The Intelligence Review | volume 1 | issue 1

However, the current threat Kim Jong-un is facing is within the highest echelon of songbun,
known as the ‘core class’, which is supposed to consist of those most loyal to him. This class
reaches the highest positions in the military and the Korean Workers Party (KWP). There was
reported discontent among this class before the strictest United Nations (UN) sanctions took
place in early March (Mi-jing 2016). However, there are no indications that this discontent will
equal action against Kim Jong-un, considering that ‘core class’ members still receive better
treatment under the military-first politics of the country.
Nevertheless, the defection of 13 DPRK restaurant workers from China, on April 6, 2016,
highlights some dysfunction (Botelho 2016). Workers abroad are supposed to be the most
loyal to the regime, because of their increased chance of being exposed to outside information.
They also often have hereditary connections to the KWP and/or the military. Therefore, a
defection of this magnitude is rare and possibly points to a weakness within the regime. But the
defection of the restaurant workers also highlights a simple pattern: individuals who become
disillusioned with the state would rather defect than rebel. The thousands of DPRK citizens
who have defected over the last few years emphasize this pattern. It was further accentuated
when South Korea announced on April 10 that a DPRK Colonel in the General
Reconnaissance Bureau defected last year (Gale 2016). A particular caveat, though, consists of
the two failed military coups, in 1991 and 1995. In both cases, a single individual that was
supposed to be part of the coups betrayed their co-conspirators and revealed the plots (Ryall
2015).
The defection and discontent is occurring while Kim Jong-un is still trying to solidify his
power. When he first became Supreme Leader in 2011 after the death of his father and
predecessor Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-un gradually demoted individuals that had connections
with his father. He clearly did not trust those who had worked closely with his father (Gause
2015:27-33). On December 12, 2013, he furthered proved this by executing his uncle, Jang Sangtaek
(Gause 2015:234). These executions were not unusual as both Kim Il-sung and Kim Jongil
used precisely such a method to maintain control. Consequently, the reported demotion of
General Ri Yong-gil in May is important, but not surprising or damaging to Kim Jong-un’s
power, as he is still developing his relatively young leadership. As a result, present conditions
do not deviate significantly from the status quo.
Furthermore, in October 2015, Kim Jong-un announced that the Seventh Workers’ Party
Congress would occur in May. This is the highest political event in the country and the first
time it has been held in 36 years. It also offered a chance for Kim Jong-un to set the tone of
his leadership for at least the next couple years. It is possible that Kim Jong-un’s overt show
of toughness over the last few months may have been his way of preparing for the event. In
essence, the DPRK’s fourth nuclear test and intercontinental ballistic missile tests could be
skewed to enhance the most important high-level meeting in North Korea in decades, and to
uphold Kim Jong-un’s byungjin policy of simultaneous nuclear and economic development,
which was adopted in March 2013. The timing of the Seventh Workers’ Party Congress could
possibly coincide with the tests in order for Kim Jong-un to take credit for the progress. One
noteworthy outcome of the Party Congress was the announcement of a five-year economic
plan, from 2016 to 2020. However, there were few details on implementation. Kim Jong-un
also highlighted the need for global denuclearization and non-proliferation and emphasized
the defensive nature of the DPRK’s nuclear program.
28