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The trend of waning solidarity and diminishing<br />

sense of a unified goal in Israel<br />

continues to unfold. The tension between<br />

right and left is on the rise, fed by irresponsible<br />

fanning of the flames by politicians<br />

and opposite views on the way to keep Israel<br />

a Jewish, democratic, secure, and just<br />

state. Exposure of corruption in government<br />

has become increasingly common damaging<br />

public trust in the state institutions.<br />

Aggressive legislation against democratic<br />

attributes of the state, damage to the delicate<br />

balance among the different branches<br />

of government, and a systematic campaign<br />

aimed at weakening the media, the law enforcement<br />

authorities, and other gatekeepers<br />

of democracy have exacerbated the polarization<br />

in Israeli society. Attacks by extremist<br />

elements and reckless campaigns on<br />

social media against the President, the judiciary,<br />

the IDF and other security organs, and<br />

the repercussions of the dispute surrounding<br />

the shooting of the immobilized terrorist in<br />

Hebron have not abated. The tension between<br />

the country’s Jewish population and<br />

the Arab minority has also continued to<br />

fester, and attempted legislation seeking to<br />

hurt the Arab minority and present it as an<br />

enemy in spite of only very limited involvement<br />

in terror attacks has added fuel to the<br />

fire. On the eve of 2018 severe political<br />

crises and fundamental tensions among the<br />

country’s different tribal identities continue<br />

to challenge Israeli society’s cohesion and<br />

resilience.<br />

Challenges, dilemmas, and<br />

recommendations<br />

Over the past decade, Israel has adapted<br />

successfully to the changing reality of<br />

the Middle East, gaining more military<br />

and political power, and avoiding serious<br />

confrontations and wars. However, the<br />

window of political and military opportunity<br />

provided by the regional crisis and the nuclear<br />

deal with Iran appears to be narrowing.<br />

Consequently, Israel must address ten key<br />

medium term and long term threats and<br />

opportunities.<br />

The "short-of-war" campaign against Iran<br />

and in the northern front. Israel’s major<br />

challenge will be to contend with the infrastructure<br />

established by Iran and its proxies<br />

in Syria and Lebanon. Activity against Hezbollah<br />

buildup over the last decade evoked<br />

no significant retaliation so far. From now<br />

on, a wider and more challenging campaign<br />

against the three enemies in the north: Iran,<br />

Hezbollah, and Syria is essential to address<br />

both Tehran’s buildup there, and possible<br />

retaliation by the Assad regime, Iran,<br />

and Hezbollah, avoiding escalation under<br />

tougher conditions. The main dilemma will<br />

be the tension between impairing enemy<br />

buildup and future threat, and risking imminent<br />

escalation. It is needed to draw rules of<br />

the game for the new environment, through<br />

military action and strategic communication<br />

with the adversaries and Russia, a significant<br />

actor. Israel possesses significant leverage<br />

against Iran and Russia: its ability to<br />

undermine their achievement in preserving<br />

the Assad regime and progressing stability<br />

in Syria.<br />

The ‘first northern war’ (the Third<br />

Lebanon War)<br />

Israel and Hezbollah are not interested in<br />

another war. Nonetheless, the Israeli action<br />

against Iran and Hezbollah, coupled with<br />

lesser urgent need to rescue Assad in Syria,<br />

could lead to escalation to “the first northern<br />

war”. This war could expand into Syria,<br />

and perhaps also involve the Syrian army.<br />

That might be the largest military confrontation<br />

since 1973. Israel must address the<br />

strategic and operative priorities involved<br />

in conducting a campaign against three enemies:<br />

Syria, Hezbollah, and Iran, under<br />

Russian presence.<br />

Specifically, Israel must prepare for three<br />

scenarios: war in Lebanon alone; war in<br />

Lebanon and Syria including Iranians and<br />

Shiites operating in Syria; and war with Iran<br />

itself. Israel has announced that the rules of<br />

the game in Lebanon changed since 2006<br />

because Hezbollah and Lebanon are a single<br />

political/military unit, and the rules for conducting<br />

the campaign will change accordingly.<br />

It will be necessary to engage with<br />

new military threats: accurate ballistic missiles,<br />

air defense systems, UAVs, anti-ship<br />

missiles, and possible attempts to invade<br />

populated locations in the Galilee.<br />

Amending the nuclear deal and containing<br />

Iranian expansion. The joint view of<br />

The US and Israel must be translated into<br />

a “parallel agreement” engaging the Iranian<br />

threat as a whole and focusing on the<br />

nuclear agreement at its core. It should determine<br />

a joint strategy against the range of<br />

Iranian threats with three aims: preventing<br />

Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons or<br />

approaching “zero distance” from a nuclear<br />

weapon; curbing the subversive Iranian<br />

activity and its support of terrorism; and<br />

preventing military capabilities serving solidification<br />

of its influence in the region.<br />

The understandings must be on three layers:<br />

A joint response to the weaknesses of<br />

the nuclear agreement in the short and long<br />

terms. In the short run keeping the agreement<br />

is better than its collapse. It will enable<br />

Israel and the United States to prepare<br />

for the more significant threats in the future.<br />

If Iran is not caught violating the agreement,<br />

it would be ill advised to withdraw<br />

from it. The “parallel agreement” should<br />

define possible Iranian violations, including<br />

a breakout to a bomb, and the responses to<br />

them. It should ensure that Israel can stop<br />

Iran if it decides to break out, and that it<br />

is not dependent on a delayed international<br />

response. Other necessary items of the<br />

agreement include coordination of the intelligence<br />

efforts on top of the international<br />

monitoring, and preventing further nuclear<br />

proliferation in the region.<br />

Parameters for amending the nuclear<br />

agreement<br />

Extending the sunset (on major nuclear<br />

restrictions) clauses, or making them<br />

conditional on a change in Iranian behavior<br />

in the non-nuclear realm; improving<br />

monitoring of the Iranian sites suspected<br />

of military nuclear activities; passing a new<br />

UN Security Council resolution clearly<br />

prohibiting testing of missiles and cruise<br />

missiles capable of carrying a nuclear<br />

warhead; and conditioning end of the<br />

military embargo on weapons supply to Iran<br />

on change in Iranian behavior.<br />

THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018 9

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