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DHS has made improvements with its aviation security initiatives, 201 and recognizing the difficult challenges that DHS and TSA face, it is understandable that not all of DHS’s projects will be successful. Unfortunately, however, a review of the available oversight work regarding TSA’s tactical and technological programs for aviation screening reveals some concerns. There have been several instances of wasteful and ineffective TSA aviation security programs, which appear to have yielded little in the way of improved security despite significant taxpayer expenditures. For example, since 2007, TSA has deployed Behavioral Detection Officers (BDOs) to airports to execute its Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program, which is intended to identify suspicious passengers based on their behavior at the airport. In 2013, GAO presented the results of an audit of the SPOT program and recommended that “TSA should limit future funding for behavioral detection activities,” based on the lack of scientific or empirical evidence to support the use of nonverbal behavioral detection and methodological problems of DHS’s SPOT validation study. 202 TSA has spent $900 million on this program since 2007, even though it appears to be doing little to make our skies safer from potential terrorist attacks. 203 TSA’s attempts to deploy effective technology screening machines for both baggage and passengers have also faced questions about efficiency and efficacy. In 2012, for example, an investigative report prepared by two House of Representative committees highlighted “serious inefficiencies in TSA’s management and deployment of screening technology,” including examples of thousands of machines going unused and sitting in warehouses, in some cases for periods of 6 months to even years. 204 For example, in 2011, GAO found that some of the explosive detection systems that DHS and TSA had acquired to screen checked baggage were not meeting 2005 standards for explosive detection, but instead were set to meet 1998 standards, raising questions about whether such technology investments would be successful in detecting small 201 “Improving Aviation Security,” Department of Homeland Security, at: http://www.dhs.gov/aviation-security, accessed December 31, 2014. 202 Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: TSA Should Limit Future Funding for Behavior Detection Activities, GAO-14-158T, November 14, 2013. 203 Ibid., p. 2 204 Committees on Oversight and Government Reform and Transportation and Infrastructure, “Airport Insecurity: TSA’s Failure to Cost-Effectively Procure, Deploy, and Warehouse Its Screening Technologies,” Joint Majority Staff Report, 112 th Congress, May 9, 2012. 49
amounts of explosives packaged in baggage. 205 The Department and TSA have faced similar challenges deploying checkpoint explosives detection equipment such as with advanced imaging technology. 206 In some cases, TSA’s technologies have faced serious questions about safety and privacy. In 2013, TSA announced that it was removing the X-Ray scanning systems that had been deployed to airports, in response to concerns that the screening systems produced naked images of passengers and that TSA could not ensure that it was meeting privacy guidelines. 207 In all, DHS had acquired 251 of these machines at a cost of more than $41 million. 208 Others have questioned the safety of the machines, and whether TSA had satisfactorily studied any potential health risks before using the machines at airports. 209 Senator Coburn sponsored bipartisan legislation along with four members of the Committee in the 112 th Congress to require DHS to commission an independent study of the use of machines, 210 and a similar requirement was ultimately included in report language for an appropriations bill. In 2012, TSA announced it was commissioning an independent study of the machines. 211 In November 2014, the National Academy of Sciences reported that the study was planned to be released by January 2015. 212 205 Government Accountability Office, “Homeland Security: DHS and TSA Continue to Face Challenges Developing and Acquiring Screening Technologies, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Transportation Security, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, GAO-13-469T, May 8, 2013. GAO reports that the exact number of machines could not be reported publicly because it was sensitive security information. 206 Government Accountability Office, Advanced Imaging Technology: TSA Needs Additional Information before Procuring Next-Generation Systems, GAO-14-357,; Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security: DHS and TSA Continue to Face Challenges Developing and Acquiring Screening Technologies, GAO-13-469T, May 8, 2013. 207 Adam Snider, “TSA pulls plug on ‘naked’ body scanners.” Politico, Jan. 18, 2013. 208 DHS Office of Inspector General, “TSA’s Management of Secure 1000SP Advanced Imaging Technology Units,” September 2014, OIG 14-138, p.1. 209 Michael Grabell, “U.S. Government Glossed Over Cancer Concerns As It Rolled Put Airport X-Ray Scanners,” ProPublica, November 1, 2011. 210 U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: “Senators Collins, Akaka, Levin, Coburn, Scott Brown introduce bill to require study, warnings of health effects of some airport scanners.” Minority Media, Jan. 31, 2012. 211 Michael Grabell, “U.S. Government Glossed Over Cancer Concerns As It Rolled Put Airport X-Ray Scanners,” ProPublica. 212 Minority Staff, Phone Call with Government Affairs Representative of National Academy of Sciences, November 6, 2014. 50
Page 1 and 2: A Review of the Department of Homel
Page 3 and 4: January 3, 2015 Dear Taxpayer, We A
Page 5 and 6: jurisdiction between various congre
Page 7 and 8: Executive Summary The Department of
Page 9 and 10: of the systems that DHS purchased t
Page 11 and 12: esponsibilities for securing U.S. p
Page 13 and 14: an independent audit 36 and interna
Page 15 and 16: Structural problems in FEMA’s pro
Page 17 and 18: leadership with real authority to m
Page 19 and 20: Mission 1—Preventing Terrorism an
Page 21 and 22: hundreds. 56 In the aftermath of th
Page 23 and 24: its previously closed investigation
Page 25 and 26: sharing network and $231 million sp
Page 27 and 28: nation’s preparedness. 87 That ye
Page 29 and 30: federal entity engaged in this work
Page 31 and 32: agency has struggled in both areas,
Page 33 and 34: including shortcomings in the tests
Page 35 and 36: 2013 shooting at the Washington Nav
Page 37 and 38: Shortly after the September 2014, S
Page 39 and 40: Mission 2— Securing and Managing
Page 41 and 42: It is true that more resources than
Page 43 and 44: FY 2014, in comparison to the rough
Page 45 and 46: Senator Coburn and other members of
Page 47 and 48: The problem of DHS’s ineffective
Page 49: the number of corruption investigat
Page 53 and 54: Ports and Sea Borders and Safeguard
Page 55 and 56: Station in Norfolk, conducted by a
Page 57 and 58: significant and experienced federal
Page 59 and 60: Mission 3— Enforcing and Administ
Page 61 and 62: Customs Enforcement is responsible
Page 63 and 64: the consideration of refugee and as
Page 65 and 66: Fraud and National Security Concern
Page 67 and 68: different biographic data.” 287 I
Page 69 and 70: 2007. 298 The evidence also suggest
Page 71 and 72: The decision by federal authorities
Page 73 and 74: women’s underwear that had a logo
Page 75 and 76: schools do not need to be accredite
Page 77 and 78: EB-5 Visa Program U.S. Citizenship
Page 79 and 80: An additional review of the EB-5 pr
Page 81 and 82: that the information was confidenti
Page 83 and 84: information, which can be used to w
Page 85 and 86: about 85,000 dams, including sensit
Page 87 and 88: Accelerated, raising serious questi
Page 89 and 90: program. 401 The contracts are stru
Page 91 and 92: “significant deficiency” and hi
Page 93 and 94: participation. Audits of DHS’s in
Page 95 and 96: National Cybersecurity Protection S
Page 97 and 98: smuggling and money laundering, whi
Page 99 and 100: Conclusion Cyber attacks represent
Page 101 and 102:
years, or in some cases even decade
Page 103 and 104:
high-threat urban areas throughout
Page 105 and 106:
$609,576. 473 Its application provi
Page 107 and 108:
identified in their grant applicati
Page 109 and 110:
performance. 496 The THIRA is a doc
Page 111 and 112:
funding. The program ties FEMA, its
Page 113 and 114:
counties near the Oklahoma-Texas bo
Page 115 and 116:
drastically, and identified an esti
Page 117 and 118:
increased costs and inefficiency in
Page 119 and 120:
disasters that are over 10 years ol
Page 121 and 122:
isks. 575 But shifting some of the
Page 123 and 124:
Taxpayers have spent considerable r
Page 125 and 126:
Other Key DHS Components, Directora
Page 127 and 128:
missions and their relevance to the
Page 129 and 130:
presidential directives. 609 The re
Page 131 and 132:
securing the southern border raises
Page 133 and 134:
The Office of Health Affairs (OHA),
Page 135 and 136:
Department has struggled with other
Page 137 and 138:
million in R&D work that went unrep
Page 139 and 140:
appear to have a system in place to
Page 141 and 142:
The Construction of the NBAF Facili
Page 143 and 144:
In March 2014, John Roth was confir
Page 145 and 146:
cases back to components’ offices
Page 147 and 148:
waste, fraud, and abuse of grant fu
Page 149 and 150:
management oversight as key challen
Page 151 and 152:
Part II: Recommendations Based on h
Page 153 and 154:
Similarly, a majority of Senators v
Page 155 and 156:
with its work to oversee federal ci
Page 157 and 158:
homes to their place of work. 713 I
Page 159 and 160:
suggests that there is an opportuni
Page 161 and 162:
civil liberties. Moreover, the Depa
Page 163:
Conclusion The nation continues to
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