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Cover Story
The struggle against non-nuclear
Iranian threats
Israeli-American strategy must hold Iran
accountable for the actions of its proxies
paying a high price for their subversive activities.
Consequently, the strategy against
Iranian assets must be designed in response
to its expansion strategy, as well as its tactical
provocations, denying Iran economic
and military means, including by expanded
secondary sanctions against foreign banks.
Finally, a joint strategy striving to drive a
wedge between Russia and Iran, using issues
on which they might disagree – Assad’s
future and Iranian military presence in
Syria – and on curbing the Iranian missile
threat.
Renewing the Israeli-Palestinian
political process
The Trump administration might present
a plan for the “ultimate deal” between Israel
and the Palestinians. Its content – principles,
parameters, and way of reaching the agreement)
– is still shrouded in secrecy, and recognizing
Jerusalem as Israel’s capital added
complications. The Israeli government may
try and use the excellent relations with the
Trump administration to ensure the parameters
are unacceptable to the Palestinians
winning the “blame game”. However, more
important is the need to take advantage of
the current favorable conditions – a supportive
US president, changing Arab attitudes
toward Israel, and Israel’s strategic posture.
It is a historic opportunity Israel cannot
afford to miss. Even when chances of a final
status agreement now are slim to non-existent,
the plan might set parameters (better
than the Clinton parameters) that could
determine a future agreement; and help in
stopping the slide toward a one-state reality.
The Israeli government should also adopt a
proactive plan to ensure the feasibility of a
future agreement that preserves the four pillars
of the Jewish people’s national home:
a Jewish, democratic, secure, and just state.
Israel should engage with the challenge
of internal Palestinian reconciliation and
the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. The
reconciliation is supposed to return the
Palestinian Authority to the Gaza Strip, but
did not address the major problem from
Israel’s perspective of Hamas’s military
wing. The reconciliation agreement will
likely fail due to Palestinian disagreements.
Still, humanitarian and moral reasons
dictate the need to promote reconstruction of
devastated Gaza. The crisis in Gaza can also
overflow to Israel. Specific reconstruction
efforts must be guided by two criteria:
avoiding Hamas misuse for military
buildup, and denying the terrorist group
political gains. A correct reconstruction
effort, with strong political backing of the
Arab states, could also constitute a platform
for gradual change in Gaza’s government.
Israel’s alliance with the Sunni Arab world
Israel is enjoying unprecedented cooperation
with neighboring pragmatic
Sunni Arab states. Common interests and
common threats of Iran and radical Islam
led to deeper cooperation with Egypt and
Jordan, as well as with Gulf States, with
which Israel does not have diplomatic relations.
With Egypt operational cooperation
against the Islamic State in Sinai, and Israel’s
support of the el-Sisi regime in Egypt
as well as 40 years of a peace treaty are the
basis for cooperation. With Gulf States, led
by Saudi Arabia, it is the common Iranian
threat and the value of Israel’s intelligence,
technological, and economic assistance.
The rise to power of Saudi Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Salman, who is pursuing
proactive and risky policies presents Israel
with space for strategic actions, alliances,
improving its geostrategic situation. The
key for moving from limited covert cooperation
to overt cooperation is progress
on the Palestinian issue. Rectifying the
crisis with Jordan over Jerusalem and the
incident with the Israeli embassy guard in
Amman is essential for advancing the cooperation
with Jordan.
The challenge of Islamic State
The territorial Islamic State in Syria
and Iraq has been defeated. However, its
remaining footholds in Libya, the Sinai
Peninsula, Afghanistan, and the Golan
Heights, may attract fighters escaping areas
they lost. Terror cells around the world are
still active, and new ones are evolving.
Most important, the idea of the Islamic
State is alive and well in social networks
and mosques with radical imams. Following
the loss of its territorial basis the Islamic
State may attempt to demonstrate its vitality
through showcase attacks throughout
the Middle East – including Israel – and
elsewhere. Bringing an end to the Islamic
State presence in the southern Golan Heights
should be part of the stabilization of Syria,
and support for Egypt in the Sinai Peninsula
should continue. No one should assume for
intelligence and operational purposes that
this group no longer poses a threat.
The security budget and the security
doctrine
Chances of a large military confrontation
in the northern front in 2018 are greater than
at any time in the past decade. This requires
accelerated preparations, including allocation
of the necessary budget. The new type
of confrontation requires preparations at all
levels, from the political level to the military
level. Understandings on the fundamental
concepts of deterrence, decision, maneuver,
and firepower ought to be developed
requiring the senior political and military
echelons to begin discussing the goals and
targets of the possible campaign; its start,
management, and exit stages; its boundaries;
and its operational efforts. The cabinet
should engage in discussions and planning
long before the confrontation.
Maintaining Israel’s legitimacy
Israel faces a significant problem of legitimacy
among large populations in the Middle
East, Europe, and the United States. The
campaign against Israel consists of a unique
combination of three different groups – radical
Islamists, the hyper-liberal left, and the
hyper-nationalist right –sharing the goal of
undermining Israel’s right to exist. These
groups employ soft but effective kinds of
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THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018