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Examining the evidence and oversight work done concerning the Department’s missions
to provide or improve physical security—including supporting private sector critical
infrastructure protection—raises serious questions about how effective these initiatives have
been. For example, over the past eight years, taxpayers have spent more than half a billion
dollars on DHS’s Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program, yet the
Department has not set up an effective chemical security regulatory program or measurably
reduced the risk of an attack on our chemical infrastructure. 53 Similarly, audits and troubling
incidents reveal that the Department’s Federal Protective Service is struggling with the mission
of protecting federal buildings 54 , while new questions are being asked about the U.S. Secret
Service’s performance protecting the White House and President of the United States. 55
Twelve years after its creation, Congress and the Department need to review DHS’s
performance in these areas and determine whether “preventing terrorism and enhancing
security” remains DHS’s first mission, and reconsider what the appropriate role is for the
Department in the federal government’s counterterrorism strategy and programs. If DHS’s
programs for counterterrorism are not yielding measurable results and improving our nation’s
ability to prevent terrorism, or if they are duplicative of other federal initiatives, DHS’s resources
should be saved or refocused on areas where the Department has a primary responsibility and
can make a measurable improvement to the nation’s security.
Reviewing DHS’s Programs and Responsibilities Related to Preventing Terrorism
On April 15, 2013, the nation experienced a major terrorist attack when two improvised
explosive devices detonated at the Boston marathon, killing three people and wounding
Lessons Learned from Canceled Radiation Portal Monitor Program Could Help Future Acquisitions,” GAO-13-256,
May 2013.
53 Senator Tom Coburn, “Chemical Insecurity: An Assessment of Efforts to Secure the Nation’s Chemical Facilities
from Terrorist Threats,” U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, July 2014.
54 Government Accountability Office, “Challenges Associated with Federal Protective Services’ Contract Guards
and Risk Assessments at Federal Facilities,” GAO-14-128T, October 30, 2013; Department of Homeland Security
Office of Inspector General, “Effects of a Security Lapse on FPS’ Michigan Guards Services Contract,” OIG-12-100
(Revised), August 2012, p.6.
55 “Executive Summary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Report on the White House Incursion
Incident of September 19, 2014,” Department of Homeland Security, November 13, 2014; Joseph Hagin, Thomas
Perrelli, Danielle Gray, Mark Filip, United States Secret Service Protective Mission Panel, “Executive Summary to
Report from the United States Secret Service Protective Mission Panel to the Secretary of Homeland Security,”
December 15, 2014.
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