
someone who did not hide his sympathy for the Jews. There were perhaps<br />
200,000 Jews living in The Netherlands, who controlled the financial life<br />
of the nation. In spite of this, the Dutch wanted to maintain an existing<br />
situation in which the Arabs had to reach the whole of Europe via Rotterdam.<br />
For this, they (the Dutch) believed that the ec should show solidarity.<br />
The analysis of the daily Messagero, however, was that the Dutch government<br />
was trying to ensure ‘that the multinationals who controlled<br />
Rotterdam should continue to be given a free hand’ – which was hardly<br />
inaccurate. According to the Corriere della Sera, The Netherlands, supported<br />
by West Germany, had in fact already won the argument with<br />
France and Great Britain. 77 The Dutch Ambassador in Rome, Boon,<br />
thought that the Italian delegation was unlikely to follow France blindly<br />
in Copenhagen. The French effort to get the states to negotiate with the<br />
Arabs rather than the majors would not be shared by Rome. There was<br />
far more understanding for the international oil companies in Italy, particularly<br />
for Shell and bp, which were seen by the European-oriented as<br />
more European companies than as Seven Sisters. 78<br />
Den Uyl and Van der Stoel<br />
From the moment that the French proposals became known, the Cabinet<br />
was assailed by doubt. The French plan for a summit conference of governmental<br />
leaders was first discussed in the Council of Ministers at the<br />
beginning of November, only a day after the proposal had been handed to<br />
Den Uyl, who had promised to study it carefully. Den Uyl had further indicated<br />
that he was willing to participate. ‘Given the Dutch thinking<br />
against regularly recurrent European summits, this was an extremely<br />
obliging response’, was the view subsequently taken at the Foreign Ministry.<br />
79 The Secretary-General of General Affairs (the Prime Minister’s<br />
Office), D.M. Ringnalda, had meanwhile warned Den Uyl of the Foreign<br />
140
Ministry’s resistance to summit conferences that excluded any foreign<br />
ministers. However, Ringnalda thought that every minister was implicated<br />
in the collective responsibility for government policy and that, accordingly,<br />
the premier could be empowered to defend and prosecute Cabinet<br />
policy abroad. It was absolutely not essential that he should always be accompanied<br />
by his Foreign Minister. 80<br />
Predictably, Van der Stoel was in complete disagreement with this<br />
view, restating the usual Foreign Ministry standpoint in the ministerial<br />
council: a summit threatened to undermine the normal diplomatic cooperation<br />
of the ec. He concluded, as he had informed the embassy in Paris,<br />
that his presence was necessary on constitutional grounds. But it was not<br />
only the nature of the decision-making, the content of the issues raised at<br />
the Summit also caused him concern. dgpa Van Lynden had meanwhile<br />
stressed to the British Ambassador that in any case he was not much in<br />
favour of the idea of taking binding decisions in Copenhagen, which<br />
could only be ‘impulse’ decisions. 81<br />
On November 16, at the Council of Ministers, Van der Stoel expressed<br />
his fear that Copenhagen would be used to make pronouncements directly<br />
opposed to American policy. His conclusion was that there was a real<br />
dilemma, and he considered approaching Bonn to avert the possibility of<br />
damaging Trans-Atlantic harmony. He recognised that there was a proper<br />
role for the ec, but The Netherlands should not allow itself to be<br />
pushed by that role into opposing Washington. The declaration of November<br />
6 had already caused American-European friction, and any further<br />
deepening of an Atlantic conflict had to be avoided. 82 A week later,<br />
after discussions on this issue between the ec foreign ministers on November<br />
20, Van der Stoel was able to report to the Council of Ministers<br />
that the meeting in Copenhagen was to be only of an informal nature. No<br />
communal communiqué would be issued (which actually did happen in<br />
the event). A collective gathering of heads of state, government leaders<br />
and foreign ministers would be held at the beginning and end of the conference;<br />
while between times consultations would take place between<br />
government leaders and individual ministers. Van der Stoel did warn that<br />
Copenhagen would inevitably have a strongly political character. Issues<br />
that would be raised included: the Middle East conflict, the European-<br />
American relation and East-West relations, and, moreover, the energy<br />
problem, plans for a European Monetary Union (emu), and possibly even<br />
European defence. 83<br />
This heavily political agenda occasioned great anxiety in the Dutch<br />
Foreign Ministry. As he had previously, in the period before the epc min-<br />
141
isterial session of November 5 and 6, Van der Stoel hoped that the Copenhagen<br />
Summit would concern itself with the oil problem as much as possible<br />
and attend to the political objectives advanced by the French as little<br />
as possible.<br />
The idea was to prepare for the Summit during an ec Energy Council<br />
meeting over December 3 and 4, but the Dutch were from the beginning<br />
pessimistic about this meeting. During a bilateral Ministry of Economics<br />
– Foreign Ministry meeting, Lubbers also let it be known that he expected<br />
little from the Energy Council. He confirmed that the oil companies were<br />
under pressure from some governments, but Cabinet action seemed unnecessary.<br />
He did have the impression that the companies would not be<br />
able to keep up the game of sharing out the oil (by shifting oil originally<br />
from Nigeria and Iran).<br />
At the moment, some Arab oil is arriving in Rotterdam (which is apparent<br />
from the decreasing imports in England from Nigeria), but it is unclear<br />
how much is being transferred. Of course, we are exercising maximum<br />
reticence over this. 84<br />
That pessimism seemed to be confirmed when it was learned that the European<br />
Commission had worked out two new proposals for implementing<br />
an oil allocation arrangement and for setting up an advisory committee<br />
for the oil industries. London and Paris reacted angrily to this plan,<br />
which Van der Stoel read as a signal that both countries ‘found the speculative<br />
chance of a new political role in the Middle East more important<br />
than optimal European cooperation’. Preparatory to the ec Energy<br />
Council meeting of December 3 and 4, which was also taking place in<br />
Copenhagen, Heath again stressed that the ec should concentrate on the<br />
foreign policy aspects of the Middle East conflict. 85<br />
During the ec Energy Council of December 3 and 4 in Copenhagen,<br />
attended by Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Economic Affairs and Finance,<br />
the differences of outlook within the ec were once again clearly delineated.<br />
Van der Stoel again set out his standpoint emphatically. He pointed<br />
out that The Netherlands was now beginning seriously to feel the restrictions,<br />
as a result of which it was the first ec country to announce petrol<br />
rationing (see Chapter 6). Van der Stoel was critical of those who were<br />
only interested in the political side of the Middle East conflict, meaning<br />
first and foremost Great Britain. It was an illusion, however, even if some<br />
magical formula for a speedy resolution of the Middle East conflict<br />
should appear, to think that the embargo and restricted production<br />
142
would be lifted within a few weeks. And their effects, moreover, were<br />
likely to last for some time. There was no invisible hand ensuring equal<br />
shares of the oil supply to all member states. Should the Nine be incapable<br />
of taking any (discrete) communal action, the market would disintegrate<br />
with all the consequences this implied. The only just and proper step, according<br />
to Van der Stoel was joint, communal action.<br />
Jobert replied that sharing the poverty would be no solution at all. And<br />
moreover, it was quite unjust to point to France and Great Britain as privileged<br />
countries. They were absolutely not energy-rich countries; France<br />
was in fact poor in energy reserves. Paris had long tried to promote the<br />
creation of an energy policy and to build up stocks, repeated Jobert, implicitly<br />
referring to The Netherlands. In this context, one must speak of<br />
past, present and future, and over the energy question as a whole, i.e. including<br />
the question of uranium enrichment, which equally called for solidarity.<br />
Addressing Van der Stoel directly, Jobert suggested that panic and<br />
psychosis had to be avoided if relations with the Arabs were not to be<br />
made even more difficult.<br />
The British Minister for Energy repeated his position, that openly<br />
communal action would endanger oil supplies by provoking Arab counteraction.<br />
In the uk too, preparations for rationing were in hand, and<br />
joint diplomatic action, in his view, offered better prospects. The Arabs<br />
had to be convinced that the ec would not be undermined.<br />
Support for Van der Stoel came mainly from the Belgian and the West<br />
German side. The Belgian Foreign Minister Van Elslande wondered what<br />
would remain of the Community’s credibility if the ec was incapable of<br />
resolving the oil problem on a communal basis. The West Germans also<br />
favoured communal action. To the West German mind, the coming<br />
Copenhagen Summit should begin with discussion of current energy<br />
problems. These views were also endorsed by the Danish and Luxembourg<br />
side. The Luxembourg Foreign Minister Thorn said he would find<br />
it rather schizophrenic if the Nine should adopt a communal political<br />
standpoint toward the outer world whilst not recognising the ec as an<br />
economic entity. The Chairman of the European Commission, Ortoli,<br />
also supported the Dutch view. 86<br />
Taken together, what this meant was that The Hague’s views on the necessity<br />
for communal action to deal with the reduction in the oil supply<br />
were by now shared by a considerable number of ec member governments.<br />
In view of the powerful opposition of both Paris and London,<br />
however, any movement by the ec or the European Commission was<br />
ruled out. On the contrary, the Commission’s proposals were brushed<br />
143
aside. Nor did it look as though these would be dealt with at the Copenhagen<br />
Summit to be held in ten days’ time. An embittered Van der Stoel<br />
declared after the meeting of December 3 and 4 that the ec member states<br />
would have to suffer the consequences themselves if the Dutch economy<br />
were radically affected by the oil crisis. 87<br />
Visible or Invisible<br />
In The Hague, a growing sense of doubt over the relationships within the<br />
ec gradually came to dominate the outlook. 88 It was very much open to<br />
question whether the ec partners could ever agree on any communal plan<br />
of action to deal with the oil crisis. But in addition, it was becoming clear<br />
that The Netherlands was perhaps not in such a bad situation as had been<br />
assumed throughout November. In the Ministerial Council for Economic<br />
Affairs, it was now concluded that, in view of the relatively satisfactory<br />
Dutch position, (communal ec) sharing carried considerable risks as<br />
well, certainly if natural gas was also involved. 89 As long as the oil companies<br />
shared out the oil pro rata, The Hague was actually in rather good<br />
shape.<br />
This is not to say that the December 14 and 15 Summit was not thoroughly<br />
prepared in The Hague, notably on December 6 in the Council for<br />
European Affairs and the following day in the Council of Ministers, on<br />
the basis of two notes prepared by the Foreign Ministry and Ministry of<br />
Economic Affairs, respectively. The Foreign Affairs note put forward the<br />
view that regular summits were undesirable, because they would interfere<br />
with the primary responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The<br />
same note recognised the major importance of communal political action,<br />
but noted the undesirability of London and Paris being given an ec<br />
mandate in any form. The note also rejected the idea of participation of<br />
either country at the coming peace conference in Geneva, as well as ec<br />
pressure being brought to bear in order to achieve that objective. Such<br />
participation would arouse great opposition in Israel, which could only<br />
serve to delay any peace accord. The note also rejected the idea of a new<br />
declaration by the Nine. Kissinger’s standpoint was rather that it was<br />
now time for quiet diplomacy. In general, in view of the importance of a<br />
healthy Atlantic alliance for the security of the West, as well as the sound<br />
financial-economic relations of the world, it was essential to be alert to<br />
anything that might try to define a European identity in opposition to the<br />
usa. 90<br />
144
With regard to the oil problem, the note proposed that discussion of<br />
this issue should have absolute priority at the Summit.<br />
Under the present circumstances, it is clearly of the utmost importance<br />
to The Netherlands that at Copenhagen, in some shape or form, there<br />
should be evidence provided of an awareness of communal responsibility<br />
for the solution of this problem. 91<br />
In his clarification of this note, Van der Stoel concluded that the central<br />
question was whether the Summit was prepared to make the oil problem a<br />
communal issue.<br />
The minister sketched the positions within the ec regarding this question<br />
as follows: powerful support could be expected for The Hague’s<br />
viewpoint from the West German Republic, Denmark and (to a lesser extent)<br />
Belgium and Luxembourg, but the attitude of Great Britain, France<br />
and Italy gave little cause for joy. He hoped that it would be possible to<br />
deal with the oil problem ‘above all other topics’, but he was not optimistic.<br />
The members of the Cabinet appeared to agree with the Foreign<br />
Ministry note and Van der Stoel’s elaboration of it. Den Uyl, Pronk and<br />
Finance Minister Duisenberg merely queried the passage repudiating the<br />
institutionalisation of summits in general: in Den Uyl’s view, such meetings<br />
often had played a stimulating role. Van der Stoel replied that summit<br />
conferences threatened to undermine the work of both the Council<br />
and the Commission. Their regular occurrence should therefore not be<br />
endorsed. 92<br />
Lubbers’s note, drawn up in consultation with the Foreign Ministry,<br />
was equally pessimistic over the possibility of Copenhagen reaching a<br />
communal policy regarding the oil problem. It dealt extensively with the<br />
plans for a communal ec energy policy, which was regarded with some<br />
caution by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. It was clear, said Lubbers,<br />
that Paris and The Hague took very different positions. The Netherlands,<br />
he said, had now made its standpoint a more flexible one, but there was<br />
no reason to take the lead. The Netherlands was ready to cooperate in<br />
bringing about a community price policy. The communal promotion of<br />
research was also significant. It was most important that a central role<br />
should be reserved for the European Commission, whose outlook was totally<br />
at variance with the French. Lubbers was therefore apprehensive<br />
that more far-reaching decisions might be taken in Copenhagen, for example<br />
over the basis of a communal energy policy, or over nuclear energy,<br />
145
while providing no guarantees for the communal operation of the energy<br />
market. 93<br />
During the debate in the Council for European Affairs, differences of<br />
opinion seemed to be developing along party political lines. According to<br />
Pronk (PvdA), the Ministry of Economic Affairs note was excessively preoccupied<br />
with state interference. Den Uyl expressed himself more cautiously,<br />
but thought there was no sense in leaving everything exactly as it<br />
was; for one would then be entirely in the hands of the oil companies. In<br />
this context it was good to remember Edward Heath’s behaviour at the<br />
start of the oil crisis. Den Uyl also wanted to know why The Netherlands<br />
had for so long resisted a communal energy policy. In response to this<br />
question, the acting Director-General for Energy from the Ministry of<br />
Economic Affairs, A.T.T. van Rhijn, said that The Netherlands had obstructed<br />
such a policy because of its natural gas reserves and because of<br />
Rotterdam’s special position. Moreover, it was feared that France, whose<br />
oil politics were closely tied to foreign policy, would be able to push the<br />
ec into a Middle Eastern policy that was unacceptable to The Netherlands.<br />
A last, striking aspect of the debate in the Council for European Affairs<br />
was the question of natural gas. Lubbers declared that, domestically,<br />
oil was increasingly being replaced by natural gas, which had its repercussions<br />
on export. There should be no reduction in exports because of<br />
this, but there should be a deceleration of export growth. He wondered<br />
why this could not be said publicly. Not speaking about this would only<br />
lead to speculation over The Hague’s plans for natural gas. In the end, one<br />
ran the risk of political arrangements over the inviolability of natural gas<br />
contracts, both in relation to volumes and prices.<br />
On this point, as so often, Van der Stoel was more cautious. The first<br />
priority was solidarity. It was scarcely possible to demand solidarity and<br />
at the same time threaten other partners with export restrictions. And in<br />
the end, such an action would predominantly affect precisely those countries<br />
that supported The Netherlands. Den Uyl appeared to be more<br />
Machiavellian than his party colleague. He thought that one should paint<br />
the nation’s situation as it was, without threats. There was nothing improper<br />
in taking up a position openly. 94<br />
The following day, this exchange of views was largely repeated and<br />
reaffirmed in ministerial council. The Council decided in principle to go<br />
along with a communal energy policy together with research and development.<br />
In the first place, however, the question was about taking communal<br />
action to combat the oil shortage, and above all directed at bring-<br />
146
ing down the level of consumption. The chances of success were not estimated<br />
highly. Van der Stoel pointed out that London was on the whole<br />
not in favour of a communal energy policy. He once again warned of the<br />
French plans for a Euro-Arab dialogue. France was working hard for this,<br />
using other means than purely through discussions between producers<br />
and consumers. Such a dialogue would create serious friction with Washington,<br />
while Kissinger undoubtedly would totally reject any thwarting<br />
of his political aims in the region. 95<br />
Van der Stoel’s expectations of Copenhagen remained low. On December<br />
4 he had tried to convince his Belgian and Luxembourg counterparts<br />
that a common Benelux standpoint would be useful, referring to the danger<br />
of the French plans for a Euro-Arab conference, specifically with an<br />
eye to American-European relations. Van Elslande was not convinced by<br />
Van der Stoel’s argument and became more positive in his attitude to the<br />
French ideas. 96<br />
Attempts at consultation with Paris and London also failed to deliver.<br />
De Ranitz reported that urging ‘solidarité de fait’ had produced no result.<br />
The French attitude toward The Netherlands in Copenhagen would be a<br />
hard one: if the Dutch were unwilling to cooperate on the French plans,<br />
they would themselves be responsible for their own oil problems. Shortly<br />
before the conference, it became apparent, not for the first time, that<br />
there was no support to be expected from the British side. Van der Stoel<br />
had emphatically put the question to Home, the British Foreign Minister;<br />
while the following day Ambassassador Gevers reported a conversation<br />
with an Assistant Under-secretary of the Foreign Office. Open expressions<br />
of solidarity with The Netherlands, according to this British diplomat,<br />
were counterproductive. Furthermore, The Hague was at the time<br />
no worse off than its other ec partners, thanks to the operations of an ‘invisible<br />
hand’. Why then demand a ‘visible hand’ (i.e. ‘sharing’ between<br />
member states) that could not itself produce any oil to share out, when the<br />
result would be merely to restrict the activities of the ‘invisible hand’.<br />
This was a view shared by Shell. The oil companies were well prepared<br />
to take care of a fair share-out of oil with their ‘invisible hand’. Wagner<br />
was also unconcerned about possible practical problems. His advice to<br />
Van der Stoel at the Copenhagen Summit was ‘to play it in such a way that<br />
the Dutch should for the time being be content with a solidarité de fait<br />
and should keep this as much as possible to themselves’. Should the<br />
British and the French proceed with their restrictive practices and should<br />
they, for instance, announce formal unilateral measures, The Hague<br />
could always resume its own freedom of trade. 97 147
The visible hand was therefore wholly unnecessary; The Netherlands<br />
was in good shape. Self-confidence in The Hague received a further boost<br />
when, on December 9, on the eve of the nato conference of ministers,<br />
Van der Stoel met Kissinger in Brussels. Kissinger expressed wholehearted<br />
appreciation of the Dutch attitude, and not without reason. On different<br />
occasions, The Hague had tried to act as mediator between Washington<br />
and the Nine. On November 28, the Dutch dgpa Van Lynden had assured<br />
the American ambassadorial counsellor that The Hague would do<br />
its best within the framework of the European Political Cooperation to<br />
exercise a moderating influence. Van der Stoel’s meeting went very well,<br />
despite Kissinger’s initial distrust of his socialist opposite number. In the<br />
event, the two ministers agreed on almost everything. Kissinger objected<br />
strongly to the construction of a European identity on the basis of anti-<br />
Americanism. Van der Stoel assured him that European solidarity, in The<br />
Hague’s view at least, must always be placed in an Atlantic context. Of<br />
course, Van der Stoel was curious to know what Kissinger thought of the<br />
embargo. Kissinger’s response sounded highly promising. He let it be<br />
known in strictest confidence that Yamani had promised him in fact to try<br />
to get the embargo against The Netherlands lifted. 98<br />
Van der Stoel also adopted the position at the nato ministerial conference<br />
that one would expect of an Atlantic statesman. The meeting was<br />
distinguished mainly by the sharp confrontation between Jobert and<br />
Kissinger. Kissinger did not hide his irritation over the attitude of the<br />
Community, while Jobert argued precisely for more drastic, independent<br />
European moves in the Middle East conflict. Van der Stoel tried to support<br />
Kissinger during the conference, which ended finally in a much more<br />
pleasant atmosphere than it had begun. Certainly, there was no hint of<br />
conflict in the final communiqué. However, Van der Stoel had found himself<br />
in an awkward predicament, given that The Netherlands had constantly<br />
exerted itself to prevent European-American estrangement. It was<br />
an important effort for the Dutch, since ‘The Netherlands more than any<br />
other ec country saw the maintenance of the link between the two continents<br />
as an important goal of its foreign policy’. 99<br />
At the close of the conference, a conversation with his Benelux colleagues<br />
left Van der Stoel with an even more despondent outlook on the<br />
coming Copenhagen Summit than before. His gloomy reflections were<br />
conveyed to the Dutch Foreign Ministry:<br />
148
A working breakfast with Benelux ministers (plus Directors-General)<br />
… led to an extremely depressing prognosis for the coming summit,<br />
where the French want to take all the decisions (in league with the uk,<br />
but hopefully opposed by West Germany) through a series of faits accomplis,<br />
largely setting aside or circumventing community institutions<br />
and procedures.<br />
The French proposals were revealed the same day. One striking passage<br />
was the suggestion of creating a European Security Council, possibly<br />
comprising Under-Secretaries of State, which could meet at any desired<br />
moment in crisis situations. From Paris, De Ranitz found these proposals<br />
remarkably similar to the Fouchet plan of the early 1960s, plans against<br />
which The Netherlands, under the leadership of Minister Luns, had<br />
fought tooth and nail at that time. Nonetheless, it hardly seemed an attractive<br />
prospect to the Dutch that they would be made scapegoats if the<br />
proposals were not accepted by the Summit. 100<br />
Meanwhile, it was also learned that several Arab ministers were coming<br />
to Copenhagen for consultations with European leaders. It seemed<br />
highly likely that this visit had been arranged at French instigation. Such<br />
a meeting was totally unacceptable as long as the embargo was in place. If<br />
the talks with the Arabs were to go ahead, Van der Stoel demanded as preconditions<br />
that discussion should first be held between the Nine over the<br />
manner of their reception; that there must be no discrimination between<br />
the ec partners; and that any real exchange of views with the Arab ministers<br />
must be avoided. In any case, the peace conference in Geneva must<br />
not be frustrated. These conditions were handed to the Belgian and<br />
French governments. 101<br />
Matters were complicated still further on the eve of the Summit when<br />
Kissinger, in an address in London on December 12, dealt at length with<br />
the oil crisis. He called on oecd countries to develop joint initiatives regarding<br />
oil production, a more rational use of energy and the development<br />
of alternative energy sources. Kissinger proposed setting up an energy<br />
action group to discuss these proposals further (see Chapter 7). Van<br />
der Stoel responded immediately and positively to these proposals, which<br />
were of course intended to influence the Copenhagen Summit and to<br />
stymie any European go-it-alone, such as the French were trying to promote.<br />
The French daily Le Monde branded the speech as a crude meddling<br />
in European affairs. 102 149
Copenhagen<br />
The Summit began on December 14. The afternoon saw the arrival in<br />
Copenhagen of government leaders and foreign ministers. Preliminary<br />
talks had been arranged for the first evening, followed by the arrival –<br />
highly undesirable in the Dutch view – of the foreign ministers of Algeria,<br />
Tunisia, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates. During conversation, the<br />
four expressed their hope that the ec would play an active role in the coming<br />
peace process and that this should not be left to the two superpowers.<br />
The ec should insist on Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied territories<br />
and on respect for Palestinian rights. The Arab countries wanted closer<br />
cooperation in general with Europe, in economic, technical and cultural<br />
fields. At the same time, it was not expected that Europe would turn<br />
against Israel, but it was hoped that the future would bring greater activity<br />
in favour of the Arabs.<br />
The Nine, however, at least a majority of the Nine, appeared unwilling<br />
to meet the Arab delegation. As recorded in a report from Van der Stoel, it<br />
was decided that the Danish Prime Minister, A. Jörgensen, and Foreign<br />
Minister, K.B. Andersen, would receive the Arabs once more, ‘so that<br />
aside from courtesies, the damage caused by the Arab actions to the European<br />
economies could be discussed’. Promises were given to look further<br />
at the Arab wishes, but that was all. 103<br />
Pompidou had originally expressed his preference for further talks<br />
with the Arab ministers and wanted the Nine to work out a mutually<br />
agreed standpoint over the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories.<br />
But it was Brandt, in particular, who insisted that the declaration of<br />
November 6 was absolutely sufficient and that with regard to resolution<br />
242 Europe must not be more pro-Arab than the Soviet Union. 104 The<br />
Italian Prime Minister also stressed that negotiations with the Arabs<br />
should be avoided. Den Uyl naturally endorsed the West German standpoint.<br />
The further talks that Pompidou wanted did not happen.<br />
The atmosphere was not improved when it was suggested by some –<br />
specifically the smaller – member states that the Arab visitors had been secretly<br />
invited by Paris and possibly also by London. 105 In the event, however,<br />
the French delegation did not succeed in notching up a single victory<br />
over the Middle East conflict. West Germany, The Netherlands and Denmark<br />
forcefully resisted a French proposal regarding the evacuation of<br />
the Israeli occupied territories. A rather milder text from the British was<br />
also seen off. In the end, the French President proposed expressing the<br />
hope that Israel realised the significance of the fact that the Arab countries<br />
150
had accepted peace negotiations. Den Uyl resisted this proposal too, because<br />
it could be construed as a one-sided appeal to Israel. With support<br />
from Brandt, pre-eminently, and from the Danish Prime Minister, Jörgensen,<br />
and his Foreign Minister, Andersen, this text was also struck<br />
off. 106<br />
Pompidou thus achieved none of his aims, which was partly explained<br />
by his poor health. It struck Den Uyl that Pompidou looked ill, ‘completely<br />
swollen up by cortisones’, according to the Dutch Premier. It was for<br />
this reason that Pompidou was incapable of standing long meetings. His<br />
poor condition was confirmed by the Danish Prime Minister, Jörgensen,<br />
who noted in his diary that the French President was on the verge of collapse,<br />
with an ambulance waiting permanently at the ready. 107 The most<br />
important reason for the French failure, however, was the growth of opposition<br />
during the preceding weeks, notably that of the West Germans.<br />
In the end, the press communiqué contained no more than an appeal to<br />
reach a just and lasting peace accord, referring to the declaration of<br />
November 6 and resolution 242 in all its parts.<br />
Pompidou refused to enter into discussion of the current oil problem,<br />
partly in reaction to the preceding attitude of the majority of member<br />
states. He declared that this question should only be raised as an integral<br />
part of discussion of a communal ec energy policy. But it was very quickly<br />
evident that there was no agreement over the communal, more us-independent<br />
ec energy policy being pushed by the French. Only Heath, who<br />
during the dinner had called Shell ‘a curse’, was ready to support the extreme<br />
French proposals, although it was open to question whether London<br />
was really prepared to cooperate with a communal energy policy.<br />
The other member states turned against the French proposals, thus opening<br />
the way for the discussions between consumer countries that<br />
Kissinger was arguing for. In the end, it was decided to ask the Council of<br />
Ministers and the European Commission to develop proposals and to<br />
take appropriate action toward establishing a communal ec approach,<br />
especially to the current oil and energy problems. 108 From the very beginning,<br />
the question had been whether this would actually happen.<br />
All in all, Copenhagen had produced more conflict than cooperation,<br />
and for this very reason had delivered a result that was wholly acceptable<br />
to The Netherlands. The Euro-Arab dialogue, for the time being, was a<br />
non-starter. The radical French plans for a communal ec energy policy<br />
had only been discussed in the most general terms and had led to nothing<br />
in the way of decisions. Nor had anything concrete been arranged over<br />
nuclear energy. The American proposals for consumer discussions had<br />
151
not been rejected, and, furthermore, the final communiqué referred to the<br />
need for Atlantic unity. The possible institutionalisation of summit conferences<br />
of government leaders was mentioned, but the idea of a European<br />
security council was turned down, specifically by Willy Brandt.<br />
France and Great Britain, in fact, had suffered a defeat, while the Dutch<br />
position appeared considerably strengthened. Van der Stoel subsequently<br />
expressed his satisfaction over the Summit. 109<br />
Another feature of these events that had become clearly apparent was<br />
further estrangement between the Germans and the French, which also<br />
suited The Hague. This was in part caused by the fact that Bonn was not<br />
prepared to go on financing a large part of the joint community agricultural<br />
policy, which favoured the French. 110 For similar reasons, this time<br />
to do with regional support given to Great Britain, British-German relations<br />
had also become rougher.<br />
There still remained a few unpleasant aspects of the Copenhagen Summit.<br />
In all probability leaked by the French, reports appeared in the press<br />
to the effect that particularly Bonn and The Hague had resisted a more<br />
critical statement on the Israeli position in the Middle East conflict. The<br />
content of the French draft text, which in the event was not accepted, was<br />
also published before the final communiqué. The resentment which this<br />
caused was brought to the attention of the French Ambassador by the<br />
Dutch dgpa Van Lynden. 111<br />
But by then this could not harm The Hague. Two days after Copenhagen<br />
the postponed visit of American Secretary of State Donaldson took<br />
place. Lengthy discussions were held with him in the presence of Ambassador<br />
Gould. The first session of these discussions was led by Van der<br />
Stoel, who expressed his satisfaction with the outcome of the Summit,<br />
since the principle of community action had now finally been accepted. At<br />
the same time he stressed the importance of consultation with other oil-using<br />
countries, specifically the usa. From the American side, admiration<br />
was expressed for the DutchCabinet’s attitude and its refusal to be blackmailed<br />
by oil, so unlike other European countries. On the other hand,<br />
there was disappointment at the fact that the final communiqué omitted<br />
any explicit reference to the Kissinger plan. Gould and Donaldson made it<br />
clear that the aim of their visit was to be informed of the situation in the energy<br />
sphere. It should therefore be said at once that any American possibilities<br />
for lending assistance were limited. It was also not the intention to put<br />
The Netherlands into a difficult position within the ec by lending help.<br />
At the second session, led by Lubbers’s the main topic of discussion<br />
was the practical situation. Lubbers explained that the government was<br />
152
in the meantime busy saving over the odds on petrol consumption in order<br />
to be able to pass on sufficient oil products, specifically naphtha, to the<br />
chemical industry. He enquired about the possibilities of American oil being<br />
supplied to Rotterdam refineries from American companies, about<br />
the possible supply of American coal to the Hoogovens steel works and<br />
about the use of nato oil stocks by the Dutch armed forces. All this<br />
would have to be looked into in Washington.<br />
These discussions would have no immediate, material, sequel. It was<br />
more a matter of political and psychological gesture, a helping hand. A<br />
brief account was distributed to the British and the French Ambassadors<br />
stressing that The Netherlands preferred solutions within the context of<br />
the ec and oecd, and that if there were any American help with oil there<br />
would be no conditions attached.<br />
Conclusion<br />
In various ways, Copenhagen can be seen to have been a failure. The<br />
route to a communal energy policy was blocked; and no concrete, communal<br />
approach to the consequences of the oil shortages was achieved.<br />
Dutch politicians at The Hague publicly spoke of their great disappointment.<br />
Press opinion over the Copenhagen Summit was also bitter. ‘Europe<br />
– does it exist?’ Het Parool wondered. When needed, ‘the Brussels<br />
machinery was full of the sand of nationalism’, concluded the Amsterdam<br />
newspaper. 112 Trouw found it astonishing that, 22 years after the institution<br />
of the European Community for Coal and Steel, Western Europe<br />
‘was still toiling over the creation of a communal energy market’. 113 Other<br />
dailies also remarked on the total absence of any perceivable ‘communal<br />
solidarity’ within the ec. 114<br />
Yet more privately in The Hague, the feeling was mainly one of satisfaction<br />
at the outcome of Copenhagen. In PvdA circles, too, the Summit<br />
was seen as a Dutch success. This is very evident from a note written by<br />
Harry van den Bergh, Secretary of the PvdA ec Committee.<br />
Though practically ignored in the Dutch press (in contrast, for example,<br />
to the English press), one can safely say we are looking here at an important<br />
political and diplomatic success for this Cabinet.<br />
According to Van den Bergh, the two most conservative governments in<br />
Europe, France and the uk, found themselves opposed by a united front<br />
153
of The Netherlands, West Germany, Denmark, Belgium, Ireland and<br />
Italy. Pompidou had not come to Copenhagen to talk about the energy<br />
crisis. At the very outside, he would have been prepared to deal with this<br />
in order to coerce the other member states, apart from Britain, into accepting<br />
the French political line. ‘Yet one must suppose that, as far as this<br />
is concerned, the planning in Paris for Copenhagen went somewhat<br />
astray’, he observed. The final communiqué from Copenhagen reflected<br />
the lack of results achieved by the French and British. 115<br />
The Netherlands had rather effectively contributed to this outcome. It<br />
had throughout forcefully resisted the French and British standpoint,<br />
both the political and economic aspects. Of course, it was mainly the<br />
powerful attitude of West Germany that had defeated the French and<br />
British proposals, but it is not entirely unlikely that the West German dependence<br />
on oil supplies from Rotterdam and on Dutch natural gas had<br />
contributed to the West German point of view. In any case, Lubbers and<br />
Van der Stoel had on several occasions referred to this dependence.<br />
No definite arrangements were made over any communal approach to<br />
dealing with the oil shortage, for which the Cabinet and Van der Stoel had<br />
so trenchantly fought. But was that in fact such a disaster? By that time,<br />
the Cabinet had come to see clearly that The Netherlands stood to gain little<br />
from such a policy. On the contrary, The Netherlands might well find<br />
itself worse off if oil provisions were in some form or other equalised<br />
within the ec. The invisible hand of the oil companies was highly generous<br />
to The Netherlands, as Wagner had emphasized to Van der Stoel. It<br />
was therefore essential to prevent a situation within the ec where member<br />
states would try, through legal means for example, to hold the oil<br />
companies to their contracts. As long as that could be avoided, The<br />
Hague’s position was actually not bad. Furthermore, there was the offer,<br />
albeit a rather vague one, of American support. All in all, The Netherlands<br />
stood to suffer under the Arab actions no more – and possibly a<br />
good deal less – than the other ec countries. Added to which, the Dutch<br />
commanded considerably larger reserves of their own energy in the form<br />
of natural gas.<br />
Van der Stoel had by now come to the conclusion that making political<br />
concessions to the Arab countries was not going to produce results. Steps<br />
taken towards the Arabs had so far led nowhere; the outcome of the new<br />
ec declaration of November 6 had been disappointing. The meeting Lubbers<br />
had held with the two Arab ministers had similarly produced nothing.<br />
The Hague, moreover, had been pushed into a point of view that<br />
seemed scarcely different from that of most other ec countries. Without<br />
154
ever explicitly admitting it, the Den Uyl Cabinet had also adopted the<br />
standpoint that Israel must vacate all the occupied territories. Only in<br />
The Hague must this not be said in so many words. When Foreign Ministry<br />
spokesman Thurkow lost sight of this tacit understanding, he also<br />
lost his position. The time for explicit support for Israel at the beginning<br />
of the war was past. Nor was it necessary, since Israel had emerged from<br />
the conflict as victor. The areas under Israeli control had enormously expanded,<br />
although this also meant much greater sacrifices.<br />
None of this, however, much altered the fact that The Netherlands,<br />
along with the other ec countries, was confronted with production restrictions.<br />
In the next chapter, we should therefore pay some attention to<br />
the domestic measures introduced at this stage to reduce domestic energy<br />
consumption.<br />
155
6<br />
Rationing<br />
In this chapter we shall turn our attention again to the policy adopted by<br />
the Dutch Cabinet to compensate for the reduction in the oil supply. We<br />
pick up the thread early in November, when the first restrictive measures<br />
were introduced to limit oil use. Throughout the course of November, assessments<br />
in The Hague of the consequences of the Arab oil actions became<br />
increasingly gloomy. This pessimism reached its peak at the end of<br />
the month when the possibility of a future reduction in the oil supply of<br />
some 40 to 50% was being discussed, even at the level of the Council of<br />
Ministers. In addition, the Dutch Central Planning Bureau was predicting<br />
that the oil embargo would lead to growing unemployment and to inflation.<br />
Other noises were also being heard: the view was taking root in various<br />
quarters that maybe The Netherlands was not in such a bad state after<br />
all, certainly when compared with most other ec countries. Yet nobody<br />
could say with any certainty how the supply would develop, and for<br />
this reason the dominant general feeling was that radical measures would<br />
have to be taken to compensate for the effects of the oil embargo. It was in<br />
this phase of uncertainty that the Cabinet took the decision to set in motion<br />
the preparations for rationing.<br />
At this stage, the Dutch Cabinet not only decided on rationing but also<br />
submitted to Parliament the so-called Enabling Act. This law authorised<br />
the government to take socio-economic measures on a sweeping scale in<br />
order to cope with the crisis situation caused by the embargo. With rationing<br />
and the Enabling Act, the political-economic heavy artillery was<br />
in place. It was also at this stage that the Ministry of Economic Affairs<br />
lost its leading role in the introduction of measures to limit consumption,<br />
as combating the effects of the embargo became increasingly an affair of<br />
the entire Cabinet, led by its Minister-President.<br />
157
Car-Free Sundays<br />
As we saw in Chapter 4, several authorities were called into being at the<br />
beginning of November to deal with the consequences of the oil crisis, and<br />
specifically with a reduction in the domestic use of energy. The most important<br />
official body was the Co-ordination Group, consisting of civil<br />
servants from various Dutch ministries under the leadership of the Secretary-General<br />
of the Ministry for Economic Affairs, F.W. Rutten. The Coordination<br />
Group played an important role during November and December<br />
as the supplier of plans, data and decisions to the Council of Ministers,<br />
where the group’s suggestions were in many cases taken on board.<br />
Although various ministries were represented in the Co-ordination<br />
Group, Economic Affairs initially took the lead in developing measures to<br />
limit consumption. The Director-General for Energy and his deputy Director-General<br />
Van Rhijn had enormous influence on Economic Affairs’<br />
policy-making. The preparation of policy at Economic Affairs was to an<br />
important extent co-ordinated by the Oil Crisis Work Group.<br />
Economic Affairs provided the Co-ordination Group and the Council<br />
of Ministers with information on the supply of oil and oil stocks, with<br />
regular meetings taking place between Economic Affairs and the oil companies,<br />
at different levels and in different contexts. For instance, consultations<br />
were arranged within the so-called Oil Contact Committee,<br />
where representatives of Economic Affairs and participants from the<br />
world of the oil companies held sessions together. As we saw earlier, provision<br />
of information on supplies, stocks and estimates by the companies<br />
had been raised to a new level since the beginning of the crisis. As far as<br />
can be judged from the documents, the policy advocated by Economic<br />
Affairs was generally supported by the oil companies. In fact, it sometimes<br />
seemed as though Economic Affairs served as the mouthpiece for<br />
the main oil multinationals; so much so that within the Council of Ministers<br />
the figures presented by Lubbers and his Ministry were sometimes<br />
queried.<br />
The most significant of the measures enacted to restrict oil use was the<br />
car-free Sunday, introduced at the beginning of November. At the same<br />
time, the Dutch people were called on to cut back on their use of energy.<br />
On November 14 it was confirmed in the Co-ordination Group that the<br />
car-free Sunday resulted in a drop in petrol consumption of around 10%.<br />
Furthermore, roughly 90% of motorists had observed the voluntary<br />
speed limit, leading to a further reduction of 5% in petrol consumption.<br />
In all, a total reduction of some 15% had thus been achieved. The oil<br />
158
companies wanted Economic Affairs to limit the production of various<br />
products – petrol, gas for cars, diesel, paraffin and fuel oil. 1<br />
Nevertheless, the dominant feeling in early November was that the carfree<br />
Sunday and the speedrestrictionswouldnotbeenough:furthermeasures<br />
were going tobeneeded. At its very first session, the Co-ordination<br />
Group discussed various other possibilities, such as banning driving on<br />
other days beside Sundays. This kind of alternative invariably provoked<br />
numerous objections. A driving ban on weekdays would lead to total dislocation<br />
of the nation’s economic and social life, it was felt. A driving ban<br />
on Saturdays would meananextrablowforthecateringindustry,which<br />
had already been badly affected. The ban on Sundays could possibly be<br />
extended to three o’clock on Monday morning, but that had to be the limit.<br />
A driving ban over the Christmas holidays was also rejected.<br />
A legally enforced maximum speed limit was seen as a possibility; the<br />
legal implications of this possibility would have to be thoroughly looked<br />
into. There was apparently little confidence in the Dutch motorists’ willingness<br />
to hold voluntarily to a 100 kms per hour speed limit over the<br />
long term. During the following week, ideas were exchanged between<br />
various bodies over this legal speed restriction, including even the Council<br />
of Ministers. During the session of November 9, it was already evident<br />
that the Ministry of Justice had objections, not least the limited possibility<br />
of enforcing such a speed limit. Lubbers therefore argued for creating a<br />
special law, to which end talks would need to be held between the Ministries<br />
of Justice, Transport and Water Management, and Economic Affairs.<br />
The Council accepted Lubbers’s proposal, but in the end, and despite<br />
all the consultations, no such emergency law was introduced.<br />
Throughout this discussion and indeed from the outset, it had been realised<br />
within Economic Affairs and in the Co-ordination Group that,<br />
should the worst come to the worst, measures like reducing the speed limit<br />
were hardly going to be of much use. The only truly effective way of reducing<br />
consumption was rationing; and indeed far greater reductions<br />
could then be achieved. Rationing would allow the government to have its<br />
own hand actually on the oil tap. The great advantage, moreover, was<br />
that all driving prohibitions could be dispensed with. It would become unnecessary<br />
to prohibit road traffic either partially or wholly on any particular<br />
days, with all the consequences of such bans; motorists would themselves<br />
decide how and when they should use their scarce resources. 2<br />
On November 9 the suggestions of the Co-ordination Group were discussed<br />
in the Council of Ministers. For the first time, the ministers seriously<br />
took on board the possible implementation of rationing, with Den<br />
159
Uyl as advocate. Should the embargo persist, he said, rationing would be<br />
inevitable. Most of the others were of the same mind. The decision was<br />
therefore taken to put in motion all the necessary preparations for rationing,<br />
using vouchers, although the final decision to actually implement<br />
rationing was not yet taken. Effectively, however, the decision set in motion<br />
a bureaucratic machine that could no longer be stopped.<br />
The Dutch Council of Ministers also agreed to a rise in the price of<br />
petrol and other oil products. Lubbers told the Council that ‘with heavy<br />
heart’ he had approved the price rise for oil products, necessitated by the<br />
higher cost of crude oil, the increase in the price of petrol being 2.5%. It<br />
was conceivable, he thought, that some of the majors might be taking advantage<br />
of this, because of the fact that they still held stocks bought in at<br />
the earlier, cheaper, price; but this was no reason to postpone the decision.<br />
3 In the following months the price of oil products was to rise still<br />
further.<br />
During the course of November, the introduction of rationing became<br />
increasingly inevitable as alternative methods of reducing petrol consumption<br />
were rejected by the Cabinet. The Council of Ministers, following<br />
the conclusions of the Co-ordination Group, found it difficult to extend<br />
the system of banning car travel. Car-free holidays were unacceptable,<br />
in view of the radical consequences this would have for family life,<br />
as well as for the catering industry. After long debate it was decided to<br />
maintain the Sunday motoring ban that was due on December 2,<br />
notwithstanding the approach of the feast of Sint Nicolaas on December<br />
5. A week later, it was decided to extend the car-free Sunday to 3 am<br />
Monday morning, as the Co-ordination Group had proposed. 4<br />
Meanwhile, the first consequences of the Arab actions were felt in the<br />
port of Rotterdam. The predictions over supplies of oil in the near future<br />
were more pessimistic than ever. Against this background, the Dutch<br />
Cabinet decided on November 23 to initiate the concrete arrangements<br />
needed for introducing ration vouchers.<br />
Estimates<br />
By mid-November, estimates in The Hague of future reductions in the oil<br />
supply and their consequences were grim. Although it was widely established<br />
that the actual situation was still satisfactory, it was mainly the anticipation<br />
of shortages in the coming months that became more and more<br />
pessimistic. This pessimism was in the first place propagated by the Min-<br />
160
istry of Economic Affairs on the basis of data and expectations communicated<br />
to them by the oil companies. In a meeting of the Economic Affairs<br />
Oil Crisis Work Group on November 21, it was assumed that it would be<br />
necessary to reduce petrol consumption by 20% in December, and 40%<br />
in January. 5 Obviously, the car-free Sundays and voluntary speed restrictions<br />
would be inadequate to achieve targets of that order.<br />
These gloomy predictions originated with the oil companies, and they<br />
were the main compelling reasons for switching to rationing. In retrospect,<br />
it can be seen that these estimates for December and January were,<br />
to say the least, on the bleak side. An ex-director of Shell-Netherlands,<br />
A.C. Helfrich, acknowledges that these estimates from the oil companies<br />
were rather ‘conservative’. One of the factors affecting these estimates<br />
was the fear that the American market might suffer shortages and exert<br />
its enormous pulling power on available oil supplies.<br />
According to Helfrich, Shell was opposed to rationing. 6 But from the<br />
minutes of the Co-ordination Group, it would appear that the oil companies<br />
were at any rate advocating further restrictions on consumption beyond<br />
the 10 to 15% maintained thus far. 7 This standpoint inevitably implied<br />
rationing. The companies were thus partly responsible for setting in<br />
motion a series of measures which would, in the new year, finally lead to<br />
rationing being introduced. In general, as ex-minister Westerterp later<br />
commented, one could still talk of close consultation between government<br />
and oil companies, and the companies supported what the government<br />
was doing, including the introduction of rationing. 8<br />
On November 23, the Dutch Council of Ministers also learned of the<br />
pessimistic forecasts of the Ministry of Economic Affairs’ Oil Crisis<br />
Work Group and the Co-ordination Group, which, as Den Uyl reported,<br />
were confirmed by a letter from Shell’s Chief Executive, Wagner. The tone<br />
of this letter was sombre. Wagner thought the rapid, drastic price increases<br />
would have a disastrous effect on the chemical industry and that the<br />
whole world economy would suffer. At that time, American oil companies<br />
were already buying Nigerian oil at prices three or four times the normal<br />
price of oil. The price of petrol in The Netherlands, Wagner thought,<br />
would shortly have to go up by some 20%. 9<br />
These gloomy prognoses were to play a principal role during the coming<br />
weeks in decision-making by the Council of Ministers. The Central<br />
Planning Bureau added its own voice to the chorus of pessimism. On November<br />
7 Lubbers, with the approval of the Council of Ministers, had<br />
asked the Central Economic Committee for their advice on the initial<br />
global consequences of the oil embargo. This advice, which was based on<br />
161
a note of November 15 from the Central Planning Bureau, was sent to<br />
Lubbers at the beginning of December. It painted a sombre picture. It was<br />
assumed that the oil supply in January would be about 50% lower than in<br />
1972, leading to little or no economic growth, increased inflation and<br />
rapidly rising unemployment. The Central Economic Committee concluded<br />
from these figures that the government had to implement a string<br />
of measures if they were to keep in check the consequences of the embargo<br />
and the sharp rise in oil prices. The note would play an important role in<br />
the tabling of the Enabling Act and in persevering with the voucher system<br />
of rationing.<br />
Economic Affairs was also assuming at the end of November that the<br />
oil supply in December would fall by around 35%, and even by 50% in<br />
January. It was widely thought that the shortfall during the subsequent<br />
months would remain at about 30 to 35%. By eating into existing oil<br />
stocks, the necessary reduction in the domestic consumption of oil products<br />
could be held at around 25%; but in this case it would be necessary to<br />
give priority to the supply of energy and raw materials needed for trade<br />
and industry. At a meeting of the Oil Crisis Work Group in Economic Affairs,<br />
the conclusion was drawn that petrol rationing would have to lead<br />
to a 40% reduction in the use of private vehicles, and a reduction in business<br />
traffic of 20 to 25%. The total reduction in petrol consumption<br />
would have to amount to approximately 30% if sufficient freedom were<br />
to be maintained for trade and industry. 10<br />
Gloom over the immediate future reached its deepest point in the<br />
Council of Ministers on November 30. Lubbers informed his colleagues<br />
that the beginning of a reduction in supplies had been confirmed in Rotterdam.<br />
In December, the reduction in supply would reach 60% compared<br />
with the previous year; while the figure should be 50% in January,<br />
he said. This would probably mean a drastic cutback of production at the<br />
refineries. The oil stocks would have to be opened. Above all, the drop in<br />
production of naphtha could cause problems for the chemical industry.<br />
Lubbers therefore wanted to maintain naphtha production as far as possible<br />
at an optimal level, which would mean cutting back on petrol for<br />
road transport. By mid-April or May of 1974, stocks could be expected to<br />
have fallen to a reserve sufficient for only 40 to 45 days.<br />
Lubbers said the reduction in supplies could in the longer term amount<br />
to as much as 60%, since two-thirds of the total supply came from countries<br />
enforcing the embargo. Because of the increased supply from Nigeria<br />
and Iran, the total drop now was around 50%. In comparison, other<br />
West European countries were confronted with reductions of around<br />
162
25%, and for this reason Lubbers thought that Dutch exports could be reduced<br />
without causing serious problems to other ec countries. In council,<br />
he urged once again to speed up the introduction of rationing, though he<br />
realised that it would not be possible to achieve this in December. Both<br />
the oil companies and the consumers were pressing the government to set<br />
out a system of priorities. If the Council of Ministers were to decide to begin<br />
rationing on January 7, he wanted the power to be able to instruct the<br />
oil companies to deliver 20% less to the petrol pumps.<br />
The Council appeared to be convinced by Lubbers’s argument. Den<br />
Uyl himself concluded that oil consumption must fall by 20% and petrol<br />
consumption by 30 to 35%. The Council of Ministers therefore took the<br />
decision to bring in rationing on January 7. On January 13, the general<br />
ban on Sunday motoring would lapse, and legal enforcement of the speed<br />
limit could be forgotten once rationing was in place.<br />
However, doubts still remained over the data provided by the Ministry<br />
of Economic Affairs. By the end of November, it was clear to several ministers<br />
that The Netherlands’ position was not as bad as it had been portrayed.<br />
On November 22, 1973, Van der Stoel received via Rutten a memorandum<br />
drafted by the Directorate-General for Energy, in which everything<br />
was once again worked out, with the accompanying request not to<br />
employ these figures outside the Council of Ministers. It was assumed in<br />
this memorandum that the oil companies, in anticipation of the restrictions,<br />
had increased their stocks as much as possible; and therefore, it was<br />
inferred at Economic Affairs, over ten weeks the stocks need not be considered<br />
so disastrously low. 11<br />
Doubts were also expressed in the Council of Ministers over the reliability<br />
of the data provided by Economic Affairs. In fact, Vredeling asked<br />
whether they depended for these figures entirely on the oil companies. 12<br />
Transport Minister Westerterp, as he later said, was also unconvinced of<br />
the correctness of Economics Affairs’ figures. ‘Supplies to The Netherlands<br />
were greater than revealed by the official figures’, he said. ‘We had a<br />
man in the pilot service at Hoek van Holland diligently keeping a tally. At<br />
any given moment there was more oil coming in than was reported by the<br />
official figures.’ 13 In spite of this, the Council of Ministers decided to<br />
switch to rationing.<br />
The need for more accurate data concerning oil supplies did not stop<br />
here. Further information was provided in the Ministerial Council for<br />
Economic Affairs on December 5. Van Rhijn announced that the international<br />
oil companies, as had earlier become clear, were in fact more or less<br />
spreading the shortfalls over the consumer countries; the embargo was<br />
163
not working. The result of this was certainly not unfavourable to The<br />
Netherlands: the reduction amounted to some 20 to 25%, much less drastic<br />
figures than those presented by Lubbers in the Council of Ministers.<br />
According to Van Rhijn, only France and Britain were getting more oil.<br />
‘Switching’ to benefit The Netherlands, besides, was not so simple, given<br />
the specific kinds of crude oil that refineries needed. And furthermore, not<br />
all oil companies were in a position to supply The Netherlands. Imports<br />
by Texaco were lower than other companies, while Chevron did not manage<br />
to import any oil at all.<br />
Anyway, The Netherlands was not in such a bad situation, and yet the<br />
mood among some of those at the Ministerial Council for Economic Affairs<br />
meeting was still a sombre one. It was assumed that the embargo<br />
could still prove effective and that a general drop of some 40% could<br />
shortly be expected. Rutten, on the other hand, thought things could turn<br />
out all right. If the embargo countries did allow transit (together with all<br />
extra possibilities for switching), the situation would be far less serious<br />
than the gloom-mongers were assuming. Rutten was right, but the Council<br />
majority remained cautious. In fact, they remained cautious precisely<br />
because there were no accurate data to go on. 14<br />
Doubts over the supply data remained. During the Council of Ministers<br />
of December 10, the reliability of these figures was again raised for<br />
discussion. Den Uyl wondered if the National Bureau for Oil Products<br />
(the Rijksbureau voor Aardolieproducten, rba), which was to lead the<br />
rationing, had sufficient expertise to monitor the figures from the oil companies.<br />
According to Lubbers, these data reports now fell under the operation<br />
of the Rationing Law, which made the provision of data obligatory<br />
with the backing of possible sanctions for non-compliance. The reports<br />
were now not monitored by the rba, but the companies would be requested<br />
to do this themselves as accurately as possible. Vredeling emphasized<br />
again that the pilot service also had data at their command, although this<br />
service was not equipped for surveillance. Duisenberg added to this that<br />
customs also possessed information, but that this information could only<br />
be used in restricted circles. The Council of Ministers maintained their interest<br />
in other, alternative, figures, but the question remained unanswered<br />
as to what conclusions could be attached to such data. In any case,<br />
according to Den Uyl, what had to be prevented was the circulation of figures<br />
relating to oil stocks that were higher than those presented by the<br />
Cabinet itself. 15<br />
It is striking how uncertain the Council of Ministers was during these<br />
crucial weeks of November and December where the reliability of these<br />
164
figures over oil supplies was concerned. Time and time again there were<br />
pleas for alternative, supplementary information that could corroborate<br />
the estimates supplied by the oil companies. But apart from the need for<br />
alternative sources, the argument for using information from the pilot<br />
service seems in retrospect rather dubious, since such estimates are inevitably<br />
crude and make no distinction between supplies destined for the<br />
Dutch economy and those destined for ec partners’ use. It is therefore curious<br />
that the data from customs, especially, played no part in the decision-making<br />
in ministerial council. Although there were doubts, and perhaps<br />
even a degree of scepticism, the government in any case was in no<br />
position to cut loose from its dependence on the oil companies. Still, the<br />
Cabinet was sufficiently convinced of the seriousness of the situation to<br />
introduce rationing.<br />
Export Restrictions<br />
Most commentaries on Cabinet policy regarding the crisis laid (and still<br />
lay) great emphasis on the domestic measures introduced to restrict the<br />
use of oil products. But that was not the only and possibly not the most effective<br />
method of combating the consequences of reduced supplies. Restricting<br />
the export from, and the transit of oil products through, The<br />
Netherlands was more effective, and was to create considerably higher<br />
percentage reductions than those achieved by the cuts at home. It involved<br />
enormous quantities of oil. In 1972, the total supply of crude oil reaching<br />
The Netherlands from abroad was approximately 130 million tons, of<br />
which circa 54% (71 million tons) was destined for further processing in<br />
The Netherlands. The other 46% (59 million tons) was immediately<br />
passed on to other countries, either by transit or re-export. Of the oil imported<br />
into The Netherlands, a considerable fraction was exported after<br />
processing: some 50 million tons in 1972. 16<br />
From the outset of the oil crisis, both government and other concerned<br />
bodies had been investigating possibilities of restricting, in one way or another,<br />
the transit of oil passing through Rotterdam and the export of oil<br />
products, with a view to liberating oil for domestic usage. It is not easy to<br />
get a clear picture of the reduction of transit and export in relation to the<br />
supply of crude; but the problem was discussed on several occasions in the<br />
Council of Ministers, and in other contexts too. There was the further<br />
possibility of restricting the export of natural gas, thereby cushioning the<br />
effects of the oil shortage on the Dutch economy.<br />
165
On November 9, it was affirmed in the Council of Ministers that, in<br />
spite of all free market ground rules, the Dutch export of oil products<br />
throughout the ec would be subject to licensing. The way this was to operate<br />
was by applying the Toute License Accordée (tla) procedure,<br />
which meant the automatic extension of licenses; but if necessary, this automatic<br />
granting of licenses could be waived. In this way, control could be<br />
exercised over the export of oil and oil products. The atmosphere in this<br />
Council was sometimes rather belligerent, for oil and gas exports were involved.<br />
Several ministers, particularly Van der Stoel and Van der Stee,<br />
proposed also bringing gas export under the tla procedure. Others,<br />
however, were more cautious and pointed out that there was no shortage<br />
of natural gas and that such a measure would therefore be seen purely as a<br />
retaliation against the lack of European solidarity. 17<br />
The question of export was not only being discussed in the Dutch<br />
Council of Ministers. The same day, Lubbers and a Rotterdam municipal<br />
authority delegation discussed the possibilities of using the transit function<br />
of Rotterdam to relieve the situation in The Netherlands, for example<br />
by restricting supplies to surrounding countries, reversing the flow of<br />
the Rotterdam-Antwerp oil pipeline, and possibly supplying Rotterdam<br />
from other European ports. It was clear that such actions might well<br />
damage Rotterdam’s position. If transit were to be restricted, it would<br />
have to be done very discretely. 18<br />
Not everyone favoured this kind of action. There was a fear at the<br />
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the repercussions of any<br />
such cutback on exports. Referring to the first meeting of the Co-ordination<br />
Group, the Head of the Foreign Ministry’s Department for Economic<br />
Cooperation (des) pointed out the following in a memo to Van der<br />
Stoel. It had been made clear at that meeting that Economic Affairs wanted<br />
to apply the same export-licensing system to Belgium as to other countries.<br />
Up till then, licensing had not been applied to Benelux, even though<br />
the Belgian government had itself decided to introduce such export licenses.<br />
Since calling for consultations at the Belgian Ministry of Economic<br />
Affairs in Brussels and within Benelux had been in vain, the Dutch Ministry<br />
of Economic Affairs now wanted licensing as a countermeasure.<br />
With the assistance of the oil companies, export to Belgium could be restricted<br />
in line with domestic restrictions. It would seem a good idea,<br />
thought the Head of des, if Foreign Affairs could ‘again communicate<br />
Dutch disappointment over this turn in the course of affairs’ via the Belgian<br />
embassy. There were, after all, risky aspects of ‘this concealed restriction<br />
of exports’, given all the Dutch effort, to maintain a common<br />
market.<br />
166
The Dutch Cabinet blamed the British government for pressurising the<br />
oil companies not to divert to The Netherlands any oil bound for Great<br />
Britain. Any action in relation to Shell would therefore have to be carefully<br />
judged.<br />
I assume that the Ministry of Economic Affairs is in agreement, yet given<br />
the importance of the matter, it is essential in my view that the Ministry<br />
of Foreign Affairs be consulted over these aspects of the consultations<br />
with Shell. 19<br />
wrote the Head of des. He also pointed out that, after some discussion<br />
the previous afternoon, the Co-ordination Group had merely agreed that<br />
a license system would have to be introduced for exports to Belgium. The<br />
reason Rutten had not then wanted to raise the possibility of voluntary<br />
restriction of exports, the head of des supposed, was ‘because it would<br />
be better if nothing could be repeated outside about this’. 20<br />
On November 14 the Dutch Ambassador in Brussels was instructed to<br />
request that ‘high level’ attention be given to this question. Van Elslande,<br />
the Belgian Foreign Minister, let it be known that he agreed with the<br />
Dutch view on this, but given the sensitivity to Arab reactions, there must<br />
be no publicity given to the matter. 21 There could be no question of any<br />
public retraction of the Belgian action already taken . The Hague did not<br />
press the matter further, but simply went ahead with the decision to bring<br />
oil exports within the Benelux trading area under license. Although the<br />
tla principle was assumed, this move involved more than merely a formality;<br />
the licensing system opened the way to a form of export restriction<br />
that, as the Foreign Ministry had warned, was not without its consequences.<br />
Matters did not rest at restricting exports of oil products. As we saw<br />
earlier, Lubbers had declared in the Dutch Second Chamber on November<br />
14 that, if the ec could not function as a community where energy<br />
was concerned, The Netherlands had to defend its own interests. ‘I shall<br />
involve natural gas in this’, he had added. In certain situations The<br />
Netherlands must not shrink from drawing the logical inferences, or even<br />
from acting in anticipation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted coolly<br />
to this fighting talk from Lubbers. 22<br />
Throughout November, the export of oil products declined drastically.<br />
On November 22 a memo to Van der Stoel observed the following. Since<br />
October 23, the export of oil products, initially with the exception of Belgium,<br />
had been subjected to licensing. As a consequence, these exports<br />
167
had declined: for instance, the export of petrol compared with the fourth<br />
quarter of 1972 was down by some 40%, while the export to Belgium<br />
was only subjected to licensing from the beginning of December. 23 This<br />
meant an initially greater reduction than the fall in the supply of crude oil<br />
during the same period. It was also concluded at General Affairs that<br />
there had been a greater reduction in exports than was strictly justified on<br />
the basis of a proportional adjustment to the level of domestic sales. 24<br />
Nevertheless, at a meeting of the Economic Affairs Oil Crisis Workshop<br />
on November 21, it was assumed that in view of the drastic reduction<br />
expected in supplies, ‘additional export restrictions’ would have to<br />
be adopted. Before taking such a decision, the Dutch Council of Ministers<br />
had to consider fully the consequences of the reduction in domestic<br />
consumption. When it came to restricting exports, great care would be<br />
needed if the chance of international cooperation were not be put at<br />
risk. 25 In the first half of December, nonetheless, exports of oil products<br />
would drop by more than 50%. 26<br />
Restriction of exports applied not only to oil products but also to crude<br />
oil. Stocks of oil stored in the Botlek area were partly destined for transit<br />
or re-export. In fact, these stocks could be divided into three categories.<br />
Firstly, there was the oil for the Dutch national market and the oil to be<br />
processed in The Netherlands before being exported. Secondly, there<br />
were stocks laid up in the Botlek area under an ec agreement to maintain<br />
stockpiles on behalf of third countries and on the basis of bilateral<br />
arrangements; and thirdly, there were stocks belonging to foreign, i.e.<br />
West German, companies, stocks which in customs-technical terms were<br />
not stored on Dutch territory at all. 27<br />
Although no concrete measures had yet been considered, the Ministry<br />
of Economic Affairs was thinking of the possibility of somehow taking<br />
advantage of Rotterdam’s transit function. In an emergency, the oil<br />
stocks of ec partners that had been stockpiled in the Botlek area under ec<br />
storage regulations could – at least in part – be requisitioned, although<br />
that would of course damage relations with the countries concerned. As<br />
we saw earlier, it had already been rationalised at Economic Affairs in<br />
October that the arrangements previously made in 1970 over these stockpiles<br />
had to be considered as merely administrative agreements of that<br />
time andwerenot binding on Lubbers, the current minister.<br />
In time of need, part of the foreign stocks could thus be taken over.<br />
This was discussed in a thoroughly business-like fashion at Economic Affairs,<br />
on the assumption that the foreign emergency stocks would be sufficient<br />
to last a hundred days. As we saw earlier, the European Commission<br />
168
had directed member states to lay in emergency supplies for 65 days by<br />
January 1, 1971, and for 90 days by January 1974. Because it was not yet<br />
1974, stocks for only 65 days were obligatory, and there was therefore<br />
more oil in these stockpiles than strictly necessary to meet the regulations.<br />
In the event of serious need, therefore, one could consider taking<br />
over the oil in this emergency reservoir that was surplus to strict requirements.<br />
Of course, various problems were raised by this, not least that the<br />
Dutch reputation as a transit country would be involved. 28 Nonetheless,<br />
on December 10, it was remarked in the Council of Ministers that in principle<br />
it would be possible to requisition part of the international stockpile<br />
laid up in the Botlek area.<br />
At the end of November, the Cabinet decided not only to introduce rationing<br />
and to reduce the domestic consumption of oil products by 20%,<br />
but to look to a reduction in export of 40%. 29 A day later, it was again<br />
agreed in the Council for Economic Affairs that it was not unreasonable<br />
that The Netherlands should cut back its exports more than proportionally<br />
in order to compensate for the expected reduction in supplies. What<br />
is remarkable here is that several of those involved, as the above-mentioned<br />
Economic Affairs memorandum shows, had by now come to believe<br />
that The Netherlands was in a rather favourable position.<br />
In a draft version of a note on energy-political action in relation to the<br />
reduced supply of crude oil to The Netherlands, which was discussed in<br />
the Council of Ministers on December 10, it was remarked that international<br />
stocks could be brought under Dutch control by government intervention;<br />
but this would seriously damage Rotterdam’s trading position.<br />
And yet restricting exports was an obvious expedient. According to the<br />
text of this note, this was already occurring, and ‘on the basis of the<br />
arrangement made with the oil companies’. This restriction was linked to<br />
the highly important initiative taken by the main oil companies, to try to<br />
ensure that sales were reduced equally in all countries. This unpublished<br />
passage concluded that this<br />
had in fact led to a greater reduction of exports than was strictly justified<br />
at this moment on the basis of proportionality with the reduction in<br />
domestic sales.<br />
The aim of introducing export licenses had been ‘to be able to control the<br />
implementation of this regulation’. 30<br />
As we have already seen, the predominant view within the Dutch Cabinet<br />
on December 5 was that little more could be expected of European<br />
169
sharing, and that it might even entail disadvantages. In the Ministerial<br />
Council for Economic Affairs, it was agreed that negotiating over sharing<br />
involved running serious risks since, without doubt, the relatively<br />
favourable energy situation of The Netherlands would be taken into consideration.<br />
A tougher method of negotiation, including natural gas exports<br />
as a counter, was therefore preferable to sharing. Den Uyl concurred<br />
with this view and pointed out that The Netherlands would be a<br />
very poor businessman if it were incapable of taking the political stance<br />
needed to get extra oil in exchange for natural gas. 31 These conclusions<br />
were drawn, as we saw, well before the Summit in Copenhagen in mid-<br />
December.<br />
Where natural gas was involved, the Cabinet showed itself an assiduous<br />
promoter of Dutch interests. It was concluded in a note that a brake<br />
had to be applied to the increasing volume of natural gas exported. Where<br />
possible, that extra gas should be diverted to replace oil. The energy crisis<br />
meant that it was entirely rational to reconsider the optimal use of the<br />
Groningen natural gas. Furthermore, there had to be a clear statement of<br />
the price of gas; and of course it was obvious to assume some linkage between<br />
the price of gas and the oil prices. Lubbers was empowered to begin<br />
negotiations over a rapid conversion to this linkage. After adapting the<br />
prices, it ought to be possible to arrive at a balanced relation between oil<br />
and natural gas in the ec. If such were the case, it would then be unnecessary<br />
to bring into discussion the contracted volumes of gas exports. 32<br />
All in all, in the matter of the export of oil products, oil stocks and natural<br />
gas, the Dutch government had by now taken up a position that<br />
brooked few scruples. Although Heath, the British Prime Minister, had<br />
been reproached with his tough and purely self-interested attitude, the attitude<br />
of the Den Uyl Cabinet was essentially no different. Initially, it had<br />
still been hoped that there might be mutual cooperation within the oecd<br />
or the ec. Once that hope had evaporated, the Dutch government’s positions<br />
hardened. Given the relatively favourable situation The Netherlands<br />
found itself in, with the American offer of support a very welcome<br />
boost, however illusory it might be, the Dutch Cabinet seemed to have<br />
lost all interest in sharing. Further, it had for some time no longer been<br />
considered in the nation’s interest.<br />
Preparations for Rationing<br />
In fact, it is all the more remarkable that, despite this relatively favourable<br />
170
position, the Dutch Cabinet was the only West European government to<br />
switch to the introduction of rationing. The initiative for this move came<br />
from the Ministry of Economic Affairs. As early as November 7, the Oil<br />
Crisis Work Group came to the conclusion that the best way to cope with<br />
the problems that had arisen would be to introduce a rationing system as<br />
rapidly as possible. It seemed to the Work Group that an extension of the<br />
ban on motoring would affect road transport too adversely, with all the<br />
ramifications that would have. 33 This assessment was adopted by the Coordination<br />
Group the following day; and one day later the Council of<br />
Ministers also decided to set in train the preparations for rationing. 34<br />
There were objections expressed, notably by the Ministry of Justice,<br />
but from that moment on, the introduction of rationing was pursued indefatigably.<br />
On November 13 an important step was taken by activating<br />
the National Bureau for Oil Products (the Rijksbureau voor Aardolieproducten,<br />
or rba), which according to the stipulations of the Rationing<br />
Law would direct the rationing of natural gas products. Initially, the rba<br />
was preoccupied with the difficulties and the complaints caused by the reduced<br />
supply of oil products. This was often dealt with by officials temporarily<br />
detached to the Bureau. At a later stage, the rba played a central<br />
administrative and informational role in preparing for the implementation<br />
of rationing.<br />
On November 16, however, the Council of Ministers hesitated over<br />
whether to continue with the introduction of rationing at short notice,<br />
even though Economic Affairs argued strenuously that if it did not happen<br />
before December 17, because of technical problems, the entire operation<br />
would have to be postponed till January. But the Council was more<br />
cautious than Economic Affairs. At that moment the oil supply was unchanged:<br />
there was no question of eating into reserve stocks. 35<br />
The oil companies, however, thought it inevitable that effective restrictions<br />
would have to be introduced quite shortly. Pressure was thus being<br />
exerted on the Cabinet. It was also argued in a memo from one of the<br />
council advisors from General Affairs that fundamental decisions had to<br />
be taken before the end of the year; it was not possible to wait any<br />
longer. 36 But the Council of Ministers decided that the introduction of rationing<br />
was not yet possible because of the multiple legal complications<br />
and transport-technical problems. There would first have to be consultations<br />
involving, in any case, the Ministries of Justice, Finance, and Transport<br />
& Water Management. And so it turned out.<br />
Five days later, the Co-ordination Group again pressed the case for a<br />
swift introduction of petrol rationing. A number of decisions over data<br />
171
would have to be taken within a very short time, as December 10 was the<br />
deadline for beginning to distribute coupons. This meant that authorisation<br />
forms and circulars would have to be sent to local authorities as soon<br />
as possible, particularly in connection with supplementary allocations.<br />
In the light of the deteriorating situation, the Co-ordination Group<br />
thought any postponement of preparations at this stage would be irresponsible.<br />
Supplies were now beginning to decline, and the forecasts were<br />
gloomier than ever, or so it was assumed. The oil companies also found<br />
further restrictions on consumption necessary. Postponement would<br />
mean that introduction could not begin until mid-January. 37<br />
And yet on November 23, the Council of Ministers once again decided<br />
to wait, even though preparations had gone ahead and approval had been<br />
given for the Ministry of Transport and Water Management to send out<br />
all the authorisation forms. The Ministerial Committee for Oil Problems<br />
was also instructed to prepare the rationing as effectively as possible. The<br />
first discussion over this took place on November 29. The idea was to<br />
meet every Thursday to discuss, among other topics, the reports issued by<br />
the Co-ordination Group, which met every Wednesday afternoon. But<br />
the definitive decision to implement rationing was postponed till November<br />
30. There were various problems to sort out in the meantime, measures<br />
that would have to be prepared in advance, including the car-free<br />
Sunday, public transport, freight transport, the costs of rationing and the<br />
bearing of the anti-discrimination regulations of the ec on the question of<br />
foreign motorists. 38<br />
At the end of November, the Oil Crisis Workgroup at the Ministry of<br />
Economic Affairs concluded that petrol rationing would have to reduce<br />
private motoring by about 40% and the use of cars for business purposes<br />
by some 20 to 25%, yielding an overall reduction of some 30%. 39 These<br />
objectives were accepted by the Co-ordination Group and by the Council<br />
of Ministers. As a consequence, on November 30 the decision was taken<br />
by the Council of Ministers to introduce petrol ration coupons with effect<br />
from January 4, 1974, and also for lpg and propane. A reduction of 25%<br />
was thought appropriate for the latter two types of fuel, for petrol 30%.<br />
Diesel was not included in the rationing scheme on account of the importance<br />
of freight and public transport, though controlled sales of diesel oil<br />
were thought necessary, to be achieved by the main companies limiting<br />
their deliveries.<br />
In the first instance, it was thought that rationing would be introduced<br />
for a period of four weeks. Because of all the preparatory work involved,<br />
this could not be introduced in December, the original preference of Eco-<br />
172
nomic Affairs, but would have to wait until January. Meanwhile, Lubbers<br />
could distribute to the oil companies all the necessary guidelines concerning<br />
petrol deliveries that would lead to a 20% reduction at the petrol<br />
pumps. Various other measures were also prepared to anticipate the consequences<br />
of rationing, in particular to guarantee the maintenance of<br />
public transport and to stagger working hours. 40<br />
These measures prepared by the Cabinet were set down in a note for<br />
parliament. In Restriction of the oil supply and its consequences, the<br />
packet of measures put together by the government was set out in a list, on<br />
the basis of an assumed 50% reduction in the oil supply by January, followed<br />
by a further 30 to 35% drop in the following months. This note<br />
was based to an important extent on the material supplied by the Central<br />
Economic Committee. The measures themselves, both short term and<br />
longer term, were as follows:<br />
– limiting petrol consumption by some 30% through rationing;<br />
– substituting oil consumption at Hoogovens and electricity-generating<br />
stations by coal, and by extra use of natural gas;<br />
– switching to natural gas for domestic use, in horticulture, and largescale<br />
users;<br />
– accelerating programmes of exploration and exploitation of natural<br />
gas and oil;<br />
– encouraging the insulation of homes;<br />
– lower heating levels, and reducing electricity use for lighting by<br />
10%. 41<br />
Over the course of December, various other decisions were taken. A government<br />
decree restricting the use of electricity for commercial lighting<br />
was issued, with the result that over the Christmas period the major cities,<br />
as elsewhere in Europe, assumed an atmosphere reminiscent of the 1950s<br />
as the illuminated advertisements were switched off. Because diesel did<br />
not fall under rationing, the Ministry of Transport & Water Management<br />
called on freight vehicles to observe a speed limit of 80 kms per hour, under<br />
the slogan ‘Plankgas oliedom’ (‘Foot down, fuel-dumb’).<br />
But there were still knots to cut through. It was announced that rationing<br />
applied to delivery vans and small trucks and lorries. Passenger<br />
cars with a diesel engine escaped the rationing, but most mopeds did not.<br />
Furthermore, it was decided that all passenger cars, irrespective of engine<br />
capacity or weight class, would be allocated fifteen litres per week. This<br />
basic assumption, the same petrol allocation for all classes, ran counter to<br />
173
the rationing plans in the filing cabinets of the Ministry of Economic Affairs.<br />
The Secretary of the Co-ordination Group, Willemsen, later gave as<br />
his opinion that this kind of equal treatment for everyone was a typical<br />
expression of the Den Uyl Cabinet’s ‘sharing philosophy’. 42<br />
Meanwhile, in mid-December a working group of officials drawn<br />
from the Ministries of Economic Affairs, Foreign Affairs and Transport<br />
& Water Management drafted a regulation for foreign motorists. To the<br />
satisfaction of the Foreign Ministry, the European Commission was informed<br />
that The Netherlands had adopted a liberal regulation for foreigners<br />
that involved no hold-up at border crossings. The thinking behind<br />
this was the anticipation that reciprocity would be observed should petrol<br />
rationing be introduced in other ec countries. This argument for a nondiscriminatory<br />
treatment of foreigners was repeated in the broader context<br />
of the ec Working Group for Transport and Energy. In addition, it<br />
was agreed there to extend preference to international motorway and air<br />
transport, as well as to domestic shipping. 43<br />
The Enabling Act<br />
In the meantime, the Den Uyl Cabinet was busy getting the heavy artillery<br />
in place to deal with the consequences of the embargo. On December<br />
8 the Cabinet submitted to the Second Chamber the proposed legislation,<br />
the Enabling Act, or to give its full title, the Act enabling legislation<br />
to regulate the creation of income and protection of employment in 1974.<br />
The aim of the Act was to allow intervention in wages and salaries, and in<br />
conditions of employment, as well as prices. In the Explanatory Statement<br />
accompanying the Act, it was explained that the oil crisis, and the<br />
economic problems arising from it, such as growing unemployment, had<br />
necessitated the introduction of the Enabling Act. 44<br />
It was pointed out earlier that the Enabling Act cannot be seen purely<br />
as the consequence of the oil crisis, even though the Cabinet continued to<br />
take for granted the connection between the Act and the specific measures<br />
designed to deal with the oil crisis. 45 The law came into force in a period<br />
of tense socio-economic relations and of inflationary tendencies. In the<br />
previous year, the Biesheuvel government had striven – with limited success<br />
– to establish a general agreement between employers’ and workers’<br />
organisations in an attempt to gain control over rising prices and incomes.<br />
Attempts at wage restraint, however, had been rejected by the trade<br />
unions.<br />
174
In the spring of 1973, differences of opinion over index-linkage led to<br />
serious conflict between industrial unions and employers. Despite strike<br />
actions, the employers did not yield, leading the Union Federations, the<br />
nkv and nvv to withdraw from talks in the Social-Economic Council<br />
and the Joint Industrial Labour Council. In the autumn of that year, because<br />
of the oil crisis, negotiations over a general agreement for 1974<br />
took place under rather dramatic circumstances. These negotiations led<br />
to new and serious disagreement over complete index-linkage. Under<br />
Cabinet pressure, a compromise was reached on November 5, but this<br />
was rejected the following day by the rank and file of employees’ organisations.<br />
Consequently, the unions announced that any further central discussions<br />
were pointless. Promises earlier conceded by the employers’ organisations,<br />
it was insisted, would have to be adhered to at the collective<br />
labour agreement negotiations, which would now have to take place separately<br />
for each branch of trade and industry.<br />
The Dutch Minister of Social Affairs, Boersma, also took the position<br />
that the accord of November 5 would still have to be implemented. The<br />
Minister told the Chamber that the government was of a mind to bring in<br />
an Enabling Act, on the basis of which binding conditions of employment<br />
could be laid down. The November accord, he said, would be taken as the<br />
starting point for government action. The government submitted its Bill<br />
to the Second Chamber on December 8. It was explained that a number of<br />
powers had been included in the Bill in order to act with the necessary decisiveness<br />
needed to bring in adjustments to the social and economic order,<br />
specifically in those areas where existing powers were either inadequate<br />
or non-existent. The areas in question were pay and other conditions<br />
of employment, foreign labour, the conditions of employment of<br />
civil servants, the salaries in the professions, dividends, leases and rents.<br />
Furthermore, the Enabling Act embraced a number of changes in existing<br />
laws, most notably in the Price Law. 46 The most important reason for<br />
submitting the Bill to parliament was the oil crisis, which threatened the<br />
provision of energy and the employment situation, and the steep rise in<br />
the price of raw materials, leading to fears of inflation.<br />
The Enabling Act was speedily dealt with by parliament, though certainly<br />
not without occasionally heated discussion. Moreover, both<br />
Chambers added their different amendments to the Bill, which before being<br />
submitted had already been modified on advice from the Council of<br />
State. The Bill was discussed by special committees within a matter of<br />
days; and in mid-December followed the memorandum in reply and the<br />
first government amendment, to be followed several days later by three<br />
further amendments.<br />
175
The PvdA and to a lesser extent the arp supported the Bill. In contrast,<br />
the vvd was not entirely convinced of the need for the government to be<br />
given such a mandate to intervene in socio-economic relations. According<br />
to the vvd, the oil crisis had been seized upon as a means of pushing<br />
through a social democratic pay policy. Furthermore, in the view of the<br />
vvd, parliament had been by-passed, a point of view also shared by the<br />
Christian Democratic parties. In response to this criticism, Den Uyl assured<br />
parliament that the intention was in no way to achieve specific incomes-political<br />
objectives. It was a matter of an emergency that had been<br />
created by the oil crisis. Although this explanation was accepted by the<br />
majority, a series of amendments were introduced by the Chamber. In the<br />
first place, it was arranged that Boersma must confer with the Ministry of<br />
Economic Affairs in different situations. Evidently, the Chamber wanted<br />
to defend the position of Lubbers and Economic Affairs. Furthermore,<br />
the Social Economic Council and other consultative organs must be involved<br />
in some decisions. And finally, parliamentary control should be<br />
strengthened, which meant, among other things, insisting that certain<br />
government decisions must be reported to the Chamber. 47 On December<br />
20, the Second Chamber voted by a majority to pass the Enabling Act.<br />
The First Chamber, however, decided to deal with the Bill only on January<br />
8 and 9.<br />
Meanwhile, the Cabinet had sent the Second Chamber a second note<br />
over the oil crisis, entitled Policy note limiting consequences of oil shortage.<br />
48 This note, also partly based on material delivered by the Central<br />
Economic Committee, was comprehensively dealt with in the Ministerial<br />
Council for Economic Affairs. The aim of the note was to flesh out the intentions<br />
announced in the first note concerning the oil shortage and in the<br />
Enabling Act. The Cabinet reiterated that, in view of the great uncertainty<br />
over oil supplies, it was inevitable that measures be taken to control<br />
prices and wages and the growth of government expenditure. The restricted<br />
oil supply and the rise in oil prices would contribute to a steep rise<br />
in prices and wages, coupled with stagnating or falling production, productivity<br />
and imports/exports. Apart from the measures announced earlier,<br />
the note announced capital spending on the extra commitment to natural<br />
gas and on increasing the profits from natural gas. With regard to industrial<br />
relations, the Cabinet announced measures aimed at maintaining<br />
the level of employment as far as possible, such as support for businesses<br />
finding themselves in difficulties, and the creation of new jobs, specifically<br />
a programme of insulation in the building industry. Rising wages must be<br />
carefully monitored (even though wages in 1974 would increase consid-<br />
176
erably), possibly requiring the introduction of a ‘rest period’ in connection<br />
with the uncertainty surrounding oil supplies.<br />
Doubt and Postponement<br />
At the end of December, another wave of doubt assailed the government<br />
over whether the rationing, already prepared and at the ready, was really<br />
necessary. The forecasts concerning oil supplies were more optimistic,<br />
even within the Council of Ministers. On December 21,forthelasttimein<br />
1973,the question of the oil shortage was raised in the Council of Ministers,<br />
and with it new data on current supplies were provided. During the<br />
handling of the Enabling Act the previous day, with the presentation of information<br />
on the oil situation, the Cabinet had ‘passed through the eye of<br />
the needle’,asDenUylremarked. 49 Den Uyl pointed out in theCouncilof<br />
Ministers that there was a general distrust of the figures. Could not more<br />
exact figures be obtained from the Customs and pilots services on the New<br />
Waterway, so that the Cabinet might be properly informed of the situation?<br />
It was clear in this ministerial council that Lubbers was no longer convinced<br />
of the need for rationing. In the following weeks he would more<br />
and more explicitly wonder whether it would be more sensible simply to<br />
blow the whistle on the entire operation. During these weeks it was predominantly<br />
the PvdA ministers, not least Den Uyl himself, who would<br />
persevere with putting rationing into operation in spite of Lubbers’s<br />
reservations.<br />
Lubbers pointed out that there had been a one million tons deficiency in<br />
December’s incoming oil supply, which was much better than the earlier<br />
prognoses. His impression was that the oil supply in December had been<br />
better than was expected at the end of November. The situation was also<br />
better because road transport had been effectively cut back, the oil companies<br />
commanded vast stockpiles, and more oil than anticipated was still<br />
arriving. He concluded that it would be better to postpone rationing, even<br />
though from the point of view of policy continuity it might perhaps be better<br />
tocarryonwithit.Iftherumoursofhugeoilstockswerecorrect,the<br />
Cabinet would have to reconsider its policy. 50 Once again it was evident<br />
that the Cabinetwasnotinaposition to command an adequate picture of<br />
the situation; and nowhere was this more in evidence than in Lubbers’s<br />
own doubts as to whether rumours of overflowing oil tanks in the Rijnmond<br />
area were true or false.<br />
177
These doubts grew. In early January, NRC Handelsblad started questioning<br />
the government’s efforts to introduce rationing, predicting a tide<br />
of protest from trade and industry. There was also doubt in the Second<br />
Chamber, the paper thought, over the necessity of rationing. Very little<br />
inconvenience had so far been suffered as a result of the embargo and reduction<br />
in oil supplies. Lubbers himself had said that he was not pessimistic<br />
about this. The oil supply was, in his view, still reasonably up to<br />
the mark.<br />
Clearly, from this statement, the government must now realise that the<br />
situation with regard to the oil supply is better than anticipated. Why<br />
then persist with a complicated and, for many, inequitable system of rationing?<br />
51<br />
Such doubts as to the need for rationing spread within the Council of<br />
Ministers at the beginning of 1974, doubts mainly fed by Lubbers. There<br />
were technical problems, he said, such as the allocation of petrol: such allocation<br />
could only be completed two weeks after rationing had been introduced,<br />
causing great uncertainty for many applicants. But the most<br />
important reason for postponing or even cancelling rationing was for<br />
Lubbers the fact that oil stocks on December 31 were ‘virtually intact’.<br />
Supply, moreover, was greater than anticipated. At any event, he proposed<br />
postponing rationing by three weeks.<br />
This went too far for the majority of the Cabinet. The Council of Ministers<br />
decided to compromise with a one week postponement, with no<br />
shifting of this deadline. The consequence of this decision was important<br />
and remarkable, for it meant that the first period of rationing would last<br />
only three weeks, not four. The total quantity of petrol that could be used<br />
in this period, however, remained the same as originally provided for four<br />
weeks, which in turn implied that every private vehicle now had the right<br />
to twenty rather than fifteen litres per week. 52<br />
It was a decision that did the government’s reputation no good. The<br />
press accused the Cabinet of irresolution and panic; ‘Poorly organised’,<br />
ran the headline of the lead editorial in de Volkskrant. ‘What is hard to<br />
swallow is the government’s panicky play from one day to the next.’ Ministers<br />
contradicted one another; the measures taken were deficient, and<br />
many administrative problems not foreseen. The petrol ration suddenly<br />
went from sixty litres per four weeks to sixty litres per three weeks.<br />
178
Analysing this policy – if policy it can be called – leads one to conclude<br />
that the government set sail on its mission with nothing better than a<br />
wet finger held up to the wind. 53<br />
‘Unfortunate’ was how Trouw characterised the five-day postponement<br />
of petrol rationing: not only the time period, but part of the reasoning also<br />
seemed at fault. ‘Why did the government have to wait for this postponement<br />
until two days before rationing should have been implemented?’<br />
Public transport could no longer reverse the extra schedules. Inevitably,<br />
and justifiably, there was huge irritation. Furthermore, the reason – that<br />
the oil supply had slightly improved – did not hold water.<br />
The Cabinet has always acted as though it was incapable of tuning its<br />
rationing policy to such minor fluctuations… By giving the impression<br />
now that it can, the Cabinet has provided with ammunition for some<br />
time to come to its many critics who will soon be wanting to see daily<br />
proof of that rationing is necessary. 54<br />
NRC Handelsblad was also critical. ‘The unexpected U-turn in policy<br />
does not suggest well-considered policy-making,’ was the paper’s judgement.<br />
The question of whether rationing was in fact urgently needed had<br />
not been adequately answered by the Cabinet. 55<br />
The Cabinet Ploughs on<br />
On January 11, the decision was taken in the Council of Ministers to<br />
press ahead with the prepared rationing scheme, in the first place for three<br />
weeks, from January 12 till February 3. It was by now believed that this<br />
rationing would lead to a saving of 20%, considerably less than the 30%<br />
previously assumed. If this 20% saving was no longer necessary, the system<br />
would revert to one or two car-free Sundays in combination with a<br />
speed limit of 90 kms per hour. 56<br />
In the Council of Ministers of January 11, confusion once again<br />
reigned over the true figures for stocks and supplies. Lubbers informed<br />
the Council that, in any case, supplies at the beginning of the year were<br />
greater than anticipated. Consumption now lay in the region of 67% of<br />
its normal magnitude, while supplies amounted to some 70%. Lubbers’s<br />
main concern was the development of prices, not oil supplies. Den Uyl,<br />
however, disagreed. In his view, the December supply had been lower<br />
179
than had been reported at the time, in fact some 50% lower than the previous<br />
year. In public, however, a figure of 30% had been discussed in order<br />
to avoid too much disquiet. 57<br />
Den Uyl’s line of reasoning contradicted the earlier statement from<br />
Lubbers, that oil stocks were more or less intact at the turn of the year.<br />
Furthermore, from Lubbers’s report it could be construed that domestic<br />
oil use had been reduced by roughly the same amount as the oil supply;<br />
and finally there seemed to be a clear improvement in the provision of oil.<br />
And yet the decision had been taken to implement rationing, even though<br />
the Council of Ministers accepted that it need not last long. 58<br />
The Cabinet decision seems, certainly in retrospect, highly contestable.<br />
Stocks were being maintained, the oil supply was recovering,<br />
and there was already on the cards a considerable reduction of exports<br />
and reduced consumption. The circumstances in which the Cabinet decided<br />
to go ahead with petrol, lpg and propane rationing are perhaps<br />
best illustrated by a telex that same day by bk Gas to the National Bureau<br />
for Oil Products (the rba), asking that the rationing of lpg be postponed<br />
until genuine shortage could be detected. According to bk Gas, stocks for<br />
the coming months looked good. In fact, given the excess stock, there was<br />
the danger that a good deal of unsold gas would ‘have to be burnt’. 59<br />
A last striking aspect of the introduction of rationing was that, at this<br />
point, the government clearly began to deviate from the policy implemented<br />
by surrounding countries. The announcement of rationing had<br />
caused surprise in the West German Republic, as the Dutch Ambassador<br />
in Bonn reported to The Hague; for there it was considered that the carfree<br />
Sundays and the speed limit would be sufficient. Nor was rationing<br />
introduced in Belgium. The only other European country that had introduced<br />
rationing was Romania. 60 This fact that countries bordering The<br />
Netherlands had not found it necessary to introduce rationing would<br />
soon prove an insuperable problem for the rationing experiment.<br />
Why was rationing implemented, in spite of all the ambivalence and in<br />
spiteofthe increasingly optimistic data? By now, Lubbers was no longer<br />
advocating it and was essentially expressing doubt. According to Rutten,<br />
this was mainly attributable to Lubbers’s uncertainty. 61 But on the other<br />
hand, there were also good reasons to doubt the sense of rationing. It was<br />
mainly the PvdA ministers, Den Uyl above all, who pushed through the<br />
decision. However, beside this, one has to set the role of the Co-ordination<br />
Group and of Rutten himself, as chairperson of the Group. Rutten had<br />
also argued for implementation at the gathering of the Ministerial Committee<br />
where he had represented Economic Affairs in the absence of Minister<br />
Lubbers. 62<br />
180
The majority of the Cabinet, for a variety of reasons, did not share<br />
Lubbers’s view. One argument was the uncertainty of supplies in the near<br />
future, despite the satisfactory figures on parade. A second argument, advanced<br />
by Van der Stoel among others, was the political instability in the<br />
Middle East, which might in time lead to the announcement of further restrictive<br />
measures. A third argument, also stressed by Van der Stoel, was<br />
the fear of repercussions from the Arab side should they perceive from the<br />
Cabinet’s decision-making that the embargo was ineffectual. 63<br />
And yet these considerations were not the main reasons for pushing<br />
ahead with rationing. The most important point was the credibility of the<br />
Cabinet’s policy. It was concluded by several members of the Cabinet, not<br />
least Den Uyl, that postponing rationing, and especially any ostentatious<br />
change of policy, would create a very bad impression with the Dutch electorate<br />
and arouse doubts as to the government’s strength of purpose. 64<br />
This, however, certainly after the postponement of the previous week and<br />
the public reactions to that, was a rather contentious argument.<br />
The idea that rationing was mainly an exercise of a social democratic,<br />
centrally controlled, economic policy of austerity, which was for example<br />
the view subsequently expressed by the then director of Shell-Netherlands,<br />
Helfrich, is surely an exaggeration. 65 Rationing, after all, can<br />
hardly be seen as an example of progressive economic politics. The introduction<br />
of the Enabling Act, passed by the First Chamber in the second<br />
week of January, went much further in that direction. Although the introduction<br />
of rationing was championed in Cabinet by the PvdA ministers<br />
above all, it was the bureaucratic weight of all those preparatory measures<br />
that played such an important role in the decision to keep on going.<br />
Even Secretary-General Rutten of Economic Affairs was in favour of<br />
pressing on; there was simply too much civil service labour invested in the<br />
preparation.<br />
Three Weeks Rationing<br />
The rationing system was in fact based on a vast mass of paperwork. In<br />
the final report of the National Bureau for Oil Products (rba), it was later<br />
found that there had been 47 different forms in circulation, two types of<br />
permit, seven kinds of ration card, one authorization, five categories of<br />
ration coupon and three kinds of allocation. Furthermore, a large number<br />
of government and other organisations were involved in the whole operation:<br />
various ministries, municipal and provincial institutions, the<br />
181
National Traffic Licensing Authority, the Central Office for Motor Vehicle<br />
Taxation, Chambers of Commerce, the Dutch motorists association<br />
anwb, not to speak of all the petrol pump owners and oil companies.<br />
In the allocation of coupons for the initial rationing period – originally<br />
four weeks – it was assumed that these would remain valid for six<br />
months. The disadvantage of this long-lasting validity was the increased<br />
risk of fraud, but that was simply accepted as part of the costs. The great<br />
advantage was the flexibility afforded, and for this reason trade in<br />
coupons was not forbidden. Allocation was determined on the basis of<br />
data supplied by the Office for Motor Vehicle Taxation. A total of 3.1 million<br />
ration cards were issued. The rba made full use of the possibility of<br />
involving other governmental bodies on the basis of their expertise,<br />
specifically in issuing extra coupons for a whole series of exceptional categories:<br />
business vehicles, commuter traffic, rental vehicles, invalids (who<br />
would need to produce evidence of their invalid status). Where road traffic<br />
was concerned, this authority was the Directorate-General for Road<br />
Transport (under the Ministry of Transport and Water Management); for<br />
the agricultural sector it was the Directorate-General for Food and Agriculture;<br />
and for the diplomatic service, the Cabinet and Protocol Department<br />
in the Foreign Ministry. The apparatus of the Directorate-General<br />
for Road Transport quickly proved inadequate to the task. Out of necessity,<br />
93 distribution circuits subsequently had to be set up to issue supplementary<br />
allocations for the business use of private vehicles. Inevitably,<br />
there was confusion among the public as to which was the appropriate<br />
authority to turn to. There was also considerable uncertainty over what<br />
exactly qualified for extra allowances. By shifting the date of implementation<br />
to January 12 and because of the simultaneous improvement in the<br />
general outlook, there was also more room to improve the allowance of<br />
extra petrol. 66<br />
Soon enough, however, rationing proved an efficient means of generating<br />
political and social discontent. As early as January 8, the Cabinet policy<br />
came under fire in the First Chamber: the need for the entire rationing<br />
operation seemed so dubious. The Cabinet stood its ground although<br />
Lubbers declared that a reduction of 20% would be sufficient rather than<br />
the 30% deemed necessary in the December note. A motion was submitted<br />
to change government thinking but was rejected by 45 votes to 24, despite<br />
the support it received from eight representatives of the ruling parties.<br />
67<br />
Against this background, the debate in the Council of Ministers over<br />
January 18 and 19 centred on the question of whether rationing should<br />
182
last beyond three weeks. There were immediately differences of opinion<br />
evident. Westerterp cast strong doubt on the need to continue. Business<br />
traffic, in his view, was encountering considerable hindrance, while the<br />
agreement between Egypt and Israel over disengagement gave cause for<br />
optimism. Lubbers seemed to be in doubt. Den Uyl, in contrast, thought<br />
that as long as the oil supply was less than 80% of the previous year, it<br />
was necessary to prolong rationing by a further three-week period. This,<br />
in the end, was what was decided.<br />
In practice, however, rationing rapidly lost its effectiveness. Along the<br />
Dutch borders, motorists were crossing the frontier to buy up foreign<br />
petrol on a large scale, resulting in a drastic slump in sales at the pumps in<br />
The Netherlands. As a result, the Dutch petrol stations were reverting to<br />
the sale of petrol without coupons. Nor was this flouting of rationing restricted<br />
to the pumps in the border areas. In increasingly wider circles, it<br />
was felt that the rationing system was being discredited. At this stage,<br />
during talks between the National Bureau for Oil Products and the oil<br />
companies, it appeared that the difference between supply and demand<br />
was estimated at 15%, less than the 20% limit set by the Cabinet. 68 The<br />
question was therefore what purpose the colossal effort of paperwork actually<br />
served. On January 22 the General-Secretary of the Cycle and Motor<br />
Manufacturing Industry (rai), W. Hustinx, pointed out to Lubbers in<br />
a telex that calculations showed that, on an annual basis, 4866 million<br />
litres of petrol had been distributed under rationing, not including extra<br />
allocations for police, fire service, invalids etc. The total petrol consumption<br />
for 1973, had there been no oil crisis, would have been 4865 million<br />
litres. In short, rationing was pointless. The rai therefore would prefer,<br />
as Hustinx delicately remarked, that the dislocation of the motor industry<br />
and trade could be ended by reverting to more normal relations, on the<br />
basis of voluntary savings in petrol consumption. 69<br />
In the second week of rationing, it became clear that the organisations<br />
involved, the oil companies as well as the distributors and pump owners,<br />
were simply not sticking to the prescribed rules. On January 22, the Association<br />
of Automobile Dealers and Garage Owners told Lubbers in no uncertain<br />
terms that they were no longer willing to cooperate in the ‘rationing<br />
circus’. Many petrol pumps had for some time gone their own<br />
way; some had even succeeded in importing petrol from abroad. But the<br />
companies were also delivering generously. On the basis of a current account<br />
system, the oil companies were allowed to supply the pump owners<br />
with extra petrol, which would be taken into account subsequently on return<br />
of the coupons from sales. This regulation was probably rather freely<br />
183
interpreted by some oil companies. It was subsequently concluded by the<br />
government that the current account system had probably let ‘too much<br />
air’ into the rationing system. 70<br />
On January 21, Rutten was talking of ‘rebellion’. The question was<br />
how the government would react. The view within the Ministry of Justice<br />
was that it would not help to maintain rationing with a heavy hand. The<br />
legal possibilities inherent in the situation were complex. Furthermore,<br />
there was a good chance that rationing would be abolished within days,<br />
which would make the Ministry of Justice look a little ridiculous. Discontinuing<br />
rationing completely, however, seemed equally undesirable. After<br />
all, the Cabinet had just announced three further weeks of rationing. It<br />
was thought at the Ministry of Justice that the Foreign Ministry was also<br />
against abolishing the scheme as long as the embargo against The Netherlands<br />
was not lifted. A system of extra measures and exceptions was<br />
thought too complicated. The best way out therefore seemed to be ‘a temporary<br />
suspension of the disposition’. 71<br />
Meanwhile, the estimates of stocks and supplies were looking even<br />
more favourable. On January 9 it was still being assumed by the Co-ordination<br />
Group that supplies in January and February would be 30% down<br />
on the previous year. But two weeks later, the shortfall was assumed within<br />
the Ministry for Economic Affairs to amount to only 22%. It was expected<br />
on January 9 that 28% less crude oil would be processed in The<br />
Netherlands; whereas two weeks later the figure cited for this reduction<br />
was 19%. In fact, it was concluded on January 24 that the outlook for<br />
most oil products was favourable. 72 On January 17 the Ministerial Committee<br />
therefore decided to go over to publication of the figures, though<br />
there was some doubt on this score within the Foreign Ministry. The<br />
Head of the Department for Economic Cooperation (des) pointed out to<br />
Van der Stoel that there remained some doubt about the assumption that<br />
the Arab countries by now no longer had any objection to the redirection<br />
of the oil stream. This idea had played a part in the decision of January 17<br />
but it was by no means certain that a government demonstration that the<br />
embargo had been ineffectual would not irritate some Arab countries. On<br />
the other hand, the Head of des appreciated that there were good domestic<br />
reasons for resuming publication of the data on oil supplies. 73<br />
On January 23 the situation in the Council of Ministers had changed<br />
from four days earlier, when it had been decided to extend rationing to<br />
February 25. A memo from Rutten to Lubbers was submitted in which it<br />
was confirmed that ‘rationing was being circumvented in diverse ways<br />
and on a vast scale’. Meanwhile, Van Agt concluded in a letter to Den Uyl<br />
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‘that maintenance of the ban on supplying petrol other than on production<br />
of coupons had gone completely haywire’. There were far too many<br />
coupons in circulation, which was mainly the consequence of their lavish<br />
distribution for road vehicles. There was unrestrained sale of petrol in<br />
border areas, given the competition from free trade in fuel over the frontiers.<br />
Van Agt noted that Den Uyl had apparently proposed a ban in order<br />
to import more extra petrol from abroad; but the law did not provide for<br />
this, quite apart from the problems with the other Benelux countries and<br />
the ec. 74<br />
Den Uyl concluded that the pressure from both parliament and the<br />
country to dispense with rationing at once was growing because it was<br />
being assumed that there were sufficient stocks of petrol. This assumption<br />
was fostered by remarks by the head of the Rotterdam trade unions,<br />
A. van Schravenmade, who had stated that the reserve tanks in the Botlek<br />
Rijnmond area were more than full. The oil companies had let it be<br />
known that a saving of 15% would be necessary in the coming weeks, less<br />
than the 20% that had served as reason for the Cabinet to introduce rationing.<br />
The Co-ordination Group had meanwhile proposed, in line with<br />
the Cabinet decision of the previous week, to call a halt to rationing on<br />
February 25; but Den Uyl was now considering a much earlier date, viz.<br />
February 4. Pronk put forward the most explicit objection to this: there<br />
were no reasons for an immediate cessation. The supplies, after all, had<br />
not become much better.<br />
To most members of the government, however, it seemed the situation<br />
was becoming uncontrollable. Van Agt again emphasized that large numbers<br />
of cars were crossing the borders to fill up in neighbouring countries.<br />
The result was more and more petrol pumps were supplying petrol without<br />
coupons. Maintaining rationing until February 24, in his view, would<br />
be impossible. He shared Den Uyl’s point of view that the scheme should<br />
be wound up on February 4. Nonetheless, there remained doubts to the<br />
last. There were in fact two draft decisions on the table: one to extend rationing<br />
by a further three weeks, the other to stop. In the end, the council<br />
decision was to end rationing on February 4, but to continue with efforts<br />
to reduce petrol consumption, specifically through the maximum speed<br />
limit. 75<br />
The series of decisions taken by the Den Uyl Cabinet ensured the inevitable<br />
outcry in the press. De Volkskrant had many questions it wanted<br />
answered over the ending of rationing. Why had the Cabinet found it necessary<br />
only one week previously to decree a new period of rationing? Had<br />
the oil supply unexpectedly become so much more favourable? With due<br />
185
espect to all conceivable arguments, the paper retained the impression<br />
‘that the early abrogation of rationing is rather to be attributed to the<br />
growing chaos than to a better than anticipated oil supply’. 76<br />
The paper expressed itself even more forcefully two days later. After<br />
the announced end of petrol rationing on February 4, the remaining period<br />
under rationing had become a joke. De Volkskrant spoke of ‘government<br />
drift’: certainly, the paper said, the epithet ‘bungling’ seemed welldeserved<br />
for the policy of the recent period. 77<br />
The story of rationing seemed to the eyes of NRC Handelsblad both<br />
brief and strange. Lubbers had not been able to make completely clear<br />
why it had been decided to abandon rationing. In spite of the encouraging<br />
figures, it hardly chimed with the long-term objectives that Lubbers had<br />
always presented.<br />
It is not so long ago that optimistic views of the oil supply in The Economist<br />
were being rubbished by various members of the Cabinet. 78<br />
Two days later the paper returned to this question. The cancellation of rationing<br />
had been more or less dictated by the oil companies and the Association<br />
of Automobile Dealers and Garage Owners (bovag), with the<br />
companies playing a particularly significant role. They had initially<br />
promised the government to cooperate with implementing instructions<br />
through to the end of the rationing period. In fact, because of the extraordinarily<br />
flexible delivery rules for petrol pumps, implementation of rationing<br />
had been less than scrupulous. Pump owners had in various ways<br />
managed to lay in extra quantities of fuel. Furthermore, as it turned out in<br />
practice, the stipulation that petrol could only be supplied on the production<br />
of coupons had generally been ignored. The whole affair only served<br />
to illustrate the shortage of trust between companies and government.<br />
This is perhaps explained by the growing belief that the oil companies<br />
have provided government with insufficient insight into the circumstances<br />
and the consequences of the oil crisis. 79<br />
Once it became clear that rationing would be abandoned, it became even<br />
more difficult to maintain any sort of control over the petrol pump owners,<br />
as was clearly realised at the Ministry of Justice. In a memorandum to<br />
the Secretary-General at the Ministry, it was suggested that it would be<br />
inconceivable to come down hard on the pump owners. But the real villains<br />
had undoubtedly been the Association of Automobile Dealers and<br />
186
Garage Owners (bovag), and a prosecution of this organisation might<br />
well help remove the impression of impotence. The Cabinet could demonstrate<br />
that important issues were at stake if a monopoly organisation like<br />
bovag resorted to ‘civil disobedience’. But of course there were also risks<br />
attached to such a judicial course of action. The most important policy<br />
objection was that by involving the courts, government would be manifesting<br />
a rather convulsive need to justify itself in what was, after all, a<br />
fairly feeble matter. 80<br />
This, then, was how rationing ended: in civil disobedience and chaos.<br />
There was much discussion at the Ministry of Economic Affairs over the<br />
question of whether it needed winding up and the cost counted; but in the<br />
end the instructions were simply to leave matters as they were. The Coordination<br />
Group also later admitted that there had been far too many<br />
problems involved. The group thought the way the oil companies had acted<br />
had been very variable: Shell had probably exploited the opportunity<br />
to restock (as was later established in the Council of Ministers). The Coordination<br />
Group concluded that petrol consumption in January had<br />
been approximately 20% less than normal. 81 The target figure had thus<br />
been achieved, but the question was whether this might not have been<br />
achieved even without rationing. Furthermore, it turned out that the combination<br />
of this reduction in consumption together with the recovery in<br />
the oil supply was by now causing storage problems.<br />
Following the end of rationing on February 4, there were initially no<br />
additional measures prepared. It was a matter of re-introducing the carfree<br />
Sundays, at least once or twice a month, and the legal fixing of a maximum<br />
speed limit. Even these measures quickly became superfluous, however,<br />
for there was now no shortage of oil. When, at the end of January,<br />
the possibility of improving both oil provisions and The Hague’s image<br />
was considered at Economic Affairs, the question was raised whether<br />
there was actually any need for an increase in supply. The answer was<br />
‘no’.<br />
In view of the unusually mild winter, the ban on reporting incoming<br />
tankers, information that tankers are being diverted to other ports, as<br />
well as the rumour that old tankers are being filled offshore because of<br />
lack of storage space on land, this question can be answered in the negative.<br />
82<br />
Helfrich later confirmed the truth of these rumours that old tankers had<br />
been used to store oil on the North Sea. Furthermore, Shell had instructed<br />
187
tankers en route to Rotterdam to sail slowly, since their oil could not be<br />
stored in the Botlek area. 83<br />
Conclusion<br />
The storage problem stands in stark contrast to the apprehensive suspicions<br />
voiced in the double Cabinet note to parliament in mid-December.<br />
For this reason alone, according to various authorities involved, it was<br />
not surprising that rationing had been a failure. According to one note<br />
from the Ministry of Justice, during the three weeks of rationing petrol<br />
had been widely sold without coupons and without any corrective action<br />
being taken. Not that it would have been easy to take effective action, given<br />
the economic unity within the ec and free traffic between Benelux<br />
countries. More generally, the note argued, a rationing system can only<br />
work in times of scarcity, and during these three weeks there had been no<br />
genuine scarcity. 84<br />
More radical criticism was expressed in a report on the experience of<br />
the Amsterdam distribution circuit. The government had hesitated far<br />
too long, and the procedures by which rationing was implemented had<br />
been inadequate and confusing. Above all, the decision to reduce the rationing<br />
period from four to three weeks, while the allowance itself remained<br />
unchanged, had seriously undermined the credibility of the whole<br />
rationing scheme. Different members of the government, moreover,<br />
seemed regularly to contradict one another, which had made a very poor<br />
impression on the public. 85<br />
The National Bureau for Oil Products (the rba) subsequently concluded<br />
that rationing was a means of defending scarce basic materials as<br />
effectively as possible under conditions of war and concomitant major<br />
shortages. But because such problems no longer existed by January 1974,<br />
the public had no belief in the legitimacy of the measures. Petrol was sold<br />
illegally on a wide scale, and the government turned out to be in no position<br />
to take any countermeasures. More generally, serious mistakes were<br />
made: information had been inadequate, co-ordination had been lacking,<br />
there were far too many coupons in circulation. In fact, a great deal had<br />
gone wrong. 86<br />
But the most important problem was the fact that stocks and supplies<br />
in January were in so much better health than initially assumed. Why did<br />
the situation turn out so favourably? Here it is relevant to pay attention<br />
not solely to the figures for supply, for in December these were indeed<br />
188
scarcely encouraging. In that month, supply fell back by a huge percentage<br />
in comparison with December 1972. And yet at the beginning of January,<br />
Lubbers was able to establish that stocks were virtually intact. 87<br />
There could have been several reasons for this striking fact. In the first<br />
place, it was evident that some companies, with an eye to the coming winter<br />
and because of an anticipated rise in oil prices, had transported extra<br />
stocks of crude oil to The Netherlands. The rba even spoke of ‘record<br />
stocks’. 88 In the second place, the export of processed oil products was in<br />
all probability drastically reduced. Thirdly, there was a drop in the domestic<br />
use of processed oil products as the result of restrictive measures,<br />
and on the basis of voluntary action, also helped by such coincidental factors<br />
as the mildness of the winter. Fourthly, supplies recovered in January<br />
much faster than expected as a result of the switching policy operated by<br />
the oil companies. Furthermore, it became clear that the embargo was not<br />
everywhere being effectively enforced. And finally, after the price rises of<br />
December, the production limits were made more flexible by the oapec<br />
countries.<br />
By the time it became apparent in January that supplies were beginning<br />
to recover, rationing had in fact become superfluous. Lubbers, who<br />
had originally been a champion of the rapid implementation of rationing,<br />
had by then come round to the position that the entire operation was too<br />
late in the day. And of course he was right. The system quickly collapsed<br />
when several of the players involved simply chose not to abide by the rules:<br />
the Cabinet was confronted with ‘civil disobedience’ on a wide scale.<br />
Even the oil companies – or at least some of them – seem not to have stuck<br />
to the distribution regulations, and as a result the major companies played<br />
a remarkable role, since they had originally argued for more radical measures<br />
than the car-free Sunday and voluntary speed limits. Even the Cabinet,<br />
in justifying the introduction of rationing, later referred to ‘the darker<br />
prospects outlined by the oil companies at the time of the decisionmaking<br />
in question’. 89 And in all probability they continued to paint this<br />
dark picture until well into December. When the government decided to<br />
put into operation the rationing mechanism prepared so long in advance,<br />
the oil companies appeared by then to be no longer convinced of the need<br />
for any drastic reduction in consumption; in fact, they contributed to the<br />
evasion, discrediting and abandonment of the whole rationing scheme.<br />
The Den Uyl government was always one step behind events. This was<br />
partly the consequence of the fact that the Cabinet was so dependent on<br />
the information provided by and the behaviour of the major oil companies.<br />
It was understandable that various ministers felt uneasy with this<br />
189
situation and in ministerial council demanded more information. The<br />
Cabinet, however, never did succeed in cutting loose from this dependency.<br />
It is striking that the government never had a proper picture of the oil<br />
supply, whereas former employees of the Foreign and the Military Intelligence<br />
Services believe that they themselves had had a reasonably adequate<br />
picture. The services were together reading the coded reports and communications<br />
of Shell and Mobil, but apparently this information never<br />
found its way to the Cabinet. 90<br />
In this situation, mutual relations between the departments involved<br />
were not always optimal. The Ministry of Economic Affairs seemed to<br />
have a monopoly command over data relating to oil supplies. Subsequently,<br />
dissatisfaction was expressed within the Foreign Ministry over<br />
the lack of information that had been passed on by Economic Affairs.<br />
This lack of information, as a later Foreign Ministry report rather charitably<br />
put it, was partly the consequence of the Economic Affairs apparatus<br />
being over-taxed, but at the same time ‘Economic Affairs did not keep<br />
to the arrangement that talks between their officials and the oil companies<br />
could also be attended by Foreign Office officials’. 91 Westerterp also<br />
expressed the view later that the information on oil stocks and supplies<br />
passed on by Economic Affairs had not always been adequate. 92 Unquestionably,<br />
this lack of effective communication between departments<br />
played a damaging role. 93<br />
In the rationing phase, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Lubbers<br />
lost their leading role as initiators in matters and measures of limiting<br />
consumption. The car-free Sunday had been the result of a mandate given<br />
Lubbers by the Cabinet to take whatever action the circumstances demanded.<br />
With the Enabling Act and rationing, the oil crisis had taken a<br />
turn which made it the concern of the entire Cabinet in which Boersma<br />
and, especially, Den Uyl increasingly played the more prominent roles,<br />
while Lubbers himself increasingly came to entertain doubts. These shifts<br />
were not conducive to decisive or adroit action, and the effectiveness of<br />
the policy suffered badly.<br />
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7<br />
From Copenhagen to Washington<br />
In this chapter we shall return to the international aspects of the oil crisis,<br />
to the stage after the failure of the European Summit of December 14 and<br />
15 in Copenhagen. At that time, the predominant feeling in The Hague<br />
was of great uncertainty over the oil supply. Although it was clear by then<br />
that some oil companies were trying to share out the oil between European<br />
countries as equitably as possible, it was felt that the oil supply<br />
would remain uncertain for the immediate future. Seen in retrospect, December<br />
1973 was the worst month for the oil supply. This was the time<br />
that the decision was taken to introduce rationing and to submit the Enabling<br />
Act to Parliament. By the end of the year, however, it was becoming<br />
clear that the worst was already over and that the supply of oil would<br />
recover within the foreseeable future.<br />
The Cabinet, in spite of everything, was taking a more business-like –<br />
even pugnacious – approach to its judgements of the oil crisis and the embargo,<br />
although its Middle East policy remained low-profile. All mention<br />
of the Arab-Israeli war was to be avoided for the time being, all public<br />
declarations suppressed, as the Arab countries wished. Any hope of European<br />
solidarity had been discarded, and even more: the Cabinet, as we<br />
saw, had in the meantime reached the conclusion that sharing was, in the<br />
end, probably not to The Netherlands’ advantage. The national energy<br />
situation was in all respects in reasonable shape and more favourable<br />
than in several other ec countries. For this reason, the failure of the<br />
Copenhagen Summit was certainly not lamented in The Hague.<br />
American Leadership<br />
This chapter deals with all the political twists and turns from the Copen-<br />
191
hagen Summit till the Washington Conference called by President Nixon,<br />
which opened on February 11, 1974. During these weeks the American<br />
government began to get more actively involved in the politics of the oil<br />
problem. In the first weeks after the outbreak of hostilities, Kissinger had<br />
mainly concentrated on ending the state of war in the Middle East. This<br />
was no easy matter. American attempts were made more difficult by the<br />
fact that elections in Israel had considerably strengthened the political<br />
right, leaving the government of Golda Meir much less room for manoeuvre.<br />
Nevertheless, negotiations were opened on December 21, although<br />
Syria took no part. Discussions proceeded with difficulty, indeed they<br />
were initially adjourned, yet despite this, they led to the signing on January<br />
18 of an Israeli-Egyptian accord guaranteeing disengagement.<br />
Washington’s relations with the West European countries at the beginning<br />
of the 1970s were not unproblematic. As already discussed in Chapter<br />
3, a number of problems in the area of monetary and trade policy, not<br />
to mention the Vietnam war, stood in the way of easy cooperation. It is<br />
not so surprising therefore that the first weeks of the oil crisis should witness<br />
such a marked lack of harmonious cooperation between the usa and<br />
its European partners. Paris, in particular, could not come to terms with<br />
the American role in negotiations for a settlement of the October War.<br />
Kissinger, on the other hand, had no time for European interference.<br />
France tried to get the ec to take a position more independent of the usa<br />
in relation to the Middle East conflict; but the ec proved too divided to<br />
play any consistent role. In part, this was due to opposition from The<br />
Hague. The Dutch Cabinet firmly believed that the ec should not thwart<br />
Kissinger’s efforts to reach a peace accord, efforts to which much energy<br />
had been devoted. At a meeting held in Geneva in December 1973,<br />
chaired jointly by the usa and the Soviet Union, the main stumbling block<br />
was the question of the participation of an independent Palestinian delegation.<br />
The meeting was adjourned shortly after the opening ceremony. 1<br />
Kissinger’s address of December 12 marked the moment when the usa<br />
tried to establish its position at the head of the Western world in the problematic<br />
area of oil and energy needs. Kissinger called on the oecd countries<br />
to develop joint initiatives regarding oil production, the use of energy<br />
and the development of alternative energy sources. He proposed setting<br />
up an energy-action group to discuss these proposals further. It was<br />
this initiative which led to major changes in the whole context in which<br />
The Netherlands’ oil policy was determined. This was already evident in<br />
Copenhagen.<br />
The Den Uyl Cabinet, especially Van der Stoel, had immediately wel-<br />
192
comed the American initiative. American opposition to French efforts toward<br />
an independent European Middle East policy could only be in the<br />
interest of the Dutch, it was thought. Furthermore, commercial rivalry<br />
between the consumer countries had intensified since Copenhagen, with<br />
various countries attempting to conclude bilateral agreements with the<br />
Arab oil-producing countries with the aim of guaranteeing longer term<br />
security for their own oil supply. This increasing tension and the politicising<br />
of the oil market were remarked on in The Hague in fiercely critical<br />
terms. It was hoped there that American leadership might help put an end<br />
to this disarray.<br />
Production Limits and Oil Prices<br />
Although the oil price rises had elicited great concern in The Hague from<br />
the very beginning, it was initially the production limits that caused the<br />
most disquiet. These limits and the embargo seemed to threaten The<br />
Netherlands most directly. In October the oapec countries had announced<br />
a monthly reduction in oil production of 5%. An extra 5% was<br />
added to this figure at the beginning of November, as a result of which<br />
November oil production in the Arab world would be some 25% less than<br />
in September (if we include the embargo against The Netherlands, Denmark,<br />
Portugal and the usa). Moreover, it was decided at the beginning<br />
of November that production in December would also be reduced by a<br />
further 5%, though this further reduction would not be put into effect<br />
against ‘friendly’ states. On November 18 the oapec countries announced<br />
that, out of appreciation for the ec communiqué of November 6,<br />
the ec countries (apart from The Netherlands and Denmark) were exempted<br />
from the limit set for December. But at the beginning of 1974, a<br />
general restriction would again be imposed, a decision confirmed at a<br />
meeting of Arab Oil Ministers over December 8 and 9.<br />
At the end of December it was clear that the character of the crisis had<br />
begun to change. From that moment, it centred more and more on prices<br />
and increasingly less on production limits. On November 19 the negotiations<br />
in Vienna between the opec countries and the oil companies had<br />
become deadlocked. The opec countries had subsequently announced<br />
that they would in future set the oil prices unilaterally. On November 22,<br />
Wagner had sent a letter to Den Uyl expressing his great alarm at the price<br />
rises. On November 30, Dutch diplomatic representatives were fully informed<br />
of Wagner’s apprehensions via the Foreign Ministry. Van der<br />
193
Stoel explained that, although the government shared Wagner’s view, in<br />
view of the embargo it would not seem to be the responsibility of The<br />
Netherlands to take any specific initiative within the oecd. 2<br />
On December 23, the Arab Oil Ministers, meeting for an opec conference<br />
in Tehran, let it be known that they wanted to double the price of<br />
oil. They decided to recommend to their governments to raise the price of<br />
the so-called light Arab crude oil to around $11.60 per barrel. Several<br />
days later, the other opec members followed suit. On December 25 the<br />
opec countries announced that the production limits then in operation<br />
would again be relaxed. All measures previously announced now lapsed,<br />
and in addition, the restriction that had reached the 25% figure was now<br />
relaxed to 15%. The oil flow would resume, but at a price three times<br />
higher than before the war. 3<br />
The Western countries reacted with shock to these spectacular price<br />
increases, even the usa, which had originally supported the idea of a price<br />
rise. As early as December 22, the Dutch Director-General for Political<br />
Affairs, Van Lynden, received a worried American aide-mémoire over the<br />
opec plans which would lead to a threefold or even fourfold increase in<br />
oil prices compared with the pre-crisis period. Price rises of this magnitude<br />
would have highly serious consequences for all users, the aide-mémoire<br />
observed. For this reason, American embassies in the opec capitals<br />
had been instructed to express their alarm at these rises at the highest level<br />
possible. The Hague was likewise asked to take similar steps. 4<br />
Van der Stoel, however, reacted coolly to this request. Shortly before<br />
the opec gathering in Tehran, the Dutch Ambassador in Jakarta had received<br />
instructions to approach the Indonesian authorities cautiously and<br />
to make clear The Hague’s concerns over the rise in oil prices. But Van der<br />
Stoel had no wish to make any comparable attempt in other opec countries.<br />
The special position of The Netherlands, i.e. as the target of the embargo,<br />
did not after all allow for The Hague to play an active role in the<br />
matter of a price dispute. This was why Indonesia had been chosen as the<br />
conduit. Van der Stoel also reacted warily to the American request of December<br />
22. The Dutch Ambassador in Tehran was merely informed in full<br />
of the American steps, but was not instructed to support them. 5<br />
It was not only Washington that tried to get the opec countries to<br />
show moderation and restraint. As it turned out later, there were also<br />
British attempts. On January 2, in conversation with the Dutch Director-<br />
General for European Cooperation, the British Ambassador at The<br />
Hague said that London was highly alarmed by the price rises that had<br />
been carried through. In his view, a positive response should be shown to<br />
194
the suggestion of the Shah of Persia for a dialogue between opec and the<br />
oecd. The British government proposed a formal approach to the opec<br />
countries to appeal for reason and moderation. Anxiety should be expressed<br />
over the December 22 price decisions of opec and the Gulf<br />
States, and it should be requested that these be introduced in stages. Finally,<br />
any new destabilising decisions at the coming opec meeting on January<br />
7 should be prevented. 6 It would be helpful if as many oecd countries<br />
as possible would support this effort, the British Ambassador thought.<br />
After discussing this internally, the Director-General reported back that<br />
The Hague was of roughly the same opinion and supported the British<br />
plan. 7<br />
Evidently, bilateral steps were going to be of little help for the time being:<br />
talks between producers and consumers were required. But there did<br />
seem to be common points of contact. At a press conference on December<br />
23, the Shah had appealed for a dialogue between opec and oecd,<br />
which should take shape within the next six months. The opec Secretary-General,<br />
Abderrahman Khene, had also expressed the same kind of<br />
idea. The appeal was endorsed by several Western governments, including<br />
The Hague, where it had been realised that these price rises would<br />
have enormous consequences for the Dutch and for Western economies in<br />
general. Particularly within the Dutch Directorate-General for International<br />
Cooperation, there was also increasing concern for the position of<br />
the developing countries.<br />
The Embargo<br />
However much the crisis was beginning to change in character, the embargo<br />
was still in force. Throughout the latter part of December and in<br />
January, the Cabinet took a very cautious position on the Middle East<br />
conflict: theirs was still a ‘low profile’ policy. In any case, The Hague declined<br />
to make public pro-Arab pronouncements and as a consequence<br />
came in for some criticism. The conservative-liberal vvd reproached the<br />
government for doing too little to defend the Dutch national interest in<br />
the Middle East (as Brussels had succeeded in doing by giving its own interpretation<br />
of the ec declaration). Van der Stoel was accused of conducting<br />
‘bystander politics’ which simply ignored the economic interests,<br />
whereas other West European countries did not hesitate to act blatantly<br />
in whatever way necessary to secure their oil supplies from the Arab<br />
countries.<br />
195
The Minister also received various suggestions, even from his own<br />
diplomats, that he might try to meet the Arab countries halfway. The<br />
Dutch Ambassador in Bonn, De Beus, for instance, conveyed the Egyptian<br />
suggestion that Den Uyl might once again confirm the November 6ec<br />
declaration in an interview. A separate communiqué would be best, but it<br />
was understood in Cairo that this was not feasible: an interview would<br />
perhaps be a satisfactory solution. The German Chancellor Brandt also<br />
had a similar conversation with a Syrian journalist. This journalist was<br />
prepared to arrange in detail questions and answers so that Den Uyl need<br />
not be drawn any further than was possible. De Beus hoped that the Premier<br />
would permit such an interview since, after all, even if the worst<br />
came to the worst, there was nothing to lose. 8<br />
This plea from De Beus was not unsupported; throughout the entire<br />
crisis there had been suggestions from a number of Dutch diplomats that<br />
the government should, in some way or other, do more to accommodate<br />
the Arab countries. Similar suggestions were heard from the Directorate-<br />
General for Political Affairs, including from Director-General Van Lynden<br />
himself. But Van der Stoel remained resolutely opposed to such a public<br />
declaration on the basis that any such declaration would only invite<br />
new demands. 9<br />
Moreover, The Hague’s position became no simpler when the Arab<br />
countries decided in Kuwait on December 23 to reward some countries<br />
for their friendlier attitude. It is possible that a certain reconsideration of<br />
the economic effects of the earlier sanctions played a part in this. In any<br />
case, it was decided to consider Belgium as a ‘friendly country’ and thus<br />
to give it a more favourable treatment. It certainly seemed like a reward<br />
for the fact that Belgium had publicly taken the line that Israel had to<br />
withdraw from all the occupied territories. It was decided, furthermore,<br />
to allow oil supplies to Belgium via Rotterdam once again, a decision that<br />
was also significant for The Netherlands. On January 4, Van Schelle reported<br />
that the Saudis were indeed pleased with the Belgian guarantee<br />
that oil intended for Antwerp really would be pumped to Antwerp via the<br />
Rotterdam-Antwerp pipeline. The quantity and quality of the crude oil<br />
arriving in Rotterdam for this purpose would have to be determined by<br />
attested Belgian shipping inspectors. 10 Japan, one of the most oil-dependent<br />
countries in the world, was also rewarded. Despite heavy American<br />
pressure, the Japanese government had already publicly stated on November<br />
22 that Israel must withdraw from all the occupied territories. 11<br />
But The Netherlands was not considered to be ‘friendly’, nor even neutral.<br />
This was evident toward the end of December when Great Britain,<br />
196
among other countries that hitherto had hardly or not at all supported<br />
The Netherlands, appeared ready to undertake diplomatic activity to try<br />
to get the embargo lifted. At the end of 1973, it was evident in The Hague<br />
that the British embassies in the Middle East had been instructed to make<br />
efforts to get the oil restrictions relaxed and, further, to argue the Dutch<br />
case. This effort, however, bore little fruit. The Egyptians perhaps recognised<br />
that the time had come for the Arabs to change their attitude toward<br />
The Netherlands, but they were not yet ready to undertake any concrete<br />
step, in that direction. Elsewhere, it was clear that British efforts in<br />
Kuwait had accomplished nothing, while the prevailing judgement in<br />
Syria and Libya gave little cause for optimism. 12<br />
It became clear after several weeks, however, that the problem lay<br />
mainly in Saudi Arabia. Yamani may have admitted that the embargo<br />
against The Netherlands and the usa was completely ineffective, 13 but<br />
King Feisal was not to be persuaded to lift the embargo. His stubbornness,<br />
according to the Dutch Ambassador Derksen, could only be softened<br />
by some new Dutch gesture, which might consist of a reply to the ultimatum<br />
of October 1973, delivered by Feisal personally in his talk with<br />
Van Roijen and repeated in his letter to Queen Juliana. 14 Little in the way<br />
of a favourable result should be counted on from the pressure exerted by<br />
other Western countries. As Derksen on another occasion observed,<br />
American mediation, specifically through the us Ambassador in Jeddah,<br />
had earlier had an adverse effect on the Dutch cause. 15<br />
Van der Stoel was not convinced by Derksen’s argument, and declined<br />
to put out any new statement or to send a mission to Jeddah. Wagner, the<br />
chief executive of Shell, shared this viewpoint. He stressed on January 11<br />
that the Dutch position in the Arabian Gulf States had not improved, and<br />
that there was therefore little point in once again sending representatives<br />
to the relevant capitals. 16<br />
In mid-January, however, there were briefly rumours in The Hague of a<br />
possible end to the embargo, fed by remarks of the Kuwaiti honorary<br />
consul, Rabbani. On January 14, the latter stated on Dutch television<br />
that the embargo had done its job. At the same time, there was now a<br />
much better understanding in The Netherlands of the Arab side of the<br />
conflict. Rabbani therefore showed himself ready to urge his Arab colleagues<br />
to lift the embargo. NRC Handelsblad reacted ironically to Rabbani’s<br />
remarks, and with good reason: within a few days, his suggestions<br />
were repudiated by the Kuwaiti government. 17 At the same time it was<br />
put about that Rabbani had fallen into disfavour. 18<br />
Despite this, from other quarters it became evident in January that<br />
197
there was movement on the embargo front. After a tour of the Gulf capitals,<br />
the Dutch Ambassador Schorer reported that Abu Dhabi, Bahrein<br />
and Qatar seemed to feel more inclined to lift the embargo than to continue<br />
with it. The situation in Kuwait was rather opaque, but Schorer<br />
thought that<br />
steadily diminishing communication between our country and the Arab<br />
world, a situation that appears to be deliberately encouraged by some<br />
influential Arab countries, could have extremely undesirable consequences.<br />
19<br />
One hears yet again in this report the echoes of criticism of Van der Stoel’s<br />
policy of passivity.<br />
The hope of a speedy end to the embargo received a boost by the signing<br />
in Geneva, on January 18, 1974, of a disengagement agreement between<br />
Egypt and Israel. On January 19 and 20, Kissinger subsequently<br />
held discussions with the Jordanian King Hussein and with the Syrian<br />
President Assad. Although after these talks Kissinger spoke positively of<br />
suggestions made by Assad concerning disengagement, there remained<br />
problems over prisoners of war. Syria was not prepared to publish a list of<br />
the names of Israeli prisoners of war. 20<br />
Nevertheless, the situation in the Middle East had markedly improved.<br />
On January 22 Kissinger therefore declared that the Arab countries<br />
should now rescind the embargo measures, which was construed in the<br />
Dutch press as a sign that the embargo would indeed soon be over. But at<br />
the Dutch Foreign Ministry the possibility had been taken into account<br />
from a very early stage that the embargo against the usa might be withdrawn<br />
without lifting the embargo against The Netherlands. On January<br />
12 the Dutch Ambassador in Washington was given the job of urging the<br />
State Department to do everything possible to get the embargo against<br />
the Netherlands ended. Ambassador Van Lynden received an assurance<br />
from Under-Secretary Donaldson that Kissinger had the Dutch interests<br />
‘very much at heart’. 21 Over the following days, however, some Arab<br />
diplomats made it abundantly clear that, should the embargo against the<br />
usa be lifted, it would continue against The Netherlands as long as the<br />
Dutch Cabinet made no explicit call for a complete withdrawal of Israel<br />
from all the occupied territories.<br />
Furthermore, despite all the secrecy over exact figures, it had by this<br />
time become clearer that the embargo had been more or less ineffective. In<br />
early January there was renewed anxiety in the Hague when it became ap-<br />
198
parent that Parisian governing circles were convinced that the oil situation<br />
in The Netherlands was far less serious than represented by the<br />
Dutch government. In this context, some French officials referred to remarks<br />
of such Dutch authorities as the Mayor of Rotterdam, W.<br />
Thomassen. Pompidou had made similar comments at a press conference.<br />
At a New Year’s reception on January 3, the French President jokingly<br />
remarked: ‘On va connaitre la solidarité, car le gaz hollandais va se<br />
solidariser avec le pétrole’, referring of course to the price of natural<br />
gas. 22<br />
In fact, the Dutch Ambassador in Paris, De Ranitz, was not at all sure<br />
how to deal with such talk. 23 He was instructed to make it clear that it<br />
was difficult to judge whether The Netherlands was in a better position<br />
than other ec countries or not. The Dutch government had often called<br />
for a more adequate system of information within the ec, and The Hague<br />
could not be reproached with reluctance to provide comparative information.<br />
In general, the Ambassador should be on the alert for optimistic expectations<br />
of the future; after all, the embargo was still in force. The government<br />
regretted the fact that, because of existing differences within the<br />
ec, the French press should so rapaciously seize on reports of the Dutch<br />
oil supply turning out better than anticipated. It was also regretted – although<br />
this sounded rather hypocritical – that the Dutch media were not<br />
themselves free of a certain Schadenfreude over the problems of supply<br />
that the French were also wrestling with. Referring to the recent price rises,<br />
De Ranitz should stress that oil problems had to be tackled communally.<br />
The ‘autonomous actions’ preferred by Paris had only had adverse, e.g.<br />
price-increasing, consequences. Besides, De Ranitz could point out that<br />
the companies themselves had in fact assumed the responsibility for sharing<br />
out the oil. Had this not been the case, The Netherlands would certainly<br />
have found itself in a far worse situation. But at the same time, he<br />
should point out that the Dutch Cabinet also found it difficult to accept<br />
that, in the absence of any agreement between the governments, this role<br />
should have to be entrusted to the multinationals. As Den Uyl proclaimed<br />
at the end of January: ‘It is unacceptable that private enterprise should determine<br />
where the oil goes to…’ 24<br />
Nonetheless, by the beginning of January, the oil situation in The<br />
Netherlands had not been bad for some time; and as far as other measures<br />
taken against the Dutch were concerned, the situation was now beginning<br />
to improve. For instance, it was reported from Kuwait that trade and<br />
business in the Gulf States no longer experienced any difficulties, although<br />
it had to be said that goodwill was in short supply. 25 Matters were<br />
199
not so clear elsewhere. Some Martinair flights, to Tripoli for example,<br />
were resumed in mid-January, but klm had not yet resumed normal services.<br />
In Libya, Syria and Iraq, the ground staff still refused to provide<br />
ground services for klm, while in Iraq and Egypt several other boycott<br />
measures remained in force. At the beginning of February, the Syrian restrictions<br />
against Dutch shipping and air flights would be lifted; those in<br />
Iraq and Libya, however, were to continue for some time. All considered,<br />
in the judgement of the Dutch Foreign Ministry, the damage suffered by<br />
Dutch trade as a result of The Hague’s stance in the Middle East conflict<br />
remained limited. 26<br />
Oil for Arms<br />
The situation surrounding the oil supply in Western Europe was complicated<br />
in this period from mid-December to February by the attempts of<br />
several countries, certainly after the failure of the Copenhagen Summit,<br />
to secure their own supply of Arab oil through bilateral agreements.<br />
France and Great Britain especially tried to conclude such bilateral agreements,<br />
but Belgium, Italy, Japan and West Germany also had a try. These<br />
moves usually went hand in hand with political statements which went<br />
some way to meeting the Arab standpoint. Furthermore, in the context of<br />
such agreements, the oil purchasers appeared ready to accept remarkably<br />
high prices. In order to limit the consequences of these high prices, Paris<br />
and London tried to strike deals whereby oil would be exchanged for<br />
technology and weapons. To the Dutch way of thinking, bilateral agreements<br />
of this kind had to be categorically rejected as merely serving to<br />
drive up the oil prices.<br />
There had already been reports in The Hague, before Copenhagen, of<br />
the bilateral activities of several non-ec states. Madrid, for example, had<br />
successfully sent a mission to the Arab oil countries. Saudi Arabia, Algeria<br />
and Iraq specifically were to continue normal deliveries to Spain and in<br />
some cases even increase them. Madrid had for some time wanted to reduce<br />
its dependence on the major oil companies by dealing directly with<br />
the producers. The Spanish position with regard to the oil crisis was<br />
much like the French, according to the Dutch Ambassador in Madrid.<br />
The Spanish government was against any action by the consumer countries<br />
that might be construed by the Arab world as ‘ganging up’. 27<br />
Under pressure from their commercial and industrial community, and<br />
from Japanese public opinion, the Japanese government also decided to<br />
200
send a mission, led by Vice Premier Takeo Miki, to various Arab countries.<br />
Japan was 100% dependent on oil imports for its energy, specifically<br />
oil from Iran, which was evident in an Arab-inclined foreign policy. 28<br />
The Japanese mission visited several Arab countries and tried to secure<br />
the oil supply in exchange for economic and technical assistance. In January,<br />
a Japanese-Iranian agreement would be concluded which guaranteed<br />
oil deliveries in exchange for Japanese support in building a joint refinery<br />
and other petrochemical projects. Several days later there followed an<br />
agreement with Iraq, and at the end of January also with Saudi Arabia. 29<br />
On December 21, several days after the failure of the Copenhagen<br />
Summit, the Dutch Ambassador in Paris reported that France was also<br />
engaged in trying to conclude a bilateral deal with Arab countries. The<br />
country mainly concerned was Saudi Arabia. However, it was unclear<br />
whether any credence should be attached to these ‘arms-for-oil’ reports,<br />
which were also starting to be reported in the Dutch press in early January.<br />
30 According to a French spokesman, the delivery had been guaranteed<br />
of 800 million tons of oil over a twenty-year period, in exchange for<br />
technological help and military supplies. 31 American sources were reporting<br />
that only 200 million tons of oil were involved over a three-year<br />
period. This report subsequently turned out to be the more accurate. The<br />
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute later confirmed that a<br />
deal was concluded in December 1973 whereby France would receive 200<br />
million barrels of oil in exchange for 38 Mirage jets, rockets, amx-30<br />
tanks, frigates and minesweepers over three years. 32 But the discussions<br />
with Saudi Arabia of early February 1974, over a long-term agreement,<br />
ran aground.<br />
At the end of January, the Dutch Ambassador in Paris sent word that<br />
there was now also talk of an arrangement between Paris and Kuwait,<br />
providing for oil deliveries for twenty years in exchange for technological<br />
help (in the construction of a nuclear power station). The agreed oil price,<br />
it was said, was probably high. It was later admitted by the French that<br />
the price was on the high side. In Paris, however, such an agreement was<br />
thought preferable to having no agreement at all, when supplies would to<br />
a large extent be dependent on the international oil companies. 33 Initially,<br />
it was denied in Paris that there was any agreement included in this deal to<br />
supply weapons, but of course this was later found to be so. In February<br />
there followed agreements with Iran and Libya, always following the<br />
same pattern of long-term oil supplies in exchange for technology, nuclear<br />
reactors and arms. 34<br />
In The Hague’s view, this approach went hand in hand with radical<br />
201
concessions to the Arab point of view. There was therefore little sympathy<br />
to be expected for the Dutch problems from the French side. De Ranitz reported<br />
that it was highly unlikely that Jobert, in his travels through the<br />
Middle East, would have had anything favourable to say on behalf of The<br />
Netherlands during talks with Arab members of government.<br />
Such would not be wholly in keeping with the idea, also entertained by<br />
President Pompidou, that France must now capitalise on their acknowledged<br />
pro-Arab policy, so unpopular with the French people but pursued<br />
by their government for many years.<br />
The question of the embargo against The Netherlands, in the French<br />
view, had to be resolved within the context of a European-Arab rapprochement.<br />
35<br />
It was not only the French who were trying to follow the bilateral route<br />
to securing their oil supplies. The British were at it, too, although they<br />
were doing so with rather less ambitious aims than the French, who were<br />
advocating a European-Arab political rapprochement. For the British it<br />
was solely a question of oil. On January 4, Gevers, the Dutch Ambassador<br />
in London, following a conversation with Under-Secretary Taylor,<br />
reported that Great Britain and Saudi Arabia were going to conclude a<br />
deal involving the supply of thirty million tons of oil per year in exchange<br />
for machines and arms. Taylor emphasized that no agreement had so far<br />
been reached, but that it could well materialise. At that moment, moreover,<br />
a British mission was on its way to Iran. He admitted that this bilateral<br />
approach could lead to playing off one industrialised country against<br />
another, but the alternative was buying by auction, with enormous price<br />
rises as a consequence. Furthermore, the oil-producing countries would<br />
shortly assume a far greater share in oil production, as a result of which<br />
the Western countries would be forced to negotiate bilateral agreements.<br />
The British government absolutely did not want to put the majors offside,<br />
but there was now simply no alternative to bilateral oil diplomacy. 36<br />
Later supplementary reports of British oil diplomacy followed, which<br />
incidentally paid more attention to the anti-Dutch embargo than had the<br />
French. The mission to Iran had been promising, in spite of Japanese competition,<br />
but talks in Saudi Arabia had come to nothing. In the case of<br />
Iran, five to six million tons of oil extra in 1974 had been discussed, in exchange<br />
for the supply of such basic industrial materials as paper, steel, cement<br />
and textile fibres of a total value of 240 million dollars. The Iranian<br />
deliveries were achieved through extra production, not to be deducted<br />
202
from normally available quantities. The British appeared not to pay a<br />
higher price than was asked of the oil companies, which the French certainly<br />
had. This transaction was labelled by the Americans as ‘aggressive<br />
bilateralism’ and condemned as ‘naïve and dangerous’. 37 Shell, of course,<br />
also regarded all these bilateral activities with cynicism and distrust. The<br />
British director of Shell Transport and Trading, Frank MacFadzean, ironically<br />
observed:<br />
Delegations and emissaries, politicians and friends of politicians, most<br />
of them with little knowledge of the oil business, descended on the Middle<br />
East like a latter day plague of near Biblical proportions. 38<br />
The end of January brought Yamani and Abdessalam on another visit to<br />
Western European countries, an occasion of further European-Arab rapprochement,<br />
this time involving Italy and West Germany. The West German<br />
government also tried to come to some barter arrangement with<br />
Arab countries, which included the prospect of the sale of Leopard tanks.<br />
This was tied to concessions to the Arab political standpoint. As was later<br />
to be revealed, the West German Foreign Minister Scheel, who on January<br />
1, 1974, succeeded his Danish colleague as the new chairman of the<br />
European Community, sent a letter to Yamani and Abdessalam which<br />
(according to the Dutch Ambassador De Beus) went further than the declaration<br />
of the Nine. Bonn may have recognised in this letter the possibility<br />
of border changes, but declared that extending territories through the<br />
use of force was no longer possible in our time. So long as it remained impossible<br />
to reach any other voluntary agreement, a peace settlement<br />
would have to be based on a total end to the occupation of foreign territories<br />
and thus a complete withdrawal of foreign troops. One had to base<br />
any accord on the borders existing before 1967. No peace accord could be<br />
possible without settling the Palestinian question, which was not to be<br />
understood as purely a problem of refugees. 39 It was afterwards concluded<br />
in The Hague that the Bonn government too had been prepared ‘to<br />
prostrate themselves just to please the Arab countries’. 40 At the end of<br />
January, a cooperation agreement was signed between West Germany<br />
and Iran worth 2.2 billion dollars. 41<br />
The Arab Oil Ministers’ visit also set the Italian government in motion.<br />
The Prime Minister Aldo Moro told the Senate on January 23 that<br />
Israel must pay the price for peace and secure borders: unconditional and<br />
complete withdrawal from the occupied territories. This was how Rome<br />
came halfway to meet the Arab demand for a further, more explicit,<br />
203
standpoint than that voiced by the declaration of November 6, a demand<br />
which Moro had up till then refused. According to the Dutch Ambassador<br />
in Rome, this U-turn was the result of pressure from Moro’s fellow<br />
party member Fanfani, who in contrast to the ‘European’ Moro belonged<br />
to the ‘Mediterranean’ school. Perhaps the oil-grabbing trips of the<br />
French and the British had also given Moro pause for new thoughts on the<br />
matter. 42 In fact, in February agreements were struck with Libya and<br />
with Saudi Arabia. A trip undertaken by Moro to several other Arab<br />
countries shortly afterwards, however, was without further success. But<br />
in June yet another accord was signed with Iran over cooperation in the<br />
field of energy. 43<br />
The Netherlands emphatically rejected this bilateral oil diplomacy.<br />
Such activities not only undermined any possibility of communal policymaking<br />
within the ec, as Van der Stoel told the Dutch Council of Ministers,<br />
they also thwarted American attempts to reach a peace settlement.<br />
European countries, France above all, were now even providing the Arabs<br />
with weapons. 44 This did not obscure the fact that interested Dutch concerns<br />
were urging a comparable, more active involvement in the Middle<br />
East. A highly placed official of klm thus suggested that Van der Stoel<br />
should visit several Arab countries, such as Syria, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi<br />
Arabia, but the latter was as resolutely unreceptive to the idea as usual.<br />
There was furthermore another complication, according to Van der Stoel:<br />
Of course, for my part, were a visit to Arab countries to be considered, I<br />
should then also be obliged out of the need for balance to think of paying<br />
a visit to Israel, which only complicates the whole affair. 45<br />
Van der Stoel did, however, consider contacting Arab colleagues in the<br />
lobbies of the un at the coming session of the General Assembly.<br />
The Dutch Foreign Minister thus maintained his reserved stance, certainly<br />
reserved in comparison with most of his ec counterparts. It was<br />
not only some of those whose economic interests were at stake who<br />
queried this attitude; in the Council of Ministers, too, doubts could sometimes<br />
be heard voiced over Van der Stoel’s categorical rejection of bilateral<br />
diplomacy. For example, on February 1, Minister for Economic Affairs<br />
Lubbers warned against a too absolute condemnation of bilateral agreements,<br />
for The Netherlands too could find itself forced to take the bilateral<br />
route in order to secure its oil supply. 46<br />
In fact, the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs was inclined to follow<br />
the example of the other ec member states. At this stage, in line with Lub-<br />
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ers’s construction of the situation, the Ministry of Economic Affairs<br />
was considering the possibilities of improving bilateral economic contacts<br />
with the oil-producing countries. But this conflicted with Foreign<br />
Ministry policy. Nevertheless, it was on record that various ec countries<br />
had already made arrangements to the effect that oil deliveries had been<br />
agreed in exchange for ‘compensatory transactions’, which in the case of<br />
Britain, France and West Germany included supplying weapons. In the<br />
view of Economic Affairs, a prompt stand by The Hague was essential ‘if<br />
we were not to wake up and find we had missed the boat, because already<br />
some Western countries had stolen a lead on us’. One of the possibilities<br />
discussed in this context was the use of development aid, though it was<br />
assumed that such an approach would be blocked by objections from<br />
Minister for Development Cooperation Pronk, 47 who was indeed in total<br />
disagreement with Lubbers in the Council of Ministers. The oil problem,<br />
in Pronk’s view, had to be resolved in a multilateral framework so that the<br />
developing countries could also be involved. 48<br />
An Invitation from Nixon<br />
In Copenhagen the ec countries could not agree on a common Middle<br />
East policy. Neither had it been found possible to put in train a communal<br />
policy regarding oil and energy provision. Moreover, several ec countries<br />
had by then become entangled in attempts to secure their own oil supply<br />
by bilateral negotiations. There were accordingly powerful centrifugal<br />
tendencies apparent within the ec; and not only within the ec, but<br />
throughout the entire Western world.<br />
Shortly before the European Summit, the American government had<br />
called for talks between consumer countries. In his December 12 address<br />
to the Pilgrims Society in London, Kissinger had warned against achieving<br />
European unity at the cost of the Atlantic alliance. There had to be a<br />
unified effort by theWesterncountriestofindacommonsolutiontothe<br />
energy problem. The usa could only withgreatdifficultyrealisesuchasolution<br />
through her own power, and an isolated Europe would find it completely<br />
impossible. For this reason he had proposed that the usa,Canada,<br />
Western Europe and Japan should set up a Joint Energy Action Group. 49<br />
Against the background outlined above, this initiative appeared to be<br />
aimed as much against unilateral West European moves as against the development<br />
of an omnipotent opec cartel (with the concomitant danger<br />
of steeply rising oil prices). In a conversation in The Hague between the<br />
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Department for Economic Cooperation (des) and Shell representatives,<br />
it was assumed that Kissinger had indeed two concerns in mind, viz. the<br />
danger of further bilateral agreements with producer countries, and the<br />
risk that the opec success would lead to comparative initiatives for other<br />
basic materials. 50 Kissinger himself later wrote that the initiative was<br />
mainly an attempt to thwart the bilateral activities of certain West European<br />
countries. 51<br />
As he explained in the Council of Ministers, Van der Stoel took a positive<br />
attitude to the initiative, despite all the complications. Immediately<br />
after Kissinger’s speech, he had ordered his civil servants to look into the<br />
American proposal. In consultation with the Ministry of Economic Affairs,<br />
a mixed workgroup was assembled to work out a course of action.<br />
The topic of discussion at the first meeting of this workgroup was more<br />
effective international cooperation in the field of energy. There were three<br />
areas where this could happen. In the first place, through the co-ordination<br />
of national measures to cut back on energy use; secondly, by stimulating<br />
the exploration of oil and gas and the development of alternative<br />
energy sources; and thirdly, by encouraging producers to expand the supply<br />
of oil and gas in order to tide over the interim period before alternative<br />
energy sources were adequately available. One option was to get the producers<br />
to invest their profits in alternative energy sources, which could<br />
also secure their own future once the age of oil was past.<br />
In any case, the workgroup concluded, what had to be prevented was<br />
that the American plan should simply sink in the boggy swamps of the<br />
ec. 52 In fact, the Kissinger plan rapidly led to open dissension within the<br />
ec. At the beginning of January, it is safe to say, the Dutch and British<br />
standpoints over Kissinger’s proposed ‘energy group’ did not significantly<br />
differ, but it was entirely otherwise with the French. Paris strongly preferred<br />
talks between consumer and producer countries in which the poorer<br />
developing countries would be directly involved. Kissinger’s proposal,<br />
on the contrary, came down to discussions between consumer countries,<br />
with the producer countries excluded. But the French point of view was<br />
not entirely clear: the exact wording of Kissinger’s initiative, according<br />
to De Ranitz, could be important. 53<br />
On January 9, 1974, Den Uyl received an invitation from Nixon which<br />
included a copy of Kissinger’s text with its exact wording. The aim of the<br />
conference, Nixon explained, was to construct a common position regarding<br />
the energy question. The Netherlands was therefore invited ‘as a<br />
first step’ to a gathering of Foreign Ministers from the ‘major industrial<br />
consumer nations’ that would be held on February 11 in Washington. The<br />
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Ministers’ job would be to put together a task force ‘drawn from the consuming<br />
countries which would formulate a consumer action programme’.<br />
The objective was the solution of those problems that had arisen as a<br />
result of the explosive growth of the world-wide energy demand, including<br />
the search for alternative sources; in addition a ‘concerted consumer<br />
position’ had to be developed<br />
for a new era of petroleum consumer-producer relations which would<br />
meet the legitimate interests of oil producing countries while assuring<br />
the consumer countries adequate supplies at fair and reasonable prices.<br />
The interests of the developing countries must at the same time also be<br />
kept in mind. After ninety days, a further meeting of ‘consumer and producer<br />
representatives’ should be held. Nixon mentioned that a simultaneous<br />
letter had been sent to the opec capitals, announcing and elucidating<br />
the American proposal. In the first instance, among the ec countries only<br />
Great Britain, West Germany, France, Italy, Norway and The Netherlands<br />
had received an invitation, as well as Canada and Japan. Bonn,<br />
charged with the chairmanship of the ec, was asked how the other countries<br />
should be represented. 54<br />
In The Hague, a session of the Foreign Ministry-Economic Affairs<br />
workgroup was held on January 9 to discuss Kissinger’s call for multilateral<br />
talks, a meeting which concluded that Nixon’s invitation should receive<br />
a positive response as promptly as possible. The workgroup had<br />
meanwhile come to the conclusion that the objectives of international<br />
talks in Washington had to be as pragmatic and as concrete as possible.<br />
The workgroup argued<br />
that the consumer countries represented there should not attempt to realise<br />
a complete, fully worked-out standpoint regarding the energy crisis,<br />
since this would take much too long.<br />
Consultations with the producer countries should be begun promptly, because<br />
this could possibly ‘put a brake on the trend of consumer and producer<br />
countries negotiating separate deals, as well as autonomous actions<br />
by producers.’ In addition, developing countries should also be drawn<br />
into these talks between consumer and producer countries as soon as possible.<br />
55<br />
On this point, there were considerable differences of opinion within<br />
the ec. Some ec countries, France specifically, were first of all striving for<br />
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negotiations between the ec and the producers. The Netherlands wanted<br />
such talks to follow from the Washington Conference, so that the usa<br />
would also be present. As far as the ec’s role was concerned, it had to be a<br />
case of translating global arrangements into communal ec policy. But, as<br />
was clearly realised by the Dutch Foreign Ministry, this principle was entirely<br />
counter to French policy. 56<br />
Despite all differences of opinion, an attempt was made to reach a<br />
common ec position at the Washington Conference. In preparation for<br />
this conference, the European Commission made a number of proposals,<br />
but the Dutch Foreign Ministry doubted whether such ec discussion was<br />
necessary or sensible. There was growing resentment within the Ministry<br />
over the role of some ec partners. After all, the ec partners had seen no<br />
need for joint consultations in their bilateral dealings over oil. 57 Van der<br />
Stoel shared this scepticism. To put this surliness of the Dutch attitude<br />
into context, it has to be remembered that at that time not all ec countries<br />
had been invited. Only the major consumer countries had been approached<br />
by Nixon. Only at a later stage would all the ec member states<br />
be involved.<br />
On January 10 the Ministerial Council for European Affairs discussed<br />
the question of possible ec preliminary consultation. Van der Stoel<br />
warned of American frustration if the ec countries responded to Nixon’s<br />
invitation by stalling until they could first reach a common standpoint.<br />
The Netherlands should straightforwardly accept the invitation. However,<br />
Under-Secretary for European Affairs Brinkhorst thought that The<br />
Netherlands would place itself in an incredible position if it by-passed<br />
communal ec deliberations, a point of view endorsed by Den Uyl. The<br />
Council for European Affairs voted accordingly. 58 On January 10, various<br />
diplomatic outposts were informed that the Cabinet welcomed<br />
Nixon’s initiative. The Hague shared the President’s view that the Washington<br />
Conference should be followed promptly by talks between consumer<br />
and producer countries, talks in which the developing countries<br />
should also be involved. 59<br />
This was the standpoint more or less agreed on. However, during the<br />
Dutch Council of Ministers of January 11, it emerged that Minister<br />
Pronk had principle objections to the Washington Conference, which he<br />
considered a manoeuvre to exclude not only the oil-producing but more<br />
especially the developing countries. He preferred direct talks between<br />
consumers and producers, in which the developing countries must be involved,<br />
as advocated by the French. Despite Pronk’s objections, however,<br />
the Cabinet agreed to accept Nixon’s invitation. 60 Given the wording of<br />
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Van der Stoel’s earlier circular, there was in fact no option.<br />
A meeting of ec Foreign Ministers was held in Brussels on January 15<br />
at which the Nine were to work out a common standpoint for the Washington<br />
Conference. At first, it looked as though agreement would be unlikely:<br />
Belgium and Denmark both had reservations over the American<br />
initiative because, like Ireland and Luxembourg, they had not been invited.<br />
As regards this criticism, all ec Member states plus the oecd Secretary-General<br />
were subsequently invited. During the discussion, Jobert<br />
initially resisted a joint acceptance of the American invitation, which<br />
hardly came as a surprise, since the French government had already indicated<br />
that it found the meeting in Washington neither expedient nor desirable.<br />
It was clear that in several respects the basic assumptions of the<br />
conference were in conflict with the French Middle East and oil policy.<br />
In Brussels, Van der Stoel’s stance was one of strong support for the<br />
American initiative. Rather opportunistically, he observed that the invitation<br />
could have a very positive effect in stimulating the search for a<br />
common ec energy policy. Of course, it was not so simple; but after<br />
laboured discussions agreement was eventually reached. All ec member<br />
states should be able to participate in the Washington Conference, and in<br />
addition the chairmen of the ec and the European Commission, Scheel<br />
and Ortoli, should also participate, on behalf of the ec as a whole. The<br />
intention was that the Committee of Permanent Representatives should<br />
work out a common standpoint on the basis of proposals from the Commission.<br />
That was to prove difficult. Jobert remained fiercely opposed to<br />
the Washington Conference and said as much in a letter to Kissinger. The<br />
French attitude to the plan was subsequently described by Kissinger as a<br />
‘lack of enthusiasm bordering on hostility’. 61<br />
French Obstruction<br />
As a result of French opposition, but also because of the sometimes less<br />
than thorough preparation on the part of the Americans, it remained for<br />
a long time unclear what exactly was going to happen in Washington.<br />
On January 18,aconversation took place in The Hague between Foreign<br />
Ministry officials and representatives from Shell, who reported that<br />
there were by now some seven working groups set up to look into the<br />
various aspects of the oil crisis. Their reports were to be ready by January<br />
23 and would provide the groundwork for a round trip by Under-<br />
Secretary Donaldson, who would inform the participant countries as to<br />
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the agenda. 62 Even the Dutch embassy in Washington sent word back to<br />
The Hague of the intended Donaldson trip; but in the event, it never took<br />
place.<br />
On February 1, Van der Stoel received an aide-mémoire from the us<br />
Ambassador in The Netherlands with the proposals for the Washington<br />
Conference, which were in fact already known in The Hague in outline.<br />
On February 8 a preliminary meeting of high officials would be held under<br />
Donaldson’s leadership. With reference to the American proposal to<br />
discuss the economic and monetary aspects in separate workgroups, Van<br />
der Stoel said that Finance Minister Duisenberg would willingly come.<br />
Ambassador Gould emphasized that his government would find it regrettable<br />
if at this stage, through informal contacts with Arab countries, basic<br />
principles began to be established that anticipated the outcome of<br />
Washington. His government, he said, attached great importance to<br />
avoiding ruinous competition. These were known views, thoroughly endorsed<br />
by Van der Stoel. He pledged to prevent damaging ec initiatives,<br />
but warned that other ec member states had other ideas on this. 63<br />
It also emerged from the American aide-mémoire that no immediate<br />
discussions between consumers and producers, so devoutly desired by<br />
The Hague, were on the agenda. Van der Stoel spoke his mind on this in<br />
Dutch ministerial council, complaining more generally of the inadequate<br />
preparations. He had been unable to get any clarity on the agenda of the<br />
energy conference. On the one hand, it was about analysing the energy<br />
situation, on the other, a question of what could be done between countries<br />
with energy problems in order to master those problems. There was<br />
also uncertainty over the role of the ec. Paris had not yet responded, and<br />
it was very much in question whether the ec could come forward with a<br />
common standpoint. 64<br />
Indeed, it turned out to be very difficult to formulate a common standpoint.<br />
This was already evident during the discussions of the Committee<br />
of Permanent Representatives. The Dutch pr had received instructions to<br />
strike a positive attitude and especially to emphasise the need for reasonable<br />
and stable price developments, and for this reason the necessity of refraining<br />
from bilateral actions that drove up prices. The French pr, however,<br />
took a contrary stance, insisting that the main issue for discussion<br />
were the objectives of the Washington Conference. He declared that in his<br />
view the problems were of a world-wide nature and therefore should be<br />
discussed in a world-wide context. In the meantime, France had therefore<br />
taken the initiative of raising the problem for discussion within the un. 65<br />
The French pr also stressed that the Community had its own responsi-<br />
210
ility with regard to relations with producer countries. This appeal for an<br />
independent European energy policy was going too far for London,<br />
which up to that point had supported Paris. The British pr, Michael Palliser,<br />
emphasized that the great problem of energy could not be resolved<br />
without cooperation with the usa. London was therefore no advocate of<br />
a European ‘go-it-alone’ policy. 66 It was clear that Great Britain and<br />
France had reached fundamentally opposite positions on this issue.<br />
Subsequently, the Dutch Ambassador in Paris, De Ranitz, reported<br />
that the French Director-General for Political Affairs, Puaux, believed<br />
that Western Europe needed to make itself independent for its own energy<br />
requirements, which in the first place would have to take place through<br />
closer European-Arab cooperation. The French obstruction of the Washington<br />
Conference was partly aimed at making clear to the Arab countries<br />
that Europe distanced itself from American policy in the Middle<br />
East. Puaux considered the whole meeting part of a new American plan to<br />
re-exert its dominance over Western Europe again, after the failure of its<br />
‘Year of Europe’. As far as talks with the producer countries were concerned,<br />
Puaux confirmed that France had in the meantime contacted the<br />
un Secretary-General, Waldheim, with the proposal to raise the oil problem<br />
for discussion under un auspices. 67<br />
These developments within the ec were met with cynicism in the<br />
Dutch press. Trouw commented that rough play was increasingly getting<br />
the upper hand.<br />
The European Community has already been playing in injury time for<br />
the past month or more: an unmistakable sign of European rough play<br />
… – It all raises the strong suspicion that the term ‘European Community’<br />
is gradually becoming little more than a flag on a farm barge sinking<br />
in a pool of nationalism and self-interest. 68<br />
On February 5, nonetheless, a communal mandate was drafted for the ec<br />
delegation, in which ample concession was made to the French objections.<br />
Thus, no permanent consultative arrangement should be set up between<br />
consumer countries, as the Americans wanted. A confrontation between<br />
consumer and producer countries must at all cost be avoided. The<br />
tone of this French-oriented mandate clearly indicated a preference for resolving<br />
oil problems through direct contact with the producer countries,<br />
for which purpose a permanent dialogue needed to be established. 69<br />
Van der Stoel remarked afterwards that the result actually suited him<br />
better than he might have expected, given the negative French attitude.<br />
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Although the effort to reach bilateral agreements was not clearly repudiated,<br />
there had been agreement that countries should not take separate<br />
measures that could seriously damage international trade. And although<br />
the conference must not become a permanent consultative body, the possibility<br />
of working groups remained open. 70<br />
All in all, the Cabinet was generally positive over the American initiative.<br />
There were, of course, second thoughts over the Nixon government’s<br />
attitude, as on a number of other grounds (finances, trade, etc.).<br />
Such thoughts were voiced by the Dutch oecd Secretary-General Van<br />
Lennep, who confessed himself pessimistic over the conference and had<br />
doubts about the way that Nixon was fulfilling his executive role. He<br />
thought the invitations had been sent out without any prior consultation;<br />
the climate had only been worsened by Kissinger’s criticisms of the<br />
French, although in his judgement the American presentation required a<br />
solid consumer front; and furthermore, the us approach had so far bypassed<br />
what Van Lennep saw as essential: the immediate beginning of discussions<br />
with the oil-producing countries over the long-term substitution<br />
price for oil. Finally, he had the impression that there was a bilateral<br />
American action afoot, with the help of private banking, to stimulate investment<br />
in the usa. This could be disastrous, since it only made the recycling<br />
of oil capital to countries most in need of it more difficult. 71<br />
Deliberations in European Political Cooperation<br />
The American attempt to take the lead once more in the field of energy<br />
provision had its impact on the Dutch government’s attitude toward the<br />
oil crisis. This was evident, for example, in their handling of their own<br />
proposal for providing aid to the Middle East. This plan, of which there is<br />
scarcely a trace to be found in the Dutch Foreign Ministry archives, was<br />
undoubtedly intended, at least in part, to win Arab appreciation. It had<br />
been briefly raised during the Summit, but it had been decided in short order<br />
to refer it to the Comité Politique (of European Political Cooperation).<br />
After Copenhagen, doubts began to gain currency at the Foreign<br />
Ministry as to whether it was so sensible after all to press ahead with the<br />
proposal. Van der Stoel stated that, in any case, the American initiatives<br />
had to be taken into account when presenting the proposal. It should not<br />
be seized on simply to frustrate European cooperation. At the Foreign<br />
Ministry it was decided on January 4 to defer publication of the plan until<br />
February. The Dutch embassies in ec member states were informed that<br />
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the Director-General for Political Affairs, Van Lynden, would suggest in<br />
the Comité Politique that the proposal be postponed. 72<br />
But it was not such a simple matter to drop the plan. Furthermore, it<br />
emerged that there were considerable differences of opinion within the<br />
Comité Politique, specifically between The Netherlands and France, over<br />
the details of the plan. The French dgpa proposed limiting cooperation<br />
to the Arab countries and excluding Israel. In addition, consultations<br />
should have a predominantly political character. The Comité Politique<br />
drafted a compromise that would go some way to satisfying both Dutch<br />
and French conceptions. Even so, there were serious qualms at the Dutch<br />
Foreign Ministry, because the plan now threatened to pre-empt the outcome<br />
of the Washington Conference. It was decided to ask the European<br />
Commission to develop the aid plan further, which would gain a bit of<br />
time. Furthermore, ‘non-Arab countries’ also had to be involved in the cooperation<br />
between the Nine and the Middle East.<br />
The Hague made no more fuss about the plan, though of course it remained<br />
an attractive proposition to win favour in the Arab world. On<br />
January 21 Van der Stoel gave the Dutch diplomatic posts in the Arab<br />
countries permission to make known the outlines of the plan where occasion<br />
arose. Ambassador Bentinck immediately warned that this could<br />
backfire, as the plan referred to the whole region and could therefore be<br />
considered as an attempt to provide support for Israel via a roundabout<br />
route. It was a warning the Dutch Foreign Ministry took to heart. 73<br />
The question of the aid plan became increasingly dominated by the<br />
French effort to bring about a dialogue that would be both economically<br />
and politically oriented, an effort regarded by The Hague with great distrust.<br />
But this notwithstanding, the French managed to achieve an important<br />
success in January in the context of European Political Cooperation.<br />
During a session of the epc Middle East working group, it emerged that<br />
West Germany was prepared to support the French proposal for joining a<br />
European-Arab dialogue. Paris wanted to begin at the level of experts and<br />
later to let this turn into a conference of Foreign Ministers. 74 Bonn probably<br />
hoped by adopting a more accommodating attitude to get Paris to<br />
participate in Washington. The Netherlands, however, like Denmark,<br />
had serious objections to the French proposal. According to The Hague,<br />
such a dialogue could damage already existing forms of cooperation, as<br />
well as the peace talks in Geneva. The Netherlands argued for this affair<br />
to be dealt with in the ministerial discussions of February 14 and 15,<br />
which in effect meant postponing it until after Washington. And furthermore,<br />
it meant taking the matter out of the official framework of epc.<br />
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But most ec members followed a proposal from the European Commission,<br />
which argued for a joint venture of the ec and epc,inwhichthe<br />
ec would take care of the economic content and epc would look after the<br />
political share. The Netherlands was the sole member state with objections<br />
to such a construction, while most others were very much in favour<br />
of getting on with it and saw no problem in simultaneous preparations for<br />
both the Washington Conference and the European-Arab dialogue. On<br />
February 7,theDutchdgpa Van Lyndenreconciled himself to the majority<br />
view, but not before a certain qualifying spin had been introduced into<br />
the decision, which implied that it had avoided ‘the Nine already committing<br />
themselves too firmly at the present stage to modalitiesandtimetables’.<br />
To the displeasure of The Netherlands, the suggestion that the<br />
American government be informed of the planned dialogue was blocked<br />
by Paris.<br />
Once again, The Netherlands found itself playing a tricky Atlantic<br />
role. As we saw earlier, the American Ambassador Gould had made it<br />
clear to Van der Stoel that his government was concerned over the development<br />
of European-Arab relations. At the time, Van der Stoel had said<br />
that he would resist any attempts to thwart the conference in Washington.<br />
This would prove to be no idle promise, although The Hague was in<br />
no position to block the European-Arab dialogue, which would have<br />
done the Dutch reputation no good at all – it had been discovered earlier<br />
that the contents of epc discussions were promptly leaked to the press.<br />
But at least The Hague contributed to the postponing of the decision.<br />
Much to the Dutch satisfaction, the epc meeting of February 14 was adjourned<br />
until March 4. 75<br />
The Washington Conference<br />
There was a great deal at stake, but the outcome of the meeting would be<br />
disappointing. The conference took place under poor auspices. In general,<br />
American-European relations at the time were not exactly characterised<br />
by high mutual esteem; while Jobert had on various occasions<br />
made it quite clear that he had little confidence in any useful outcome. 76<br />
The reaction in most Middle Eastern countries was, predictably, to repudiate<br />
the conference. The gathering was seen, especially by the more radical<br />
countries like Algeria and Libya, as an American attempt to organise a<br />
block of rich consumer countries against the oil-producing countries and<br />
the Third World. 77 Algeria had in the meantime proposed dealing with<br />
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energy problems in a special session of the un General Assembly.<br />
A heavyweight Dutch delegation made the trip to Washington, consisting<br />
of Van der Stoel, Duisenberg and Lubbers, as well as several high<br />
officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Economic Affairs and Finance.<br />
It was uncertain till the last moment whether Lubbers would go,<br />
largely because of his involvement in a road accident in The Netherlands.<br />
78<br />
The conference was opened by the hosts. In his opening address,<br />
Kissinger proposed setting up a ‘semi-permanent’ co-ordinating group to<br />
see to preparations for a second consumers’ conference. At a subsequent<br />
stage, a world energy conference that also involved the producer countries<br />
would have to be convened. 79 Van der Stoel was the first non-American<br />
invited to speak, undoubtedly an intentional gesture of appreciation<br />
for his stance. 80 In his address, during which he only incidentally referred<br />
to the embargo, he pointed out the scale of the consequences the oil crisis<br />
had had. Solutions had to be found that were acceptable to all countries.<br />
Although an increase in oil prices was justified, an escalation of prices<br />
could destroy the entire structure of the international economy. And that<br />
was not the aim. The developed countries must resist the temptation to<br />
think too much of themselves. The Netherlands was therefore an emphatic<br />
opponent of bilateral oil diplomacy. Some way of finding a common solution<br />
must be found ‘to increase the flow of assistance’ to the non-oilproducing,<br />
developing countries. Van der Stoel’s address signalled support<br />
for the American plans, but not in their entirety. In fact, he specifically<br />
welcomed the Algerian plan for a special session of the General Assembly,<br />
and he omitted any supportive reference to Kissinger’s proposal<br />
for a follow-up consumers’ conference. 81<br />
After this, the conference progressed with difficulty, first and foremost<br />
caused by the surly, uncooperative attitude of the French. The signs were<br />
initially not so grim; the French government had at the last moment decided<br />
to let Jobert set out, although Pompidou had forbidden his Minister<br />
of Finance, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, to accompany him. Jobert, whom<br />
Pompidou referred to as ‘mon Kissinger à moi’, tried to prevent any form<br />
of practical decision-making and refused to have anything to do with a<br />
follow-up conference. 82<br />
The European split on the issue of energy now came into the spotlight.<br />
The British standpoint had in the meantime moved in the American direction.<br />
West Germany, then holding the ec chairmanship, was also prepared<br />
to go a long way to meet the Americans. Increasingly, France was<br />
finding itself isolated. 83 Jobert accused his European colleagues of adopt-<br />
215
ing a far too docile attitude toward the Americans and at one point even<br />
saluted them with ‘Bonjour les traitres’. No punches were pulled within<br />
the closed doors of the internal ec consultations, the clashes between<br />
Jobert and Helmut Schmidt being particularly bruising. 84 The West German<br />
Minister of Finance, who because of Scheel’s role as ec Chairman<br />
was leading the West German delegation, took an outspokenly Atlantic<br />
position, emphasizing that relations with Washington were more important<br />
for Bonn than those with the European Community. 85<br />
Jobert refused at the end to sign the final communiqué, but nonetheless<br />
voted for the setting up of a high-level group to implement the various<br />
agreements reached. These included further study of the global energy situation,<br />
cooperation in monetary and economic areas, and ‘the development<br />
of a cooperative multilateral relationship’ between producer and<br />
consumer countries. This high-level group, soon to be known as the Energy<br />
Co-ordinating Group (or ecg) had furthermore the task of making<br />
arrangements for a new conference, involving both consumer and producer<br />
countries. 86 Van der Stoel considered the result an American success;<br />
but the Americans had had to make concessions, as the communiqué<br />
showed. There would thus be no follow-up conference to be held solely<br />
between consumer countries, as Kissinger had wanted; and the Algerian<br />
initiative for a special session of the un was welcomed, partly due to the<br />
insistence of the Dutch. This was something else Kissinger would rather<br />
not have seen. 87 Where the Americans did chalk up a result, however, was<br />
in sharpening the oppositions within the ec. Nixon and Kissinger had<br />
aimed ‘to shock Western Europe back into line behind Washington’, although<br />
in this they had only partly succeeded. 88 Certainly, France’s position<br />
had been weakened.<br />
In the Dutch Council of Ministers, Van der Stoel later described the<br />
conference as mainly of ‘procedural’ character, noting that Jobert had<br />
played an obstructive role. The French, of course, had wanted to keep<br />
open the possibility of bilateral agreements. Paris had also tried to ensure<br />
an exclusive role for Europe in the Middle East, while the usa, as the<br />
Dutch Foreign Minister put it, wanted ‘global consultation’. In any case,<br />
The Netherlands had avoided giving any impression of heading for a confrontation<br />
with the Arab countries. Van der Stoel had for this reason also<br />
been positive over the Algerian proposal to raise the whole oil problem for<br />
discussion at a special session of the un.<br />
This latter remark about the Algerian proposal aroused differences of<br />
opinion in the Council of Ministers. Pronk, with support from Den Uyl,<br />
stressed the importance of the special session of the General Assembly.<br />
216
Lubbers disagreed. In his view, the oil-consuming countries would do better<br />
to organise themselves. He was therefore not so keen on a special un<br />
session where, he felt, because of the nature of the context, the oil problem<br />
would be pushed into the background. 89<br />
After the conference, ‘Washington’ was extensively analysed in a<br />
Dutch Foreign Ministry note sent both to the Council of Ministers and to<br />
several diplomatic posts abroad. According to this evaluation, the American<br />
initiative was intended to strengthen the position of the consumer<br />
countries; yet at the same time the conference had had a strongly political<br />
character. Four distinct political aspects were identified, There was firstly<br />
‘the European-American relationship’, the subject of an intense struggle<br />
within the ec, specifically between France and the other member states.<br />
Paris saw the summit as an American attempt to gain more influence over<br />
the energy policies of the ec countries and over their relations with the<br />
Arab oil producers. Jobert fiercely resisted these attempts, which if successful<br />
would be at the cost of European independence.<br />
In this controversy, faced with a choice between a European unity which<br />
in this field scarcely exists and accepting the cooperation offered by the<br />
usa, France’s partners in the event opted for the side of the United<br />
States. The West Germans above all, through Scheel and Schmidt, made<br />
these political aspects a central issue.<br />
This was not to say that the remaining eight member states agreed with<br />
all the American proposals in Washington. At the Dutch insistence, the<br />
initiative for a special session of the General Assembly was welcomed in<br />
the final communiqué, although ‘Kissinger was only reluctantly prepared<br />
to accept this’. But taken as a whole, on this issue the outcome of the conference<br />
was most satisfactory for the Americans.<br />
The second aspect concerned ‘relations within the ec’. The ec countries<br />
had gone to Washington with a mandate that was both unclear and<br />
incomplete. As a result, it had been once again evident that, as long as<br />
there was no advance toward internal integration, the Nine were in no<br />
position to conduct any clear foreign policy in the wider world. The conference<br />
had only served to intensify the crisis atmosphere in Brussels. The<br />
third question was ‘the relations with the Arab oil producers’. No-one desired<br />
a further confrontation with them, and for this reason a further<br />
ministerial conference involving exclusively consumer countries, such as<br />
the Americans had wanted, was undesirable. To what extent the Arabs<br />
would consider the proposed follow-up conference of producers and con-<br />
217
sumers a confrontation was unclear. In any case, it was highly uncertain<br />
that they would be prepared to participate in such a follow-up.<br />
Finally, there was ‘the position of the developing countries’. The Washington<br />
participants had all pledged to exert themselves seriously to maintain<br />
and to expand development aid. The question, however, was how the<br />
developing countries could be involved in an effective capacity in the follow-up<br />
talks. It was in this context that the progress of the proposed General<br />
Assembly was so important.<br />
The conclusion was that The Netherlands positively valued the tasks<br />
assigned to the Energy Co-ordinating Group, which could be expected to<br />
provide an effective framework for consultation between like-minded<br />
consumer countries. It was regrettable that the ec as such was unable to<br />
contribute to this consultation process so long as Paris remained aloof.<br />
TheNetherlands had to continue its efforts within the Energy Co-ordinating<br />
Group to bring about talks between theproducersand consumers of<br />
oil, talks in which the developing countries must also be involved. These<br />
consultations would eventually have to leadtoaskeletonagreementthat<br />
could promote a stable supply of oil to the consumer countries and, at the<br />
same time, guarantee reasonable, stable and predictable prices. 90<br />
Conclusion<br />
In the two months from mid-December to mid-February there were various<br />
shifts in the political force field generated by the oil crisis. In addition,<br />
there were new, fundamental questions that demanded attention: for example,<br />
in what international framework should matters of oil and energy<br />
needs be discussed. France tried to ensure that the oil needs of Western<br />
Europe should be dealt with under the framework of the ec and epc, as<br />
essentially part of an energy policy that would be independent of the usa,<br />
and which would in part be based on a European-Arab rapprochement.<br />
When this failed, Paris, just like other ec member states, switched to a bilateral<br />
approach to the Arab producers. Among the ec member states,<br />
France was also the most radical champion of talks within the un. Washington,<br />
however, had little enthusiasm for the un option: on the contrary,<br />
the consumer countries must first develop their own plan of action before<br />
they sat round the table with the producer, and later the developing countries.<br />
The Cabinet, although it had adhered to an Atlantic line during the crisis,<br />
now stood divided on this question. It was not so surprising that<br />
218
Pronk should follow the argument of the more radical oil-producing<br />
countries, such as Algeria and Libya, for holding global talks; but the<br />
Cabinet as a whole adopted a halfway stance with regard to this question.<br />
Kissinger’s initiative for consumer talks was supported, but on the condition<br />
that such talks be followed promptly by discussions with the oil-producing<br />
countries and with the Third World countries, if possible under<br />
the auspices of the United Nations.<br />
In the months following the Copenhagen Summit, the question of relations<br />
between Europe and America burned with some ferocity. The<br />
Netherlands, faithful to tradition, put Atlantic unity first. As became<br />
clear, this choice was not based on the usual need for unity in the face of a<br />
threat from the Soviet Union. As home country of one of the Seven Sisters<br />
and having an interest in maintaining the existing relations in the international<br />
oil sector, and as the object of attempts to break down those relations,<br />
The Netherlands was driven toward the American side mainly on<br />
political-economic grounds.<br />
At the same time, it has to be said that the American leadership was not<br />
without its opportunism and self-interest, as was equally evident in other<br />
policy areas. But then again, the forces of opposition were considerable.<br />
Paris declined to acquiesce to American leadership, while various oil-producing<br />
countries expressed their dissatisfaction over the Washington<br />
Conference convened by Kissinger.<br />
The attitude of the Western countries toward the oil crisis was also an<br />
example of a disintegration within the Atlantic world that could also be<br />
seen in other areas in the early 1970s. At the same time it was clear that<br />
the alternative of an independent European oil and Middle Eastern policy<br />
was not capable of getting off the ground because of mutual divisions and<br />
distrust. The leading role of America was therefore accepted by the European<br />
countries faute de mieux, in the face of open resistance from the<br />
French, and by The Netherlands with more enthusiasm than by most. 91<br />
219
8<br />
Sweating it out<br />
As we have emphasized several times, the oil crisis can be approached<br />
from different perspectives. In other words, the crisis had various aspects<br />
or, if you will, different levels. One important aspect was the relation between<br />
the West and the developing countries of the Third World, which<br />
had been affected by the crisis in various ways. On the one hand, rising oil<br />
prices threatened some developing countries – particularly the more industrialised<br />
among them – with ruinous debts; while, on the other hand,<br />
the performance of the opec countries on the international stage fostered<br />
a new self-awareness in the non-Western world. This was expressed in the<br />
appeal by the Group of 77 non-aligned countries for a New International<br />
Economic Order (nieo).<br />
This call for reconstruction of the international economy was in part a<br />
reflection of the power that various anti-Western movements at the turn<br />
of the 1970s had developed, particularly in South-East Asia and South<br />
Africa. Salvador Allende’s accession to power in Chile also seemed like<br />
writing on the wall. Calls for a nieo were frequently heard in the un, an<br />
attractive forum for the supporters of this cause because there the Western<br />
countries had no majority. It was entirely understandable that the<br />
non-Western aligned developing countries, particularly the more radical<br />
oil states like Algeria, should want to raise the issue of the oil crisis within<br />
the un. What they were trying to do was to tie the oil problem into a<br />
broader range of political-economic issues.<br />
Against this anti-Western offensive, the Western countries were divided<br />
in their attitude. One might even say that this division further encouraged<br />
the growing assertiveness of the Group of 77 as well as opec. Division<br />
also characterised the response in the Dutch Cabinet to the North-<br />
South aspect of the oil crisis. As we shall see, some PvdA members of this<br />
Cabinet, Pronk in particular, had considerable sympathy for the struggle<br />
221
to achieve international redistribution of wealth – and understanding,<br />
therefore, for opec’s action in raising oil prices. This approval implied<br />
support for the idea of placing the oil crisis on the agenda at the un,<br />
whether or not in some broader context. Others, Lubbers above all, took<br />
a more business-like approach and argued for the development of Western<br />
cooperation, as agreed at the Washington Conference. The problem,<br />
however, as we shall see, was that the attitude of the usa did not altogether<br />
evince a loyalty of purpose appropriate to its hegemonic position.<br />
The Dutch position, partly because of the dubious American role,<br />
would become no easier during this last phase of the embargo. After long<br />
discussions, Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar and<br />
Saudi Arabia decided on March 18 to lift the embargo against the usa. It<br />
was a provisional decision: the question would be reviewed on June 1. The<br />
embargo against The Netherlands, as well as Denmark, Portugal, South<br />
Africa and Rhodesia, was not lifted. 1 Although the oil supply into Rotterdam<br />
was slowly returning to its normal level, this turn of events nevertheless<br />
proved a blow, for however ineffective it may have proved to be, the<br />
embargo was still capable of damaging the interests of the port. The matter<br />
therefore remained of getting the Arabs to lift their punitive action.<br />
This turned out to be no easy task, because the circumstances under<br />
which the Dutch policy was necessarily formulated were constantly<br />
changing. During this last phase from February to July, the embargo and<br />
the coalition behind it seemed to change. Those Arab countries that had<br />
in the first place advocated the embargo against The Netherlands were<br />
now opposed to it, and vice versa. Algeria, the first oil producer to announce<br />
an embargo, now began to argue for its removal. 2 Saudi Arabia,<br />
initially one of the more moderate states, now turned out to be the driving<br />
force keeping it in place. It is a particularly interesting possibility that the<br />
Saudis took this stance in collaboration with the usa.<br />
A Second Letter to King Feisal<br />
From the middle of January 1974, rumours began circulating that the embargo<br />
against The Netherlands, unlike that against the usa, would not be<br />
lifted. On January 12, the Dutch Ambassador in Washington, Van Lynden,<br />
was instructed to request the State Department to try to get the embargo<br />
against The Netherlands ended. Van Lynden, as we saw, was at the<br />
time assured that Kissinger had the Dutch interests ‘very much at heart’.<br />
But it turned out during the course of January that for the time being most<br />
222
of the Arab countries had no intention of lifting the embargo against The<br />
Netherlands. On January 26, the Dutch embassies in the Arab countries<br />
were impressed by the Foreign Ministry that it was by no means certain<br />
that the embargo would be lifted at the same time as the embargo against<br />
the usa. They were assigned to keep their eyes and ears open, but not to<br />
approach the Arab authorities officially: the policy was to remain low<br />
profile.<br />
Yet the time did seem ripe for some kind of diplomatic initiative. Van<br />
der Stoel decided on January 28 to propose in Cabinet that the letter from<br />
King Feisal, written at the time in reply to Queen Juliana’s missive, should<br />
be answered. 3 The letter would of course have to give a degree of satisfaction,<br />
but without doing violence to The Hague’s position on the Middle<br />
East. The missive would need to be sent before February 14, the date<br />
planned for the following oapec meeting in Tripoli. Asked whether<br />
Feisal would appreciate such a reply, the Saudi Ambassador Nowilaty answered<br />
positively, albeit in his own unofficial capacity. Ambassador Van<br />
Lynden in Washington was therefore instructed to see whether the State<br />
Department, in parallel with the letter to Feisal, would be prepared to exercise<br />
its influence on Feisal ‘in a subtle way’ to get the lifting of the embargo<br />
against the usa linked to a removal of that against The Netherlands.<br />
4<br />
But the Dutch Ambassador in Jeddah, who had argued earlier for just<br />
such an initiative, warned that his American colleague, James Akins, had<br />
so far shown a rather unsubtle manner. It might perhaps be more sensible<br />
first to try on one’s own behalf; and if this proved unsuccessful, one could<br />
always turn to the Americans later. Van Lynden subsequently reported<br />
from Washington that Under-Secretary Sisco had reached similar conclusions.<br />
He repeated that in various conversations with Arab countries, and<br />
especially Saudi Arabia, it was always stressed that any lifting of the embargo<br />
should not include the usa alone but also its allies. 5 Nothing could<br />
be done, however, about the fact that the us attitude, particularly in Jeddah,<br />
was apparently not always favourable to The Netherlands. These reports<br />
were a first indication of the remarkable intrigues that would be witnessed<br />
in the coming months.<br />
In the letter plus enclosure to King Feisal, sent around February 10, the<br />
Cabinet took refuge behind the earlier adopted ec standpoint of November<br />
6. Strictly speaking, there was no question of a separate statement<br />
such as the Arab countries desired; yet the ec declaration was quoted and<br />
paraphrased in such a way that the Cabinet in fact was balanced precariously<br />
on the edge of what was still acceptable to the Second Chamber.<br />
223
The Cabinet based its position on resolution 242 and on the ec declaration<br />
of November 6 which reiterated, crucially, the need ‘for Israel to end<br />
the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of<br />
1967’. Furthermore, this document emphasized the right of any state to<br />
live within secure and recognised borders. The Cabinet also held that the<br />
legitimate rights of the Palestinians must be given ‘form and substance’<br />
within the framework of a peace settlement.<br />
This implies that the Palestinians, by some means or other, should be<br />
given a say in the matter of determining their own future.<br />
The Hague, according to the enclosed document, sought further to make<br />
a constructive contribution to the Euro-Arab dialogue. 6<br />
This was going quite a way in the direction of further clarification,<br />
which Van der Stoel had always refused to give. At the end of January,<br />
moreover, he was considering a visit to several Arab countries, even<br />
though in earlier ministerial council he had spoken rather dismissively of<br />
the ‘travel bug’ contracted by some of his ec colleagues. In this context, at<br />
the beginning of February he inquired of the accredited ambassadors in<br />
the Middle East how they rated the low-profile policy he had been conducting<br />
with regard to the Middle East.<br />
There was evidently positive appreciation and support for this policy,<br />
although there had been suggestions in more recent months that more initiatives<br />
might be helpful. Ambassador Derksen thought the way this lowprofile<br />
policy had served the national interest ‘could hardly be overestimated’.<br />
It had prevented worse things happening and furthermore had<br />
made it possible for some countries, such as Saudi Arabia, to maintain<br />
their economic ties with The Netherlands whilst turning a blind eye. His<br />
considered view was that the time was not yet ripe to change this low-profile<br />
approach. The relatively healthy Dutch position with regard to oil<br />
stocks meant there need be no hurry to honour the Arab countries with a<br />
visit. 7 Derksen was not the only one who reacted coolly to Van der Stoel’s<br />
plan to arrange a Middle East visit. Ambassador Schorer in Kuwait also<br />
seemed to have had doubts: a tour by Van der Stoel was perhaps not such<br />
a good idea, but something had to be done to improve Dutch-Arab relations.<br />
A parliamentary delegation, for example, could break the ice. 8<br />
Van der Stoel decided to postpone his trip to the Arab countries. At the<br />
beginning of February, the Foreign Ministry considered putting together<br />
a fact-finding mission, with representatives drawn from the business<br />
community; but it quickly became apparent that the latter preferred to de-<br />
224
fend their interests through their own channels. Furthermore, it was realised<br />
that economic relations between The Netherlands and the Arab region<br />
were actually suffering very few obstacles. What was least needed,<br />
in fact, was publicity. 9<br />
King Feisal replied on February 28. He thanked Queen Juliana for her<br />
letter, which he had not personally received, and promised to look out for<br />
opportunities for cooperation and for strengthening the ties between the<br />
two countries. At the same time, however, various recriminations were<br />
listed. ‘What hurt me,’ he wrote:<br />
is to have seen friendly Holland, alone among all European countries,<br />
openly expressing sympathy with Israel, challenging in so doing the feelings<br />
of all Arabs, who have a plain and an evident right to their home<br />
and country.<br />
Feisal reiterated that the Dutch Cabinet must openly revise its position<br />
with regard to the Middle East conflict. 10 All in all, Feisal’s reply was on<br />
the brusque side; there was no mention of lifting the Saudi embargo.<br />
The Lifting of the Embargo against the USA<br />
It became clear at the beginning of March that the Saudi standpoint, and<br />
that of other Arab countries too, had if anything hardened. In the Council<br />
of Ministers of March 15, Van der Stoel admitted that he had no explanation<br />
for this. 11 By now, several Arab countries had adopted the position<br />
that the embargo against the usa should be lifted. It was particularly<br />
President Sadat who was aware that this embargo would only frustrate<br />
progress on the diplomatic front. At first, the Syrian President, Assad, resisted<br />
the idea of lifting the embargo, but under Saudi pressure the Arab<br />
opec countries agreed in Vienna on March 18 that the embargo against<br />
the usa should be lifted. Syria and Libya did not initially acquiesce in this<br />
decision; in fact, Libya only lifted its embargo against the usa on December<br />
31, 1974. 12<br />
As feared in The Hague, the embargo against The Netherlands (and<br />
Denmark) was maintained. Italy and West Germany, on the other hand,<br />
were promoted to the status of ‘friendly’ states, which served to highlight<br />
further the isolated status of The Netherlands within the European Community.<br />
13 In a response to the Vienna aopec meeting, the Dutch government<br />
issued a public statement in which it expressed ‘disappointment’<br />
225
with what it considered unjust discrimination. The Dutch standpoint on<br />
the Middle East conflict did not, after all, differ from that of the Nine.<br />
The Cabinet assumed ‘that the issue of Arab discrimination against The<br />
Netherlands would therefore be raised in the near future within the appropriate<br />
European bodies’. How and when was not yet clear. 14<br />
The Dutch Cabinet does not seem to have been in any way intimidated<br />
by the Arab oapec countries. Van der Stoel immediately let it be known<br />
that there should be no expectation of change in Dutch policy, but this did<br />
not obscure the fact that there was a real problem. 15 Following the oapec<br />
decision, Lubbers expressed his concern over the position of the port of<br />
Rotterdam. 16 He had already said in the Council of Ministers on March 8<br />
that although the oil supply had recovered, the maintenance of the embargo<br />
was nonetheless damaging to Rotterdam’s position in the international<br />
oil trade. 17<br />
A first task at the Foreign Ministry was to find out what reasons underlay<br />
the oapec decision. Ambassador D.R. Bot reported from Vienna that<br />
the reason for maintaining the embargo against Denmark and The<br />
Netherlands was that these two countries had up to that point declined to<br />
issue a more pro-Arab statement. Italy and West Germany had been rewarded<br />
for the statements by Moro in the Italian Senate and the letter<br />
from Scheel to Sadat in which the West German had declared his endorsement<br />
of the Arab interpretation of resolution 242. 18 It was suggested in<br />
certain Arab capitals that The Hague should follow these examples.<br />
But the information from the Arab countries also seemed to indicate<br />
that matters were becoming more complicated. It was not so much the<br />
more radical countries that were now advocating a continuation of the<br />
embargo but more especially those that had hitherto been more moderate.<br />
Ambassador Van Hoeve reported Syrian sources as saying that Saudi<br />
Arabia was most strongly in favour of maintaining the embargo. The<br />
Ambassador in Algiers reported that Minister Abdessalam had told<br />
Jobert that it was not so much his country as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait<br />
that were most fiercely opposed to lifting the embargo against The<br />
Netherlands. 19<br />
At this time, relations within the ec began to change. Paris began to<br />
give The Netherlands more explicit support. Jobert gave the instruction<br />
to issue démarches in all the Arab capitals to get the continuation of the<br />
action against The Netherlands raised on the agenda. Van der Stoel regarded<br />
this in a positive light, though he could not avoid the suspicion<br />
that French self-interest also played some part. After all, the continuation<br />
of this discriminatory action made the start of a European-Arab dia-<br />
226
logue, which would be so convenient to the French, scarcely thinkable.<br />
During a visit to Algeria, Jobert had insistently raised the issue of the embargo<br />
against The Netherlands and had even gone so far as to call it ‘absurd’.<br />
Abdessalam’s reply was that the usa had done far more to accommodate<br />
the Arab position. The Hague had offered no further comment<br />
on the November 6 declaration, as Van Elslande, Moro and Scheel had all<br />
done. When Jobert then answered that this hardly seemed a sufficient explanation,<br />
Abdessalam had said: ‘You will find no objection from the Algerian<br />
side’ and advised him to raise the issue in Jeddah and Kuwait. 20 All<br />
of which confirmed earlier reports from the Dutch embassy in Algiers.<br />
On March 25, news came from De Ranitz in Paris that most Arab<br />
countries, according to Quai d’Orsay, seemed to have no objection to<br />
lifting the embargo. Even Damascus had by now come round to a more<br />
charitable position. 21 Only the Saudi Foreign Minister, Omar Saqqaf,<br />
had expressed hostility toward The Netherlands in Vienna, although he<br />
had promised to take up the question with King Feisal. This negative attitude,<br />
according to Dutch Ambassador Derksen, was in any case the result<br />
of the tactless behaviour of the American Ambassador, J. Akins. 22<br />
Meanwhile in Kuwait, ‘Kiele Kiele Kuwait’ (Tickle Tickle Kuwait),<br />
the carnival hit from the Dutch makers of the tv satirical programme<br />
Farce Majeure, aroused enormous displeasure, with Rabbani being recalled<br />
to Kuwait. When it was revealed in the press there that the Dutch<br />
honorary consul had had connections with Farce Majeure, this caused a<br />
new storm of protest. In Kuwait the affair was taken up at a high level, as<br />
was confirmed in 1997 by the European commissioner F. Andriessen.<br />
When the French Ambassador had suggested lifting the embargo, the reply<br />
of Rashid-al-Rashid, the Secretary-General of the Kuwaiti Foreign<br />
Ministry, was to put this gramophone record on the record player. 23<br />
Plans for a United Nations Conference<br />
Prior to the conference in Washington, there had been an interesting debate<br />
in The Hague. As we have seen, Jobert had strong objections to the<br />
basic premises of the Washington Conference. This was hardly surprising,<br />
since the American initiative was aimed directly against the essence<br />
of French policy vis-à-vis the oil crisis. As an alternative to talks between<br />
consumers, the French government proposed raising the whole issue of<br />
the oil problem at the un, the most suitable framework being the Economic<br />
and Social Council (ecosoc). Such an approach would from the<br />
227
eginning involve both producer countries and developing countries, a<br />
proposal that appealed to various members of the Den Uyl Cabinet. 24<br />
Although the aim of this plan was to accommodate the oil producers,<br />
representatives of the Arab and other oil-producing countries reacted<br />
rather critically to the proposal. The developing countries under the umbrella<br />
of the Group of 77 similarly were not impressed. From New York,<br />
the Dutch Permanent Representative, Fack, reported that the Egyptian<br />
mission thought the energy issue could not be raised at the un in isolation,<br />
but should rather be investigated in the context of price trends<br />
among other raw materials and industrial products over the past 25<br />
years. Besides, any treatment of the energy question would also have to<br />
include the role of the major oil companies. And furthermore, attention<br />
must also be given to the connection with world food prices and the high<br />
prices that developing countries had to pay for the transfer of industrial<br />
technology. Even Algeria expressed opposition to the French proposal.<br />
What was referred to in Western circles as the ‘energy question’ was, in<br />
the Algerian view, merely a part of the global issue of resources and development.<br />
25<br />
Nor could the French proposal count on clear-cut approval within the<br />
ec. Most member states reacted with reserve whilst expressing regret that<br />
the plan had been launched without prior ec consultations. Italy did,<br />
however, adopt a cautiously positive attitude. The most powerful criticism<br />
came from the British side. The British Permanent Representative<br />
warned of the danger that the agenda of any energy conference might become<br />
so voluminous as to be unmanageable if developing countries all<br />
wanted to include their various resources. 26<br />
On January 22 Van der Stoel set out his stand against the French proposal.<br />
Whilst he did think that in the short term talks between consumers<br />
and producers were to be recommended – and he would bring this up at<br />
the forthcoming Washington Conference – he thought the un conference<br />
advocated by the French demanded too much preparation time and,<br />
moreover, would lead inevitably to the vaguest kind of outcome simply<br />
because of the large numbers of participants. He had no principle objection<br />
to a global conference, but he would certainly prefer tripartite talks<br />
as envisaged in the follow-up to Washington. 27 It seemed a better idea, he<br />
thought, to leave the initiative in this to a leading developing country. 28<br />
Despite this reception, the French proposal did touch on an important<br />
– and in The Hague’s view, a rather dubious – aspect of the Washington<br />
Conference, viz., the lack of consultation with producer and developing<br />
countries. The Dutch Cabinet had from the outset adopted the standpoint<br />
228
that such talks had to be started as soon as possible. The French proposal<br />
for talks within a un framework went even further, however, than calling<br />
for the involvement of developing countries: in the un, specifically in the<br />
General Assembly, the Western countries had no built-in majority. Quite<br />
the contrary in fact: nowhere was the influence of the Third World countries<br />
in principle so great as it was in the General Assembly.<br />
There were different attitudes to the French proposal within the Dutch<br />
Cabinet, as in the earlier reception of Nixon’s invitation. In a public address<br />
on January 22, Pronk came out in support of the French call for<br />
global talks; an address which caught the attention of the French Ambassador<br />
in The Hague, J. Senard. On January 24 Senard met Pronk for discussion,<br />
a meeting at which the latter, following the Foreign Affairs line,<br />
showed himself rather cool on some aspects of the French proposals. But<br />
Pronk recognised that what should be aimed at was a situation in which<br />
all concerned should be part of the consultative process. The Dutch Minister<br />
finally pointed out that the American proposal also talked about a<br />
global energy conference. In his view, such global discussion required a<br />
wider framework in which scarce resources other than oil should also be<br />
included for discussion. Nor should it be restricted to seeking agreements<br />
on raw materials but it rather should deal with prices, supply and demand.<br />
29 In effect, he was allying himself with the standpoint of the more<br />
radical oapec countries like Algeria.<br />
Senard succeeded insofar as Pronk was prepared to contend for the<br />
French proposal in the Council of Ministers of February 1. Pronk acknowledged<br />
that in several respects Jobert’s way of conducting policy had<br />
to be repudiated: in particular, the French attempts to secure bilateral<br />
agreements. Whilst he could well see that for tactical reasons it was not<br />
possible to support Paris openly, he nonetheless thought that, from the<br />
point of view of the interests of developing countries, the French plan itself<br />
was one that he would subscribe to. Van der Stoel disagreed with<br />
Pronk; he considered Jobert’s plan to be essentially an attempt to scupper<br />
the planned conference in Washington. Den Uyl, however, endorsed<br />
Pronk’s judgement. However ambivalent the French proposal might be,<br />
he believed the oil problem had to be tackled in a global perspective. The<br />
Council in the end came to the compromise that the developing countries<br />
had to be involved in international discussions over the oil crisis as soon<br />
as possible. 30<br />
Aside from these deliberations, Permanent Representative Fack reported<br />
from New York that the French mission also realised that preparations<br />
for such a conference would cost time and effort. According to the<br />
229
French there were two major problems. The first problem was the American<br />
attitude. Kissinger rejected the French proposal as premature. The<br />
planned consumer talks should first be held in Washington and then one<br />
should look further ahead. Secondly, the attitude of the producer countries<br />
was also less than encouraging. Jobert therefore had throttled back,<br />
though there were still considerable doubts in Paris over the usefulness of<br />
the rapidly approaching Washington Conference.<br />
At the beginning of February, Algeria took up the French initiative by<br />
calling for a special session of the un General Assembly dedicated to the<br />
problem of resources and development. The Dutch Cabinet had far fewer<br />
difficulties with this plan than with the French proposal. On February 7<br />
Van der Stoel let it be known that he had no objection to this proposal,<br />
since the General Assembly session called for by Algeria would have a far<br />
broader character and would not interfere with the upcoming Washington<br />
Conference. At this stage, partly because of The Hague’s positive assessment<br />
of the Algerian proposal, there began a certain Algerian-Dutch<br />
rapprochement that contributed to the shift in the Arab camp alluded to<br />
in the previous section. Some of the initially radical countries, particularly<br />
Algeria, gradually began to adopt the standpoint that it was now time<br />
that the embargo against The Netherlands be lifted.<br />
This did not mean that The Netherlands and Algeria found themselves<br />
agreeing about everything, as was evident during a conversation between<br />
Dutch Director-General for Political Affairs Van Lynden and the Algerian<br />
Ambassador Chaalal. On that occasion, Chaalal gave his assessment<br />
of Kissinger’s initiative as:<br />
an attempt to regain influence partly lost in the oil-producing countries<br />
and thus to re-establish [American] hegemony in the field of global energy<br />
provision both in relation to producers and Western Europe.<br />
Therefore, Algeria advocated dealing with the whole issue in the un. Van<br />
Lynden skirted round differences of opinion, pointing out to the Ambassador<br />
that The Hague’s standpoint of working for a wider consultative<br />
framework after the conference fitted in with Algeria’s wishes. 31 The<br />
same day Chaalal spoke with Pronk, who expressed his understanding<br />
for the Algerian criticism of the Washington Conference but at the same<br />
time asked that Kissinger’s recent statements, to the effect that the aim of<br />
the conference was not to form a front of industrialised countries, should<br />
also be given attention. Pronk repeated that The Hague’s standpoint on<br />
this matter in every way accommodated the Algerian objections. 32 On<br />
230
February 13, The Netherlands and the other ec countries voted for the<br />
convening of a special session of the General Assembly.<br />
The Sequel to Washington<br />
As we saw in the previous chapter, it was decided at the Washington Conference<br />
to set up a high-level group – the Energy Co-ordinating Group<br />
(ecg), whose job it was to develop the implications of decisions taken.<br />
The ecg was also assigned to work on an Oil Sharing Plan to share the<br />
discomfort as widely as possible in the event of any new crisis. 33 Twelve<br />
countries had pledged to take part in the ecg: only France had declined<br />
any cooperation. As early as February 20, The Hague was invited for the<br />
first meeting of the group. The Americans were in a hurry.<br />
At first sight, the Dutch Foreign Ministry thought Kissinger was moving<br />
too far ahead too fast, for a follow-up conference was to take place<br />
immediately after the special session of the General Assembly, now fixed<br />
for April. In Van der Stoel’s view, there would for this reason be no interest<br />
in this follow-up conference, at least in the short term, among the developing<br />
countries. After the Cabinet session in which the invitation had<br />
been discussed, the acting Premier Van Agt remarked at a press conference<br />
that The Hague hated the thought of an excess of institutionalisation,<br />
and that the Dutch representative in the ecg should adopt a ‘cautious<br />
approach’.<br />
The high-level group met for the first time at the end of February, The<br />
Netherlands being represented by the Head of the Department for Economic<br />
Cooperation from the Foreign Ministry. During this meeting,<br />
which was mainly procedural, it became clear that the Americans had in<br />
the meantime abandoned their haste: the workgroups to be formed had<br />
until the end of May to produce their reports. At a second meeting eight<br />
workgroups were established, each to concern itself with a different aspect<br />
of the programme for international cooperation decided in Washington.<br />
To the satisfaction of The Hague, the workgroup concerned with the<br />
allocation of oil in time of crisis was assigned a Dutch chairman. The<br />
Dutch, after all, had for some time expressed great interest, especially<br />
within the oecd, in the creation of just such a crisis-allocation system in<br />
which the usa should also be a participant. 34<br />
Otherwise, however, the American policy toward the crisis did not<br />
give rise to unalloyed satisfaction. Washington seemed to adopt a highly<br />
aloof attitude to the preparation for a special session of the General As-<br />
231
sembly, generating the impression that this session was somehow in conflict<br />
with the aims of the programme agreed in Washington. Such a conflict<br />
between Western interests and those of the Third World, as we have<br />
seen, had always been a cause for concern in the Dutch Cabinet. On<br />
March 16 Van der Stoel communicated his unease to the American State<br />
Department. He argued for a positive approach toward the aspirations of<br />
the Group of 77. He also wondered whether it would not be possible, as in<br />
Washington, to arrange for ‘convergence’ between the follow-up to the<br />
Washington Conference and the special session. The Netherlands further<br />
argued for such convergence at the third meeting of the ecg. Most other<br />
countries, however, wanted the special session and subsequent talks between<br />
producers and consumers to be kept separate. There was generally<br />
little feeling of support for any substantial energy discussion during the<br />
special session.<br />
The Euro-Arab Dialogue<br />
Jobert, meanwhile, was continuing with his attempts to get a Euro-Arab<br />
dialogue off the ground. Following the Washington Conference, the<br />
Dutch were anxious to give this dialogue a less anti-American character;<br />
for which purpose Van der Stoel, who was greatly disturbed by the conflicts<br />
within the Atlantic world, travelled to both London and Bonn for<br />
talks. On the advice of his Director-General for Political Affairs, Van<br />
Lynden, and against all his own objections, he decided to go along with<br />
the announcement of the epc plans for a dialogue, on the condition that<br />
only a first, exploratory, stage should be initiated. There could be no<br />
question of second and third stages, involving the setting up of a mixed<br />
commission and a European-Arab ministerial conference, as long as the<br />
embargo against The Netherlands remained in force. 35<br />
During an epc meeting in Brussels on March 4, the Nine formally accepted<br />
a French initiative to pursue such a dialogue. Only the British were<br />
unwilling to bind themselves because of the change of government in<br />
London where the Labour Party under Harold Wilson had just been<br />
elected to power. Van der Stoel later said that he had only agreed to the<br />
first exploratory stage of this dialogue because<br />
the Nine as such were incapable of moving on to the second stage, let<br />
alone the third, so long as the Arabs governments of their own choice<br />
continued to wield the weapon of discrimination against the group of<br />
Nine.<br />
232
Furthermore, the dialogue must not be allowed to undermine the ecg<br />
consultations or the American peace efforts in the Middle East. 36<br />
It is unclear whether the eventual decision issuing from the epc deliberations<br />
was to go for the first stage of the Euro-Arab dialogue or the dialogue<br />
in general, albeit in that case with the Dutch conditions attached. In<br />
the Dutch Council of Ministers, Van der Stoel informed his colleagues<br />
that he had gone along with the dialogue proposal in the epc to avoid being<br />
isolated, but that two conditions had been stipulated. The first was<br />
that the existing peace negotiations must not be hindered; the second,<br />
that following the second stage there must be renewed talks over further<br />
progress. 37 In the First Chamber he mentioned yet another condition:<br />
that the energy conference must not be thwarted. 38<br />
On further reflection, it had been a remarkable meeting in Brussels. At<br />
that same moment Kissinger was visiting nato headquarters, but there<br />
was no contact with the ec ministers even though they were only a fifteen<br />
minute journey apart. Kissinger was not informed of the decisions made<br />
in the context of European Political Cooperation. On his return to the<br />
usa, Nixon sent a tough letter to Chancellor Willy Brandt in which the<br />
Euro-Arab dialogue was rejected in some fairly sharp language. 39<br />
No consultation had taken place. It is not impossible, however, that<br />
during the epc discussions Scheel did suggest having had a meeting with<br />
Kissinger. He even gave the impression that the previous day the Americans<br />
had agreed to the dialogue idea, which in turn had been a reason for<br />
the Dutch readiness to compromise. Van der Stoel was therefore unpleasantly<br />
surprised when it became apparent that the State Department was<br />
reacting negatively to the Nine’s decision to arrange a dialogue. Both in<br />
Cabinet and in the Second Chamber, considerable resentment was expressed<br />
at this course of events. Brandt later attempted to soothe matters<br />
by assuring Washington that the Nine had taken into account the American<br />
objections to the dialogue being set in motion too soon. 40<br />
This could not have been easy, because the French pursuit of a Euro-<br />
Arab dialogue was disparaged in Washington in extraordinarily negative,<br />
dismissive terms. ‘The idea of a Foreign Ministers’ meeting between all<br />
Arab states and European states can only fill one with horror,’ said<br />
Kissinger at a staff meeting at the State Department. ‘Anyone seriously<br />
pursuing it ought to have his head examined.’ One of the most important<br />
American objections was that a Euro-Arab dialogue under French leadership<br />
would strengthen Algeria’s position at the expense of the Egyptian<br />
Sadat, who was highly regarded in Washington. 41<br />
On March 12 the Comité Politique met to discuss this Euro-Arab dia-<br />
233
logue further, agreeing, at least after British consent, that the Arab countries<br />
should be informed immediately of the main lines of the decision taken.<br />
At once, the old differences on the dialogue’s basic aims and principles<br />
reasserted themselves, this time the question of how far the dialogue<br />
should be concerned with the Middle East peace settlement and related<br />
political questions. The French stressed that if economic cooperation<br />
were going to be discussed with Arab countries, it was simply unrealistic<br />
to exclude political questions from consideration. The Dutch delegation<br />
warned again of the danger of undermining other initiatives. According<br />
to The Hague, the aims of the dialogue had to be economic, not political.<br />
There was also disagreement over the Israeli position in the dialogue. It<br />
was agreed that there had to be contact with Israel; but the French wanted<br />
this to be held in strict secrecy in order not to prejudice the dialogue with<br />
the Arab countries. The Netherlands and Denmark expressed their dissent:<br />
the Nine had to maintain a certain balance in their readiness to cooperate<br />
with countries in the Middle East. And, moreover, since cooperation<br />
with Israel was already on the agenda, this could not now be ignored.<br />
42<br />
However, as we have seen, all this had to be shelved until it was clear<br />
what the new British Labour government’s attitude to the epc plans<br />
would be. This exchange of power in London was highly significant for<br />
the Dutch Cabinet. Labour, like the PvdA in the Netherlands, had neither<br />
an anti-American nor anti-Israeli reputation. Wilson’s government might<br />
therefore mean significant support for the Dutch; and Van der Stoel lost<br />
no time in travelling to London, in early March, to hold discussions with<br />
his new colleague, James Callaghan. Callaghan, it turned out, backed the<br />
dialogue. He had reservations, though, being particularly anxious not to<br />
accentuate differences with France. In general, the new party in power in<br />
London clearly gave priority to cooperation with the usa, more so than<br />
the previous Conservative government under Heath. Van der Stoel, of<br />
course, had been playing precisely this tune for some time, and so could<br />
speak freely of the desirability of more frequent consultations with the<br />
usa. 43<br />
It had also not been lost on Kissinger that the new Labour government<br />
advocated a far more pro-Atlantic policy than Heath’s government. During<br />
talks with the representatives of the American majors, the American<br />
Secretary of State declared that ‘international affairs have reached a point<br />
where a Labour government is more pro-American than a Conservative<br />
one’. 44 Kissinger could draw a similar conclusion with regard to the<br />
Dutch government of Den Uyl and Van der Stoel.<br />
234
When it became clear on March 18 that the embargo was not to be lifted,<br />
The Hague’s resistance to the Euro-Arab dialogue increased. Immediately<br />
following the oapec decision, Van der Stoel reminded the epc<br />
chairman Scheel of the qualification he had entered; the second stage of<br />
direct official contacts with the Arab countries could not begin as long as<br />
the embargo remained in place. This reminder was also brought to the attention<br />
of all ec governments. For Paris, this block on further progress<br />
that seemed to have arisen was all the more reason to call for the Arab<br />
world to lift the embargo against The Netherlands.<br />
All the problems surrounding the Euro-Arab dialogue once more illustrated<br />
how sharp the differences were between the ec member states. In<br />
The Hague, Van der Stoel submitted a note on these problems on March<br />
21 which was discussed on March 27 in the Council for European Affairs<br />
and on March 29 in the Council of Ministers. Van der Stoel’s note contained<br />
the classic argument for Atlantic unity with the corresponding<br />
view of European integration: distrusting European Political Cooperation<br />
and advocating strengthening of the Commission. The note suggested<br />
that cooperation within the ec was threatened with paralysis, at least<br />
partly as a consequence of the unwillingness to strengthen the authority<br />
of the European Commission. The energy crisis and the admission of<br />
three new members had further undermined the willingness to act, and<br />
the more prominent role assumed by epc had put the European-American<br />
relationship under some pressure. The note therefore gave the highest<br />
priority to combating the acute crisis of confidence that had arisen within<br />
the relationship between the Nine and the usa. It was most important to<br />
improve these relations. If Paris was unwilling to cooperate, then one<br />
must turn to Bonn and London. 45<br />
At the end of March, there was a positive response from the Arab<br />
world to the proposal from the Nine to institute a dialogue. On April 20<br />
and 21 the nine epc Ministers gathered informally at Gymnich Castle in<br />
Bonn to discuss this response. Once again, there were differences of opinion.<br />
The first of these centred on the Dutch pre-condition. Jobert refused<br />
to commit himself in writing to the principle that the discriminatory Arab<br />
actions against certain ec countries must first be repealed before the second<br />
phase of dialogue could begin. Van der Stoel accepted this, under the<br />
proviso that the Nine did consider themselves bound to the spirit of this<br />
qualification. This was a proviso his eight colleagues were prepared to accept.<br />
A second problem concerned relations with Washington. Jobert, perhaps<br />
afraid of ‘renewed treachery’ by Scheel, turned against the proposal<br />
235
that the epc chairman should be entrusted with full and prompt exchanges<br />
of information with the usa during the dialogue. Despite French<br />
opposition, Scheel pushed through the so-called ‘Gymnich formula’<br />
which ‘gave the usa the right to be consulted in the epc decision-making<br />
process’. 46 During this epc gathering, Jobert, according to Van der Stoel,<br />
had adopted an ‘extremely anti-American standpoint’. 47 Van der Stoel<br />
kept quiet on this question to avoid exposing himself unnecessarily, and<br />
agreement was thus eventually achieved. 48<br />
These differences of opinion again demonstrated that the Nine could<br />
only reach any kind of agreement on the dialogue with some difficulty.<br />
The pursuit of a European-Arab rapprochement therefore arrived at a<br />
complete impasse when its driving force, Georges Pompidou, died on<br />
April 2. With the death of Pompidou, after Heath the second greatest<br />
champion of an independent European role on the world stage had disappeared.<br />
In May, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing was elected President, initiating<br />
a period during which French foreign policy would be much more Atlantic-oriented.<br />
49 Shortly after this, the curtain also fell on Willy Brandt’s<br />
time as Chancellor. Brandt’s position had been steadily weakened during<br />
the oil crisis. Finance Minister Helmuth Schmidt had drawn power to<br />
himself, a fact that had become increasingly obvious during ec<br />
meetings. 50 It was therefore not by chance that following Brandt’s resignation<br />
in the wake of a spy scandal, he should be succeeded by the more<br />
pro-Atlantic Schmidt. In the spring of 1974, politicians thus came to<br />
power in three major ec countries who were far more Atlantic-oriented<br />
than their respective predecessors.<br />
The Supply Recovers<br />
As we saw earlier, the oil supply to The Netherlands had by now begun to<br />
recover. It had already become clear during the period of rationing that<br />
the worst was over. In mid-January the Dutch Cabinet still believed that<br />
the supply would be 70% of the previous year, whereas the actual supply<br />
turned out at the end of the month to be over 80%. 51 Since processing and<br />
consumption were lower than the previous year, the stocks at the end of<br />
January were 20% higher. The situation was roughly similar in February<br />
and March: supply stabilised at around 80 to 85% and processing and<br />
consumption recovered to around 85%. Whether the reduced supply was<br />
still a consequence of the embargo was a question the Cabinet doubted.<br />
The Minister for Housing, J. Gruijters, asked for clarification in the<br />
236
Council of Ministers of March 8. According to Lubbers, the reduction<br />
was indeed the result of the embargo. 52 In March, however, stocks<br />
reached a level that was in comparison with the previous year as much as<br />
30% higher. Throughout the whole embargo, the end stocks of crude oil<br />
remained higher than the previous year. 53 The situation was even more<br />
reassuring in April, with supplies more or less reaching the level of the<br />
previous year. Processing recovered to almost 95% of the level for 1973.<br />
Meanwhile, Shell communicated that there were no more immediate<br />
problems as far as provisioning was concerned. 54<br />
After the period of rationing, the need to restrict the consumption of<br />
oil products was thought, logically, to become gradually less. In a letter to<br />
the Second Chamber, Westerterp announced on February 1 that maximum<br />
and minimum speed limits on the roads would be introduced from<br />
February 6. Moreover, the action 3 x 5 = 15 was started by the Ministry of<br />
Transport and Water Management together with the Dutch motorists association<br />
and the Association of Automobile Dealers and Garage Owners.<br />
There would be a 5% saving from the introduction of the maximum<br />
speed limit, 5% from a more economical style of driving, and 5% from<br />
more selective use of motor vehicles. 55 The public readiness to observe<br />
these prescriptions, however, was not what it had been at the beginning of<br />
the crisis. This was hardly surprising, given the steadily improving reports<br />
of the oil supply. Measures restricting consumption, such as cutting<br />
back on the use of electricity for street lighting and advertising, were in<br />
fact also lifted several weeks later.<br />
‘Sweating it out’<br />
Yet the embargo, at least formally, was still in place. At the Foreign Ministry<br />
toward the end of March, the balance was again calculated. This<br />
was partly as a result of reports such as that Scheel had sent a grovelling<br />
letter to Yamani and Abdellasam. Parts of Scheel’s letter had by then appeared<br />
in the Algerian press. These reports increased the pressure from<br />
his civil servants for Van der Stoel also to go further to meet the Arabs.<br />
But what exactly had Scheel written? Every attempt was made to get<br />
hold of the full text of the letter. On March 28, De Beus reported that the<br />
missive contained a record of the German explanation of their position<br />
during the meeting with Yamani and Abdessalam. Subsequently, the<br />
Arab side had requested a written statement of the German standpoint,<br />
while in Bonn no objection had been raised. De Beus had pointed out to<br />
237
his interlocutor from the West German Foreign Ministry that the wording<br />
was rather pointed, in particular the reference to returning to the pre-<br />
1967 borders and the demand for complete withdrawal of foreign troops.<br />
De Beus had also requested a copy of the letter, a request which had<br />
caused a certain German embarrassment. 56<br />
The result of this letter in The Hague was to increase the pressure on<br />
Van der Stoel. On March 28 he had a meeting with the Algerian Ambassador.<br />
In the preparations for this meeting, Director-General Van Lynden<br />
hinted that Scheel’s letter should provoke thought. He suggested that Van<br />
der Stoel too ‘could write something similar’. ‘I know that the idea does<br />
not appeal to you,’ acknowledged Van Lynden, ‘but as a result of their interpretative<br />
statements or their letters, your Belgian, Italian and German<br />
colleagues have put the Dutch Government in a dilemma.’<br />
Van der Stoel again put the suggestion to one side. ‘I fear’, he replied,<br />
‘that in our case this would lead to further demands for clarification (for<br />
example, ‘also Jerusalem’).’ In fact, this very question of a clarifying<br />
statement was raised during the meeting with the Algerian Ambassador,<br />
who took the opportunity to suggest that Algeria could publish an interpretation<br />
of the Dutch standpoint that would not subsequently be denied<br />
by The Hague. Van der Stoel, however, did not take up the offer. He<br />
replied that his standpoint over the Israeli withdrawal was no different<br />
from that of the other ec partners. 57<br />
Partly as a result of this, the Head of the Department for Africa and the<br />
Middle East (dam) drafted a note in which The Hague’s position was<br />
analysed further. Three options were identified. The first was the suggestion<br />
of the Algerian Ambassador, that Algiers should publish an interpretative<br />
statement of the Dutch position. This should state that the ec formulation<br />
of November 6, ‘mettre fin à l’occupation territoriale’, meant in<br />
The Hague’s view, ‘evacuation de tous les territoires occupés’ (i.e. ending<br />
the territorial occupation meant complete withdrawal from all occupied<br />
territory). The second option was for the Dutch government to issue its<br />
own clarification of the ec November 6 statement; and the third option<br />
was ‘sweating it out’.<br />
The Algerian suggestion undoubtedly had its advantages, concluded<br />
the Head of dam. The Hague need not make a further statement itself<br />
and would yet satisfy those in the Arab world who no longer wished to<br />
maintain the embargo weapon. Should this option be taken up, it must be<br />
established in advance that both formally and in practice the embargo<br />
would be lifted by all Arab countries and that there would be no propagandist<br />
use made of it (e.g. ‘Netherlands caves in’). There should further<br />
238
e plenty of opportunity provided for resumption of trade with the Arab<br />
world, and the Arabs must cease working up cultural indignation over<br />
such trivial issues as the Farce Majeure song, ‘Kiele, Kiele, Kuwait’.<br />
On the possibility of issuing a Dutch statement, the dam note suggested<br />
that the best approach would be to follow the West German example,<br />
to publish a summary of discussions held. The talks Van der Stoel would<br />
hold outside the meeting of the General Assembly would provide a good<br />
opportunity. The memorandum came with an attached draft of such a<br />
statement, setting out that a peace settlement must be found that could be<br />
agreed on by all parties, which incorporated coherently all the elements of<br />
resolution 242, as repeated in the Nine’s declaration of November 6,<br />
1973.<br />
In accord with this resolution, the borders existing before 1967 should<br />
be taken as a basic principle.<br />
This implied<br />
ending the foreign territorial occupation of national territory and thus a<br />
complete withdrawal of foreign troops. Border corrections, reached<br />
through peaceful talks and willingly effected by the parties concerned,<br />
should not of course be excluded.<br />
Something should be said in a possible final paragraph over ‘the importance<br />
of American attempts to bring the respective parties together’.<br />
The third option, finally, meant maintaining The Netherlands ‘principled<br />
position’, i.e. waiting until the embargo was lifted through the play of<br />
‘exogenous factors’.Anend to the embargo might finally result from various<br />
factors: pressure from the Nine; as a lever to get a stalled dialogue<br />
kick-started again; or through the growth of awareness within oapec that<br />
continuationofthe embargo promised less advantage than disadvantage<br />
to theArabs; or possibly American pressure – ‘which we still hope for’. It<br />
was apparently assumed at the Dutch Foreign Ministry that the usa was<br />
not at that moment about to exert any pressure on the Dutch behalf.<br />
It was clear from a note added by Van Lynden that he was a strong advocate<br />
of the Dutch issuing their own statement.<br />
Now that the Belgian, Italian, and German statements have given their<br />
own interpretations to the November text, the Dutch government, in<br />
my view, should not avoid giving its own interpretation.<br />
239
The appended text was in his view considerably less drastic a revision<br />
than the Italian text and slightly less than the Belgian and German statements.<br />
According to Van Lynden, putting out an interpretative statement,<br />
either now or at the latest in New York, would have the best chance<br />
together with the French attempts of succeeding in getting the embargo<br />
lifted.<br />
Yet once again Van der Stoel flatly rejected the advice of his Director-<br />
General for Political Affairs. This was made very clear in a note that he<br />
added to the dam memorandum: ‘Choose option III; text appended to<br />
option II too radical for me and moreover would lead to further demands<br />
for interpretation’, and that was an end to the matter. 58<br />
In Cabinet, too, Van der Stoel adopted the same unbending stance. He<br />
urged his colleagues not to be too gloomy. The Arab countries were beginning<br />
to see that continuing the embargo would only impede Euro-Arab<br />
dialogue. Den Uyl shared this point of view and criticized Scheel’s action.<br />
The fact that news had only been received of his letter weeks later was a<br />
matter that should be taken up at a high level. A protest was in order. Lubbers,<br />
as on earlier occasions, was less optimistic, pointing out all the negative<br />
consequences of the position to which The Netherlands had been<br />
brought. Transport Minister Westerterp added his own comment, too: it<br />
must remain the aim of Dutch policy to get the embargo lifted as soon as<br />
possible; and in this connection, he pointed out the problems under which<br />
klm was still labouring.<br />
Van der Stoel recognised that the embargo was a serious headache, but<br />
repeated that if one were to go down the same path as Scheel, new Arab<br />
demands would surely follow. He proposed getting the ec partners once<br />
more to exert pressure in the Arab capitals to get the embargo lifted. A<br />
similar request should also be made to the American government, and beyond<br />
that, bilateral goodwill initiatives might be considered. It was eventually<br />
decided that Van der Stoel should protest against the steps taken by<br />
the Italian and West German governments. Secondly, the ec partners<br />
would be asked to demonstrate solidarity and not to accept discrimination<br />
against a fellow member state. 59<br />
On March 29 Van der Stoel took a far more lenient view of the West<br />
German letter. He concluded that Scheel had refused an ‘additional statement’<br />
and had only given a written account of the conversation with Yamani<br />
and Abdessalam. The earlier conclusion, that The Hague had refused<br />
to provide an additional clarification to the ec declaration of November<br />
6 whereas Bonn had complied, was accordingly incorrect. 60<br />
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The Special General Assembly<br />
The special session of the United Nations General Assembly so desired by<br />
the developing countries was held in April. Initially, the American government<br />
was against such a session, which was considered a hindrance to<br />
the consultative process resulting from the Washington Conference. But<br />
partly due to pressure from the ec countries, the Americans eventually<br />
came round to participating in the special session that opened on April 9<br />
and lasted for three weeks.<br />
The view of this session taken in The Hague was not entirely positive.<br />
As we saw, Lubbers in particular had expressed his doubts in the Council<br />
of Ministers. His view was shared at the Ministry of Economic Affairs,<br />
particularly within the Directorate-General for Foreign Economic Relations.<br />
In a note from the Director-General, the special session was situated<br />
in the context of an increasing loss of Western influence in the world.<br />
Up till then, international economic cooperation had been based on gatt<br />
and the imf. The basic principles grounding this international order had<br />
been undermined, according to the note. There were two reasons for this.<br />
On the one hand, there had been increasing economic nationalism and a<br />
concomitant lack of adequate international co-ordination; and on the<br />
other hand, there was the increasing influence of power formations in<br />
economic life. In addition, the power that the Bretton Woods system had<br />
always carried was being eroded. The United States was still trying to<br />
take up the leader’s role, but this was being thwarted by Paris as well as<br />
several developing countries. The position of opec was largely so strong<br />
because of Western divisions, and opec was always ready and able, if not<br />
always liberally, to act as the standard bearer of the interests of the developing<br />
world.<br />
All these developments were accelerated by the oil crisis. ‘If my view is<br />
correct, we are now living through the last days of Bretton Woods and of<br />
gatt’, wrote the Director-General. The Western countries were in a<br />
weak position vis-à-vis the developing countries because of the dependence<br />
of their economies and their mutual divisions. Some countries were<br />
trying to secure their own interests by means of bilateral agreements,<br />
leading to even greater confusion. It was significant that a new Charter<br />
was already being discussed within the un, one that would no longer be<br />
based on the principle of free trade. The concluding advice of the note<br />
from the Director-General for Foreign Economic Relations ran:<br />
241
We have to try to provide a realistic counterbalance to the rather<br />
grandiose philosophies of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that would<br />
seem to betoken a flight from reality. 61<br />
It is certainly true that the special session was regarded at the Dutch Foreign<br />
Ministry in a much more positive light. Such views were in the first<br />
place inspired by the progressive climate of ideas within Pronk’s Directorate-General<br />
for International Cooperation; but neither the Directorate-General<br />
for Political Affairs nor Van der Stoel was against the idea<br />
of the special session, albeit for more opportunistic reasons. For them, the<br />
session seemed a good opportunity for improving relations with the Arab<br />
countries.<br />
The special session kicked off in New York on April 9. 62 The following<br />
day, the general deliberations were opened with an address by the Algerian<br />
President Boumédienne, who declared that the non-aligned countries<br />
were now a new driving force in international relations. The non-aligned<br />
countries sought to establish fair participation for the Third World in<br />
global politics, which had to be based on a fair share of the world’s<br />
wealth. This necessarily required a fundamental reorganisation of economic<br />
relations between rich and poor countries that would lead to a redistribution<br />
of the possibilities for growth and development.<br />
Over the course of the following days, the Western countries, including<br />
specifically the ec member states, acknowledged that a fairer share in the<br />
world economy should be striven for. Such terms as ‘collective economic<br />
security’, ‘economic peace-keeping’ and even a ‘global early warning system’<br />
(against undesirable fluctuations in the market for raw materials).<br />
Even the usa declared, out of Kissinger’s own mouth, a willingness to<br />
contribute to the economic development of the Third World, including<br />
the transfer of technologies.<br />
On April 17 the oil-producing countries reviewed the history of the oil<br />
price increases: a long overdue adjustment of price levels, according to<br />
them. They pointed out that the welfare of the industrialised countries<br />
had largely existed thanks to the fact that oil prices had been held at an artificially<br />
low level. In this regard, it was striking that the Saudi address<br />
was more moderate than the other oil producers. Yamani argued that polarisation<br />
had to be avoided. In his view, the danger of a global recession<br />
as the result of uncontrolled price increases was so great that this would in<br />
all probability lead to a ‘devastating global war’. Because of the developed<br />
economies’ greater capacity for adapting, the developing countries<br />
would be the losers.<br />
242
Van der Stoel, in his address, adopted a positive attitude toward the<br />
wishes expressed by various Third World countries. He stressed that from<br />
the beginning The Hague had tried to play a mediating role. The Netherlands<br />
hoped that a clash between North and South could be avoided and<br />
that the deployment of a broad plan of action would be adopted with the<br />
general support of the industrialised world. He appreciated the work of<br />
the Group of 77 and expressed a willingness to work with the Group toward<br />
the realisation of a new international economic order.<br />
Partly at the urging of the Dutch, the Nine declared their readiness to<br />
contribute to a fund for the worst hit developing countries. On behalf of<br />
the ec, Scheel advised Waldheim on April 26 of an offer of a ‘substantial<br />
contribution’. The Dutch delegation was positive over the Algerian President’s<br />
proposal to set up short-term funds. If this should not prove feasible,<br />
support would be given to set up a preparatory committee whose task<br />
would be to submit concrete proposals to the un Economic and Social<br />
Council within a short period. The proposal for a ‘crash programme’ for<br />
1974, ahead of a fund for the worst hit countries, was also actively supported<br />
by The Hague. And finally, The Netherlands gave its support to<br />
the proposal to set up a consortium on behalf of those countries most affected.<br />
With the winding up of the general deliberations on April 24, the real<br />
work began behind the scenes. In the meantime, a workgroup had begun<br />
on April 11 with the framing of a development statement and a draft action<br />
programme. Away from the floodlight of publicity, the Western<br />
countries took a rather less cooperative line than they had professed during<br />
the general deliberations of the General Assembly. The traditional oppositions<br />
between developed and developing countries re-emerged during<br />
these negotiations. It was also striking that whereas the energy question<br />
and oil prices had assumed a prominent place in the general deliberations,<br />
the negotiations focused on the more general questions of development,<br />
raw materials, trade and finance. This was mainly because the Group of<br />
77 rejected every reference to the energy question. A French attempt to<br />
deal with the oil problem within the wider context of the question of raw<br />
materials in a committee of producers and consumers was wrecked by the<br />
resistance of both the producers and the usa.<br />
Albeit with the greatest difficulty, some sort of agreement was reached<br />
in the workgroup on the framing of a draft statement and an action plan;<br />
but this could not disguise the fact that in several respects the opposition<br />
between North and South remained insurmountable. At the final session<br />
of May 1 and 2, several countries made a final statement. The American<br />
243
Permanent Representative stressed that it would be incorrect to speak of<br />
consensus, given the number of points on which there was no unanimity,<br />
particularly referring to the action plan. The usa had objections to this<br />
programme without going into details. Other Western countries said they<br />
also had important reservations.<br />
On the other hand, the Algerian Foreign Minister, A. Bouteflika,<br />
spoke of a consensus that had no precedent. He stressed that this did not<br />
mean unanimity, but added that unanimity should not be expected if one<br />
were dealing with a fundamental change in the economic system. The session<br />
had strengthened the un, to his mind, while the conduct of the<br />
Group of 77 had been marked by a spirit of moderation. He pointed out<br />
that the General Assembly had witnessed a change in power relations although,<br />
in the light of the attitude of most Western countries, it is highly<br />
doubtful whether Bouteflika was right in this.<br />
An important motive for Van der Stoel’s trip to New York, as mentioned<br />
earlier, was to try to make contact in the corridors with colleagues<br />
from other countries, not least the Arab countries. Van der Stoel thus held<br />
conversations with counterparts from Egypt, Kuwait and the United<br />
Arab Emirates, among others, all three of whom were for the lifting of the<br />
embargo. His Egyptian colleague assured him that no bilateral problem<br />
existed between Egypt and The Netherlands, and that he would present<br />
the case to his government for lifting the embargo. This sounded altogether<br />
positive. Nevertheless, the Egyptian Minister emphasized that<br />
The Hague would have to come up with ‘something new’ before the<br />
oapec meeting in June. 63<br />
Later in Washington, Van der Stoel also held talks with Kissinger,<br />
pointing out to him the remarkable fact that Saudi Arabia especially refused<br />
to cooperate in getting the embargo lifted. Kissinger promised to<br />
raise the question on his following visit to King Feisal. The two statesmen<br />
differed, however, in their estimates of the value of the special session.<br />
Van der Stoel thought the session far less confrontational than he had anticipated<br />
and wondered whether agreement might be possible, in the<br />
sense that a un world conference on energy might be arranged, attended<br />
by a representative delegation from both producer and consumer countries.<br />
Kissinger’s response was negative. He reiterated the familiar American<br />
standpoints: that better cooperation had first to be achieved between<br />
the consumer countries; that a un energy conference could have disastrous<br />
consequences if no prior agreement had been reached between the<br />
Western countries. Kissinger thought it absurd that the producers should<br />
be capable of forming a cartel whilst the consumer countries could not. 64<br />
244
Subsequently, Van der Stoel concluded that hardly any progress had<br />
been made at the special session. There was possibly the draft of an action<br />
plan, but that was virtually crippled by a series of preconditions. In the<br />
General Assembly, the initially positive tone had degenerated into confrontation.<br />
65 In The Hague, nonetheless, the session was not seen as a disaster:<br />
indeed, far from it as far as The Netherlands’ status was concerned.<br />
For the attention had shifted during the session away from the politics of<br />
energy to the more general struggle of the Group of 77 toward a New International<br />
Economic Order. Most Western countries had reacted to this<br />
demand by rejecting it outright. The Dutch delegation, however, had<br />
adopted a more sympathetic attitude and within the ec had endeavoured<br />
to foster understanding for the proposals of the Group of 77, an attitude<br />
which, according to Van der Stoel, had been highly appreciated by various<br />
developing countries. It was therefore concluded in The Hague that<br />
adopting this approach had certainly contributed to the view now taken<br />
by a number of Arab countries that the embargo should be lifted. 66<br />
Saudi Arabia Stands Firm<br />
While Van der Stoel was busy in New York, a certain optimism briefly<br />
prevailed in The Hague concerning the likelihood of the embargo being<br />
lifted. This feeling arose through talks held between Den Uyl and the Saudi<br />
Ambassador Nowilaty. The Premier inferred from the latter’s wording<br />
that there was now a great chance that the embargo would be lifted, and<br />
on April 11 he shared this judgement with the Council of Ministers, 67 going<br />
on to speak of his optimism at a press conference. This of course led to<br />
premature news reports that the end of the embargo was in sight, leaving<br />
Van der Stoel, on his return, to have to straighten various matters out. In<br />
the Second Chamber, Den Uyl later denied that he had ever uttered anything<br />
definite about the duration of the embargo, but the impression he<br />
created was less than highly convincing. 68<br />
Indeed, Den Uyl had been too optimistic: the embargo still had months<br />
to run. It was becoming clearer at this stage that especially the moderate<br />
countries, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in particular, remained opposed to<br />
any lifting of the embargo. In both countries ‘the familiar grievances’<br />
were still playing a role, but in the case of Saudi Arabia there was another<br />
line of reasoning involved. As early as March 28, Dutch Ambassador<br />
Derksen had reported that Jeddah was not, on the whole, inclined to lift<br />
the embargo, but rather saw it to their advantage to ‘keep Western Europe<br />
245
divided’. 69 It was also clear from other sources that Saudi Arabia had no<br />
interest in promoting a Euro-Arab dialogue. 70 Maintaining the embargo<br />
therefore served the purpose of blocking this dialogue in a highly effective<br />
manner, an entirely different function from the early days.<br />
In May the Dutch Cabinet adopted a more wait-and-see attitude.<br />
There was no doubt by now that Algeria wanted an end to the embargo.<br />
In Den Uyl’s judgement, the Algerian standpoint was partly based on the<br />
attitude shown by The Netherlands at the special session. Furthermore,<br />
the Dutch Foreign Ministry was supporting the Algerian Minister Bouteflika’s<br />
candidature for the chairmanship of the General Assembly, and at<br />
the same time attempting to find a mutually satisfactory compromise<br />
with Algeria in the World Bank.<br />
At the end of May, Van der Stoel expressed the hope that the coming Israeli-Syrian<br />
disengagement accord would lead to the end of the embargo.<br />
71 The accord was signed in Geneva on May 31, the same day that<br />
the Security Council approved a resolution empowering Waldheim to<br />
take whatever measures were needed to set up a corps of observers to supervise<br />
the disengagement due to begin on June 1. 72<br />
Van der Stoel considered taking a trip himself to several Arab capitals<br />
after these events, 73 but, to much surprise, no decision was taken at the<br />
oapec session on June 2 to lift the embargo against The Netherlands. By<br />
now, a complete reversal of positions within the oapec had taken place.<br />
On June 3 the Dutch Ambassador in Damascus reported an assurance he<br />
had been given by the Syrians that their country had not voted against<br />
lifting the embargo. On the question as to who had, the Syrians pointed<br />
out that ‘there were Arab countries that regarded the Euro-Arab dialogue<br />
with great reluctance’. In diplomatic circles, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and<br />
Qatar were now always cited as the most important opponents of lifting<br />
the embargo. On the other side, Algeria explicitly declared itself opposed<br />
to maintaining the embargo. In fact, Algiers let it be known that it was no<br />
longer willing to abide by the decision of June 2 to keep the embargo in<br />
place. 74 That other radical state, Iraq, had also spoken out against maintaining<br />
the embargo.<br />
Various news reports reaching The Hague during June confirmed that<br />
Saudi Arabia in particular wanted to keep the embargo in place in order<br />
to obstruct any Euro-Arab dialogue. More unpalatably, Saudi Arabia<br />
was being supported in this policy by the United States, or was even acting<br />
at the behest of the usa. The Algerian Ambassador in East Berlin suggested<br />
that Jeddah had not been acting autonomously in the maintenance<br />
of the embargo, ‘but rather in the present case had been little more than<br />
246
an instrument of the United States’. It was Washington that had got Jeddah<br />
to resist the lifting of the boycott<br />
because by this means the American government thought it could see a<br />
way of obstructing the dialogue and cooperation between the ec and<br />
the non-European Mediterranean states.<br />
The Dutch Ambassador in East Berlin found this argument highly improbable,<br />
but the Algerian stuck to his story. 75<br />
Similar stories were coming from other sources, not least from Paris.<br />
De Ranitz reported that a highly placed official in the French Foreign<br />
Ministry, de Commines, had confirmed the rumours – also printed by Le<br />
Monde – of American duplicity. Kissinger, for various reasons, was<br />
against a Euro-Arab dialogue and had probably convinced King Feisal of<br />
the undesirability of such a dialogue. It was not inconceivable that he had<br />
told the king that only Washington was capable of forcing Israel to make<br />
concessions. Furthermore, only the us would have been capable of combating<br />
the communism feared so much by Feisal. 76<br />
Reports that Washington had incited Feisal to adopt a tough stance<br />
were also circulating in the Egyptian press. Although Van der Stoel subsequently<br />
claimed to have given these suggestions little credence, they<br />
were certainly believed at the Foreign Ministry in 1974. 77 In a memo to<br />
the Dutch Foreign Minister on June 7, the acting head of the Department<br />
for Africa and the Middle East concluded that it was doubtful whether it<br />
was of any further use, given this background, to continue urging<br />
Kissinger to put in a good word for The Netherlands. 78 On the same day,<br />
Van der Stoel referred in the Council of Ministers to the reasons why Saudi<br />
Arabia was opposed to a Euro-Arab dialogue. There was nothing in it<br />
for the Saudis, whereas Egypt and Algeria, their competitors, stood to<br />
take a more prominent role in the context of such a dialogue. 79 A week<br />
later, the Dutch Ambassador Derksen reported from Jeddah that both his<br />
French and British colleagues thought the usa and Saudi Arabia were in<br />
league in this affair. The Ambassador confessed that he ‘had to acknowledge<br />
a certain reality in the scenario alluded to’, not so much because of<br />
Le Monde or Israeli propaganda but because a highly placed Saudi official<br />
had confirmed the story’s truth. 80 247
To the End<br />
The oapec decision of June 2 had been a blow. Several days later, Den<br />
Uyl expressed his concern over Rotterdam’s position now that the embargo<br />
was to continue officially. On June 12 the Mayor and Aldermen of<br />
Rotterdam again asked the Premier as a matter of urgency, given the magnitude<br />
of the interests at stake, not to relax the pressure and ‘to take whatever<br />
steps were necessary to get the Arab countries to end the boycott<br />
against The Netherlands’. Yet again, Van der Stoel decided to turn to<br />
Washington to mediate, but without result. According to Arab information,<br />
Feisal took a sharp line when Nixon paid a visit to Jeddah. Minister<br />
Saqqaf told a British diplomat, moreover, that any removal of the embargo<br />
in the short term was out of the question ‘unless the Dutch government<br />
should publicly call for a total Israeli withdrawal from Arab territory’. At<br />
a ministerial session of nato, Kissinger was also in a ‘fairly hopeless’<br />
mood. 81<br />
One of Feisal’s influential advisors suggested to the French Ambassador<br />
that the embargo would be withdrawn at the next oapec meeting<br />
on July 10. But on June 18 De Ranitz reported that King Feisal himself remained<br />
adamant.<br />
The matter was complicated by the rumours regarding the anti-Dutch<br />
intrigues of the United States which in all probability had taken root in<br />
Jeddah and were even being confirmed from the Saudi Arabian side.<br />
The new French Foreign Minister, Jean Sauvagnargues, had also referred<br />
to these rumours. 82<br />
In London, suggestions of American double-dealing were being treated<br />
cautiously. The idea was not considered probable, although it could<br />
well be that the usa, given the undesirability of a Euro-Arab dialogue,<br />
was not exerting itself as strenuously as it might to get the lifting of the<br />
embargo discussed as a matter of urgency. 83 Yet the reports persisted. The<br />
Algerian Ambassador in Peking also confirmed this reading of the American<br />
role, adding that this attitude was mainly due to the influence exerted<br />
by the American-Arab oil company Aramco. 84<br />
A short time later, however, the Saudi Minister Saqqaf spoke of The<br />
Netherlands in a rather more conciliatory fashion. There were deliberations<br />
within the Dutch Foreign Ministry over the possibility of offering<br />
Saqqaf a ‘face-saving’ formula in the guise of a letter reiterating the Dutch<br />
standpoint, but Van der Stoel would not hear of this initiative. ‘In the<br />
248
light of earlier experience with the Saudis on this point,’ he said, ‘I think it<br />
would be extremely dangerous.’ It could create the impression that a price<br />
can still be demanded for the lifting of the embargo. 85<br />
In fact, it was decided at the oapec meeting on July 10 that the embargo<br />
against both Denmark and The Netherlands should be lifted. Little attention<br />
was paid to the matter within the Arab countries since for some<br />
time the embargo had been regarded as an affair superseded by other<br />
events, and moreover, it had for some time no longer been observed by<br />
many countries. By this time, most other anti-Dutch measures in Arab<br />
countries had also been rescinded. The boycott of klm by Libya had been<br />
lifted at the end of April, though in Iraq this did not happen till August,<br />
and the boycott of Dutch shipping by dock-workers in Libya was not<br />
withdrawn until September.<br />
On the day the embargo was lifted, NRC Handelsblad wrote that ‘a political<br />
comic strip that has scarcely any comparison in the entire history of<br />
Dutch foreign policy’ had now reached its end. Future historians would<br />
undoubtedly be poring over the days of ‘grandeur et misère behind the<br />
dykes’. Besides which, according to NRC Handelsblad, the Arab attitude<br />
had also been based on the knowledge that plans for a Euro-Arab dialogue<br />
could only be implemented if the embargo were lifted. 86<br />
The Energy Co-ordination Group<br />
The Netherlands was of course much relieved at the lifting of the embargo.<br />
But in one respect The Hague could also be satisfied. A day before the<br />
end of the embargo, during a meeting in Brussels, the twelve countries<br />
that made up the Energy Co-ordinating Group (ecg) had decided ‘in<br />
principle to pool member nations’ oil resources in the event of a future energy<br />
crisis’. 87 The ecg talks had by that time got into their stride. On the<br />
basis of a Foreign Affairs note, this progress was discussed in the Council<br />
of Ministers in The Hague on June 14.<br />
There were still several important problems on the horizon, said the<br />
note. There was little chance of talks between producers and consumers<br />
in the foreseeable future. During the special session, it had been evident<br />
that the time was not yet ripe for a special summit devoted to energy, involving<br />
producers, consumers and developing countries. There was little<br />
enthusiasm, especially in Washington and London. Nor did the producer<br />
countries seem very keen; they seemed rather to want to maintain a free<br />
hand. Within the ecg it was sometimes wondered whether there was any<br />
249
point in pursuing a dialogue with the producers, not least because by this<br />
time the oil prices had begun to fall again. From the Western point of<br />
view, such talks were no longer urgent, but for The Netherlands such a<br />
discussion was still desirable, at least if a clash with the producer countries<br />
could thereby be avoided.<br />
Ideas on the role and status of the international oil companies had been<br />
widely discussed within the ecg. A report on this was drawn up, with the<br />
most important conclusion that the consumer lands had to form a closer,<br />
more collective relationship with these companies which, it was taken for<br />
granted, would continue to play a central role in the future. It was not the<br />
aim to interfere with the power of the oil companies. What was needed<br />
was to set up an effective international system of information. 88<br />
This view conformed entirely with the interests and standpoint that<br />
The Hague had always advanced throughout the oil crisis. The most important<br />
problem the Den Uyl Cabinet had had to wrestle with had been in<br />
dependence on the oil companies for information, a state of affairs that<br />
had bred insecurity and distrust. The delegation in the ecg, in the view of<br />
the Dutch Cabinet, should therefore urge that the oil companies be legally<br />
compelled to divulge information in times of crisis. This might have to<br />
happen through a mutual adjustment of the different national legislations.<br />
More generally, and preferably within the context of the oecd, a<br />
code of behaviour should be introduced that would hold not only in times<br />
of crisis. 89<br />
In mid-July it was evident that the ecg had largely succeeded in reaching<br />
an accord on an Integrated Emergency Programme that, inter alia,<br />
provided for the sharing of oil in cases of serious reductions in the oil supply.<br />
The programme was based on three basic principles: 1) participant<br />
countries, in proportion to their normal imports, must lay up a stock of<br />
oil for a number of days to be determined later; 2) they must jointly reduce<br />
consumption if the oil provision for the entire Group should fall below a<br />
certain percentage, viz. 7%; and 3) subject to decisions to the contrary,<br />
the participants commit themselves in such cases to switch to oil-sharing<br />
according to an automatic formula.<br />
To an extent, this scheme corresponded with the allocation scheme already<br />
worked out within the oecd prior to the oil crisis. It was even more<br />
comprehensive, since the obligations to lay in stocks and to limit consumption<br />
in a crisis situation were now defined and incorporated into the<br />
allocation ratios. According to the Dutch Foreign Ministry, this was<br />
cause for satisfaction, because agreement now seemed possible for an<br />
Emergency Programme that would serve to anchor the solidarity of the<br />
250
participant countries. The Council of Ministers shared this positive assessment.<br />
Finally, the ecg was to draft an International Energy Programme that<br />
would be based on the International Energy Agency (iea) founded in November<br />
1974. The iea was a combination of the most important consumer<br />
countries that between them accounted for 80% of the world’s oil<br />
consumption. It was in fact a consumer front against the producers. In<br />
principle, all oecd members could be members of the iea. Only France<br />
declined the privilege, although because of its ec membership Paris<br />
nonetheless remained closely involved with the work of the iea. 90<br />
Conclusion<br />
With this accord, the adventure of the oil crisis arrived back in port, a<br />
journey that had reached an end in every way satisfactory to The Netherlands.<br />
With the iea, an organisation joining forces had come into being,<br />
just what The Hague had been advocating for so long. There was no more<br />
question of a European power-combine, independent from the usa, being<br />
linked to any Euro-Arab dialogue. The Netherlands had played an active<br />
role throughout the oil crisis by blocking such an association, as proposed<br />
in particular by Paris. Of course, this opposition was not the only reason<br />
for the failure of the French objectives.<br />
As we saw earlier, political relations within the ec had by this time undergone<br />
remarkable changes. In the three largest member states, power<br />
had passed to different political leaders than those at the beginning of the<br />
crisis. Compared with their predecessors, the new leaders seemed much<br />
keener on preserving good relations with the usa. A period of mounting<br />
conflict within the Atlantic world seemed to have passed. The oil crisis, in<br />
various respects, had been the nadir of Euro-American tension during<br />
this period.<br />
Mutual Western divisions, as was emphasized by Economic Affairs especially,<br />
had contributed to a weakening of the Western position vis-à-vis<br />
the countries of the Third World and to a growing non-Western selfawareness.<br />
The actions of opec were in several respects an example and a<br />
symbol of this new self-awareness. In the continuation of the opec actions,<br />
the Group of 77 uncommitted non-Western countries formulated<br />
the struggle for a New International Economic Order. It was especially<br />
Washington that set itself against this non-Western effort to achieve an international<br />
economic redistribution.<br />
251
Within the Den Uyl government in The Netherlands, there were different<br />
opinions on this question. Pronk sympathised with the ambitions of<br />
the nieo. From this perspective he also understood the measures that<br />
opec had taken. Lubbers, on the contrary, argued for further development<br />
of the arrangements made in Washington and was more disposed<br />
toward a consumers’ front. The Cabinet supported the effort to get the<br />
whole energy problem dealt with in the un General Assembly, but Van<br />
der Stoel arrived at this position through more opportunistic, diplomatic<br />
considerations than Pronk: this attitude might, after all, contribute to<br />
ending the embargo. The strategy worked. Algeria decided in March that<br />
the embargo had to be lifted, and as a quid pro quo The Netherlands supported<br />
Bouteflika’s candidature for the chairmanship of the General Assembly<br />
and also attempted to reach agreement with Algeria in the World<br />
Bank.<br />
But for the time being there was no lifting of the embargo. It was mainly<br />
Saudi Arabia (possibly egged on by Washington) that resisted the decision<br />
to lift the embargo. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait declined to vote for abrogation<br />
for the specific purpose of thwarting the so-called Euro-Arab dialogue,<br />
which had been principally decided to be set up in the context of<br />
European Political Cooperation. Effectively blocking this dialogue was a<br />
cause for considerable satisfaction on the part of the Americans. It is<br />
therefore hardly surprising that The Hague should find American attempts<br />
to get the embargo lifted – to say the least – rather ineffective.<br />
During the last phase of the embargo, The Hague played a rather remarkable<br />
role, a role which, as was remarked earlier, can be seen as very<br />
useful for Dutch interests in the international oil sector. In the Dutch<br />
Cabinet, and particularly, in the case of Van der Stoel, there was little feeling<br />
for a Euro-Arab dialogue. The latter in fact declined, with not too<br />
much hesitation, to adopt the advice given by his civil servants and diplomats<br />
to make some gesture toward the Arab countries. The second letter<br />
to King Feisal was nonetheless a moment that Van der Stoel’s tactics came<br />
closest to those of various other ec countries, such as West Germany. But<br />
with head held high, Van der Stoel declared in ministerial council on July<br />
12 that The Netherlands ‘had not demeaned itself’ in the way that certain<br />
other European countries most certainly had. 91 It had in fact been neither<br />
necessary nor advisable.<br />
The pressure to get the embargo lifted by this stage was slackening.<br />
The oil was again arriving in the usual vast quantities in the port of Rotterdam<br />
and had already reached its normal level by April. In all probability,<br />
even for those countries that had not wanted to lift the embargo, it had<br />
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only had political significance. In any case, in the spring of 1974 the oil<br />
supplies in the Botlek area reached record highs and lay dozens percent<br />
higher than in 1973. This is not to say that the decision to lift the embargo<br />
on July 10 was not greeted with considerable relief in The Hague. In all,<br />
the embargo against The Netherlands had lasted more than eight months.<br />
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Conclusion<br />
In many respects, The Netherlands came through the oil crisis rather well.<br />
The embargo soon proved ineffective, in the sense that Dutch oil imports<br />
at the end of 1973 were no more seriously depleted than those of other<br />
Western countries. Indeed, compared with several other West European<br />
countries, the oil supply to The Netherlands looked rather healthy. In a<br />
book on the oil crisis written from an Arab perspective, the conclusion<br />
was correctly drawn that ‘friendly states’ in Western Europe had suffered<br />
more from an embargo laid against The Netherlands than had The<br />
Netherlands itself. 1<br />
Through the months of October 1973 to the spring of 1974, the oil<br />
supply to Western Europe as a whole was probably not much lower than<br />
during the same period of the previous year. In all West European countries,<br />
oil supplies in this period remained more or less at the normal level.<br />
In some, partly as a result of the usual increase in winter use, the level<br />
dipped: most of all in Belgium, and to a lesser degree in France and Great<br />
Britain. The Netherlands in fact came off rather well: stocks in The<br />
Netherlands remained virtually normal. 2<br />
The oil embargo was more a matter of image projection and intimidation.<br />
It was mainly the fearful expectations that diminished so drastically,<br />
while in practice the oil supply itself surprisingly remained at a satisfactory<br />
level. This is not to say that there was no cause for alarm. The embargo<br />
was undoubtedly an action of a highly threatening kind. Nor were the<br />
pessimistic predictions of the Central Planning Bureau lies. Moreover, in<br />
December the oil supply to Rotterdam fell by a large percentage over a<br />
very short time. It was in these straightened circumstances that the Den<br />
Uyl Cabinet adopted drastic measures – the introduction of rationing and<br />
the Enabling Act. The oil, however, came rather swiftly back on stream.<br />
The Cabinet realised this, which was one of the reasons for the secrecy<br />
surrounding the figures relating to the oil supply.<br />
255
Summarising, we can say that the oil embargo against The Netherlands<br />
did not work; and the most important reason for this failure was<br />
that the oil companies decided to spread the oil scarcity. In addition, it<br />
was from the outset the question of whether those countries participating<br />
in the embargo were really prepared to exercise control over the transport<br />
of oil to those countries against which the embargo had been imposed. Because<br />
the oil companies switched to rescheduling the oil supply, it is very<br />
well possible that – just as in the usa – oil may have arrived in The<br />
Netherlands from embargoing states.<br />
The real sting in the Arab action, however, was the unilaterally declared<br />
price increases. These higher prices were to have major consequences<br />
for the Dutch economy, though they hit The Netherlands no<br />
harder than other oil-importing countries. Moreover, The Netherlands<br />
had the additional advantage that the prices of natural gas could, in the<br />
short term at least, be linked to the price of oil. Subsequently, therefore,<br />
things worked out quite well. Even the fear that the position of Rotterdam<br />
as a port and of the Botlek area as a whole might suffer proved to be<br />
unfounded. When in July the embargo was eventually lifted, Rotterdam’s<br />
central position in the international oil sector was unaffected.<br />
As Van der Stoel had maintained in the Council of Ministers, therefore,<br />
the Dutch government had not needed to demean itself in the way<br />
that some other countries had done. The Cabinet and Van der Stoel, in<br />
fact, had with considerable care managed to manoeuvre their way<br />
through the crisis. When Voorhoeve singled out Van der Stoel’s policy as<br />
an example of blatant moral intransigence in the face of Dutch economic<br />
interests, this accusation already sounded facile. There had been genuine<br />
attempts to conciliate the Arab countries. The second letter to Feisal (see<br />
Chapter 8) in fact went so far that it was scarcely distinguishable from<br />
the line taken by some other ec member states – such as West Germany –<br />
that had been so roundly cursed by The Hague.<br />
The Dutch government, the Foreign Ministry in particular, had to<br />
navigate between the demands of the Arab countries on the one hand and<br />
those of the Chamber and public opinion on the other. The so-called<br />
Thurkow affair should also be seen in this light. But at the same time it<br />
has to be said that Van der Stoel certainly did not go as far as some of his<br />
advisors and diplomats had wanted. In the main he resisted the pressure<br />
openly and explicitly to satisfy the demands of the Arab countries. It was<br />
his view, and not without reason, that for The Netherlands to concede to<br />
these demands would only lead to further demands.<br />
It was just possible that the Arabs were not primarily concerned with<br />
256
the Dutch policy over the Middle East conflict and Israel at all. Van der<br />
Stoel was convinced that the embargo had already been prepared well before<br />
October. In his judgement, given the transit function of the Botlek<br />
area and Rotterdam, the aim of the embargo against The Netherlands<br />
was to put pressure on the whole of Western Europe. The objectives behind<br />
the action were political as well as economic.<br />
As we saw earlier, it is not easy to settle on a definitive account of the<br />
role and the specific aims of the Arab oil-producing countries. For a start,<br />
and this was the view of Dutch diplomats at the time, there were significant<br />
differences between the various countries involved; in addition to<br />
which the attitude of some of these states changed during the crisis. The<br />
oil crisis was therefore a rather complicated power game, which made it<br />
particularly difficult for the Den Uyl Cabinet to undertake any action via<br />
diplomatic means.<br />
In this regard, it would be interesting to compare the objectives (as well<br />
as the self-perception) of the embargo against The Netherlands with that<br />
against Denmark. It should also be noted that the Den Uyl government<br />
never once attempted to collaborate with this other North-West European<br />
victim of the Arab action. At any rate, we have been unable to find<br />
anything in the Dutch archives over any such attempt. 3<br />
But it was not only the Arab countries that were divided among themselves.<br />
The same was true of the ec countries. It rapidly became apparent<br />
that no-one could count on European solidarity. Within the ec, it was a<br />
matter rather of ‘every man for himself’; or worse, some partners, France<br />
in particular, were possibly exploiting the situation in order to undermine<br />
the position of Rotterdam as an oil port. The British government also<br />
tried to force the oil companies to leave The Netherlands in the lurch. The<br />
oil crisis showed once again that the ec, when it came to the crunch, was<br />
not prepared to close ranks.<br />
There were complaints in The Hague over the lack of ‘European solidarity’,<br />
but this was more for public consumption than an expression of<br />
real disillusion, for the attitude in the Dutch Council of Ministers was<br />
business-like and aimed at the defence of the national economic interest.<br />
The government’s efforts in this direction were such that oil transit and<br />
oil products had to be more sharply reduced than domestic consumption.<br />
In case of emergency, the government was even considering requisitioning<br />
foreign oil stocks stored in the Botlek area. In any case, the West Germans,<br />
Belgians and even the French dependence on Dutch natural gas and<br />
Dutch transit were used to persuade these countries to adopt a more pro-<br />
Dutch attitude. As a Dutch Foreign Ministry memorandum put it: ‘maxi-<br />
257
mum use was made of the uncertainty as to whether the oil destined for<br />
transit also fell under the embargo’. 4<br />
Yet it would be going too far to attribute the relatively satisfactory outcome<br />
to the crisis mainly to the performance of the Den Uyl Cabinet. One<br />
could equally conclude that the Dutch government and Foreign Minister<br />
Van der Stoel clung far too long to the illusion that The Netherlands’ ec<br />
partners could be brought over to share their view of ‘solidarity’; while<br />
the pursuit of ‘sharing’ can only be seen as pointless or even damaging to<br />
the Dutch case.<br />
The satisfactory oil supply was in the first place the result of the oil<br />
companies’ policy, especially of Shell and bp. Once it became apparent<br />
that the oil shortage was to be shared out by the oil companies more or<br />
less equally over their West European customers, The Hague’s need for<br />
‘solidarity’ rather rapidly evaporated. In December, the Council of Ministers<br />
realised that the ‘invisible hand’ of the oil companies was rather<br />
more useful than the ec partners’ ‘visible hand’. Accordingly, there was<br />
little disappointment over the less than successful issue of the ec Summit,<br />
held in mid-December in Copenhagen.<br />
Some members of the Council of Ministers, not least of whom Den Uyl<br />
himself, had difficulties with this dependence on the oil companies. 5 In<br />
fact, it was later urged within the Energy Co-ordinating Group that these<br />
oil companies should be compelled in whatever way to provide information.<br />
And yet the freedom of action of the oil companies proved to be in<br />
the Dutch interest. Possible ec interventions, with an eye to the relatively<br />
favourable energy situation in The Netherlands and the Dutch production<br />
of natural gas, could well have led to disadvantageous complications.<br />
In his discussion with Heath, therefore, Den Uyl could not avoid arguing<br />
for the maintenance of that freedom, a standpoint that would certainly<br />
have astonished any Dutch voter who still remembered the 1972<br />
election manifesto Turning Point ’72.<br />
TheDen Uyl Cabinet therefore, unlike the French, argued for the maintenance<br />
of existing arrangements in the international oil sector. This policy<br />
fitted the traditional, liberal standpoint that previous Dutch governmentshad<br />
also adopted. Initially, at least, the Council of Ministers argued<br />
for some action to be taken by the European Commission, but there was<br />
no need for this to be part of any reform-minded ec energy policy. The attempted<br />
economic approach to theArab oil producers, independently of<br />
the usa,wasalsoviewedfromThe Hague with distrust. On the contrary,<br />
the Dutch government lent its support to Kissinger’s attempts to reassert<br />
American leadership by means of an Energy Conference convened in<br />
Washington.<br />
258
The Dutch oil interests were of course the most important reason for<br />
this attitude. More generally, there was the fear of growing rivalry and<br />
chaos within the world economy. Above all, there was the threat of Western<br />
divisions, of the kind seen in the West European ‘bilateral oil diplomacy’.<br />
Ministers in Den Uyl’s Cabinet concerned with the crisis, however,<br />
held that American leadership was more important than Western division<br />
and impotence. Some even hoped that the United States would make<br />
concessions to the Third World, though this turned out to be an illusion,<br />
much to the disappointment of Van der Stoel among others.<br />
This did not mean that the American government’s position could be<br />
blindly trusted in all respects. During the last months of the embargo, the<br />
remarkable situation arose that the continuing embargo against The<br />
Netherlands could be exploited as a diplomatic means of preventing a<br />
closer European approach to the Arab countries. In this situation, the<br />
roles in the Arab world began to turn around. The original instigators of<br />
the embargo, such as Algeria, now began to urge that it be withdrawn,<br />
since continuing the embargo stood in the way of the Euro-Arab dialogue.<br />
There was one clear exception to this general rule of the Dutch Atlantic<br />
orientation, and that was the Cabinet’s view of the initiative to call a special<br />
session of the un General Assembly. Nixon and Kissinger rejected<br />
this idea. Within the Council of Ministers, their scepticism was shared by<br />
Lubbers, but the PvdA ministers, Pronk above all, had more sympathy for<br />
this endeavour to involve the Third World more. Van der Stoel and the<br />
Dutch Foreign Affairs chiefs were of the same mind, albeit out of more<br />
opportunistic motives.<br />
Besides, the debates over the special session cannot properly be judged<br />
unless we pay far more attention to the major changes that seemed to be<br />
taking place in world politics at large. At the beginning of the 1970s, the<br />
predominant fear in The Hague – and in the Ministry for Economic Affairs<br />
– was that the structure of the post-war world economic order was<br />
under pressure. The years of American hegemony, backed by such international<br />
organisations as the imf and the World Bank, seemed to be coming<br />
to an end. American–European relations were tense, and the nonaligned<br />
nations of the Third World, partly in response to this Western disunity,<br />
were demanding a New International Economic Order.<br />
In this respect, the position of the Den Uyl Cabinet was ambiguous. In<br />
a certain sense, the Cabinet was itself the product of these changes that<br />
seemed to be taking place in the world at this time. Pronk in particular<br />
personified the willingness to go some way to meet the demands of the<br />
259
Third World countries, a readiness which went so far as to generate a certain<br />
sympathy for opec’s actions. Yet most of the Dutch Cabinet members<br />
adopted a very cautious stance toward the special session of the General<br />
Assembly.<br />
The attitude of the Den Uyl Cabinet toward the oil crisis was certainly<br />
not morally inspired, nor was there any question of preaching or of any<br />
exalted ideological aims. Any ideological luxury, after all, is scarcely possible<br />
when such enormous economic interests are at stake. Neither can we<br />
agree with the suggestion of R. Vernon that the Dutch government was<br />
‘less knowledgeable, less powerful, and less prepared to act on oil matters’<br />
than the British. 6 The manner in which goal-directed power politics<br />
were employed, or attempted, by Den Uyl’s Dutch Cabinet was just as<br />
business-like as that of any other West European government.<br />
Support for Israel might at first sight seem to contradict this assertion.<br />
The pro-Israeli attitude of the Den Uyl Cabinet may even have been damaging<br />
to Dutch economic interests. During the most ominous days of the<br />
oil crisis, the Dutch government was accused of paying too little attention<br />
to these interests. Indeed, Den Uyl’s government did go rather far in its offer<br />
of support to Israel. In secret a considerable quantity of arms and especially<br />
munitions, for The Netherlands at least, was delivered: Stemerdink<br />
points out that after the deliveries to Israel ‘all the depots were empty’. In<br />
this action, The Netherlands assumed a strikingly different position from<br />
other ec countries. Only from West Germany – in all probability – were<br />
American arms and American material transferred to Israel. Moreover,<br />
Van der Stoel went further, trying to assist Israel on the diplomatic front,<br />
in the first place by blocking a joint French-British ec representation in<br />
the Security Council, much to the astonishment of some of his diplomats,<br />
such as Fack and Van der Klaauw.<br />
What was the source of this pro-Israeli attitude? One can first of all<br />
point to the traditional Dutch bond with Israel. Although this ‘special relationship’<br />
had become somewhat weaker in the preceding years, these relations<br />
undoubtedly played a role in the arms deliveries. In the second<br />
place, the land of kibbutzim was popular with the Dutch Labour Party.<br />
Van der Stoel’s attitude, especially his refusal to accede to the more pro-<br />
Arab advice from the top echelon of the Dutch Ministry for Foreign Affairs,<br />
can be partly explained by the existing bond between the PvdA and<br />
the Israeli Labour Party. 7<br />
However, in several respects the support for Israel did not represent a<br />
departure from the broader objectives of Dutch policy in the face of the<br />
oil crisis. We were able to remark that the arms deliveries to Israel took<br />
260
place with the support of the usa and even at the urging of the Americans,<br />
even though at the time probably only very few individuals knew this. But<br />
more generally, the Dutch Cabinet and Van der Stoel followed the American<br />
line on the Middle East. In part, this was a consequence of the usual<br />
basic Atlantic assumptions, but this approach meshed perfectly with<br />
Dutch interests in the international oil sector, in particular The Hague’s<br />
rejection of an independent European economic and political rapprochement<br />
with the Arab countries over the head of the United States. The<br />
Netherlands adopted an Atlantic stance, supporting the Americans’ superpower<br />
role in the Middle East and rejected a Euro-Arab dialogue as<br />
much out of political as out of economic considerations.<br />
In general, the actions of the Den Uyl Cabinet in international affairs<br />
can be judged business-like and goal-directed. A similar conclusion, however,<br />
would be less justified when it came to domestic measures. Rationing,<br />
in particular, was unnecessary. In the first instance, though, government<br />
action was effective. During the first phase of the car-free Sundays,<br />
the government succeeded in compensating for the reduction in the<br />
oil supply by reducing domestic consumption. In this equation, though, it<br />
must also be noted that the transit and export of oil and oil products probably<br />
declined more sharply than the supply of oil, so that Dutch stocks at<br />
the end of the year had not or had hardly been affected.<br />
Reviewing the figures for oil supply, it might justifiably be concluded<br />
that there had in fact never been any real supply crisis. The fact that the<br />
Cabinet nevertheless took action to reduce the level of domestic consumption<br />
is understandable in the light of the threatening attitude the Arab oil<br />
exporters appeared to take. Foresight, after all, is the essence of government.<br />
Furthermore, the oil supply was in very short order much reduced<br />
in December. The measures restricting oil use were therefore not useless.<br />
Other measures to deal with the temporary reduction in the oil supply<br />
and oil processing – by means of direct talks between those concerned<br />
presided over by the Ministry for Economic Affairs – served an important<br />
purpose. Later on, the government could happily acknowledge that the<br />
setting up of a National Office for Chemical Products had become superfluous.<br />
But it soon became apparent that the embargo was ineffective and that<br />
the restriction on the oil supply would be merely temporary. There was oil<br />
enough. Before the oil crisis began, the oil companies had shipped extra<br />
stocks of oil to The Netherlands, which was no more than normal procedure<br />
in connection with the approaching winter. In 1973 there was an additional<br />
reason to maximalize stocks: the threatening price increases.<br />
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Moreover, rumours had for some time been circulating over a possible<br />
‘political use of the oil weapon’. All in all, stocks at the beginning of January<br />
1974 stood at a reassuringly high level, 8 while at the same time signs<br />
of recovery in the oil supply were evident. As we have seen, it was also evident<br />
within the Dutch Ministry for Economic Affairs that there was no<br />
depletion of oil stocks. In fact, shortly afterwards, stocks were found to<br />
be higher than the previous year. Rumours were circulating to the effect<br />
that oil tankers lay waiting before the coast because storage tanks were<br />
overfull.<br />
The introduction of rationing was therefore a superfluous measure,<br />
decided at a moment when the oil supply did indeed appear to be waning.<br />
The PvdA faction in the Second Chamber later concluded that the government’s<br />
analysis, set out in the December note ‘Restriction of the oil<br />
supply and its consequences’, was faulty. The conclusion that a 30 to<br />
35% reduction in oil use had to be achieved was a gross exaggeration. 9<br />
By the end of January 1974, there was absolutely no further need to proceed<br />
with the whole exercise. No neighbouring country resorted to such<br />
measures; the Dutch government here was completely out of step.<br />
Nor were all ministers by that time convinced of the need for rationing.<br />
Lubbers, in particular, had his doubts, subsequently dismissed by Rutten,<br />
the Economics Affairs secretary-general and chairman of the Co-ordination<br />
Group, as ‘loss of nerve’. 10 The chief reasons for going through<br />
with the plan seem to be all the infrastructural preparation and the concomitant<br />
‘credibility’ of the Cabinet. In the eyes of top Economics Affairs<br />
officials like Rutten, it was mainly the credibility of the Ministry of Economics<br />
Affairs that was at stake. Eventually, all Cabinet members agreed<br />
to push ahead with rationing, albeit for rather different reasons. Van der<br />
Stoel thought calling off rationing would have a provocative effect on the<br />
Arab states, since it would amount to a declaration in so many words that<br />
the embargo did not work.<br />
During the Cabinet discussions over rationing, it became clear that<br />
there was considerable scepticism over the figures furnished by the oil<br />
companies. On several occasions, attempts were made to get further supplementary<br />
information, for example through the pilot service. There<br />
was also mistrust between the different departments involved. Westerterp,<br />
apparently, had little faith in the data on oil stocks and supplies used<br />
by Economic Affairs (originally supplied by the oil companies).<br />
At such moments, interdepartmental mistrust between the Dutch<br />
Ministries of Economic Affairs and Foreign Affairs also surfaced publicly.<br />
Before the oil crisis, as we have seen in Chapter 1, Economic Affairs<br />
262
had primacy in matters international arising from the oil problem. During<br />
the crisis, however, Foreign Affairs came to play a more prominent<br />
role, which was regarded with a somewhat jaundiced eye by the other<br />
Ministry. Against this background, it is remarkable that all the reassuring<br />
reports on the embargo reaching Foreign Affairs should have played no<br />
part in the decision-making over rationing. Willemsen, the chairman of<br />
the Co-ordination Group, later expressed his opinion that Rutten considered<br />
any doubt cast on the figures furnished by Economic Affairs as an attack<br />
on the competence of the Ministry in its management of the consumption-limiting<br />
measures. 11<br />
Rationing lasted but a brief period before ending in chaos and civil disobedience.<br />
The oil companies, who had originally urged more far-reaching<br />
measures than the car-free Sundays, were partly instrumental in putting<br />
the skids under the rationing system. This is not to deny that the<br />
measures introduced to reduce consumption were successful up to a point<br />
and that they helped to produce the unexpectedly favourable stockpile<br />
position. These stocks undoubtedly contributed to the record profits<br />
booked by the oil companies in the year 1974. Large stocks at a time of<br />
rapidly increasing oil prices could only benefit the companies, a fact<br />
which, naturally, did not escape the attention of some members of the<br />
Dutch Cabinet. As a former advisor to Den Uyl later put it: ‘You don’t<br />
have to be an economist to see that’. 12<br />
Although the longer-term consequences of the oil crisis fall beyond the<br />
scope of this book, we would nevertheless like to close with a few observations<br />
on this aspect. We have already remarked that the oil crisis heralded<br />
a turning point in the development of international relations: the failure<br />
of the ec’s effort to develop a greater political independence from the<br />
usa. The oil crisis took place at a remarkable moment. The Western<br />
world seemed to find itself in an increasingly weaker position. Above all,<br />
the power of the United States appeared to be on the wane. The egregious<br />
American setback in Vietnam was an example and a symbol of this. The<br />
non-Western countries, both the communist states and the countries of<br />
the Third World, had become stronger. The actions of the Arab oil states<br />
were a product of these circumstances and seemed only to amplify this<br />
weakness in the West.<br />
In the face of these challenges, the West could only respond with discord<br />
and division. There were conflicts between the United States and<br />
Western Europe. According to the French historian Grosser, 1973 was<br />
the andiron of post-war American-European relations. Despite all their<br />
best intentions, the ec states were unable to cooperate more effectively<br />
263
(as an alternative to the Pax Atlantica), whether in tackling common energy<br />
problems or in relation to the epc. The oil crisis was merely the proof<br />
of this discord.<br />
In the spring of 1974, more pro-Atlantic leaders assumed power in<br />
three major ec countries: Wilson, Schmidt and Giscard d’Estaing. This<br />
development put an end to the pursuit of an independent ec energy policy.<br />
Actions to reach a certain tuning of energy policy within the Western<br />
world would subsequently be taken in the Energy Co-ordinating Group<br />
and lead to the setting up of the International Energy Agency.<br />
The days of the worst splits in the Western world were past. Recovery<br />
of Western unity went hand in hand with the end of European manoeuvring<br />
in the Arab direction. There would also be no New International<br />
Economic Order. As was remarked at the Dutch Ministry of Economic<br />
Affairs, Western discord had been an important cause of the search for a<br />
nieo. The oil crisis was also an important turning point as far as this was<br />
concerned. The opec measures, both a consequence of and a means to<br />
exploit mutual Western rivalries, in the end drove the Western countries<br />
back together.<br />
In The Netherlands, the events of 1973 and 1974 were to echo and reecho<br />
for a long time to come. In subsequent years, different lessons were<br />
drawn from the whole experience of the oil crisis, one of the more obvious<br />
being that in the future, energy matters would have to be treated in a<br />
cleaner and more efficient way. Already in the period dealt with here, action<br />
was taken to rein in the unrestricted growth of energy consumption.<br />
Within a fairly reasonable time, this would lead to the better insulation of<br />
homes, among other measures.<br />
In the Hague, the oil crisis ensured a new awareness that the Western<br />
oil-consuming countries were vulnerable. In the years after 1973-74, attempts<br />
were also made by the Dutch government to improve relations<br />
with the Arab world. The Dutch position on the Middle East conflict<br />
would slowly but surely shift in a direction more favourable to the Arab<br />
countries. 13 In addition, development aid would be offered to Egypt, even<br />
though the latter hardly belonged to the poorest of the developing nations.<br />
Nonetheless, Egypt was selected in the latter part of 1974 as a land<br />
of special help, as a part of a policy of reconciliation by the Dutch government<br />
in relation to the Arab world.<br />
264
Notes<br />
Notes Chapter 1<br />
1 nmfa, Embassy archives Jerusalem (hereafter paj), Code 921.322, Folder MO<br />
Conflict I, 8-X-73 thru 31- X 73, Jongejans to nmfa, no. 26, 09/10/73. See for the<br />
plan for a pre-emptive strike: Bar-Siman-Tov, 1987, pp. 188-194. Meir told Den<br />
Uyl later that she was informed about the upcoming attack fifteen hours before<br />
this happened. However, she had decided against a pre-emptive strike. See iisg,<br />
Archive Van Thijn, Inv. no. 13, Diary entry, 12/11/73.<br />
2 See for the battle: Aker, 1985, pp. 72-105.<br />
3 Garthoff, 1985, pp. 368-372.<br />
4 This decision was probably also influenced by the wish to turn away the attention<br />
from the Watergate scandal. See: Gaddis, 1978 , p. 275.<br />
5 Garthoff, 1985, pp. 376-382.<br />
6 Lebow and Gross Stein, 1994, p. 151.<br />
7 Lebow and Gross Stein, 1994, pp. 165-166.<br />
8 Lebow and Gross Stein, 1994, pp. 185-186.<br />
9 Grosser, 1978, p. 350.<br />
10 Soetendorp, 1982, passim; Schaper, ‘Nederland’, pp. 229-242 and Grünfeld,<br />
1991, passim.<br />
11 Hellema, 1990, passim. In the Netherlands the nationalization of the Suez Canal<br />
company was seen as an act which corresponded with the policy of the Indonesian<br />
president Sukarno.<br />
12 Schaper, ‘Nederland’, pp. 235-238.<br />
13 Rusman, ‘Dilemma’s’, pp. 171-180.<br />
14 Het Parool, 27/09/93 and Peeters, pp. 208-218.<br />
15 amd (Archives Ministry of Defence), Ministeriële Beschikking, no. V96007435,<br />
Memorandum by the Military Intelligence Service (Militaire Inlichtingendienst,<br />
mid) about the training of Israeli military at the octd, 14/11/95. The three to<br />
265
four groups consisted of eighteen to twenty persons, with military personnel of<br />
various ranks. An Israeli major once flew in from West Germany to attend an exercise.<br />
The length of the training, according to mid documents, lasted five weeks<br />
at the Doumoulin barracks in Soesterberg.<br />
16 See, Het Parool, 25/09/93.<br />
17 Rusman, ‘Dilemma’s’, p. 168.<br />
18 nmfa, PAJ, Code 921.322, Folder MO-Conflict I, 8-X-73 thru 31- X 73, Jongejans<br />
to nmfa, no. 24, 06/10/73, Van der Stoel to Jerusalem, no. 7. 06/10/73,<br />
Jongejans to Den Haag, no. 37589, 07/10/73.<br />
19 nmfa, Code 999.224, Folder 1250, VN/Midden-Oosten, Part XII, Van der Stoel<br />
to New York, no. 263, 07/10/73.<br />
20 That was the situation before the outbreak of the war.<br />
21 Archives Prime Minister’s Office (hereafter KMP), Beschikking no. 14988, Memorandum<br />
‘Conclusions of the meeting as 8 October’, top secret, 09/11/73.<br />
22 nmfa, Code 999.224, Folder 1250, VN/Midden-Oosten, part XII, Van der Stoel<br />
to New York, no. 266, 08/10/73.<br />
23 nmfa, PAJ, Code 921.322, Folder “MO-Conflict I, 8-X-73 thru 31- X 73’, memorandum<br />
for the press, 08/10/73.<br />
24 nmfa, Record Group IV, Code 101, Folder 485, Het Nederlandse beleid tijdens<br />
de oliecrisis 1973 - 1977, Volume I (hereafter: nmfa report on the oil crisis, Part<br />
I), p. 66.<br />
25 Grünfeld, 1991, p. 106. The Directorate-General for Political Affairs (dgpz) is<br />
the political section of the nmfa. dgpz deals with bilateral relations and security<br />
matters.<br />
26 Statement by The Netherlands government regarding the outbreak of the war,<br />
09/10/1973. Italics by the authors.<br />
27 Parliamentary proceedings (HTK), 1973-1974, p. 98.<br />
28 Fack, 1984, pp. 54-55.<br />
29 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder Midden-Oosten, Palestijns probleem, Nederlandse<br />
standpunten, Volume IV, Van der Stoel circular, no. 192, 10/10/73.<br />
30 nmfa, Code 999.224, Folder 1250, Fack to nmfa, no. 675.841, 09/10/73.<br />
31 nmfa, PAJ, Code 921.322, Folder MO-Conflict I, 8-X-73 thru 31- X 73, Jongejans<br />
to nmfa, no. 27, 09/10/73.<br />
32 nova interview with former Israeli ambassador Chanan Bar On, October 1993.<br />
33 nova interview with Bar On, October 1993 and with Van der Stoel, January<br />
1997.<br />
34 Interview with Van den Bergh, February 1997. Within the Labour Party one<br />
politician was also brought up to date. It was the parliamentary leader Ed van<br />
Thijn. According to him, Vredeling informed him several weeks after the outbreak<br />
of the war during a late night visit at his home. Interview with Van Thijn,<br />
February 1997.<br />
266
35 Every American embassy houses a number of officials who work for the Central<br />
Intelligence Agency (cia). Such a CIA station is run by the Chief of Station (cos)<br />
who has his own means of communication with cia headquarters. For The<br />
Netherlands cos: De Graaff and Wiebes, 1998, passim.<br />
36 Interviews with former cia officials, Washington, June 1997 and March 1998.<br />
37 Kruimink cannot recall what was discussed in Swift’s mansion on that Sunday,<br />
but he presumes that it dealt with the ongoing war in the Middle East. Interview<br />
with Kruimink, February 1997.<br />
38 According to Kruimink no decision was taken about the arms deliveries in the<br />
daily meetings of the Comité Verenigde Inlichtingendiensten Nederland (cvin)<br />
which co-ordinates the Netherlands intelligence activities. Letter of Kruimink to<br />
the authors, 11 February 1997.<br />
39 Letter of Van der Stoel to the authors, 26/05/1998 and interview with Vredeling,<br />
June 1998.<br />
40 iisg, Collection Den Uyl, Inv. no. 694, ‘Enkele onderwerpen die van 26 October<br />
tot 2 November 1973 in de publiciteit zijn geweest’, undated. Another indication<br />
can be found in the book by Boon who claimed that two Israeli cargo planes,<br />
which landed at Volkel, were forced to return empty. See: Boon, 1976, p. 283.<br />
41 Peeters, 1997, p. 198.<br />
42 Interview with Stemerdink, November 1996, and telephone conversation with<br />
Stemerdink, June 1998.<br />
43 Interview with Vredeling, June 1998.<br />
44 Peeters, 1997, p. 198.<br />
45 Interview with Kruimink, March 1997.<br />
46 nmfa, Code 921.320, Folder 538, Geheim memorandum van de Secretaris-Generaal<br />
van het ministerie van Defensie to de minister van Defensie, 09/10/73.<br />
47 nmfa, Code 921.320, Folder 538, Geheim memorandum van de Secretaris-Generaal<br />
van het ministerie van Defensie to de minister van Defensie, 09/10/73.<br />
48 Interview with Van der Stoel, January 1997.<br />
49 nmfa, Code 921.320, Folder 538, Memorandum dnw to dgpz, no. 90 (“zeer<br />
veel spoed”), 09/10/73.<br />
50 F.E. Kruimink, ‘Enkele factoren van belang voor het beoordelen van de vraag,<br />
wat is de waarde van 11.000 tankgranaten voor Centuriontanks’, undated (but<br />
in view of the wording probably 10 October 1973), in iisg, Collection Cees<br />
Wiebes.<br />
51 See for the importance of Centurion ammunition: Stemerdink, 1989, pp. 248-<br />
249.<br />
52 The Netherlands refused to criticize openly the French and British stance, even<br />
when Israel asked for this. See: nmfa, BZ-Rapport oliecrisis, Volume I, p. 78.<br />
53 Kruimink, ‘Enkele factoren van belang’.<br />
267
54 According to Stemerdink and Vredeling the latter had talked on Wednesday<br />
morning to Van der Stoel and Den Uyl about the delivery of arms: interviews with<br />
Stemerdink and Vredeling, November 1996 and January 1997. Van der Stoel<br />
claimed that he only once discussed this issue with Den Uyl and Vredeling. Interview<br />
Van der Stoel, January 1997.<br />
55 nmfa, Code 921.320, Folder 538, aantekeningen op Memorandum dnw/pc to<br />
dgpz, no. 90 (‘zeer veel spoed’), 09/10/73.<br />
56 nmfa, Code 921.320, Folder 538, aantekeningen op Memorandum dnw/pc to<br />
dgpz, no. 90, 09/10/73.<br />
57 Interview with Vredeling, January 1997.<br />
58 nova interview with Van der Stoel, October 1993. Italics by the authors. A remarkable<br />
statement because Meir was on the verge of executing a desperate visit<br />
to Washington in order to speed up the us deliveries of arms. Bar-Siman-Tov,<br />
1987, pp. 206-211.<br />
59 Interview with Van der Stoel, January 1997.<br />
60 Grünfeld, 1991, p. 65.<br />
61 Grünfeld, 1991, p. 65.<br />
62 Interview with Stemerdink, November 1996.<br />
63 nova interview with Stemerdink, October 1993.<br />
64 Interview with Stemerdink, November 1996.<br />
65 Interview with Stemerdink, November 1996.<br />
66 Telephone conversation with Stemerdink, June 1998.<br />
67 Telephone conversation with Peijnenburg, January 1997.<br />
68 Telephone conversation Meines, January 1997.<br />
69 nova interview with Bar On, October 1973.<br />
70 Het Parool, 25/09/93.<br />
71 Telephone conversation with Meines, January 1997.<br />
72 Letter of Kruimink to the authors, 11/02/97.<br />
73 Telephone conversation with Stemerdink, June 1998.<br />
74 According to Schulten in Het Parool, 25/09/93.<br />
75 nova interview with Vredeling, October 1993.<br />
76 Kruimink, ‘Enkele factoren van belang’.<br />
77 Kruimink, ‘Enkele factoren van belang’.<br />
78 nova interview with Bar On, October 1993.<br />
79 nmfa, Code 921.320, Folder 545 Wapenleveranties aan het Midden-Oosten, 1<br />
July 1973 t/m dec. 1974, Memorandum DNW to Van der Stoel, via dam, dgpz<br />
and S, no. 103, 02/11/73.<br />
80 HTK, 1973-1974, Aanhangsel, no. 335.<br />
81 Letter of Van der Stoel to the authors, 26/05/98.<br />
82 Telephone conversation with Stemerdink, June 1998.<br />
268
83 nova interview with Van der Stoel, October 1973.<br />
84 nova interview with Bar On, October 1973.<br />
85 Interview with Van den Bergh, February 1997.<br />
86 nmfa, PAJ, Code 921.322, Folder MO-Conflict July thru Oct. , Letter to Den<br />
Uyl, 30/10/73.<br />
87 nova interview with Bar On, October 1993.<br />
88 Letter of Lubbers to the authors, 09/02/97.<br />
89 Interview with Kruimink, March 1997.<br />
90 nmfa, Code 921.320, Folder 538 Wapenleveranties aan Israel, July 1970 to dec.<br />
1974, anonymous and undated.<br />
91 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5703, Van Lynden to nmfa, no. 804, 31/10/73.<br />
92 nmfa, BZ-Rapport oliecrisis, Volume I, p. 81.<br />
93 nmfa, Code 921.320, Folder 538, Van der Stoel to Washington, no. 362,<br />
06/11/73.<br />
94 Interview with Vredeling, January 1997.<br />
95 Interview with Van der Stoel, January 1997.<br />
96 Van der Stoel claims that in those days he presumed that Schlesinger thanked him<br />
for the Dutch willingness to open up its airspace for us planes. Letter by Van der<br />
Stoel to the authors, 26/05/98.<br />
97 nmfa, Code 921.320, Folder 545, Van der Stoel to Paris, 23/10/73.<br />
98 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5704, Van der Stoel to Gevers, no. 193,<br />
08/11/73.<br />
99 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5704, Gevers to Van der Stoel, no. 512,<br />
09/11/73.<br />
100 nmfa, Code 921.320, Folder 545, Memorandum dam to S, no. 101, 11/10/73.<br />
101 nova Interview with Yamani, October 1973.<br />
102 nmfa, Code 921.320, Folder 545, Van Hoeve to nmfa, no. 45, 16/10/73.<br />
103 nmfa, Code 921.320, Folder 545, Van der Stoel to Damascus, no. 25,<br />
17/10/73.<br />
104 nmfa, PA Algiers, Code 614.56, Box 19, Folder Arabische olieboycot, Van der<br />
Stoel to Algiers, 17/10/73.<br />
105 See for this also Chapter 3.<br />
106 nmfa, BZ-Rapport oliecrisis, Volume I, p. 69.<br />
107 Grünfeld, pp. 106-107.<br />
108 KMP, Cabinet meetings. Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, no. 6181, 12/10/73.<br />
109 nmfa, BZ-Rapport oliecrisis, Volume I, p. 71.<br />
110 Interview with Van der Stoel, January 1997.<br />
111 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder Midden-Oosten, Palestijns probleem, Nederlandse<br />
standpunten, Volume IV, Memo S to M, 17/10/73.<br />
112 nmfa, PA PVVN New York, Code 999.214 GS, Inv. no. 20, Box 2, Van der Stoel<br />
to pvvn, no. 677, 17/10/73.<br />
269
113 nfma, BZ-Rapport Oliecrisis, Volume I, p. 81.<br />
114 Grünfeld, 1991, p. 138.<br />
115 Interview with Van der Klaauw, September 1993.<br />
116 See also Chapter 2.<br />
117 KMP, Cabinet meetings. Cabinet Session, no. 6180, 19/10/73.<br />
Notes Chapter 2<br />
1 See for a general overview: Odell, 1986, pp. 11-50 and Vernon, 1976, pp. 1-72.<br />
2 Winkler Prins, 1974, p. 25 and Adelphi Paper no. 117, 1975, pp. 2-4.<br />
3 Adelphi Paper no. 117, 1975, p. 3.<br />
4 Aarts, 1996, pp. 76-78.<br />
5 Bromley, 1991, pp. 128-129 and Szyliowicz & O’Neill (ed.), 1975, pp. 52-63.<br />
6 Van Ginkel, 1978, pp. 25-34.<br />
7 Sutcliffe, 1996, pp. 202-204.<br />
8 Bromley, 1991, pp. 136-137.<br />
9 Bromley, 1991, pp. 138-139.<br />
10 Winkler Prins, 1974, p. 25 and European Report, 1973, pp. 3-4.<br />
11 Sherrill, 1983, pp. 198-199. See also: us National Archives (hereafter NA), Suitland,<br />
Maryland, Nixon Project, WHCF Subject Files, EX TA 1, Box 11, Memorandum<br />
by Love for Nixon, 30/10/73.<br />
12 International Economic Report, 1974, pp. 46-47 and 106 and Goldstein (ed.),<br />
1982, p. 73. For Japan: Adelphi Paper no. 115, 1975, pp. 25-31.<br />
13 Bromley, 1991, pp. 140-141; Oppenheim, 1976-1977, pp. 34-43 and International<br />
Economic Report, 1974, p. 48.<br />
14 Bromley, 1991, pp. 128-129.<br />
15 Yergin, 1991, pp. 590-591.<br />
16 asd, FOIA 8102540, State Department Memorandum: ‘The U.S. and the Impending<br />
Energy Crisis’, secret, 09/03/72.<br />
17 Yergin, 1991, pp. 599-602.<br />
18 Schneider, 1983, p. 38; Van Ginkel, 1978, pp. 45-50 and Vernon, 1976, pp. 182-<br />
184.<br />
19 Yergin, 1991, pp. 608-609.<br />
20 What Voorhoeve, 1985, claims on p. 239.<br />
21 Lieber, 1976, p. 37.<br />
22 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume I, pp. 34-38.<br />
23 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume I, p. 41. It concerns the Welsing report,<br />
‘De kwetsbaarheid van de Westerse aardolieaanvoer uit het Midden-Oosten en<br />
Noord-Afrika in het licht van de Sovjet-politiek’, 1971.<br />
270
24 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume I, pp. 41.<br />
25 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 8003, memorandum plan to m, r, t & z, no. 153,<br />
14/06/73.<br />
26 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 8003, memorandum plan to m, r, t & z, no. 153,<br />
14/06/73.<br />
27 nmfa, PA Algiers, Code 614.56, Box 17, Gevers to nmfa, no. 9282-942/1212,<br />
26/06/73, and Boon to Den Haag, no. 3812/893, 26/06/73.<br />
28 nmfa, PA Algiers, Code 614.56, Box 17, Van Lynden to nmfa, no. 680,<br />
20/09/73.<br />
29 aaw, Code 614.0, Folder Energie: wereldcrisis 1973/74, Kaufmann to nmfa,<br />
no. 524.99.31, 20/07/73.<br />
30 aaw, Code 614.0, Folder Energie: wereldcrisis 1973/74, Derksen to nmfa, no.<br />
1919/310, 21/07/73; Hoekman to nmfa, no. 2404/638, 21/08/73, and Renardel<br />
to nmfa, no. 1993/528, 06/08/73.<br />
31 Interview with Willemsen, February 1997.<br />
32 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6165, 12/10/73.<br />
33 nmfa, PA Algiers, Code 614.56, Box 19, Folder Arabisch olie-embargo, 1973,<br />
Van der Stoel to Algiers, no. 209, 24/10/73.<br />
34 nmfa, Code 613.211.45, Doos 38, Map 440, Co-ordinator to Van der Stoel, no.<br />
20, top secret, 22/10/73.<br />
35 HTK, 1973-1974, pp. 32-322.<br />
36 KHA, 09/10/73, p. 714 and Van Ginkel, 1978, pp. 67-68.<br />
37 nova interview with Yamani in Geneva, October 1993. See also the memorandum<br />
of a conversation between a Saudi delegation led by Yamani and William P.<br />
Rogers in April 1973. asd, FOIA 8700809, Memorandum of Conversation between<br />
Yamani, Rogers and other delegates, 16/04/73.<br />
38 Daoudi & Dajani, 1985, p. 138.<br />
39 Szyliowicz & O’Neill (ed.), 1975, pp. 63-64 and Adelphi Paper no. 136, 1977,<br />
pp. 2-4. It soon turned out that the feo had made incorrect appraisals of the situation.<br />
Not the embargo but the strict reduction of the oil consumption was the<br />
main cause of the problems. The feo also underestimated the volume of the<br />
stocks in the usa and the possibilities to import oil via Canada.<br />
40 aaz, Cabinet meetings, minutes of the Cabinet meeting, no. 6180, 19/10/73. Van<br />
der Stoel reported not in this meeting that also Syria had accused The Netherlands<br />
of illegal deliveries of arms.<br />
41 nmfa, PA Algiers, Code 614.56, Box 19, Folder Arabisch olie-embargo, 1973,<br />
Van der Stoel to Algiers, no. 51, 21/10/73.<br />
42 nmfa, PA Algiers, Code 614.56, Box 19, Folder Arabisch olie-embargo 1973,<br />
Bentinck to nmfa, no. 51, 21/10/73.<br />
43 Coordinator to mp and m, 21/10/73, in: nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume I,<br />
p. 85.<br />
271
44 nmfa, Code 613.211.45, Box 38, Folder 440, Kruimink to Van der Stoel, no.<br />
20, top secret, 22/10/73.<br />
45 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5701, Van Hoeve to nmfa, no. 49, 22/10/73.<br />
46 See: Adelphi Paper no. 117, 1975, pp. 26-29.<br />
47 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5701, Thoe Schwartzenberg to nmfa, no.<br />
3434/847, 29/10/73.<br />
48 KHA, 09/11/1973, p. 714.<br />
49 Grünfeld, 1991, p. 62.<br />
50 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 7944, Memos by the Shell executive, 26/09/73 and<br />
31/10/73.<br />
51 nmfa, PA Algiers, Code 614.56, Box 19, Folder Arabisch olie-embargo, 1973,<br />
Van der Stoel circulaire, no. 275, 22/10/73.<br />
52 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5703, Thoe Schwartzenberg to nmfa, no. 55,<br />
29/10/73 and no. 56, 01/11/73; Scheepers to nmfa, no. 19, 29/10/73 and Schorer<br />
to nmfa, no. 20, 30/10/73.<br />
53 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5704, Gevers to nmfa, no. 499, 02/11/73.<br />
54 nmfa, PA Algiers, Code 614.56, Box 19, Folder Arabisch olie-embargo, 1973,<br />
Van der Stoel to Djedda, no. 23, 23/10/73.<br />
55 nmfa, PA Algiers, Code 614.56, Box 19, Folder Arabisch olie-embargo, 1973,<br />
Van der Stoel to Algiers, no. 14, 23/10/73.<br />
56 To this group Shell International also belonged.<br />
57 Grünfeld, 1991, p. 122. He bases his judgement on the views of Wagner.<br />
58 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 7949, Memo van der Stoel to S., no. 161/73,<br />
23/10/73.<br />
59 HEK, Rijksbegroting, Zitting 1973/74, no. 12600, Hoofdstuk V, no. 2, pp. 13-<br />
14, Regeringsverklaring, 23/10/73.<br />
60 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5703, Memo Van Lynden to M via S, no. 768,<br />
24/10/73.<br />
61 nmfa, Code 613.211.45, Box 38, Folder 440, Schorer to nmfa, no. 17,<br />
27/10/73.<br />
62 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5701, Bentinck to nmfa, no. 55, 24/10/73 and<br />
no. 61, 03/11/73.<br />
63 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5701, Vegelin to nmfa, no. 378, 02/11/73.<br />
64 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5704, Van der Stoel to Brussels, no. 807/220,<br />
02/11/73.<br />
65 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 7829, Van Vloten to nmfa, no. 57, 18/10/73.<br />
66 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5703, Von Oven to nmfa, no. 96, 24/10/73 and<br />
no. 104, 01/11/73. Von Oven got the impression that Cairo was satisfied with the<br />
cease-fire.<br />
67 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5703, Van der Stoel to Cairo, no. 47, 30/10/73.<br />
272
68 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5703, Van Lunteren to nmfa, no. 57, 24/10/73.<br />
69 In the ultimatum was written: ‘from Arab occupied territories’.<br />
70 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5701, memo dam via dgpz to M, 26/10/73.<br />
71 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6187, 26/10/73.<br />
72 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5703, Van der Stoel to Teheran, no. 26,<br />
26/10/73, Van der Stoel circulaire, no. 222, 26/10/73 and Van der Stoel to Djedda,<br />
no. 26, 27/10/73.<br />
73 Algemeen Dagblad and NRC Handelsblad, 01/10/73.<br />
74 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5701, Van der Stoel to Djedda, no. 29 and no.<br />
30, 01/10/73.<br />
75 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5703, Van der Stoel to Tehran, no. 29, 30/10/73,<br />
and Van der Stoel to Tunis, no. 37, 30/10/73.<br />
76 asd, FOIA 8903648, Kissinger to American Embassy, The Hague, no. 215365,<br />
08/11/73.<br />
77 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5704, Van der Stoel to various embassies, no.<br />
235, 02/11/73.<br />
78 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume I, pp. 96-97.<br />
79 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5703, Van der Stoel to London, no. 178,<br />
24/10/73.<br />
80 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5703, Van der Stoel to London, no. 178,<br />
24/10/73.<br />
81 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5703, Van der Stoel to Djedda, no. 23, 23/10/73<br />
and to Cairo, no. 44, 23/10/73. Also: Van Vloten to nmfa, no. 61, 27/10/73.<br />
82 nmfa, Code 613.211.45, Box 38, Folder 440, Renardel to nmfa, no. 60,<br />
25/10/73.<br />
83 nmfa, Code 613.211.45, Box 38, Folder 440, Schorer to nmfa, no. 17,<br />
27/10/73.<br />
84 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5703, Thoe Schwartzenberg to nmfa, no. 55,<br />
29/10/73 and no. 56, 01/11/73; Scheepers to nmfa, no. 19, 29/10/73 and Schorer,<br />
Koeweit to nmfa, no. 20, 30/10/73.<br />
85 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5703, Schorer to nmfa, no. 25, 01/11/73.<br />
86 See for this Chapter 4.<br />
87 Doran made the correct observation that commercial motives were primary for<br />
Iraq. See: Doran, 1977, p. 32.<br />
88 nmfa, Code 613.211.45, Box 38, Folder 440, Renardel to nmfa, no. 64,<br />
09/11/73.<br />
89 asd, FOIA 8903648, American Embassy, Tripoli to SecState, no. 1365,<br />
25/10/73.<br />
90 asd, FOIA 8903648, American Embassy Tripoli to Secstate, no. 2396, 30/10/73.<br />
91 nmfa, Code 912.10 GS, Folder 1007, Copy memorandum Luns (nato) to M for<br />
dgpz, Den Haag, 04/11/73.<br />
273
92 NRC Handelsblad, 31/10/73.<br />
93 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume I, pp. 109-111.<br />
94 HTK, 1973-1974, pp. 524 e.v.<br />
95 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5701, Van der Stoel circular no. 194, 11/10/73.<br />
96 Interviews with former members of the Mossad and bvd. Also the South-African<br />
airline (sal) is supposed to have flown arms and munitions to Israel via Portugal<br />
with cargo planes.<br />
97 nmfa, Code 921.320, Folder 545, Van Hoeve to nmfa, no. 45, 16/10/73.<br />
98 nmfa, Code 613.211.45, Box 38, Folder 440, Von Oven to nmfa, no. 90,<br />
21/10/73.<br />
99 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5703, Vroon to nmfa, no. 113, 21/10/73.<br />
100 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5703, memo vadv, no. 231812/380, 25/10/73.<br />
101 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5703, Van der Stoel to Damascus, no. 20,<br />
30/10/73.<br />
102 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5702, Vroon to nmfa, no. 123, 02/11/93 and<br />
Van Hoeve to nmfa, no. 59, 03/10/73.<br />
103 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume I, pp. 102-103.<br />
104 iisg, Archive Ed van Thijn, Inv. no. 13, Dairy entry, 12/11/73, 13/11/73,<br />
15/11/73 and 16/11/73.<br />
105 Terlingen & Roskam, 1997, pp. 68-73. In Elseviers Magazine one could read in<br />
November 1973 that Rabbani considered it absolutely unfair to put blame on the<br />
Minister. Elseviers Magazine, 10/11/73.<br />
106 See for the internal law aspects of the embargo: Moore (ed.), 1977, pp. 391-445.<br />
Notes Chapter 3<br />
1 Quandt, 1977, pp. 219-220; Golan, 1976, pp. 119-121; Sheenan, 1976, pp. 80-<br />
82 and Brecher, 1980, pp. 302-309.<br />
2 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 8003, memo Jacobs to chef des, no. 992/73,<br />
05/11/73, and Daoudi & Dajani, 1985, p. 139.<br />
3 See for example: Jansen and De Vree, 1985, pp. 311-317.<br />
4 Gaddis, 1982, p. 332.<br />
5 Grosser, 1982, pp. 263-282.<br />
6 Hellema, 1995, pp. 203-222.<br />
7 Voorhoeve, 1985, pp. 178-179.<br />
8 See Buchand, 1993, p. 48, and Urwin, 1995, pp. 147-149.<br />
9 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume I, p. 33.<br />
10 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume I, p. 33 passim.<br />
11 nmfa, Code 996.40, Folder 1827, nota Van Zutphen over Topconferentie Energiebeleid,<br />
16/10/73.<br />
274
12 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume I, pp. 43-44.<br />
13 aez, CAB, Afdeling PAZ, Sectie DG Energie, Box 85-0947, Folder 2, Werkgroep<br />
voor Economisch, Sociologisch and Statistisch Onderzoek van het Rijnmond-gebied<br />
(essor), nota inzake het te voeren beleid n.a.v. de oliecrisis, 14/02/74, p. 19.<br />
14 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5703, De Ranitz to nmfa, no. 619 and 622,<br />
31/10/73.<br />
15 Costigliola, 1992, pp. 178-179.<br />
16 Agulhon, 1993, p. 439 and Hanrieder & Auton, 1980, p. 151.<br />
17 Grosser, 1978, p. 354.<br />
18 Simonian, 1985, 1985, p. 208, and Roussel, 1984, p. 475.<br />
19 nmfa, Code 996.40, Folder 1827, memo die to M and T via S, no. 927/73,<br />
01/11/73.<br />
20 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 7955, Boon to nmfa, no. 962.198, 04/10/73.<br />
21 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5703, Gevers to nmfa, no. 494, 01/11/73, and<br />
Turner, 1980, p. 178.<br />
22 Yergin, 1991, pp. 623-624.<br />
23 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume I, p. 120.<br />
24 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5703, Gevers to nmfa, no. 498, 02/11/73.<br />
25 nmfa, PA Algiers, Box 19, Folder 614.56, Van der Stoel to Algiers, 03/11/73.<br />
26 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5704, Gevers to nmfa, no. 505, 06/11/73, and<br />
Van der Stoel to London, no. 193, 07/11/73.<br />
27 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume I, p. 108.<br />
28 Bark & Gress, 1993, pp. 260 and 281 and nmfa, PA Bonn, Code 614.51, Box<br />
201, Van der Stoel to Bonn, no. 189, 01/11/73.<br />
29 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 7835, memo die to M and T and R, 02/11/73.<br />
30 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5704, Kupers to nmfa, no. 420, 02/11/73.<br />
31 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5703, De Roos to nmfa, no. 74, 30/10/73.<br />
32 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5704, Jongejans to nmfa, no. 3901/806,<br />
01/11/73.<br />
33 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 7859, Krijgsman to nmfa, no. 5175, 25/10/73.<br />
34 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5703, Van Schelle to nmfa, no. 371 & 372,<br />
29/10/73.<br />
35 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 7859, Krijgsman to nmfa, no. 9345, 30/10/73.<br />
36 nmfa, Code 996.236.3, Folder 201, memo des to M via dges and S, no. 995,<br />
26/10/73.<br />
37 Van Lennep, 1991, p. 247.<br />
38 nmfa, Code 996.236.3, Folder 201, memo des to M via dges and S, no. 995,<br />
26/10/73.<br />
39 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume I, pp. 117-119.<br />
40 nmfa, Code 613.211.45, Folder 440, Midden-Oosten, olieboycot, Volume I,<br />
275
Van der Stoel to Washington, 31/10/73 and 04/11/73. When Van der Stoel<br />
learned about this, he immediately contacted his ambassador and urged him to<br />
approach Kissinger. Van der Stoel would appreciate it highly if the American was<br />
willing to promote the Dutch interests during his upcoming visit to the Middle<br />
East.<br />
41 nmfa, Code 996.40, Folder 1847, memo die to dges, no. 977/73, 01/11/73.<br />
42 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6201, 01/11/73. The<br />
ministers concluded that apart from the ec there were other possibilities left to<br />
use. According to Vredeling the nato stocks in The Netherlands could be used.<br />
Van der Stoel confirmed that the oil pipeline system of nato was also very important.<br />
43 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume I, pp. 121-122.<br />
44 nmfa, Code 996.40, Folder 1827, memo die to M and T via S, no. 927/73,<br />
01/11/73.<br />
45 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume I, p. 105.<br />
46 Voorhoeve, 1985, pp. 237-238 and nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume I, p.<br />
130.<br />
47 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume I, p. 132.<br />
48 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume I, p. 133.<br />
49 nmfa, PA Parijs, GS, Code 912.1, Box 2, Van der Stoel circular, no. 243,<br />
08/11/73, and iisg, Collection Den Uyl, inv. no. 1111, Memorandum regarding<br />
the deliberations on the oil crisis in the ec, undated.<br />
50 Grünfeld, 1991, p. 76.<br />
51 iisg, Collection Ed van Thijn, inv. no. 13, Diary entry, 08/11/73.<br />
52 nmfa, PA Parijs, GS, Code 912.1, Box 2, Van der Stoel circular, no. 243,<br />
08/11/73.<br />
53 Letter by Van der Stoel to the authors, 25/03/98.<br />
54 Lieber, 1976, p. 14.<br />
55 nmfa, PA Parijs, GS, Code 912.1, Box 2, Van der Stoel circular, no. 243,<br />
08/11/73.<br />
56 Yergin, 1991, p. 628.<br />
57 Kissinger, 1982, p. 713, and Stuart & Tow, 1990, pp. 81-82.<br />
58 Simonian, 1985, p. 205.<br />
59 Kissinger, 1982, p. 718, and de Volkskrant, 06/11/73.<br />
60 Het Parool, 06/11/73.<br />
61 Trouw, 06/11/73.<br />
62 NRC Handelsblad, 06/11/73.<br />
63 NRC Handelsblad, 09/11/73.<br />
64 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6206, 09/11/73.<br />
65 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6206, 09/11/73.<br />
276
66 ‘The use of the oil weapon speeded up and crystallized the eec position, rather<br />
than fundamentally changing it’. In: Adelphi Paper no. 117, 1975, p. 8.<br />
67 Interview with Rutten, January 1997.<br />
Notes Chapter 4<br />
1 NRC Handelsblad, 20/10/73.<br />
2 Het Parool, 24/10/73.<br />
3 Archives Ministry for General Affairs (hereafter aaz), RVD-Dossier Coördinatiegroep<br />
Voorlichting Energietekort, Van de Graaf to Den Uyl, no. 595,<br />
29/10/73.<br />
4 Lieber, 1976, p. 9.<br />
5 Archives Ministry of Economic Affairs (hereafter aez), CAB, Dept. PAZ, Section<br />
DG Energy, Box 85-0947, Folder 2, Werkgroep voor Economisch, Sociologisch<br />
en Statistisch Onderzoek van het Rijnmond-gebied (ESSOR), memorandum regarding<br />
policy in view of oil crisis, 14/02/74, p. 7.<br />
6 Mitchell, 1989, p. 430.<br />
7 Mitchell, 1989, pp. 482-484 and Winkler Prins, 1974, p. 122.<br />
8 aez, CAB, Dept. PAZ, Section DG Energy, Box 85-0947, Folder 2, Werkgroep<br />
voor Economisch, Sociologisch and Statistisch Onderzoek van het Rijnmondgebied<br />
(ESSOR), memorandum regarding policy in view of oil crisis, 14/02/74, p. 7.<br />
9 NRC Handelsblad, 26/10/73.<br />
10 De Volkskrant, 27/10/73.<br />
11 aez, RBA, Box 20-0006, Folder no. 3, Directoraat-Generaal voor Energievoorziening,<br />
report by J.C.W. de Vries, 09/11/73.<br />
12 aez, Dept. PAZ, Box 251, Folder 30, Van Eupen to all oil companies, no.<br />
373/8856/EA, 16/10/73.<br />
13 Grünfeld, 1991, p. 100.<br />
14 Interview with Willemsen, February 1997.<br />
15 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6180, 19/10/73.<br />
16 aez, Directorate AEP, Archives College van Directeuren-Generaal, Box 99,<br />
Folder Stafbesprekingen met de minister AEP, conclusions of conversation with<br />
Lubbers et al., 22/10/73.<br />
17 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 8003, Memo des to Van der Stoel, no. 957,<br />
30/10/73.<br />
18 For example from Lybia: nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5703, Van der Stoel to<br />
Washington, no. 354, 31/10/73.<br />
19 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5703, De Ranitz to Den Haag, no. 619 and no.<br />
622, 31/10/73.<br />
277
20 Rosenthal and Scholten, 1977, p. 112.<br />
21 Interview with Rutten, January 1997, and with Willemsen, February 1997.<br />
22 Trouw, 20/10/73.<br />
23 NRC Handelsblad, 24/10/73.<br />
24 De Volkskrant, 31/10/73.<br />
25 aez, RBA, Box 20-0006, Folder no. 3, Directoraat-Generaal voor de Energievoorziening,<br />
report by J.C.W. de Vries, 09/11/73.<br />
26 aez, Directorate AEP, Archives College van Directeuren-Generaal, Box 99,<br />
Folder Stafbesprekingen met de minister AEP, Conclusions of conversation with<br />
Lubbers et al., 29/10/73.<br />
27 aez, RBA, Box 20-0009, Folder 2, Rapport inzake de aardoliedistributie in de periode<br />
19 oktober 1973 tot 28 februari 1974, pp. 3a-12.<br />
28 HTK, 1973-1974, pp. 528-530.<br />
29 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume I, p. 115.<br />
30 HTK, 1973-1974, pp. 527-528.<br />
31 HTK, 1973-1974, pp. 528-540.<br />
32 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 8003, Eerste rapport Coördinatiegroep Maatregelen<br />
Oliecrisis, 08/11/73.<br />
33 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6159, 02/11/73.<br />
34 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6195, 02/11/73.<br />
35 aez, Archive bureau Secretaris-Generaal, Box 294, Folder 2, Oliecrisis, Van Agt<br />
to Lubbers, 07/11/73.<br />
36 De Telegraaf, 05/11/73.<br />
37 De Tijd, 05/11//73.<br />
38 Haagsche Courant, 05/11/73.<br />
39 Het Parool, 31/10/73.<br />
40 NRC Handelsblad, 03/11/73.<br />
41 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 8003, Eerste rapport Coördinatiegroep Maatregelen<br />
Oliecrisis, 08/11/73 and letter from W.Q.J. Willemsen to authors, 26 May<br />
1998.<br />
42 aaz, RVD-Dossier Coördinatiegroep Voorlichting Energietekort, memo Coördinatiegroep<br />
Maatregelen Oliecrisis, 08/11/73.<br />
43 amj (Archives Ministry of Justice), File A 73/099, Folder energiecrisis, Part I,<br />
Uittreksel uit PG-vergadering, 08/11/73.<br />
44 amj, File A 73/099, Folder energiecrisis, Part II, Nota voor de Ministerraad over<br />
de aardoliecrisis, 08/11/73.<br />
45 amj, File A 73/099, Folder Energiecrisis, Part I, Uittreksel PG-vergadering,<br />
08/11/1973.<br />
46 aez, Directorate AEP, Archive College van Directeuren-Generaal, Box 99, Folder<br />
Stafbesprekingen met de minister, conclusions of conversation with Lubbers<br />
et al., 05/11/73.<br />
278
47 Grünfeld, 1991, p. 93. Grünfeld refers to a meeting of the politburo of the<br />
Labour Party on 12 November 1973.<br />
48 Rosenthal and Scholten, 1977, p. 103.<br />
49 nmfa, PA Bonn, Code 614.51, Box 201, Van der Stoel to Bonn, no. 189,<br />
01/11/73.<br />
50 Interview with Willemsen, February 1997.<br />
51 Grünfeld, 1991, p. 76.<br />
52 Yergin, 1991, pp. 619-620, and Van Seumeren, 1989, p. 110.<br />
53 Tweede-Kamerfractie Partij van de Arbeid, ‘Onderzoek naar de rol van de<br />
oliemaatschappijen in de Oliecrisis van 1973-1974’, June 1975, pp. 10-11.<br />
54 Interview with Wagner, March 1997, and nmfa, Code 996.236.3, OESO<br />
Oliecommissie, Folder 201, Part III, Memorandum of des to M via dges,<br />
06/11/73.<br />
55 nmfa, Code 996.236.3, OESO Oliecommissie, Folder 201, Part III, Memorandum<br />
of des to M via dges, 06/11/73.<br />
56 nmfa, Code 996.236.3, OESO Oliecommissie, Folder 201, Part III, Memorandum<br />
of des to M via dges, 06/11/73. See: Van Seumeren, 1989, p. 113.<br />
57 Sampson, 1975, p. 263.<br />
58 nmfa, Code 996.236.3, Folder 201, memo des to dgpz, no. 996, 07/11/73.<br />
59 Interview with Wagner, March 1997.<br />
60 Adelphi Paper no. 117, 1975, p. 7; Heikal, 1975, pp. 273-274 and Church, 1977,<br />
pp. 39-40.<br />
61 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 8003, memo des to Van der Stoel, no. 957,<br />
30/10/73.<br />
62 nmfa, Code 614.51, Nederlandse maatregelen n.a.v. de oliecrisis 1973/74, Folder<br />
8003, Memorandum des to Van der Stoel, no. 1006, 09/11/73. The whole issue<br />
of transfer of oil will be dealt with in Chapter 6.<br />
63 Interview with Willemsen, February 1997.<br />
64 Letter by W.Q.J. Willemsen to authors, 26 May 1998.<br />
65 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 8003, Eerste rapport Coördinatiegroep Maatregelen<br />
Oliecrisis, 08/11/73.<br />
66 aez, RBA, Box 20-0003, File no. 7, Letters E.F. Geessink, ministerie van Landbouw<br />
and Visserij to ez, no. ACB 612, 06/11/73 and no. ACB 637, 20/11/73.<br />
Notes Chapter 5<br />
1 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5704, De Roos to nmfa, no. 80, 08/11/73.<br />
2 nmfa, Code 613.211.45, Box 38, Folder 440, Von Oven to nmfa, no. 118,<br />
17/11/73.<br />
279
3 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5705, Von Oven to nmfa, no. 122, 21/11/73.<br />
4 nmfa, Code 613.211.45, Box 38, Folder 440, Van der Stoel to Cairo, no. 56,<br />
19/11/73.<br />
5 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, pp. 149-152.<br />
6 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5704, Schorer to nmfa, no. 35, 12/11/73.<br />
7 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 7917, De Ranitz to nmfa, no. 668, 15/11/73.<br />
8 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5705, memo deu to dam, No.167, 19/11/73.<br />
9 nmfa, PA Bonn, Code 614.51, Box 5, memo De Beus, no. 401, 06/11/73.<br />
10 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 8004, Von Oven to nmfa, no. 106, 02/11/74.<br />
11 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 8008, Boon, Rome to nmfa, no. 276, 27/11/73.<br />
12 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 8004, Boon, Rome to nmfa, no. 302, 13/12/73, and<br />
Van Lynden, Washington to nmfa, no. 936, 28/12/73.<br />
13 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 8004, Baghdad to nmfa, no. 4013/993, 29/12/73.<br />
14 Grünfeld, 1991, p. 80.<br />
15 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5705, Van der Stoel to various embassies, no.<br />
255, 18/11/73. See also: Netherlands National Archives, hereafter: nna), Collection<br />
Van Roijen, 2.21.183, Inv. no. 62, Van der Stoel to Van Roijen, 30/11/73,<br />
and memo about conversation with Yamani, undated.<br />
16 nmfa, Code 613.211.45, GS, Folder 440, Midden-Oosten: olieboycot, Volume<br />
I, Boon to nmfa, no. 253, 14/11/73.<br />
17 Interview with Van der Stoel, January 1997.<br />
18 nmfa, Code 912.1 GS, Folder 1026, Derksen to nmfa, no. 67, 18/11/73.<br />
19 nna (Dutch National Archive), Collection Van Roijen, 2.21.183, Inv. no. 62,<br />
Queen Juliana to King Feisal plus memorandum, 06/02/74. The reason for this<br />
late reply is unknown to the authors.<br />
20 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5704, memo dam to m via dgpz, no. 93,<br />
22/11/73.<br />
21 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5705, De Vreede to nmfa, no. 33, 23/11/73.<br />
22 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5704, Van der Stoel to various embassies, no. 29<br />
and 59, 23/11/73.<br />
23 HTK, 1973-1974, 12.600, V, no. 14.<br />
24 HEK, 1973-1974, pp. 111-112.<br />
25 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, p. 154.<br />
26 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, p. 154.<br />
27 Letter of Van der Stoel to the authors, 25 March 1998.<br />
28 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, p. 160.<br />
29 Het Parool and de Volkskrant, 06/12/73.<br />
30 nna, Archive De Koster, Inv. no. 2.21.291, Folder 80, note by H.J. de Koster,<br />
18/12/73.<br />
31 HTK, 1973-74, p. 1000.<br />
280
32 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5704, De Ranitz to nmfa, no. 655, 08/11/73.<br />
33 iisg, Collection Ed van Thijn, Inv. no. 13, Diary entry, 07/11/73.<br />
34 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5701, De Ranitz to nmfa, no. 703, 27/11/73.<br />
35 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5701, Gevers to nmfa, no. 539, 23/11/73.<br />
36 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5701, Gevers to nmfa, no. 516, 12/11/73; iisg,<br />
Collection Den Uyl, Inv. no. 1138, Memorandum of conversation Den Uyl-<br />
Heath, 11/11/73, and Collection Ed van Thijn, Inv. no. 13, diary entry, 08/11/73.<br />
37 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, Council for Economic<br />
Affairs, no. 6115, 16/11/73 and iisg, Collection Den Uyl, Inv. no. 1138, Memorandum<br />
of conversation Den Uyl-Heath, 11/11/73. See for the British problems<br />
also: Wilson, 1979, pp. 22-33.<br />
38 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5701, De Beus to nmfa, no. 443, 16/11/73.<br />
39 nmfa, Code 996.40, Folder 1847, Sassen to nmfa, no. 200, 19/11/73.<br />
40 nmfa, Code 996.236.3, Folder 201, Kaufmann to nmfa, no. 95, 21/11/73.<br />
41 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, p. 174.<br />
42 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6226, 23/11/73. See for<br />
Kissinger’s irritation: Kissinger, 1982, p. 719.<br />
43 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, pp. 145-146.<br />
44 nmfa, PA Algiers, Code 614.56, Box 17, Van Hoeve to nmfa, no. 73, 22/11/73,<br />
and Bentinck to nmfa, no. 78, 24/11/73.<br />
45 nmfa, Code 613.211.45, Box 38, Folder 440, De Ranitz to nmfa, no. 704,<br />
27/11/73.<br />
46 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5701, Bentinck to nmfa, no. 73, 17/11/73.<br />
47 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5704, Van der Stoel circular, no. 265, 22/11/73.<br />
48 Interview with Van der Stoel, January 1997, and letter by Lubbers to the authors,<br />
9 February 1997.<br />
49 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 8003, memo des, no. 1007, 09/11/73.<br />
50 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5704, Van der Stoel to various embassies, no. 42,<br />
27/11/73.<br />
51 nmfa, Code 613.211.45, Box 38, Folder 440, Van Schelle to nmfa, no. 408,<br />
27/11/73.<br />
52 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6234, 30/11/73.<br />
53 Van Elslande declared that Israel should withdraw from all occupied territories.<br />
Later Belgium was to be rewarded for this statement when it was ‘transferred’ to<br />
the category of ‘friendly states’.<br />
54 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5705, Memo Vegelin van Claerbergen to dgpz,<br />
30/11/73.<br />
55 Letter of Lubbers to the authors, 9 February 1997.<br />
56 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5701, Van der Stoel circular, no. 277, 03/12/73.<br />
Lubbers denied that he declared that The Netherlands was an opponent of annexation.<br />
Letter Lubbers to the authors, 9 February 1997.<br />
281
57 Trouw, 04/12/73.<br />
58 nmfa, Code 613.211.45, Box 38, Folder 440, Van der Stoel to Washington, no.<br />
380, 22/11/73 and iisg, Collection Ed van Thijn, Inv. no. 13, Diary entry,<br />
08/11/73.<br />
59 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, p. 167.<br />
60 nmfa, Code 613.211.45, Box 38, Folder 440, Van der Stoel to Washington, no.<br />
380, 22/11/73.<br />
61 iisg, Collection Den Uyl, Inv. no. 1110, Transcript of a bilateral conversation<br />
between Foreign Affairs and Economic Affairs about the oilcrisis, 26/11/73.<br />
62 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6226, 23/11/73.<br />
63 nmfa, GS, Code 912.1, Folder 1041, Van Lynden to nmfa, no. 870, 30/11/73.<br />
64 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5700, memo plan to Van der Stoel, no. 210,<br />
05/12/73.<br />
65 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5700, Van Lynden to Van der Stoel, no. 877,<br />
30/11/73.<br />
66 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5700, memo DWH to dgpz, 07/12/73.<br />
67 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5703, Scheltema to S, 05/12/73.<br />
68 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5704, De Ranitz to nmfa, no. 741, 08/12/73.<br />
69 Interview with Helfrich, February 1997.<br />
70 nmfa, Code 912.2, Folder 3581, De Ranitz to nmfa, no. 727, 03/12/73.<br />
71 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 7917, De Ranitz to nmfa, no. 738, 07/12/73.<br />
72 Marshall, 1997, p. 90.<br />
73 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5701, De Beus to nmfa, 19/11/73.<br />
74 Simonian, 1985, pp. 206-210.<br />
75 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of the Cabinet meeting, no. 6226, 23/11/73.<br />
76 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5704, Van Schelle to nmfa, no. 854.937,<br />
01/12/73.<br />
77 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5704, Boon to nmfa, no. 962.398, 04/12/73 and<br />
no. 962.400, 05/12/73.<br />
78 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 7955, Boon to nmfa, no. 297, 13/12/73.<br />
79 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume I, p. 120.<br />
80 nna, 2.02.05.02, Archives of the Cabinet Office, Inv. no. 1225, Note Ringnalda<br />
to Den Uyl, no. 547, 02/11/73.<br />
81 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5704, Van der Stoel to various embassies, no.<br />
208, 27/11/73.<br />
82 Marshall, 1997, p. 90, and KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting,<br />
no. 6115, 16/11/73.<br />
83 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6226, 23/11/73.<br />
84 iisg, Collection Den Uyl, Inv. no. 1110, Transcript of a bilateral meeting between<br />
Foreign Affairs and Economic Affairs about oil, 26/11/73.<br />
282
85 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, pp. 170-172.<br />
86 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, pp. 170-172.<br />
87 Grünfeld, 1991, p. 83.<br />
88 Grünfeld, 1991, p. 83, incorrectly writes that The Netherlands had high hopes<br />
about Copenhagen.<br />
89 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, Council for European<br />
Affairs, 05/12/73.<br />
90 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, pp. 176-177.<br />
91 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, p. 180.<br />
92 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, Council for European Affairs,<br />
05/12/73.<br />
93 aez, Archive DG-BEB, no. 89-1227, Box 3283, Folder 7, Memorandum by the<br />
Minister of Economic Affairs, 05/12/73.<br />
94 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, Council for Economic<br />
Affairs, no. 6279, 06/12/73. See for all memoranda: iisg, Collection Den Uyl,<br />
Inv. no. 1110.<br />
95 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, Council for Economic Affairs,<br />
no. 6279, 06/12/73.<br />
96 nmfa, BZ-dossier Oliecrisis, Volume II, p. 178.<br />
97 nmfa, BZ-dossier Oliecrisis, Volume II, pp. 182-183.<br />
98 nmfa, BZ-dossier Oliecrisis, Volume II, pp. 161-163 and interview with Van der<br />
Stoel, January 1997.<br />
99 nmfa, BZ-dossier Oliecrisis, Volume II, pp. 161-163; Campbell, 1993, p. 558<br />
and Simonian, 1985, pp. 211-212.<br />
100 Hellema, 1995, pp. 211-217.<br />
101 nmfa, BZ-dossier Oliecrisis, Volume II, pp. 178-179 and iisg, Collection Den<br />
Uyl, Inv. no. 1139, Memorandum Main Issues Summit, undated and letter Ortoli,<br />
12/12/73.<br />
102 De Volkskrant, 14/12/73.<br />
103 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5704, Van der Stoel circular, no. 288, 17/12/73.<br />
104 Brandt, according to Van der Stoel, was much firmer compared with Scheel. Until<br />
then Scheel had switched sides constantly between Bonn and Paris. Interview<br />
with Van der Stoel, January 1997.<br />
105 Simonian, 1985, pp. 213-214.<br />
106 Jørgensen, 1989, pp. 208-210.<br />
107 ‘Boebie, die oliecrisis gaat toch niet kwakkelen, hè’, in: HP/De Tijd, 02/05/97,<br />
and Jørgensen, 1989, p. 210.<br />
108 nmfa, BZ-dossier Oliecrisis, Volume II, pp. 184-188 and Campbell, 1993, p.<br />
559.<br />
109 iisg, Collection Den Uyl, Inv. no. 1139, communiqué European Summit, undated.<br />
283
110 Simonian, 1985, pp. 200 and 215-216. For other monetary and ec matters<br />
which were discussed in Copenhagen: pp. 217-224. See also: Joustra & Van<br />
Venetië, 1989, p. 131.<br />
111 nmfa, Code 912.1, Folder 2315, Memo Van der Stoel to S, 20/12/73. London<br />
profited enormously from this regional support. See. Gann & Duignan, 1998,<br />
pp. 145-146.<br />
112 Het Parool, editorial comment, 22/12/73.<br />
113 Trouw, editorial comment, 20/12/73.<br />
114 NRC Handelsblad, editorial comment, 16/12/73.<br />
115 iisg, Collection Den Uyl, Inv. no. 1139, Note by H. van den Bergh, no. F/434,<br />
February 1974.<br />
Notes Chapter 6<br />
1 aez, Archive RBA, Box 20-0009, Folder 5, Tweede rapport Coördinatiegroep<br />
Maatregelen Oliecrisis, 14/11/73.<br />
2 aez, Archive RBA, Box 20-0009, Folder 5, Tweede rapport Coördinatiegroep<br />
Maatregelen Oliecrisis, 14/11/73.<br />
3 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6206, 09/11/73.<br />
4 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6115, 16/11/73 and no.<br />
6226, 23/11/73.<br />
5 aez, Archive PAZ, Box 616, Folder 2, Verslag 4e vergadering ez Werkgroep<br />
Oliecrisis, 21/11/73.<br />
6 Interview with Helfrich, February 1997. When in late November a meeting took<br />
place with some members of the Cabinet, the oil companies, according to Helfrich,<br />
opposed distribution. That would be impossible solely in The Netherlands.<br />
However, Den Uyl stuck to his original stance. ‘And on such occasion one can<br />
only salute and comply’, according to Helfrich.<br />
7 aez, Archive RBA, Box 20-0009, Folder 5, Derde Rapport Coördinatiegroep<br />
Maatregelen Oliecrisis, 22/11/73.<br />
8 nova interview with Westerterp, October 1993.<br />
9 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6226, 23/11/73.<br />
10 aez, Archive PAZ, Box 616, Folder 2, Verslag 5de vergadering ez Werkgroep<br />
Oliecrisis, 28/11/73.<br />
11 nmfa, Code 613.211.45, Box 38, Folder 440, memo Rutten to Van der Stoel,<br />
22/11/73.<br />
12 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6234, 30/11/73.<br />
13 nova interview with Westerterp, October 1993.<br />
14 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, Council for Economic Affairs,<br />
05/12/73.<br />
284
15 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6267, 10/12/73.<br />
16 aaz, RVD-Dossier Coördinatiegroep Voorlichting Energietekort, Rutten to Lubbers,<br />
plus the cec note ‘Beperking van de aanvoer van ruwe aardolie naar Nederland:<br />
globale initiële gevolgen en perspectieven voor 1974’, 04/12/73.<br />
17 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of the Cabinet meeting, no. 6206, 09/11/73.<br />
Economic Affairs had made that decision with the exception of the Benelux.<br />
Brussels had in the meantime also licensed oil exports inside the Benelux. This<br />
was in contradiction with the Benelux Treaty. Economic Affairs intended to retaliate.<br />
One should not forget that the exports to Belgium were bigger compared<br />
to the imports.<br />
18 aez, Archive RBA, Box 20-0006, Folder 3, Memorandum by De Vries (dge),<br />
09/11/73.<br />
19 nmfa, Code 614.51, Nederlandse maatregelen t.a.v. de oliecrisis 1973/74, Folder<br />
8003, memo des to Van der Stoel, no. 1006, 09/11/73.<br />
20 nmfa, Code 614.51, Nederlandse maatregelen t.a.v. de oliecrisis 1973/74, Folder<br />
8003, memo des to Van der Stoel, no. 1006, 09/11/73.<br />
21 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder OESO Oliecommissie, Volume V, Van der Stoel to<br />
Brussels, no. 192, 14/11/74 en Van Schelle to nmfa, no. 395, 20/11/74.<br />
22 HTK, 1973-1974, pp. 1000-1004, en nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, p.<br />
166.<br />
23 nmfa, Code 613.211.45, Box 38, Folder 440, Rutten to Van der Stoel, Nota inzake<br />
Nederlandse voorzieningssituatie, 22/11/73.<br />
24 aaz, RVD-Dossier Coördinatiegroep Voorlichting Energietekort, Memorandum,<br />
November 1973.<br />
25 aez, Archive PAZ, Box 616, Folder 2, Verslag 4de vergadering ez werkgroep<br />
Oliecrisis, 21/11/73.<br />
26 Maull refers to ‘re-exports from Rotterdam’s refining centre, which fell to 39%<br />
of their normal level in the first half of December, but recovered to 90 per cent in<br />
January’. See: Maull, 1975, p. 7.<br />
27 HTK, 1973-1974, Bijlagen, 12724, Nota over de beperking van de olie-aanvoer<br />
en de gevolgen daarvan, p. 2, 08/12/73.<br />
28 nmfa, Code 996.236.3, Folder 201, memo des to Van der Stoel via dges en S,<br />
23/11/73.<br />
29 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6234, 30/11/73.<br />
30 nna, 2.02.05.02, Archive of the Council of Ministers, Inv. no. 1228, Ontwerpnota<br />
“Energiepolitieke maatregelen samenhangende met de beperking van de<br />
aanvoer van ruwe olie naar Nederland”, 10/12/73.<br />
31 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, Council for Economic Affairs,<br />
05/12/73.<br />
32 aez, Archive RBA, Box 20-0009, Folder 5, Nota concept besluitvorming inzake<br />
aardgas, no. 45, 06/12/73.<br />
285
33 aez, Archive PAZ, Box 616, Folder 2, Verslag 1ste vergadering ez Werkgroep<br />
Oliecrisis, 07/11/73.<br />
34 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6206, 09/11/73.<br />
35 nna, 2.02.05.02, Archive van de Raad van Ministers, inv. no. 1225, Memorandum<br />
Van de Graaf to Den Uyl, no. 604, 15/11/73.<br />
36 nna, 2.02.05.02, Archive van de Raad van Ministers, inv. no. 1225, Memorandum<br />
Van de Graaf to Den Uyl, no. 605, 15/11/73.<br />
37 aez, Archive RBA, Box 20-0009, Folder 5, Derde Rapport Coördinatiegroep<br />
Maatregelen Oliecrisis, 22/11/73.<br />
38 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6226, 23/11/73.<br />
These foreigners received a lot of attention at the nmfa. A flexible regime was<br />
preferred, as was the advice to Van der Stoel. Irritations in foreign countries had<br />
to be avoided. The interest of the Dutch trucking was paramount and should not<br />
be hindered. See: nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, p. 193.<br />
39 aez, Archive PAZ, Box 616, Folder 2, Verslag 5de vergadering ez werkgroep<br />
Oliecrisis, 28/11/73.<br />
40 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6234, 30/11/73.<br />
41 HTK, 1973-1974, Bijlagen, 12724, Nota over de beperking van de olie-aanvoer<br />
en de gevolgen daarvan, p. 2, 08/12/73.<br />
42 Interview with Willemsen, February 1997 and letter by Willemsen to the authors,<br />
26 May 1998.<br />
43 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, p. 197.<br />
44 HTK, 1973-1974, Bijlagen, 12723, Memorie van Toelichting bij de Machtigingswet,<br />
08/12/73.<br />
45 Van Schendelen, 1979, pp. 19-23.<br />
46 Van Schendelen, 1979, p. 11.<br />
47 Van Schendelen, 1979, pp. 12-14.<br />
48 HTK, Bijlagen, 12739, Beleidsnota beperking gevolgen olieschaarste, 12/12/73.<br />
49 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6272, 21/12/73.<br />
50 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6272, 21/12/73.<br />
51 NRC Handelsblad, 03/01/74.<br />
52 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6274A, 04/01/74.<br />
53 De Volkskrant, 05/01/74.<br />
54 Trouw, 05/01/74.<br />
55 NRC Handelsblad, 05/01/74.<br />
56 aez, Archive RBA, Box 20-0009, Folder 5, Conclusies van het overleg Ministeriële<br />
Commissie Olieproblematiek, 10/01/74.<br />
57 iisg, Collection Den Uyl, Inv. no. 1110, Van de Graaf to Den Uyl, 08/01/74.<br />
58 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6285, 11/01/74.<br />
59 aez, Archive RBA, Box 20-0001, Folder 3, Telex from bk gas BV to rba, no.<br />
603, 11/01/74.<br />
286
60 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, p. 200. In the beginning of January distribution<br />
was planned only in Sweden and Norway.<br />
61 Interview with Rutten, January 1997. He referred to the behaviour of his own<br />
minister as typical Lubbers nervousness.<br />
62 Interview with Rutten, January 1997. According to Rutten, Lubbers was not<br />
present because he did not dare to become responsible for the decision regarding<br />
distribution.<br />
63 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, p. 197.<br />
64 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6274a, 04/01/74.<br />
65 Interview with Helfrich, February 1997.<br />
66 aez, Archive RBA, Box 20-0009, Folder 2, ‘Rapport inzake de aardoliedistributie<br />
in de periode 19 oktober 1973 tot 28 februari 1974’, Rijksbureau voor Aardolieprodukten,<br />
February 1974, pp. 12-32.<br />
67 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, p. 199.<br />
68 aez, Archive RBA, Box 20-0009, Folder 2, Rapport inzake de aardoliedistributie<br />
in de periode 19 oktober 1973 tot 28 februari 1974, pp. 12-32.<br />
69 aez, Archive RBA, Box 20-0001, Folder 4, Hustinx to Lubbers, no. 1360,<br />
22/01/74.<br />
70 HTK, 1973-1974, Bijlagen, 12946, Nota ‘Kwantitatieve beperkingen in de<br />
olieaanvoer’, p. 17, 04/06/74.<br />
71 amj, Dossier A 73/099, Folder energiecrisis, Volume I, Nota Me. Mok to Van<br />
Agt (‘extremely urgent’), 21/01/74.<br />
72 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 8003, 9e rapport Coördinatiegroep Maatregelen<br />
Oliecrisis, 09/01/74 en aez, Archive Bureau Secretaris Generaal, Box 290, Folder<br />
8, Nota ep to sg, 24/01/74.<br />
73 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, p. 200.<br />
74 nna, 2.02.05.02, Archive of the Council of Ministers, Inv. no. 1289, Note Rutten<br />
and Van Agt to Den Uyl, 23/01/74.<br />
75 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6304, 23/01/73.<br />
76 De Volkskrant, 24/01/74.<br />
77 De Volkskrant, 26/01/74.<br />
78 NRC Handelsblad, 24/01/73.<br />
79 NRC Handelsblad, 26/01/74.<br />
80 amj, Dossier A 73/099, Folder energiecrisis, Volume I, Nota van het Hoofd van<br />
de Hoofdafdeling Staats- en Strafrecht L. Oranje to de SG, no. 13, 25/01/74.<br />
81 aez, Archive RBA, Box 20-0009, Folder 5, Rapport Coördinatiegroep Maatregelen<br />
Oliecrisis, 07/02/74.<br />
82 aez, Archive BEB, no. 89-3321, Box 5649, Overmars to Director Bilaterale<br />
Zaken, ‘Mogelijkheden tot verbetering van het Nederlandse image in de Arabische<br />
landen; eeg-aspecten’, no. 180, 01/02/74.<br />
287
83 Interview with Helfrich, February 1997. Not only in The Netherlands was there<br />
a frantic search for extra capacity to store oil. Also in the usa companies procured<br />
and rented extra fuel tanks and thousands of train tank cars in order to<br />
store the oil. J.R. Scanlin, president of the General American Transportation<br />
Corporation, stated in December 1973: ‘We had about 3,800 idle tank cars<br />
[available to lease] a year ago. Today we have 700’. See: Sherrill, 1983, p. 195.<br />
84 amj, Dossier A 73/099, Folder energiecrisis, Volume II, Note to Mr. Q.J.M<br />
Kramer, 26/03/74.<br />
85 aez, CAB, PAZ, Section DGE, Box 85-0947, Folder 2, Rapport Aardolie-distributie<br />
1974, distributiekring Amsterdam (vertrouwelijk), March 1974.<br />
86 aez, Archive RBA, Box 20-009, Folder 2, ‘Rapport inzake de aardoliedistributie<br />
in de periode 19 oktober 1973 tot 28 februari 1974’, Rijksbureau voor Aardolieprodukten,<br />
February 1974, pp. 1-2.<br />
87 See also: iisg, Collection Den Uyl, Inv. no. 1110, Note De Graaf to Den Uyl,<br />
08/01/74.<br />
88 See for this also: Mitchell, 1989, p. 482.<br />
89 HTK, 1973-1974, Bijlagen, 12946, ‘Nota kwantitatieve beperkingen in de<br />
olieaanvoer’, p. 16, 04/06/1974.<br />
90 Wagner was warned for this. Not only Western intelligence services could intercept<br />
the Shell traffic but also Soviet and Warsaw Pact services could do the same.<br />
Shell was spurred to improve their communications security. However, this was<br />
not a unique Dutch capability. According to a former employee of the National<br />
Security Agency (nsa) this service intercepted and read the communications traffic<br />
of Esso, Exxon, American Shell and Mobil. Also the traffic of Japanese multinationals<br />
was an important target and in particular their confidential conversations<br />
with Yamani produced much valued information. Confidential interviews.<br />
91 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, p. 195.<br />
92 nova interview with Westerterp, October 1993.<br />
93 There were also problems with the Ministry of Defence. They considered themselves<br />
to have absolute priority and with success. Not a single military exercise<br />
was cancelled. Interview with Willemsen, February 1997.<br />
Notes Chapter 7<br />
1 Hoff, 1991, pp. 108-109.<br />
2 nmfa, Code 996.236.3, OESO Oliecommissie, Volume III, Folder 201, Van der<br />
Stoel to all embassies, no. 275, 30/11/73.<br />
3 See for the text of all decisions taken: Fraser, 1980, pp. 195-196 and Jaarboek,<br />
1974, p. 82.<br />
288
4 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 7806, aide-mémoire, presented by the us ambassador<br />
to dgpz, 22/12/73.<br />
5 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, p. 204.<br />
6 nmfa, Code 996.236.3, OESO Olie-Commissie, Volume IV, Folder 202, Van der<br />
Stoel to London, no. 1, 03/01/74.<br />
7 nmfa, Code 996.236.3, OESO Olie-Commissie, Volume IV, Folder 202, Van der<br />
Stoel to London, no. 3, 04/01/74.<br />
8 nmfa, Code 613.211.45, Box 38, Folder 440, De Beus to nmfa, no. 496,<br />
18/12/73.<br />
9 nova interview with Van der Stoel, October 1993.<br />
10 During a conversation with Van Elslande on 7 January, Van der Stoel and Lubbers<br />
agreed on this arrangement as long as it stayed exclusively within the Belgian-Dutch<br />
domain. See: nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 7814, memo dam/MO to<br />
dgpz, no. 1/74, 03/01/74 and Code 996.236.3, OESO Oliecommissie, Volume<br />
III, Folder 201, Van Schelle to nmfa, no. 8, 07/01/74.<br />
11 Yergin, 1991, pp. 628-629 and Adelphi Paper no. 117, 1975, p. 9.<br />
12 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5702, Van Oven to nmfa, no. 145, 28/12/73.<br />
13 International Herald Tribune, 18/01/74. A study drafted by the International<br />
Longshoremen’s Association stated later that ‘oil shipments from the<br />
Arabian/Persian Gulf (including Iraq and Iran) in December 1973 were about<br />
7.4 per cent below the September level’. The us Department of Commerce later<br />
concluded that millions of barrels flowed into the United States form oapec<br />
countries during the embargo. Most of the oil (25.8 million barrels) came form<br />
Saudi Arabia. In short, the oil flow did not diminish considerably. Late January,<br />
the import of oil in Rotterdam was already at 80% of the pre-crisis situation. See:<br />
sipri, 1974, p. 151.<br />
14 nmfa, Code 613.211.45, Box 38, Folder 440, Derksen to nmfa, no. 3,<br />
29/01/74.<br />
15 nmfa, Code 613.211.45, Box 38, Folder 440, Derksen to nmfa, no. 7,<br />
04/02/74.<br />
16 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, p. 207.<br />
17 NRC Handelsblad, 14/01/74.<br />
18 Trouw, 29/01/74.<br />
19 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder ‘Midden-Oosten, Olieboycot, Volume 3’, Schorer<br />
to nmfa, no. 12, 27/01/74.<br />
20 Isaacson, 1992, pp. 542-550.<br />
21 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5702, Van der Stoel to Van Lynden, no. 12,<br />
12/01/74 and Van Lynden to nmfa, no. 37, 14/01/74.<br />
22 nmfa, Code 996.236.3, OESO Oliecommissie, Volume III, Folder 201, De<br />
Ranitz to nmfa, no. 49, 25/01/74.<br />
289
23 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 8003, De Ranitz to nmfa, no. 6, 04/01/74.<br />
24 nmfa, Code 996.236.3, OESO Oliecommissie, Volume III, Folder 202, Celer to<br />
Paris, no. 11, 24/01/74, and Elsevier, 2 February 1974.<br />
25 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5706, Schorer to nmfa, no. 3, 13/01/74.<br />
26 nmfa, Code 912.10, Folder 1939, memo dam to dgpz, no. 15/74, 31/01/74.<br />
27 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 7835, Madrid to nmfa, no. 106, 12/12/73.<br />
28 International Economic Report, 1974, p. 45.<br />
29 Vernon, 1976, pp. 113-127.<br />
30 See:. Het Parool, 08/01/74 and 09/01/74.<br />
31 nmfa, PA Paris, Code 614.51 GS, Box 1, De Ranitz to nmfa, no. 767, 21/12/73.<br />
32 sipri, 1974, pp. 110-111.<br />
33 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5702, De Ranitz to nmfa, no. 55, 30/01/74.<br />
34 sipri, 1974, pp. 116-117.<br />
35 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5702, De Ranitz to nmfa, no. 60, 31/01/74.<br />
36 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 8083, Gevers to nmfa, no. 5 & 33, 04/01/74 and<br />
18/01/74. Political motives perhaps also played a role. Feisal wanted Heath to<br />
continue his pro-Arab policy and was hostile towards the pro-Israel attitude of<br />
the Labour Party led by Harold Wilson. Feisal even ordered that Britain should<br />
receive more Saudi oil than before the crisis broke out. See: Lieber, 1976, p. 30.<br />
37 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5702, Gevers to nmfa, no. 31, 18/01/74; sipri,<br />
1974, p. 117, and Lieber, 1976, p. 31.<br />
38 Yergin, 1991, p. 629.<br />
39 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5706, De Beus to nmfa, no. 142, 26/03/74.<br />
40 nmfa, PA Archive Bonn, Code 614.56, Box 19, Derksen to nmfa, no. 30,<br />
28/03/74.<br />
41 sipri, 1974, p. 116.<br />
42 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5702, Boon to nmfa, no. 27, 24/01/74.<br />
43 sipri, 1974, p. 116.<br />
44 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6285, 11/01/74.<br />
45 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5706, Van der Stoel circular no. 40, 04/02/74.<br />
46 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6315, 01/02/74.<br />
47 aez, Werkarchief BEB, 89-3321, Box 5649, Note to Directeur Bilaterale Zaken,<br />
drafter Overmars. Onderwerp: ‘Mogelijkheden tot verbetering van het Nederlandse<br />
image in de Arabische landen; EEG-aspecten’, no. 180, 01/02/74.<br />
48 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6315, 01/02/74.<br />
49 Simonian, 1985, pp. 212-213.<br />
50 nmfa, Code 996.236.3, OESO Oliecommissie, Volume IV, Folder 202, memo<br />
des to dges, no. 83, 21/01/74.<br />
51 Kissinger, 1982, pp. 896-903.<br />
52 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 7803, Memorandum Plan ‘Kissinger/Energy Action<br />
Group’ of dwh to dgpz, 21/12/73.<br />
290
53 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5702, De Ranitz to nmfa, no. 11, 08/01/74.<br />
54 nmfa, Code 996.236.3, OESO Oliecommissie, Volume IV, Folder 202, Letter<br />
Nixon to Den Uyl (secret), 09/01/74.<br />
55 nmfa, Code 996.236.3, OESO Oliecommissie, Volume IV, Folder 202, memo<br />
Van Schaik, 08/01/74, en conclusies van de vergadering over multilateraal overleg<br />
inzake olie and energie, 09/01/74.<br />
56 nmfa, Code 996.236.3, OESO Oliecommissie, Volume IV, Folder 202, memo<br />
Van Schaik, 08/01/74 and conclusies van de vergadering over multilateraal overleg<br />
inzake olie and energie, 09/01/74.<br />
57 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 8003, memo des to M, no. 39/74, 10/01/74.<br />
58 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, p. 215.<br />
59 nmfa, Code 996.40, Folder EG/Olie & energiecrisis, Volume 2, Folder 1848,<br />
Van der Stoel, circular no. 1008, 10/01/74.<br />
60 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, p. 216.<br />
61 Kissinger, 1982, pp. 903-904.<br />
62 nmfa, Code 996.236.3, OESO Oliecommissie, Volume IV, Folder 202, memo<br />
des to dges, no. 83, 21/01/74.<br />
63 nmfa, Code 996.236.3, OESO Oliecommissie, Volume IV, Folder 202, Van der<br />
Stoel to Washington, no. 53, 01/02/74.<br />
64 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6315, 01/02/74.<br />
65 See for this also Chapter 8.<br />
66 nmfa, Code 996.236.3, OESO Oliecommissie, Volume IV, Folder 202, Sassen to<br />
nmfa, no. 22, 24/01/74.<br />
67 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5702, De Ranitz to nmfa, no. 29, 17/01/74.<br />
68 Trouw, 02/02/74.<br />
69 Grünfeld, 1991, p. 86; Simonian, 1985, pp. 230-231 and Mendershausen, 1976,<br />
p. 72.<br />
70 nmfa, PA Djedda, Code 614.0 GS, Box 39, Folder Internationaal overleg inzake<br />
grondstoffen, Van der Stoel, circular no. 49, 06/02/74.<br />
71 nmfa, Code 996.236.3, OESO Oliecommissie, Volume IV, Folder 202, Kaufmann<br />
to nmfa, no. 12, 24/01/74.<br />
72 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, p. 221.<br />
73 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, p. 222.<br />
74 Kissinger, 1982, pp. 899-890.<br />
75 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, p. 223 and Kissinger, 1982, pp. 899-<br />
890.<br />
76 Jobert, 1974, pp. 284-288.<br />
77 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 7803, De Roos to nmfa, no. 276/64, 11/02/74.<br />
78 Joustra & van Venetië, 1989, pp. 132-133.<br />
79 Kissinger, 1982, pp. 910-912.<br />
291
80 Interview with Van der Stoel, January 1997.<br />
81 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 7803, Van Lynden to nmfa, no. 380/738, 11/02/74.<br />
82 Goldsborough, 1974, p. 545.<br />
83 Simonian, 1985, pp. 232-241; Jobert, 1976, pp. 378-383 and Yergin, 1991, p.<br />
630.<br />
84 ‘Jobert, personifying to the Germans the delusions in French policy, was the butt<br />
of Schmidt’s anger.’ See: Bark & Gress, 1993, pp. 297-300.<br />
85 Schmidt, 1987, pp. 201-202. Schmidt pleaded already on 4 November 1973 in a<br />
letter to Kissinger for a kind of consumers’ facade against the opec.<br />
86 sipri, 1974, pp. 33 and 124-131.<br />
87 nmfa, Code 999.214, Folder 684, Van der Stoel circular no. 58, 15/01/74;<br />
Kissinger, 1982, pp. 912-925 and Lieber, 1976, pp. 22-25.<br />
88 Costigliola, 1992, p. 180.<br />
89 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6332, 15/02/74.<br />
90 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 7803, Van der Stoel circular no. 58, 15/02/74. nna,<br />
2.02.05.02, Archive of the Council of Ministers, Inv. no. 1309, Note by des to<br />
the Council, no. des 76451, 29/03/74.<br />
91 Simonian, 1985, pp. 225-228.<br />
Notes Chapter 8<br />
1 sipri, 1974, p. 29 and Kalb & Kalb, 1975, pp. 588-589.<br />
2 Hoff’s conclusion that Algeria was opposed to the lifting of the embargo is not<br />
correct. Hoff, 1991, p. 108.<br />
3 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, p. 209.<br />
4 nmfa, Code 613.211.45, Folder 441, Van der Stoel to Washington, no. 43,<br />
30/01/74.<br />
5 nmfa, Code 613.211.45, Folder 441, Van Lynden to nmfa, no. 105, 01/02/74.<br />
6 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5706, undated draft. It is unclear if this text was<br />
transmitted in the end.<br />
7 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5706, Derksen to nmfa, no. 10, 09/02/74.<br />
8 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5706, Schorer to nmfa, no. 21, 17/02/74.<br />
9 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, p. 244.<br />
10 nmfa, Code 912.1 GS, Folder 1026, Derksen to nmfa, no. 15, 28/02/74.<br />
11 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, p. 245.<br />
12 Yergin, 1991, p. 631; Daoudi & Dajani, 1985, pp. 143-144 and Mitterand,<br />
1982, pp. 106-111.<br />
13 Kissinger, 1982, pp. 946-952. Also the embargo against Rhodesia, Portugal and<br />
South Africa was continued.<br />
292
14 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5706, Van der Stoel circular no. 1048, 22/03/74.<br />
15 nmfa, Code 614.51, Folder 8008, Van der Stoel to Copenhagen, no. 8,<br />
19/03/74.<br />
16 NRC Handelsblad, 19/03/74.<br />
17 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, p. 246.<br />
18 nmfa, PA Algiers, Code Folder 614.56, Box 19, Bot to nmfa, no. 29, 20/03/74.<br />
19 nmfa, PA Algiers, Code 614.56, Box 19, Van Hoeve to nmfa, no. 33, 24/03/74<br />
and Bentinck to nmfa, no. 26, 23/03/74.<br />
20 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5706, De Ranitz to nmfa, no. 195, 25/03/74.<br />
21 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5706, De Ranitz to nmfa, no. 196, 25/03/74.<br />
22 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5706, Derksen to nmfa, no. 30, 28/03/74. Akins<br />
would have described the continuation of the embargo as ‘petty’. See: Van der<br />
Stoel to Djedda, no. 19, 28/03/74.<br />
23 nmfa, Postarchief Algiers, Code 614.56, Box 19, Kaufmann to nmfa, no. 185,<br />
no. 190 and no. 191, 11/04/74. Also: Beelaerts to nmfa, no. 39, 13/04/74 and<br />
Terlingen & Roskam, 1997, pp. 64-65.<br />
24 nmfa, Code 999.214, Folder 684, Fack to nmfa, no. 24, 17/01/74.<br />
25 nmfa, Code 999.214, Folder 684, Fack to nmfa, no. 34, 23/01/74.<br />
26 nmfa, Code 999.214, Folder 684, Fack to nmfa, no. 37, 25/01/74.<br />
27 nmfa, Code 996.236, Folder 202, Celer to PVEG, Brussels, no. 8, 22/01/74.<br />
28 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, p. 219.<br />
29 nmfa, Code 999.214, Folder 684, Pronk to New York, no. 25, 24/01/74.<br />
30 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of the Cabinet meeting, no. 6315, 01/01/74.<br />
31 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5702, Van der Stoel to Algiers, no. 7, 08/02/74.<br />
32 nmfa, Code 912.1, Folder 2089, Pronk to Algiers, no. 6, 08/02/74.<br />
33 asd, FOIA 8903648, State Department memorandum, 11/04/74.<br />
34 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, pp. 235-236.<br />
35 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, pp. 237-239.<br />
36 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5706, Van der Stoel to Damascus, no. 16,<br />
20/03/74.<br />
37 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6365, 08/03/74.<br />
38 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, p. 240.<br />
39 nmfa, Code 996.0 EEG, Folder 594, Volume 17, EEG-VS, Van Aerssen to Van<br />
der Stoel, no. 381 142, 06/03/74; Kissinger, 1982, pp. 927-931 and Simonian,<br />
1985, pp. 241-242.<br />
40 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, p. 240.<br />
41 na, RG59, Kissinger Staff Meetings 1973-1977, Entry 5177, Box 2, 05/03/74<br />
and Box 3, 22/03/74.<br />
42 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, p. 241.<br />
43 nmfa, PA London, GS, Code 912.1, Box 44, Van der Stoel circular no. 86,<br />
293
11/03/74. About Callaghan’s ‘warm feelings’ for the United States: Callaghan,<br />
1987, pp. 358-359.<br />
44 na, RG59, Kissinger Staff Meetings 1973-1977, Entry 5177, Box 3, 22/03/74.<br />
45 nmfa, Code 996.0 EEG, Folder 594, Volume 17, EEG-VS, Van der Stoel to Den<br />
Uyl, no. 69046, 22/03/74.<br />
46 Marshall, 1997, p. 91 and Simonian, 1985, p. 244.<br />
47 nmfa, Code 996.0 EEG, Folder 594, Volume 17, EEG-VS, Tammenons Bakker<br />
(van m) to nmfa, no. 86, 25/04/74.<br />
48 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, pp. 242-243.<br />
49 Agulhon, 1993, pp. 439 and 449 and Costigliola, 1992, pp. 180-182.<br />
50 Marshall, 1997, pp. 92-93.<br />
51 aez, Archive PAZ, Box 616, Folder 2, Verslag 13de vergadering ez Werkgroep<br />
Oliecrisis, 30/01/74.<br />
52 nna, 2.02.05.02, Archive of the Council of Ministers, Inv. no. 1289, minutes of<br />
the Cabinet meeting, no. 6354, 01/03/74.<br />
53 Keesings Historisch Archief, 28 June 1974, p. 406.<br />
54 aez, Archive Bureau Secretaris-Generaal, Box 294, Folder 11, Directie aep to<br />
sg, no. 303/74/ep, 19/04/74.<br />
55 Keesings Historisch Archief, 15 February 1974, p. 101.<br />
56 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5706, De Beus to nmfa, no. 148, 28/03/74.<br />
57 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, pp. 244-248.<br />
58 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5706, memo dam to m, no. 40 plus annexes,<br />
28/03/74.<br />
59 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, pp. 249-250.<br />
60 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5706, Van der Stoel to Bonn, no. 97, 02/04/74.<br />
61 aez, Archive DG BEB, no. 89-1227, Box 3283, Folder 7, Note by A. Houtman,<br />
15/03/74.<br />
62 Our reconstruction is based on: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 1974, passim.<br />
63 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6421, 19/04/74.<br />
64 nmfa, PA Djedda, GS, Folder 614.0, Van Lynden to nmfa, no. 313, 15/04/74.<br />
65 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of Cabinet meeting, no. 6441, 03/05/74.<br />
66 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, p. 233.<br />
67 nna, 2.02.05.02, Archive of the Council of Ministers, Inv. no. 1289, minutes of<br />
the Cabinet meeting, no. 6410, 11/04/74.<br />
68 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, p. 253.<br />
69 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5706, Derksen to nmfa, no. 31, 28/03/74.<br />
70 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5706, Van Schelle to nmfa, no. 135, 29/03/74.<br />
71 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, p. 254.<br />
72 Quandt, 1977, pp. 231-245.<br />
294
73 nmfa, Code 912.2, Folder 1013, Derksen to nmfa, no. 48, 01/06/74.<br />
74 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5706, Van Hoeve to nmfa, no. 63, 03/06/74,<br />
and International Herald Tribune, 02/06/74.<br />
75 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5706, Reinink to nmfa, no. 77, 06/06/74.<br />
76 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5706, De Ranitz to nmfa, no. 316, 07/06/74,<br />
and Le Monde, 04/06/74.<br />
77 Interview with Van der Stoel, January 1997.<br />
78 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5706, memo dam to m, no. 85, 07/06/74.<br />
79 KMP, Cabinet meetings, minutes of the Cabinet meeting, no. 6485, 07/06/74.<br />
80 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5706, Derksen to nmfa, no. 50, 13/06/73, and<br />
Celer to Djedda, no. 31, 17/06/74.<br />
81 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume II, pp. 255-256.<br />
82 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5706, De Ranitz to nmfa, no. 339, 18/06/74.<br />
83 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5706, Vixseboxse to nmfa, no. 95, 24/06/74.<br />
84 nmfa, Code 913.211.0, Folder 5706, Schaapveld to nmfa, no. 272, 20/06/74.<br />
85 nmfa, Code 912.1, Folder 2274, Memo dgpz to M, 28/06/74.<br />
86 NRC Handelsblad, 10/07/74.<br />
87 Daoudi & Dajani, 1985, p. 155, and asd, FOIA 8903648, State Department<br />
Briefing Paper, May 1974.<br />
88 nna, 2.02.05.02, Archive of the Council of Ministers, Inv. no. 1327, Note des to<br />
the Council, no. des 129754, 05/07/74.<br />
89 nna, 2.02.05.02, Archive of the Council of Ministers, Inv. no. 1327, Note Van<br />
de Graaf to Den Uyl, no. 315, 13/06/74.<br />
90 Lieber, 1976, p. 38 and Jaarboek, 1974, pp. 82-86.<br />
91 nna, 2.02.05.02, Archive of the Council of Ministers, Inv. no. 1289, minutes of<br />
the Cabinet meeting, no. 6563, 12/07/74.<br />
Notes Conclusion<br />
1 Daoudi and Dajani, 1985, p. 173-174.<br />
2 Vernon, 1976, pp. 101-102.<br />
3 Voorhoeve, 1979, p. 245. The embargo ‘showed that Dutch foreign policy could<br />
be relatively independent from economic self-interest’. Voorhoeve has to acknowledge,<br />
however, that Dutch national security policy became more pro-Arab<br />
after 1974.<br />
4 nmfa, BZ-rapport Oliecrisis, Volume I, p. 108.<br />
5 According to former advisor of Prime Minister Den Uyl, T. van de Graaf. Interview<br />
with Van de Graaf, January 1997.<br />
6 Vernon, 1976, pp. 163-164.<br />
295
7 According to former minister Chr. van der Klaauw. Interview with Van der<br />
Klaauw, September 1993.<br />
8 De Staatscourant, 17/04/74.<br />
9 Tweede-kamerfractie Partij van de Arbeid, ‘Het onderzoek naar de rol van de<br />
oliemaatschappijen in de oliecrisis van 1973-1974’, pp. 14-15.<br />
10 Interview with Rutten, January 1997.<br />
11 Interview with Willemsen, February 1997.<br />
12 Interview with Van de Graaf, January 1997.<br />
13 Voorhoeve, 1979, p. 246.<br />
296
Archival Records<br />
A large number of records and collections of documents were consulted for the<br />
study. Private organizations and individuals also made documents available. The<br />
aim of this survey is to provide insight into the archives which were consulted for the<br />
purposes of this study.<br />
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives<br />
1 Secret Archives<br />
2 Departmental Archives<br />
3 Archives various diplomatic posts<br />
The Netherlands Ministry of Defence archives<br />
1 Department of the Under-Secretary of Defence<br />
2 Secretary-General’s Department<br />
3 Defence Staff<br />
4 Directorate-General for Equipment<br />
5 Military Intelligence Service (mis), Central Organization<br />
Netherlands National Archives, The Hague<br />
1 Minutes of Cabinet Meetings<br />
2 National Defence Council<br />
3 Collection J.H. van Royen<br />
4 Collection H.J. de Koster<br />
Archives City of Amsterdam<br />
Newspaper Archives<br />
297
Archives City of Rotterdam<br />
Central Archives<br />
Ministry of Home Affairs, The Hague<br />
Collection of the Dutch National Security Service (bvd) in Leidschendam<br />
International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam<br />
Collection E. van Thijn<br />
Collection J.M. den Uyl<br />
General Affairs, The Hague<br />
1 The archive of the Prime Minister’s office (kmp)<br />
2 Minutes of the Ministerial Council for European Affairs<br />
3 Minutes of the Ministerial Council for Economic Affairs<br />
4 The archive of the Committee of the United Intelligence Services in the Netherlands<br />
(cvin)<br />
5 The archive of the Intelligence Coordinator<br />
Ministry of Economic Affairs, The Hague<br />
1 Secretary-General’s Department<br />
2 Archives of the Minister and Under-Secretary<br />
3 Council of Director-Generals<br />
4 Directorate for Foreign Economic Relations<br />
5 National Bureau for Oil Products<br />
6 Directorate-General for General Economic Policy<br />
7 Directorate-General for Energy<br />
Ministry of Finance, The Hague<br />
General Treasury Archives<br />
imf Archives<br />
Ministry of Justice, The Hague<br />
Files a 73/099, Folder i & ii, 1973-1976<br />
File a 73/399<br />
Ministry of Transport and Water Management, The Hague<br />
Departmental Archives<br />
National Archives, College Park, Maryland<br />
rg 59 State Department diplomatic records<br />
298
g 165 Modern Military Field Branch<br />
rg 273 National Security Council<br />
rg 319 us Army Intelligence, g-2<br />
rg 341 us Air Force Intelligence<br />
National Archives, Alexandra, Virginia <br />
1 Richard Nixon Presidential Materials Project<br />
US Department of State, Washington D.C.<br />
foia requests<br />
Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland<br />
rg 84 Diplomatic Posts (The Hague)<br />
Correspondence and interviews were held with the following persons.<br />
Their position in 1973-1974 is indicated.<br />
Agt, A.A.M. van<br />
Bar On, C.<br />
Bergh, H. van den<br />
Gould Jr., Kingdon<br />
Graaf, T. van de<br />
Hek, A. van der<br />
Helfrich, A.C.<br />
Heuven, M. van<br />
Kaufman, J.<br />
Klaauw, Chr. van der<br />
Kruimink, F.E.<br />
Lubbers, R.F.M.<br />
Meines, T.<br />
Molenaar, H.<br />
Oskam, J.<br />
Peijnenburg, G.H.J.<br />
Pronk, J.P.<br />
Rabbani, M.<br />
Ranitz, J.A. de<br />
Riddle, A.W.<br />
Rising, L.E.<br />
Minister of Justice<br />
Israeli Ambassador in The Hague<br />
Member of parliament for the PvdA<br />
US Ambassador in The Netherlands<br />
Advisor of the Prime Minister to the Prime Minister’s Office<br />
Member of parliament for the PvdA<br />
Commercial Director Shell Netherlands<br />
US diplomat in The Hague<br />
Permanent Representative of The Netherlands at the oeso<br />
Deputy-Permanent Representative of The Netherlands at<br />
the Mission to the United Nations<br />
Coordinator of The Netherlands intelligence community<br />
Minister of Economic Affairs<br />
Brigadier-general, Head logistics at the Ministery of Defence<br />
Director Rotterdam Harbor<br />
Representative of the Independent Oil Traders in Rotterdam<br />
Secretary-General at the Ministery of Defence<br />
Minister for Development Cooperation<br />
Consul of Kuwait in The Hague<br />
Netherlands Ambassador in Paris<br />
Military Air attaché at the US Embassy in The Hague<br />
Military attaché at the US Embassy in The Hague<br />
299
Rutten, F.W.<br />
Schaik, R.J. van<br />
Schiff, E.L.C.<br />
Stemerdink, A.<br />
Stoel, M. van der<br />
Swift, Carleton B.<br />
Tanguy, Charles Reed<br />
Tjeenk Willink, H.D.<br />
Thijn, E. van<br />
Vredeling, H.<br />
Willemsen, W.Q.J.<br />
Wagner, G.A.<br />
Westerterp, T.<br />
Yamani, Ahmed Zaki<br />
Secretary-General at the Ministry of Economic Affairs and<br />
Chairman of Co-ordination Committee for the Oil crisis<br />
Chief Directorate-General European Cooperation at the<br />
Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br />
Secretary-General at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br />
Under-Secretary of Defence<br />
Minister of Foreign Affairs<br />
cia Station chief in The Hague<br />
US Counselor at the US Embassy in The Hague<br />
Advisor at the Prime Minister’s office<br />
Leader of the PvdA in parliament<br />
Minister of Defence<br />
Secretary of the Oil Crisis Working group<br />
Chief executive of Royal Dutch Shell<br />
Minister of Transport and Water Management<br />
Oil Minister of Saudi Arabia<br />
And various officials of The Netherlands intelligence community and officials working<br />
for foreign intelligence and security services who want to remain anonymous.<br />
300
List of Acronyms and Terms<br />
aaw<br />
aaz<br />
aez<br />
amd<br />
amf<br />
amj<br />
ara<br />
arp<br />
asd<br />
az<br />
beb<br />
bp<br />
bvd<br />
bz<br />
cec<br />
chu<br />
cia<br />
cmo<br />
cos<br />
cpb<br />
cpn<br />
cvin<br />
dam<br />
des<br />
dges<br />
Archives of the Netherlands Embassy, Washington<br />
Archives of General Affairs (Cabinet’s Office)<br />
Archives of the Ministry of Economic Affairs<br />
Archives of the Ministry of Defence<br />
Archives of the Ministry of Finance<br />
Archives of the Ministry of Justice<br />
Netherlands National Archives<br />
Anti-Revolutionary Party<br />
Archives of the US State Department<br />
Ministry of General Affairs<br />
Directorate-General for the Foreign Economic Relations of the Ministry<br />
of Economic Affairs<br />
British Petroleum<br />
Internal Security Service<br />
Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br />
Central-Economic Commission<br />
Christian Historical Union<br />
Central Intelligence Agency<br />
Co-ordination Group Measure against Oilcrisis<br />
Chief of Station of the cia<br />
Central Planning Bureau<br />
Communist Party Netherlands<br />
Committee on the United Intelligence Services in the Netherlands<br />
Department for Africa and Middle-East of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br />
Department for Economic Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br />
Directorate-General for European Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign<br />
Affairs<br />
301
dge<br />
dgi<br />
dgis<br />
dgpa<br />
die<br />
dio<br />
dgv<br />
dm<br />
doc<br />
ecd<br />
ecg<br />
ecosoc<br />
eec<br />
ec<br />
emu<br />
epc<br />
ez<br />
feo<br />
gatt<br />
htk<br />
iaea<br />
idb<br />
iea<br />
iep<br />
imf<br />
kmp<br />
kvp<br />
lpg<br />
m<br />
maag<br />
mdap<br />
mid<br />
nato<br />
nkv<br />
nmfa<br />
ns<br />
nvv<br />
Directorate-General for Energy of the Ministry of Economic Affairs<br />
Directorate-General Industry of the Ministry of Economic Affairs<br />
Directorate-General for International Cooperation of the Ministry of<br />
Foreign Affairs<br />
Directorate-General for Political Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br />
Department European Integration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br />
Department for International Organizations of the Ministry of Foreign<br />
Affairs<br />
Directorate-General for Traffic of the Ministry of Transport and Water<br />
Management<br />
Deutsche Mark<br />
Defence Oil Center<br />
Economic Control Service<br />
Energy Co-ordinating Group<br />
Economic and Social Council of the un<br />
European Economic Community<br />
European Community<br />
European Monetary Union<br />
European Political Cooperation<br />
Ministry of Economic Affairs<br />
Federal Energy Office<br />
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade<br />
Parliamentary Proceedings<br />
International Atomic Energy Agency<br />
Dutch Foreign Intelligence Service<br />
International Energy Agency<br />
International Energy Programme<br />
International Monetary Fund<br />
Prime Minister’s Office<br />
Catholic People’s Party<br />
Liquefied Petrol Gas<br />
Minister of Foreign Affairs<br />
Military Assistance Advisory Group<br />
Mutual Defense Assistance Program<br />
Military Intelligence Service<br />
North Atlantic Treaty Organization<br />
Dutch Catholic Trade Union<br />
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br />
Dutch Railways<br />
Dutch Union of Trade Unions<br />
302
oapec<br />
ofe<br />
opec<br />
pa<br />
plan<br />
plo<br />
ppr<br />
psp<br />
PvdA<br />
pv<br />
r<br />
pv<br />
s<br />
salt<br />
ser<br />
t<br />
unef<br />
vvd<br />
wkc<br />
wsag<br />
z<br />
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries<br />
US Office of Fuel and Energy<br />
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries<br />
Archives diplomatic post<br />
Department for Planning at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br />
Palestine Liberation Organization<br />
Radical Political Party<br />
Pacifist Cooperation Socialist Party<br />
Labour Party<br />
Permanent Representative<br />
Minister of Development Aid<br />
Council for Economic Affairs<br />
Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br />
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks<br />
Social Economic Council<br />
Under-Secretary of European Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br />
United Nations Emergency Force<br />
People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy<br />
Mathematical Center<br />
Washington Special Action Group<br />
Under-Secretary of Disarmament Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br />
303
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310
Newspapers<br />
Algemeen Dagblad<br />
Elsevier<br />
De Groene Amsterdammer<br />
Intermediair<br />
International Herald Tribune<br />
Le Monde<br />
NRC Handelsblad<br />
Het Parool<br />
De Telegraaf<br />
The Times<br />
Trouw<br />
de Volkskrant<br />
Vrij Nederland<br />
311
312
Index of Names<br />
Abdessalam, B. 131, 134, 203, 226-227,<br />
237, 240<br />
Agt, A.A.M. van 19, 104, 106, 107, 184-<br />
185, 231<br />
Akins, J. 223, 227<br />
Allende, S. 221<br />
Andersen, K.B. 150-151<br />
Andriessen, F.H.J.J. 227<br />
Antonissen, J.L. 24, 28, 29<br />
Assad, H. al- 198, 225<br />
Atiki, A.R. 59, 119<br />
Bar On, Ch. 22, 24, 25, 29, 31-33<br />
Beek, R. ter 68<br />
Bentinck, G.W. 54, 57, 59, 125, 213<br />
Bergh, H. van den 22, 32, 153<br />
Bernard, A. 46<br />
Bernhard, Prince 120<br />
Beus, J.G. de 129-139, 196, 203, 237,<br />
238<br />
Biesheuvel, B.W. 174<br />
Blodgett, J.Q. 134<br />
Boersma, J. 106, 132, 175-176, 190<br />
Boon, H.N. 50, 120-121<br />
Bot, D.R. 226<br />
Bot, Th.J. 235<br />
Boumedienne, H. 53, 59, 242<br />
Bouteflika, A. 244, 246, 252<br />
Brandt, W. 32, 78, 82, 85, 93, 127, 139,<br />
150-152, 196, 233, 236, 283<br />
Brezhnev, L. 14, 15<br />
Brinkhorst, L.J. 208<br />
Cals, J. 97<br />
Callaghan, J. 230<br />
Carrington, J. 112<br />
Chalaal, M.A. 59, 234<br />
Commines, de A. 247<br />
Davies, R. 90<br />
Derksen, G.W. 122, 197, 224, 227, 245,<br />
247<br />
Dis, C.N. van 105<br />
Donaldson, W.H. 136-137, 152, 198,<br />
209-210<br />
Douglas Home, A. 80, 90, 128, 147<br />
Drake, E. 79, 80<br />
Drees, W. 97<br />
Duisenberg, W.F. 94, 145, 164, 210, 215<br />
Eban, A. 135<br />
Elslande, P. van 132-133, 143, 147, 167,<br />
227<br />
Eupen, H.A.A.M. van 101<br />
Fack, R. 19, 20, 38, 228-229, 260<br />
Fahmi, I. 69<br />
Fanfani, A. 204<br />
Feisal, King 46, 57, 63, 121-122, 197,<br />
222-225, 227, 244, 247-248, 252, 256<br />
Gamasi, A.G. 73<br />
Gaulle, Ch. De 74, 76, 78<br />
Geessink, E.F. 115<br />
Gevers, W.J.G. 34, 50, 56, 80, 81, 147,<br />
202<br />
Giscard d’Estaing, V. 215, 236, 264<br />
Gould, K. 152, 210, 214<br />
313
Greenhill, D. 80<br />
Grosser, A. 75, 78, 263<br />
Gruijters, J.P.A. 236<br />
Grünfeld, F. 27, 57, 90<br />
Hamadi, S. 56<br />
Heath, E. 79, 80, 85, 111, 128, 146, 151,<br />
170, 234, 236, 258<br />
Hek, A. van der 67, 126<br />
Helfrich, A.C. 137, 161, 181, 187<br />
Hoeve, J.B.E.Ph. van 35, 69, 130, 226<br />
Hulten, M.H.M. 104, 105<br />
Hussein, S. 55, 120, 198<br />
Hustinx, W. 183<br />
Imkamp, M.J.J.A. 67<br />
Jobert, M. 78, 91, 126-127, 126-139,<br />
143, 148, 209, 214-217, 226-227, 229-<br />
230, 232, 235, 236<br />
Jong, P.J.S. de 123<br />
Jong, L. de 93, 118<br />
Jongejans, G.J. 13, 22<br />
Jørgensen, A. 150-151<br />
Juliana, Queen 107, 121, 197, 223, 225<br />
Kaufmann, J. 50<br />
Khene, A. 195<br />
Khodja, A. 122<br />
Kissinger, H. 14, 22, 62, 73, 75, 93, 134-<br />
137, 144, 147-152, 192, 198, 205-207,<br />
209, 212, 215-217, 219, 222, 230-234,<br />
242, 244, 247-248, 258-259<br />
Klaauw, Chr. van der 20, 39, 260<br />
Kok, W. 106<br />
Koster, H.J. de 125<br />
Kosygin, A.N. 14<br />
Kruimink, F.E. 23-25, 27, 29-33, 54, 267<br />
Kruisinga, R.J.H.. 125<br />
Kuipers, D. 23<br />
Kupers, F. 81, 84<br />
Langman, H. 47, 48<br />
Leber, G. 139<br />
Lennep, E. van 83, 212<br />
Lubbers, R.F.M. 19, 31, 33, 51, 52, 61,<br />
84, 85, 94, 95, 101, 103, 105, 106, 110,<br />
112, 115, 126, 131-136, 142, 145, 152,<br />
154, 158-184, 189-190, 204-205, 215-<br />
217, 226, 237, 240-241, 252, 259, 262<br />
Luns, J.M.A.H. 66, 75, 149<br />
Lynden, D.W. van 20, 26, 34, 37, 39, 50,<br />
78, 89, 92, 124-125, 131-134, 141, 148-<br />
149, 152, 194, 196, 213-214, 230, 232,<br />
238-240<br />
Lynden, R.B. van 24, 33, 57, 60, 62, 84,<br />
85, 136, 198, 222-223<br />
Mayhew, Chr. 80<br />
McFadzean, F. 79-80, 203<br />
Mei, D.F. van der 125<br />
Meijer, J. 36<br />
Meines, T. 28-29<br />
Meir, G. 32, 72, 127, 192, 265, 268<br />
Messmer, P. 138<br />
Miki, T. 201<br />
Moro, A. 203-204, 226-227<br />
Nasser, A. 17<br />
Nixon, R.M. 14-16, 38, 45, 53, 75, 192,<br />
206-208, 212, 216, 229, 233, 248, 259<br />
Nowilaty, R. 57, 61, 63, 122, 132, 223,<br />
245<br />
Ortoli, F.X. 91, 143, 209<br />
Oven, F. von 60, 69, 118, 120, 125<br />
Pallisser, M. 211<br />
Parsons, G. 80<br />
Peeters, F. 23, 29,<br />
Peijnenburg, M.W.J.M. 67, 105<br />
Peijnenburg, G.H.J. 24, 31<br />
Piercy, G. 46<br />
Pompidou, G. 78, 78, 126-127, 130-131,<br />
137-138, 147, 199, 202, 215, 236<br />
Portheine, F. 67<br />
Posthumes Meyes, H.Ch. 50<br />
Pronk, J.P. 132, 145-146, 185, 205, 208,<br />
216, 219, 221, 229-230, 242, 252, 259<br />
Puaux, G. 211<br />
Qaddafi, M. 47<br />
Rabbani, M. 72, 197, 227<br />
Rafai, A. 35, 69<br />
Ranitz, J.A. de 77, 78, 119, 130-131,<br />
137-138, 147, 199, 202, 206, 211, 227,<br />
247, 248<br />
314
Rashid al Rashid, A. 64, 227<br />
Renard de Lavalette, P.A.E. 63-65, 95,<br />
119, 120<br />
Rhijn, A.T.T. van 146, 158, 163-164<br />
Riad, M. 118<br />
Riezenkamp, J. 103<br />
Ringnalda, D.M. 140-141<br />
Roijen, J.H. van 63, 120-122, 137<br />
Roos, J.J. de 118<br />
Rosenthal, U. 102, 110<br />
Rush, K. 33, 50<br />
Rutten, F.W. 95, 102, 108, 114, 158, 163-<br />
164, 167, 180-181, 184, 262, 263<br />
Sadat, A. 14, 15, 225-226, 233<br />
Said el Sayed, M. 60<br />
Saloom, K.M. 120<br />
Saqqaf, O. 227, 248<br />
Sauvagnargues, J. 248<br />
Scheel, W. 91, 139, 283, 203, 209, 216-<br />
217, 226-227, 233, 235-238, 240, 243<br />
Schelle, A. Ch. Van 196<br />
Scheltema, H. 137<br />
Schiff, E.L.C. 38<br />
Schlesinger, J. 22, 34, 134<br />
Schmelzer, W.K.N. 17, 47, 48<br />
Schmidt, H. 216-217, 236, 264<br />
Scholten, G.H. 102, 110<br />
Schorer, D.M. 58, 59, 64, 119, 198, 224<br />
Schravenmade, A. van 185<br />
Schulten, J. 30<br />
Senard, J. 78, 229<br />
Simonian, H. 139<br />
Sisco, J. 135, 223<br />
Spek, F. van der 31, 32, 34<br />
Stee, A.P.J.M.M. van der 104, 166<br />
Stemerdink, A. 23, 24, 27-31, 39, 260<br />
Stoel, M. van der 18-39, 49, 51-58, 60-<br />
72, 76-98, 104, 105, 110, 117-155, 163,<br />
166-167, 181, 184, 192, 195-197, 204-<br />
216, 223-248, 252, 256-262<br />
Suheim, M. 64<br />
Swift, C.B. 23, 267<br />
Taylor, J. 202<br />
Thijn, E. van 20, 72, 90, 127<br />
Thomassen, W. 196<br />
Thorn, G. 143<br />
Thurkow, Chr.Th.F. 124-125, 155, 256<br />
Uyl, J.M. den 9, 10, 19, 22-27, 31-33, 39,<br />
54, 60-64, 67-72, 76, 94, 98-106, 109,<br />
115, 120, 124-132, 140, 145-146, 150,<br />
155, 159-164, 170, 174, 176-185, 189-<br />
193, 199, 206, 208, 216, 228-229, 234,<br />
240, 246-252, 257-263<br />
Vernon, R. 260<br />
Voorhoeve, J.J.C. 256<br />
Vredeling, H. 19, 22-24, 26-34, 39, 58,<br />
63, 64, 67, 93, 94, 135, 163, 164<br />
Vreede, de C. 122<br />
Vroon, A.C. 70<br />
Wagner, G.A. 57, 58, 90, 110-112, 129,<br />
147, 154, 161, 193-194, 197, 288<br />
Waldheim, K. 73, 211, 243, 246<br />
Walker, P. 81<br />
Werner, E.G.G. 111-112<br />
Westerterp, T.E. 37, 161, 163, 183, 190,<br />
237, 240, 262<br />
Wiegel, H. 125<br />
Willemsen, W.Q.J. 108, 174, 263<br />
Wilson, H. 127, 232, 234, 264<br />
Yamani, A.Z. 9, 34, 35, 46, 52, 53, 121,<br />
131-134, 148, 203, 237, 240, 242<br />
Yariv, A. 73<br />
Yergin, D. 47, 93<br />
Zanten, T.A. van 28<br />
315
Index of Subjects<br />
Abu Dhabi 57, 59, 64, 198, 222<br />
anwb 182, 237<br />
Airlines<br />
Air France 70<br />
El Al 29, 69<br />
Lufthansa 70<br />
Martinair 200<br />
Royal Dutch Airlines (klm) 29, 35, 52-<br />
56, 67-71, 200, 201, 204, 240, 249<br />
Sabena 70<br />
Schreiner Airways 69<br />
Algeria 40, 42, 46, 53, 55, 57, 59, 66,<br />
72, 101, 122, 130, 150, 200, 214, 219,<br />
221-222, 227-230, 233, 238, 246-247,<br />
252<br />
Arab League 62, 118<br />
Arab League’s Bureau for the boycott of Israel<br />
53, 54, 68-70<br />
Azores 16, 27<br />
Bahrain 52, 119, 198, 222<br />
Belgium 40, 81, 82, 92, 99, 113, 139-143,<br />
145, 147, 154, 166-168, 196, 200, 209,<br />
255, 257<br />
Benelux 90, 102, 113, 139, 147-149,<br />
166-167<br />
bk Gas 180<br />
bovag 183, 186, 187, 237<br />
Canada 205, 207<br />
Car-free Sundays 89, 105, 107-109, 158-<br />
160, 172, 179, 189-190, 261<br />
Centurion tanks 18, 25, 26, 29<br />
Chile 221<br />
Conference on Security and Cooperation<br />
in Europe (csce) 15, 38<br />
Davignon Report 75<br />
Defense Condition 3 (Defcon iii) 14<br />
Denmark 71, 74, 119, 145, 150, 154,<br />
193, 209, 213, 222, 226, 234, 249, 257<br />
Dubai 53<br />
Egypt 11-40, 60, 69, 73, 118, 135198,<br />
200, 222, 244, 247, 264<br />
Energy Co-ordinating Group (ecg) 216,<br />
218, 231-232, 249-251, 258, 264<br />
Eurodif 138<br />
Eurometaal 24<br />
European Community 9, 15-16, 19, 45,<br />
48, 51, 52, 54, 61, 63, 71, 74, 75, 77-80,<br />
84-88, 89, 92, 94, 94, 95, 102, 105, 110,<br />
11, 114, 117, 126-131, 135-144, 151,<br />
157, 163-168, 170-174, 191-219, 236,<br />
222-253, 256-257, 260, 263-264<br />
Comité Politique 35-37, 54, 76, 89,<br />
212, 213, 233<br />
Copenhagen Summit 117, 125, 126,<br />
137, 138, 141-155, 170, 191-193,<br />
200-201, 212, 219, 258<br />
Euro-Arab Dialogue 147, 151, 213-<br />
214, 226-227, 232-236, 240, 245,<br />
247-249, 251-252, 259, 261<br />
European Commission 48, 75-77, 84-<br />
87, 90, 91, 142-145, 151168, 174,<br />
208-209, 214, 218, 235, 258<br />
European Community for Coal and<br />
Steel 153<br />
European Council 76<br />
European Energy Council 142<br />
316
European Monetary Union 141<br />
European Political Cooperation (epc)<br />
21, 35, 39, 51, 54, 74, 76, 78, 80, 87,<br />
89, 91, 93, 95.121-124, 127-136,<br />
148, 203, 212-214, 232-236, 252,<br />
264<br />
Farce Majeure 227, 239<br />
Federation of Arab Trade Unions 71<br />
Fouchet Plan 149<br />
France 16, 19, 22, 35, 37, 38, 40, 43, 44,<br />
51, 54, 61, 67, 76-79, 81, 82, 83, 87, 90,<br />
92, 95, 99, 114, 117, 123-124, 129-131,<br />
137-140, 143-145, 150, 152-154, 164,<br />
200-202, 204-207, 211, 213, 215-218,<br />
231, 234, 251, 255, 257<br />
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade<br />
(gatt) 62, 241<br />
Gilze Rijen Airport 23, 29, 31<br />
Great Britain 22, 27, 28, 33, 35, 38, 51,<br />
67, 74, 77, 79-81, 83, 90, 93, 95, 112,<br />
114, 127, 139-140, 143-145, 152-<br />
153164, 167, 196, 200, 202, 205, 207,<br />
211, 255, 257<br />
Group of 77 221, 228, 232, 243-245, 251<br />
Gymnich ‘formula’ 235-236<br />
Hoogovens Steel Works 153<br />
imf 241, 259<br />
Indonesia 17, 194<br />
International Energy Agency (iea) 251,<br />
258<br />
Iran 44, 55, 59, 62, 90, 112, 142, 162,<br />
201, 202, 204<br />
Iraq 46, 51, 53, 55, 56, 59, 63-65, 72,<br />
120, 200-201, 204, 246<br />
Ireland 74, 154, 209<br />
Israel 9-40, 51-55, 57-61, 66-71, 73, 82,<br />
88-94, 103, 122-123, 135, 150-151,<br />
155, 198, 224, 234, 260<br />
Italy 19, 37, 40, 44, 51, 54, 76-79, 92, 99,<br />
140, 145, 154, 200, 203, 207, 225-226,<br />
228<br />
Japan 41, 75, 83, 196, 200, 201, 205, 207<br />
Jordan 14, 15, 53, 69, 70, 118<br />
Kiele Kiele Koeweit 227, 239<br />
Kuwait 45, 46, 47, 52, 54, 58, 59, 63-65,<br />
72, 101, 196-199, 201, 204, 222, 224,<br />
226-227, 244-246, 252<br />
Leopard tanks 29<br />
Libya 16, 42, 46, 50-52, 55, 59, 63-65,<br />
72, 197, 200-201, 204, 214, 219, 225,<br />
249<br />
Luxembourg 139, 143, 145, 147, 209<br />
Morocco 122<br />
Melsbroek Airport 29<br />
Military Advisory Assistance Group<br />
(maag) 29<br />
Mossad 69<br />
Mutual Defense Assistance Programme<br />
(mdap) 26<br />
nato 14, 27, 38-40, 59, 66, 75, 93, 94,<br />
136-137, 148, 153, 233, 248<br />
Eurogroup 139<br />
Oil Pipeline System 276<br />
Netherlands, Cabinet passim<br />
Co-ordination Group for Oil Crisis Action<br />
106, 108, 114, 158-161, 166-<br />
167, 171-174, 180, 184-185, 187,<br />
262<br />
Council of Ministers 51, 52, 92, 93,<br />
101, 104, 106, 114<br />
Council for Economic Affairs 144,<br />
163, 169-170, 176<br />
Council for European Affairs 86, 144,<br />
146, 208, 235<br />
Netherlands, Central Economic Committee<br />
161-162, 173, 176<br />
Netherlands, Central Planning Bureau<br />
10, 109, 157, 161, 255<br />
Netherlands, Enabling Act 157, 162, 174-<br />
177, 181, 190-191, 255<br />
Netherlands, Foreign Intelligence Service<br />
(idb) 52, 190<br />
Netherlands, Military Intelligence Service<br />
18<br />
Netherlands, Ministry of Agriculture 115<br />
Netherlands, Ministry of Defence 22-31<br />
Netherlands, Ministry of Economic Affairs<br />
passim<br />
317
Directorate-General for Energy 101,<br />
110, 114-115, 163<br />
Directorate-General for Industry 102<br />
Directorate-General for Foreign Economic<br />
Relations 241<br />
National Bureau for Oil Products 104<br />
Working Group Oil Crisis 114, 161-<br />
162, 168, 171-172<br />
Netherlands, Ministry of Finance 171,<br />
215<br />
Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br />
passim<br />
Department for Africa and the Middle<br />
East (dam) 26, 121, 238-240, 247<br />
Department for European Integration<br />
(die) 87, 92<br />
Department for International Organizations<br />
(dio) 19<br />
Directorate-General for International<br />
Cooperation (dgis) 19, 20, 36, 195,<br />
242<br />
Directorate-General for Political Affairs<br />
(dgpa) 20, 37, 39, 196, 242<br />
Department for Economic Cooperation<br />
(des) 47, 48, 87, 111-113, 166, 167,<br />
184, 206, 231<br />
Plan Policy Unit (plan) 49, 50<br />
Netherlands, Ministry of General Affairs<br />
140, 168, 171<br />
Netherlands, Ministry of Justice 109,<br />
159, 171, 184, 186, 188<br />
Netherlands, Ministry of Transport and<br />
Water Management 106, 159, 171-<br />
174, 182, 237<br />
Netherlands, National Bureau for Oil<br />
Products (rba) 164, 171, 180-183,<br />
188, 189<br />
Netherlands, natural gas 49, 95, 99-100,<br />
126, 139, 146, 154, 165-167, 170-173,<br />
176, 199, 256-257<br />
Netherlands, Newspapers<br />
Algemeen Dagblad 61<br />
Haagsche Courant 107<br />
Het Parool 93, 98, 108, 153<br />
De Telegraaf 23, 107<br />
NRC Handelsblad 93, 98, 100, 103,<br />
108, 178, 179, 186, 197, 249<br />
Staatscourant 105<br />
Trouw 93, 102, 134, 153, 179, 211<br />
de Volkskrant 93, 98, 100, 103, 178,<br />
185, 186<br />
Netherlands, political parties<br />
Anti-Revolutionary Party (arp) 9, 97,<br />
176<br />
Catholic People’s Party (kvp) 9, 39, 67,<br />
97, 105<br />
Christian Historical Union (chu) 125<br />
Communist Party (cpn) 19<br />
Democrats 1966 (D’66) 9, 67, 97, 98<br />
Liberal Conservative Party (vvd) 66,<br />
67, 125, 176, 195<br />
Pacifist Socialist Party (psp) 19, 31<br />
Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA) 9, 20, 39,<br />
67, 68, 72, 88, 97, 98, 126, 153, 176-<br />
177, 180-181, 221, 234, 260, 262<br />
Radical Party (ppr) 9, 20, 98<br />
Netherlands, parliament<br />
First Chamber 123-124, 176, 181, 182,<br />
233<br />
Second Chamber 19, 31, 52, 61, 66, 67,<br />
94, 98, 101, 104-106, 115, 123, 125-<br />
126, 133, 167, 174-176, 178, 233,<br />
237, 245, 256, 262<br />
Netherlands, Rationing Law 114, 164,<br />
171<br />
Netherlands, Social-Economic Council<br />
106, 175-176<br />
New International Economic Order<br />
(nieo) 221, 245, 251, 252, 259, 264<br />
Nigeria 90, 112, 142, 161-162<br />
nkv 175<br />
Norway 207<br />
nvv 175<br />
Oil Companies<br />
Agip 42<br />
Aramco 46, 248<br />
Basrah Petroleum Company 55<br />
British Petroleum (bp) 42, 51, 77, 79,<br />
80, 110, 111, 127, 140, 258<br />
cfp 42<br />
Chevron 46, 111, 164<br />
Ef-Erap 42<br />
eni 42<br />
Exxon 46, 55, 288<br />
Getty 42<br />
Libyan national oil Company 63<br />
Mobil Oil 46, 55, 190<br />
Occidental 42<br />
Phillips 42<br />
318
Shell 9, 10, 40, 46, 51, 53, 55-58, 63,<br />
77, 79, 80, 87, 90, 101, 109-115, 120-<br />
121, 127, 129, 137, 140, 147, 151,<br />
161, 167, 181, 187, 190, 197, 203,<br />
206, 209, 237, 258, 288<br />
Sonatrach 122<br />
Standard oil of Indiana 42<br />
Texaco 46, 111, 163<br />
Oil Contact Committee 158<br />
Oman 58, 59, 64, 119<br />
Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting<br />
Countries (oapec) 46, 51, 52, 54,<br />
55, 71, 73, 97, 100, 114, 119189, 193,<br />
223, 225, 226, 235, 239, 244, 246, 248,<br />
249<br />
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting<br />
Countries (opec) 42, 44-48, 51, 76,<br />
84, 129, 193-195, 205-207, 221-222,<br />
241, 251, 260, 264<br />
Organisation for Economic Cooperation<br />
and Development (oecd) 47, 48, 50,<br />
58, 74, 80, 83-86, 95, 103, 111, 114,<br />
129, 149, 153, 170, 192, 194-195, 209,<br />
231, 250, 251<br />
oecd Oil Commission 83, 105<br />
Palestinian Liberation Organisation (plo)<br />
51<br />
Portugal 27, 33, 119, 193, 222<br />
Qatar 53, 57, 59, 63, 64, 198, 222<br />
rai 183<br />
Ramstein 29<br />
Rhodesia 119, 222<br />
Romania 120, 180<br />
Rotterdam 28, 49, 53, 62, 65, 71, 72, 77,<br />
81, 8285, 90-93, 99-100, 103-105, 107,<br />
109, 112, 120, 121, 129-142, 146, 153-<br />
154, 160, 162, 166, 168-169, 196, 199,<br />
222, 226, 248, 252, 255-257<br />
Rotterdam-Antwerp Oil Pipeline 82, 103,<br />
133<br />
Rotterdam Botlek or Rijnmond Area 40,<br />
168-169, 177, 185, 188, 253, 257<br />
Saudi Arabia 21, 41-43, 45, 51, 57, 59-<br />
62, 68, 71, 72, 84, 97, 121, 122, 197,<br />
200-202, 204, 226, 245-247, 252<br />
Schiphol (Amsterdam airport) 69<br />
Stockholm International Peace Research<br />
Institute 201<br />
Sinai desert 16, 30<br />
Socialist International 32, 127<br />
Soesterberg military airfield 18, 27, 29,<br />
266<br />
South Africa 119, 221-222<br />
Soviet Union 14-16, 38, 54, 150, 192, 219<br />
Spain 33, 200<br />
Syria 9, 19, 14-16, 20, 51, 53, 69, 70,<br />
118, 130, 192, 197-198, 200, 204<br />
Sudan 150<br />
Suez canal 13-15, 16, 18, 73<br />
Thyssen Steel 119<br />
Toute License Accordée (TLA) 166-167<br />
Treaty of Rom 75<br />
Tunisia 51, 62, 150<br />
Turkey 66<br />
“Turning Point 72” 98, 258<br />
United Arab Emirates 63, 150, 200<br />
United Nations 53, 73, 91, 204, 210-211,<br />
215-219, 226-231, 239, 241-246, 252,<br />
259-260<br />
Emergency Force 73<br />
Economic and Social Council (ecosoc)<br />
227, 243<br />
General Assembly 14, 17-19, 80, 92,<br />
130, 204, 215, 216-217, 229-231,<br />
239, 241-246, 252, 259-260<br />
Resolution 242 15, 17, 19-21, 36, 37,<br />
58-61, 89, 91, 122-125, 128, 150-<br />
151, 224, 226, 239<br />
Resolution 2949 17, 80, 88, 89, 92<br />
Security Council 14, 15, 18-21, 36, 39,<br />
67, 93, 239, 246, 260<br />
United States of America (usa) 14-40, 41-<br />
49, 52, 53, 55, 57, 65, 66, 68, 75, 83-85,<br />
88, 93, 94, 129, 134-137, 151, 192-219,<br />
221-253, 256, 258, 261, 263<br />
Central Intelligence Agency (cia) 23<br />
Council on International Economic Policy<br />
44<br />
Federal Energy Office (feo) 53<br />
National Security Agency 288<br />
National Security Council 135<br />
State Department 44-46, 50, 85, 198,<br />
222, 223, 232-233<br />
319
Valkenburg airfield 29<br />
Vietnam 192, 263<br />
Volkel airfield 27<br />
Washington Conference 192, 208-219,<br />
222, 227-228, 230-232, 241<br />
West Germany 16, 23, 25, 29, 32, 38, 40,<br />
43, 44, 81, 82, 99, 112, 129, 139-150,<br />
154, 180, 203, 205, 207, 213, 215, 225-<br />
226, 252, 256, 260<br />
Western European Union 139<br />
World Bank 246, 252, 259<br />
Ypenburg military airfield 29<br />
320