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and preparedness grants programs—are making the nation safer or accomplishing DHS’s stated
priority mission. Likewise, DHS’s initiatives aimed at improving domestic security from
potential terrorist attacks have a history of problems, and there are questions about their
effectiveness or utility. DHS’s technology initiatives and programs designed to monitor and
detect chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attacks have not proven to be effective or
cost-efficient, and billions of dollars have been spent on these initiatives. DHS has similarly
struggled with its responsibilities for identifying and prioritizing critical infrastructure
protection, including spending eight years and more than half a billion dollars on a program to
secure chemical facilities which has yielded few tangible results. DHS has even struggled to
effectively manage its responsibilities for securing federal facilities and protecting the President
of the United States.
Given the importance of the nation’s counterterrorism and protective security missions,
Congress and the Department should review and reconsider DHS’s programs related to its first
mission—ending programs and initiatives that are non-essential or yielding few improvements
in enhanced security. Congress and DHS’s leadership must reconsider how DHS can provide a
more significant contribution to the nation’s counterterrorism mission. Moreover, DHS must
ensure that it is executing its critical protective security responsibilities, including protecting
the President and other national leaders.
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