The Intelligence Review | volume 1 | issue 1

It is true that the Kurdish push for independence is the most serious factor putting strain on
the unity of Iraq. There is no doubt that the Kurds have had a desire for an independent state
even before the fall of the Ottoman Empire. However their intent does not match their
capabilities. Moreover, there are two factors that are crucial, if a Kurdish state is to become a
reality, namely consistent international support and economic capabilities (Chulov 2016). Starting
with the former, not only do the Kurds lack international support, but their secondary source
of income, second only to the central government in Baghdad, is Turkey. The Kurdistan
Regional Government has been involved in the illegal sale of crude oil from Kirkuk to Turkey
(Ansary 2016). Turkey, however, is not only an unviable prospect as an international supporter
for a Kurdish state, but is in fact known for its hostility towards the Kurdish presence within
its borders, and has condemned the idea of a formation of a Kurdish state countless times.
The economic capabilities also pose a problem for Kurdistan, because an oil driven economy
can only function if the government controls the oil reserves, which the Kurds do not. It is
true that Iraqi Kurdistan possesses oil-rich lands within its borders that are rich enough to
sustain it as a nation. Currently, as part of the Iraqi constitution of 2005, the Kurdistan region
has autonomous control, but it cannot collect revenues made from the sales of oil reserves in
the region (Jawad 2013:13).
Iraqi lands are also threatened militarily by Daesh, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria. Despite being on the rise in the past few years, Daesh lost 40 percent of its territory
since January 2016 and continues to be on the defensive (Dearden 2016). Much of the land
loss by Daesh is a result of the Kurdish fighting force, known as the Peshmerga. In addition
to being known as the supreme ground force, the Peshmerga is also known to have “bulldozed,
blown up and burned down thousands of homes in Arab villages” (Jalal 2016) following their
successes over Daesh. This has increased Arab animosity toward the Kurds.
Another recent development occurred in April, when Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s
idea for the formation of a technocratic cabinet gained parliamentary approval in Baghdad.
The technocratic cabinet came as a result of large-scale protest led by Shia Cleric Muqtada al-
Sadr against government corruption. The goal of the technocratic government is to appoint
ministers based on their experience, expertise and merit, as opposed to the previous system of
party representation. The Kurds, although adamant that their ministerial representation be
maintained at 20 percent in the new cabinet, have been actively involved in the process. The
Kurdish regional government has conducted meetings in Baghdad with other Kurdish parties
to strategize and discuss the matter (Salih 2016).
Implications and Conclusion
The cry for independence by president Barzani is likely a rallying tactic to gain support for his
extended —and what some view as illegitimate— presidency. The infighting between the
Kurdish parties, in addition to their impasse in negotiations with the regional government,
indicates a weak, politically fragmented Kurdistan. The current, broken, Kurdistan is incapable
of successfully attaining or even pursuing independence. The loss of land by the Islamic State
indicates a stronger central government in Baghdad, more so however a stronger Kurdish
influence. The actions of the Peshmerga mimic demographic engineering as they are spreading
their influence through occupation of formerly Arab lands following the defeats of Daesh. In
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