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IRAN EMILY B. LANDAU
Comparing the nuclear
challenges posed
by North Korea and Iran
DRAWING A comparison between Iran
and North Korea in the nuclear realm is
both conceptually sound and empirically instructive.
Both states are strongly motivated
nuclear proliferators that violated their NPT
commitment to remain non-nuclear, and in
both cases the effort to bring them back to
the fold of the treaty has proven to be an
extremely difficult arms control challenge
for the international community. Moreover,
Iran and North Korea are both dangerous
nuclear proliferators – despite rhetorical
protestations to the contrary, the aggressive
behavior they display toward states in their
regions and beyond undercuts their narrative
of being solely defensively oriented in
the missile and nuclear realms. The nuclear
capabilities they seek – while useful for regime
survival – are also a means for advancing
offensive strategic goals. This finds expression
in North Korea’s repeated threats
of actual (first) use, but also in both states’
recognition of the value of a nuclear shield:
the fact that nuclear capabilities render
states invulnerable to coercive responses to
their actions. This message was underscored
by reactions to NATO’s attack of Libya in
2011, namely, that if Libya had not given up
its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), it
would not have been attacked.
North Korea today is a nuclear state –
and according to latest US estimates, it
has enough fissile material (plutonium and
highly enriched uranium) for about 60 nuclear
weapons, as well as ballistic missiles
that can be used to attack its close neighbors.
Regarding an attack on the US mainland,
despite North Korea’s demonstration
of ICBM capability through missile tests
carried out in 2017, it will most likely take
more time and testing before North Korea
can strike the US with a nuclear tipped missile.
But it is inching toward this goal.
As far as is known, Iran is still well behind
North Korea, and has not yet crossed
the nuclear threshold. The Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action (JCPOA) negotiated
between the P5+1 and Iran was meant to
prevent Iran from ever reaching that stage
by dismantling Iran’s dangerous nuclear infrastructure,
but the deal does not achieve
this goal. Moreover, Iran remains as motivated
as ever to maintain and enhance its
nuclear breakout capability. As such, once
the main provisions of the deal expire, Iran
can be expected to return to its previous
nuclear activities. In fact, Iran will be even
better positioned to do so, having in the
ensuing period become stronger economically
(sanctions lifted), regionally (having
significantly enhanced its regional reach
since the deal was presented), and in terms
of its nuclear infrastructure (having worked
on advanced centrifuges under the terms of
the deal).
Some contest the comparison between
these two states in the nuclear realm, noting
that Iran and North Korea are actually very
different – that unlike North Korea, Iran is
not a nuclear state and that it has agreed to
the JCPOA which curbs its program; moreover,
they point out that Iran is an important
regional actor with a rich cultural history,
whereas North Korea is isolationist and
aggressive. In short, the argument goes, in
light of these differences analysts should not
draw negative conclusions about Iran on the
basis of the experience with North Korea.
It is no doubt true that these two states
are very different in many respects, and that
differences among states are sometimes pertinent
to comparisons in the nuclear realm
as well. But not always. In fact, the features
that are normally mentioned in the North
Korea-Iran context do not undercut the
much more significant similarities between
these two states. So the fact that North Korea
is a nuclear state and Iran is not says nothing
about the much more important question
of their nuclear motivation, which is very
strong in both cases. And if Iran remains
behind North Korea, this is not a reason to
dismiss the comparison, but should rather
encourage us to take heed of what could ultimately
evolve in Iran’s case as well.
WHEN THINKING about these two cases,
beyond the common challenge that they
pose to the international community that
seeks their nuclear rollback, an important
question is what we might expect from Iran
if it too were to cross the nuclear threshold.
And in this regard, some of the features
mentioned by detractors of the comparison,
in order to base their claim that Iran should
not be unfavorably compared to North Korea,
actually indicate that it is Iran that will
be the more dangerous nuclear state.
Iran’s regional strength and the JCPOA it
agreed to are actually not features that work
in favor of making light of any pending
threat. As in the case of deals that were
struck with North Korea, the JCPOA is at
best a partial deal that does not signal a
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THE JERUSALEM REPORT FEBRUARY 5, 2018