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Bar On know by telephone that the Israeli military attaché in Paris had
been contacted to establish exactly what Israel’s needs were, and that
once this was known, the decision lay with the Cabinet. Bar On was told
no more than this by him. 47
More information arrived at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on October
9.FromWashington came the news that The Netherlands must see
what they themselves could do, 48 which meant that in any case there
would be no Americanrepudiation.VanderStoelwaskeptinformedof
activities at the Defence Ministry. A Foreign Ministry memo of October
9 reported the Israeli request for ‘any type and any quantity’ of 105 and
155 mm ammunition. Defence had let it be known that smaller quantities
of the above calibre were availablefromsurplus stock and could in
addition be supplied from stocks intended for theDutcharmy’sown
use. 49
The following morning, October 10, DenUylreceived a note from
Kruimink titled: ‘Several factors of relevance in evaluating the question:
what is the value of 11,000 tank shells for Centurion tanks.’ The note
made reference to the possible delivery of 11,000 tank shells, field telephone
cable, tank parts and also mines. The artillery ammunition that
had been so centrally significant in the Defence papers was not even mentioned
in Kruimink’s note. According to him, what was important at that
time was above all spare parts and tank shells for the Israeli Centurions.
50 This shift was probably linked with developments in the war, for
after the first few difficult days, the Israeli army had now gone on the offensive.
The Israeli interest in ammunition and spares for Centurion tanks was
understandable. These tanks constituted about half the Israeli tank force,
in a situation in which they were confronted on both fronts with superior
numbers of Syrian and Egyptian tanks. 51 The British Centurion tank was
also the standard tank in both Dutch and British armies. The British government,
however, as already mentioned, had banned the export of
weapons to both belligerent parties. 52 For the Dutch army, the 11,000
tank shells constituted ‘ammunition for the first phase’, predestined for
five days of Dutch fighting in the event of war (mainly in Germany, it was
hoped), whereas this was probably sufficient to see the Israelis through
three days of battle.
Given the content of his note, Kruimink was assuming a secret operation.
He indicates briefly how transport to Israel could be worked out
practically and also made suggestions for camouflaging the necessary replenishment
of stocks in The Netherlands, which would have to occur in
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