Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information

Per the MOA, the DNI and FBI may, through mutual agreement, add or
remove ADICs or SACs as DDNIRs. While it may not be feasible to designate
the heads of all 56 FBI field divisions as DDNIRs, in light of the current
challenges posed by the large geographic regions, it may be feasible to
designate some additional DDNIRs to help improve counterterrorism
information sharing and coordination within larger existing regions. The OIGs
recommend that the DNI, in coordination with the FBI, evaluate the existing
DDNIR regional structure to ensure that regions are appropriately sized and
defined to better align common areas of interest and geographic coordination
among participating partners.
Mission and Program Guidance – The OIGs found that the DDNIR
program lacks in-depth guidance and a well-defined strategy for ensuring the
program is well-understood and implemented consistently across regions. All
DDNIRs are required to attend a four-hour orientation at the ODNI before
assuming their DDNIR role. However, we found that some of the DDNIRs want
more guidance and clarification on what the DNI expects them to do. 33
The OIGs also found that the objectives of the program had not been
clearly communicated to the IC-member representatives. According to the
DDNIR Southeast Region’s October 2014 semi-annual report, despite
messaging from ODNI and FBI leadership regarding the importance of the
program, many of the participants in the region continue to express
uncertainty as to the purpose of the DDNIR program and regional integration. 34
For example, one official who regularly attended meetings in the DDNIR
Southeast Region stated that if the objective of the program is to “foster
relationships,” then the program is working well; but if the goal of the program
is to collaborate on regional issues and produce a regional product, then the
program is not succeeding. The DDNIR Southeast Region’s October 2014 semiannual
report also noted that many of the region’s partners have few or no
analytic resources, and that for many, the analysis is conducted at the
headquarters level.
33 Similarly, the Congressionally directed 9/11 Review Commission found in their March 2015 report,
“The FBI: Protecting the Homeland in the 21st Century,” that the DDNIR program is experiencing
“growing pains,” and that, “It is not well defined by the ODNI or well understood by the ADICs and SACs
who serve in this capacity. Some confusion stems from the question of which functions the ADIC/SAC is
performing for the DNI as opposed to performing as part of his/her FBI responsibilities, because the
stakeholder groups are not the same. Most ADICs/SACs understand that the Domestic DNI
Representative role is to lead coordination, but are not clear what should be coordinated, and to what
end. ADICs/SACs did not believe that they had adequate guidance on how to manage the Domestic DNI
Representative responsibilities beyond their own field office’s geographic area, given that some of the 12
regions are quite large.”
34 Each DDNIR is required to submit to the DNI semi-annual updates on the DDNIR’s evaluations and
recommendations of DNI policies and procedures and IC performance.
35