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schools do not need to be accredited or licensed to participate in the Student Exchange Visitor
Program. Unaccredited or unlicensed schools may host students. ICE reports such schools
undergo a special vetting process and are asked to provide additional information, such as
letters from other institutions that such students and their credits are accepted at their
institution. Flight schools must be FAA certified. According to the 2014 SEVP Quarterly
Review, there are currently 8,988 schools enrolled in the SEVP program as of October 2014. 335
Several oversight audits by the Government Accountability Office raised significant
questions about ICE’s management of the Student and Exchange Visitor Program, and whether
it was vulnerable to fraud and abuse. In 2012, GAO reported that ICE “has not developed a
process to identify and analyze program risks since assuming responsibility for [the program] in
2003” 336 and that ICE officials “have expressed concerns about fraud risks posed by schools that
do not comply with [program] requirements.” 337 A GAO audit identified examples of poor
management of the program. Of particular concern was that 38 percent of the SEVP-certified
flight schools eligible for the program did not have required FAA certifications. 338
A follow-up audit by GAO in 2014 found that problems persisted with ICE’s
management of SEVP, specifically the “optional practical training” (OPT) component of the
program which allows SEVP students to work in jobs related to their field of study. 339 GAO
found that “ICE has not consistently collected the information and developed the monitoring
mechanisms needed to help ensure foreign students comply with OPT requirements, thereby
maintaining their legal status in the United States.” 340 For example, GAO reviewed ICE’s
records on SEVP participants and found that the records of 38 percent (or 48,642 out of 126,796
visa holders) did not contain an employer’s name. 341
The problems identified by watchdog audits are substantiated by investigations and
arrests that highlight the potential abuse and, in some cases, national security vulnerabilities
335 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Student Exchange Visitor Program, “SEVIS by the Numbers:
General Summary Quarterly Review, October 2014.
336 Government Accountability Office, Student and Exchange Visitor Program: DHS Needs to Assess Risks and
Strengthen Oversight Functions, June 2012.
337 Ibid.
338 Ibid.
339 Government Accountability Office, “Student and Exchange Visitor Program: DHS Needs to Assess Risk and
Strengthen Oversight of Foreign Students with Employment Authorization,” March 7, 2014.
340 GAO, “Student and Exchange Visitor Program: DHS Needs to Assess Risk and Strengthen Oversight of Foreign
Students with Employment Authorization,” March 7, 2014.
341 GAO, “Student and Exchange Visitor Program: DHS Needs to Assess Risk and Strengthen Oversight of Foreign
Students with Employment Authorization,” March 7, 2014.
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