atw 2018-03v6
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nucmag.com<br />
<strong>2018</strong><br />
3<br />
149<br />
Nuclear Energy<br />
Technologies<br />
for the Arctic<br />
153 ı Spotlight on Nuclear Law<br />
U.S. Regulators Reject Proposal to Subsidize<br />
Nuclear and Coal Power Prices<br />
154 ı Environment and Safety<br />
Integrated Risk Informed Decision Making in Nuclear Reactors<br />
ISSN · 1431-5254<br />
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163 ı Decommissioning and Waste Management<br />
Investigations on the Influence of the Geometry<br />
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182 ı Report<br />
2017 Nuclear Power Plant Compact Statistic
The International Expert Conference on Nuclear Technology<br />
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<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
Twilight of the Experts<br />
Dear reader, With the political phase-out from the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Germany in 2011, a few weeks<br />
after the catastrophic earthquake and tsunami in Japan and the resulting accidents at the Fukushima nuclear power<br />
plants, the country not only loses a reliable, domestic, environmentally friendly and inexpensive energy source, it also<br />
leaves a gap for those whose main objective is the fundamental rejection of nuclear energy.<br />
Although the German anti-nuclear scene is keeping itself<br />
afloat with constant demands for an even earlier complete<br />
phase-out before 2022, the recurrence of such demands<br />
like a prayer wheel does not seem to be very satisfying, also<br />
thanks to the unspectacular and accident-free operation of<br />
the German nuclear power plants.<br />
Creativity is called for here when there are – geographically<br />
speaking – such obvious new thematic objects. After<br />
all, the German phase-out of nuclear power with its<br />
coupled “energy turnaround” should also become another<br />
export hit for German policymakers; whatever other<br />
successful concepts from Germany may have asserted<br />
themselves on the world political stage. Clearly, then,<br />
targeted actionism against nuclear power plants close to<br />
the border is an obvious course of action. Europe continues<br />
to be the world's leading region with 182 nuclear power<br />
plants and 26 % of Europe's electricity comes from nuclear<br />
energy. As a result, the neighbouring countries of Germany,<br />
the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Switzerland, the Czech<br />
Republic, the Slovak Republic and, as a newcomer, Poland<br />
can be brought into the spotlight.<br />
Belgium's seven nuclear power plants at the Doel and<br />
Tihange sites, among others, are continually being taken<br />
up with striking consistency and selective targeted actions.<br />
The plants supply about 50 % of the country's own<br />
electricity supply, experience with the operation of nuclear<br />
power plants has existed since 1962 and the operational<br />
lifetime of the plants has been extended several times.<br />
Belgian realism and pragmatism are also evident here:<br />
individual governments have repeatedly considered the<br />
early shut-down of nuclear power plants, but also under<br />
the premiss that the security of electricity supply is not<br />
compromised. Exit: None!<br />
First of all, the nuclear power plant units Tihange-2 and<br />
Doel-3 were made subject around Christmas 2015: Realted<br />
with new findings on the material of the two reactor<br />
pressure vessels and production-related inconsistencies,<br />
catchy keywords were generated: The terms “clapped-out”<br />
reactor pressure vessels and “crumbling reactors”, introduced<br />
by relevant anti atomic protagonists, made the<br />
round. Nonetheless, the expertise and the very open communication<br />
on the subject by the Belgian supervisory<br />
authority Federaal Agentschap voor Nucleaire Controle<br />
(FANC) were lost in most of the media. Hydrogen flakes,<br />
brittle fracture characteristics and preheated emergency<br />
cooling water are simply not attractive topics. Nevertheless,<br />
comprehensive factual information is also available in<br />
Germany, for example on the websites of the Federal<br />
Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation,<br />
Construction and Nuclear Safety (BMUB).<br />
As a next coup against Tihange, the German antinuclear<br />
scene then landed the extensive distribution of<br />
iodine tablets in the Aachen area as a “precautionary<br />
measure” against the imminent nuclear “Super-GAU” from<br />
Belgium in order to promote nuclear anxiety culture. The<br />
action was successful if fears were to be stirred up. In more<br />
than 50 years of nuclear energy use in Germany, such an<br />
action had been judged to make little sense in expert<br />
circles, also with consideration of the risks of uncontrolled<br />
self-medication with iodine.<br />
At the beginning of February <strong>2018</strong> a letter from the<br />
FANC was opportune. The letter was passed to “investigative”<br />
press and showed that there had recently been<br />
an accumulation of “precursor” events in the Tihange-1<br />
nuclear power plant block.<br />
The “investigative” press quickly published the headline<br />
“Tihange-1 more dangerous than previously known”.<br />
Without going into the safety-related details of “precursor<br />
events”, the BMUB is quoted here:“... The current reporting<br />
gives the impression that, based on the number of<br />
so-called precursor events, it is possible to draw conclusions<br />
about the safety of a plant. But this is not the case.<br />
Rather, they are probabilistically calculated events that<br />
help to take a closer look at a particular scenario. These<br />
very complex precursor calculations are an element of a<br />
comprehensive security architecture. Probability calculations<br />
can help to further optimize a learning safety system<br />
of this or other facilities...” (translation, original text only<br />
available in German language).<br />
Further discomfort among the population will nevertheless<br />
remain; goal achieved.<br />
However, there are two other aspects to consider<br />
related with the reporting, which already leave a very<br />
negative connotation. On the one hand, the driving journalists<br />
like to call themselves “investigative” and “experts”.<br />
The outlined reports show that the term “investigative” has<br />
little impact, for example, the same anti-nuclear protagonists<br />
are constantly being presented and the opposite is<br />
more likely to be measured. If the “investigative” journalist<br />
were to act as an expert on his own behalf, a mystery of the<br />
Middle Ages would finally be solved: squaring the circle.<br />
Another negative connotation remains when “experts”<br />
appear in coverage who offer their services elsewhere on<br />
the subject...<br />
Nuclear energy continues to be used and operated<br />
safely in Belgium. If you want to get your own impression<br />
of the situation, you can access the web today and access a<br />
wide range of sources; from the EU stress tests according<br />
to Fukushima, through the documents on the nuclear<br />
safety conferences of the International Atomic Energy<br />
Agency to the supervisory authorities and technical expert<br />
organisations.<br />
If you are looking for more cabaret, please refer to<br />
Twitter and the 280-character opinions there (e.g.<br />
# tihange), which also complete the picture of atomic<br />
expertise shown here.<br />
Christopher Weßelmann<br />
– Editor in Chief –<br />
139<br />
EDITORIAL<br />
Editorial<br />
Twilight of the Experts
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
EDITORIAL 140<br />
Expertendämmerung<br />
Liebe Leserin, lieber Leser, mit dem politischen Ausstieg aus der friedlichen Nutzung der Kernenergie in<br />
Deutschland im Jahr 2011, wenige Wochen nach dem katastrophalen Erdbeben mit Tsunami in Japan, und der dadurch<br />
ausgelösten Unfälle in den Fukushima-Kernkraftwerken verliert das Land nicht nur eine verlässliche, heimische,<br />
umweltschonende und preisgünstige Energiequelle, er hinterlässt auch eine Lücke für diejenigen, deren inhaltliches<br />
Hauptziel die fundamentale Ablehnung der Kernenergienutzung ist.<br />
Zwar hält sich die deutsche Anti-Atomszene mit<br />
fortwährenden Forderungen nach einem noch früheren<br />
vollständigen Ausstieg vor 2022 über Wasser, aber das<br />
gebetsmühlenartige Wiederholen solcher Forderungen<br />
scheint auch dank des unspektakulären und störfallfreien<br />
Betriebs der deutschen Kernkraftwerke nicht sehr<br />
erfüllend zu sein.<br />
Hier ist dann Kreativität gefragt, wenn es – geografisch<br />
– so naheliegende neue Themenobjekte gibt. Sollte doch<br />
der deutsche Atomausstieg mit seiner gekoppelten „Energie<br />
wende“ auch ein weiterer Exportschlager deutscher<br />
Politik werden; welche anderen Erfolgskonzepte aus<br />
Deutschland sich auf der Weltbühne der Politik auch<br />
immer durchgesetzt haben mögen. Naheliegend ist also<br />
gezielter Aktionismus gegen grenznahe Kernkraftwerke.<br />
Ein Unterfangen mit nicht unerheblichem Potenzial, ist<br />
Europa doch weiterhin mit 182 Kernkraftwerken bei der<br />
Nutzung als Region weltweit führend und 26 % des<br />
europäischen Stroms stammten aus der Kernenergie.<br />
Somit können die Nachbarländer Niederlande, Belgien,<br />
Frankreich, die Schweiz, die Tschechische Republik, die<br />
Slowakische Republik und als Newcomer Polen bequem in<br />
den Fokus gerückt werden.<br />
Mit auffälliger Beständigkeit und punktuell gezielten<br />
Aktionen werden unter anderem die sieben Kernkraftwerke<br />
Belgiens an den Standorten Doel und Tihange<br />
fortwährend aufgegriffen. Die Anlagen liefern rund 50 %<br />
der landeseigenen Versorgung, Erfahrungen mit dem<br />
Betrieb von Kernkraftwerken bestehen seit 1962 und für<br />
die in Betrieb befindlichen Anlagen wurden mehrfach<br />
Laufzeitverlängerungen beschlossen. Hier zeigen sich<br />
auch belgischer Realismus und Pragmatismus: Zwar<br />
wurde von einzelnen Regierungen immer wieder eine<br />
vorzeitige Abschaltung von Kernkraftwerken in Erwägung<br />
gezogen, aber auch unter der Maßgabe, dass die Stromversorgungssicherheit<br />
nicht beeinträchtigt wird. Ausstieg:<br />
Fehlanzeige!<br />
Als erstes wurden die Kernkraftwerksblöcke Tihange 2<br />
sowie Doel 3 um Weihnachten 2015 zum zugkräftigen<br />
Thema gemacht: Im Zusammenhang mit neuen Erkenntnissen<br />
zum Material der beiden Reaktordruckbehälter und<br />
fertigungsbedingten Inkonsistenzen wurden einprägsame<br />
Schlagworte generiert: Die Begriffe „marode“ Reaktordruckbehälter<br />
und „Bröckelreaktoren“ machten, von<br />
einschlägigen Anti-Atom-Protagonisten eingebracht, die<br />
Runde. Gleichwohl blieben Fachexpertise und die sehr<br />
offene Kommunikation zum Thema seitens der belgischen<br />
Aufsichtsbehörde Federaal Agentschap voor Nucleaire<br />
Controle (FANC) in den meisten Medien auf der Strecke.<br />
Wasserstoff-Flocken, Sprödbruch-Kennlinien und vorgeheiztes<br />
Notkühlwasser sind halt keine attraktiven Themen.<br />
Gleichwohl ist umfassende sachliche Information auch in<br />
Deutschland dazu verfügbar, so auf den Webseiten des<br />
Bundesministeriums für Umwelt, Naturschutz, Bau und<br />
Reaktorsicherheit (BMUB).<br />
Als nächsten Coup gegen Tihange landete die deutsche<br />
Anti-Atom-Szene dann zur Förderung der Atom- Angstkultur<br />
die flächige Verteilung von Jod-Tabletten im<br />
Großraum Aachen als „Vorsorgemaßnahme“ gegenüber<br />
dem drohenden nuklearen „Super-Gau“ aus Belgien. Galt<br />
es Ängste zu schüren, war die Aktion erfolgreich. In mehr<br />
als 50 Jahren Kernenergienutzung in Deutschland war<br />
eine solche Aktion als wenig sinnvoll in Expertenkreisen<br />
beurteilt worden, auch mit der Abwägung mit den Risiken<br />
unkontrollierter Selbstmedikamentation.<br />
Um dann noch nachzulegen kam Anfang Februar <strong>2018</strong><br />
ein Schreiben der FANC wie gelegen. Dieses sei „investigativer“<br />
Presse zugespielt worden und zeige, dass es im<br />
Kernkraftwerksblock Tihange 1 jüngst zu Häufungen von<br />
„Precursor“-Ereignissen gekommen sei.<br />
Schnell publizierte die geneigte „investigative“ Presse<br />
die Schlagzeile „Tihange 1 gefährlicher als bislang<br />
bekannt“. Ohne auf die sicherheitstechnische Bedeutung<br />
von „Precursor-Ereignissen“ einzugehen, sei hier das BMUB<br />
zitiert: „... In der aktuellen Berichterstattung entsteht der<br />
Eindruck, dass man auf Grundlage der Anzahl von<br />
sogenannten Precursor-Ereignissen auf die Sicherheit einer<br />
Anlage schließen könne. Das ist aber nicht der Fall. Sie sind<br />
vielmehr probabilistisch durchgerechnete Anlässe, die<br />
dabei helfen, sich ein bestimmtes Szenario genauer<br />
anzusehen. Diese sehr komplexen Precursor-Berech nungen<br />
sind ein Element einer umfassenden Sicherheits architektur.<br />
Die Wahrscheinlichkeitsberechnungen können helfen,<br />
weitere Optimierungen an einem lernenden Sicherheitssystem<br />
dieser oder anderer Anlagen vorzunehmen ...“<br />
Weiteres Unbehagen bei der Bevölkerung wird dennoch<br />
verbleiben; Ziel erreicht.<br />
Zu betrachten sind aber noch zwei weitere Aspekte in<br />
Zusammenhang mit der Berichterstattung, die schon<br />
einen zusätzlichen sehr faden Beigeschmack hinterlassen.<br />
Da sind zum einen die treibenden Journalisten, sich selbst<br />
gerne als „investigativ“ und „Experten“ bezeichnend.<br />
Dabei zeigen die umrissenen Berichterstattungen, dass<br />
vom Begriff „Investigativ“ wenig zu spüren ist, werden<br />
doch z. B. fortwährend dieselben Anti-Atom-Akteure<br />
präsentiert und Gegenstimmen misst man eher. Wenn<br />
dann zudem der „investigative“ Journalist als „Experte“ in<br />
eigener Sache auftritt, dann wäre endlich ein Mysterium<br />
des Mittelalters gelöst: Die Quadratur des Kreises. Ein<br />
weiterer fader Nebengeschmack verbleibt, wenn „Experten“<br />
auftreten, die an anderer Stelle ihre Dienstleistungen<br />
zum Thema anbieten ...<br />
Kernenergie wird in Belgien weiterhin sicher genutzt<br />
und betrieben. Wer sich ein eigenes Bild dazu machen<br />
möchte, kann auf das Web zurückgreifen und viel fältige<br />
Quellen; von den EU-Stresstests nach Fukushima, über die<br />
Dokumente zu den Nuklearen Sicherheits konferenzen der<br />
Internationalen Atomenergie-Organisation bis hin zu<br />
den Aufsichtsbehörden und Technischen Gutachter organisationen.<br />
Wer mehr Kabarett sucht, sei auf Twitter und die<br />
dortigen 280-Zeichen-Meinungen verwiesen (z. B.<br />
# tihange), die das hier angerissene Bild von „Atomexpertise“<br />
gelungen abrunden.<br />
Christopher Weßelmann<br />
– Chefredakteur –<br />
Editorial<br />
Twilight of the Experts
Kommunikation und<br />
Training für Kerntechnik<br />
Suchen Sie die passende Weiter bildungs maßnahme<br />
im Bereich Kerntechnik?<br />
Wählen Sie aus folgenden Themen: Dozent/in Termin/e Ort<br />
3 Atomrecht<br />
Das Recht der radioaktiven Abfälle RA Dr. Christian Raetzke 06.03.<strong>2018</strong> Berlin<br />
23.10.<strong>2018</strong><br />
Ihr Weg durch Genehmigungs- und Aufsichtsverfahren RA Dr. Christian Raetzke 24.04.<strong>2018</strong> Berlin<br />
18.09.<strong>2018</strong><br />
Navigation im internationalen nuklearen Vertragsrecht Akos Frank LL. M. 25.04.<strong>2018</strong> Berlin<br />
Atomrecht – Was Sie wissen müssen RA Dr. Christian Raetzke 12.06.<strong>2018</strong> Berlin<br />
3 Energie, Politik und Kommunikation<br />
Schlüsselfaktor Interkulturelle Kompetenz –<br />
International verstehen und verstanden werden<br />
Public Hearing Workshop –<br />
Öffentliche Anhörungen erfolgreich meistern<br />
Kerntechnik und Energiepolitik im gesellschaftlichen Diskurs<br />
– Themen und Formate<br />
Angela Lloyd 26.09.<strong>2018</strong> Berlin<br />
Dr. Nikolai A. Behr 16.10. - 17.10.<strong>2018</strong> Berlin<br />
N.N. 12.11. - 13.11.<strong>2018</strong> Gronau/Lingen<br />
3 Kerntechnik, Rückbau und Strahlenschutz<br />
Export kerntechnischer Produkte und Dienstleistungen –<br />
Chancen und Regularien<br />
In Kooperation mit dem TÜV SÜD Energietechnik GmbH Baden-Württemberg:<br />
Das neue Strahlenschutzgesetz –<br />
Folgen für Recht und Praxis<br />
Stilllegung, Rückbau und Entsorgung –<br />
Recht und Praxis<br />
RA Kay Höft, M.A.,<br />
RA Olaf L. Kreuzer<br />
RA Dr. Christian Raetzke,<br />
Maria Poetsch<br />
RA Dr. Christian Raetzke,<br />
Dr. Matthias Bauerfeind<br />
20.06. - 21.06.<strong>2018</strong> Berlin<br />
05.06. - 06.06.<strong>2018</strong> Berlin<br />
24.09. - 25.09.<strong>2018</strong> Berlin<br />
3 Nuclear English<br />
Advancing Your Nuclear English (Aufbaukurs) Devika Kataja 11.04. - 12.04.<strong>2018</strong> Berlin<br />
10.10. - 11.10.<strong>2018</strong><br />
Enhancing Your Nuclear English Devika Kataja 04.07. - 05.07.<strong>2018</strong> Berlin<br />
3 Wissenstransfer und Veränderungsmanagement<br />
Erfolgreicher Wissenstransfer in der Kern technik –<br />
Methoden und praktische Anwendung<br />
Veränderungsprozesse gestalten – Heraus forderungen<br />
meistern, Beteiligte gewinnen<br />
Dr. Christien Zedler,<br />
Dr. Tanja-Vera Herking<br />
Dr. Christien Zedler,<br />
Dr. Tanja-Vera Herking<br />
21.03. - 22.03.<strong>2018</strong> Berlin<br />
28.11. - 29.11.<strong>2018</strong> Berlin<br />
Haben wir Ihr Interesse geweckt? 3 Rufen Sie uns an: +49 30 498555-30<br />
Kontakt<br />
INFORUM Verlags- und Verwaltungs gesellschaft mbH ı Robert-Koch-Platz 4 ı 10115 Berlin<br />
Petra Dinter-Tumtzak ı Fon +49 30 498555-30 ı Fax +49 30 498555-18 ı seminare@kernenergie.de<br />
Die INFORUM-Seminare können je nach<br />
Inhalt ggf. als Beitrag zur Aktualisierung<br />
der Fachkunde geeignet sein.
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
142<br />
Issue 3<br />
March<br />
CONTENTS<br />
149<br />
Nuclear Energy<br />
Technologies<br />
for the Arctic<br />
| | Vogtle Unit 3 construction site in Waynesboro, Burke County, Georgia, U.S.A. Two AP1000 reactors are under construction<br />
with an capacity of appr. 1,250 MW (gross) each. Start of operation is scheduled for 2022. (Courtesy: Georgia Power Company)<br />
Editorial<br />
Twilight of the Experts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139<br />
Expertendämmerung . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140<br />
Abstracts | English . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144<br />
Abstracts | German . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145<br />
Inside Nuclear with NucNet<br />
The Nuclear Option:<br />
Can This Be Africa’s Energy Future? . . . . . . . . . 146<br />
NucNet<br />
154<br />
| | Integrated risk informed decision making.<br />
Calendar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148<br />
DAtF Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .147<br />
Energy Policy, Economy and Law<br />
Russian Nuclear Energy Technologies<br />
for the Development of the Arctic . . . . . . . . . . 149<br />
Andrej Yurjewitsch Gagarinskiy<br />
Spotlight on Nuclear Law<br />
U.S. Regulators Reject Proposal to Subsidize Nuclear<br />
and Coal Power Prices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153<br />
149<br />
Jay R. Kraemer<br />
| | The Russian floating nuclear power plant.<br />
Contents
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
143<br />
Environment and Safety<br />
The Importance of Integration of Deterministic<br />
and Probabilistic Approaches in the Framework<br />
of Integrated Risk Informed Decision Making<br />
in Nuclear Reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154<br />
CONTENTS<br />
Mohsen Esfandiari, Kamran Sepanloo, Gholamreza Jahanfarnia<br />
and Ehsan Zarifi<br />
Applied Reliability Assessment for the Passive<br />
Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs)<br />
Using System Dynamics (SD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158<br />
168<br />
| | Composition of a TRISO-pebble.<br />
Yun Il Kim and Tae Ho Woo<br />
Zur Rationalität des Deutschen<br />
Kernenergieausstieges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178<br />
Wolfgang Stoll<br />
Statistics<br />
Nuclear Power Plants:<br />
2017 <strong>atw</strong> Compact Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182<br />
|158<br />
163<br />
| | Passive systems in NPP’s.<br />
Decommissioning and Waste Management<br />
Studies on the Geometric Influence on Hard<br />
Metal Shavers During Concrete Shaving . . . . . . 163<br />
Untersuchungen zum Geometrieeinfluss<br />
von Hartmetalllamellen beim Betonfräsen . . . . 163<br />
Simone Müller and Sascha Gentes<br />
| Tungsten carbide lamella with variable mass.<br />
Editorial<br />
Country<br />
Location/<br />
Station name<br />
Status Reactor type<br />
Capacity<br />
gross<br />
[MW]<br />
Capacity<br />
net<br />
[MW]<br />
1st<br />
Criticality<br />
[Year]<br />
Argentina<br />
Atucha 1 p D2O-PWR 357 341 1974<br />
Embalse p Candu 648 600 1983<br />
Atucha 2 p D2O-PWR 745 692 2014<br />
CAREM25 P PWR 29 25 (2020)<br />
Armenia<br />
Metsamor 2 p VVER-PWR 408 376 1980<br />
Belarus<br />
Belarusian 1 P VVER-PWR 1 194 1 109 (2019)<br />
Belarusian 2 P VVER-PWR 1 194 1 109 (2021)<br />
Bangladesh<br />
Rooppur 1 [2] P VVER-PWR 1 200 1 080 (2022)<br />
182<br />
KTG Inside . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186<br />
News . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188<br />
Nuclear Today<br />
Could Our Nuclear Vision Benefit<br />
From a Spell of Tesla Magic? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202<br />
John Shepherd<br />
Research and Innovation<br />
The Technology of TVHTR-Nuclear- Power<br />
Stations With Pebble Fuel Elements . . . . . . . . . 168<br />
Urban Cleve<br />
Imprint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180<br />
AMNT <strong>2018</strong>: Registration Form . . . . . . . . . . . Insert<br />
Contents
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
144<br />
ABSTRACTS | ENGLISH<br />
The Nuclear Option:<br />
Can this Be Africa’s Energy Future?<br />
NucNet | Page 146<br />
There are worldwide 448 commercial nuclear<br />
reactors in operation today, but only two of them, at<br />
Koeberg, in Africa. Yet if ambitious policymakers<br />
have their way, that could change. For the first time,<br />
many African countries have expressed an interest<br />
in developing nuclear power for peaceful energy<br />
generation. According to the IAEA, more than 30<br />
member states are considering or preparing nuclear<br />
power programmes for the first time, a third of them<br />
in Africa. One thing does seem certain. If Africa<br />
starts to commission new nuclear reactors, China<br />
and Russia, and their affiliated state-run enterprises,<br />
will be at the front of the queue to provide<br />
the technology. Scott Firsing, an international<br />
relations and security expert focusing on foreign<br />
power involvement in Africa, says their interest is<br />
linked to the projection of strategic power and<br />
investment into Africa, but also to secure access to<br />
uranium reserves.<br />
Russian Nuclear Energy Technologies<br />
for the Development of the Arctic<br />
Andrej Yurjewitsch Gagarinskiy | Page 149<br />
Small nuclear facilities have become an integral<br />
part of two important areas of human activities,<br />
namely, they are the basis of nuclear ships and<br />
scientific/educational research reactors that are in<br />
fact the main training facilities for new nuclear<br />
specialists all over the world. However, despite<br />
great and justified expectations of their developers,<br />
small nuclear power plants (SNPPs), with their<br />
obvious advantages (compared to conventional<br />
energy sources) in hardly-accessible areas, have not<br />
yet managed to start playing a notable role in the<br />
power industry. This is also completely true as<br />
concerns the task of using nuclear technologies for<br />
the development of the Arctic, where only the<br />
nuclear ship propulsion can be considered as an<br />
accomplished technology. Russia is the world’s only<br />
country that has civil nuclear ships in operation.<br />
U.S. Regulators Reject Proposal to Subsidize<br />
Nuclear and Coal Power Prices<br />
Jay R. Kraemer | Page 152<br />
On January 8, <strong>2018</strong>, the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory<br />
Commission (“FERC”) unanimously rejected<br />
a rulemaking proposed by Secretary of Energy Rick<br />
Perry designed to enable the owners of coal and<br />
nuclear power plants to charge higher prices for<br />
their output, and thereby to prevent further premature<br />
retirements of such plants. The FERC has<br />
exclusive authority, under the Federal Power Act, to<br />
establish rules for interstate wholesale sales of<br />
electricity. Although the FERC simultaneously initiated<br />
a new proceeding to consider how to enhance<br />
the resilience of electricity supply and delivery in<br />
the U.S., that proceeding seems unlikely to offer<br />
near-term relief to nuclear plants that are approaching<br />
closure due to their inability to compete economically<br />
both with facilities fueled by low-priced<br />
natural gas and with renewable power sources<br />
benefitting from favorable tax provisions. Accordingly,<br />
the American nuclear power industry will<br />
probably have to look elsewhere for relief from its<br />
present dire economic circumstances.<br />
The Importance of Integration of Deterministic<br />
and Probabilistic Approaches in the<br />
Framework of Integrated Risk Informed<br />
Decision Making in Nuclear Reactors<br />
Mohsen Esfandiari, Kamran Sepanloo,<br />
Gholamreza Jahanfarnia and Ehsan Zarifi | Page 154<br />
Analysis of nuclear reactor accidents and transients<br />
are very necessary for prediction of emergency<br />
conditions, being used to control and respond to<br />
extreme conditions. The nuclear accident investigation<br />
and safety analysis have been performed by<br />
either probabilistic or deterministic approaches. In<br />
this paper, the recent investigations on combining<br />
deterministic, probabilistic approaches and integrated<br />
risk informed decision-making (IRIDM) are<br />
reviewed in studying of events and making decisions<br />
in nuclear reactors. Then, the importance of the<br />
combined approaches for more comprehensive integrated<br />
risk informed decisions making are presented.<br />
By combination of both approaches and<br />
using IRIDM, the analysis of nuclear accident can be<br />
more realistic and, contrasting design basis accidents<br />
(DBAs) and beyond design basis accidents<br />
(BDBAs) with high accuracy is possible. Generally,<br />
the IRIDM approach can confidently be used in<br />
assurance of safety of any type of nuclear reactors.<br />
Applied Reliability Assessment for the<br />
Passive Safety Systems of Nuclear Power<br />
Plants (NPPs) Using System Dynamics (SD)<br />
Yun Il Kim and Tae Ho Woo | Page 158<br />
The passive system by the free-fall is investigated in<br />
the accident of nuclear power plants (NPPs). The<br />
complex algorithm of the system dynamics (SD)<br />
modeling is done in the passive cooling system. The<br />
nuclear passive system by free-fall is successfully<br />
modeled for the loss of coolant accident (LOCA).<br />
Conventional passive system of gravity or natural<br />
circulation is working only when the piping systems<br />
is in the good condition. The external coolant<br />
supply system is introduced in the case of the piping<br />
system failure. The water is poured into the reactor<br />
through the guiding piping or tube. If the explosion<br />
happens, the coolants could be showering into the<br />
reactor core and its building. New kind of passive<br />
system is expected successfully in the on-site black<br />
out where the drone could be operated by battery or<br />
engine.<br />
Studies on the Geometric Influence on Hard<br />
Metal Shavers During Concrete Shaving<br />
Simone Müller and Sascha Gentes | Page 163<br />
Minimising contaminated waste is a top priority in<br />
decommissioning projects in the nuclear sector. In<br />
the area of building decontamination, efficient processing<br />
of all affected concrete ceilings, walls and<br />
floors is essential and quickly results in a surface<br />
area of several thousand square metres to be processed.<br />
Decontamination is mainly carried out by<br />
using milling machines, e. g. rotary cultivators.<br />
Within the scope of a research project (BMWI, ZIM,<br />
funding code: KF2286004LL3) the project partners<br />
Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT) and Contec<br />
Maschinenbau & Entwicklungstechnik GmbH<br />
(Alsdorf/Sieg) investigated the influence of the<br />
geometry of the cutting tools on concrete removal.<br />
This article shows results from the test program<br />
conducted at the Institute for Technology and<br />
Management in Construction (TMB) of the KIT,<br />
Department of Deconstruction of Conventional and<br />
Nuclear Structures.<br />
The Technology of TVHTR-Nuclear-Power<br />
Stations With Pebble Fuel Elements<br />
Urban Cleve | Page 168<br />
The German development of TVHTR Power Stations<br />
was primarily initiated through the ideas of Prof. Dr.<br />
R. Schulten. He developed this technology in the<br />
1950's while employed by Brown Boveri. Dr. Schulten<br />
became CTO at the new BBC/Krupp Reaktorbau<br />
GmbH in Mannheim and later as Professor and Director<br />
of KFA-Jülich Nuclear Research Department.<br />
Two HTR nuclear power plants have been build in<br />
Germany, comissioned and success fully operated:<br />
The AVR in Jülich and the THRT-300 in Hamm-<br />
Schmehausen. Well know seawater desalination<br />
plants can be installed, working as distillation process<br />
so as MSF (multi-stage-flash)-plant. The heat<br />
would be supplied by HTR reactors. Additionally the<br />
co-installation of solar plants is possible.<br />
On the Rationality of the<br />
German Nuclear Phase-out<br />
Wolfgang Stoll | Page 178<br />
Our state of mind appears to be in equilibrium when<br />
it is balanced between opportunity and risk. The<br />
relationship between individual expectations of<br />
happiness and risk endured varies greatly depending<br />
on the state of mind of the individual. It is<br />
our understanding of ourselves that manageable<br />
individual risks are more likely to be taken than<br />
risks imposed by external forces. The anti-nuclear<br />
protesters operate skillfully with this superextension<br />
of the term to create general anxiety.<br />
However, the problem is of a general nature. Classical<br />
scientific findings come mainly from the field of<br />
very high probability, which we simply describe as<br />
the causal link between cause and effect. In general,<br />
however, in the advance of our knowledge into ever<br />
more complicated contexts, right down to the<br />
so-called statistical “noise”, the connection between<br />
cause and effect is becoming less and less clear. This<br />
vagueness opens up a great deal of discretion.<br />
Nuclear Power Plants:<br />
2017 <strong>atw</strong> Compact Statistics<br />
Editorial | Page 182<br />
At the end of the last year 2017, nuclear power<br />
plants were operating in 31 countries worldwide. In<br />
total, 448 nuclear power plants were operating on<br />
the key date. This means that the number declined<br />
slightly by 2 units compared to the previous year’s<br />
number on 31 December 2016. 3 units started<br />
operation, 5 units stopped operation. The installed<br />
nuclear capacity is still high that with 420 GWe<br />
gross. 56 plants in 16 countries were under construction.<br />
In addition, there are about 125 nuclear<br />
power plant units in 25 countries worldwide under<br />
development.<br />
Could Our Nuclear Vision Benefit From<br />
a Spell of Tesla Magic?<br />
John Shepherd | Page 202<br />
As I put the finishing touches to this latest article, US<br />
entrepreneur and boss of the Tesla car giant, Elon<br />
Musk, successfully launched a new rocket, the<br />
Falcon Heavy, from the Kennedy Space Center in<br />
Florida. What this has to do with nuclear today?<br />
Technologically speaking nothing. But think ‘outside<br />
the box’ – as I’m sure many of you have been told in<br />
those corporate management-training classes. The<br />
answer is: ‘vision’. The unabashed vision to be bold,<br />
daring, imaginative. The vision to believe in technology<br />
and to be unafraid to build on the experience<br />
and knowledge gained to date, including the failures,<br />
as we take the next steps forward.<br />
Abstracts | English
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
Die Option Kernenergie:<br />
Kann das die Energiezukunft Afrikas sein?<br />
NucNet | Seite 146<br />
Heute sind 448 kommerzielle Kernreaktoren weltweit<br />
in Betrieb, aber nur zwei davon, in Koeberg/<br />
Südafrika, in Afrika. Wenn ehrgeizige Politiker ihre<br />
Visionen durchsetzen, könnte sich dies bald ändern.<br />
Zum ersten Mal haben viele afrikanische Länder ihr<br />
Interesse an der friedlichen Entwicklung und<br />
Anwendung der Kernenergie für die Energieerzeugung<br />
deutlich gemacht. Nach Angaben der IAEO erwägen<br />
bzw. bereiten mehr als 30 Mitgliedsstaaten<br />
erstmals Kernenergieprogramme vor, ein Drittel<br />
davon in Afrika. Eines scheint sicher zu sein. Wenn<br />
Afrika beginnt, Kernreaktoren in Betrieb zu<br />
nehmen, werden China und Russland und ihre<br />
angeschlossenen staatlichen Unternehmen an der<br />
Spitze der beteiligten Unternehmen stehen, um die<br />
Technologie bereitzustellen. Scott Firsing, ein<br />
Experte für internationale Beziehungen und Sicherheit,<br />
der sich auf das Engagement ausländischer<br />
Staaten in Afrika konzentriert, sagt, dass ihr Interesse<br />
mit der Projektion strategischer Interessen und<br />
Investitionen in Afrika verbunden ist, aber auch mit<br />
der Sicherung des Zugangs zu Uranreserven.<br />
Russische Kernenergietechnologien<br />
für die Entwicklung der Arktis<br />
Andrej Yurjewitsch Gagarinskiy | Seite 149<br />
Kernkraftwerke im unteren Leistungsbereich sind<br />
zu einem integralen Bestandteil von zwei wichtigen<br />
Bereichen geworden, nämlich als Basis von nuklear<br />
angetriebenen Schiffen und Forschungsreaktoren.<br />
Letztere sind die Hauptausbildungsstätten für neue<br />
Nuklearexperten auf der ganzen Welt sind. Trotz<br />
großer und berechtigter Erwartungen ihrer Entwickler<br />
ist es den kleinen Kernkraftwerken (SMR)<br />
mit ihren offensichtlichen Vorteilen (gegenüber<br />
konventionellen Energieträgern) z. B. in schwer<br />
zugänglichen Gebieten jedoch noch nicht gelungen,<br />
eine nennenswerte Rolle in der Energiewirtschaft<br />
zu spielen. Dies gilt auch für die Aufgabe der<br />
Nutzung von Nukleartechnologien für die Entwicklung<br />
der Arktis, wo nur der nukleare Schiffsantrieb<br />
als geeignete Technologie im Transportsektor<br />
betrachtet werden kann. Russland ist das einzige<br />
Land der Welt, in dem zivile Nuklearschiffe in<br />
Betrieb sind.<br />
US-Regulierungsbehörden lehnen<br />
Vorschlag zur Subventionierung<br />
von Kern- und Kohlekraftwerken ab<br />
Jay R. Kraemer | Seite 152<br />
Am 8. Januar <strong>2018</strong> lehnte die U.S. Federal Energy<br />
Regulatory Commission („FERC“) einstimmig eine<br />
vom Energieminister Rick Perry vorgeschlagene<br />
Regelung ab, die es den Eigentümern von Kohleund<br />
Kernkraftwerken ermöglichen sollte, höhere<br />
Preise für den erzeugten Strom zu verlangen und<br />
damit weitere vorzeitige Stilllegungen solcher<br />
Anlagen zu verhindern. Der FERC hat die ausschließliche<br />
Befugnis, im Rahmen des Bundesgesetzes<br />
über die Energieversorgung Regeln für den<br />
zwischenstaatlichen Großhandelsverkauf von Elektrizität<br />
aufzustellen. Obwohl die FERC gleichzeitig<br />
ein neues Verfahren einleitete, um zu prüfen, wie<br />
die Verlässlichkeit der Stromversorgung und -lieferung<br />
in den USA verbessert werden kann, erscheint<br />
es unwahrscheinlich, dass dieses Verfahren den<br />
Kernkraftwerken, für die eine Stilllegung ansteht,<br />
aufgrund derzeit nicht gegebener wirtschaftlicher<br />
Konkurrenzfähig kurzfristig Entlastungen bietet.<br />
Hintergrund ist der Marktdruck aufgrund preisgünstigem<br />
Erdgas als auch günstigen Steuerregelungen<br />
für Erneuerbare.<br />
Die Bedeutung der Integration von<br />
deterministischen und probabilistischen<br />
Ansätzen im Rahmen der integrierten<br />
risikogerechten Entscheidungsfindung<br />
für Kernreaktoren<br />
Mohsen Esfandiari, Kamran Sepanloo,<br />
Gholamreza Jahanfarnia und Ehsan Zarifi | Seite 154<br />
Die Analyse von Unfällen und Transienten in Kernreaktoren<br />
ist für die Analyse von Notfallbedingungen<br />
sehr wichtig, da sie zur Kontrolle und Reaktion von<br />
extremen Anlagenzuständen eingesetzt wird. Die<br />
Unfalluntersuchung und die Sicherheitsanalyse<br />
werden entweder mit probabilistischen oder deterministischen<br />
Ansätzen durchgeführt. In diesem<br />
Beitrag werden Untersuchungen zur Kombination<br />
deterministischer und probabilistischer Ansätze und<br />
integrierter risikoorientierter Entscheidungsfindung<br />
(IRIDM) bei der Untersuchung von Ereignissen und<br />
der Entscheidungsfindung für Kernreaktoren vorgestellt.<br />
Die Bedeutung der kombinierten Ansätze<br />
für eine umfassendere integrierte risikoorientierte<br />
Entscheidungsfindung wird dargestellt. Durch die<br />
Kombination beider Ansätze und den Einsatz von<br />
IRIDM kann die Analyse von Nuklearunfällen angepasster<br />
durchgeführt werden und es ist möglich,<br />
Störfallszenarien mit hoher Genauigkeit abzuwägen.<br />
Im Allgemeinen kann der IRIDM-Ansatz zum<br />
Nachweis der Sicherheit von Kernreaktoren aller Art<br />
verwendet werden.<br />
Angewandte Zuverlässigkeitsbewertung<br />
für passive Sicherheitssysteme von<br />
Kernkraftwerken (KKW) unter Verwendung<br />
von Systemdynamik (SD)<br />
Yun Il Kim und Tae Ho Woo | Seite 158<br />
Ein passives auf der Schwerkraft basierendes Sicherheitssystem<br />
wird für Unfallszenarien von Kernkraftwerken<br />
untersucht. Der komplexe Algorithmus der<br />
Modellierung der Systemdynamik (SD) erfolgt im<br />
passiven Kühlsystem. Die Eignung des Passivsystems<br />
wird erfolgreich für den Verlust von Kühlmittelunfällen<br />
(LOCA) modelliert. Konventionelle passive<br />
System oder natürliche Zirkulation sind nur dann<br />
zuverlässig, wenn die Rohrleitungssysteme in gutem<br />
Zustand sind. Das externe Kühlmittelversorgungssystem<br />
wird bei Ausfall des Rohrleitungssystems<br />
aktiviert. Das Wasser wird in den Reaktor eingespeist.<br />
Untersuchungen zum Geometrieeinfluss<br />
von Hartmetalllamellen beim Betonfräsen<br />
Simone Müller und Sascha Gentes | Seite 163<br />
Die Minimierung kontaminierter Abfälle ist bei<br />
Rückbauvorhaben im kerntechnischen Bereich von<br />
höchster Priorität. Im Bereich der Gebäudedekontamination<br />
ist hierbei eine effiziente Bearbeitung<br />
aller betroffenen Betondecken, -wände und -böden<br />
unerlässlich und führt schnell zu einer zu bearbeitenden<br />
Fläche von mehreren tausend Quadratmetern.<br />
Die Dekontamination erfolgt überwiegend<br />
durch den Einsatz von Fräsen, z.B. Bodenfräsen. Im<br />
Rahmen eines Forschungsprojektes (BMWI, ZIM,<br />
Förderkennzeichen: KF2286004LL3) untersuchten<br />
die Projektpartner Karlsruher Institut für Technologie<br />
(KIT) und die Contec Maschinenbau &<br />
Entwicklungstechnik GmbH (Alsdorf/Sieg) den<br />
Geometrieeinfluss der Abtragswerkzeuge auf den<br />
Betonabtrag. Dieser Artikel zeigt Ergebnisse aus<br />
dem am Institut für Technologie und Management<br />
im Baubetrieb (TMB) des KIT, Abteilung Rückbau<br />
konventioneller und kerntechnischer Bauwerke<br />
durchgeführten Versuchsprogramms.<br />
Die Technologie der TVHTR-Kernkraftwerke<br />
mit Kieselstein-Brennelementen<br />
Urban Cleve | Seite 168<br />
Die deutsche Entwicklung der HTR-Kraftwerke<br />
wurde in erster Linie durch die Ideen von Prof. Dr.<br />
R. Schulten initiiert. Er entwickelte diese Technologie<br />
in den 1950er Jahrenbei Brown Boveri<br />
beschäftigt war. Zwei HTR-Kernkraftwerke wurden<br />
in Deutschland gebaut, in Betrieb genommen und<br />
erfolgreich betrieben: Der AVR in Jülich und der<br />
THRT-300 in Hamm-Schmehausen. HTR-Anlagen<br />
sind geeignet, Energie für Meerwasserentsalzungsanlagen<br />
bereit zu stellen, die mit dem Destillationsverfahren<br />
oder als MSF (Multi-Stage-Flash)-Anlage<br />
ausgeführt sind. Zusätzlich ist z.B. die Mitnutzung<br />
von Solaranlagen möglich.<br />
Zur Rationalität des<br />
Deutschen Kernenergieausstieges<br />
Wolfgang Stoll | Seite 178<br />
Unsere Befindlichkeit erscheint dann im Gleichgewicht,<br />
wenn sie sich zwischen Chance und Risiko<br />
einpendelt. Dabei ist das Verhältnis zwischen individuellen<br />
Glückserwartungen und ertragenem Risiko<br />
je nach dem Gemütszustand des Einzelnen sehr verschieden.<br />
Es liegt in unserem Selbstverständnis,<br />
dass überschaubare individuelle Risiken eher eingegangen<br />
werden als von außen unsteuerbar aufgezwungene.<br />
Die Kernenergiegegner operieren zur<br />
allgemeinen Angstmache geschickt mit dieser<br />
Begriffsüberdehnung. Das Problem ist aber von<br />
ganz allgemeiner Natur. Klassische wissenschaftliche<br />
Erkenntnisse kommen überwiegend aus dem<br />
Bereich der sehr hohen Wahrscheinlichkeit, die wir<br />
vereinfacht als kausale Verknüpfung von Ursache<br />
und Wirkung kennzeichnen. Ganz allgemein wird<br />
aber im Vordringen unseren Wissens in immer<br />
kompliziertere Zusammenhänge bis in das so<br />
genannte statistische „Rauschen“ der Zusammenhang<br />
von Ursache und Wirkung immer weniger<br />
eindeutig. Diese Unschärfe eröffnet einen großen<br />
Ermessensspielraum.<br />
Kernkraftwerke: 2017 <strong>atw</strong> Kompaktstatistik<br />
Editorial | Seite 182<br />
Ende 2017 waren Kernkraftwerke in 31 Ländern<br />
weltweit in Betrieb. Zum Stichtag waren 448 Kernkraftwerke<br />
in Betrieb. Die Zahl hat sich im Vergleich<br />
zum Vorjahresstichtag um 2 Blöcke verringert.<br />
3 Kernkraftwerksblöcke haben den Betrieb aufgenommen,<br />
5 Blöcke wurden stillgelegt. Die installierte<br />
Kernkraftkapazität ist weiterhin auf sehr<br />
hohem Niveau mit 420 GWe brutto. 56 Anlagen in<br />
16 Ländern befanden sich in Bau. Darüber hinaus<br />
befinden sich weltweit rund 125 Kernkraftwerksblöcke<br />
in 25 Ländern in der Entwicklung.<br />
Könnte unsere nukleare Vision von einem<br />
Zauber der Tesla-Magie profitieren?<br />
John Shepherd | Seite 202<br />
Als ich diesem neuesten Artikel den letzten Schliff<br />
gab, startete der US-Unternehmer und Chef des Tesla-Autoherstellers<br />
Elon Musk erfolgreich eine neue<br />
Rakete. Was hat das mit der Kernenergie zu tun?<br />
Technologisch gesehen nichts. Aber denken Sie<br />
über den Tellerrand hinaus – viele von Ihnen haben<br />
in Corporate Management-Trainingskursen davon<br />
erfahren haben. Die Antwort lautet:“Vision“. Die<br />
Vision, kühn, gewagt und fantasievoll zu sein. Die<br />
Vision, an die Technologie zu glauben und sich<br />
nicht zu scheuen, auf den bisherigen Erfahrungen<br />
und Kenntnissen aufzubauen, einschließlich der<br />
Misserfolge, wenn die nächsten Schritte nach vorn<br />
gemacht werden.<br />
145<br />
ABSTRACTS | GERMAN<br />
Abstracts | German
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
146<br />
INSIDE NUCLEAR WITH NUCNET<br />
* Egypt, Ghana,<br />
Kenya, Morocco,<br />
Niger, Nigeria,<br />
South Africa, Sudan,<br />
Tunisia and Uganda<br />
The Nuclear Option:<br />
Can This Be Africa’s Energy Future?<br />
NucNet<br />
Uranium first left Africa’s shores for wealthier nations in the 1940s, when the U.S. shipped 30,000 tonnes<br />
of it from the Shinkolobwe mine in Katanga province in the Democratic Republic of Congo to be used in the<br />
first atomic bombs. In return, the U.S. helped the DRC build Africa’s first nuclear reactor – a research unit at<br />
the University of Kinshasa – in 1958.<br />
Niger began mining uranium in 1971, with all the output<br />
going to French nuclear reactors. Around 19 % of the<br />
world’s uranium reserves are held by three African nations:<br />
Niger, Namibia, and South Africa. In 2015, the International<br />
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began a project to<br />
increase and improve the current capacity of member<br />
states in Africa for “optimising production, implementation<br />
of good practices and overall effective management of<br />
the region’s natural uranium endowment”.<br />
And yet while the rest of the world used Africa’s uranium<br />
resources to embrace nuclear technology, South Africa was<br />
the only country on the continent to develop domestic<br />
nuclear energy generation, with its Koeberg nuclear station<br />
beginning commercial operation in the mid-1980s.<br />
There are 448 commercial nuclear reactors in operation<br />
today, but only two of them, at Koeberg, in Africa. Yet if<br />
ambitious policymakers have their way, that could change.<br />
For the first time, many African countries have expressed<br />
an interest in developing nuclear power for peaceful<br />
energy generation. According to the IAEA, more than 30<br />
member states are considering or preparing nuclear power<br />
programmes for the first time, a third of them in Africa.<br />
In January 2017, the IAEA conducted an eight-day<br />
review of Ghana’s nuclear programme, following similar<br />
reviews in South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya. The rest of the<br />
continent is enthusiastic – some 150 officials from 35<br />
African countries gathered under the IAEA in Kenya in<br />
April 2015 to chart a way forward. Ten African countries*<br />
formed the African Network for Enhancing Nuclear Power<br />
Programme Development. The network intends to build and<br />
strengthen national and regional capacity for planning,<br />
developing and managing the infrastructure for new and<br />
expanding nuclear power programmes.<br />
For Africa, the driving factor behind plans for new<br />
nuclear is evident. The continent’s inability to generate<br />
enough electricity continues to hamper economic growth,<br />
cutting 2 to 4 % off GDP every year, according to the Africa<br />
Progress Panel. The panel estimates that some 600 million<br />
people on the continent do not have access to electricity, a<br />
figure that will require $ 55 bn per year in investment by<br />
2030 to fix.<br />
The IAEA says that in sub-Saharan Africa, only about a<br />
third of the population have access to electricity and the<br />
number of people without access is on the rise. This<br />
presents a significant barrier to economic and social<br />
development and so governments across the continent are<br />
seeking ways to improve their existing energy infrastructure,<br />
and develop new or diverse energy sources that<br />
are reliable, affordable and sustainable.<br />
Against this backdrop, nuclear technology has acquired<br />
a reputation among policymakers as a cost-effective and<br />
environmentally friendly fix. “Nuclear power is considered<br />
a prominent alternative and a more environmentally<br />
beneficial solution since it emits far less greenhouse gases<br />
during electricity generation than coal or other traditional<br />
power plants,” Ogbonnaya Onu, Nigeria’s Minister of<br />
Science and Technology, told local media in December<br />
2017. “It is a manageable source of generating electricity<br />
and has large power-generating capacity that can meet<br />
industrial and city needs.”<br />
Yet not all are so enamoured with Africa’s nuclear plans.<br />
Opponents point to the high upfront costs of nuclear power<br />
stations, the security and safety issues of hosting plants in<br />
volatile countries, and the technological and political<br />
improvement that will be required to bring legislative and<br />
regulatory systems up to date.<br />
Nigeria is typical. Africa’s most populous country has<br />
decided to include nuclear power in its energy mix to meet<br />
an increasing demand for electricity and support economic<br />
development. The country has been developing its nuclear<br />
power infrastructure for several years.<br />
But last year the IAEA said Nigeria’s nuclear regulator<br />
faces challenges related to its independence and in<br />
developing the skills to carry out regulatory activities.<br />
Nigeria’s government needs to ensure that the Nigerian<br />
Nuclear Regulatory Authority is independent and<br />
functionally separate from organisations that could<br />
influence its decision-making. The IAEA highlighted the<br />
fact that Nigeria has no national policy on safety that<br />
is in line with global safety standards.<br />
Charles Adesanmi, retired former director of Nigeria’s<br />
Nuclear Technology Centre, believes there are two issues<br />
that are inhibiting Africa’s use of nuclear energy for<br />
electricity: cost and public opinion.<br />
He said: “First of all, anything that has to do with power<br />
generation requires a lot of money. If we are unable to<br />
adequately fund hydro, solar, coal, gas, how can we be<br />
talking of funding nuclear which is more expensive?”<br />
The issue of cost is the big one. South Africa’s<br />
state-owned utility Eskom has given itself the internal<br />
target that for new nuclear to make sense, the levelised<br />
cost of electricity (LCOE) from the project must be<br />
between $ 60 and $ 80 per MWh for the first two reactor<br />
units.<br />
The IAEA has put the LCOE for the construction of new<br />
nuclear power plants in a range from $ 40 to $ 100 per<br />
MWh. It says there is “significant overlap” in the range of<br />
the average LCOE produced by various energy technologies,<br />
but despite its significant up-front costs nuclear is<br />
competitive. (LCOE is the long-term price at which the<br />
electricity produced by a power plant will have to be sold at<br />
for the investor to cover all their costs).<br />
Opponents to new nuclear in South Africa say the<br />
procurement deal would be the largest in the country’s<br />
history at an estimated $ 77 bn (€ 72 bn). The government,<br />
which has said it wants to generate 9,600 MW of energy<br />
from as many as eight reactors, has put the total cost at<br />
anything from $ 37 bn (€ 34.8 bn) to $ 100 bn (€ 94 bn).<br />
Inside Nuclear with NucNet<br />
The Nuclear Option: Can This Be Africa’s Energy Future? ı NucNet
DAtF DTL-Poster <strong>2018</strong>-01 297x420v4.indd 1 23.02.18 11:10<br />
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
Critics argue that this is too much to spend for a country<br />
where the economy is fragile and political turbulence is<br />
worrying investors. The counterargument is that the LCOE<br />
for other forms of energy is in the same range as nuclear<br />
and that South Africa is already losing money through<br />
power outages and slowed industrial growth. Eskom<br />
published figures last year claiming a net loss to the<br />
economy of around $ 700 m in 2016 as a result of its<br />
renewable power purchases from producers.<br />
“If these [nuclear plants] are not built, instability of<br />
electricity supply and rising prices will slow economic<br />
growth, and this will come with increasing poverty and<br />
political instability,” says Rob Jeffrey, an independent<br />
energy economist.<br />
While Eskom has commissioned dozens of private<br />
renewable projects to provide wind, solar and other forms<br />
of energy, these will never provide enough electricity,<br />
Mr ,Jeffrey says. “Wind only supplies electricity at best on<br />
average 34 % of the time. It is highly variable, unreliable<br />
and unpredictable. Solar is only available to generate<br />
electricity on average 26 % of the time.<br />
For Africa’s only true industrial economy, the outages<br />
have been devastating. In just one quarter during 2015<br />
when power cuts were at their height, the South African<br />
economy contracted 14 %, according to Bloomberg.<br />
From debates around the upfront costs of three new<br />
plants to media claims of foreign influence over the bidding<br />
process, the battle to expand South Africa’s industry is<br />
likely to offer lessons for countries across the continent.<br />
“Nuclear in the long term has low costs as you amortise<br />
the plant,” Phumzile Tshelane, chief executive of the<br />
government-owned South African Nuclear Energy Corporation<br />
(NECSA), told African Business. “If African countries<br />
are going to leapfrog to much more profitable economic<br />
development, they will have to choose sources of energy<br />
that are relatively cheap in the long term. I believe that<br />
when you look at the lifecycle costs, nuclear is cheaper.”<br />
One thing does seem certain. If Africa starts to commission<br />
new nuclear reactors, China and Russia, and their<br />
affiliated state-run enterprises, will be at the front of the<br />
queue to provide the technology. Scott Firsing, an international<br />
relations and security expert focusing on foreign<br />
power involvement in Africa, says their interest is linked to<br />
the projection of strategic power and investment into<br />
Africa, but also to secure access to uranium reserves.<br />
“Together, China and Russia are leading the drive for<br />
global energy security. At the same time they are solidifying<br />
their overall political and trade relationships with African<br />
countries and their leaders.”<br />
Author<br />
NucNet<br />
The Independent Global Nuclear News Agency<br />
Editor responsible for this story: David Dalton<br />
Editor in Chief, NucNet<br />
Avenue des Arts 56<br />
1000 Brussels, Belgium<br />
www.nucnet.org<br />
DATF EDITORIAL NOTES<br />
147<br />
New Poster<br />
Notes<br />
Nuclear Energy in Germany<br />
The DAtF has published the new poster Nuclear Energy in Germany<br />
| Status: February <strong>2018</strong>. This poster is not just an update to the<br />
January 2017 edition of Nuclear Power in Germany concerning the<br />
status of NPPs, waste disposal and of selected interim storage<br />
facilities but is a new product consolidating other maps into one.<br />
The poster now features research reactors, a more comprehensive<br />
overview on interim storage and conditioning facilities and state<br />
collection centers for radioactive waste from medicine, research and<br />
industry.<br />
3 It can be downloaded and ordered at kernenergie.de.<br />
Kernenergie in Deutschland<br />
Nuclear Energy in Germany<br />
SCHLESWIG- Kiel<br />
HOLSTEIN<br />
Brunsbüttel<br />
Greifswald/ C C D<br />
C<br />
Rubenow<br />
Brokdorf C<br />
MECKLENBURG-<br />
HAMBURG Schwerin VORPOMMERN<br />
Krümmel<br />
C<br />
Stade<br />
Geesthacht<br />
Unterweser<br />
D<br />
BREMEN<br />
Gorleben<br />
Rheinsberg<br />
Munster C C D E<br />
1)<br />
Emsland<br />
NIEDERSACHSEN<br />
A C<br />
Berlin<br />
Leese<br />
BERLIN<br />
Lingen<br />
Hannover Braunschweig<br />
D<br />
Potsdam<br />
Grohnde<br />
E Morsleben<br />
A D Gronau<br />
Asse E<br />
Magdeburg<br />
C<br />
BRANDENBURG<br />
Konrad<br />
C<br />
E<br />
Ahaus<br />
2)<br />
SACHSEN-ANHALT<br />
Hamm-<br />
Würgassen<br />
Krefeld<br />
Uentrop<br />
D<br />
NORDRHEIN-<br />
Düsseldorf WESTFALEN<br />
Jülich<br />
THÜRINGEN<br />
Dresden<br />
C D<br />
SACHSEN<br />
Dresden<br />
3)<br />
HESSEN<br />
Erfurt<br />
D<br />
Ebsdorfergrund<br />
Mülheim-<br />
Hanau<br />
Kärlich<br />
A Großwelzheim<br />
Wiesbaden<br />
Ellweiler<br />
Kahl<br />
Mainz<br />
D<br />
C<br />
Mainz<br />
C<br />
Biblis<br />
Karlstein Grafenrheinfeld<br />
C<br />
Mitterteich<br />
RHEINLAND-<br />
SAARLAND PFALZ<br />
Elm-Derlen<br />
Obrigheim<br />
BAYERN<br />
Saarbrücken<br />
C Neckarwestheim<br />
Philippsburg<br />
C<br />
B C D<br />
Niederaichbach<br />
Karlsruhe Stuttgart<br />
C<br />
Isar<br />
C D<br />
BADEN-<br />
Gundremmingen<br />
Garching<br />
WÜRTTEMBERG<br />
Neuherberg<br />
München<br />
KKW in Betrieb Leistung Betriebsbeginn<br />
brutto (kommerziell)<br />
NPP in operation<br />
Rated Start of<br />
capacity commercial<br />
gross operation<br />
(MWe)<br />
Brokdorf 1.480 1986<br />
Emsland 1.406 1988<br />
Grohnde 1.430 1985<br />
Gundremmingen C 1.344 1985<br />
Isar 2 1.485 1988<br />
Neckarwestheim II 1.400 1989<br />
Philippsburg 2 1.468 1985<br />
Gesamt ı Total 10.013<br />
Stand: Februar <strong>2018</strong> ı Status: February <strong>2018</strong><br />
In Deutschland sind 7 Kernkraftwerke mit einer<br />
Leistung von insgesamt 10.013 MWe (brutto)<br />
in Betrieb.<br />
In Germany 7 nuclear power plants are in operation<br />
with a total installed capacity of 10,013 MWe (gross).<br />
For further details<br />
please contact:<br />
Nicolas Wendler<br />
DAtF<br />
Robert-Koch-Platz 4<br />
10115 Berlin<br />
Germany<br />
E-mail: presse@<br />
kernenergie.de<br />
www.kernenergie.de<br />
Kernkraftwerk<br />
Nuclear<br />
power plant<br />
Forschungsreaktor<br />
Research<br />
reactor<br />
A<br />
Kernbrennstoffversorgung<br />
Nuclear fuel<br />
supply facility<br />
B<br />
Wiederaufarbeitungsanlage<br />
Reprocessing<br />
plant<br />
C<br />
Zwischenlager<br />
Interim storage<br />
facility<br />
D<br />
Konditionierung<br />
Conditioning<br />
E<br />
Endlager<br />
Final<br />
repository<br />
• Landessammelstelle<br />
Federal state<br />
collection centers<br />
In Betrieb<br />
In operation<br />
Abgeschaltet/<br />
Stilllegung<br />
End of operation/<br />
Decommissioning<br />
Rückbau<br />
Dismantling<br />
«Grüne Wiese»<br />
Greenfield site<br />
Errichtung<br />
Construction<br />
Bergwerk in Erkundung<br />
(seit 2013 eingestellt)<br />
Exploration mine<br />
(discontinued since 2013)<br />
1) Pilot-Konditionierungsanlage ı Pilot conditioning plant<br />
2) Bereitstellung Mitte der 2020er-Jahre ı Operational by the mid 2020s<br />
3) AVR-Behälterlager ı AVR flask store<br />
info@<br />
www. kernenergie.de<br />
DAtF Notes
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
148<br />
Calendar<br />
<strong>2018</strong><br />
CALENDAR<br />
04.03.-09.03.<strong>2018</strong><br />
82. Jahrestagung der DPG. Erlangen, Germany,<br />
Deutsche Physikalische Gesellschaft (DPG),<br />
www.dpg-physik.de<br />
11.03.-17.03.<strong>2018</strong><br />
International Youth Nuclear Congress (IYNC).<br />
Bariloche, Argentina, IYNC and WiN Global,<br />
www.iync.org/category/iync<strong>2018</strong>/<br />
26.03.-27.03.<strong>2018</strong><br />
Fusion energy using tokamaks: can development<br />
be accelerated? London, United Kingdom,<br />
The Royal Society, royalsociety.org<br />
08.04.-11.04.<strong>2018</strong><br />
International Congress on Advances in Nuclear<br />
Power Plants – ICAPP 18. Charlotte, NC, USA,<br />
American Nuclear Society (ANS), www.ans.org<br />
08.04.-13.04.<strong>2018</strong><br />
11 th International Conference on Methods and<br />
Applications of Radioanalytical Chemistry –<br />
MARC XI. Kailua-Kona, HI, USA, American Nuclear<br />
Society (ANS), www.ans.org<br />
16.04.-19.04.<strong>2018</strong><br />
Einführung in die Kerntechnik. Mannheim,<br />
Germany, TÜV SÜD, nucleartraining@tuev-sued.de<br />
16.04.-17.04.<strong>2018</strong><br />
VdTÜV Forum Kerntechnik – Sicherheit im Fokus.<br />
Berlin, Germany, VdTÜV mit Unterstützung des<br />
TÜV NORD, des TÜV SÜD und des TÜV Rheinland,<br />
www.tuev-sued.de/tagungen<br />
17.04.-19.04.<strong>2018</strong><br />
World Nuclear Fuel Cycle <strong>2018</strong>. Madrid, Spain,<br />
World Nuclear Association (WNA),<br />
www.world-nuclear.org<br />
18.04.-19.04.<strong>2018</strong><br />
9. Symposium zur Endlagerung radioaktiver<br />
Abfälle. Vorbereitung auf KONRAD – Wege zum<br />
G2-Gebinde. Hanover, Germany, TÜV NORD<br />
Akademie, www.tuev-nord.de/tk-era<br />
22.04.-26.04.<strong>2018</strong><br />
Reactor Physics Paving the Way Towards More<br />
Efficient Systems – PHYSOR <strong>2018</strong>. Cancun, Mexico,<br />
www.physor<strong>2018</strong>.mx<br />
08.05.-10.05.<strong>2018</strong><br />
29 th Conference of the Nuclear Societies in Israel.<br />
Herzliya, Israel. Israel Nuclear Society and Israel<br />
Society for Radiation Protection, ins-conference.com<br />
13.05.-19.05.<strong>2018</strong><br />
BEPU-<strong>2018</strong> – ANS International Conference on<br />
Best-Estimate Plus Uncertainties Methods. Lucca,<br />
Italy, NINE – Nuclear and INdustrial Engineering S.r.l.,<br />
ANS, IAEA, NEA, www.nineeng.com/bepu/<br />
13.05.-18.05.<strong>2018</strong><br />
RadChem <strong>2018</strong> – 18 th Radiochemical Conference.<br />
Marianske Lazne, Czech Republic, www.radchem.cz<br />
14.05.-16.05.<strong>2018</strong><br />
ATOMEXPO <strong>2018</strong>. Sochi, Russia, atomexpo.ru<br />
15.05.-17.05.<strong>2018</strong><br />
11 th International Conference on the Transport,<br />
Storage, and Disposal of Radioactive Materials.<br />
London, United Kingdom, Nuclear Institute,<br />
www.nuclearinst.com<br />
20.05.-23.05.<strong>2018</strong><br />
5 th Asian and Oceanic IRPA Regional Congress<br />
on Radiation Protection – AOCRP5. Melbourne,<br />
Australia, Australian Radiation Protection Society<br />
(ARPS) and International Radiation Protection<br />
Association (IRPA), www.aocrp-5.org<br />
29.05.-30.05.<strong>2018</strong><br />
49 th Annual Meeting on Nuclear Technology<br />
AMNT <strong>2018</strong> | 49. Jahrestagung Kerntechnik.<br />
Berlin, Germany, DAtF and KTG,<br />
www.nucleartech-meeting.com<br />
03.06.-07.06.<strong>2018</strong><br />
38 th CNS Annual Conference and 42 nd CNS-CNA<br />
Student Conference. Saskotoon, SK, Canada,<br />
Candian Nuclear Society CNS, www.cns-snc.ca<br />
03.06.-06.06.<strong>2018</strong><br />
HND<strong>2018</strong> 12 th International Conference of the<br />
Croatian Nuclear Society. Zadar, Croatia, Croatian<br />
Nuclear Society, www.nuklearno-drustvo.hr<br />
04.06.-07.06.<strong>2018</strong><br />
10 th Symposium on CBRNE Threats. Rovaniemi,<br />
Finland, Finnish Nuclear Society, ats-fns.fi<br />
04.06.-08.06.<strong>2018</strong><br />
5 th European IRPA Congress – Encouraging<br />
Sustainability in Radiation Protection. The Hague,<br />
The Netherlands, Dutch Society for Radiation<br />
Protection (NVS), local organiser, irpa<strong>2018</strong>europe.com<br />
06.06.-08.06.<strong>2018</strong><br />
2 nd Workshop on Safety of Extended Dry Storage<br />
of Spent Nuclear Fuel. Garching near Munich,<br />
Germany, GRS, www.grs.de<br />
25.06.-26.06.<strong>2018</strong><br />
index<strong>2018</strong> – International Nuclear Digital<br />
Experience. Paris, France, Société Française d’Energie<br />
Nucléaire, www.sfen.org, www.sfen-index<strong>2018</strong>.org<br />
27.06.-29.06.<strong>2018</strong><br />
EEM – <strong>2018</strong> 15 th International Conference on the<br />
European Energy Market. Lodz, Poland, Lodz<br />
University of Technology, Institute of Electrical Power<br />
Engineering, Association of Polish Electrical<br />
Engineers (SEP), www.eem18.eu<br />
29.07.-02.08.<strong>2018</strong><br />
International Nuclear Physics Conference 2019.<br />
Glasgow, United Kingdom, www.iop.org<br />
05.08.-08.08.<strong>2018</strong><br />
Utility Working Conference and Vendor<br />
Technology Expo. Amelia Island, FL, USA, American<br />
Nuclear Society (ANS), www.ans.org<br />
22.08.-31.08.<strong>2018</strong><br />
Frédéric Joliot/Otto Hahn (FJOH) Summer School<br />
FJOH-<strong>2018</strong> – Maximizing the Benefits of<br />
Experiments for the Simulation, Design and<br />
Analysis of Reactors. Aix-en-Provence, France,<br />
Nuclear Energy Division of Commissariat à l’énergie<br />
atomique et aux énergies alternatives (CEA) and Karlsruher<br />
Institut für Technologie (KIT), www.fjohss.eu<br />
28.08.-31.08.<strong>2018</strong><br />
TINCE <strong>2018</strong> – Technological Innovations in<br />
Nuclear Civil Engineering. Paris Saclay, France,<br />
Société Française d’Energie Nucléaire, www.sfen.org,<br />
www.sfen-tince<strong>2018</strong>.org<br />
05.09.-07.09.<strong>2018</strong><br />
World Nuclear Association Symposium <strong>2018</strong>.<br />
London, United Kingdom, World Nuclear Association<br />
(WNA), www.world-nuclear.org<br />
09.09.-14.09.<strong>2018</strong><br />
21 st International Conference on Water Chemistry<br />
in Nuclear Reactor Systems. San Francisco, CA, USA,<br />
EPRI – Electric Power Research Institute, www.epri.com<br />
10.09.-13.09.<strong>2018</strong><br />
Nuclear Energy in New Europe – NENE <strong>2018</strong>.<br />
Portoroz, Slovenia, Nuclear Society of Slovenia,<br />
www.nss.si/nene<strong>2018</strong>/<br />
17.09.-21.09.<strong>2018</strong><br />
62 nd IAEA General Conference. Vienna, Austria.<br />
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),<br />
www.iaea.org<br />
17.09.-20.09.<strong>2018</strong><br />
FONTEVRAUD 9. Avignon, France,<br />
Société Française d’Energie Nucléaire (SFEN),<br />
www.sfen-fontevraud9.org<br />
17.09.-19.09.<strong>2018</strong><br />
4 th International Conference on Physics and<br />
Technology of Reactors and Applications –<br />
PHYTRA4. Marrakech, Morocco, Moroccan<br />
Association for Nuclear Engineering and Reactor<br />
Technology (GMTR), National Center for Energy,<br />
Sciences and Nuclear Techniques (CNESTEN) and<br />
Moroccan Agency for Nuclear and Radiological<br />
Safety and Security (AMSSNuR), phytra4.gmtr.ma<br />
30.09.-04.10.<strong>2018</strong><br />
TopFuel <strong>2018</strong>. Prague, Czech Republic, European<br />
Nuclear Society (ENS), American Nuclear Society<br />
(ANS). Atomic Energy Society of Japan, Chinese<br />
Nuclear Society and Korean Nuclear Society,<br />
www.euronuclear.org<br />
02.10.-04.10.<strong>2018</strong><br />
7 th EU Nuclear Power Plant Simulation ENPPS<br />
Forum. Birmingham, United Kingdom,<br />
Nuclear Training & Simulation Group,<br />
www.enpps.tech<br />
14.10.-18.10.<strong>2018</strong><br />
12 th International Topical Meeting on Nuclear<br />
Reactor Thermal-Hydraulics, Operation and<br />
Safety – NUTHOS-12. Qingdao, China, Elsevier,<br />
www.nuthos-12.org<br />
14.10.-18.10.<strong>2018</strong><br />
NuMat <strong>2018</strong>. Seattle, United States,<br />
www.elsevier.com<br />
16.10.-17.10.<strong>2018</strong><br />
4 th GIF Symposium at the 8 th edition of Atoms<br />
for the Future. Paris, France,<br />
www.gen-4.org<br />
22.10.-24.10.<strong>2018</strong><br />
DEM <strong>2018</strong> Dismantling Challenges: Industrial<br />
Reality, Prospects and Feedback Experience. Paris<br />
Saclay, France, Société Française d’Energie Nucléaire,<br />
www.sfen.org, www.sfen-dem<strong>2018</strong>.org<br />
22.10.-26.10.<strong>2018</strong><br />
NUWCEM <strong>2018</strong> Cement-based Materials for<br />
Nuclear Waste. Avignon, France, French<br />
Commission for Atomic and Alternative Energies<br />
and Société Française d’Energie Nucléaire,<br />
www.sfen-nuwcem<strong>2018</strong>.org<br />
24.10.-25.10.<strong>2018</strong><br />
Chemistry in Power Plant. Magdeburg, Germany,<br />
VGB PowerTech e.V., www.vgb.org<br />
05.11.-08.11.<strong>2018</strong><br />
International Conference on Nuclear Decommissioning<br />
– ICOND <strong>2018</strong>. Aachen, Eurogress,<br />
Germany, achen Institute for Nuclear Training GmbH,<br />
www.icond.de<br />
Calendar
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
Russian Nuclear Energy Technologies<br />
for the Development of the Arctic<br />
Andrej Yurjewitsch Gagarinskiy<br />
Small nuclear facilities have become an integral part of two important areas of human activities, namely, they are the<br />
basis of nuclear ships and scientific/educational research reactors that are in fact the main training facilities for new<br />
nuclear specialists all over the world. However, despite great and justified expectations of their developers, small<br />
nuclear power plants (SNPPs), with their obvious advantages (compared to conventional energy sources) in hardlyaccessible<br />
areas, have not yet managed to start playing a notable role in the power industry.<br />
This is also completely true as concerns the task of using<br />
nuclear technologies for the development of the Arctic,<br />
where only the nuclear ship propulsion can be considered<br />
as an accomplished technology [1].<br />
1 Civil nuclear ships<br />
Russia is the world’s only country that has civil nuclear<br />
ships in operation. Nuclear shipbuilding experience of<br />
other countries (Savannah, 1962–1979, USA; Otto Hahn,<br />
1968–1980, FRG; and Mutsu, 1974 –1991, Japan) was<br />
relatively brief. Plans to construct nuclear icebreakers<br />
repeatedly declared by countries such as USA, Canada,<br />
Argentina and China are still just intentions.<br />
Table 1 presents both the past (starting from the<br />
world’s first nuclear icebreaker Lenin) and the present of<br />
Russia’s civil nuclear fleet, which is intended exclusively<br />
for the development of the country’s Arctic regions.<br />
Currently the Russian civil nuclear shipbuilding is<br />
resurging. To timely replace the existing icebreakers to<br />
enable reliable continuous navigation and year-round<br />
delivery of goods via the Northern Sea Route, the<br />
government in the summer of 2011 has decided to build<br />
and launch three universal nuclear icebreakers: the pilot<br />
one in 2017 and two serial ones in 2019 and 2020,<br />
respectively. The pilot icebreaker’s keel was laid at the<br />
Baltic Plant in 2013.<br />
The Iceberg Design Bureau has developed a detailed<br />
design of a nuclear icebreaker with improved icebreaking<br />
capability and variable draught (from 10.5 m in deep<br />
waters to 8.5 m in shallow ones). This variable draught<br />
would allow this icebreaker to operate not only in Arctic<br />
seas, but also in the mouths of northern rivers. The new<br />
nuclear facility – RITM-200 – developed by OKBM<br />
Afrikantov for this icebreaker includes two integral PWRs<br />
of 175 MWth each; its lifetime makes up to 40 years and its<br />
period of continuous operation is 26,000 hours.<br />
Icebreaker parameters are: displacement – 23,000 t;<br />
length – 172.2 m, width – 33 m, height – 15 m, speed – 22<br />
knots. This ship – that would allow for up to 6 months of<br />
independent sailing – is intended for operation in the<br />
Western Arctic (Barents Sea, Pechora Sea, Kara Sea, mouth<br />
of the Yenissei and the Ob Bay region). This pilot icebreaker<br />
Arktika (Figure 1), already afloat, is currently<br />
under construction at the Baltic Plant, as well as two serial<br />
icebreakers of the same design, Sibir (Arktika’s successor<br />
on the berth) and Ural (keel laid). As by late 2017, their<br />
commissioning was expected between 2019 and 2021.<br />
| | Fig. 1.<br />
Launching of the new Arktika, 2016.<br />
Revised version of a<br />
paper presented at<br />
the Annual Meeting<br />
of Nuclear Technology<br />
(AMNT 2017), Berlin.<br />
149<br />
ENERGY POLICY, ECONOMY AND LAW<br />
Ship Year of commissioning Power facility Current status<br />
Lenin 1959 2 OK-900 reactors,<br />
32.4 MW (44,000 hp)<br />
Arktika 1975 2 reactors,<br />
55 MW (75,000 hp)<br />
Decommissioned in 1989<br />
Museum since 2010<br />
Decommissioned in 2008<br />
Sibir 1977 same Decommissioned in 1992<br />
Sent for disposal in 2016<br />
Rossiya 1985 same Decommissioned in 2013<br />
Sovetsky Soyuz 1989 same Decommissioned in 2010<br />
Restoration being considered<br />
Yamal 1989 2 OK-900A reactors In operation<br />
Taymyr 1989 KLT-40 reactor,<br />
36.8 MW (50,000 hp.)<br />
In operation<br />
Vaygach 1990 same In operation<br />
50 Let Pobedy 2007 2 reactors,<br />
55 MW (75,000 hp)<br />
In operation<br />
Sevmorput (LASH) 1988 29.4 MW (39,000 hp) In operation<br />
(restored in 2013–2015<br />
| | Tab. 1.<br />
Russian civil nuclear fleet.<br />
Energy Policy, Economy and Law<br />
Russian Nuclear Energy Technologies for the Development of the Arctic ı Andrej Yurjewitsch Gagarinskiy
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ENERGY POLICY, ECONOMY AND LAW 150<br />
Renovation of the country’s icebreaker fleet will<br />
continue. Currently another icebreaker, Leader, is being<br />
developed. This ship would enable year-round navigation<br />
of ships with up to 100,000 t deadweight and up to<br />
50-m-wide hull over the whole Northern Sea Route. This<br />
would be a huge ship over 200 m long and about 40 m<br />
wide. Its capacity – 120 MW – would be unprecedented for<br />
icebreakers (though such military ships and passenger<br />
liners do exist). Russia already has an engineering design<br />
ready for the Leader. Negotiations are currently underway<br />
to identify its manufacturer plant and construction<br />
schedule. Powerful icebreaker fleet became increasingly<br />
demanded following the start of the Yamal-LNG Project<br />
that “opened new horizons for our national economy”,<br />
according to President Putin.<br />
2 Nuclear power plants for the Arctic<br />
As concerns nuclear energy for hardly-accessible areas,<br />
decades of RD&D have not yet yielded any significant<br />
advancement of nuclear sources in this seemingly obvious<br />
consumption sector.<br />
Initially, all works related to the development of both<br />
stationary and transportable SNPPs were concentrated in<br />
the USA and the USSR.<br />
At the very beginning of 1950ies, the United States have<br />
for the first time started to pay serious attention to SNPPs,<br />
exclusively because of their army’s interest. Such SNPPs<br />
(with capacities ranging from 0.3 to 3 MW) intended as<br />
energy sources for remote military bases have been<br />
deployed in Alaska, Greenland and even the Antarctic, but<br />
in the sixties all of them have been shut down. In 1968, the<br />
United States have installed a floating NPP – MH-1A<br />
Sturgis (10 MW) – in a lake near the Panama Canal. It has<br />
operated for 8 years (Figure 2)<br />
operation since 1974, but the concept of building small<br />
stationary NPPs similarly to large ones was abandoned.<br />
Rosenergoatom Concern (the Russian nuclear generating<br />
company) considers this NPP, with its low efficiency and<br />
too many workers required per power capita, rather as an<br />
encumbrance than as a prototype for the future.<br />
The global situation with SNPPs is quite similar. The<br />
IAEA small- & medium-sized reactor (SMR) database [2]<br />
(IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency) contains<br />
information on dozens of designs – but virtually all of them<br />
are still paper designs at various stages of development.<br />
There are still no market signals to confirm enthusiastic<br />
forecasts of some experts and companies (such as, e.g., the<br />
U.S. NuScale Power) who predict good commercial future<br />
for SMRs. Only the 25-MWe CAREM (that demonstrates<br />
obvious features of a prototype ship reactor) and pilot<br />
high-temperature reactors are currently under construction<br />
in Argentina (since 2014) and China (since 2012 –<br />
two-module Shidao-Bay-1), respectively.<br />
| | Fig. 3.<br />
Finally the FNPP construction is nearing completion.<br />
| | Fig. 2.<br />
Mobile and transportable NPPs.<br />
As for the Soviet Union, it has launched its strategic<br />
R&D on small reactors in the middle of 1950ies. In October<br />
1956, a governmental decision on SNPP deployment has<br />
been adopted.<br />
Figure 2 presents some interesting designs (TES-3,<br />
PAMIR, ARBUS) that have achieved the implementation<br />
stage. However, all these facilities were demonstrationonly.<br />
The only exclusion is the Bilibino NPP with its four<br />
12 MWe water-graphite reactor units. The plant is in<br />
In 1990ies, Russia has adopted a long-ranging decision<br />
of principle: to build a floating NPP (FNPP) to demonstrate<br />
the advantages the nuclear energy offers for remote<br />
isolated regions. This NPP was to be barge-based, factorybuilt<br />
and returned to the special site for every refueling<br />
and repairs [3]. KLT-40, a nuclear icebreaker reactor<br />
with proven high reliability and safety, was chosen for<br />
installation at this FNPP. After its start in 2007, the FNPP<br />
construction went on with great difficulties – it has<br />
survived not only the change of the manufacturer plant<br />
and multiple changes of the first operating site<br />
( Severodvinsk, Vilyuchinsk, Pevek), but also what was<br />
maybe the worst – on-the-go redesign to allow for use of<br />
low-enriched fuel. In 2016, the FNPP – Akademik<br />
Lomonosov – achieved the stage of dock trials (Figure 3).<br />
Unfortunately, this redesign reduced the capacity and<br />
hence the refueling interval (to 2–3 years) of the FNPP, so<br />
that it had to be equipped with refueling equipment and<br />
spent fuel storage. This contradicts with the key conceptual<br />
requirement, which inhibits any onboard operations<br />
with fuel for future floating NPPs. So today the developers<br />
are facing the task to extend the refueling interval of future<br />
floating NPPs to 10–12 years.<br />
This task is becoming increasingly important with the<br />
latest incentives intended to solve the energy supply issue<br />
in the Russian Arctic – and pertinent to the strategic issue<br />
of supplies to hardly accessible areas and, prima facie, to<br />
the “Arctic vector” of the Russian energy industry [4].<br />
Below follows the opinion of Mikhail Kovalvchuk,<br />
President of the Kurchatov Institute: “In recent years, the<br />
development of Arctic areas became a strategic priority for<br />
Energy Policy, Economy and Law<br />
Russian Nuclear Energy Technologies for the Development of the Arctic ı Andrej Yurjewitsch Gagarinskiy
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
Design Refueling interval, years Lifetime, years Development stage<br />
ABV-6 10–12 50 – Pilot reactor and NPP unit Volnolom – detailed design (1993)<br />
– FNPP for the Far North – feasibility study<br />
– Nuclear co-generation plant for Kazakstan – feasibility study<br />
– Pilot bench – in operation<br />
KLT-40S 2.5–3 40* – Equipment for two reactors – supplied to the<br />
FNPP Akademik Lomonosov<br />
RITM-200 4.5–5 40* – Two reactors for the pilot universal icebreaker – preparation<br />
for complete shipment (2016)<br />
– Reactors for the next two icebreakers – scheduled supply<br />
in <strong>2018</strong> and 2019, respectively<br />
VBER-300 1.5–2 60 – NPP with two VBER-300 units – quotation (2002)<br />
– VBER-300 reactor facility – conceptual design (2004)<br />
– VBER-300 units for Kazakhstan – detailed design (2007–2009)<br />
VBER-600 1.5–2 60 – 100 – 600 MW capacity range – concept (2007–2008)<br />
– NPP with VBER-460/600 – R&D (2008–2012)<br />
* – allows for extension to 60 years<br />
| | Tab. 2.<br />
SMR designs under development.<br />
our country. President of the Russian Federation has approved<br />
the “Fundamentals of the Russian State Policy in<br />
the Arctic to 2020 and beyond” (2008) and the “Strategy of<br />
the Russian Arctic Zone Development and National<br />
Security Assurance to 2020” (2013). The following aspects<br />
of the tasks to be solved should be emphasized: first, a<br />
state-of-the-art computerized energy infrastructure should<br />
be an integral part of the comprehensive socioeconomic<br />
development of the Arctic. Second, many large-scale oil/<br />
gas and other projects are now underway in the Arctic.<br />
Third, long distances between – and unreliable energy<br />
supplies to – local communities are a specific feature of the<br />
Russian Arctic. Local conditions require a distributed<br />
energy supply system, which should account for both<br />
extreme operating conditions. On the whole, the Arctic<br />
energy supply system consists of onshore and offshore<br />
components. The latter are based on the practical<br />
experience of efficient application of Russian shipbuilding<br />
technologies…”<br />
Indeed, Russian nuclear designers are experienced in<br />
developing and operating ship reactors, both for the Navy<br />
and for the civil fleet. Table 2 [5] lists the designs produced<br />
by OKBM Afrikantov, the country’s leading developer of<br />
small and medium reactors (6 – 600 MW).<br />
Another well-known RD&D institute, NIKIET, has<br />
developed a family of SNPPs with capacities ranging from<br />
1 to 20 MWe, including facilities such as Shelf and Uniterm<br />
of about 6 MWe each [6].<br />
Developers of conventional stationary reactors also do<br />
not lose hope to join the competition for entering the<br />
future SNPP market. For example, VVER developers are<br />
already offering an integral facility (VVER-I) of 100, 200<br />
and 300 MW. This design is based on the natural circulation<br />
of coolant, so it couples higher safety with compact<br />
equipment, thus allowing for modular arrangement of the<br />
NPP.<br />
Another SNPP development line is presented by smaller<br />
units of 0.5–1 MWe (5–10 MWt) that can be deployed on<br />
the basis of unmanned autonomous thermoelectric power<br />
plants.<br />
Practical feasibility of this class of energy sources is<br />
confirmed by the Kurchatov Institute’s experience in<br />
constructing power facilities based on the direct<br />
heat-to-electricity conversion. Romashka built in 1962 as a<br />
pilot facility intended for space applications was the first<br />
such facility in the world. In 1982, the Kurchatov Institute<br />
has built and launched Gamma – a prototype thermoelectric<br />
facility intended for ship applications [1] – which<br />
| | Fig. 4.<br />
Gamma – a prototype unmanned underwater power source<br />
(launched in 1982).<br />
has operated for many years and made it possible<br />
to perform an exhaustive scope of studies and tests<br />
(Figure 4).<br />
In the mid-80ies, proceeding from the Gamma’s<br />
successful operating experience, the design of Elena NPP<br />
was developed in the framework of conversion programs.<br />
This type of power facilities is based on the following three<br />
cornerstones:<br />
• water-water reactor with power self-regulation as a<br />
heat source;<br />
• heat removal by natural circulation of coolant in the<br />
primary and secondary circuit;<br />
• thermoelectric conversion of heat into electricity.<br />
As a result, such facilities – whose technical feasibility is<br />
now doubtless – offer considerable advantages compared<br />
to those based on turbine energy conversion.<br />
3 Nuclear technologies for the<br />
development of the Arctic shelf<br />
As concerns the Arctic shelf development, the Energy<br />
Strategy of Russia to 2035 estimates the country’s<br />
continental shelf to contain 90 billion tons of oil equivalent<br />
(toe), including 16 billion tons of oil with condensate and<br />
74 trillion m 3 of gas. About 70% of these resources find<br />
themselves on the Barents, Pechora and Kara Sea shelves,<br />
which together make about a half of the Russian Arctic<br />
shelf. Experts forecast that by 2035 Russia will annually<br />
produce up to 30 million tons of oil and 130 billion m 3 of<br />
gas on its Arctic shelf.<br />
The averaged total electricity demand by the hydrocarbon<br />
production industry is estimated above 3 GW, so<br />
ENERGY POLICY, ECONOMY AND LAW 151<br />
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Russian Nuclear Energy Technologies for the Development of the Arctic ı Andrej Yurjewitsch Gagarinskiy
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ENERGY POLICY, ECONOMY AND LAW 152<br />
the summary demand of future oil & gas rigs on the Russian<br />
Arctic shelf may be quite high. About 40 % of this demand<br />
can be covered by underwater feeder cables, but this<br />
option is limited by distances below 200 km from the<br />
shore. Another 60% from rigs situated beyond this distance<br />
can be covered by autonomous underwater/sub-ice power<br />
plants. As concerns this application, small autonomous<br />
reactors seem to have no alternative [7].<br />
By the end of 1980-ies, the USSR already had a concept<br />
of underwater NPP with small reactor units [8]. Table 3<br />
lists some nuclear facilities proposed by the leading<br />
Russian design companies for application on oil & gas<br />
Facility<br />
Basic parameters<br />
Submarine tanker Carrying capacity – 20,000 t,<br />
propeller power – 30 MW<br />
Underwater<br />
nuclear compressor<br />
station<br />
Underwater station<br />
for LNG production<br />
Nuclear drill<br />
submarine<br />
| | Tab. 3.<br />
SMR designs under development.<br />
Displacement – 7,500 m 3 ,<br />
compressor output – 40 MW,<br />
continuous unmanned operation time<br />
– 10,000 hours<br />
The station includes: tankers,<br />
gas storages, liquefaction units,<br />
nuclear power facilities, terminals etc.<br />
Displacement – 20,000 m 3 ,<br />
reactor capacity – 6 MWe<br />
fields in heavy ice conditions.<br />
In late 2017, the media have published some information<br />
on the Iceberg project developed by the Rubin and<br />
OKBM Afrikantov design bureaus: a 24-MW underwater<br />
NPP capable of autonomous unmanned operation for a<br />
year (total lifetime 30 years). This NPP is intended as a<br />
power source for oil/gas drill and extraction rigs in areas<br />
with thick ice – in fact, this is a return to one of unique<br />
unimplemented designs of the eighties.<br />
In the developers’ opinion, nuclear energy supplies to<br />
underwater/sub-ice oil/gas production on the Arctic shelf<br />
should be based on system approach (“made in factory and<br />
shipped to sites”), with a maximum use of long operating<br />
experience of nuclear ships. This would enable:<br />
• no atmospheric releases plus localization and<br />
minimization of heat impact on the Arctic Ocean water<br />
to negligible values (compared to natural temperature<br />
fluctuations);<br />
• lower risk of oil spills – that cannot be efficiently<br />
liquidated by available technologies – in ice con ditions;<br />
• higher reliability and safety of power facilities;<br />
• minimized workforce requirements (up to total<br />
autonomy);<br />
• efficient and safe offshore operation under water/ice at<br />
distances of 1,000 km from the coast and beyond.<br />
The policy currently implemented by the government with<br />
regard to the Arctic region, as well as the scientific and<br />
technical experience accumulated by Russia, both allow<br />
for confident conclusion that considerable advances in the<br />
development of nuclear power facilities for the Arctic are<br />
to be expected in the short term.<br />
References<br />
1. Kurchatov Specialists and Atomic Fleet. Editor: M.V. Kovalchuk,<br />
NRC KI, Moscow, 2016 (in Russian).<br />
2. Status of Small and Medium-Sized Reactor Designs. A<br />
Supplement to the IAEA Advanced Reactor Information System<br />
(ARIS). IAEA, 2012<br />
3. Russia’s Nuclear Energy Strategy to 2050. NRC KI, Moscow, 2013<br />
(in Russian).<br />
4. M.V. Kovalchuk. Arctic Vector of Russian Energy. Priroda, 2016<br />
(in Russian).<br />
5. V.V. Petrunin et al.: Prospects for Small and Medium Nuclear<br />
Power Plants: a New Development Area. In: Small Nuclear Power<br />
Plants a New Development Area, IBRAE, Moscow, 2015<br />
(in Russian).<br />
6. A.I. Alekseev et al.: Uniterm SMR: a Frontline Area of Nuclear<br />
Power Development. In: Small Nuclear Power Plants a New<br />
Development Area, IBRAE, Moscow, 2015 (in Russian).<br />
7. E.P. Velikhov et al. Nuclear Energy for the Arctic Shelf. V Mire<br />
Nauki, v.10, 2015 (in Russian).<br />
8. V.S. Nikitin, V.S. Ustinov et al.: Nuclear Energy in the Arctic Region.<br />
The Arctic: Ecology and Economy, v.4(20), 2015 (in Russian).<br />
Authors<br />
Andrej Yurjewitsch Gagarinskiy<br />
National Research Centre “Kurchatov Institute”<br />
Moscow, Russian Federatio<br />
Energy Spotlight Policy, on Nuclear Economy Lawand Law<br />
Russian U.S. Regulators Nuclear Reject Energy Proposal Technologies to Subsidize for the Nuclear Development and Coal of the Power Arctic Prices ı Andrej ı Andrej Yurjewitsch Gagarinskiy
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
U.S. Regulators Reject Proposal to Subsidize Nuclear and<br />
Coal Power Prices<br />
Jay R. Kraemer<br />
On January 8, <strong>2018</strong>, the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) unanimously rejected a rulemaking<br />
proposed by Secretary of Energy Rick Perry designed to enable the owners of coal and nuclear power plants to charge higher<br />
prices for their output, and thereby to prevent further premature retirements of such plants. The FERC has exclusive<br />
authority, under the Federal Power Act, to establish rules for interstate wholesale sales of electricity. Although the FERC<br />
simultaneously initiated a new proceeding to consider how to enhance the resilience of electricity supply and delivery in<br />
the U.S., that proceeding seems unlikely to offer near-term relief to nuclear plants that are approaching closure due to<br />
their inability to compete economically both with facilities fueled by low-priced natural gas and with renewable power<br />
sources benefitting from favorable tax provisions. Accordingly, the American nuclear power industry wil+l probably have<br />
to look elsewhere for relief from its present dire economic circumstances.<br />
Last fall, Secretary Perry concluded that U.S. wholesale<br />
electricity markets, as operating in power auctions<br />
conducted in accordance with FERC regulations, were<br />
not adequately compensating the “resiliency” benefits of<br />
nuclear and coal-fired “fuel-secure generation” facilities.<br />
Accordingly, he issued a directive instructing the FERC to<br />
develop and publish new market rules to correct that shortcoming.<br />
See, “Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule,” 82 Federal Register<br />
46940-48 ( October 10, 2017) (the “ Proposed Rule”).<br />
Specifically, he called upon the FERC to amend its regulations<br />
to require that each of the six regional entities<br />
( Independent System Operators (“ISOs”) and Regional<br />
Transmission Organizations (“RTOs”)) conducting FERCregulated<br />
power auctions promptly establish new rates for<br />
the purchase of power from certain generating facilities.<br />
Such rates would provide for recovery of the facilities’ costs<br />
of operation, fuel, capital, and financing, as well as a fair<br />
return on equity. Eligible generating facilities were defined<br />
in the Proposed Rule so as to include power plants that were<br />
not currently subject to cost-of- service rate regulation, had a<br />
90-day fuel supply on site, and were able to supply certain<br />
reliability energy services, such as voltage support, frequency<br />
services, and operating reserves. As a practical<br />
matter, therefore, the Proposed Rule called for the FERC to<br />
adopt regulations requiring electricity rate tariffs allowing<br />
full cost and reasonable profit recovery for coal-fired and<br />
nuclear “ merchant” power plants which, on the document’s<br />
face, appeared to be the only generating facilities that could<br />
meet the applicable definitions.<br />
The FERC received extensive comments on the Proposed<br />
Rule from ISOs, RTOs, electric utilities, non- utility elec tricity<br />
generators, trade associations repre senting a wide variety of<br />
energy interests, and many others. Meanwhile, the composition<br />
of the FERC itself changed markedly in the two<br />
months following publication of the Proposed Rule, including<br />
the confirmation of a new Chairman who assumed office<br />
in early December 2017 (and one of whose first official<br />
actions was to request an additional 30 days within which to<br />
respond to the Proposed Rule).<br />
In its unanimous Order terminating the rulemaking proceeding<br />
initiated in response to the Proposed Rule, the FERC<br />
briefly reviewed the development of the U.S. electric power<br />
industry and its own efforts to help ensure the resilience of<br />
the bulk power system. It then held that neither the Proposed<br />
Rule nor the record in that rule making proceeding<br />
had shown that the current RTO/ISO rates were unjust or<br />
unreasonable, or that they were unduly preferential or discriminatory<br />
– the statutory criteria in the Federal Power Act<br />
for changing rates. In addition, the FERC found no basis in<br />
the record to conclude that there was a threat to grid<br />
resilience, either in the current rates charged for power or<br />
otherwise. It then specifically rejected the Proposed Rule’s<br />
concept that all qualifying generating facilities should<br />
receive a cost-of-service recovery rate regardless of the need<br />
for power or the resulting prices to power consumers.<br />
Two FERC Commissioners – both Democrats – wrote concurring<br />
opinions that were quite critical of the Proposed<br />
Rule. One stated that, by “simply designat[ing facilities] for<br />
support rather than determining what services needed to be<br />
provided,” the Proposed Rule “sought to freeze yesterday’s<br />
resources in place indefinitely, rather than adapting to the<br />
resources that the market is selecting today or toward which<br />
it is trending in the future.” (Concurring Statement of Commissioner<br />
LaFleur, at 4.) The other described the Proposed<br />
Rule’s remedy as a “multi-billion dollar bailout targeted at<br />
coal and nuclear generating facilities,” and pointed to the<br />
transmission and distri bution systems in the U.S., rather<br />
than to generating facilities, as a greater threat to grid resilience.<br />
(Concurring Statement of Commissioner Glick, at 2.) A<br />
third Commissioner, after applauding “Secretary Perry’s<br />
bold leadership in jump- starting a national conversation on<br />
this urgent challenge,” stated that he would have preferred<br />
to move expeditiously to direct the RTOs/ISOs either to submit<br />
interim rate revisions for existing power plants that were<br />
providing resilience attributes and were at risk of retiring<br />
before the new FERC proceeding was concluded or to explain<br />
why such rate revisions were not necessary. ( Concurring<br />
Statement of Commissioner Chatterjee, at 1, 3.)<br />
After terminating the proceeding involving the Proposed<br />
Rule, the FERC began a new proceeding to address potential<br />
grid resiliency challenges in the RTOs/ISOs, including a<br />
better understanding of what resiliency means and requires.<br />
The FERC ordered each RTO and ISO to submit, within 60<br />
days, comments on those issues, on how the RTOs/ISOs<br />
assess threats to resiliency, and on how they mitigate threats<br />
to resilience. Following those sub missions, other interested<br />
parties will have 30 days to submit reply comments.<br />
The new FERC proceeding is much more “open-ended”<br />
than was the Proposed Rule, in terms of its potential<br />
outcome, whether it will in fact lead to any new rule making,<br />
and especially whether it will result in higher rates for<br />
nuclear plants threatened with premature retirement. Some<br />
states, most particularly Illinois and New York, have already<br />
put in place arrangements that permit compensation to the<br />
owners of nuclear plants for their non-carbon-emitting<br />
power production. Other states, such a Connecticut, New<br />
Jersey, and Pennsylvania have similar schemes under consideration.<br />
However, because the Trump Administration<br />
appears wedded to continued efforts to support the coal<br />
industry (and, relatedly, seems unwilling to recognize the<br />
climate benefits of carbon-free generation of electricity), it<br />
appears that any economic relief to at-risk nuclear power<br />
plants is more likely to come from state-sponsored plans, or<br />
possibly proposals initiated by ISOs and/or RSOs themselves,<br />
than from initiatives from the Federal Government.<br />
Author<br />
Jay R. Kraemer<br />
Of Counsel<br />
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP<br />
801 17 th Street, NW Washington, DC 20006, USA<br />
153<br />
SPOTLIGHT ON NUCLEAR LAW<br />
Spotlight on Nuclear Law<br />
U.S. Regulators Reject Proposal to Subsidize Nuclear and Coal Power Prices ı Jay R. Kraemer
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
154<br />
ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY<br />
The Importance of Integration of<br />
Deterministic and Probabilistic<br />
Approaches in the Framework of<br />
Integrated Risk Informed Decision<br />
Making in Nuclear Reactors<br />
Mohsen Esfandiari, Kamran Sepanloo, Gholamreza Jahanfarnia and Ehsan Zarifi<br />
Introduction For many years, decision making on safety issues has been based on either deterministic safety<br />
assessment (DSA) or probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). In recent years, integrated risk informed decision-making<br />
(IRIDM) approach has been suggested to integrate in a systematic manner quantitative and qualitative (deterministic<br />
and probabilistic) safety considerations to attain a balanced decision [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. The IRIDM and investigation of<br />
the combination of deterministic and probabilistic approaches are important issues, which have attracted much<br />
attention in recent years. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) has developed reports on integrated<br />
risk-informed decisions and applications of deterministic and probabilistic approaches since 1998 [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13].<br />
They considered the high-level criteria for defence-in-depth and all of safety margin by using the IRIDM concept. Collins<br />
[14] investigated risk informed safety and regulatory decision making based on USNRC perspective. He investigated the<br />
methods to enhance the safety criteria, regulatory effectiveness and efficiency, and public confidence. Impediments for<br />
the application of risk-informed decisions making (RIDM) in nuclear safety were considered by Hahn et al [15]. They<br />
suggested that the PSA method could not be replaced or substituted by DSA method. IAEA has overviewed risk- informed<br />
regulation of nuclear facilities [4]. In the overview, the application of RIDM to provide safety level in all types of nuclear<br />
facility is considered. Risk-informed decision making in the context of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration<br />
(NASA) risk management is studied by Dezfuli et al [16, 17, 18]. In this investigation, evolution of risk-related policy and<br />
guidance documents and NASA’s risk management approach are discussed. The International Nuclear Safety Group<br />
(INSAG) has also published a framework for an integrated RIDM process (INSAG 25, 77, etc) [19, 20, 21, 22]. In this<br />
report, the framework, principles and key elements for RIDM are identified and their interrelationship are described. In<br />
another study, Fontes et al [23, 24] considered ITO model of pit corrosion in pipelines by applying RIDM. Talarico [25,<br />
26] indicated RIDM of safety investments by using the disproportion factor, Process safety and environmental protection.<br />
For this purpose a systematic approach, Cost-benefit analysis, determination model and simulations on realistic data<br />
were presented. Veeramany et al [27, 28] investigated a framework for modeling of high-impact and low-frequency<br />
power grid events to support RIDM. In this report, an integrated high-impact and low-frequency risk framework was<br />
applied for improvement of the risk models. Borgonovo and Apostolakis [29, 30] introduced an importance measure,<br />
the differential importance measure (DIM), for RIDM. Using this method, the problems exiting in Fussell-Vesely (FV)<br />
and risk achievement worth (RAW) methods were solved.<br />
A risk-informed defence-in-depth<br />
frame work for existing and advanced<br />
reactors are considered by Fleming<br />
and Silady [31, 32, 33, 34]. A new<br />
definition of defence-in-depth including<br />
the inherent characteristics,<br />
design features of a nuclear reactor,<br />
and the quantification of the design<br />
features importance is suggested.<br />
Mohammad Modarres [35] proposed<br />
and discussed implications of a largely<br />
probabilistic regulatory framework<br />
using best estimate, goal-driven,<br />
risk-informed, and performancebased<br />
methods.<br />
The traditional defense-in-depth<br />
design and operation regulatory<br />
philosophy are used to propose a<br />
framework when uncertainty in<br />
conforming to specific goals and<br />
objectives is high. The steps need to<br />
develop a corresponding technologyneutral<br />
regulatory approach from the<br />
proposed framework explained.<br />
Kang and Sung [36, 37] studied<br />
analysis of safety-critical digital<br />
systems for RIDM. The fault tree<br />
analysis framework of the safety of<br />
digital systems are presented and the<br />
relationship between the important<br />
characteristics of digital systems and<br />
the PSA results using mathematical<br />
expressions are described quantitatively.<br />
Kim et al [38, 39, 40] discussed<br />
the risk-informed approach that have<br />
proposed to make a safety case for<br />
advanced nuclear reactors. They also<br />
considered a risk-informed safety<br />
analysis approach suggested by<br />
Westinghouse. In this paper, the<br />
risk-informed approach and its<br />
potential to improve the conventional<br />
and deterministic approaches because<br />
of various desirable characteristics are<br />
discussed. Future nuclear reactor<br />
designs meet an uncertain regulatory<br />
environment. Delaney et al [41, 42,<br />
43] considered the risk-informed<br />
design guidance for this reactor<br />
systems. Some level of probabilistic<br />
insights in the regulations and<br />
supporting regulatory documents for<br />
generation-IV nuclear reactors are<br />
anticipated. This paper presented an<br />
iterative four-step risk-informed<br />
methodology to guide the design of<br />
future-reactor systems.<br />
Deterministic approach<br />
Deterministic safety approach (DSA)<br />
applies a set of conservative rules<br />
and requirements for the design and<br />
operation of a nuclear facility. Thereby<br />
providing a way of taking into account<br />
uncertainties in the performance of<br />
equipment and humans. DSA provides<br />
the defence-in-depth that assures the<br />
successive performance of barrier to<br />
prevent accidents. A safe for operator<br />
of nuclear power plant, and environment<br />
during the normal and abnormal<br />
operation can be achievable by<br />
Environment and Safety<br />
The Importance of Integration of Deterministic and Probabilistic Approaches in the Framework of Integrated Risk Informed Decision Making in Nuclear Reactors<br />
Mohsen Esfandiari, Kamran Sepanloo, Gholamreza Jahanfarnia and Ehsan Zarifi
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
applying an appropriate defence- indepth.<br />
It is needed to determine the<br />
design basis accidents to analyze<br />
safety of nuclear facilities in deterministic<br />
approach, that its analysis as<br />
well as presence of DID can increase<br />
the safety margin, which has an<br />
important role in prevention and<br />
mitigation of the accidents. If these<br />
parameter are met, the level of risk to<br />
operators and public from operation<br />
of the nuclear facility will be acceptably<br />
low [4, 5, 7, 19].There are<br />
also uncertainties in deterministic<br />
approach; For example, there are<br />
uncertainties in the analytical models,<br />
computer codes, and the capability of<br />
structures, systems and components,<br />
etc. The involved uncertainties are<br />
determined by applying conservative<br />
assumptions, as well as models and<br />
data. Deterministic approach has<br />
advantages and disadvantages. The<br />
main advantage of deterministic<br />
approach is that it is well developed<br />
for applying to all types of nuclear<br />
facilities [4, 5, 7, 19]. In addition to its<br />
advantages, there are defects like<br />
indicating the rare fault instead of<br />
lesser faults that are more frequent to<br />
the risk, disability to balance a design<br />
and reduction in level of risk.<br />
Probabilistic approach<br />
Probabilistic approach is used for the<br />
analysis of safety of nuclear power<br />
plants. This method has three safety<br />
levels. By application of this approach,<br />
it is possible to analyze all transients<br />
and accidents including fires and<br />
floods, Core Damage Frequency<br />
(CDF) and Large Early Release<br />
Frequency (LERF). In addition, all<br />
sources of radioactive material,<br />
human errors, and levels of risk can be<br />
considered in this method. Probabilistic<br />
approach can be used in all the<br />
modes of operation of the plant. The<br />
scope of the PSA applying may be less<br />
than this and, the limitations of PSA<br />
method must be recognized when it is<br />
used as part of the IRIDM process.<br />
At first, initial events are determined<br />
in probabilistic safety analysis,<br />
then it must calculated whether the<br />
core damage frequency and associated<br />
risk can satisfy the required requirements<br />
or not.<br />
The PSA method uses comprehensive<br />
list of initiating events and determines<br />
all the fault sequences that<br />
could lead to core damage or a large<br />
early release. The levels of risk,<br />
parameters uncertainty, and sensitivity<br />
studies can be also considered<br />
by using PSA approach.<br />
The deficiency in the probabilistic<br />
approach is that the PSA model cannot<br />
determine all the initiating events<br />
and fault sequences that could affect<br />
to the risk. The uncertainties in some<br />
areas of the PSA model are very large.<br />
Nevertheless, The PSA model can explicitly<br />
explain many of uncertainties<br />
by using modern PSA computer codes.<br />
The PSA approach is a part of decision-making<br />
and cannot replace it, individually.<br />
It can only be a contributor<br />
to the decision making.<br />
Integration of PSA and DSA<br />
methods into the integrated<br />
risk informed decisionmaking<br />
The deterministic and probabilistic<br />
approaches must be used to control<br />
the level of nuclear facilities risk to<br />
satisfy the safety of operators. There<br />
are many differences between deterministic<br />
and probabilistic approaches<br />
in evaluation methods and boundary<br />
conditions. The deterministic approach<br />
is conservative but Probabilistic<br />
approach is more realistic and uses<br />
best estimate approach. The deterministic<br />
approach usually uses some<br />
of initiating events and fault<br />
sequences, while the Probabilistic<br />
approach uses a comprehensive set of<br />
initiating events and hazards for<br />
analysis. In deterministic approach,<br />
accident conditions are addressed<br />
separately, so that the PSA approximately<br />
integrates all initiating events<br />
and safety systems in the same model.<br />
DSA approach uses approximate<br />
method for calculating initiating<br />
events frequencies and systems and<br />
components failure probabilities,<br />
while PSA uses explicit methods for<br />
these purposes. Uncertainties are<br />
addressed by conservative assumptions<br />
and can be quantified by using<br />
explicit methods in deterministic and<br />
probabilistic models.<br />
Generally, in view of intiating<br />
events, DSA only considers design<br />
basis accidents, howerver PSA considers<br />
all design basis and beyond<br />
design accidents. By considering the<br />
safety systems, DSA only indicates<br />
singular failure criterion, however PSA<br />
indicates both of singular and combined<br />
failiure criterion . In deterministic<br />
approach, with the respect of the<br />
operator instruction, nothing should<br />
be done in 30 minutes, but afterwards<br />
instructions should be implemented<br />
completely. Whereas in the PSA the<br />
operator's proceeding is more realistic.<br />
In other words, the basis of DSA is<br />
more conservative while the PSA is<br />
realistic as much as possible.<br />
The PSA can complement the<br />
deterministic methods because:<br />
• PSA considers thousands of accident<br />
sequences instead of the<br />
relatively few.<br />
• It analyses more complex failure<br />
modes.<br />
• It quantifies the remaining risk.<br />
• It identifies non-conservative and<br />
overly conservative in the design.<br />
• It quantifies the part of the uncertainties,<br />
contributing to the understanding<br />
of the issues.<br />
Integrated approach can determine<br />
that design is balanced against<br />
initiating events. Also, determines the<br />
importance of structures, systems and<br />
components (SSCs). In all cases, a<br />
combination of deterministic and<br />
probabilistic approaches is made to<br />
achieve acceptable safety level. Each<br />
approach has separate viewpoint, it is<br />
possible to use the result of each<br />
approach for another one instead of<br />
the applying assumptions into them.<br />
In this way, the deterministic success<br />
criteria, which is obtained in the<br />
deterministic approach, can be used<br />
in probabilistic approach. In addition,<br />
the new design basis events and<br />
re-classified structures, systems<br />
and components from probabilistic<br />
approach can be used in the deterministic<br />
approach. Then, deterministic<br />
and probabilistic results are compared<br />
with regulation and the assessed risk<br />
metrics, respectively. Finally, the<br />
acceptable safety level can be achieved<br />
by using the integrated risk-informed<br />
decision. If the safety level is not<br />
satisfied, the measures should be<br />
re-implemented to enhance the safety<br />
level [1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 19, 20, 33, 44],<br />
Figure 1.<br />
Early safety management focused<br />
primarily on the safety of the plant<br />
and equipment (the technology),<br />
while subsequent practices also<br />
| | Fig. 1.<br />
Process of safety analysis by integration of DSA and PSA.<br />
ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 155<br />
Environment and Safety<br />
The Importance of Integration of Deterministic and Probabilistic Approaches in the Framework of Integrated Risk Informed Decision Making in Nuclear Reactors<br />
Mohsen Esfandiari, Kamran Sepanloo, Gholamreza Jahanfarnia and Ehsan Zarifi
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 156<br />
| | Fig. 3.<br />
Requirements for IRIDM.<br />
considered several factors such as<br />
human operators, organization, etc.<br />
The IRIDM approach to managing<br />
safety adopted by many operators<br />
worldwide addresses all aspects and<br />
the complex interaction between<br />
them, Figure 2.<br />
| | Fig. 2.<br />
Important parameter for IRIDM.<br />
Experience has shown that an<br />
integrated decision making process,<br />
including deterministic and probabilistic<br />
analyses with good engineering<br />
practices, consideration of<br />
operating experience and sound<br />
managerial arrangements, is effective<br />
in refining and improving safe design<br />
and safe operation of nuclear installations.<br />
A risk-based on integrated<br />
decision-making process provides a<br />
defensible basis for making decisions.<br />
In addition, it is possible to recognize<br />
the greatest risks and prioritize<br />
attempts to minimize or omit them.<br />
Decision making case<br />
DSA<br />
method<br />
This approach has many benefits<br />
including a greatly improved understanding<br />
of the safety and identifying<br />
safety vulnerabilities that have<br />
not identified using standards-based<br />
evaluation techniques. IRIDM is a<br />
consultative process that applies a set<br />
of performance measures, with other<br />
considerations, to “inform” decisionmaking.<br />
IRIDM is invoked for key<br />
decisions, which typically requires<br />
setting of requirements. It is applied in<br />
many different fields, risk assessment,<br />
engineering design decisions and<br />
configuration management processes,<br />
etc. Using the IRIDM, assures project<br />
success and best decision making for<br />
risk assessment, etc [4, 17, 19]. The<br />
comparison between several methods<br />
for safety analysis and decision<br />
making is shown in Table 1.<br />
Integrated Risk Informed Decision<br />
Making is a best practice approach to<br />
safety management and decision<br />
making. IRIDM is a modular model<br />
that considers all relevant and important<br />
factors in an appropriate way to<br />
reach a balanced decision for taking<br />
account of all the risks and hazards<br />
posed by the facility. The main goal of<br />
the model is to develop an integrated<br />
data bank for informed decision<br />
making in necessary cases. The integrated<br />
data bank includes: operational<br />
feedback, organizational factor analysis,<br />
human factor, inspection, Deterministic<br />
Safety Analysis, Living<br />
Probabilistic Safety Analysis, security<br />
and safeguard and etc. The scheme of<br />
this model is shown in Figure 3.<br />
A series of requirements and<br />
criteria including different steps are<br />
needed for IRIDM process. The first<br />
step is defining the any types of issues<br />
that can be considered in safety analysis.<br />
The second step is identifying the<br />
requirements and criteria related to<br />
the specific issue. In this step, the<br />
mandatory requirements, deterministic<br />
and probabilistic insights and other<br />
requirements should be determine for<br />
PSA<br />
method<br />
| | Tab. 1.<br />
Comparison between several methods for safety analysis.<br />
RIDM<br />
method<br />
IRDM<br />
method<br />
Comprehensiveness<br />
of events considered<br />
Ç – – Ç<br />
Quality assurance – Ç – Ç<br />
Review of SAR report – Ç Ç Ç<br />
Emergency preparedness<br />
and resparde<br />
– – Ç Ç<br />
Licensing Ç Ç – Ç<br />
implementation of IRIDM process. In<br />
third step, weighting of inputs is<br />
determined. A specific weight of each<br />
parameter attributes based on its importance<br />
for different issues. Then,<br />
the evaluating methods of safety<br />
issues can be recognized by these<br />
weights. The forth step is decision<br />
making. The aim of this step is to make<br />
a decision whether the change should<br />
be made in design or operation of<br />
the plant, the regulation under consideration,<br />
etc. A good decision<br />
making process requires conducting<br />
the preceding steps. Because improper<br />
decision making will result in<br />
necessity of redoing all steps. After<br />
making a good decision, it should be<br />
implemented. The operators should<br />
receive proper training and, required<br />
changes in the associated instruments<br />
should be applied. The final step is<br />
monitoring of the process. In order to<br />
have proper implementation of the<br />
aforementioned issue, a complete<br />
regulation should be performed. in<br />
the case, the adequate efficiency has<br />
not been achieved in the implemented<br />
steps, the procedure should be revised<br />
or re-planed [4, 5, 7, 19, 44].<br />
Advantages of IRIDM approach is<br />
include:<br />
• Transparency, as the weighting<br />
of the elements and the way<br />
resolution is achieved is clear;<br />
• Balanced, if all elements are<br />
weighted properly;<br />
• Logical, if carried out in a structured<br />
way;<br />
• Consistency, if weighting developed<br />
appropriately;<br />
• Accountable, if documented properly<br />
so the process can be reconstructed;<br />
It is necessary to be considered that<br />
complexity of integration of quantitative<br />
and qualitative information is<br />
very high.<br />
According to give explanation in<br />
this paper, the importance of using<br />
the combination of both deterministic<br />
and probabilistic approaches in the<br />
framework of integrated risk informed<br />
decision making is quite evident.<br />
For more realistic analysis of nuclear<br />
accidents should be done using<br />
both deterministic and probabilistic<br />
approaches. The required parameters<br />
(for example, deterministic success<br />
criteria, new design basis event,<br />
re-classified SSCs…) for an approach<br />
should be used in the other one or vice<br />
versa. In addition, the final decision<br />
will be made on basis of IRIDM by<br />
using deterministic and probabilistic<br />
insights. This will lead to greater<br />
safety of operators and environment,<br />
Environment and Safety<br />
The Importance of Integration of Deterministic and Probabilistic Approaches in the Framework of Integrated Risk Informed Decision Making in Nuclear Reactors<br />
Mohsen Esfandiari, Kamran Sepanloo, Gholamreza Jahanfarnia and Ehsan Zarifi
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
Determination of greater defense<br />
barriers, lower costs, Selection of<br />
limiting cases for detailed quantitative<br />
analysis, less energy dissipation, Performance<br />
of detailed quantitative<br />
analysis for each limiting case, Evaluation<br />
of compliance to the acceptance<br />
criteria and safety margins, etc.<br />
Conclusion<br />
In general, when the analysis of<br />
nuclear accidents are separately done<br />
by deterministic and probabilistic<br />
approaches are faced with shortcomings<br />
and drawbacks. It is not<br />
possible to provide a comprehensive<br />
prediction for nuclear accidents. In<br />
deterministic approach, many effective<br />
factors in the event are not considered<br />
but in probabilistic approach,<br />
most effective factors in the event are<br />
used for determining the frequency of<br />
occurrence and total error. Therefore,<br />
for better understanding and comprehensive<br />
analysis of events, deterministic<br />
and probabilistic assessment<br />
is necessary at the same time.<br />
This review indicates that the integrated<br />
risk-informed approach has<br />
great potential to improve safety level<br />
by using probabilistic and deterministic<br />
approaches. By using IRIDM<br />
approach, determining of initiating<br />
events, multiple failures and event<br />
sequences are possible. The final decision<br />
should be based on integrated<br />
risk-informed rather than the risk,<br />
itself. Risk assessment should only<br />
be part of the decision process. For<br />
the final decision, integrated risk<br />
informed should be based on combination<br />
of deterministic and probabilistic<br />
approach.<br />
Adopting an IRIDM model is way<br />
of helping prevent these incidents and<br />
accidents as well as other benefits<br />
such as:<br />
• Safer and more secure operations<br />
have reduced risks through more<br />
comprehensive understanding of<br />
operational risks;<br />
• Greater resilience, including the<br />
ability to cope with unforeseen<br />
threats and adverse events;<br />
• Better integration of operations<br />
and technical systems, with financial<br />
and human resource management;<br />
• Greater efficiency, including more<br />
productive operations, higher staff<br />
morale, lower staff turnover, more<br />
efficient and effective control<br />
measures;<br />
• Greater ability to identify weaknesses<br />
so that they can be actively<br />
corrected to prevent opportunities<br />
for accidents to happen.<br />
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Environment and Safety<br />
The Importance of Integration of Deterministic and Probabilistic Approaches in the Framework of Integrated Risk Informed Decision Making in Nuclear Reactors<br />
Mohsen Esfandiari, Kamran Sepanloo, Gholamreza Jahanfarnia and Ehsan Zarifi
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33. IAEA, Defence in Depth in Nuclear<br />
Safety, IAEA; INSAG-10, IAEA, Vienna,<br />
1996.<br />
34. J.N. Sorensen, G.E. Apostolakis, T.S.<br />
Kress, D.A. Powers, on the role of<br />
defense-in-depth in risk informed<br />
regulation. Presented at PSA’99,<br />
Washington DC, USA, August 22–25,<br />
La Grange Park, IL, USA: American<br />
Nuclear Society; 1999.<br />
35. M. Modarres, Advanced nuclear power<br />
plant regulation using risk-informed<br />
and performance-based methods,<br />
Reliability Engineering and System<br />
Safety, College Park, MD 20874, USA,<br />
2009.<br />
36. H.G. Kang, T. Sung, An analysis of safety-critical<br />
digital systems for risk-informed<br />
design, Reliability Engineering<br />
and System Safety, Taejon 305-600,<br />
South Korea, 2002.<br />
37. I.S. Kim, T.K. Kim, M.C. Kim, B.S. Kim,<br />
S.W. Hwang, K.C. Ryu, Suitability review<br />
of FMEA and reliability analysis for<br />
digital plant protection system and<br />
digital engineered safety features<br />
actuation system. KINS/HR-327; 2000.<br />
38. I. S. Kim, S.K. Ahn, K.M. Oh, Deterministic<br />
and risk-informed approaches<br />
for safety analysis of advanced reactors:<br />
Part II, Risk- informed approaches,<br />
Reliability Engineering and System<br />
Safety, Daejeon 305-338, Republic of<br />
Korea, 2010.<br />
39. M.C. Jacob, J.P. Rezendes, Development<br />
of risk informed safety analysis<br />
approach and pilot application.<br />
Westinghouse, WCAP-16084-NP, rev 0,<br />
September, 2003.<br />
40. DOE, USNRC, Next generation nuclear<br />
plant licensing strategy – a report to<br />
congress, August, 2008.<br />
41. M.J. Delaney, G.E. Apostolakis, M. J.<br />
Driscoll, Risk-informed design guidance<br />
for future reactor systems, Nuclear<br />
Engineering and Design, Cambridge,<br />
MA 02139-4307, USA, 2005.<br />
42. G.E. Apostolakis, How useful is<br />
quantitative risk assessment?, Risk Anal.<br />
24, 515–520, 2004.<br />
43. G.E. Apostolakis, M.W. Golay, A.L.<br />
Camp, A.L. Duran, D.J. Finnicum, S.E.<br />
Ritterbusch, June 4–5, A new riskinformed<br />
design and regulatory<br />
process. In: Proceedings of the Advisory<br />
Committee on Reactor Safeguards<br />
Workshop on Future Reactors, Report<br />
NUREG/CP-0175, pp. p237–p248, US<br />
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,<br />
Washington, DC, 2001.<br />
44. A. Lyubarskiy, I. Kuzmina, M. E.<br />
Shanawany, Advances in Risk Informed<br />
Decision Making – IAEA’s Approach,<br />
Vienna, Austria, 2011.<br />
Authors<br />
Mohsen Esfandiari<br />
Gholamreza Jahanfarnia<br />
Department of Nuclear<br />
Engineering<br />
Science and Research Branch<br />
Islamic Azad University, Tehran,<br />
Iran<br />
Kamran Sepanloo<br />
Ehsan Zarifi<br />
Reactor and Nuclear Safety<br />
Research School<br />
Nuclear Science and Technology<br />
Research Institute (NSTRI), Tehran,<br />
Iran.<br />
Applied Reliability Assessment for the<br />
Passive Safety Systems of Nuclear Power<br />
Plants (NPPs) Using System Dynamics (SD)<br />
Yun Il Kim and Tae Ho Woo<br />
1 Introduction A new kind of passive system is investigated in case of an accident in nuclear power plants<br />
(NPPs). Conventional passive systems have the limitations in the conditional integrity like the piping system of the<br />
coolants. In this paper, the free-falling of emergency coolants are proposed where the flying machine, drone, is imported<br />
to carry out the coolants on the upper position of the containment building. In the cases of the Fukushima and Chernobyl,<br />
the piping systems were blown away. So, the emergency coolants couldn’t flow into the reactor core position where the<br />
reactor fuels were making continuous very high energy without stabilizing of the power level. Although the integrity of<br />
the piping injection systems have been investigated as the good conditions, the previous history couldn’t give the<br />
satisfactions to the public.<br />
During the Fukushima disaster, the<br />
operator had been seeking for the<br />
prime minister to take a permission to<br />
open the gas leak valve in the containment<br />
building when the reactor pump<br />
was out of order and the hydrogen<br />
gases were produced continuously.<br />
Eventually, the hydrogen explosion<br />
happened and the four plants were<br />
collapsed within several days after<br />
East-Japan earthquake impact on the<br />
Fukushima coast and its related areas.<br />
Furthermore, even if there was an<br />
opportunity to make use of the sea<br />
water in order to cool down the<br />
reactor core, the operator didn’t use it<br />
for keeping the expensive reactor<br />
structure from the saluted sea water<br />
in which the material corrosions could<br />
been happened and the material could<br />
be in the significantly damaged situation.<br />
Then, all kinds of the cooling<br />
systems were gone permanently.<br />
The dangerous radioactive contaminations<br />
to the environment have been<br />
done continuously. Considering the<br />
case of the Fukushima nuclear accident,<br />
the piping system has the crucial<br />
fault that the safety system can’t<br />
make any role in the post-accident or<br />
on-accident. Piping in the NPPs should<br />
be incorporated with the alternative<br />
coolant supply method. So, the<br />
detached system from plant building<br />
could be imagined in this study.<br />
The merit of the passive system is<br />
operated without in-site electricity.<br />
So, the natural circulation or gravity<br />
could be acted for the designed system<br />
by injection of the coolants. However,<br />
even the action of switch of the system<br />
operation should be done to start. So,<br />
the manual based stating action is<br />
needed for the operation of passive<br />
system. As the same condition of the<br />
Environment and Safety<br />
Applied Reliability Assessment for the Passive Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) Using System Dynamics (SD) ı Yun Il Kim and Tae Ho Woo
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
initial action, the detached lifted<br />
coolant carrying by drone is similar in<br />
the starting state. However, the non<br />
in-site power is supplied by the battery<br />
in the drone’s flying system. ‘Passive’<br />
means that the power is not used from<br />
the in-site system of the plant. The<br />
battery is supplied from the external<br />
energy source. So, the drone could be<br />
considered as one for constructing the<br />
passive system in NPPs. There are the<br />
comparisons of the passive systems in<br />
Table 1.<br />
Type<br />
Natural<br />
circulation<br />
Gravity<br />
Free-fall<br />
Power<br />
| | Tab. 1.<br />
List of passive systems.<br />
Non in-site electricity<br />
Non in-site electricity<br />
Non in-site electricity,<br />
Battery or engine<br />
installed in drones<br />
| | Fig. 1.<br />
Simplified configuration of NPPs in the accident.<br />
| | Fig. 2.<br />
Passive systems of NPPs.<br />
ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 159<br />
There are some passive safety<br />
system related papers. Cho et al.<br />
worked for the passive auxiliary feedwater<br />
system (PAFS) [Cho et al. 2016].<br />
In addition, Gou et al. studied that the<br />
thermal hydraulic investigations were<br />
done for a new type of passive residual<br />
heat removal system (PRHRS) [Gou et<br />
al. 2009]. Park et al. showed that the<br />
advanced modular integral type rector<br />
is investigated by the natural circulation<br />
performance [Park et al. 2007].<br />
2 Method<br />
2.1 Overview<br />
Figure 1 shows the simplified configuration<br />
of the NPPs in the accident<br />
where the water tank is carried by the<br />
drones. The water falls as the free-fall<br />
for the water tank in which the water<br />
are entering to the reactor building.<br />
The passive action by the free-fall is<br />
done completely, which could be used<br />
in the case of the piping based<br />
injection system failure. There are<br />
some passive systems in Figure 2<br />
where the natural circulation and<br />
gravity are shown. In this paper, the<br />
free-fall is described. There are the<br />
conceptual comparisons of passive<br />
systems of NPPs in Figure 3 that the<br />
water falls down from flying drone<br />
containing water tank and the water is<br />
injected from the conventional water<br />
tank attached to the reactor building.<br />
This is revolutionary different from<br />
the conventional passive system in<br />
which the piping integrity should be<br />
kept. Otherwise, in the free-fall<br />
system, the reservoir could be an<br />
active role on or after accident. So,<br />
| | Fig. 3.<br />
Conceptual comparisons of passive systems in NPPs.<br />
this means that the post-accident<br />
safety system is installed in this new<br />
system. In the current commercial<br />
NPPs, there is not any kind of the<br />
post-accident safety system. It has<br />
been experienced in Chernobyl as well<br />
as Fukushima cases that it was impossible<br />
to make the coolant enter into<br />
the reactor core where the nuclear<br />
fuels were continuing the nuclear<br />
reactions and producing the heats.<br />
Table 2 shows the specifications of<br />
the condensate water storage tank as<br />
the emergency water tank [The Virtual<br />
Nuclear Tourist, 2016]. Newly developed<br />
drone could supply 500 kg [Air-<br />
Mule, 2016]. Therefore, it takes about<br />
1,137 times supplies to carry the tank<br />
water. If one uses 10 units of drone, it<br />
reduced to about 113 times. However,<br />
| | Fig. 4.<br />
Major factors for the free fall of coolants.<br />
Tank<br />
(Condensate storage tank)<br />
Mass flow rate<br />
Content<br />
| | Tab. 2.<br />
Specification of emergency water tank.<br />
the coolant carrying quantity is<br />
changeable by the situation and<br />
carrier design.<br />
2.2 Cooling by the free-fall<br />
The modeling of this paper is to show<br />
the capability of the free-fall coolant<br />
in which this should make the<br />
enhanced integrity to the piping based<br />
injection systems. So, the major factor<br />
of the fee-fall coolants is the coolant<br />
quantity with mass flow rate which is<br />
150,000 gallons<br />
(567,812 liters, 568,500 kg water)<br />
200 ~ 400 gallons/min.<br />
Environment and Safety<br />
Applied Reliability Assessment for the Passive Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) Using System Dynamics (SD) ı Yun Il Kim and Tae Ho Woo
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 160<br />
in Figure 4. Following the Newtonian<br />
mechanics, the uniform gravitational<br />
field without air resistance can<br />
show the terminal velocity shows [The<br />
Physics Classroom, 2016],<br />
v(t)= -gt+ v o (1)<br />
So, one can find the pressure using<br />
Bernoulli’s principle [Clancy, 2006],<br />
(2)<br />
The coolant quantity is obtained by<br />
mass flow rate [Potter, 2007],<br />
ṁ = v(t)∙ρ (3)<br />
Therefore, using continuity equation<br />
[Potter, 2007],<br />
Q = ṁ ∙A = v(t) ∙ ρ ∙ A(4)<br />
where,<br />
v o is the initial velocity (m/s)<br />
v(t) is the vertical velocity<br />
to time t (m/s)<br />
g is the gravitational acceleration<br />
(9.8 m/s 2 )<br />
z is the elevation of the point<br />
ρ is the density of the water<br />
(1,000 kg/m 3 )<br />
ṁ is the mass flow rate (kg/m 2 s)<br />
Q is the mass rate (kg/s)<br />
A is the area (m 2 )<br />
2.3 Configuration of the drone<br />
The water tank is carried out by the<br />
drone where the mechanics of the<br />
flying robotics is exploited. There is<br />
the mechanical analysis of the drone<br />
for nuclear engineering applications<br />
in the below equations [Cho and Woo,<br />
2016]. The mathematical forms of the<br />
movement of the flying is described as<br />
the flight dynamics in which three<br />
kinds of the parameters are done as<br />
roll, pitch, and yaw. These are angles<br />
of rotation in three dimensions<br />
about the vehicle’s center of mass<br />
[NASA, 2014]. The configurations are<br />
shown in Figure 5 [The Smithsonian’s<br />
National Air and Space Museum,<br />
2014]. In the control of the four thrust<br />
forces from four rotors, there are three<br />
angles Ø, θ, ψ and the altitude z to<br />
make the six motions and then the<br />
control inputs are [Jeong and Jung,<br />
2014],<br />
(5)<br />
where, k pø , k iø , k dø are the proportional-integral-derivative<br />
(PID) controller<br />
gains for the roll angle control,<br />
k pθ , k iθ , k dθ are PID controller gains for<br />
the pitch angle control, and k pψ , k iψ ,<br />
k dψ are PID controller gains for the<br />
yaw angle control, respectively.<br />
Furthermore, the altitude control of<br />
PID controller is as follows [Jeong and<br />
Jung, 2014],<br />
(6)<br />
where, m is the mass, g is the gravitational<br />
acceleration, and then V z is,<br />
(7)<br />
where, k pz , k iz , k dz are PID controller<br />
gains for the altitude control and<br />
altitude data zs are obtained using a<br />
sonar sensor.<br />
2.4 System dynamics (SD)<br />
Algorithm<br />
The SD was created by Dr. Jay Forrest<br />
in MIT around 1960s in which the<br />
scientific and technological matters<br />
as well as social and humanities<br />
are quantified as the mathematical<br />
SD<br />
modeling [SDS, 2014]. The interested<br />
event is described by the Boolean<br />
values and the designed modeling<br />
could show the event scenarios. There<br />
are several kinds of characteristics as<br />
the complexed non-linear manipulations<br />
in the problems. The event flows<br />
backward in the modeling, which is a<br />
particular merit in the SD modeling.<br />
The event quantification could be the<br />
stocking of the values of the event<br />
which is called as ‘Level’. In addition,<br />
the cause loop is seen by the event<br />
flows, which is like the flow chart<br />
in the computer programming. Each<br />
calculation is done as the time step in<br />
which the time interval is decided by<br />
the author. The software in this study<br />
is Vensim code system as the window<br />
version 6.3 [Ventana, 2016]. There<br />
are the comparisons between the SD<br />
and conventional safety assessments,<br />
probabilistic safety assessment (PSA),<br />
in Table 3. The event values are made<br />
by the Boolean value based quantifications<br />
with calculation interval of<br />
designed time step. Hence, the realtime<br />
calculations are reasonably<br />
possible in SD which is basically the<br />
dynamical simulations. There are<br />
several companies for the SD software<br />
in the world.<br />
2.5 Modeling of the event<br />
The modeling of the event is constructed<br />
by passive system sequences.<br />
Designed scenarios are initiated by<br />
the loss of coolant accident (LOCA)<br />
and it is needed to find the integrity of<br />
reactor [Ha, 2006]. So, the conventional<br />
event tree is made which is in<br />
Figure 6. Based on the event tree, the<br />
SD modeling in done in Figure 7<br />
which is modified from conventional<br />
work during early 1,000 minutes. The<br />
characteristics of the SD are reflected<br />
in the modeling where the non-linear<br />
algorithm is expressed. The line is<br />
used as the curved line as well as<br />
the straight line so that the event<br />
flow could be drawn without any<br />
PSA<br />
Theory Random number based Boolean value Probability<br />
Event Non-linear lines Event tree, Fault tree<br />
Result Relative value Probability value<br />
Graphics Colorful Black & white<br />
Topic Variable Variable<br />
Dynamics Time step based Operator manipulated<br />
Real-time Possible Impossible<br />
Speed Quick Time needed<br />
Commercialization Very active Moderate<br />
| | Fig. 5.<br />
Three parameters’ motions.<br />
| | Tab. 3.<br />
Comparisons between the SD and PSA.<br />
Environment and Safety<br />
Applied Reliability Assessment for the Passive Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) Using System Dynamics (SD) ı Yun Il Kim and Tae Ho Woo
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
| | Fig. 6.<br />
Event tree of event.<br />
| | Fig. 7.<br />
SD modeling.<br />
Event<br />
| | Tab. 4.<br />
List of event value.<br />
| | Fig. 8.<br />
Causes tree of SD modeling.<br />
Content<br />
LOCA (if then else(random 0 1 () < 0.8, 0, 1))<br />
/ Reactor<br />
Piping Integrity if then else(random 0 1 () < 0.3, 0, 1)<br />
Alarm Alert if then else(random 0 1 () < 0.5, 0, 1)<br />
* LOCA * Piping Integrity<br />
Manual Actions if then else(random 0 1 () < 0.4, 0, 1)<br />
* Alarm Alert * Piping Integrity<br />
Reactor SCRAM if then else(random 0 1 () < 0.6, 0, 1)<br />
* Manual Actions *Piping Integrity<br />
Coolant Tank Integrity if then else(random 0 1 () < 0.5, 0, 1)<br />
Flying Integrity if then else(random 0 1 () < 0.3, 0, 1)<br />
Drone Action<br />
Coolant Tank Integrity * Flying Integrity<br />
Emergency Cooling by Operator if then else(random 0 1 () < 0.5, 0, 1)<br />
* Drone Action *Reactor SCRAM<br />
Reactor if then else(random 0 1 () < 0.5, 0, 1)<br />
+ Emergency Cooling by Operator + 0.001<br />
restriction. One of most important<br />
merits in SD is used as the feedback<br />
algorithm in which Reactor is connected<br />
to LOCA. This means the final<br />
event, Reactor, affects to the initial<br />
event, LOCA. There are some cartoon<br />
shapes which could give the operator<br />
the sign of meaning. In the arrow line,<br />
the plus sign means the additive<br />
values of the event. In Table 4, the<br />
values of the event are shown, which<br />
are decided by expert’s judgments. In<br />
the case of Piping Integrity, if the<br />
randomly generated number between<br />
0 and 1 is lower than 0.3, the value is<br />
0.0. Otherwise it is 1.0. So, the<br />
Boolean value is obtained. The others<br />
are similar to this case. In the case of<br />
LOCA and Reactor, the values are<br />
accumulated using the ‘Level’ function<br />
in which the values are summed up by<br />
the designed time step.<br />
3 Results<br />
The simulation is performed for the<br />
SD modeling. Using passive system of<br />
the free-fall of coolant, the designed<br />
scenarios are quantified. Figure 8 is<br />
the causes tree of SD modeling which<br />
is from the Figure 7. There are results<br />
of the modeling. In Figure 9, there are<br />
the cause tree’s results of SD modeling<br />
as (a) Reactor and (b) LOCA. In<br />
Figure 9 (a), the possibility for LOCA<br />
is shown. The Y-axis has the relative<br />
value where the value is stabilized after<br />
it increases abruptly. In the final<br />
stage as Reactor in Figure 9 (b), the<br />
integrity of the reactor is increased.<br />
4 Conclusions<br />
The complex algorithm of the SD<br />
modeling is done in the passive<br />
cooling system. The free-fall could be<br />
another kind of the nuclear passive<br />
system which is different from the<br />
conventional passive systems as<br />
gravity and natural circulation. There<br />
are some finding in this study as<br />
follows,<br />
• The nuclear passive system is modeled<br />
using the free-fall concept.<br />
• System dynamics (SD) based<br />
algorithm is performed for nuclear<br />
accident.<br />
• More realistic safety assessment is<br />
described.<br />
• New kind of nuclear safety analysis<br />
is done successfully<br />
The nuclear passive system by the<br />
free-fall is successfully modeled for<br />
the LOCA accident. Conventional<br />
passive systems of gravity or natural<br />
circulation could be performed when<br />
the piping systems are not damaged.<br />
However, in the Fukushima and<br />
Chernobyl cases, the piping was blown<br />
ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 161<br />
Environment and Safety<br />
Applied Reliability Assessment for the Passive Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) Using System Dynamics (SD) ı Yun Il Kim and Tae Ho Woo
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 162<br />
| | Fig. 9.<br />
Results of SD modeling, (a) LOCA and (b) Reactor.<br />
away. So, the external coolant supply<br />
system is introduced in the paper<br />
where the water is poured into the<br />
reactor. The guiding piping or tube<br />
could be equipped for entering the<br />
water into the reactor core. If the<br />
explosion happens, the coolants could<br />
be showering into the reactor core and<br />
its building. New kind of passive<br />
system is expected successfully in the<br />
on-site black out, because the drone<br />
could be operated by battery or<br />
engine.<br />
References<br />
| | AirMule. 2016. Technology, Urban<br />
Aeronautics LTD. Urban Aeronautics<br />
AirMule, http://www.urbanaero.com/<br />
category/airmule/.<br />
| | Cho, Y.J., Bae, S.W., Bae, B.U., Kim, S.,<br />
Kang, K.H. and Yun, B.J. 2016.<br />
Analytical studies of the heat removal<br />
capability of a passive auxiliary feedwater<br />
system (PAFS). Nuclear Engineering<br />
and Design 2016, 248, 306-316.<br />
| | Cho, H.S. and Woo, T.H. 2016.<br />
Mechanical analysis of flying robot for<br />
nuclear safety and security control by<br />
radiological monitoring. Annals of<br />
Nuclear Energy, 94, 138-143.<br />
| | Clancy, L.J. 2006. Aerodynamics.<br />
India: Sterling Book House.<br />
| | Gou, J., Qiu, S., Su, G. and Jia, D. 2009.<br />
Thermal Hydraulic Analysis of a Passive<br />
Residual Heat Removal System for an<br />
Integral Pressurized Water Reactor.<br />
Science and Technology of Nuclear<br />
Installation, 473795.<br />
| | Ha, T. and Garland, W. 2006. Loss of<br />
Coolant Accident (LOCA) Analysis for<br />
McMaster Nuclear Reactor through<br />
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), presented<br />
at 27 th Annual Conference of<br />
the Canadian Nuclear Society, Toronto,<br />
Ontario, Canada, June 11-14, 2006.<br />
| | Jeong, S.H. and Jung, S.A. 2014. A<br />
quad-rotor system for driving and flying<br />
missions by tilting mechanism of rotors:<br />
From design to control. Mechatronics,<br />
24, 1178-1188.<br />
| | NASA. 2014. Dynamics of Flight,<br />
National Aeronautics and Space<br />
Administration (NASA). Available on:<br />
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WWW/k- 12/UEET /StudentSite/<br />
dynamicsofflight.html/.<br />
| | Park, H.S., Choi, K.Y., Cho, S., Park, C.K.,<br />
Yi, S.K., Song, C.H. and Chung, M.K.<br />
2007. Experiments on the Heat Transfer<br />
and Natural Circulation Characteristics<br />
of the Passive Residual Heat Removal<br />
System for an Advanced Integral Type<br />
Reactor. Journal of Nuclear Science and<br />
Technology, 44, 703-713.<br />
| | Potter, M. and Wibbert, D. 2007.<br />
Schaum’s Outline of Fluid Mechanics<br />
(Schaum's Outlines), 1 st Edition. New<br />
York (NY): McGraw-Hill Education.<br />
| | SDS. 2014. Introduction to System<br />
Dynamics, System Dynamics Society<br />
(SDS). Available on:<br />
http://www.systemdynamics.org/<br />
joining/#aboutsd/.<br />
| | The Physics Classroom, Kinematic<br />
Equations and Free Fall, 2016. Available<br />
online: http://www.physicsclassroom.com/class/1DKin/Lesson-6/Kinematic-Equations-and-Free-Fall/.<br />
| | The Virtual Nuclear Tourist. 2006.<br />
Emergency Feedwater Systems.<br />
Available online: http://www.nucleartourist.com/systems/af.htm.<br />
| | The Smithsonian’s National Air and<br />
Space Museum. 2014. Roll, Pitch, and<br />
Yaw. Available on: http://howthingsfly.<br />
si.edu/flight-dynamics/roll-pitch-andyaw.<br />
| | Ventana. Vensim code system. 2016.<br />
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Authors<br />
Yun Il Kim<br />
Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety<br />
62 Gwahak-ro, Yuseong-gu<br />
Daejeon 34142<br />
Republic of Korea;<br />
Tae Ho Woo<br />
Department of Mechanical and<br />
Control Engineering<br />
The Cyber University of Korea<br />
106 Bukchon-ro, Jongno-gu<br />
Seoul 03051<br />
Republic of Korea<br />
Environment and Safety<br />
Applied Reliability Assessment for the Passive Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) Using System Dynamics (SD) ı Yun Il Kim and Tae Ho Woo
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
Untersuchungen zum Geometrieeinfluss<br />
von Hartmetalllamellen beim Betonfräsen<br />
Simone Müller und Sascha Gentes<br />
Einleitung und Motivation Die Minimierung kontaminierter Abfälle ist bei Rückbauvorhaben im kerntechnischen<br />
Bereich von höchster Priorität. Im Bereich der Gebäudedekontamination ist hierbei eine effiziente Bearbeitung<br />
aller betroffenen Betondecken, -wände und -böden unerlässlich und führt schnell zu einer zu bearbeitenden Fläche von<br />
mehreren tausend Quadratmetern. Die Dekontamination erfolgt überwiegend durch den Einsatz von Fräsen, z.B.<br />
Bodenfräsen, die ursprünglich für die Bearbeitung von Estrichen und niederfesten Betonen ausgelegt sind. Bei der<br />
Bearbeitung normalfester Betone, wie sie in Kernkraftwerken üblicherweise verbaut sind, verringert sich die Standzeit<br />
gegenüber Estrichen aufgrund der höheren Betonfestigkeiten jedoch drastisch. Daraus ergibt sich, neben vermehrten<br />
Rüstzeiten zum Werkzeugwechsel und einem daraus resultierenden Kontaktrisiko der Mitarbeiter zu kontaminiertem<br />
Werkzeug, auch ein erhöhtes Aufkommen an Sekundärabfall durch den vermehrten Anfall von verschlissenen<br />
Fräslamellen.<br />
Das vom Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft<br />
und Energie (BMWi) geförderte<br />
Forschungsprojekt „Entwicklung und<br />
Optimierung eines Schlagwerkzeugs<br />
zum Abtrag von (kontaminierten)<br />
Beton oberflächen“ (EOS, Förderkennzeichen:<br />
KF2286004LL3) nimmt sich<br />
dieser Aufgabenstellung mit dem Ziel<br />
eines effizienteren Betonabtrags durch<br />
eine Weiterentwicklung der Fräslamellen<br />
an. Ein schnellerer Betonabtrag<br />
führt unweigerlich auch zu<br />
geringerem Personaleinsatz. Die effizientere<br />
Dekontamination gewinnt<br />
daher, vor dem Hintergrund der<br />
zunehmenden Anzahl von Rückbauprojekten<br />
im kerntechnischen Bereich,<br />
an ökonomischer und sicherheitstechnischer<br />
Relevanz. Im Rahmen des<br />
Forschungsprojektes arbeiten als<br />
Kooperationspartner das Karlsruher<br />
Institut für Technologie (KIT) und<br />
die Contec Maschinenbau & Entwicklungstechnik<br />
GmbH (Alsdorf/Sieg)<br />
zusammen.<br />
Methodik und<br />
Vorgehensweise<br />
Am Institut für Technologie und<br />
Management im Baubetrieb (TMB) des<br />
KIT, Abteilung Rückbau konventioneller<br />
und kerntechnischer Bauwerke,<br />
wurde zur Erprobung verschiedener<br />
Fräslamellengeometrien<br />
ein Versuchstand konzipiert. Mit<br />
diesem können, bei definiertem<br />
Fräsen vorschub, -drehzahl und Zustellung,<br />
gezielt verschiedene Belastungswege<br />
der Fräslamelle nachgebildet<br />
werden. Im Anschluss kann<br />
der an der Lamelle aufgetretene Verschleiß<br />
gemessen werden.<br />
| | Abb. 1.<br />
Bodenfräse CT320 des Herstellers Contec GmbH<br />
zur Führung der Verfahreinheit der<br />
Fräse angebracht sind (Abb. 2). Der<br />
Grundkörper, eine handelsübliche<br />
Betonfräse, wie in Abbildung 1<br />
dargestellt, ist über eine Zustelleinheit<br />
mit einem Verfahrschlitten verbunden.<br />
Dieser Schlitten läuft auf den<br />
horizontalen Schienen, siehe Abbildung<br />
2. Im Gehäuse der Betonfräse<br />
befindet sich die Werkzeugtrommel<br />
mit den Achsen, auf denen die Fräslamellen<br />
gelagert sind. Auf dem<br />
Boden des Versuchsstandes lassen<br />
sich darüber hinaus auch unterschiedliche<br />
Betonproben befestigen (Abbildung<br />
3).<br />
| | Abb. 2.<br />
Versuchsstand<br />
Aufbau der Fräslamellen<br />
und das Fräsverfahren<br />
Die Fräslamellen sind fliegend auf<br />
den Achsen der Werkzeugtrommel<br />
gelagert. Der Aufbau der Werkzeugtrommel<br />
und der Fräslamellen ist in<br />
Abbildung 4 dargestellt. Die Außengeometrie<br />
ist bei handelsüblichen<br />
Lamellen sternförmig.<br />
Je nach Maschinengröße und<br />
Hersteller besitzt eine Lamelle fünf<br />
bis zwölf Spitzen. An den Sternspitzen<br />
ist ein Hartmetallstift eingelassen, der<br />
die Materialabnutzung verringert<br />
(siehe Abbildung 4 rechts). Die<br />
Innen geometrie der Achsenlagerung<br />
163<br />
DECOMMISSIONING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT<br />
Versuchsstand<br />
Der eingesetzte Versuchsstand besteht<br />
aus einem symmetrischen Außengerüst,<br />
an dem horizontale Schienen<br />
| | Abb. 3.<br />
links: Fräslamelle in Fräse; rechts: Frässpuren<br />
Decommissioning and Waste Management<br />
Studies on the Geometric Influence on Hard Metal Shavers During Concrete Shaving ı Simone Müller and Sascha Gentes
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
DECOMMISSIONING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT 164<br />
| | Abb. 5.<br />
Laserscan des Betonabtrags<br />
| | Abb. 4.<br />
Aufbau der Frästrommel<br />
der Lamellen ist rund. Durch diese<br />
Form ist eine Positionierung der Hartmetallspitzen<br />
zur Betonoberfläche<br />
nicht gegeben und im Normalgebrauch<br />
nicht vorgesehen.<br />
Im Betrieb drücken die durch die<br />
Trommelrotation induzierten Fliehkräfte<br />
die Fräslamellen radial von<br />
der Trommelmittelachse weg. Durch<br />
die Zustellung der Fräse zum Boden<br />
schlagen die Fräslamellen bei<br />
Trommel rotation auf die zu bearbeitende<br />
Betonoberfläche. Durch das<br />
spröde Werkstoffverhalten des Betons<br />
fragmentiert die Betonoberfläche infolge<br />
des Stoßes. Die Hartmetalllamelle<br />
wird von der Betonoberfläche<br />
in Richtung der Trommelachse gedrückt<br />
und rollt auf der Oberfläche<br />
ab. Nach dem Überwinden der Oberfläche<br />
legt sich die Lamelle wieder an<br />
der Achseninnenseite an. Dieser Vorgang<br />
wiederholt sich für alle Trommelachsen<br />
zyklisch bei jeder Umdrehung<br />
der Werkzeugtrommel. Eine ausführliche<br />
und weiterführende Erläuterung<br />
des Fräsvorgangs ist in [2] dargestellt<br />
Beton und Versagensmechanik<br />
Nach DIN 1045 ist Beton ein künstlicher<br />
Stein. Hergestellt wird dieser<br />
aus einem Gemisch von Zement,<br />
Betonzuschlag (Gesteinskörnung),<br />
Wasser und je nach Anwendungsfall<br />
speziellen Zusatzstoffen. Es ergibt<br />
sich ein zweiphasiges System aus<br />
Zementmatrix und Zuschlagsstoff [5].<br />
Aufgrund der unterschiedlichen<br />
mechanischen Eigenschaften der<br />
Zuschlagskörnung und des Zements<br />
sind die Versagensmechanismen von<br />
Beton körpern sehr komplex. Die<br />
unter schiedlichen mechanischen Eigen<br />
schaften der einzelnen Bestandteile<br />
des Betons führen zu deutlichen<br />
lokal-ungleichmäßigen Werkstoffkennwerten.<br />
Das Auftreffen einer Lamelle auf<br />
der Zementmatrix bzw. auf einem<br />
Zuschlagskorn oder im Randgebiet<br />
zwischen Zuschlagskorn und Zementmatrix<br />
führt aufgrund verschiedener<br />
Festigkeiten der Komponenten zu<br />
unterschiedlichem Abtrag. Um eine<br />
möglichst gleichbleibende Reproduzierbarkeit<br />
der Abtragsmechanik der<br />
Lamellen erreichen zu können, wurde<br />
darauf geachtet, dass der Beton im<br />
Rahmen des Versuchsprogramms<br />
möglichst gleichmäßige Eigenschaften<br />
besitzt. Durchgeführte Voruntersuchungen<br />
zeigten, dass die Wahl<br />
eines geringen Durchmessers des<br />
Zuschlaggrößtkorns ein homogeneres<br />
Abtragsergebnis erzielt. Für die durchgeführten<br />
Versuchsreihen wurde aufgrund<br />
dieser Ergebnisse ein Durchmesser<br />
von 8 mm gewählt, der dem<br />
geringsten Größtkorndurchmesser<br />
nach DIN 1045-2 [6] entspricht.<br />
Nach Manns [7] sind in Kernkraftwerken<br />
vorwiegend Normalbetone<br />
verbaut. Alle Versuche im Rahmen der<br />
Untersuchung erfolgten auf Basis<br />
eines Normalbetons in der Mitte der<br />
Bandbreite mit einer Festigkeitskasse<br />
von C30/37.<br />
Messtechnik<br />
Zur Auswertung der Versuche kommen<br />
zwei Verfahren zum Einsatz.<br />
Einerseits wird durch Wiegen der<br />
Fräslamellen vor und nach Versuchseinsatz<br />
der Massenabtrag an der<br />
Fräslamelle bestimmt. Aus dem<br />
Massenverlust ergibt sich ein Maß<br />
des Lamellenverschleißes.<br />
Andererseits wird mit Hilfe eines<br />
Laserscanners der durch die Fräslamelle<br />
verursachte Materialabtrag<br />
bestimmt. Der Laserscanner vermisst<br />
genau die Oberfläche der Betonprobe.<br />
Mit diesen Daten können geometrische<br />
Größen der Fräsrille wie<br />
Abtragstiefe und -fläche berechnet<br />
werden. Abbildung 5 zeigt einen<br />
solchen Scan.<br />
Der verwendete Laserscanner<br />
arbeitet nach dem Lichtschnittverfahren,<br />
das das Prinzip der optischen<br />
aktiven Triangulation nutzt [1]. Bei<br />
diesem Messprinzip strahlt ein Laser<br />
im eindimensionalen Fall auf das zu<br />
untersuchende Testobjekt und wird<br />
von dessen Oberfläche in diffuser<br />
Streuung abgelenkt. Optisch ist dies<br />
als Lichtfleck auf dem zu messenden<br />
Punkt zu erkennen. Ein Teil des<br />
diffus gestreuten Lichts wird über ein<br />
Objektiv auf einen photoelektrischen<br />
Detektor geworfen. Durch die Anordnung<br />
mehrerer einzelner Detektoren<br />
in einer Reihe (Zeilensensor) kann die<br />
Koordinate des auftreffenden Lichts<br />
entlang der Detektorachse bestimmt<br />
werden. Mit dem bekannten Abstand<br />
des Detektors zur Lichtquelle ergibt<br />
sich ein Dreieck, mit dem der Abstand<br />
des untersuchten Objekts zur<br />
Lichtquelle errechnet werden kann<br />
[2, 1, 3].<br />
Beim Lichtschnittverfahren wird<br />
der Laserstrahl mit einer vorgesetzten<br />
Linse zusätzlich ausgeweitet, sodass<br />
eine Linie auf das Testobjekt projiziert<br />
wird. Der benötigte Sensor wird dafür<br />
um eine Dimension erweitert (Matrixsensor).<br />
So können alle Punkte auf<br />
der projizierten Linie simultan und<br />
ohne relative Verschiebung des Messgerätes<br />
zum Testobjekt gemessen<br />
werden. Um ein dreidimensionales<br />
Abbild zu bekommen, muss lediglich<br />
eine Relativbewegung orthogonal<br />
zur Laser linie durchgeführt werden<br />
[2, 3, 4].<br />
Variationen der Fräslamelle<br />
Neben der Änderung der Betriebsparameter<br />
der Betonfräse, die im<br />
Rahmen von [2] betrachtet wurden,<br />
bietet die Variation der Fräs lamellengeo<br />
metrie eine Möglichkeit zur Einflussnahme<br />
auf den Betonabtrag.<br />
Abbildung 6 und Abbildung 7<br />
zeigen eine handelsübliche Fräslamelle<br />
im unbenutzten Zustand und<br />
mit einem Beanspruchungsweg von<br />
ca. 540 m.<br />
Mögliche Stellgrößen der Variation<br />
der Lamelle sind das Fräslamellengewicht<br />
und die Außengeometrie der<br />
Fräslamelle so wie die Größe der<br />
verwendeten Hartmetallstifte.<br />
Decommissioning and Waste Management<br />
Studies on the Geometric Influence on Hard Metal Shavers During Concrete Shaving ı Simone Müller and Sascha Gentes
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
| | Abb. 6.<br />
Fräslamelle Beanspruchungsweg: 0 m<br />
| | Abb. 7.<br />
Fäslamelle Beanspruchungsweg: 540 m<br />
Fräslamellengewicht<br />
Die Betrachtung der allgemeinen<br />
Stoßgleichung:<br />
(wobei m die Masse der Stoßkörper<br />
bezeichnet und v bzw. v' die Geschwindigkeiten<br />
vor- bzw. nach<br />
dem Stoß) zeigt, dass die in den Stoß<br />
eingebrachte Energie neben den<br />
Geschwindigkeiten der Stoßpartner<br />
auch von deren Gewicht abhängt. Der<br />
Betonabtrag beim Fräsen mittels Hartmetalllamellen<br />
sollte also auch vom<br />
Fräslamellengewicht abhängen. Zur<br />
Klärung dieser Hypothese erfolgten<br />
Versuche mit einer Fräslamelle mit<br />
veränderlicher Masse.<br />
Mit den in Abbildung 8 und Abbildung<br />
9 gezeigten Stahlscheiben lässt<br />
sich das Gewicht der Lamelle schrittweise<br />
erhöhen.<br />
Außengeometrie und Größe der<br />
verwendeten Hartmetallstifte<br />
Durch die Erhaltung der gegebenen<br />
Außendimensionen wurde gewährleistet,<br />
dass die modifizierten Lamellengeometrien<br />
auch weiterhin in<br />
konventionell erhältlichen Maschinen<br />
zum Einsatz kommen können.<br />
Im Rahmen der durchgeführten<br />
Versuche zur Variation der Geometrie<br />
sind Lamellen mit einem Spitzenwinkel<br />
von 30 und 60 Grad untersucht<br />
worden. Zusätzlich erfolgte die Untersuchung<br />
einer Oktaedergrundfläche<br />
(siehe Abbildung 10) sowie der<br />
| | Abb. 8.<br />
CAD Zeichnung: Hartmetalllamelle mit veränderlicher Masse<br />
Einfluss verschiedener Hart metallspitzen<br />
durchmesser bei gleicher Lamellengeometrie<br />
(siehe Abbildung<br />
11). Um dabei eine gleichbleibende<br />
Gesamtmasse der veränderten Lamellen<br />
gewährleisten zu können, wurde<br />
der Grundkörper durch gewichtsreduzierende<br />
Bohrungen versehen. Je<br />
nach Geometrie ergeben sich unterschiedliche<br />
Bohungsdurchmesser. Die<br />
hierdurch geschaffene gleichbleibende<br />
Masse gewährleistet die Vergleich barkeit<br />
der verschiedenen Lamellengeometrien.<br />
Veränderungen des Gewichts<br />
würden ein verändertes kinetisches<br />
Verhalten verursachen und so die<br />
jeweilige Abtragsleistung, wie die<br />
Ergebnisse zur Änderung des Fräslamellengewichts<br />
zeigen, beeinflussen.<br />
| | Abb. 10.<br />
Untersuchte Fräslamellen: Variation der Außengeometrie<br />
| | Abb. 11.<br />
Variation des Hartmetallspitzendurchmessers<br />
| | Abb. 12.<br />
Abtrag in Abhängigkeit des Lamellenzusatzgewichtes<br />
| | Abb. 9.<br />
Hartmetalllamelle mit veränderlicher Masse<br />
Ergebnisse<br />
Die Versuche wurden mit den<br />
oben beschriebenen Variationen der<br />
Lamellen durchgeführt, im Einzelnen<br />
sind dies Variationen des Gewichts,<br />
der Außengeometrie und der Größe<br />
der verwendeten Hartmetallstifte.<br />
Dabei sind Beton (alle Probekörper<br />
stammen aus einer Betoncharge), Fräsenvorschub<br />
sowie Drehzahl und<br />
DECOMMISSIONING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT 165<br />
Decommissioning and Waste Management<br />
Studies on the Geometric Influence on Hard Metal Shavers During Concrete Shaving ı Simone Müller and Sascha Gentes
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
DECOMMISSIONING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT 166<br />
| | Abb. 13.<br />
Abtrag in Abhängigkeit der Außengeometrie<br />
Variation<br />
Fräsenzustellung konstant gehalten<br />
worden. Die Auswertung der durchgeführten<br />
Versuche soll im Hinblick auf<br />
Frässpurtiefe und -fläche sowie den<br />
Massenabtrag an der Fräslamelle<br />
(Vgl.: [8], [9]) exemplarisch betrachtet<br />
werden:<br />
Das Diagramm in Abbildung 12<br />
zeigt die Tiefe der durch die Fräslamelle<br />
entstandenen Frässpur im<br />
Betonkörper über das zusätzlich an<br />
der Fräslamelle angebrachte Gewicht.<br />
Es ist zu erkennen, dass ein linearer<br />
Zusammenhang zwischen dem Gewicht<br />
der Fräslamelle und dem<br />
Betonabtrag besteht. Durch eine<br />
Massen zunahme von 120 g ergibt sich<br />
beispielsweise eine Erhöhung der<br />
Abtragstiefe um 0,3 mm, dies entspricht<br />
einer Zunahme um etwa 10%<br />
des ursprünglichen Ausgangsab trages.<br />
Die Versuche bei Variation der<br />
Außengeometrie, die in Abbildung<br />
13 abgebildet sind, zeigen, dass die<br />
Anordnung von möglichst viel Masse<br />
an dem Lamellenaußendurchmesser<br />
höhere Abtragswerte um bis zu rund<br />
10 Prozent liefert.<br />
Die Verwendung unterschiedlich<br />
großer Hartmetallspitzen (Abbildung<br />
11) resultiert, wie das Diagramm in<br />
Abbildung 14 zeigt, in einem fast<br />
sechzigfach geringeren Massenverlust<br />
und Verschleiß bei größerem Spitzendurchmesser,<br />
bei rund anderthalbfacher<br />
Abtragsfläche. Gleichzeitig verringert<br />
sich die erreichte Abtragstiefe<br />
bei größeren Spitzendurchmessern<br />
um rund 10 Prozent.<br />
Einfluss auf Abtrag<br />
Gewicht Abtragstiefe ± 10%<br />
Außengeometrie Abtragstiefe ± 10%<br />
Hartmetallspitzendurchmesser<br />
| | Tab. 1.<br />
Ergebnisse des Forschungsprojektes EOS.<br />
Änderung des Massenverlusts der Fräslamellen<br />
zueinander um das 60fache<br />
Zusammenfassung und<br />
Ausblick<br />
Die im Rahmen des Forschungsprojektes<br />
EOS durchgeführten Versuche<br />
zeigen einen Zusammenhang<br />
zwischen der Geometrie der Fräslammelle<br />
und dem Betonabtrag beziehungsweise<br />
dem Verschleiß der<br />
Lamelle in Form des Massenverlustes<br />
der Lamelle. Es konnte im Versuchsaufbau<br />
gezeigt werden, dass die Variation<br />
der Außengeometrie durch Anordnung<br />
von möglichst viel Masse an<br />
dem Lamellenaußendurchmesser höhere<br />
Abtragswerte von bis zu 10 Prozent<br />
liefert. Weiterhin führt die<br />
Vergrößerung des Hartmetallspitzendurchmessers<br />
zu einem größeren,<br />
flächigen Betonabtrag bei sechzigfach<br />
geringerem Massenverlust (Verschleiß)<br />
an der Fräslamelle. Die<br />
Ergebnisse sind in Tabelle 1 zusammengefasst.<br />
Somit wird im Verhältnis<br />
zum Lamellenverschleiß ein größeres<br />
Abtragsvolumen erreicht. Dies führt<br />
zu einer Verlängerung der Standzeit,<br />
Reduktion der Rüstanzahl und somit<br />
Verringerung des Sekundärabfalls.<br />
Eine Übertragung der erzielten<br />
Versuchsergebnisse in die Praxis ist<br />
vorgesehen.<br />
Literatur<br />
| | Abb. 14.<br />
Variation des Hartmetallspitzendurchmessers<br />
[1] MICRO-EPSILON MESSTECHNIK GmbH<br />
u. Co. KG (Hrsg.): Betriebsanleitung<br />
scanCONTROL 2700 / 2710 / 2750.<br />
MICRO-EPSILON MESSTECHNIK GmbH<br />
u. Co. KG.<br />
[2] Deutsches Institut für Normung (Hrsg.):<br />
Optoelectronic measurement of form,<br />
profile and distance: Deutsche Norm :<br />
DIN 32877. Berlin: Deutsches Institut<br />
für Normung, (DIN 32877).<br />
[3] VDI Verein Deutscher Ingenieure e.V.:<br />
Genauigkeit von Koordinatenmeßgeräten;<br />
Kenngrößen und deren<br />
Prüfung = Coordinate measuring<br />
machines with optical probes optical<br />
sensors for one-dimensional distance<br />
measurement. Februar 1999, Ausg.<br />
deutsch- englisch. Berlin, 1999 (VDI-<br />
VDE-Richt linien ; 2617,6,2). – Frühere<br />
Ausg.: 11.96 Entwurf, deutsch.<br />
[4] Sackewitz, Michael (Hrsg.): Leitfaden<br />
zur optischen 3D-Messtechnik.<br />
Stuttgart : Fraunhofer-Verl., 2014<br />
( Vision-Leitfaden ; 14). – ISBN 978–3–<br />
8396–0761–9. – Literaturangaben.<br />
[5] Bergmeister K.; Wörner J.: Beton<br />
Kalender 2005 – Fertigteile Tunnelbauwerke,<br />
2005, Kapitel VIII: Hans-Wolf<br />
Reinhardt – Beton, Ernst & Sohn, Verlag<br />
für Architektur und technische Wissenschaften<br />
GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin.<br />
[6] Verein Deutscher Zementwerke e.V.;<br />
Biscoping M.: Gesteinskörnungen für<br />
Normalbeton; Zement-Merkblatt<br />
Beton technik B 2 1.2012; http://www.<br />
beton.org/fileadmin/beton-org/<br />
media/Dokumente/PDF/Service/<br />
Zementmerkbl%C3%A4tter/B2.pdf<br />
(Abgerufen: 25.04.2017).<br />
[7] Manns W.: Beton für den Bau von<br />
Kernkraftwerken 1971, Betontechnische<br />
Berichte, Verein Deutscher<br />
Zementwerke.<br />
[8] Tagungsband KOTEC 2017: 13. Internationales<br />
Symposium “Konditionierung<br />
radioaktiver Betriebs- und Stilllegungsabfälle,”<br />
22.-24. März 2017; Untersuchungen<br />
zum Geometrieeinfluss der<br />
Hartmetalllamellen beim Betonfräsen;<br />
M.Sc. Simone Müller, Prof. Dr. Sascha<br />
Gentes.<br />
[9] Tagungsband 48th Annual Meeting on<br />
Nuclear Technology 2017, 16 - 17 Mai<br />
2017: Untersuchungen zum Geometrieeinfluss<br />
auf die Abtragsleistung von<br />
Hartmetalllamellen beim Betonfräsen;<br />
M.Sc. Simone Müller, Prof. Dr. Sascha<br />
Gentes.<br />
Authors<br />
M. Sc. Simone Müller,<br />
Prof. Dr.-Ing Sascha Gentes,<br />
Institut für Technologie und<br />
Management im Baubetrieb<br />
des Karlsruher Instituts für<br />
Technologie (KIT)<br />
Geb. 50.31<br />
Am Fasanengarten<br />
76131 Karlsruhe, Deutschland<br />
Decommissioning and Waste Management<br />
Studies on the Geometric Influence on Hard Metal Shavers During Concrete Shaving ı Simone Müller and Sascha Gentes
Kommunikation und<br />
Training für Kerntechnik<br />
Strahlenschutz – Aktuell<br />
In Kooperation mit<br />
TÜV SÜD Energietechnik GmbH<br />
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<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
168<br />
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION<br />
The Technology of TVHTR-Nuclear- Power<br />
Stations With Pebble Fuel Elements<br />
Power and Heat for the Production of Drinking Water Out of Seawastewater<br />
and/or Hydrogen in Combination with Solar Plants<br />
Urban Cleve<br />
Basic design features and<br />
operational experiences<br />
Design principals<br />
of TVHT reactors<br />
The German development of TVHTR<br />
Power Stations [4, 5, 6] was primarily<br />
initiated through the ideas of Prof. Dr.<br />
R. Schulten. He developed this technology<br />
in the 1950`s while employed<br />
by Brown Boveri. Dr. Schulten became<br />
CTO at the new BBC/Krupp Reaktorbau<br />
GmbH in Mannheim and later as<br />
Professor and Director of KFA-Jülich<br />
Nuclear Research Department [6]. Dr<br />
Schulten stated:<br />
“In the field of Nuclear Energy,<br />
the AVR Reactor occupies a specific<br />
unique position. Helium gas cooled,<br />
graphite moderated, inherently safe<br />
and the hottest reactor worldwide. It<br />
is the story of the only pure German<br />
development of nuclear power plant<br />
technology.”<br />
Main design features of the AVR<br />
Reactor are:<br />
• Spherical graphite fuel elements<br />
which contain the fission material.<br />
• Graphite as main core construction<br />
material and as reflector and moderator.<br />
• A safe integrated reactor concept<br />
with helium used for the cooling<br />
gas.<br />
• Enclosed primary helium gas circuit<br />
in one reactor vessel.<br />
These are the most important basics<br />
for safe operation. The goal until<br />
now has been the construction of an<br />
inherently safe nuclear power station<br />
with out-standing nuclear and design<br />
safety [6, 19].<br />
AVR power station<br />
The technology of the AVR was set up<br />
from “zero”, Figure 1, as there was no<br />
prior experience with engineering<br />
and design of components operating<br />
in a helium environment [1, 2].<br />
The complete new development of<br />
all components was a huge challenge<br />
and consequently routine delays and<br />
cost increases were experienced.<br />
Additionally, the TÜV, a regulatory<br />
oversight business, underwent phases<br />
| | Fig. 1.<br />
The AVR 46 MWth/15 MWel Experimental HTR<br />
Power plant.<br />
of learning and had to develop better<br />
testing methods for the nuclear power<br />
stations. During cold tests under normal<br />
environmental temperature and<br />
pressure all components were extensively<br />
and successfully tested.<br />
• The steam generator, Figure 2,<br />
was constructed several times and<br />
during production new test procedures<br />
had to be developed. After<br />
completion it underwent a helium<br />
pressure test, the first of its kind<br />
worldwide.<br />
| | Fig. 2.<br />
The AVR steam generator during manufacturing.<br />
• The absorbing rods functioned<br />
hundreds of times without showing<br />
any problems. After installing<br />
into the reactor and tested in a<br />
helium atmosphere they failed<br />
completely. It needed extensive<br />
design improvements, after which<br />
functioned perfectly.<br />
• All components of the pebble<br />
charging system were tested over<br />
years of operation. They showed<br />
only some problems during operation<br />
and improvements could be<br />
performed under radioactive conditions<br />
using specially designed<br />
equipment.<br />
• Nearly 600 helium valves manufactured<br />
by suppliers failed completely<br />
and had to be newly<br />
designed and tested under helium<br />
conditions. The new design (by<br />
BBK) was a great success. No<br />
further problems were identified<br />
after testing in a helium atmosphere.<br />
All problems had been solved and an<br />
average yearly availability of 66.4 %<br />
with a maximum of 92 % per year was<br />
achieved during 23 years of operation<br />
including the periods for which numerous<br />
experiments were performed.<br />
This probably established a world<br />
record for a completely new reactor<br />
design.<br />
The section through the AVR with<br />
inner core, the graphite reflector,<br />
thermal shield, inner reactor pressure<br />
vessel, biological shield 1 and the<br />
outer pressure vessel is shown in<br />
Figure 3.<br />
| | Fig. 3.<br />
Section through the AVR reactor.<br />
| | Fig. 4.<br />
View into the core of the AVR.<br />
Research and Innovation<br />
The Technology of TVHTR-Nuclear- Power Stations With Pebble Fuel Elements ı Urban Cleve
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
• We had only one major problem,<br />
an incident of INES 1. Only one of<br />
the some thousand weldings of the<br />
steam generator leaked. After several<br />
months of repair the steam<br />
generator functioned very good<br />
again with full capacity. [6, 7].<br />
• The inner core structure, Figure 4,<br />
has a diameter of 3 m and 4.5 m<br />
high.<br />
• The fuel charging unit, [7, 8]<br />
Figure 5, designed and developed<br />
by BBK, with all its numerous components<br />
functioned sensationally<br />
well. In 23 Years of operation only<br />
220 pebbles were discharged. This<br />
was a figure of 0.0092 % of the<br />
2,400,000 moved pebbles. A basic<br />
diagram of the fuel cycle shows<br />
Figure 6 [7, 8, 9].<br />
| | Fig. 5.<br />
View into the core of the AVR.<br />
• Because of the excellent functioning<br />
of all de- and remounting<br />
equipment for the components,<br />
repairs could be done during operating<br />
of the reactor. No personal<br />
had been injured by radiation.<br />
• The AVR had to be shut down only<br />
by political reasons in 1988. It<br />
was an excellent test reactor for a<br />
variety of different fuel elements<br />
with different kinds of compositions<br />
of Uranium, Thorium and<br />
Plutonium. All these international<br />
experiments must be stopped, a<br />
very poor decision for future development<br />
of HTR-Power-Stations<br />
worldwide.<br />
As a result, it can be confirmed, that<br />
the operation of the AVR Reactor was<br />
a unique success story.<br />
The AVR modul reactor<br />
An AVR design, modified with an integrated<br />
He prim /He sec heat exchanger<br />
and only one steel pressure vessel,<br />
is the far best developed and operational<br />
completely tested.<br />
| | Fig. 7.<br />
THTR-300 MWel/750MWth Demonstration<br />
Power Station.<br />
Modul concept of a<br />
Small Model HTR (SMHTR) up<br />
to 100 MWth/40 MWel<br />
The design of the THTR-300el<br />
Demonstration Nuclear Power<br />
Station<br />
The basic design of the THTR-300<br />
Power Station started in 1965,<br />
Figure 7. No prior experience from<br />
the AVR could be brought into the new<br />
design (Figure 8).<br />
The main design differences of the<br />
THTR-300 to the AVR are:<br />
• Pre-stressed concrete pressure<br />
vessel (PCPV) instead of two steelvessels<br />
(Figure 9). The dimension<br />
was 25 meters in diameter and<br />
28 meters high. The PCPV was<br />
chosen primarily for safety reasons.<br />
A model with a scale of 1:20 was<br />
tested with water pressure. Very<br />
small cracks occurred at a pressure<br />
between 90-120 bar. The main<br />
crack was Occurred at 190 bar.<br />
After a pressure drop to 40 bar the<br />
vessel was nearly gastight again.<br />
This test was the baseline for the<br />
calculation of the THTR-300 PCPV<br />
[28].<br />
• A closed inner circuit of helium<br />
cooling gas to avoid the release of<br />
fission products and graphite dust.<br />
This was the most important<br />
design factor to avoid release<br />
of contaminated primary helium<br />
gas or contaminated particles of<br />
graphite dust.<br />
• Helium gas flow from top to<br />
bottom.<br />
• TRISO-Pebbles as fuel elements.<br />
• All other components such as<br />
blowers, fuel element feeding and<br />
handling components, graphite<br />
structures, etc. were designed and<br />
improved very similar to the components<br />
of the AVR and showed<br />
no problems.<br />
New nuclear calculations of the reactor<br />
physics showed, that the diameter<br />
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 169<br />
| | Fig. 6.<br />
Fuel cycle of pebble bed transportation<br />
system.<br />
• After decommissioning in 1989 it<br />
was ascertained, that the complete<br />
graphite interior had not moved by<br />
one millimeter. It looked as newly<br />
installed. Only some very small<br />
accumulations of graphite dust in<br />
some corners could be detected.<br />
• According to the INES scale only<br />
one incident occurred with “1“, all<br />
other events had an INES level of<br />
“zero“ during 23 years of operation<br />
[6, 7].<br />
| | Fig. 8.<br />
Survey of the THTR-300.<br />
Research and Innovation<br />
The Technology of TVHTR-Nuclear- Power Stations With Pebble Fuel Elements ı Urban Cleve
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
Plant parameter Units Calculated values Measured values<br />
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 170<br />
| | Fig. 9.<br />
Pre-stressed concrete pressure vessel and<br />
THRT-300 core.<br />
| | Fig. 10.<br />
Concept of pebble bed ring core.<br />
of the core with 5.6 m was too large,<br />
so the shutdown rods in the surrounding<br />
graphite reflector could not cool<br />
the pebbles to the low temperatures<br />
necessary in case of shutdown of<br />
the reactor. Until this time no prior<br />
experience was available with the<br />
behavior of the graphite core structure<br />
during extended operation.<br />
Therefore, the decision was made to<br />
insert the shutdown rods directly into<br />
the pebble bed with the potential<br />
danger of crushing the fuel elements.<br />
An alternative design with a pebble<br />
bed ring core PBRC (Figure 10) [4]<br />
could not be chosen, as no prior<br />
experience existed with the behavior<br />
of the graphite structure in the AVR.<br />
Testing of the insertion of rods into<br />
the pebble bed could not be performed<br />
under operational conditions.<br />
This decision was discovered later<br />
when operating the THTR-300 during<br />
commissioning of the power station<br />
which was a terrible mistake. There<br />
was no nuclear risk, but 0.6 % of<br />
the pebbles ruptured which was<br />
Reactor thermal power MW 761.65 763.5<br />
Circulated speed rpm 5,369 5,361<br />
Helium flow kg/s 297 293.9<br />
SG inlet He temperature °C 750 750.4<br />
SG outlet He temperature °C 247 245.9<br />
Feedwater flow kg/s 254 253.9<br />
Main steam temperature °C 545 544.3<br />
Main steam pressure bar 186 184.9<br />
Reheat flow kg/s 247.3 237.9<br />
Reheat temperature °C 535 532.3<br />
Reheat pressure bar 46.3 47.5<br />
Generator output MWe 305.9 306<br />
Net electric output MWe 295.5 295.6<br />
Net heat rate kcal/kWh 2,145 2,134<br />
| | Tab. 1.<br />
THTR-300, Comparison of key plant parameters.<br />
substantially higher when compared<br />
to the results of the AVR at 0.0092 %.<br />
All operational difficulties with the<br />
THTR-300-Reactor based on this<br />
unique problem.<br />
Table 1 [14] shows the differences<br />
between calculated design parameters<br />
and the parameters in operation.<br />
Smaller differences cannot be calculated<br />
and it was determined that<br />
without the problems of a high<br />
percentage of crushed pebbles, the<br />
THTR-300 would have been operated<br />
with the same high operational times<br />
as obtained with the AVR.<br />
Today, it can be determined that<br />
the PBRC would have avoided all of<br />
these difficulties. The stability of the<br />
graphite structure of the AVR ascertained<br />
after the shutdown of the AVR,<br />
proved this design could be the basis<br />
for a new PBRC which was patented in<br />
1965 [4].<br />
The positive results of the operation<br />
of the THTR-300 include [11, 12,<br />
13]:<br />
• HTR power stations can be operated<br />
and connected to the power<br />
grid in the same manner as conventional<br />
power plants.<br />
• Rupture of fuel elements does not<br />
increase the radioactivity of primary<br />
helium cooling gas.<br />
• Thermodynamic efficiency is as<br />
high as in conventional power<br />
plants.<br />
• The nuclear and radiological safety<br />
of personal and environment is<br />
excellent.<br />
• No radiation injuries, neither in<br />
the AVR nor in the THTR-300<br />
occurred.<br />
• The contaminated primary helium<br />
gas and graphite dust are safely<br />
surrounded and contained in the<br />
PCPV.<br />
• The pre-stressed concrete pressure<br />
vessel PCPV showed it was an<br />
excellent safety barrier against<br />
radiation, plane crashes, terrorist<br />
attacks, and earthquakes up to the<br />
highest magnitudes, etc.<br />
The pebble fuel elements<br />
Design and operational<br />
experiences with pebble fuel<br />
elements<br />
The most important components of a<br />
nuclear power station are the fuel<br />
elements. They contain the fissile<br />
material for generating the energy<br />
and the more robust the fuel elements<br />
the safer the nuclear plant. The main<br />
material of a pebble fuel element is<br />
graphite and they have a diameter of<br />
| | Fig. 11.<br />
Original concept of a pebble and later<br />
installed TRISO pebble.<br />
| | Fig. 12.<br />
Arrangement of a TRISO-pebble.<br />
Research and Innovation<br />
The Technology of TVHTR-Nuclear- Power Stations With Pebble Fuel Elements ı Urban Cleve
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
60 mm while the diameter of the inner<br />
fuel containing matrix is 50 mm [14].<br />
Figure 11 shows the difference<br />
between the first idea of a pebble with<br />
non-coated fuel and the current type.<br />
The inner diameter of the coated fuel<br />
particles is 0.5 mm. Embedded in the<br />
inner graphite matrix are approximately<br />
15,000 coated particles (cp) in<br />
one pebble and contain the fuel<br />
material (Figure 12). The fuel kernel<br />
is encapsulated by three layers of very<br />
hard and pressure resistant PyC-/-SiC-<br />
/-PyC and is gas tight (Figure 13).<br />
These are the “TRISO” Fuel Elements<br />
and each coated particle has a<br />
diameter of 0.9 mm.<br />
| | Fig. 14.<br />
Treatment of pebbes by hand, first pebble<br />
loading into the core of the AVR-HTR.<br />
| | Fig. 15.<br />
Storage of burnt-down pebbles in casks.<br />
describes results of an experiment: “A<br />
High Voltage Head-End Process for<br />
Waste Minimization and Reprocessing<br />
of Coated Particle Fuel for High<br />
Temperature Reactors.” [10] This<br />
process is proposed for the separation<br />
of coated kernels from the fuel matrix<br />
and makes it possible to reprocess the<br />
burnt down fuel by separation of the<br />
coatings and the fuel kernel. The fuel<br />
kernels remain intact and has been<br />
successfully demonstrated in experiments<br />
as shown in Figure 16, 17, and<br />
18. The characteristics of the coated<br />
fuel kernels and the complete pebbles,<br />
manufactured by NUKEM, is shown in<br />
Table 2.<br />
This process, proposed and studied<br />
with experiments by EU-JRC-Petten,<br />
envisages the complete removal of the<br />
coating-layers to make the fuel accessible<br />
for further reprocessing and<br />
manufacturing of new fuel kernels.<br />
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 171<br />
| | Fig. 13.<br />
Composition of a TRISO-pebble.<br />
Without coating the radioactivity<br />
of the primary helium gas in the AVR<br />
was calculated initially to be 10 7<br />
Curie. Therefore, the AVR was<br />
designed with two pressure vessels.<br />
All piping and helium operated components<br />
were surrounded with clean<br />
helium gas, to prevent primary contaminated<br />
Helium gas from entering<br />
the reactor vessel. These fuel elements<br />
were not initially used.<br />
The newly developed TRISO<br />
elements avoid fission and decay<br />
products, which are the sources of<br />
dangerous radioactivity. Three layers<br />
form a containment for every CP<br />
and keep all fission products safely<br />
enclosed. The layers remain gas tight<br />
from 1,620 °C to 1,800 °C and do not<br />
deteriorate or corrode even under<br />
high pressure.<br />
As previously mentioned, AVR<br />
was initially designed with a helium<br />
primary gas activity of 10 7 Curie. After<br />
the development of the pebbles with<br />
coated particles the primary helium<br />
gas activity was measured at only<br />
360 Curie [3], a factor of 0.000036<br />
lower. They were proven in long term<br />
operation in the AVR as reliable fuel<br />
elements and have very excellent<br />
advantages in comparison with all<br />
fuel elements in other nuclear power<br />
stations.<br />
Fresh pebbles can be stored and<br />
handled without any risk of radiation<br />
(Figure 14). Radiated, burnt down<br />
pebbles or graphite balls will be stored<br />
(Figure 15). primarily in specially<br />
designed containers or stockrooms<br />
inside the basement of the reactor<br />
building. No cooling is necessary and<br />
they can be stored over a longtime<br />
without risk of contamination or<br />
radiation of the surrounding area or<br />
personnel [15, 16, 17].<br />
Breeding of fissile Uranium-233<br />
by using Thorium-232<br />
Sufficient Thorium can be found in<br />
the surface of the earth to generate<br />
electricity and heat by nuclear power<br />
stations for a very long time. [20, 21,<br />
22] However, fissile fuel needs to be<br />
produced from the Thorium. This is<br />
possible by breeding 232 Th up to 233 Th<br />
using slow neutrons initially resulting<br />
in Protactinium ( 233 Pa) which decays<br />
to fissionable 233 Uranium. This process<br />
is a very good possibility in a<br />
THTR power station.<br />
The coated fuel kernels can contain<br />
Uranium 235/238, Plutonium 238-<br />
242, or Thorium 232 [15, 17, 18].<br />
These fuel materials can be combined<br />
in a pebble matrix and burned<br />
together. After extracting the core,<br />
every single pebble can be measured<br />
to its degree of burn-up. In HTR-<br />
Pebble Bed reactors the disposal of Pu<br />
can be extensively controlled and<br />
each pebble is treated individually. A<br />
very detailed and full control of Pu<br />
disposal is guaranteed and possible<br />
through inspection to meet the NPT.<br />
Decommissioning and Reprocessing<br />
of Fuel Elements and<br />
Coated particles<br />
The paper by the Netherlands<br />
European Joint Research Centre JRC<br />
Pebble Bed Ring-Core Design<br />
for very large TVHT-Reactors<br />
Important discoveries were generated<br />
from the long-term operation of<br />
the AVR and relatively short period<br />
of three years operation of the<br />
THTR-300, The information obtained<br />
from these two power plants is<br />
Coated particle<br />
Particle batch HT 354-383<br />
Kernel composition UO 2<br />
Kernel diameter in<br />
micro-meter<br />
Enrichment<br />
[U-235 wt. %]<br />
Thickness of coatings<br />
in micro-meter<br />
501<br />
Buffer 92<br />
Inner PyC 38<br />
SiC 33<br />
Outer PyC 41<br />
16.75<br />
Particle diameter 909<br />
Pebble<br />
Heavy metal loading<br />
[g/pebble]<br />
U-235 contents<br />
[g/pebble]<br />
Number of coated<br />
particles per pebble<br />
Volume packaging<br />
fracture [%]<br />
Defective SiC layers<br />
[U/U tot ]<br />
6.0<br />
1.00 +/-1%<br />
9,560<br />
6.2<br />
7.8 x 10 -6<br />
Matrix graphite grade A3-3<br />
Matrix density [kg/m 3 ] 1,750<br />
Temp. at final heat<br />
treatment [°C]<br />
1,900<br />
| | Tab. 2.<br />
Typical chracteristics of coated particles and<br />
pebbles produced by NUKEM.<br />
Research and Innovation<br />
The Technology of TVHTR-Nuclear- Power Stations With Pebble Fuel Elements ı Urban Cleve
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 172<br />
| | Fig. 16.<br />
Reprocessing of pebbles before separaing<br />
coating.<br />
| | Fig. 17.<br />
Reprocessing of pebbles, separated coating<br />
shells.<br />
| | Fig. 18.<br />
Reprocessing of pebbes, fuel kernels<br />
separated from coating.<br />
necessary for the design and construction<br />
of future large commercial V/<br />
HTR power plants. The experience<br />
gained with the graphite structures<br />
are excellent and new PBRC design<br />
based on the experiences may not<br />
produce any problems. The PCPV [4]<br />
of the THTR-300 was designed without<br />
any prior experience and was a<br />
first-time solution.<br />
Together with the improved manufacturing<br />
of the graphite by suppliers<br />
and extensive knowledge from previous<br />
designs it is possible to construct<br />
graphite cores and reflectors with<br />
high long term stability (Figure 4).<br />
The internal inspection of the AVR<br />
core showed no shift of graphite<br />
blocks after more than 23 years<br />
in operation and development of<br />
graphite as a suitable material in<br />
HTR-Reactors made good advancements<br />
with improved development.<br />
Unlike the THTR-300 the absorber<br />
rods are installed in the surrounding<br />
graphite moderator to prevent damage<br />
to the graphite pebbles. This was a<br />
major problem with the THTR-300<br />
(Figure 19).<br />
The core parameters shall be small<br />
and not too high. This is important<br />
for lower decay heat temperatures<br />
in case of a loss of coolant accident<br />
(Figure 20).<br />
The dimensions of a ring-core can<br />
be optimized by:<br />
• difference between inner and outer<br />
diameter,<br />
• height of fuel zone,<br />
• core volume,<br />
• power density of fuel zone,<br />
• maximum helium gas temperature,<br />
• optimal flow of pebbles through<br />
the core.<br />
These six factors can be optimised<br />
with regard to maximum decay heat<br />
temperature, which must not exceed<br />
1,600 °C in case of cooling loss (loca)<br />
and/or pressure drop (lopa), which<br />
would indicate an MC Accident.<br />
The possible main design features<br />
for this new concept may include:<br />
• TRISO pebbles as fuel elements.<br />
• Use of U-235 together with Th-232<br />
to breed U-233, PU [20, 21].<br />
| | Fig. 19.<br />
Pebble bed of the THTR-300 with shot down<br />
rods in the pebble bed.<br />
| | Fig. 20.<br />
Results of loss of coolant LOCA/MCA accident<br />
of AVR.<br />
• A pre-stressed concrete pressure<br />
vessel to surround the primary<br />
helium completely with extreme<br />
safeguarding against all types of<br />
potential critical events, terrorrist<br />
attacts, and disturbances inside<br />
and outside of the powerplant, and<br />
absolutely safe against cyberattacks<br />
[26].<br />
• The new design of a pebble bed<br />
core in a ring form, (Figure 10) [4]<br />
with several extraction devices for<br />
the pebbles below the core. An<br />
advantage of this design is an<br />
improved and more regular or<br />
symmetrical flow of pebbles<br />
through the core with higher<br />
possible burn up of the fuel and<br />
improved symmetrical cooling of<br />
the complete pebble bed [7].<br />
• Shut down and regulation rods<br />
only in the graphite reflector,<br />
• He primary /He Secondary heat exchangers<br />
in the primary helium circuit of<br />
the PCPV to avoid water ingression<br />
[4].<br />
• Only one heat transport system to<br />
supply the different secondary<br />
plants with high temperature heat<br />
will reduce costs and simplify<br />
design of the pressure vessel.<br />
• The secondary pure helium is<br />
inside the pipes and will have a<br />
slightly higher pressure against<br />
the primary integrated helium<br />
circuit. In case of a leak, the<br />
ingressing pure helium will be<br />
contaminated and can be cleaned<br />
up by the helium cleaning plant<br />
and refilled into the clean helium<br />
circuit.<br />
• This design makes it possible, to<br />
install the He/He-heat exchanger<br />
tightly into the pressure vessel.<br />
Several different exchanger<br />
systems were constructed without<br />
the ability to extract them from<br />
the vessel as practiced in the<br />
THTR-300.<br />
• This design makes it impossible to<br />
contaminate anything outside of<br />
the reactor vessel and all possible<br />
industrial processes can be designed<br />
without danger of radioactive<br />
contamination in a quite<br />
normal conventional construction.<br />
• This nuclear power facility makes<br />
it possible to construct every<br />
secondary industrial production<br />
plants close to the HTR Power<br />
Station.<br />
• Helium gas flow upstream from<br />
bottom to ceiling. The experience<br />
from the AVR shows this solution<br />
has some advantages compared<br />
with downstream design in the<br />
THTR-300.<br />
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One of the most important feature of<br />
this design is the small core, very<br />
similar to the core of the AVR. The<br />
results of the MCA tests with heat<br />
rise by decay heat (Figure 20) can<br />
be put into consideration. So, we<br />
are able to increase the primary<br />
maximum helium heat temperature to<br />
the highest possible temperatures,<br />
possibly to 1,100 °C, limited only<br />
by the maximum allowable metallic<br />
tube temperature of the He/He heat<br />
exchanger inside the PCPV.<br />
Design of important components<br />
for a new 600 MW el /<br />
1.500 MW th Pebble Bed<br />
Reactor and potential risks<br />
The Pre-stressed concrete<br />
pressure vessel. (PCPV)<br />
The reactor vessel is, for safety reasons,<br />
the most important component<br />
of every nuclear power station. The<br />
calculation for larger cores for pebble<br />
bed reactors showed that the diameter<br />
of the core is too great for construction<br />
using steel pressure vessels and<br />
therefore cannot be manufactured<br />
using metallic materials. It was<br />
decided to look for other construction<br />
materials for a large HTR pebble bed<br />
design with high volume and high<br />
pressure.<br />
Two solutions had been taken into<br />
consideration, a pre-stressed cast iron<br />
vessel and a pre-stressed concrete<br />
pressure vessel. The PCPV had been<br />
chosen due to its excellent safety<br />
advantages versus the cast iron vessel.<br />
Several safety conditions could not be<br />
reached with a pre-stressed cast iron<br />
vessel and the construction would<br />
have some fundamental problems.<br />
This HTR design was a completely<br />
new construction without any prior<br />
experience and the operational<br />
helium gas pressure was calculated<br />
at 40 bar. It was decided to perform<br />
experiments with a 1:20 scale model.<br />
The model was pressurized with<br />
warm water. Very small cracks began<br />
to form at a pressure between 90-120<br />
bar. The main crack was reached at<br />
190 bar.<br />
After the pressure dropped to 40<br />
bar, the vessel was nearly gastight<br />
again. After the pressure drop the<br />
cables pulled the concrete together<br />
[4]. These results were deemed very<br />
important since this test proved that<br />
oxygen could not enter into the vessel<br />
in event of a crash. Throughout the<br />
testing, all necessary factors were<br />
measured and used as a baseline for<br />
new calculation programs to calculate<br />
the PCPV for the THTR-300.<br />
| | Fig. 21.<br />
Arrangement of stressing cables of the<br />
THRT-PCPV.<br />
| | Fig. 22.<br />
Top of the steam generator of THTR-300.<br />
| | Fig. 23.<br />
Installation of the thermal shield.<br />
Development, design and<br />
erection of the THTR-300<br />
pre-stressed concrete pressure<br />
vessel<br />
Figure 21 shows the cross section of<br />
the reactor [26]. Located Inside are<br />
the core, graphite and carbon brick<br />
structures, thermal shield, six steam<br />
generators, blowers, shut down rods,<br />
measuring devices, and isolation with<br />
liner and liner cooling system further<br />
the penetrations for the steam generators,<br />
the holes in the concrete are<br />
reinforced by steel layers with steel<br />
tops (Figure 22). There are 135 penetrations<br />
in total, the largest of which<br />
are for extracting the steam generators<br />
at 2.25 m. All of the penetrations<br />
are surrounded by cables and have<br />
| | Fig. 24.<br />
PCPV during manufacturing.<br />
| | Fig. 25.<br />
Model of bottom of THTR-300 core.<br />
| | Fig. 26.<br />
Results of pressure test of the THTR-PCPV.<br />
encountered no design problems. The<br />
construction phase is demonstrated in<br />
Figures 23, 24 and 25.<br />
The results of the pressure test<br />
Figure 26 shows the accuracy between<br />
the measured and calculated<br />
factors. The pressure tests were performed<br />
using nitrogen and helium to<br />
ensure accurate measuring. The design<br />
pressure was 39.2 bar and the<br />
highest possible pressure in case of an<br />
accident was calculated at 46.1 bar.<br />
The test reached the calculated and<br />
highest possible pressure (as required<br />
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 173<br />
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RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 174<br />
by the TÜV) without any problems<br />
arising [14]. As a result, it can be assured<br />
that existing design knowledge<br />
and calculation program are sufficient<br />
to calculate larger PCPV up to the<br />
highest possible capacities, potentially<br />
reaching 4.000 MWth.<br />
Safety criterions<br />
The main safety criterion [19] of a<br />
PCPV are:<br />
• Safety against plane crashes,<br />
terrorist attacks, political disturbances.<br />
• Safety against air ingress.<br />
• Safety against loss of contaminated<br />
graphite dust.<br />
• Safety against all kind of crashes or<br />
cracks.<br />
• Safety against earthquakes up to<br />
highest degrees.<br />
Within the inner He/He heat exchanger:<br />
• Safety against water ingress.<br />
• Safety against tritium ingress.<br />
Graphite reflector and<br />
ceramic structure<br />
The large numbers of design experiences<br />
with both reactors will lead<br />
to the best technical solutions. SGL<br />
Group is a very important supplier for<br />
both graphite and carbon bricks production<br />
and is capable of designing<br />
very reliable structures, Figure 4.<br />
and symmetrical pebble flow through<br />
the pebble bed. The best test results<br />
obtained from the wall designed for<br />
the AVR was thoroughly tested in<br />
advance at the test laboratory of BBC/<br />
Krupp. [1] Figure 27. This design<br />
leads to a very symmetrical gas flow<br />
across the pebble bed from bottom up<br />
and consequently leads to very good<br />
symmetrical cooling of all pebbles<br />
across the bed. The calculation factors<br />
for this design had been developed<br />
in the BBC/Krupp laboratory and<br />
showed excellent results [6, 7].<br />
The pebble flow in the AVR was<br />
much better than in the THTR-300<br />
due to the larger diameter of the<br />
THTR bed. Diameters that are too<br />
large lead to very different pebble<br />
flow velocities, up to a factor of 10<br />
times, between the wall and center of<br />
the bed [7, 14]. Very high burnt-up<br />
results of the fuel can be achieved<br />
with good symmetrical pebble flow.<br />
Helium-pr/Hes-ec heat<br />
exchangers<br />
• The calculations can be based on<br />
the results of the tests performed<br />
by FZ-Jülich with the test devices<br />
(Figure 28) [36].<br />
• The results of the very high temperature<br />
steam boiler tests, with<br />
steam temperatures of 600 °C,<br />
done in the GKM Mannheim,<br />
Germany Power Station, can be put<br />
into consideration.<br />
• The secondary helium shall have a<br />
higher pressure than the primary<br />
helium circuit. No radioactivity can<br />
pollute the secondary part of the<br />
power station.<br />
• Manufacturing is done same with<br />
the design, proved in the THTR-300<br />
with the steam generators (Figure<br />
29).<br />
The Helium blowers<br />
The blowers in the AVR and in the<br />
THTR-300 showed no problems at all.<br />
An increase to higher capacities may<br />
be possible without problems. They<br />
should be still oil lubricated (Figure<br />
30).<br />
The shut down and<br />
regulation rods<br />
• An identical design of the<br />
THTR-300 regulation rods can be<br />
used, only more pieces will be<br />
necessary (Figure 31).<br />
The fuel element circuit<br />
• The experience with the AVRinstallation<br />
during 23 years of<br />
operation is excellent [5, 6, 8].<br />
Core and Helium gas flow<br />
The experience of the AVR proves that<br />
the flow from bottom up has some advantages.<br />
The helium gas temperature<br />
range is 230 °Cto 280 °C and entrance<br />
temperature from 750 °C to 950 °C<br />
possible reach 1,100 °C at the highest.<br />
This is dependent on the metallic<br />
material stresses and strength of the<br />
tube material.<br />
The design of the wall of the graphite<br />
reflector is very important for good<br />
| | Fig. 28.<br />
Test facility of He-He heat exchangers<br />
in FZ-Jülich laboratory.<br />
| | Fig. 30.<br />
Helium blower of THTR-300.<br />
| | Fig. 27.<br />
Pebble bed flow experiments in the laboratory<br />
of BBC/Krupp with 1:1 scale.<br />
| | Fig. 29.<br />
Manufacturing of the THTR steam generator.<br />
| | Fig. 31.<br />
Shut down and regulation rod of THTR-300.<br />
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No changing or enlarging of<br />
com ponents is necessary. Several<br />
charging units shall operate<br />
parallel. These components, previously<br />
designed by BBC/Krupp,<br />
can be used without changing the<br />
construction, Figure 5.<br />
The Helium Cleaning Plant<br />
• The task of the Helium cleaning<br />
plant is to clean in a bypass the<br />
helium gas of the primary circuit<br />
from impurities such as solid<br />
graphite dust and the radioactive<br />
chemical elements Krypton,<br />
Xenon, Argon and Tritium. A<br />
detailed description is published<br />
in ATW 5/1966 [23].<br />
Safety systems and MCA tests<br />
The AVR was the worldwide only<br />
nuclear power station with two times<br />
MCA test-simulations [4, 5, 19].<br />
The first was done in spring 1967<br />
during the commissioning period. As<br />
mentioned, we had a lot of undecided<br />
problems with the unknown behavior<br />
of important components, so mainly<br />
with the absorber rods. We had an<br />
agreement with the TÜV that a<br />
MCA-test-simulation should prove<br />
the inherent nuclear safety and<br />
the good behavior of all these components.<br />
At highest helium gas temperature<br />
of 850 °C and full power of 46 MW th<br />
the blowers were stopped by quick<br />
stop. The complete power plant was<br />
without electricity, also the reservediesel-engines<br />
were out of operation<br />
and the absorber rods were blocked.<br />
Only the core temperature measuring<br />
was in function. After stop, by the<br />
temperature moved by decay heat<br />
slowly up to about 1.000 °C. [3] Then<br />
the temperature falls down during the<br />
next days to normal degrees. Some<br />
days later we re-started the complete<br />
power station without any problem<br />
[4].<br />
After this test, full licensing was<br />
granted by the TÜV for the completed<br />
power station.<br />
A second the test was done in 1976.<br />
[6] This time all instruments could<br />
be considered and all data were taken<br />
to measure the temperature course<br />
by the simulation of a loss of coolant<br />
accident to develop a calculation program<br />
for such a future case (Figure<br />
20).<br />
These two worldwide first experiments<br />
had been the simulation of a<br />
worst-case scenario, an MCA, the only<br />
tests in nuclear power stations up to<br />
now.<br />
We knew exactly, that there was no<br />
nuclear risk at all, as the radioactivity<br />
of the primary helium gas was very<br />
low. The coated particles made a very<br />
good job.<br />
A similar experiment was done in<br />
1986 in Chernobyl. There the fuel<br />
was not coated and the reactor not<br />
inherent safe. The result is wellknown.<br />
Also, loss of coolant was the reason<br />
for the MCA in Fukushima, again the<br />
fuel was not coated.<br />
This shows the difference and<br />
advantages of the reliability of pebble<br />
fuel elements with coating of the fuel<br />
particles in case of accidents versus<br />
other Nuclear Power Station designs.<br />
Compared with the originally<br />
calculated radioactive contamination<br />
for the AVR power plant of 10 7 Curie<br />
the measured radioactivity of the AVR<br />
in operation with coated particles was<br />
360 Curie. The resultant calculation<br />
factor is 0.000036.<br />
With the Chinese Experimental<br />
HTR-10 MW th reactor a further<br />
successful loss of coolant test was<br />
done with TRISO pebble fuel elements.<br />
Further we will install the following<br />
additional installations to safe the<br />
reactor in every case of heavy danger<br />
[19]:<br />
• Diesel motor driven generators for<br />
electrical reserve power.<br />
• Quick extraction of all pebbles<br />
from the core to a special safe store.<br />
• Shut down rods in the graphite<br />
reflector.<br />
• Gastight design of the Reactor<br />
building as containment.<br />
• Water tight basement.<br />
Summary and Safety Conclusions:<br />
• Inherently safe design.<br />
• No melting of the core is possible.<br />
• Gastight integrated helium circuit.<br />
• Safe against water ingress.<br />
• Safe against air ingress.<br />
• Safe against heavy earth quakes.<br />
• The PCPV is safe against terrorism<br />
and other severe attacks and has<br />
proved as an excellent containment.<br />
• The PCPV has proved after decommissioning<br />
as an excellent bunker<br />
for longtime storage of all contaminated<br />
components, up to now for<br />
more than 25 years.<br />
• No graphite burning possible.<br />
• Continuous cooling of the pebbles<br />
is not necessary for the new elements,<br />
pebbles in the core, or in<br />
the castors and store.<br />
“The safest Nuclear Power Station is<br />
the most economical Power Station.“<br />
The Secondary electric and/<br />
or heat producing parts<br />
of a HTR-Power Station<br />
Nuclear safety regulations<br />
No nuclear safety regulations are necessary<br />
for every secondary industrial<br />
plant in connection with nearby HTR-<br />
Power station [24, 25, 26, 27].<br />
In 23 Years of operation there was<br />
not the smallest radioactive contamination<br />
measured in the turbine part of<br />
the AVR. After the shutdown of the<br />
THTR-300 the complete secondary<br />
part had been sold and is still in operation<br />
in another conventional power<br />
station connected to a normal steam<br />
boiler plant.<br />
The Helium secondary /water-steam<br />
generator<br />
The secondary helium, coming from<br />
the He/He-heat exchanger in the<br />
primary helium circuit, is lead to a<br />
new design of Helium/water-steam<br />
generator. This generator produces<br />
the steam for the steam turbinegenerator<br />
set to produce the electricity.<br />
The steam data are conventional<br />
with a steam pressure of may be<br />
220 bar and 525 °C and intermediate,<br />
if required two times, reheating to<br />
525 °C.<br />
The temperature of the secondary<br />
helium will be calculated in accordance<br />
with the he/he- heat exchanger<br />
in the primary helium circuit. These<br />
temperatures depend on the cubematerial,<br />
the higher the temperature,<br />
the smaller the heat-exchanger. This is<br />
only an economical question.<br />
The steam turbine generator set<br />
and auxiliary components<br />
No design changes or modifications<br />
are necessary [29]. The same construction<br />
as in conventional power<br />
stations can be designed and installed.<br />
That means a conventional turbine<br />
with temperature entrance of 525 °C,<br />
220 bar steam pressure, intermediate<br />
heating one or two times up to 525 °C,<br />
| | Fig. 32.<br />
Precleaning installation for sea/wastewater.<br />
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RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 176<br />
the water-cooled condenser and the<br />
generator. The water leaving the condenser<br />
is pumped through several<br />
heat exchangers, which are fed by<br />
extracted steam from the turbine.<br />
Everything as conventional as in all<br />
conventional Power Stations. All<br />
components and installations of the<br />
secondary part can be designed as in<br />
normal conventional power stations.<br />
There is not a difference in design.<br />
The sea/wastewater<br />
desalination plant<br />
Overview<br />
The sea/wastewater desalination<br />
plant can be installed with experienced<br />
components [30, 31, 32]. These<br />
will consist of the seawater precleaning<br />
installation, Figure 32, and<br />
the following different heat exchangers<br />
for heating up the water<br />
until evaporation. The distillated<br />
water is free of solid particles, and can<br />
be used as drinking water or for many<br />
other purposes. The residual salt,<br />
brine and further solids can be sold or<br />
deposited.<br />
A solar plant can be used to reduce<br />
the necessary heat from the steam turbine<br />
during sunshine. The produced<br />
heat in the nuclear part can be nearly<br />
completely used with highest thermodynamic<br />
efficiency. The Seawater is<br />
extracted from the sea and precleaned.<br />
Turbine condenser<br />
The condenser of the turbine, Figure<br />
33, is the first stage to heat up the<br />
seawater. Seawater resistant tubes are<br />
necessary in the condenser. The quantity<br />
of cooling seawater, the temperature<br />
rise and condenser pressure must<br />
be economically optimized. The efficiency<br />
of the thermodynamic process<br />
must be calculated. Normally the<br />
temperature rise in the condenser is<br />
calculated with 5 ° -10 °C. Also the<br />
quantity of cooling water can vary, for<br />
a 600 MWel unit between 20.000 –<br />
40.000 m 3 / hour. If the required<br />
cooling water quantity is too high for<br />
| | Fig. 33.<br />
chematic of a turbine condenser.<br />
the desalination plant, the water can<br />
be released back into the Sea (Figure<br />
33).<br />
Solar plant<br />
A conventional solar plant, Figure 34,<br />
can be installed. The solar energy<br />
depends on sunshine intensity, which<br />
depends mainly the daily time and<br />
seasonal periods of the year and<br />
environmental conditions (Figure<br />
35). The heat from the solar plant<br />
must be transported to the heat exchanger<br />
as second heating stage. This<br />
circuit makes it possible, to reduce the<br />
extracted steam from the turbine. The<br />
safe steam can be used for additional<br />
production of electric energy in the<br />
low pressure part of the turbine by<br />
expension the steam down to condenser<br />
pressure. The solar plant is<br />
able to produce elec tricity indirectly.<br />
| | Fig. 34.<br />
Solar plant.<br />
| | Fig. 35.<br />
Average solar energy in Tunis CIty, 1997.<br />
Desalination plant<br />
Well know seawater desalination<br />
plants can be installed, working as<br />
distillation process so as MSF (multistage-flash)-plant<br />
(Figure 36). The<br />
preheated sea-water will be brought<br />
with the steam extracted from the<br />
turbine to a temperature of 90 °C to<br />
| | Fig. 36.<br />
Multi-stage-flash desalination plant.<br />
| | Fig. 37.<br />
Multi effect distillation plant.<br />
135 °C, (1.0-1.5 bar). Then the seawater<br />
streams to the evaporating<br />
chambers with economically optimized<br />
number of stages. The distillate<br />
then can be used as drinking water.<br />
With nearly the same technic works<br />
the MED (multi-effect-distillation)<br />
process (Figure 37). Chemicals must<br />
be added as far as necessary, this is<br />
depending from the quality of the<br />
seawater.<br />
An economically plant optimization<br />
is to be carried out to choose the<br />
best process.<br />
The brine, consisting of the chemicals,<br />
salt and other solid components<br />
of the seawater will be evaporated. To<br />
evaporate the solid particles several<br />
possibilities are applicable, evaporating<br />
by the sun directly, by solar heat<br />
or by low pressure steam from the<br />
turbine. The solid parts will be dried<br />
and stabilized. Then they may be sold<br />
or stored.<br />
An analysis should be carried out,<br />
which demonstrates the influence of<br />
different plant designs, operating parameters<br />
and environmental conditions<br />
on the efficiency and the costs of<br />
the plant and their thermodynamic<br />
efficiency.<br />
Advantages of co-generation of<br />
electric power and water<br />
• The use of pre-cleaned seawater as<br />
cooling water for the turbine condenser<br />
makes it possible to operate<br />
this process without cooling towers<br />
or smaller ones if necessary. All<br />
residual heat from the thermodynamic<br />
process to generate<br />
electric power, which otherwise is<br />
dissipated in the cooling towers, is<br />
used for pre-heating the sea-water<br />
during the first stage.<br />
• The extracted low pressure steam<br />
from the turbine feeds the<br />
high-pressure line of the turbine<br />
to produce electricity and the residual<br />
heat of the steam is then<br />
used in the evaporating process for<br />
the desalinization plant.<br />
• The thermodynamic efficiency of<br />
the combined processes can reach<br />
nearly 100 %.<br />
• The combined feeding of the evaporators<br />
by steam from the turbine<br />
and with heat from the solar plant<br />
makes it possible to operate the<br />
evaporators of the desalination<br />
plant up to 8,760 hours per year.<br />
This provides nearly 100 % operational<br />
time for this high investment<br />
costs.<br />
• The solar plant replaces the extracted<br />
steam from the turbine.<br />
More electricity can be indirectly<br />
produced.<br />
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• The final evaporation and drying<br />
of the brine can be completed using<br />
solar heat, a very economical<br />
process.<br />
• The water produced can be collected<br />
and stored. Both processes can<br />
be produced separately and alternatively,<br />
according to operational<br />
demands as a main or by-product.<br />
Summary and conclusions<br />
Main Design Principals of large<br />
VHTR-Power Plants:<br />
Future designs of VHT- Reactors<br />
must have the following design elements<br />
[38], mostly by safety reasons:<br />
• Pebbles with TRISO coated particles.<br />
• inherent safe design, no melting of<br />
the core is possible.<br />
• Gastight closed primary helium<br />
circuit in one pressure vessel.<br />
• Pre-stressed concrete pressure<br />
vessel.<br />
• Helium primary /Helium secondary heat<br />
exchangers in the primary circuit.<br />
• Pebble bed ring core (PBRC).<br />
• Small core dimensions.<br />
• Several extractions for pebbles.<br />
• Safe against all possible dangerous<br />
events, extern and intern.<br />
• Safe against all types of terroristic<br />
attacks, cyber-attacks, plane<br />
crashes and similar attacks.<br />
• High magnitude earthquakes.<br />
• Highest possible safety standard.<br />
Economical advantages:<br />
• Very high primary helium gas<br />
temperatures.<br />
• No shut down for fuel elements<br />
changing and transportation.<br />
• Thermodynamic efficiency as high<br />
as in fossil power stations.<br />
• One/two times intermediate<br />
reheating possible.<br />
• Very high burn up of nuclear<br />
material.<br />
• Use of 232 thorium in combination<br />
with 235 Uranium to breed 233 Uranium.<br />
• Burn up of Plutonium, weapons<br />
plutonium included.<br />
• Reaching the non-proliferation-treaty<br />
agreement (NPT).<br />
• Safe storage of all nuclear material.<br />
• Safe and easy storing of radioactive<br />
material.<br />
(V)HTR to Co-Generate Electricity<br />
and high- plus low-temperature heat<br />
for several Industrial Processes (23,<br />
24, 33):<br />
Production of electricity by gas<br />
turbines [37]:<br />
• Hydrogen production [34, 35].<br />
• Chemicals.<br />
• Industrial Gases.<br />
• Steel making.<br />
• Nuclear Preheating.<br />
• Town Heating.<br />
and so on.<br />
Literature and References<br />
1. U. Cleve: Die Gesamtanlage des AVR<br />
Versuchsatomkraftwerkes in Jülich,<br />
Inbetriebnahme und Funktionsprüfungen.<br />
<strong>atw</strong>: 5/1966.<br />
2. AVR Versuchsatomkraftwerk mit Kugelhaufenreaktor<br />
in Jülich. Sonderdruck<br />
<strong>atw</strong> 5/1966<br />
3. Urban Cleve: Der AVR-Kugelhaufenreaktor<br />
und seine Weiterentwicklung.<br />
Elektrik+Elektronik Heft 3 /1969.<br />
4. U. Cleve, K. Kugeler, K. Knizia: The<br />
Technology of High Temperature-<br />
Reactors, Design, Commissioning and<br />
Operational Results of 15 MW el Experimental<br />
Reactor Jülich, Germany and<br />
THTR-300 MW el Demonstration Reactor<br />
Hamm and Their Impact on Future<br />
Designs. IACPP-Congress Nice 2011,<br />
5. U. Cleve: Die Technik der Hochtemperatur<br />
Reaktoren, Kolloquium RWTH<br />
Aachen, IEHK Juli 2011.<br />
6. AVR – Experimental High-Temperature-<br />
Reactor: 21 Years of Successful Operation<br />
for an Future Technology. VDI-<br />
Verlag ISBN 3-18-401015-5 1990.<br />
7. U. Cleve: Fragen und Antworten zum<br />
Experten-Bericht über Störfälle mit dem<br />
AVR. FZ-Jülich, 2014.<br />
8. U. Cleve: Fuel handling facility of high<br />
temperature pebble bed reactor.<br />
THTR-Meeting Brüssel 1967.<br />
9. U. Cleve: Onload fuelling of pebble bed<br />
high temperature reactor. HTR-<br />
Symposium London 1968.<br />
10. Fütterer at al.: A High Voltage Head-<br />
End Process for Waste Minimization<br />
and Reprocessing of coated Particle Fuel<br />
for High Temperature Reactors.<br />
Proceedings of ICAPP San Diego USA<br />
June 2010.<br />
11. U. Cleve: Die Technik der Hochtemperaturreaktoren.<br />
<strong>atw</strong> 12/ /2009.<br />
12. U. Cleve: Technik und Einsatzmöglichkeiten<br />
nuklearer Hochtemperaturreaktoren.<br />
Fusion Heft 1/2011.4<br />
13. HKG: THTR-Projektinformationen<br />
1962 – 1985.<br />
14. HRB: The commissioning of the<br />
THTR-300, a performance report.<br />
15. H. Bonnenberg: High Temperature Gas<br />
Cooled Reactor with spherical fuel<br />
elements. DGAP 2007.<br />
16. N. Nabielek, K.Verfondern, M.J. Kania:<br />
HTR Fuel Testing in AVR and MTRs. HTR<br />
Conference, Prague 2010.<br />
17. N. Nabielek, C.Tang, A.Müller: Recent<br />
Advances in HTR Fuel Manufacture.<br />
HTR-Conference Prague 2010.<br />
18. E. Mulder, D.Serfontaine, W. van der<br />
Merve: Thorium and Uranium fuel Cycle<br />
symbiosis in a pebble bed high<br />
temperature reactor. HTR-Conference<br />
Prague 2010.<br />
19. K. Kugeler: Gibt es den katastrophenfreien<br />
Reaktor? Physikalische Blätter 37<br />
/ 2001.<br />
20. U. Cleve: Zukunftsdialog der Bundeskanzlerin:<br />
Thorium als Energiequelle.<br />
Argumente und Stellungnahmen.<br />
Beiträge im Internet 2012.<br />
21. U. Cleve: Breeding of fissile 233 Uranium<br />
using 232 thorium with Pebble Fuel<br />
Elements. EIR-Conference: Report 49,<br />
May 2013.<br />
22. U. Cleve, Thorium: Brennstoff aus der<br />
Erde für tausende von Jahren.<br />
23. J. Schöning et.al Die Heliumgasreinigungsanlage.<br />
<strong>atw</strong> 5/1966.<br />
24. G. Wrochna: Results from Nuclear<br />
Cogeneration Industrial Initiative. NC2I<br />
National Center for Nuclear Research<br />
(NCBJ) Poland. 2016,<br />
25. Fütterer et.al.: The ARCHER Projekt,<br />
Advanced HTR for Cogeneration of heat<br />
and Electricity. Proceedings of the HTR,<br />
China 2014.<br />
26. U. Cleve: Nukleare Hochtemperaturreaktoren<br />
zur Erzeugung flüssiger<br />
Brennstoffe, von Wasserstoff und<br />
elektrischer Energie. <strong>atw</strong> 6/2011.<br />
27. U. Cleve: The Technology of High<br />
Temperature Reactors and Production<br />
of Nuclear Process Heat. NUTECH -2011,<br />
University of Cracow 2011.<br />
28. Auslegung, Konstruktion und Errichtung<br />
des Spannbetondruckbehälters<br />
des THTR-300. Ablauf und Ergebnisse.<br />
29. U. Cleve: Auslegung und Konstruktion<br />
großer Dampfturbinen. Technische<br />
Mitteilungen des HdT Heft 1, 1964.<br />
30. U. Cleve: Dampf-Wärme-Umwelttechnische<br />
Verfahrenskombinationen.<br />
Symposium Katovic 1976.<br />
31. T. Brendel: Solare Meerwasserentsalzungsanlagen<br />
mit mehrstufiger<br />
Verdunstung. Dissertation: Ruhr<br />
Universität Bochum 2003.<br />
32. J.Gebel, S.Yüce: An Engineering Guide<br />
to Desalination. VGB PowerTech. (2008).<br />
33. U.Cleve: Cost Valuation of Electricity<br />
and Heat for several industrial processes<br />
by co-generation in Power Stations.<br />
Dissertation: University of Heidelberg<br />
1960.<br />
34. K.R.Schultz, L.C.Brown, G.E.Besenbruch,<br />
C.J.Hamilton: Large Scale Production of<br />
Hydrogenby Nuclear Energy for Hydrogen<br />
Economy. GA-Report A 74265,<br />
35. S. Schulien: Ein Weg aus der Abhängigkeit<br />
von Erdöl – Nutzbarmachung der<br />
Wasserstofftechnik. FH Wiesbaden.<br />
36. Sun Guohui et al. Discussion of High-<br />
Temperature Performance of Alloy 625<br />
for HTR Steam Generators. Proceedings<br />
of HTR, Weihei, China 2014.<br />
37. W. von Lensa: Internationale<br />
Entwicklungsprogramme zum<br />
Hochtemperaturreaktor. Bericht<br />
FZ-Jülich.<br />
38. U. Cleve: Konstruktionsprinzipien zur<br />
nuklearen und betrieblichen Sicherheit<br />
on HTR-KKW.<br />
Authors<br />
Dr.-Ing. Urban Cleve<br />
Ex. CTO/HA-Leiter Technik<br />
of BBC/Krupp Reaktorbau GmbH,<br />
Mannheim<br />
Hohenfriedbergerstr. 4<br />
44141 Dortmund, Germany<br />
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 177<br />
Research and Innovation<br />
The Technology of TVHTR-Nuclear- Power Stations With Pebble Fuel Elements ı Urban Cleve
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 178<br />
Zur Rationalität des Deutschen<br />
Kernenergieausstieges<br />
Wolfgang Stoll<br />
Einleitung Platon stellte 400 vor Christus fest: „Was immer Du tust, Du tust einem anderen Böses.“ Streng genommen<br />
müsste das ebenso für Unterlassungen gelten – aber unser Leben ist mehr auf Handlungen und Handlungsfolgen<br />
eingestellt.<br />
Zum Rahmen unserer Handlungsoptionen<br />
gehört auch das Gewerberecht.<br />
Nach seinen etablierten Regeln<br />
erlaubt es gewerbliche Tätigkeiten,<br />
die den Nachbarn jenseits der Grenzen<br />
des Grundstücks, auf dem das<br />
Gewerbe ausgeübt wird, nicht unzumutbar<br />
gefährden. Das Ausmaß der<br />
Gefährdung, das der Nachbar zu<br />
tolerieren hat, darf das allgemein als<br />
akzeptiert betrachtete „Restrisiko“ als<br />
Äquivalent von einem (statistischen)<br />
Todesfall unter 1 Million Menschen<br />
und Jahr nicht überschreiten. (Für die<br />
Grenzen der Zumutbarkeit des fremd<br />
verschuldeten Risikos, das zu akzeptieren<br />
ist, gibt es in der deutschen<br />
Rechtsprechung das Kalkar-Urteil).<br />
Das ist ungefähr 1 % des aus der<br />
mittleren Lebenserwartung ableitbaren<br />
individuellen statistischen<br />
Ablebensrisikos aus allen Lebensrisiken<br />
einschließlich des Todes durch<br />
Krankheit. Wo auch der Nutzen des<br />
Einzelnen dagegen bilanziert werden<br />
kann, wie bei vielen individuell eingegangenen<br />
Risiken, wie z.B. im<br />
Straßen verkehr, liegt das akzeptierte<br />
Todesrisiko (Autounfälle) bei derzeit<br />
50 Menschen pro Million und Jahr.<br />
Es kann bisher nicht sicher ausgeschlossen<br />
werden, dass bei einem<br />
Störfall in einem Kernkraftwerk der<br />
üblichen Bau- und Betriebsweise diese<br />
in Deutschland festgelegte Zumutbarkeitsgrenze<br />
überschritten wird. Die<br />
Höhe des Restrisikos ergibt sich aus<br />
im Wesentlichen zwei Risikosträngen,<br />
wie sie sowohl aus mangelnder Organisationsqualität,<br />
wie sie auch aus<br />
Mängeln der technischen Qualität des<br />
Systems entstehen können. Für die<br />
Beurteilung der Zumutbarkeitsgrenze<br />
nach obigem Todesfallrisiko wird hier<br />
die Wirkung ionisierender Strahlung<br />
auf Menschen in der Umgebung<br />
des Kraftwerkes herangezogen, die<br />
alle sonst noch möglichen Schadwirkungen<br />
überwölbt. Die herrschende<br />
Interpretation dieser Schädigung<br />
fußt auf einer Schadensvermutung<br />
auch bei sehr geringer Überschreitung<br />
der natürlichen Strahlenexposition,<br />
die eine Person durch die Summe an<br />
Inhalation, Ingestion und äußerer<br />
Bestrahlung vom Kernkraftwerk her<br />
erfährt. Eine kausale Schadenszuordnung<br />
an der Einzelperson mit<br />
gleicher Maximalfolge (Krebs) ist<br />
wegen der Multikausalität (parallel<br />
wirkende mögliche andere Schadstoffe)<br />
ausgeschlossen. Es gibt allenfalls<br />
in großen Bevölkerungskollektiven<br />
statistisch erkennbare Schäden<br />
in eintretenden Krankheiten, einer<br />
Lebensverkürzung und dem Tod in<br />
einem sowohl zeitlich, wie örtlich<br />
unscharf begrenzten Umfeld.<br />
Verstellte Wirklichkeit.<br />
Mit zunehmendem Lebensalter – und<br />
das erreichen bei uns immer mehr<br />
Menschen – rückt das Bewusstsein<br />
der Endlichkeit immer näher. Man<br />
kann das „Leben“ mit ein paar Zahlen<br />
umfassen. Nehmen wir einen<br />
94- Jährigen. Er besteht aus etwa einer<br />
Million Milliarden Zellen, von denen<br />
jede Sekunde eine Million zugrunde<br />
gehen. Die Ausscheidungen in den<br />
Eiweißbestandteilen in Stuhl und Urin<br />
beweisen das täglich. Leben umschließt<br />
also ein fortlaufendes Sterben<br />
von Zellen, was für dieses Menschenleben<br />
eine Bildung neuer Zellen im<br />
etwa Zehnfachen seines Körpergewichtes<br />
(rund 3 x 10E+15 Zellen)<br />
erfordert.<br />
Es sind aber nicht alle Organe<br />
gleichmäßig betroffen. Herausragend<br />
sind Haut, Haare, die Darmzotten und<br />
die Lunge. Unsere Lunge muss im<br />
Durchschnitt jährlich mit der Atemluft<br />
70 Gramm zellzerstörendes Ozon<br />
verkraften, was nur durch eine Neubildung<br />
von Zellen in den Alveolen<br />
gelingt. Enzyme, die das Abräumen<br />
der so beschädigten Zellen besorgen,<br />
nennen wir beschönigend „Reparaturenzyme“.<br />
Diese werden besonders<br />
dort und dann gebildet, wenn<br />
gehäufte Zellfehlbildungen und<br />
damit Zelltod signalisiert wird. Diese<br />
Korrekturen sind besonders beim<br />
wachsenden Organismus nötig,<br />
weshalb Kleinkinder bis zum Zehnfachen<br />
der Reparaturenzymkonzentration<br />
des Erwachsenen erreichen.<br />
Setzt man beim Erwachsenen einen<br />
Zellschaden, wie z.B. bei der ionisierenden<br />
Bestrahlung der ohnehin<br />
auf den fortlaufenden Zelltod programmierten<br />
Alveolen der Lunge, z.B.<br />
durch die Alphastrahlung von Radon,<br />
so antwortet der Körper mit einem<br />
Anstieg der Reparaturenzymkonzentration.<br />
Der Vorgang ist aber relativ<br />
langsam, also erst nach Stunden,<br />
und bleibt auch länger wirksam,<br />
sodass die Reparaturenzyme im<br />
ganzen Organismus auch andere<br />
vorgeschädigte Zellen ausscheiden.<br />
Erst eine Schädigung in Intervallen<br />
(mehrere Tage Pause) bringt die<br />
Reparaturenzyme auf den Wert des<br />
Babys, wo sie allerdings nur mehrere<br />
Wochen verharrt. Das begründet<br />
die Wirkung von Radonbädern<br />
auf Rheuma und andere Gewebsschädigungen.<br />
Es kommt aber auf die<br />
Dosis und die intermittierende<br />
Schädigung an – Dauerschädigung<br />
bewirkt durch Überlastung des Reparatursystems<br />
das Gegenteil. Diese<br />
wichtige Unter scheidung spiegelt sich<br />
nicht in unserem Gefahren-Bewusstsein.<br />
Unser streng nach kausaler Verknüpfung<br />
von Ursache und Wirkung<br />
aufgebautes Rechtssystem wird,<br />
sobald irgendwelche Schäden eingetreten<br />
oder auch nur zu befürchten<br />
sind, damit gegen alle Logik zur<br />
Bewertung nur statistisch erfassbarer<br />
Wirkungen als pseudokausal herangezogen.<br />
In angstzentrierten Gesellschaften,<br />
wie der unseren, kann diese<br />
Pseudokausalität schon im Vorfeld<br />
der Handlungen zu Totalverboten<br />
führen. Das erklärt auch das Abschaltgebot<br />
nach Fukushima, obwohl es<br />
an Deutschen Kernkraftwerken keine<br />
mit dem dortigen Unfallablauf<br />
und dessen Folgen vergleichbare<br />
Szenarien gibt.<br />
Zum deutschen<br />
Risikoverständnis<br />
Unsere Befindlichkeit erscheint dann<br />
im Gleichgewicht, wenn sie sich<br />
zwischen Chance und Risiko einpendelt.<br />
Research and Innovation<br />
On the Rationality of the German Nuclear Phase-out ı Wolfgang Stoll
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
Dabei ist das Verhältnis zwischen<br />
individuellen Glückserwartungen<br />
und ertragenem Risiko je nach dem<br />
Gemütszustand des Einzelnen sehr<br />
verschieden. Es liegt in unserem<br />
Selbstverständnis, dass überschaubare<br />
individuelle Risiken eher eingegangen<br />
werden, als von außen<br />
unsteuerbar aufgezwungene.<br />
Man kann unser individuelles<br />
Risiko feld als Schalenmodell darstellen,<br />
bei dem die innerste Schale<br />
die schiere Existenzerhaltung bildet,<br />
die von der Schale des nicht Hungerns<br />
(Essen), des nicht Frierens (Bekleidung),<br />
darum herum des Geborgenseins<br />
(Wohnen, Abstand) und schließlich<br />
der Schale der sozialen Akzeptanz<br />
(Familie, Gesellschaftliche Einbettung)<br />
umfangen wird. Im Gegensatz<br />
zu anderen Teilen der Welt weiß sich<br />
der Deutsche Bürger in den oben genannten<br />
Schalen sicher umfangenen<br />
und baut auch auf deren Kontinuität.<br />
Die Angst des Einzelnen, die sich stets<br />
auf Objektsuche befindet, weist bei<br />
unserem durchschnittlichen Bürger<br />
daher nach außen auf die eher kollektiven<br />
und weniger gegenständlichen<br />
Angstobjekte, besonders wenn sie<br />
vom Einzelnen nicht direkt beeinflussbar<br />
und in einer zeitlich wie örtlich<br />
unscharfen kollektiven Schadensvermutung<br />
allgegenwärtig sind. Die<br />
Angst vor ionisierender Strahlung gehört<br />
in diesen Problemkreis, wobei<br />
eine individuell mit einer Heilungsvermutung<br />
erduldete ionisierende<br />
Strahlung in der Medizin schon wegen<br />
ihrer örtlichen und zeitlichen Begrenzbarkeit<br />
davon weitgehend ausgenommen<br />
ist.<br />
Der Zugang zu Wechselfällen des<br />
Lebens, wie er aus solchen Gefährdungen<br />
entsteht, kann ja nach Einstellung<br />
überwiegend aktiv und verändernd<br />
(wie im Christentum) oder<br />
überwiegend ertragend und kontemplativ<br />
(wie z.B. im „Kismet“-Denken<br />
des Islam) ausgerichtet sein. Schon<br />
aus biblischen Ursprüngen ist unsere<br />
abendländische Denkschablone in<br />
Schuld und Sühne aktiv und kausal.<br />
Wir vereinfachen die oft nur scheinbar<br />
kausalen Zusammenhänge, die oft<br />
nur das nahe an 100 % herankommende<br />
Ende von Wahrscheinlichkeiten<br />
darstellen, wobei wir dem<br />
„Wunder“ den unscheinbaren Rest bis<br />
zur vollen Kausalität überlassen. Das<br />
gilt für alle Ereignisse, die wir wahrnehmen<br />
können, vierdimensional, das<br />
heißt in Raum und Zeit. Die daraus<br />
abgeleitete scheinbare Unentrinnbarkeit<br />
bei Schadereignissen entsteht<br />
durch Überdehnung großer Dimensionen<br />
ins Unendliche: Zeitlich im<br />
„Ewig“ und „immer“, örtlich im „Überall“.<br />
Die Kernenergiegegner operieren<br />
zur allgemeinen Angstmache geschickt<br />
mit dieser Begriffsüberdehnung.<br />
Das Problem ist aber von<br />
ganz allgemeiner Natur. Klassische<br />
wissenschaftliche Erkenntnisse kommen<br />
überwiegend aus dem Bereich<br />
der sehr hohen Wahrscheinlichkeit,<br />
die wir vereinfacht als kausale Verknüpfung<br />
von Ursache und Wirkung<br />
kennzeichnen. Ganz allgemein wird<br />
aber im Vordringen unseren Wissens<br />
in immer kompliziertere Zusammenhänge<br />
bis in das so genannte statistische<br />
„Rauschen“ der Zusammenhang<br />
von Ursache und Wirkung<br />
immer weniger eindeutig. Diese<br />
Unschärfe eröffnet einen großen<br />
Ermessensspielraum (ein Beispiel ist<br />
die globale Erwärmung). Zusätzlich<br />
werden dann aus Gründen der Vereinfachung<br />
auch noch die Randbedingungen<br />
weggelassen, mit denen<br />
eine statistische Aussage von der<br />
Wissenschaft zusätzlich oft eingeschränkt<br />
wird. Schon Immanuel Kant<br />
fand, dass der Bedarf an Entscheidungen<br />
immer größer wäre als der<br />
Vorrat an Erkenntnissen. Der Einzelne<br />
vereinfacht aber im Alltag seine<br />
Schlussfolgerungen durch die im<br />
Recht und in der Religion anerzogene<br />
strenge Kausalität. Überlässt man<br />
scheinbar gefahrengeneigte Tätigkeiten<br />
den abergläubischen und<br />
nur ausschnittsinformierten Angstbürgern<br />
als neue Warnungen vor<br />
Ungemach und als mögliche Katastrophenszenarien,<br />
so versteifen Mehrheiten<br />
diese daher vereinfachend als<br />
„Gewissheiten“ und leiten daraus<br />
kollektive Handlungsanweisungen ab.<br />
So hat in unserer Gesellschaft die<br />
Angst eine Vorliebe für alle jetzt und<br />
hier vermeidbaren Angstobjekte,<br />
ohne die Spätfolgen (auch die des<br />
Unterlassens) ausreichend im Blick<br />
zu haben. In Gesellschaftssystemen,<br />
die sich weniger perfektioniert geben,<br />
sind auch die Ordnungssysteme<br />
weniger strikt durchgehalten und der<br />
Bürger sorgt in der für ihn stets erwiesenen<br />
Unzuverlässigkeit vorsichtig<br />
für sich selbst, wobei er in einem allgegenwärtigen<br />
gefährlicheren Risikofeld<br />
weniger Anstoß an verbleibenden<br />
Restrisiken nimmt. In Aufstellen und<br />
Durchhalten von Ordnungssystemen<br />
ist jedoch gerade Deutschland ein<br />
Extrembeispiel, was schon im sprachlichen<br />
Doppelbegriff der Sicherheit,<br />
die sowohl Gewissheit, wie auch die<br />
Gefahrenabwesenheit meint (lateinisch:<br />
certitudo securitatis), zum Ausdruck<br />
kommt. Der den Doppelbegriff<br />
einfordernde Bürger macht sich nicht<br />
klar, dass genau dies alle gefahrengeneigte<br />
Technik fast schon definitionsgemäß<br />
ausschließt, was im<br />
Besonderen die Kerntechnik trifft.<br />
Die unkonditionierte<br />
Ablehnung<br />
Einziger Ausweg aus diesem typisch<br />
deutschen Dilemma, bei dem man<br />
sich stets in einem überschaubaren<br />
und geregelten Umfeld wähnt, kann<br />
nur ein kategorischer Ausschluss einer<br />
radioaktive Stoffe hantierenden Technik<br />
sein.(Obwohl dies objektiv wahrscheinlich<br />
gar nicht im strengen Sinne<br />
nötig wäre).<br />
Daraus folgt, dass jede unkontrollierte<br />
Freisetzung von Radionukliden,<br />
wie immer diese zustande kommt,<br />
ausgeschlossen werden muss. Begrifflich<br />
verlangt das für Radionuklide<br />
geschlossene Quellen, die allenfalls<br />
Strahlung, aber keine Dispersion bewirken.<br />
Eine radioaktive Freisetzung<br />
aus Betrieb oder Unfall in einem Kernkraftwerk<br />
muss somit auf das Betriebsgelände<br />
oder besser auf den<br />
Kernenergieanteil der Anlage beschränkt<br />
bleiben. Dies gilt nicht nur<br />
für den Normalbetriebsfall, in dem<br />
eine wie immer geschulte Betreibermannschaft<br />
sichernd eingreifen kann,<br />
sondern auch für eine unbeherrschte<br />
Betriebsstörung ohne menschlichen<br />
Steuerungseingriff.<br />
Streng genommen gälte das für<br />
alle von einer Dispersion von Radionukliden<br />
gefährdeten Flächen, die ja<br />
auch an Landesgrenzen nicht Halt<br />
macht, wie man an dem Unfall in<br />
Tschernobyl erfahren musste. Die<br />
zu einem solchen weit reichenden<br />
Ausschluss nötigen internationalen<br />
Instrumente fehlen bisher jedoch.<br />
Es gibt für den Radionuklideinschluss<br />
bei schweren Störfällen bereits<br />
technische Teil-Lösungen, (z.B.<br />
das Kraftwerk Olkiluoto III in Finnland<br />
und Flamanville III in Frankreich), bei<br />
denen ein eventuell schmelzender<br />
Rektorkern sicher aufgefangen wird.<br />
Der überwiegende Teil der Menschheit<br />
hält derartige etwas teurere<br />
Konzepte wegen der geringen Eintrittswahrscheinlichkeit<br />
der Schäden<br />
auch nach Fukushima bisher noch<br />
nicht für nötig.<br />
Schon die „umhüllte radioaktive<br />
Quelle“ verlangt, dass die Umhüllungen<br />
des Systems unzerstört bleiben<br />
muss und dass sie einen sich aufbauenden<br />
Innendruck allenfalls nur<br />
über Filter abbauen darf, die alle<br />
gefährlichen Radionuklide zurückhalten<br />
können. Für einen geometrisch<br />
noch intakten Reaktor gibt es im Prinzip<br />
zwei primäre Störkräfte, die auf<br />
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 179<br />
Research and Innovation<br />
On the Rationality of the German Nuclear Phase-out ı Wolfgang Stoll
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 180<br />
ihn einwirken können: Die Kettenreaktion<br />
selbst und die abzuführende<br />
Nachwärme. Der Abbruch der Kettenreaktion<br />
erfolgt nach Verlust des<br />
Kühlmittels automatisch, solange das<br />
Kühlmittel auch der einzige Moderator<br />
ist. Das gilt für alle wassermoderierten<br />
Systeme. Die Nachwärme<br />
entspricht im Abschaltzeitpunkt<br />
etwa 4 % der Reaktorleistung<br />
und fällt nach einer Woche auf etwa<br />
0,5 % ab. Solange das Rohrleitungssystem<br />
noch intakt ist und eines der<br />
mehreren redundant und diversitär<br />
ausgelegten Nachkühlsysteme noch<br />
funktioniert, kann die Restwärme<br />
abgeführt werden. Selbst wenn der<br />
Systemumlauf nicht mehr funktioniert,<br />
so kann der mit Wasser be deckte<br />
Reaktorkern noch durch Ver dampfung<br />
gekühlt werden. Die frei werdende<br />
Wärme der ersten 10 Tage nach Abschaltung<br />
eines 1.000 MWe Reaktors<br />
entspricht der Verdampfungswärme<br />
von 40.000 Kubikmetern Wasser (also<br />
etwa 3 großen Schwimmbecken).<br />
Nach diesen 10 Tagen ist der Hauptteil<br />
des kurzlebigen radioaktiven Jods<br />
zerfallen und es muss von den flüchtigen<br />
Bestandteilen im Wesentlichen<br />
noch das ausdampfbare Cäsiumjodid<br />
zurückgehalten werden.<br />
Soweit keine Kühlung erfolgt, wird<br />
bis dahin der Kern mit allen seinen<br />
auch nicht aktiven Bestandteilen<br />
zu einem geschmolzenen Klumpen<br />
(das sogenannte Corium) umgeformt<br />
worden sein, der langsam durch sein<br />
Gewicht in den Beton des Bodens<br />
des Reaktorgebäudes einsinkt. Im<br />
medialen Sprachgebrauch hat sich<br />
dieser Vorgang plakativ als das<br />
„Chinasyndrom“ verselbstständigt<br />
und überschattet so alle parallel<br />
laufenden, möglicherweise sogar<br />
schwerer wiegenden Freisetzungsvorgänge.<br />
Es ist höchst spekulativ, ob<br />
das eindringende Corium irgendwann<br />
das meist mehrere Meter dicke Betonfundament<br />
durchschmelzen kann<br />
(schon eine einige Meter dicke Lage<br />
von Quarzsand kann das verhindern)<br />
und ob dann das Schmelzgut noch<br />
flüchtige Spaltprodukte nach außen<br />
durch den Boden freisetzen würde.<br />
Jedenfalls kann man dieses Risiko<br />
relativ einfach durch eine hochtemperaturfeste<br />
Wanne unter dem Reaktordruckgefäß<br />
(=core catcher) oder<br />
durch einen entsprechend dicken<br />
Stahlboden (Wie in neuen Russischen<br />
Reaktordruckgefäßen vorgesehen)<br />
soweit verlangsamen, dass der Vorgang<br />
mit abnehmender Restwärme<br />
ohne Durchbruch nach außen zum<br />
Stillstand kommt.<br />
Man geht derzeit dazu über, die<br />
Kühlmöglichkeiten des abgeschalteten<br />
Reaktors so weit zu perfektionieren,<br />
dass das System sich selbsttätig<br />
und ohne Umlegen von Hebeln oder<br />
Einschalten von Notstromaggregaten<br />
auch ohne menschlichen Eingriff ausreichend<br />
mit Wasser kühlt. Das bleibt<br />
aber immer „engineered safety“ und<br />
ist, soweit man nicht auf Wasser aus<br />
einem statischen Gefälle, z.B. von<br />
einem großen Hochbehälter zurückgreifen<br />
kann, von Pumpen, also einer<br />
funktionierenden Energiezufuhr und<br />
einem intakten Rohrleitungssystem<br />
abhängig.<br />
Wenn nichts davon funktioniert,<br />
(wenn z.B. der Druckbehälter auch<br />
nicht mehr mit Zu- und Ableitungen<br />
verbunden sein sollte), ist der Kernschmelzunfall<br />
nach etwa 25 Minuten<br />
Tatsache.<br />
Es ist verständlich, dass unabhängig<br />
davon, durch welche Ursache<br />
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Research and Innovation<br />
On the Rationality of the German Nuclear Phase-out ı Wolfgang Stoll
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
(einschließlich absichtlicher Kernzerstörung)<br />
eine unkontrollierte<br />
Freisetzung von Radionukliden mit<br />
der weiträumigen Verseuchung bewohnter<br />
Landstriche stattfinden kann,<br />
kein dicht besiedeltes Umfeld einem<br />
solchen Risiko ausgesetzt werden darf.<br />
Von diesem Risiko ist der Weiterbetrieb<br />
der in Europa, besonders aber<br />
Deutschland laufenden Kernkraftwerke<br />
eben nicht grundsätzlich frei –<br />
wie klein auch immer man eine Wahrscheinlichkeit<br />
dafür ansetzt.<br />
Soweit man die Reaktionen der<br />
Reaktorbetreiber auf Fukushima<br />
bisher beurteilen kann, werden die<br />
EVA-Ereignisse (= Einwirkung von<br />
Außen, einschließlich Flutung) und<br />
die Notkühlsysteme überprüft und<br />
auskömmlich (je 4 Systeme) sowohl<br />
auf Redundanz, wie auf Diversität<br />
verbessert. In den USA prüft man<br />
zusätzlich die Evakuierungsmöglichkeiten<br />
der Kraftwerksumgebung. Die<br />
21 von Russland geplanten neuen<br />
Kernkraftwerke haben alle einen verstärkten<br />
Druckgefäßboden und ein<br />
zweites Containment. Sofortabschaltungen<br />
gibt es nur in Deutschland,<br />
Auslaufen der Kernenergie ist in<br />
der Schweiz geplant, Neubaupläne<br />
wurden in Italien gestoppt. Die<br />
anderen Nuklearnationen bewegen<br />
sich zwischen Prüfungen, Verbesserungen,<br />
Laufzeitverkürzungen und<br />
verzögertem Neubau, ohne dass es<br />
bisher allgemein gültige Verhaltensregeln<br />
gibt.<br />
Die mehr grundsätzlichen<br />
Alternativen<br />
Die Summe aller dieser Vorkehrungen<br />
mindert die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass<br />
es nach entsprechenden Störungen<br />
zum Kernschmelzen und in der Folge<br />
zum unkontrollierten Austritt von<br />
Spaltprodukten kommt. Ausgeschlossen<br />
sind derartige Folgen aber<br />
nicht grundsätzlich. Damit bleibt<br />
die diffuse Angst vor ionisierender<br />
Strahlung und deren Folge für die<br />
nähere und auch weitere Kraftwerksumgebung<br />
erhalten.<br />
Will man sich darauf einstellen, so<br />
darf das äußere System der Umschließung<br />
– das Containment oder<br />
der umhüllende zweite Druckbehälter<br />
– keiner zusätzlichen zerstörenden<br />
Kraft mehr ausgesetzt werden. Untersucht<br />
man die Risiken dazu, so fallen<br />
zunächst die Zirkon-Wasser-Reaktion<br />
mit Wasserstoffbildung und eine<br />
nachfolgende Knallgasexplosion am<br />
schwersten ins Gewicht. Man kann<br />
den Reaktorraum mit Stickstoff<br />
fluten, um Luftzutritt zu verhindern,<br />
aber auch diese Vorkehrung kann<br />
im Störfall durch Eindringen von<br />
Luft über Undichtigkeiten versagen.<br />
Rekombinatoren (Platinmetalle) helfen<br />
auch nur so lange, als der Gasumlauf<br />
diese ausreichend schnell<br />
erreicht, noch genügend Sauerstoff<br />
vorhanden ist und die Rekombinations-Rate<br />
mit der Zirkon-Wasserrektion<br />
Schritt halten kann – was<br />
nicht in allen Fällen gewährleistet ist.<br />
Überhitzt kann er sogar direkt zur<br />
Zündquelle werden.<br />
Zirkon als reaktives Metall ausschließen<br />
heißt auf andere Hüllmaterialien<br />
ausweichen. Dafür bietet sich<br />
rostfreier Stahl an, was allerdings<br />
die Anreicherungskosten für das Uran<br />
fast verdoppelt und Ansprüche an<br />
die Tritium-Rückhaltung im Betrieb<br />
erhöht.<br />
Bei Schiffsreaktoren wird das<br />
überwiegend so praktiziert. (Eine<br />
etwas ferner liegende Lösung wäre die<br />
Verwendung der Spaltedelmetalle als<br />
Hüllrohr, wozu man diese allerdings<br />
aus den Spaltprodukten der Wiederaufarbeitung<br />
abtrennen, für thermische<br />
Reaktoren das Rhodium seiner<br />
starken Neutronenabsorption wegen<br />
von Palladium und Ruthenium<br />
trennen und die Menge von 10 abgebrannten<br />
Kernen für den Metallbedarf<br />
eines Folgekerne zusammenkommen<br />
lassen müsste, wonach es allerdings<br />
für nachfolgende Kerne jeweils wieder<br />
verwendet werden könnte).<br />
Das Zusammenschmelzen und<br />
damit die Corium-Bildung würden<br />
dadurch zwar stark verzögert, aber<br />
nicht grundsätzlich verhindert. Das<br />
gilt im Übrigen auch für den gepriesenen<br />
Hochtempera tur reaktor, da der<br />
als Moderator verwendete Grafit bei<br />
Luftzutritt abbrennen und Radionuklide<br />
freisetzen würde. Für die Absorption<br />
der Hauptmenge der gasförmigen<br />
Spaltpro dukte Jod und Cäsium wäre<br />
ein Wasser filter ( Berieselung oder<br />
Wäscher) am einfachsten. Der Rest<br />
der dis pergierbaren Radionuklide<br />
wäre technisch am besten an<br />
großober flächige Produkte zu binden.<br />
Da humoser Boden Cäsium am<br />
längsten festhält, könnte wahrscheinlich<br />
stattdessen gewöhnlicher Torf<br />
als Rück halte medium dienen. Auch<br />
Aktiv kohle wirkt ähnlich. Dabei<br />
kommt es nicht auf eine dauerhafte<br />
Rück haltung, sondern nur auf eine<br />
zeit liche Ver zögerung bis zum radioaktiven<br />
Zerfall der Hauptmenge Jod<br />
im Cäsiumjodid an. Wenn man das<br />
Brandrisiko von Aktivkohle auch noch<br />
ausschließen will, muss man auf<br />
Zeolithe als Filtermedium ausweichen,<br />
was das Filtervolumen etwa<br />
verdreifacht.<br />
Als nächste Stufe der Vermeidung<br />
derartiger Störfälle bliebe nur der<br />
Weg, das System so zu verändern,<br />
dass auch bei Kernzerstörung entweder<br />
ein umschließendes Medium<br />
die freigesetzten Radionuklide auffängt<br />
oder keine Dispersionskräfte zur<br />
Ausbreitung mindestens von atmosphärischen<br />
Freisetzungen mehr existieren.<br />
Das bedeutet zunächst die<br />
Trennung von Drucksystemen wie der<br />
Dampferzeugung vom nuklearen Kern<br />
durch Zwischenwärmeübertragung<br />
mit einem nicht-dispergierenden<br />
Kühlmittel wie z.B. durch ein hoch<br />
siedendes flüssiges Metall. Es bedeutete<br />
auch, dass Druckgebende chemische<br />
Reaktionen ausgeschlossen<br />
werden müssen, was u.a. Zircaloy und<br />
Wasser als Paarung ausschließt. Wenn<br />
dann schon die Kernschmelze als<br />
Möglichkeit unterstellt wird, sollte die<br />
Wärmekapazität des sich erhitzenden<br />
Systems so gering wie möglich sein,<br />
um die äußere Kühlleistung zu minimieren.<br />
Das führt ganz automatisch<br />
zum Schnellen Reaktor, bei dem auch<br />
kein Moderator mit erhitzt wird und<br />
der wegen seiner hohen Energiedichte<br />
im Kern nur wenige Prozent des<br />
Volumens eines Druckwasserreaktors<br />
gleicher Leistung benötigt, die es<br />
dann zu kühlen gilt.<br />
Es gibt bereits Reaktoren, die<br />
diesem Konzept schon recht nahe<br />
kommen, wie z.B. die Blei-Wismutgekühlten<br />
Reaktoren der Russischen<br />
U-Boote der A-Klasse. Obwohl schon<br />
einige davon gesunken sind, hat man<br />
noch nirgends Radionuklide in schädigendem<br />
Ausmaß an der Meeresoberfläche<br />
gefunden. Man kann<br />
davon ausgehen, dass selbst ein bis<br />
zur Dispersion von Radionukliden<br />
zerstörter Reaktor zwar das darüber<br />
stehende Wasser verunreinigt, aber<br />
dennoch keine akute Gefahr darstellt,<br />
solange die über einem Reaktor<br />
stehende Wassermenge für die Nachkühlung<br />
ausreichend groß ist und sich<br />
in einem einigermaßen geschlossenen<br />
Becken befindet. Diese Randbedingungen<br />
würden von jedem mittelgroßen<br />
Stausee erfüllt, während man<br />
die stromführenden Teile und die<br />
Bedienung auf der trockenen Seite der<br />
Staumauer anordnen könnte.<br />
Schlussbemerkung<br />
Das mag alles sehr futuristisch<br />
klingen, aber man kann bei Betrachtung<br />
der auch heute noch in Planung<br />
und Bau befindlichen Kernkraftwerke<br />
davon ausgehen, dass die Menschheit<br />
nicht grundsätzlich auf die Nutzung<br />
der Kernenergie verzichten wird.<br />
Andererseits wird das Ausmaß an<br />
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 181<br />
Research and Innovation<br />
On the Rationality of the German Nuclear Phase-out ı Wolfgang Stoll
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
182<br />
STATISTICS<br />
(Manuskript Erstfassung:<br />
2012,<br />
im November 2017<br />
überarbeitet)<br />
Organisationsversagen immer wieder<br />
in Einzelfällen ausreichen, auch die<br />
ausgeklügeltsten ingenieurmäßigen<br />
Sicherheitsvorkehrungen unwirksam<br />
zu machen. Da bisher wegen der hohen<br />
Anfangskosten Kernkraftwerke<br />
bevorzugt in reichen und technisch<br />
fortschrittlichen Ländern gehäuft<br />
betrieben wurden, hat man dort auch<br />
alle bezahlbaren Sicherheitsvorkehrungen<br />
getroffen. Jetzt bauen<br />
aber vorwiegend ärmere Länder neue<br />
Kernkraftwerke, womit dann gerade<br />
dort das Eintreten schwerer Störfälle<br />
denkbar ist. Wegen der aber auch<br />
dort wachsenden ausgeprägten<br />
Risiko aversion wären zur Aufrechterhaltung<br />
der nuklearen Option<br />
voll abgesicherte, wenn auch teure<br />
Abhilfen gerechtfertigt. Es dürfte sich<br />
daher lohnen, System mindestens zu<br />
planen und zu erproben, die unter<br />
wirklich allen Umständen eine<br />
Dispersion ausschließen.<br />
Authors<br />
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Stoll<br />
Hanau, Deutschland<br />
Nuclear Power Plants:<br />
2017 <strong>atw</strong> Compact Statistics<br />
Editorial<br />
At the end of the last year 2017 (key date: 31 December 2017), nuclear power plants were operating in 31 countries<br />
worldwide (cf. Table 1). In total, 448 nuclear power plants were operating on the key date. This means that the<br />
number decreased by 2 units compared to the previous year’s number on 31 December 2016 (450, which means the<br />
highest number of units since the first start of an commercial nuclear power plant in 1956) due to first criticalities on the<br />
one hand and shut-downs on the other. The gross power output of these nuclear power plant units amounted to<br />
around 420 GWe*, the net power output was approximately 396 GWe. This means that the available gross capacity<br />
was about 1 GW, i.e. -0,25 % and the net capacity about 1 GW below the previous year’s values of about 421 GWe gross<br />
and 397 GWe net.<br />
Three (3) nuclear power plants started (nuclear)<br />
operation 1 in two countries in 2017. These units reached<br />
initial criticality, were synchronized with the grid and<br />
started commercial operation for the first time in 2017<br />
(cf. Tab. 1): China: Fuqing 4 (1089 MW, PWR, CGO),<br />
Tianwan 3 (1126 MW, PWR, CGO), Pakistan: Chasnupp-4<br />
(340 MW, PWR, CGO). One unit was synchronized with<br />
the grid and started commercial operation for the first<br />
time in 2017: China: Yangjiang 4 (1086 MW, GO).<br />
For the third time since the accidents in Fukushima<br />
( Japan) two nuclear power units, Takahama 3 (870 MW,<br />
PWR) and Takahama 4 (870 MW, PWR) resumed operation<br />
in 2017 in Japan after a longer shut-down.<br />
Five nuclear power plant units were definitively<br />
per manently shut-down worldwide in 2017. In Germany<br />
the unit Gundremmingen B (1344 MW) was shut-down<br />
after 33 years of successful operation. In Japan the prototype<br />
fast breeder reactor Monju (280 MW) was shut down<br />
22 years after first criticality. In the Republic of Korea the<br />
PWR Kori 1 (608 MW) was permanently shut down. The<br />
BWR Oskarshamn 1 (492 MW) was shut down in Sweden.<br />
The Spanish nuclear power plant Santa Maria de Garona<br />
(466 MW) was permanently shut down after five years of<br />
lay-up operation due to an applied for but not approved<br />
prolonged operation license.<br />
Three new projects started with the first concrete and<br />
further build activities. In Bangladesh one new build project<br />
started with Rooppur 1(1200 MW), India started the<br />
new build of the third unit at Kudankulam (1000 MW) and<br />
in the Republic of Korea one additional project started<br />
with Shin-Kori 5 ( 1455 MW).<br />
In total 56 reactors are under construction worldwide<br />
in 15 countries. The total gross capacity of this projects is<br />
about 61 GW*, the net capacity 58 GW, in other words the<br />
number was lower (2) compared to the previous year number<br />
due to the three operation starts, three new build projects<br />
and the suspension of one project with two reactors.<br />
Compared with the millennium change 1999/2000 this<br />
means that the number of projects under construction has<br />
risen, when 30 nuclear power plants were under construction<br />
worldwide.<br />
Two projects in the USA were stopped. South Carolina<br />
Public Service Authority (minority partner of the project,<br />
40 %) decided to stop the new build project Virgil C. Summer<br />
2 and 3. Construction of two advanced pressurized<br />
water reactors (APR 1000, 1080 MW) by Westinghouse<br />
started in 2013. In March 2017, Westinghouse Electric<br />
Company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy because of $9<br />
billion of losses from its two U.S. nuclear construction projects.<br />
SCANA (share in project: 60 %) considered its options<br />
for the project, and ultimately decided to abandon<br />
the project in July 2017 after the decision of its minority<br />
partner.<br />
Active construction projects (numbers in brackets)<br />
listed are: Argentina (1), Bangladesh (1), Belarus (2), Brazil<br />
(1), China (18), Finland (1), France (1), India (7), Japan<br />
(2), Republic of Korea (4), Pakistan (2), Russia (7),<br />
Slovak Republic (2), Taiwan (2), the USA (2) and the United<br />
Arab Emirates (4).<br />
In addition, there are about 125 nuclear power plant<br />
units in 25 countries worldwide that are in an advanced<br />
planning stage, others are in the pre-planning phase<br />
( status: 31 December 2017).<br />
Statistics<br />
Nuclear Power Plants: 2017 <strong>atw</strong> Compact Statistics
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
Country<br />
Location/<br />
Station name<br />
Status Reactor type<br />
Capacity<br />
gross<br />
[MW]<br />
Capacity<br />
net<br />
[MW]<br />
1st<br />
Criticality<br />
[Year]<br />
Argentina<br />
Atucha 1 p D2O-PWR 357 341 1974<br />
Embalse p Candu 648 600 1983<br />
Atucha 2 p D2O-PWR 745 692 2014<br />
CAREM25 P PWR 29 25 (2020)<br />
Armenia<br />
Metsamor 2 p VVER-PWR 408 376 1980<br />
Belarus<br />
Belarusian 1 P VVER-PWR 1 194 1 109 (2019)<br />
Belarusian 2 P VVER-PWR 1 194 1 109 (2021)<br />
Bangladesh<br />
Rooppur 1 [2] P VVER-PWR 1 200 1 080 (2022)<br />
Belgium<br />
Doel 1 p PWR 454 433 1975<br />
Doel 2 p PWR 454 433 1975<br />
Doel 3 p PWR 1 056 1 006 1982<br />
Doel 4 p PWR 1 090 1 039 1985<br />
Tihange 1 p PWR 1 009 962 1975<br />
Tihange 2 p PWR 1 055 1 008 1983<br />
Tihange 3 p PWR 1 094 1 046 1985<br />
Brazil<br />
Angra 1 p PWR 640 609 1984<br />
Angra 2 p PWR 1 350 1 275 1999<br />
Angra 3 P PWR 1 300 1 245 (2020)<br />
Bulgarien<br />
Kozloduj 5 p VVER-PWR 1 000 953 1987<br />
Kozloduj 6 p VVER-PWR 1 000 953 1989<br />
Canada<br />
Bruce 1 p Candu 824 772 1977<br />
Bruce 2 p Candu 786 734 1977<br />
Bruce 3 p Candu 805 730 1977<br />
Bruce 4 p Candu 805 750 1979<br />
Bruce 5 p Candu 872 817 1985<br />
Bruce 6 p Candu 891 822 1984<br />
Bruce 7 p Candu 872 817 1986<br />
Bruce 8 p Candu 845 817 1987<br />
Darlington 1 p Candu 934 878 1993<br />
Darlington 2 p Candu 934 878 1990<br />
Darlington 3 p Candu 934 878 1993<br />
Darlington 4 p Candu 934 878 1993<br />
Pickering 1 p Candu 542 515 1971<br />
Pickering 4 p Candu 542 515 1973<br />
Pickering 5 p Candu 540 516 1983<br />
Pickering 6 p Candu 540 516 1984<br />
Pickering 7 p Candu 540 516 1985<br />
Pickering 8 p Candu 540 516 1986<br />
Point Lepreau p Candu 705 660 1983<br />
China<br />
CEFR p SNR 25 20 2011<br />
Changjiang 1 p PWR 650 610 2015<br />
Changjiang 2 p PWR 650 601 2016<br />
Fangchenggang 1 p PWR 1 080 1 000 2015<br />
Fangchenggang 2 p PWR 1 088 1 000 2016<br />
Fangjiashan 1 p PWR 1 080 1 000 2014<br />
Fangjiashan 2 p PWR 1 080 1 000 2014<br />
Fuqing 1 p PWR 1 087 1 000 2014<br />
Fuqing 2 p PWR 1 087 1 000 2015<br />
Fuqing 3 p PWR 1 089 1 000 2016<br />
Fuqing 4 [1] p PWR 1 089 1 089 2017<br />
Guandong 1 p PWR 984 944 1993<br />
Guandong 2 p PWR 984 944 1994<br />
Hongyanhe 1 p PWR 1 080 1 000 2013<br />
Hongyanhe 2 p PWR 1 080 1 000 2013<br />
Hongyanhe 3 p PWR 1 080 1 000 2014<br />
Hongyanhe 4 p PWR 1 119 1 000 2016<br />
Lingao 1 p PWR 990 938 2002<br />
Lingao 2 p PWR 990 938 2002<br />
Lingao II-1 p PWR 1 087 1 000 2010<br />
Lingao II-2 p PWR 1 087 1 000 2011<br />
Ningde 1 p PWR 1 087 1 000 2012<br />
Ningde 2 p PWR 1 080 1 000 2014<br />
Ningde 3 p PWR 1 080 1 000 2015<br />
Ningde 4 p PWR 1 089 1 018 2016<br />
Qinshan 1 p PWR 310 288 1992<br />
Qinshan II-1 p PWR 650 610 2002<br />
Qinshan II-2 p PWR 650 610 2004<br />
Qinshan II-3 p PWR 642 610 2010<br />
Qinshan II-4 p PWR 642 610 2011<br />
Qinshan III-1 p Candu 728 665 2002<br />
Qinshan III-2 p Candu 728 665 2003<br />
Tianwan 1 p VVER-PWR 1 060 1 000 2005<br />
Country<br />
Location/<br />
Station name<br />
Status Reactor type<br />
Capacity<br />
gross<br />
[MW]<br />
Capacity<br />
net<br />
[MW]<br />
1st<br />
Criticality<br />
[Year]<br />
Tianwan 2 p VVER-PWR 1 060 1 000 2007<br />
Tianwan 3 [1] p VVER-PWR 1 060 1 000 2017<br />
Yangjiang 1 p PWR 1 080 1 000 2013<br />
Yangjiang 2 p PWR 1 080 1 000 2015<br />
Yangjiang 3 p PWR 1 080 1 000 2015<br />
Yangjiang 4 [1] p PWR 1 086 1 000 2016<br />
Fangchenggang 3 P PWR 1 080 1 000 (2020)<br />
Fangchenggang 4 P PWR 1 080 1 000 (2022)<br />
Fuqing 5 P PWR 1 087 1 000 (2020)<br />
Fuqing 6 P PWR 1 087 1 000 (2020)<br />
Haiyang 1 P PWR 1 180 1 100 (2016)<br />
Haiyang 2 P PWR 1 180 1 100 (2016)<br />
Hongyanhe 5 P PWR 1 080 1 000 (2020)<br />
Hongyanhe 6 P PWR 1 080 1 000 (2021)<br />
Sanmen 1 P PWR 1 180 1 100 (2016)<br />
Sanmen 2 P PWR 1 180 1 100 (2016)<br />
Shidaowan 1 P HTGR 211 200 (2016)<br />
Taishan 1 P PWR 1 750 1 660 (2017)<br />
Taishan 2 P PWR 1 750 1 660 (<strong>2018</strong>)<br />
Tianwan 4 P VVER-PWR 1 060 990 (<strong>2018</strong>)<br />
Tianwan 5 P VVER-PWR 1 118 1 000 (2020)<br />
Tianwan 6 P VVER-PWR 1 118 1 000 (2022)<br />
Yangjiang 5 P PWR 1 080 1 000 (<strong>2018</strong>)<br />
Yangjiang 6 P PWR 1 080 1 000 (<strong>2018</strong>)<br />
Czech Republic<br />
Dukovany 1 p VVER-PWR 500 473 1985<br />
Dukovany 2 p VVER-PWR 500 473 1986<br />
Dukovany 3 p VVER-PWR 500 473 1987<br />
Dukovany 4 p VVER-PWR 500 473 1987<br />
Temelín 1 p VVER-PWR 1 077 1 027 1999<br />
Temelín 2 p VVER-PWR 1 056 1 006 2002<br />
Finland<br />
Loviisa 1 p VVER-PWR 520 496 1977<br />
Loviisa 2 p VVER-PWR 520 496 1981<br />
Olkiluoto 1 p BWR 890 860 1979<br />
Olkiluoto 2 p BWR 890 860 1982<br />
Olkiluoto 3 P PWR 1 600 1 510 (2019)<br />
France<br />
Belleville 1 p PWR 1 363 1 310 1987<br />
Belleville 2 p PWR 1 363 1 310 1988<br />
Blayais 1 p PWR 951 910 1981<br />
Blayais 2 p PWR 951 910 1982<br />
Blayais 3 p PWR 951 910 1983<br />
Blayais 4 p PWR 951 910 1983<br />
Bugey 2 p PWR 945 910 1978<br />
Bugey 3 p PWR 945 910 1978<br />
Bugey 4 p PWR 917 880 1979<br />
Bugey 5 p PWR 917 880 1979<br />
Cattenom 1 p PWR 1 362 1 300 1986<br />
Cattenom 2 p PWR 1 362 1 300 1987<br />
Cattenom 3 p PWR 1 362 1 300 1990<br />
Cattenom 4 p PWR 1 362 1 300 1991<br />
Chinon B-1 p PWR 954 905 1982<br />
Chinon B-2 p PWR 954 905 1983<br />
Chinon B-3 p PWR 954 905 1986<br />
Chinon B-4 p PWR 954 905 1987<br />
Chooz B-1 p PWR 1 560 1 500 1996<br />
Chooz B-2 p PWR 1 560 1 500 1997<br />
Civaux 1 p PWR 1 561 1 495 1997<br />
Civaux 2 p PWR 1 561 1 495 1999<br />
Cruas Meysse 1 p PWR 956 915 1983<br />
Cruas Meysse 2 p PWR 956 915 1984<br />
Cruas Meysse 3 p PWR 956 915 1984<br />
Cruas Meysse 4 p PWR 956 915 1984<br />
Dampierre 1 p PWR 937 890 1980<br />
Dampierre 2 p PWR 937 890 1980<br />
Dampierre 3 p PWR 937 890 1981<br />
Dampierre 4 p PWR 937 890 1981<br />
Fessenheim 1 p PWR 920 880 1977<br />
Fessenheim 2 p PWR 920 880 1977<br />
Flamanville 1 p PWR 1 382 1 330 1985<br />
Flamanville 2 p PWR 1 382 1 330 1986<br />
Golfech 1 p PWR 1 363 1 310 1990<br />
Golfech 2 p PWR 1 363 1 310 1993<br />
Gravelines B-1 p PWR 951 910 1980<br />
Gravelines B-2 p PWR 951 910 1980<br />
Gravelines B-3 p PWR 951 910 1980<br />
Gravelines B-4 p PWR 951 910 1981<br />
Gravelines C-5 p PWR 951 910 1984<br />
Gravelines C-6 p PWR 951 910 1985<br />
Nogent 1 p PWR 1 363 1 310 1987<br />
183<br />
STATISTICS<br />
Statistics<br />
Nuclear Power Plants: 2017 <strong>atw</strong> Compact Statistics
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
184<br />
STATISTICS<br />
Country<br />
Location/<br />
Station name<br />
Status Reactor type<br />
Capacity<br />
gross<br />
[MW]<br />
Capacity<br />
net<br />
[MW]<br />
1st<br />
Criticality<br />
[Year]<br />
Nogent 2 p PWR 1 363 1 310 1988<br />
Paluel 1 p PWR 1 382 1 330 1984<br />
Paluel 2 p PWR 1 382 1 330 1984<br />
Paluel 3 p PWR 1 382 1 330 1985<br />
Paluel 4 p PWR 1 382 1 330 1986<br />
Penly 1 p PWR 1 382 1 330 1990<br />
Penly 2 p PWR 1 382 1 330 1992<br />
St. Alban 1 p PWR 1 381 1 335 1986<br />
St. Alban 2 p PWR 1 381 1 335 1987<br />
St. Laurent B-1 p PWR 956 915 1981<br />
St. Laurent B-2 p PWR 956 915 1981<br />
Tricastin 1 p PWR 955 915 1980<br />
Tricastin 2 p PWR 955 915 1980<br />
Tricastin 3 p PWR 955 915 1980<br />
Tricastin 4 p PWR 955 915 1981<br />
Flamanville 3 P PWR 1 600 1 510 (<strong>2018</strong>)<br />
Germany<br />
Brokdorf p PWR 1 480 1 410 1986<br />
Emsland p PWR 1 406 1 335 1988<br />
Grohnde p PWR 1 430 1 360 1985<br />
Gundremmingen B [6] V BWR 1 344 1 284 1984<br />
Gundremmingen C p BWR 1 344 1 288 1985<br />
Isar 2 p PWR 1 485 1 410 1988<br />
Neckarwestheim II p PWR 1 400 1 310 1989<br />
Philippsburg 2 p PWR 1 468 1 402 1985<br />
Hungary<br />
Paks 1 p VVER-PWR 500 470 1983<br />
Paks 2 p VVER-PWR 500 473 1984<br />
Paks 3 p VVER-PWR 500 473 1986<br />
Paks 4 p VVER-PWR 500 473 1987<br />
India<br />
Kaiga 1 p Candu (IND) 220 202 2001<br />
Kaiga 2 p Candu (IND) 220 202 1999<br />
Kaiga 3 p Candu (IND) 220 202 2007<br />
Kaiga 4 p Candu (IND) 220 202 2010<br />
Kakrapar 1 p Candu (IND) 220 202 1993<br />
Kakrapar 2 p Candu (IND) 220 202 1995<br />
Kudankulam 1 p VVER-PWR 1 000 917 2013<br />
Kudankulam 2 p VVER-PWR 1 000 917 2016<br />
Madras Kalpakkam 1 p Candu (IND) 220 205 1984<br />
Madras Kalpakkam 2 p Candu (IND) 220 205 1986<br />
Narora 1 p Candu (IND) 220 202 1992<br />
Narora 2 p Candu (IND) 220 202 1991<br />
Rajasthan 1 p Candu 100 90 1973<br />
Rajasthan 2 p Candu 200 187 1981<br />
Rajasthan 3 p Candu (IND) 220 202 1999<br />
Rajasthan 4 p Candu (IND) 220 202 2000<br />
Rajasthan 5 p Candu (IND) 220 202 2009<br />
Rajasthan 6 p Candu (IND) 220 202 2010<br />
Tarapur 1 p BWR 160 150 1969<br />
Tarapur 2 p BWR 160 150 1969<br />
Tarapur 3 p Candu (IND) 540 490 2006<br />
Tarapur 4 p Candu (IND) 540 490 2005<br />
Kakrapar 3 P Candu (IND) 700 640 (<strong>2018</strong>)<br />
Kakrapar 4 P Candu (IND) 700 640 (2019)<br />
PFBR (Kalpakkam) P SNR 500 470 (2020)<br />
Kudankulam 3 P VVER-PWR 1 000 917 (<strong>2018</strong>)<br />
Rajasthan 7 P Candu (IND) 700 630 (2019)<br />
Rajasthan 8 P Candu (IND) 700 630 (2019)<br />
Iran<br />
Bushehr 1 p VVER-PWR 1 000 953 2011<br />
Japan<br />
Fukushima Daini 1 p BWR 1 100 1 067 1982<br />
Fukushima Daini 2 p BWR 1 100 1 067 1984<br />
Fukushima Daini 3 p BWR 1 100 1 067 1985<br />
Fukushima Daini 4 p BWR 1 100 1 067 1987<br />
Genkai 2 p PWR 559 529 1981<br />
Genkai 3 p PWR 1 180 1 127 1994<br />
Genkai 4 p PWR 1 180 1 127 1997<br />
Hamaoka 3 p BWR 1 100 1 056 1987<br />
Hamaoka 4 p BWR 1 137 1 092 1993<br />
Hamaoka 5 p BWR 1 267 1 216 2004<br />
Higashidori 1 p BWR 1 100 1 067 2005<br />
Ikata 2 p PWR 566 538 1982<br />
Ikata 3 p PWR 890 846 1994<br />
Kashiwazaki Kariwa 1 p BWR 1 100 1 067 1985<br />
Kashiwazaki Kariwa 2 p BWR 1 100 1 067 1990<br />
Kashiwazaki Kariwa 3 p BWR 1 100 1 067 1993<br />
Kashiwazaki Kariwa 4 p BWR 1 100 1 067 1994<br />
Kashiwazaki Kariwa 5 p BWR 1 100 1 067 1990<br />
Kashiwazaki Kariwa 6 p BWR 1 356 1 315 1996<br />
Country<br />
Location/<br />
Station name<br />
Status Reactor type<br />
Capacity<br />
gross<br />
[MW]<br />
Capacity<br />
net<br />
[MW]<br />
1st<br />
Criticality<br />
[Year]<br />
Kashiwazaki Kariwa 7 p BWR 1 356 1 315 1997<br />
Mihama 3 p PWR 826 781 1976<br />
Monju [6] V FBR 280 246 1994<br />
Ohi 1 p PWR 1 175 1 120 1979<br />
Ohi 2 p PWR 1 175 1 120 1979<br />
Ohi 3 p PWR 1 180 1 127 1991<br />
Ohi 4 p PWR 1 180 1 127 1993<br />
Onagawa 1 p BWR 524 496 1984<br />
Onagawa 2 p BWR 825 796 1995<br />
Onagawa 3 p BWR 825 798 2002<br />
Sendai 1 p PWR 890 846 1984<br />
Sendai 2 p PWR 890 846 1985<br />
Shika 1 p BWR 540 505 1993<br />
Shika 2 p BWR 1 358 1 304 2005<br />
Shimane 2 p BWR 820 791 1989<br />
Takahama 1 p PWR 826 780 1974<br />
Takahama 2 p PWR 826 780 1975<br />
Takahama 3 [4] p PWR 870 830 1985<br />
Takahama 4 [4] p PWR 870 830 1985<br />
Tokai 2 p BWR 1 100 1 067 1978<br />
Tomari 1 p PWR 579 550 1989<br />
Tomari 2 p PWR 579 550 1991<br />
Tomari 3 p PWR 912 866 2009<br />
Tsuruga 2 p PWR 1 160 1 115 1986<br />
Shimane 3 P BWR 1 375 1 325 (2022)<br />
Ohma P BWR 1 385 1 325 (2023)<br />
Korea (Republic)<br />
Kori 1 [6] V PWR 603 576 1978<br />
Kori 2 p PWR 676 639 1983<br />
Kori 3 p PWR 1 042 1 003 1985<br />
Kori 4 p PWR 1 041 1 001 1986<br />
Shin Kori 1 p PWR 1 048 996 2010<br />
Shin Kori 2 p PWR 1 045 993 2011<br />
Shin Kori 3 p PWR 1 400 1 340 2016<br />
Hanul 1 p PWR 1 003 960 1988<br />
Hanul 2 p PWR 1 008 962 1989<br />
Hanul 3 p PWR 1 050 994 1998<br />
Hanul 4 p PWR 1 053 998 1998<br />
Hanul 5 p PWR 1 051 996 2003<br />
Hanul 6 p PWR 1 051 996 2004<br />
Wolsong 1 p Candu 687 645 1983<br />
Wolsong 2 p Candu 678 653 1997<br />
Wolsong 3 p Candu 698 675 1999<br />
Wolsong 4 p Candu 703 679 1999<br />
Shin Wolsong 1 p PWR 1 043 991 2012<br />
Shin Wolsong 2 p PWR 1 000 960 2015<br />
Hanbit 1 p PWR 996 953 1986<br />
Hanbit 2 p PWR 993 945 1987<br />
Hanbit 3 p PWR 1 050 997 1995<br />
Hanbit 4 p PWR 1 049 997 1996<br />
Hanbit 5 p PWR 1 053 997 2001<br />
Hanbit 6 p PWR 1 052 995 2002<br />
Shin Kori 4 P PWR 1 400 1 340 (<strong>2018</strong>)<br />
Shin Kori 5 P PWR 1 400 1 340 (2022)<br />
Shin Hanul 1 P PWR 1 400 1 340 (2020)<br />
Shin Hanul 2 P PWR 1 400 1 340 (2022)<br />
Mexico<br />
Laguna Verde 1 p BWR 820 765 1990<br />
Laguna Verde 2 p BWR 820 765 1995<br />
Netherlands<br />
Borssele p PWR 515 482 1973<br />
Pakistan<br />
Kanupp 1 p Candu 137 909 1972<br />
Chasnupp 1 p PWR 325 300 2000<br />
Chasnupp 2 p PWR 325 300 2011<br />
Chasnupp 3 p PWR 340 315 2016<br />
Chasnupp 4 [1] P PWR 340 315 2017<br />
Kanupp 2 P PWR 1 100 1 014 (2021)<br />
Kanupp 3 P PWR 1 100 1 014 (2022)<br />
Romania<br />
Cernavoda 1 p Candu 706 650 1996<br />
Cernavoda 2 p Candu 706 655 2007<br />
Russia<br />
Balakovo 1 p VVER-PWR 1 000 953 1986<br />
Balakovo 2 p VVER-PWR 1 000 953 1988<br />
Balakovo 3 p VVER-PWR 1 000 953 1990<br />
Balakovo 4 p VVER-PWR 1 000 953 1993<br />
Beloyarsky 3 p FBR 600 560 1981<br />
Beloyarsky 4 p FBR 800 750 2014<br />
Bilibino 1 p LWGR 12 11 1974<br />
Bilibino 2 p LWGR 12 11 1975<br />
Statistics<br />
Nuclear Power Plants: 2017 <strong>atw</strong> Compact Statistics
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
Country<br />
Location/<br />
Station name<br />
Status Reactor type<br />
Capacity<br />
gross<br />
[MW]<br />
Capacity<br />
net<br />
[MW]<br />
1st<br />
Criticality<br />
[Year]<br />
Bilibino 3 p LWGR 12 11 1976<br />
Bilibino 4 p LWGR 12 11 1977<br />
Kalinin 1 p VVER-PWR 1 000 953 1985<br />
Kalinin 2 p VVER-PWR 1 000 953 1987<br />
Kalinin 3 p VVER-PWR 1 000 953 2004<br />
Kalinin 4 p VVER-PWR 1 000 953 2011<br />
Kola 1 p VVER-PWR 440 411 1973<br />
Kola 2 p VVER-PWR 440 411 1975<br />
Kola 3 p VVER-PWR 440 411 1982<br />
Kola 4 p VVER-PWR 440 411 1984<br />
Kursk 1 p LWGR 1 000 925 1977<br />
Kursk 2 p LWGR 1 000 925 1979<br />
Kursk 3 p LWGR 1 000 925 1984<br />
Kursk 4 p LWGR 1 000 925 1986<br />
Leningrad 1 p LWGR 1 000 925 1974<br />
Leningrad 2 p LWGR 1 000 925 1976<br />
Leningrad 3 p LWGR 1 000 925 1980<br />
Leningrad 4 p LWGR 1 000 925 1981<br />
Novovoronezh 4 p VVER-PWR 417 385 1973<br />
Novovoronezh 5 p VVER-PWR 1 000 953 1981<br />
Novovoronezh II-1 p VVER-PWR 1 000 955 2016<br />
Rostov 1 p VVER-PWR 1 000 953 2001<br />
Rostov 2 p VVER-PWR 1 000 953 2010<br />
Rostov 3 p VVER-PWR 1 085 1 011 2014<br />
Smolensk 1 p LWGR 1 000 925 1983<br />
Smolensk 2 p LWGR 1 000 925 1985<br />
Smolensk 3 p LWGR 1 000 925 1990<br />
Akademik Lomonosov I P PWR 40 35 (2019)<br />
Akademik Lomonosov I P PWR 40 35 (2019)<br />
Baltic 1 (Kaliningrad) P VVER-PWR 1 170 1 080 (2020)<br />
Leningrad II-1 P VVER-PWR 1 170 1 085 (2020)<br />
Leningrad II-2 P VVER-PWR 1 170 1 085 (2021)<br />
Novovoronezh II-2 P VVER-PWR 1 000 955 (<strong>2018</strong>)<br />
Rostov 4 P VVER-PWR 1 085 1 011 (2019)<br />
Slovakia<br />
Bohunice 3 p VVER-PWR 505 472 1985<br />
Bohunice 4 p VVER-PWR 505 472 1985<br />
Mochovce 1 p VVER-PWR 470 436 1998<br />
Mochovce 2 p VVER-PWR 470 436 1999<br />
Mochovce 3 P VVER-PWR 440 408 (2019)<br />
Mochovce 4 P VVER-PWR 440 408 (2019)<br />
Slovenia<br />
Krsko p PWR 727 696 1983<br />
South Africa<br />
Koeberg 1 p PWR 970 930 1984<br />
Koeberg 2 p PWR 970 930 1985<br />
Spain<br />
Almaraz 1 p PWR 1 049 1 011 1981<br />
Almaraz 2 p PWR 1 044 1 006 1983<br />
Ascó 1 p PWR 1 033 995 1984<br />
Ascó 2 p PWR 1 027 997 1985<br />
Cofrentes p BWR 1 092 1 064 1985<br />
Trillo 1 p PWR 1 066 1 002 1988<br />
Vandellos 2 p PWR 1 087 1 045 1987<br />
Santa Maria de Garoña [6] V BWR 466 446 1971<br />
Sweden<br />
Forsmark 1 p BWR 1 022 984 1980<br />
Forsmark 2 p BWR 1 158 1 120 1981<br />
Forsmark 3 p BWR 1 212 1 170 1985<br />
Oskarshamn 1 [6] V BWR 492 473 1972<br />
Oskarshamn 2 p BWR 661 638 1975<br />
Oskarshamn 3 p BWR 1 450 1 400 1985<br />
Ringhals 1 p BWR 910 878 1976<br />
Ringhals 2 p PWR 847 807 1975<br />
Ringhals 3 p PWR 1 117 1 064 1981<br />
Ringhals 4 p PWR 990 940 1983<br />
Switzerland<br />
Beznau 1 p PWR 380 365 1969<br />
Beznau 2 p PWR 380 365 1972<br />
Gösgen p PWR 1 060 1 010 1979<br />
Leibstadt p BWR 1 275 1 220 1984<br />
Mühleberg p BWR 390 373 1973<br />
Taiwan, China<br />
Chin Shan 1 p BWR 636 604 1978<br />
Chin Shan 2 p BWR 636 604 1979<br />
Kuosheng 1 p BWR 985 948 1981<br />
Kuosheng 2 p BWR 985 948 1983<br />
Maanshan 1 p PWR 951 890 1984<br />
Maanshan 2 p PWR 951 890 1985<br />
Lungmen 1 P BWR 1 356 1 315 (2020)<br />
Lungmen 2 P BWR 1 356 1 315 (2021)<br />
Country<br />
Location/<br />
Station name<br />
Status Reactor type<br />
Capacity<br />
gross<br />
[MW]<br />
Capacity<br />
net<br />
[MW]<br />
1st<br />
Criticality<br />
[Year]<br />
United Arab Emirates<br />
Barakah 1 P PWR 1 400 1 340 (<strong>2018</strong>)<br />
Barakah 2 P PWR 1 400 1 340 (2019)<br />
Barakah 3 P PWR 1 400 1 340 (2020)<br />
Barakah 4 P PWR 1 400 1 340 (2021)<br />
United Kingdom<br />
Dungeness B-1 p AGR 615 520 1985<br />
Dungeness B-2 p AGR 615 520 1986<br />
Hartlepool-1 p AGR 655 595 1984<br />
Hartlepool-2 p AGR 655 585 1985<br />
Heysham I-1 p AGR 625 585 1984<br />
Heysham I-2 p AGR 625 575 1985<br />
Heysham II-1 p AGR 682 595 1988<br />
Heysham II-2 p AGR 682 595 1989<br />
Hinkley Point B-1 p AGR 655 610 1976<br />
Hinkley Point B-2 p AGR 655 610 1977<br />
Hunterston B-1 p AGR 644 460 1976<br />
Hunterston B-2 p AGR 644 430 1977<br />
Sizewell B p PWR 1 250 1 191 1995<br />
Torness Point 1 p AGR 682 595 1988<br />
Torness Point 2 p AGR 682 595 1989<br />
Ukraine<br />
Khmelnitski 1 p VVER-PWR 1 000 950 1985<br />
Khmelnitski 2 p VVER-PWR 1 000 950 2004<br />
Rovno 1 p VVER-PWR 402 363 1981<br />
Rovno 2 p VVER-PWR 416 377 1982<br />
Rovno 3 p VVER-PWR 1 000 950 1987<br />
Rovno 4 p VVER-PWR 1 000 950 2004<br />
Zaporozhe 1 p VVER-PWR 1 000 950 1985<br />
Zaporozhe 2 p VVER-PWR 1 000 950 1985<br />
Zaporozhe 3 p VVER-PWR 1 000 950 1987<br />
Zaporozhe 4 p VVER-PWR 1 000 950 1988<br />
Zaporozhe 5 p VVER-PWR 1 000 950 1988<br />
Zaporozhe 6 p VVER-PWR 1 000 950 1989<br />
South Ukraine 1 p VVER-PWR 1 000 950 1983<br />
South Ukraine 2 p VVER-PWR 1 000 950 1985<br />
South Ukraine 3 p VVER-PWR 1 000 950 1989<br />
USA<br />
Arkansas Nuclear One 1 p PWR 969 903 1974<br />
Arkansas Nuclear One 2 p PWR 1 006 943 1980<br />
Beaver Valley 1 p PWR 955 923 1976<br />
Beaver Valley 2 p PWR 957 923 1987<br />
Braidwood 1 p PWR 1 289 1 225 1988<br />
Braidwood 2 p PWR 1 289 1 225 1988<br />
Browns Ferry 1 p BWR 1 200 1 152 1974<br />
Browns Ferry 2 p BWR 1 193 1 152 1975<br />
Browns Ferry 3 p BWR 1 232 1 190 1977<br />
Brunswick 1 p BWR 1 074 1 002 1977<br />
Brunswick 2 p BWR 1 075 1 002 1975<br />
Byron 1 p PWR 1 307 1 225 1985<br />
Byron 2 p PWR 1 304 1 225 1987<br />
Callaway p PWR 1 316 1 236 1985<br />
Calvert Cliffs 1 p PWR 935 918 1975<br />
Calvert Cliffs 2 p PWR 939 911 1977<br />
Catawba 1 p PWR 1 286 1 205 1985<br />
Catawba 2 p PWR 1 286 1 205 1986<br />
Clinton 1 p BWR 1 175 1 138 1987<br />
Comanche Peak 1 p PWR 1 283 1 215 1990<br />
Comanche Peak 2 p PWR 1 283 1 215 1993<br />
Donald Cook 1 p PWR 1 266 1 152 1975<br />
Donald Cook 2 p PWR 1 210 1 133 1978<br />
Columbia (WNP 2) p BWR 1 244 1 200 1984<br />
Cooper p BWR 844 801 1974<br />
Davis Besse 1 p PWR 971 925 1978<br />
Diablo Canyon 1 p PWR 1 236 1 159 1985<br />
Diablo Canyon 2 p PWR 1 246 1 164 1985<br />
Dresden 2 p BWR 1 057 1 009 1970<br />
Dresden 3 p BWR 1 057 1 009 1971<br />
Duane Arnold p BWR 737 680 1975<br />
Farley 1 p PWR 933 888 1977<br />
Farley 2 p PWR 934 888 1981<br />
Fermi 2 p BWR 1 317 1 217 1988<br />
FitzPatrick p BWR 918 882 1975<br />
Ginna p PWR 713 614 1970<br />
Grand Gulf 1 p BWR 1 516 1 440 1985<br />
Hatch 1 p BWR 891 857 1974<br />
Hatch 2 p BWR 905 865 1979<br />
Hope Creek 1 p BWR 1 360 1 291 1986<br />
Indian Point 2 p PWR 1 348 1 299 1974<br />
Indian Point 3 p PWR 1 051 1 012 1976<br />
La Salle 1 p BWR 1 242 1 170 1984<br />
185<br />
STATISTICS<br />
Statistics<br />
Nuclear Power Plants: 2017 <strong>atw</strong> Compact Statistics
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
186<br />
KTG INSIDE<br />
Country<br />
Location/<br />
Station name<br />
Status Reactor type<br />
Capacity<br />
gross<br />
[MW]<br />
Capacity<br />
net<br />
[MW]<br />
1st<br />
Criticality<br />
[Year]<br />
La Salle 2 p BWR 1 238 1 170 1984<br />
Limerick 1 p BWR 1 203 1 139 1986<br />
Limerick 2 p BWR 1 199 1 139 1990<br />
McGuire 1 p PWR 1 358 1 220 1981<br />
McGuire 2 p PWR 1 358 1 220 1984<br />
Millstone 2 p PWR 946 91 0 1975<br />
Millstone 3 p PWR 1 308 1 253 1986<br />
Monticello p BWR 734 685 1971<br />
Nine Mile Point 1 p BWR 671 642 1969<br />
Nine Mile Point 2 p BWR 1 302 1 259 1988<br />
North Anna 1 p PWR 1 035 980 1978<br />
North Anna 2 p PWR 1 033 980 1980<br />
Oconee 1 p PWR 955 887 1973<br />
Oconee 2 p PWR 955 887 1974<br />
Oconee 3 p PWR 961 893 1974<br />
Oyster Creek p BWR 595 550 1969<br />
Palisades p PWR 870 81 2 1971<br />
Palo Verde 1 p PWR 1 528 1 403 1986<br />
Palo Verde 2 p PWR 1 524 1 403 1988<br />
Palo Verde 3 p PWR 1 524 1 403 1986<br />
Peach Bottom 2 p BWR 1 233 1 1 60 1974<br />
Peach Bottom 3 p BWR 1 233 1 1 60 1974<br />
Perry 1 p BWR 1 397 1 31 2 1987<br />
Pilgrim p BWR 71 2 670 1972<br />
Point Beach 1 p PWR 696 643 1970<br />
Point Beach 2 p PWR 696 643 1972<br />
Prairie Island 1 p PWR 642 593 1973<br />
Prairie Island 2 p PWR 641 593 1974<br />
Quad Cities 1 p BWR 1 061 1 009 1973<br />
Quad Cities 2 p BWR 1 061 1 009 1973<br />
RiverBend 1 p BWR 1 073 1 036 1986<br />
Robinson 2 p PWR 855 769 1971<br />
Salem 1 p PWR 1 276 1 1 70 1977<br />
Salem 2 p PWR 1 303 1 1 70 1981<br />
Seabrook 1 p PWR 1 330 1 242 1990<br />
Sequoyah 1 p PWR 1 259 1 221 1981<br />
Sequoyah 2 p PWR 1 279 1 221 1982<br />
Shearon Harris 1 p PWR 983 951 1987<br />
South Texas 1 p PWR 1 41 0 1 354 1988<br />
Country<br />
Location/<br />
Station name<br />
Status Reactor type<br />
Capacity<br />
gross<br />
[MW]<br />
Capacity<br />
net<br />
[MW]<br />
1st<br />
Criticality<br />
[Year]<br />
South Texas 2 p PWR 1 41 0 1 354 1989<br />
St. Lucie 1 p PWR 1 1 22 1 080 1976<br />
St. Lucie 2 p PWR 1 1 35 1 080 1983<br />
Virgil C. Summer p PWR 1 071 1 030 1984<br />
Surry 1 p PWR 900 848 1972<br />
Surry 2 p PWR 900 848 1973<br />
Susquehanna 1 p BWR 1 374 1 298 1983<br />
Susquehanna 2 p BWR 1 374 1 298 1985<br />
Three Mile Island 1 p PWR 1 021 976 1974<br />
Turkey Point 3 p PWR 906 877 1972<br />
Turkey Point 4 p PWR 800 760 1973<br />
Vogtle 1 p PWR 1 223 1 1 60 1987<br />
Vogtle 2 p PWR 1 226 1 1 60 1989<br />
Waterford 3 p PWR 1 250 1 200 1985<br />
Watts Bar 1 p PWR 1 370 1 270 1996<br />
Watts Bar 2 p PWR 1 240 1 180 2016<br />
Wolf Creek p PWR 1 351 1 268 1984<br />
Vogtle 3 P PWR 1 080 1 000 (2019)<br />
Vogtle 4 P PWR 1 080 1 000 (2020)<br />
Virgil C. Summer 2 [3] P PWR 1 080 1 000 (-)<br />
Virgil C. Summer 3 [3] P PWR 1 080 1 000 (-)<br />
1) Start of nuclear operation (first criticality: C, first grid connection: G, commercial operation: O):<br />
3 units in 2017 (CGO), China: Fuqing 4 (1089 MW, PWR, CGO), Tianwan 3 (1126 MW, PWR, CGO),<br />
Pakistan: Chasnupp-4 (340 MW, PWR, CGO); 1 unit in 2017 (GO), China Yangjiang 4 (1086 MW, GO).<br />
2) Start of construction (first concrete), 3 units in 2017: Bangladesh: Rooppur 1 (1200 MW),<br />
India: Kudankulam 3 (1000 MW), South Korea: Shin-Kori 5 (1455 MW).<br />
3) Project under construction (finally) cancelled: USA: Virgil C. Summer 2 and Virgil C. Summer 3<br />
(1080 MW).<br />
4) Resumed operation: Japan: Takahama 3 (PWR, 870 MW) and Takahama 4 (PWR, 870 MW).<br />
5) Nuclear power plant in long-term shutdown: none.<br />
6) Nuclear power plants permanently shutdown in 2017 (5 units): Germany: Gundremmingen B<br />
(BWR, 1344 MW); Japan: Monju (FBR, 280 MW); South Korea: Kori 1 (PWR, 608 MW);<br />
Spain: St. Maria de Garona (BWR, 466 MW); Sweden: Oskarshamn 1 (BWR, 492 MW).<br />
(All capacity data in MWe gross)<br />
AGR: Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor, BWR: Boiling water reactor, Candu: CANada Deuterium<br />
Uranium reactor (IND: Indian type), D 2 O-PWR: heavy water moderated, pressurised water reactor,<br />
PWR: pressurised water reactor, GGR: gas-graphite reactor, LWGR/GLWR: light water cooled<br />
graphite moderated reactor (Russian type RBMK), FBWR: advanced boiling water reactor, FBR: fast<br />
breeder reactor<br />
| | Tab. 1.<br />
Nuclear power plant units worldwide on 31.12.2016 in operation (p), under construction (P), in lay-up operation/long-term shutdown (1) or permanently shut-down in 2016 (V)<br />
[Sources: Operators, IAEO]. All information and data refer to the year 2016. Data have been updated with reference to the sources<br />
Herzlichen<br />
Glückwunsch<br />
März <strong>2018</strong><br />
91 Jahre wird<br />
27. Prof. Dr. Bernhard Liebmann,<br />
Kronberg<br />
88 Jahre werden<br />
6. Prof. Dr. Hubertus Nickel, Jülich<br />
25. Dr. Hans-Ulrich Borgstedt,<br />
Karlsruhe<br />
25. Dr. Peter Borsch, Dresden<br />
87 Jahre wird<br />
17. Dipl.-Ing. Hans Waldmann<br />
86 Jahre wird<br />
14. Dr. Peter Engelmann,<br />
Eggenstein-Leopoldshafen<br />
85 Jahre werden<br />
26. Dipl.-Ing. Gerhard Frei, Uttenreuth<br />
30. Dipl.-Phys. Dieter Pleuger, Kiedrich<br />
84 Jahre werden<br />
1. Prof. Dr. Günther Kessler, Stutensee<br />
18. Dipl.-Ing. Willi Riebold, München<br />
30. Prof. Dr. Helmut Völcker, Essen<br />
83 Jahre werden<br />
2. Dipl.-Ing. Joachim Hospe, München<br />
14. Dr. Hermann Kraemer, Seevetal<br />
82 Jahre werden<br />
2. Dr. Ralf-Dieter Penzhorn, Bruchsal<br />
8. Prof. Dr. Erich Tenckhoff, Erlangen<br />
19. Dr. Hermann Hinsch, Hannover<br />
81 Jahre wird<br />
29. Dipl.-Ing. Friedrich Garzarolli, Fürth<br />
80 Jahre werden<br />
4. Dr. Rainer Göhring, Nauen<br />
6. Dipl.-Math. Udo Harten, Stutensee<br />
10. Dr. Hein-Jürzen Kriks, Braunschweig<br />
11. Peter Vagt, Rösrath<br />
14. Dr. Peter Paetz, Bergisch Gladbach<br />
16. Prof. Dr. Helmut Röthmeyer,<br />
Braunschweig<br />
22. Dr. Bruno-J. Baumgartl, Weiterstadt<br />
79 Jahre werden<br />
1. Prof. Dr. Günter Höhlein, Wiesbaden<br />
1. Dipl.-Ing. Wolfgang Dietz, Lindlar<br />
7. Dr. Kurt Vinzens, Berg-Aufkirchen<br />
17. Dipl.-Phys. Renate von Le Suire,<br />
Seeshaupt<br />
2. Dipl.-Ing. Helmut Pekarek,<br />
Wonga Park/AUS<br />
25. Dipl.-Ing. Joachim Koch, Mömbris<br />
78 Jahre werden<br />
1. Dipl.-Ing. Wolfgang Stumpf, Moers<br />
3. Dr. Lutz Niemann, Holzkirchen<br />
3. Dipl.-Ing. Eberhard Schomer, Erlangen<br />
7. Dr. Volker Klix, Gehrden<br />
12. Prof. Dr. Arndt Falk, Sterup<br />
18. Dipl.-Ing. Friedhelm Hülsmann,<br />
Garbsen<br />
21. Uwe Göldner, Krefeld<br />
29. Ing. Dieter-W. Sauer, Berlin<br />
29. Dipl.-Phys. Harald Reinhardt,<br />
Leverkusen<br />
KTG Inside
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
Inside<br />
187<br />
Sicherheit, Kompetenz und<br />
unsere Jahrestagung (AMNT)<br />
Liebe KTGler, liebe <strong>atw</strong>-Leser, für den zuverlässigen Betrieb eines Kernkraftwerks sind die technische<br />
Kompetenz und das Sicherheitsbewusstsein der Betriebsmannschaft sowie die Sicherheit der Anlage wesentliche<br />
Voraussetzungen. In Deutschland ist nun das Ende des Betriebs von Leistungsreaktoren beschlossen, nicht so bei vielen<br />
unserer europäischen Nachbarn. Sollen und können wir die kerntechnische Kompetenz in Deutschland weiterhin<br />
erhalten?<br />
Im Rahmen der Energievorsorgeforschung liegt es zur<br />
Sicherheit der Bevölkerung und der Umwelt nahe, das<br />
Know-how, die Kompetenz in der Kerntechnik zu erhalten<br />
und noch weiter auszubauen. Kurzfristig zur Gewährleistung<br />
des sicheren Restbetriebs in Deutschland sowie<br />
langfristig zur Bewertung der Sicherheit benachbarter<br />
Anlagen und vor allem, um einen Beitrag zur Erhöhung<br />
der Sicherheit geplanter Neubauten im internationalen<br />
Umfeld leisten zu können.<br />
Zu der nachgewiesenen, hohen Zuverlässigkeit der<br />
deutschen Anlagen tragen sehr viele bei, vor allem<br />
die Betreiber selbst, aber auch, um hier nur einige zu<br />
nennen, technische Sicherheitsorganisationen, Gutachter,<br />
Genehmigungsbehörden, die Reaktor-Sicherheitskommission,<br />
der Kerntechnische Ausschuss sowie Forschungszentren<br />
und Hochschulen mit den die (Sicherheits-)<br />
Forschung fördernden Ministerien und Projektträgern.<br />
Diese Situation erfordert die Aufstellung eines sorgfältigen<br />
Konzeptes zum perspektivischen Erhalt der Kompetenz,<br />
was angesichts der vielfältigen und verschiedenartigen<br />
Know-how-Träger eine anspruchsvolle Aufgabe ist.<br />
Der Kompetenzerhalt/-ausbau braucht dabei zwingend<br />
die Einbeziehung und Motivation junger Menschen.<br />
Hierzu bietet sich als ein Instrument die Reaktorsicherheitsforschung,<br />
als eine Säule des Kompetenzerhalts in der<br />
Kerntechnik, an.<br />
Erste Anlaufstellen wären hier die Universitäten mit<br />
ihren Studierenden und geförderten nationalen kerntechnischen<br />
Forschungsprojekten und internationalen<br />
Forschungskooperationen, die ihren Doktoranden eine<br />
vertiefte Auseinandersetzung mit der Thematik ermöglichen.<br />
Wichtig ist aber auch die Zusammenführung von<br />
Nachwuchswissenschaftlern (m/w) mit Spezialisten aus<br />
relevanten beteiligten Institutionen. Dies umso mehr, da<br />
die Kerntechnik ein hochgradig multidisziplinäres Arbeitsgebiet<br />
ist.<br />
Für den Kompetenzerhalt kommt der KTG und ihrer<br />
Jahrestagung (AMNT) eine besondere Rolle zu, da sie die<br />
verschiedenen Disziplinen sowie die nationalen und<br />
internationalen Experten in einem Netzwerk verknüpfen<br />
kann. Von Bedeutung ist dabei auch der Einfluss, den die<br />
Mitglieder direkt oder durch Ansprache der Vertreter in<br />
den Gremien auf die Gestaltung und Schwerpunktsetzung<br />
der Jahrestagung nehmen können und sollten.<br />
Bringen Sie sich ein, um unser Know-how zu erhalten!<br />
| | Prof. Dr.-Ing.<br />
Marco K. Koch<br />
(54), Bochum<br />
Stellvertretender<br />
Vorsitzender<br />
der KTG<br />
KTG Inside<br />
Verantwortlich<br />
für den Inhalt:<br />
Die Autoren.<br />
Lektorat:<br />
Sibille Wingens,<br />
Kerntechnische<br />
Gesellschaft e. V.<br />
(KTG)<br />
Robert-Koch-Platz 4<br />
10115 Berlin<br />
T: +49 30 498555-50<br />
F: +49 30 498555-51<br />
E-Mail: s.wingens@<br />
ktg.org<br />
KTG INSIDE<br />
Ihr Marco K. Koch<br />
www.ktg.org<br />
77 Jahre werden<br />
4. Ing. Ulrich Ristow, Neu-Isenburg<br />
8. Dr. Frank Steinbrunn, Fröndenberg<br />
14. Dipl.-Ing. Bernd Jürgens, Hirschberg<br />
22. Dipl.-Phys. Gerhard Jourdan, Landau<br />
76 Jahre wird<br />
10. Dipl.-Phys. Alfons Scholz, Brühl<br />
75 Jahre werden<br />
7. Dr. Peter Royl, Stutensee<br />
16. Dipl.-Ing. Jochen Heinecke, Kürten<br />
20. Dipl.-Ing. Jörg Brauns, Hanau<br />
26. Dr. Jürgen P. Lempert, Hannover<br />
26. Graeme William Catto,<br />
Buch a. Erlbach<br />
70 Jahre werden<br />
5. Dipl.-Wirtsch.-Ing. Bernd Pontani,<br />
Alzenau<br />
13. Dipl.-Kfm. Jochen Bläsing,<br />
Mörlenbach<br />
22. Dr. Volker Mirschinka, Essen<br />
65 Jahre wird<br />
21. Dr. Ulrich Rohde, Dresden<br />
60 Jahre wird<br />
26. Dr. Sheikh Shahee, Leinburg<br />
50 Jahre werden<br />
20. Thomas Wiese, Ebermannstadt<br />
30. Dipl.-Ing. Heiko Ringel, Offingen<br />
April <strong>2018</strong><br />
97 Jahre wird<br />
2. Prof. Dr. Albert Ziegler, Karlsbad<br />
87 Jahre werden<br />
9. Dr. Klaus Penndorf, Geesthacht<br />
11. Hubert Bairiot, Mol/B<br />
19. Dr. Klaus Einfeld, Murnau<br />
28. Dipl.-Ing. Rudolf Eberhart,<br />
Burgdorf<br />
85 Jahre wird<br />
6. Ing. Reinhard Faulhaber, Köln<br />
84 Jahre wird<br />
22. Dipl.-Ing. Gert Slopianka,<br />
Gorxheimeral<br />
83 Jahre werden<br />
3. Dipl.-Psych. Georg Sieber, München<br />
5. Prof. Dr. Hans-Henning Hennies,<br />
Karlsruhe<br />
19. Dr. Ernst Müller, Rösrath<br />
19. Dr. Gottfried Class,<br />
Eggenstein-Leopoldshafen<br />
21. Dipl.-Ing. Walter Jansing,<br />
Bergisch Gladbach<br />
30. Dr. Friedrich-Wilhelm Heuser,<br />
Overath<br />
82 Jahre werden<br />
4. Helmut Kuhne, Neunkirchen<br />
6. Dipl.-Ing. Hans Pirk, Rottach-Egern<br />
10. Dipl.-Ing. Franz Stockschläder,<br />
Bad Bentheim<br />
11. Dipl.-Ing. Bernhard-F. Roth,<br />
Eggenstein-Leopoldshafen<br />
24. Dipl.-Ing. Horst Schott, Overath<br />
81 Jahre werden<br />
7. Dipl.-Ing. Helmut Adam,<br />
Neuenhagen<br />
13. Dr. Martin Peehs, Bubenreuth<br />
KTG Inside
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
188<br />
NEWS<br />
Wenn Sie keine<br />
Erwähnung Ihres<br />
Geburtstages in<br />
der <strong>atw</strong> wünschen,<br />
teilen Sie dies bitte<br />
rechtzeitig der KTG-<br />
Geschäftsstelle mit.<br />
80 Jahre werden<br />
4. Prof. Dr. Klaus Kühn,<br />
Clausthal-Zellerfeld<br />
5. Dr. Hans Fuchs, Gelterkinden/CH<br />
9. Dr. Carl Alexander Duckwitz, Alzenaz<br />
28. Prof. Dr. Georg-Friedrich Schultheiss,<br />
Lüneburg<br />
79 Jahre wird<br />
8. Dr. Siegbert Storch, Aachen<br />
78 Jahre wird<br />
18. Dipl.-Ing. Norbert Granner,<br />
Bergisch Gladbach<br />
77 Jahre werden<br />
17. Dipl.-Phys. Ernst Robinson, Gehrden<br />
28. Dr. Ludwig Richter, Hasselroth<br />
76 Jahre werden<br />
9. Prof. Dr. Hans-Christoph Mehner,<br />
Dresden<br />
27. Dr. Dieter Sommer, Mosbach<br />
27. Dr. Jürgen Wunschmann, Eggenstein<br />
29. Dr. Klaus-Detlef Closs, Karlsruhe<br />
75 Jahre werden<br />
15. Dr. Werner Dander, Heppenheim<br />
18. Dipl.-Betriebsw. Uwe Janßen,<br />
Weinheim<br />
18. Dipl.-Ing. Victor Luster, Bamberg<br />
26. Ing. Helmut Schulz, Kürten<br />
70 Jahre werden<br />
6. Dr. Wolfgang Tietsch, Mannheim<br />
9. Ing. Herbert Moryson, Essen<br />
22. Dr. Heinz-Dietmar Maertens, Arnum<br />
26. Dr. Rainer Heibel, Ness Neston/GB<br />
27. Ulrich Wimmer, Erlangen<br />
65 Jahre werden<br />
10. Dipl.-Phys. Harold Rebohm, Berlin<br />
24. Dipl.-Phys. Michael Beczkowiak,<br />
Karben<br />
60 Jahre werden<br />
4. Dipl.-Ing. Holger Bröskamp,<br />
Höhnhorst<br />
4. Dipl.-Ing. (FH) Franz Xaver Pirzer,<br />
Schwandorf<br />
50 Jahre werden<br />
16. Rainer Bezold, Dormitz<br />
16. Dr. Matthias Messer, Tetbury/GB<br />
30. Dr. Christian Raetzke, Leipzig<br />
Die KTG gratuliert ihren Mitgliedern<br />
sehr herzlich zum Geburtstag und<br />
wünscht ihnen weiterhin alles Gute!<br />
Top<br />
Foratom: Europe needs<br />
nuclear for climate change<br />
and energy security<br />
(foratom) Nuclear energy contributes<br />
to the European Union’s three key<br />
energy objectives laid out in the bloc’s<br />
energy union initiative of security of<br />
supply, competitiveness and environmental<br />
sustainability, Yves Desbazeille,<br />
director-general of industry group<br />
Foratom, told journalists in Brussels<br />
on 29 January <strong>2018</strong>.<br />
According to Mr Desbazeille, the EU<br />
must continue to focus on achieving its<br />
ultimate goal of cutting CO 2 emissions,<br />
transitioning to a low- carbon economy,<br />
ensuring security of energy supply and<br />
creating jobs. He said the EU should<br />
continue to use “all the best tools available”,<br />
including nuclear energy.<br />
Mr Desbazeille said nuclear was<br />
not mentioned in the EU’s latest ‘Clean<br />
Energy for All Europeans’ legislative<br />
package, although it is currently<br />
providing almost half of the EU’s lowcarbon<br />
electricity.<br />
He said adjustments are also<br />
needed to the way the European<br />
energy markets work in order to stimulate<br />
investment in long-term energy<br />
capacities. A higher price to carbon<br />
emissions is needed to encourage such<br />
investments and a revision of the EU<br />
emissions trading scheme (ETS) will<br />
be a “key instrument” for decarbonising<br />
the EU’s economy, Mr Desbazeille<br />
said.<br />
On the UK leaving the Euratom<br />
treaty as part of Brexit, Mr Desbazeille<br />
said the EU and UK should not delay<br />
negotiating their future relationship<br />
in the civil nuclear field and in<br />
particular defining the parameters of<br />
a transitional period.<br />
Euratom is the treaty which underpins<br />
the nuclear industry and the<br />
trade in nuclear materials in the EU.<br />
| | (18501457), www.foratom.org<br />
WNA outlines vision<br />
for future of electricity<br />
(wna) Harmony is the nuclear industry<br />
vision supported by the World<br />
Nuclear Association (WNA) for the<br />
future of electricity and how nuclear<br />
energy can help the world achieve its<br />
2° climate target.<br />
According to WNA, nuclear power<br />
capacity will need to grow signifi cantly<br />
around the world in order to meet<br />
the International Energy Agency’s 2°<br />
scenario. “By 2050, nuclear energy<br />
must account for 25 % of energy<br />
genera tion if we are to meet our<br />
climate targets. With nuclear making<br />
up 11 % of generation in 2014, an extra<br />
1000 GW in nuclear capacity will need<br />
to be built by 2050” states Agneta<br />
Rising, WNA Director General. “However,<br />
meeting this goal will not be<br />
easy”, she adds.<br />
One of the actions being undertaken<br />
by the Harmony programme is<br />
an evaluation of current barriers and<br />
recommended solutions. These can be<br />
summarised as follows:<br />
Electricity market failures: Ensure<br />
a level playing field for all low carbon<br />
energy sources including nuclear.<br />
Regulatory barriers: Harmonise<br />
international regulatory processes to<br />
ensure consistency, efficiency and<br />
predictability.<br />
Misconception of risks and benefits:<br />
Address public concerns and put the<br />
health, environmental and safety risks<br />
of nuclear in perspective compared to<br />
other power generation technologies.<br />
“FORATOM very much welcomes<br />
the work being undertaken by the<br />
WNA. Indeed, Europe faces many of<br />
the same challenges, and opportunities,<br />
as other regions”, underlines<br />
Yves Desbazeille, FORATOM Director<br />
General. “Globally, the EU is the<br />
region which emits the lowest amount<br />
of CO 2 emissions from electricity generation<br />
thanks to nuclear energy. We<br />
look forward to continuing our fruitful<br />
cooperation with the WNA and<br />
making sure our positive messages<br />
about the real value of nuclear energy<br />
resonate across Europe”.<br />
For more information about the<br />
Harmony programme check out the<br />
website: world-nuclear.org/harmony.<br />
| | (18501447), www.world-nuclear.org,<br />
www.foratom.org<br />
World<br />
Head of ROSATOM Alexei<br />
Likhachev announced <strong>2018</strong><br />
the Year of Nuclear Science<br />
(rosatom) On the 6th of February<br />
<strong>2018</strong>, speaking at the function at the<br />
Presidium of Scientific and Technical<br />
Board of ROSATOM dedicated to the<br />
Russian Science Day, Director General<br />
of ROSATOM Alexei Likhachev<br />
announced <strong>2018</strong> the Year of Nuclear<br />
Science.<br />
Likhachev reminded that the<br />
nuclear sector had appeared in the<br />
world owing to fundamental scientific<br />
discoveries and today’s achievements<br />
of Russian nuclear scientists in many<br />
respects were based on scientific<br />
News
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
Operating Results October 2017<br />
Plant name Country Nominal<br />
capacity<br />
Type<br />
gross<br />
[MW]<br />
net<br />
[MW]<br />
Operating<br />
time<br />
generator<br />
[h]<br />
Energy generated. gross<br />
[MWh]<br />
Month Year Since<br />
commissioning<br />
Time availability<br />
[%]<br />
Energy availability Energy utilisation<br />
[%] *) [%] *)<br />
Month Year Month Year Month Year<br />
OL1 Olkiluoto BWR FI 910 880 523 453 505 6 084 788 253 316 643 70.17 93.53 67.01 91.99 66.89 91.65<br />
OL2 Olkiluoto BWR FI 910 880 745 687 245 5 131 241 242 948 381 100.00 77.68 100.00 76.66 101.37 77.29<br />
KCB Borssele PWR NL 512 484 703 352 921 2 653 908 157 458 349 93.60 71.62 93.63 72.12 92.49 69.50<br />
KKB 1 Beznau 1,2,7) PWR CH 380 365 0 0 0 124 746 087 0 0 0 0 0 0<br />
KKB 2 Beznau 1,2,7) PWR CH 380 365 745 283 718 2 370 828 130 602 984 100.00 85.94 100.00 85.41 100.25 84.71<br />
KKG Gösgen 7) PWR CH 1060 1010 745 788 371 7 019 814 303 630 449 100.00 91.62 99.98 91.20 99.83 90.77<br />
KKM Mühleberg BWR CH 390 373 745 286 910 2 560 350 123 772 595 100.00 91.47 99.97 90.80 98.75 89.98<br />
CNT-I Trillo PWR ES 1066 1003 745 791 502 6 975 968 237 469 685 100.00 90.51 100.00 90.20 99.03 89.19<br />
Dukovany B1 PWR CZ 500 473 745 371 657 2 094 026 107 904 400 100.00 59.16 100.00 58.76 99.77 57.40<br />
Dukovany B2 PWR CZ 500 473 745 368 190 2 590 373 103 913 002 100.00 72.79 100.00 72.20 98.84 71.01<br />
Dukovany B3 PWR CZ 500 473 0 0 2 309 273 101 934 129 0 74.25 0 63.88 0 63.30<br />
Dukovany B4 PWR CZ 500 473 745 370 436 2 197 298 102 725 449 100.00 71.01 99.55 60.37 99.45 60.23<br />
Temelin B1 PWR CZ 1080 1030 745 802 035 7 883 127 105 511 286 100.00 100.00 99.96 99.96 99.68 100.04<br />
Temelin B2 PWR CZ 1080 1030 745 808 164 6 031 344 99 895 666 100.00 76.21 100.00 75.84 100.44 76.54<br />
Doel 1 PWR BE 454 433 745 337 695 2 951 580 133 564 553 100.00 89.85 99.88 89.32 99.46 88.90<br />
Doel 2 PWR BE 454 433 745 339 506 2 939 341 131 592 990 100.00 90.56 99.98 90.17 99.85 88.21<br />
Doel 3 PWR BE 1056 1006 0 0 6 732 621 251 169 221 0 86.76 0 86.57 0 86.93<br />
Doel 4 PWR BE 1084 1033 745 812 158 6 281 391 252 953 842 100.00 81.41 100.00 80.78 99.48 78.75<br />
Tihange 1 PWR BE 1009 962 0 0 2 690 977 289 954 051 0 38.01 0 37.60 0 36.54<br />
Tihange 2 PWR BE 1055 1008 745 786 476 5 870 641 247 389 709 100.00 80.71 100.00 76.52 100.69 76.58<br />
Tihange 3 PWR BE 1089 1038 745 804 709 7 855 132 267 335 829 100.00 100.00 99.98 99.98 99.07 98.76<br />
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Operating Results December 2017<br />
Plant name<br />
Type<br />
Nominal<br />
capacity<br />
gross<br />
[MW]<br />
net<br />
[MW]<br />
Operating<br />
time<br />
generator<br />
[h]<br />
Energy generated, gross<br />
[MWh]<br />
Time availability<br />
[%]<br />
Energy availability Energy utilisation<br />
[%] *) [%] *)<br />
Month Year Since Month Year Month Year Month Year<br />
commissioning<br />
KBR Brokdorf DWR 1480 1410 744 932 450 5 778 146 340 192 059 100.00 51.68 93.41 48.23 84.26 44.37<br />
KKE Emsland 4) DWR 1406 1335 744 1 001 858 11 323 704 335 323 283 100.00 93.28 100.00 93.13 95.68 91.94<br />
KWG Grohnde DWR 1430 1360 744 971 810 9 684 880 366 627 579 100.00 86.06 94.84 82.24 90.74 76.66<br />
KRB B Gundremmingen 4) SWR 1344 1284 732 636 949 9 689 710 331 342 654 98.39 93.06 97.96 92.22 62.39 81.55<br />
KRB C Gundremmingen SWR 1344 1288 744 982 473 9 929 820 320 579 893 100.00 87.85 100.00 85.93 97.80 83.86<br />
KKI-2 Isar DWR 1485 1410 744 1 083 616 11 523 513 341 598 323 100.00 91.53 99.96 91.15 97.80 88.26<br />
KKP-2 Philippsburg DWR 1468 1402 744 1 065 419 7 853 827 355 167 516 100.00 63.18 100.00 63.12 95.90 60.10<br />
GKN-II Neckarwestheim DWR 1400 1310 744 995 400 10 540 800 320 123 134 100.00 88.93 100.00 88.60 95.72 86.10<br />
findings of the father-founders of the<br />
sector. “The sectoral science all the<br />
way has proved the theorem of the<br />
sector existence,” he said, noting that<br />
the contemporary challenges required<br />
solving many new topical tasks on<br />
which the future development of<br />
nuclear industry is dependent and<br />
ROSATOM’s competitiveness on the<br />
world market is maintained.<br />
According to Likhachev, ROSATOM’s<br />
management pays the high priority<br />
attention to the development of the<br />
sectoral science that is confirmed by the<br />
staff and organizational decisions<br />
made last year and setting the highpriority<br />
tasks which include building<br />
up the sectoral plan in scientific areas,<br />
creation of the scientific eco-environs,<br />
provisions for sustainable financing of<br />
scientific activities, raising prestige of<br />
scientific work, and many others.<br />
“One more important task we are<br />
facing is the broadening scientific<br />
contacts, including our ‘blood brother’<br />
NRC Kurchatov Institute as well as<br />
with the Russian Academy of Sciences.<br />
In April <strong>2018</strong>, we plan to hold a large<br />
scientific conference of the sector<br />
where we will summarize certain<br />
results and possibly make decisions on<br />
development in promising areas,”<br />
Alexei Likhachev said.<br />
“Using this opportunity, I would like<br />
to announce <strong>2018</strong> the Year of Nuclear<br />
Science,” the head of sector said.<br />
In turn, President of the Russian<br />
Academy of Sciences Aleksandr Sergeev<br />
noted in his address that today<br />
“RAS and ROSATOM work on friendly<br />
terms and in concert”. “In our interaction,<br />
ROSATOM is the support of RAS<br />
and, perhaps, today RAS needs ROSA-<br />
TOM more than ROSATOM needs<br />
RAS,” he said.<br />
The meeting was attended by<br />
leading Russian scientists, heads of<br />
ROSATOM, Russian Academy of<br />
Sciences, directors of nuclear research<br />
centers, and NRC Kurchatov Institute.<br />
At the function, welcoming speeches<br />
and presentations were made by Head<br />
of Proryv Project Evgeniy Adamov;<br />
Director of NRC Kurchatov Institute<br />
Denis Minkin; Director of SRC RF<br />
TRINITY (part of ROSATOM’s Science<br />
Division) Vladimir Cherkovets; Director<br />
of Institute for Laser Physical Research,<br />
Academician of RAS Sergey<br />
Garanin; Deputy General Director of<br />
*)<br />
Net-based values<br />
(Czech and Swiss<br />
nuclear power<br />
plants gross-based)<br />
1)<br />
Refueling<br />
2)<br />
Inspection<br />
3)<br />
Repair<br />
4)<br />
Stretch-out-operation<br />
5)<br />
Stretch-in-operation<br />
6)<br />
Hereof traction supply<br />
7)<br />
Incl. steam supply<br />
8)<br />
New nominal<br />
capacity since<br />
January 2016<br />
9)<br />
Data for the Leibstadt<br />
(CH) NPP will<br />
be published in a<br />
further issue of <strong>atw</strong><br />
BWR: Boiling<br />
Water Reactor<br />
PWR: Pressurised<br />
Water Reactor<br />
Source: VGB<br />
News
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
190<br />
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NMRC for Radiology Sergey Ivanov<br />
and others.<br />
| | (18501542), www.rosatom.ru<br />
IAEA mission: France<br />
committed to safe,<br />
responsible management<br />
of radioactive waste<br />
(iaea) An International Atomic Energy<br />
Agency (IAEA) team of experts said<br />
France demonstrated a comprehensive<br />
commitment to safety with a<br />
responsible approach to the management<br />
of radioactive waste and spent<br />
nuclear fuel. The team also made<br />
suggestions aimed at further enhancements<br />
and noted several good practices.<br />
The Integrated Review Service for<br />
Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel<br />
Management, Decommissioning and<br />
Remediation (ARTEMIS) team concluded<br />
an 11-day mission to France on<br />
24 January. The mission, requested by<br />
the Government of France, was hosted<br />
by the Directorate General of Energy<br />
and Climate (DGEC), with the participation<br />
of officials from several relevant<br />
organizations including the<br />
French National Radioactive Waste<br />
Agency (ANDRA) and the Nuclear<br />
Safety Authority (ASN), which is responsible<br />
for nuclear and radiation<br />
safety regulation in the country.<br />
ARTEMIS missions provide independent<br />
expert advice from an international<br />
team of specialists convened<br />
by the IAEA. Reviews are based on the<br />
IAEA safety standards as well as international<br />
good practices. The mission<br />
to France aimed to help the country<br />
meet European Union obligations that<br />
require an independent peer review of<br />
national programmes for the safe and<br />
responsible management of spent fuel<br />
and radioactive waste.<br />
Nuclear power currently generates<br />
more than 70 percent of France’s electricity.<br />
The country has 58 operating<br />
nuclear power reactors, which will<br />
require the continuing safe management<br />
of radioactive waste and spent<br />
fuel. France operates facilities for<br />
the disposal of very low-level and<br />
| | Members of the ARTEMIS team which carried out a mission to France that<br />
concluded on 24 January <strong>2018</strong>. (Photo: IAEA)<br />
low- level wastes, and is developing a<br />
deep geological repository for the disposal<br />
of high-level waste.<br />
“On the basis of the review, the<br />
team concluded that France’s waste<br />
management programme is comprehensive<br />
and coherent in fostering<br />
safety,” said ARTEMIS team leader<br />
Peter De Preter, Senior Advisor at<br />
ONDRA/NIRAS, the Belgian agency<br />
for the management of radioactive<br />
waste. “Our review highlights France’s<br />
commitment to safety.”<br />
The ARTEMIS team said France is<br />
well positioned to continue meeting<br />
high standards of safety. It noted a<br />
number of good practices to be shared<br />
with the global waste management<br />
community, while making suggestions<br />
for further enhancing the programme.<br />
Good practices identified by the<br />
team included:<br />
• A clear government commitment<br />
to the national strategy and programme<br />
for waste management,<br />
including safe disposal.<br />
• The development of a transparent<br />
national waste inventory.<br />
• Deliberate efforts towards maintaining<br />
a high level of professional,<br />
competent staff.<br />
Suggestions made by the team<br />
included:<br />
• Facilitate implementation of the<br />
requirement for decommissioning<br />
to take place in the shortest time<br />
possible.<br />
• Optimize management of very low<br />
level wastes.<br />
• Consider mechanisms to address<br />
disposal liabilities for small waste<br />
producers.<br />
The team comprised 13 experts from<br />
Belgium, Canada, Cuba, Finland,<br />
Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and<br />
the United Kingdom as well as three<br />
IAEA staff members. The team held<br />
meetings with officials from the<br />
Government and several relevant<br />
organizations.<br />
“This peer review represents an<br />
important element in our efforts to<br />
ensure the safety of the French waste<br />
management programme, establish<br />
greater public confidence and respond<br />
to the EU waste directive,” said Aurelien<br />
Louis, Head of the Nuclear Industry<br />
Department at DGEC. “The outcome<br />
of the mission was very positive<br />
while also providing us with suggestions<br />
that will be a good basis for future<br />
enhancements.”<br />
IAEA Deputy Director General<br />
Juan Carlos Lentijo, Head of the Department<br />
of Nuclear Safety and Security,<br />
noted that the French mission<br />
was the second ARTEMIS carried out<br />
to meet EU obligations, following a recent<br />
review in Poland.<br />
“The French national programme<br />
is characterized by a pervasive proactive<br />
attitude combined with a high level<br />
of professionalism, which together<br />
demonstrates an enduring commitment<br />
to safety,” Lentijo said. “The<br />
French programme review provides<br />
all of us a valuable reference with an<br />
established, diverse and coherent programme.”<br />
The final mission report will be<br />
provided to the Government in about<br />
two months.<br />
About ARTEMIS<br />
ARTEMIS is an integrated expert<br />
review service for radioactive waste<br />
and spent fuel management, decommissioning<br />
and remediation programmes.<br />
This service is intended for<br />
facility operators and organizations<br />
responsible for radioactive waste<br />
management, as well as for regulators,<br />
national policy makers and other<br />
decision makers.<br />
| | (18501336), www.iaea.org<br />
IAEA and EU review progress<br />
on cooperation<br />
(iaea) The International Atomic<br />
Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European<br />
Union (EU) reviewed progress<br />
achieved in working together on a<br />
range of nuclear activities and agreed<br />
to further enhance cooperation during<br />
their sixth annual Senior Officials<br />
Meeting in Vienna.<br />
The talks on 8 February at the<br />
IAEA’s headquarters provided a forum<br />
for exchanging views on strengthening<br />
collaboration on nuclear safety,<br />
security, safeguards, sustainable development,<br />
nuclear energy research<br />
and increasing innovation. The two<br />
organizations welcomed the fruitful<br />
cooperation and progress achieved<br />
over the past years. They agreed to<br />
deepen cooperation in several areas,<br />
particularly in the promotion of<br />
nuclear applications for sustainable<br />
development.<br />
“The EU is a significant partner for<br />
the IAEA and these annual gatherings<br />
of senior officials serve an important<br />
role in helping to coordinate our<br />
activities,” said Cornel Feruta, Chief<br />
Coordinator for the IAEA. “We have<br />
been pleased by progress made in<br />
working together on several nuclearrelated<br />
issues, and look forward to<br />
deepening our cooperation, in particular<br />
in the area of nuclear applications<br />
for sustainable development.”<br />
“Nuclear safety and security remain<br />
our key priorities, both in<br />
News
<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
| | Cornel Feruta (centre), Chief Coordinator for<br />
the IAEA, making opening remarks at the sixth<br />
annual IAEA/EU Senior Officials Meeting held<br />
in Vienna on 8 February <strong>2018</strong>.<br />
Europe and globally,” said Gerassimos<br />
Thomas, Deputy Director General in<br />
the Directorate-General for Energy of<br />
the European Commission. “In <strong>2018</strong>,<br />
the EU will conduct its first ever<br />
topical peer review on ageing management<br />
of nuclear power plants under<br />
the amended Nuclear Safety Directive.<br />
It will also advance its strategic<br />
agenda on non-power applications in<br />
medicine, industry and research. We<br />
are working in close cooperation with<br />
the IAEA on these matters.”<br />
The EU and the IAEA reaffirmed<br />
support for the Joint Comprehensive<br />
Plan of Action (JCPOA) based on their<br />
respective mandates. The EU High<br />
Representative, as Coordinator of the<br />
Joint Commission established under<br />
the JCPOA, will remain in close<br />
contact with the IAEA regarding<br />
continued implementation of the<br />
agreement.<br />
EU support for a variety of IAEA<br />
activities has delivered consistent and<br />
concrete results over the past year.<br />
Officials commended the long-standing<br />
and successful cooperation under<br />
the Instrument for Nuclear Safety<br />
Cooperation. The EU also welcomed<br />
joint efforts to address environmental<br />
remediation in Central Asia and the<br />
upcoming donors’ conference in fall<br />
<strong>2018</strong>.<br />
During the talks, the EU and the<br />
IAEA agreed to further strengthen cooperation<br />
in training as well as research<br />
and development. They welcomed<br />
progress in advancing activities<br />
on nuclear applications since the<br />
signing of Practical Arrangements in<br />
this field last year. The EU also reaffirmed<br />
its support for the implementation<br />
of the IAEA’s <strong>2018</strong>-2021 Nuclear<br />
Security Plan.<br />
The sides welcomed the launch of<br />
the IAEA’s new ARTEMIS peer review<br />
service of national decommissioning<br />
and waste management programmes,<br />
to which the European Commission<br />
contributes. First reviews have taken<br />
place in some EU Member States<br />
under the EU waste directive. The safe<br />
long-term operation of nuclear power<br />
plants and developments related to<br />
Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) were<br />
also discussed.<br />
Officials reviewed progress on the<br />
implementation of nuclear safeguards<br />
in EU Member States and on the<br />
European Commission Support Programme<br />
to the IAEA. Exchanges took<br />
place on the <strong>2018</strong> Preparatory<br />
Committee for the 2020 Review<br />
Conference on the Treaty on the<br />
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons<br />
(NPT), scheduled to be held 23 April<br />
to 4 May <strong>2018</strong> at the United Nations<br />
Office in Geneva.<br />
The next Senior Officials Meeting<br />
is expected to take place in Luxembourg<br />
in early 2019.<br />
| | (18501339), www.iaea.org<br />
IAEA mission sees significant<br />
improvements to Belgian<br />
regulatory framework and<br />
identifies areas for further<br />
enhancement<br />
(iaea) An International Atomic Energy<br />
Agency (IAEA) team of experts said<br />
Belgium has made significant improvements<br />
to its regulatory framework<br />
for nuclear and radiation safety<br />
since 2013 by clarifying the regulatory<br />
body’s roles and responsibilities and<br />
strengthening its independence. The<br />
team also observed other improvements<br />
and identified areas for further<br />
enhancement.<br />
The Integrated Regulatory Review<br />
Service (IRRS) peer-review team concluded<br />
a nine-day follow-up mission<br />
today to review Belgium’s implementation<br />
of recommendations and<br />
suggestions made by a 2013 mission.<br />
The review was conducted at the<br />
request of the Government and hosted<br />
by the country’s nuclear regulatory<br />
body, comprising the Belgian Federal<br />
Agency for Nuclear Control (FANC)<br />
and its technical support arm, Bel V.<br />
Using IAEA safety standards and<br />
international good practices, IRRS<br />
missions are designed to strengthen<br />
the effectiveness of the national<br />
nuclear regulatory infrastructure,<br />
while recognizing the responsibility of<br />
each country to ensure nuclear safety.<br />
The IRRS team said the regulatory<br />
body had adequately addressed most<br />
of the recommendations and suggestions<br />
made by the 2013 mission. The<br />
team also said the regulatory body<br />
should remain focused on tackling<br />
outstanding issues.<br />
“Belgium has made key improvements<br />
to the national regulatory<br />
framework, making it more effective<br />
and efficient,” said team leader Robert<br />
Campbell of the United Kingdom’s<br />
Office for Nuclear Regulation. “The<br />
independence of the regulatory body<br />
has now been strengthened in legislation,<br />
and the roles and responsibilities<br />
between the regulator and the<br />
National Agency for Radioactive Waste<br />
Management have been clarified.”<br />
Belgium has seven operating<br />
nuclear power reactors at two sites,<br />
Doel and Tihange, providing just over<br />
half of the country’s electricity and<br />
other nuclear installations including<br />
research reactors, a radioactive waste<br />
treatment facility and an isotope production<br />
facility. In addition, medical<br />
and industrial applications of radioactive<br />
sources are widely used. By law,<br />
nuclear power will start to be phased<br />
out in 2022.<br />
The scope of the 2013 and the 2017<br />
missions covered areas including: the<br />
responsibilities and functions of the<br />
Government and the regulatory body;<br />
the management system of the regulatory<br />
body; activities of the regulatory<br />
body related to regulation of the full<br />
range of nuclear facilities and activities;<br />
emergency preparedness and<br />
response; control of medical exposure<br />
and radiation safety; and the interface<br />
between nuclear safety and nuclear<br />
security.<br />
The team found that the regulatory<br />
body has taken positive steps to:<br />
• Establish a central information<br />
system for sealed source tracking<br />
and inventory as well as inspection<br />
recording.<br />
• Develop a tool to assist in reviewing<br />
and assessing safety-related<br />
modifications through a clearly<br />
defined graded approach.<br />
• Improve patient radiation protection<br />
by raising awareness<br />
about the need to justify medical<br />
examinations.<br />
• Enhance openness and transparency,<br />
including more communications<br />
on regulatory activities<br />
aimed at improving public trust.<br />
“We are very pleased with the results,<br />
which show that the work we’ve<br />
carried out in the last four years is<br />
recognized by international experts.<br />
I particularly appreciate the comments<br />
on transparency and the independence<br />
of the regulator,” said Jans<br />
Bens, director-general of FANC. “I’d<br />
like to thank the staff of the regulatory<br />
body for their contribution to this<br />
achievement, and we look forward to<br />
making continued efforts at improving<br />
the regulatory framework.”<br />
The IRRS team also identified a few<br />
areas for further enhancing the effectiveness<br />
of the regulatory body, including<br />
by completing the programme<br />
of work on its management system.<br />
191<br />
NEWS<br />
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192<br />
NEWS<br />
“The team has recognised the progress<br />
made by the regulatory body<br />
since the 2013 review,” said David<br />
Senior, head of the IAEA’s Regulatory<br />
Activities Section. “The mission found<br />
that the regulatory body has addressed<br />
the findings from the initial<br />
review, demonstrating a commitment<br />
to continuous improvement of the<br />
regulatory framework against IAEA<br />
safety standards.”<br />
The 12-member IRRS team comprised<br />
experts from Canada, Finland,<br />
France, Greece, Hungary, the Netherlands,<br />
the United Kingdom and the<br />
United States of America as well as<br />
four IAEA staff members.<br />
The final mission report will be<br />
provided to the Government in about<br />
three months. Belgium plans to make<br />
it public.<br />
| | (18501410), www.iaea.org<br />
First‐of‐its‐kind nuclear safety<br />
culture forum puts the<br />
spotlight on national context<br />
(nea) The influence of national context<br />
on nuclear safety culture was the<br />
focus of the country‐specific forum<br />
held on 23‐24 January <strong>2018</strong> by the<br />
Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) in<br />
Stockholm, Sweden, in co‐operation<br />
with the World Association of Nuclear<br />
Operators (WANO) and the Swedish<br />
Radiation Safety Authority (SSM).<br />
The purpose of this forum was to<br />
create awareness on potential safety<br />
culture challenges related to national<br />
context, with the objective of helping<br />
organisations maintain a healthy<br />
safety culture for safe operations of<br />
nuclear installations and for effective<br />
regulatory activities. The event<br />
brought together over 60 experts from<br />
the Swedish nuclear community and<br />
international observers from France,<br />
Finland, Japan, Korea, South Africa<br />
and the United States, representing<br />
the industry and regulatory organisations.<br />
Opening remarks were delivered<br />
by NEA Director‐General William D.<br />
Magwood, IV, SSM Director General<br />
Mats Persson and WANO Chief<br />
Executive Officer (CEO) Peter Prozesky.<br />
Participants, then, spent one and<br />
a half days self‐reflecting upon their<br />
national cultural attributes in relation<br />
to safety culture. They held focus<br />
group discussions, analysed data and<br />
identified traits relevant to their<br />
national context that may strengthen<br />
or jeopardise safety. Through interactive<br />
roleplay, they explored how<br />
their national context may affect<br />
nuclear safety‐relevant behaviours.<br />
In plenary sessions, the participants<br />
shared ways and approaches to work<br />
with the national context in order to<br />
improve or maintain healthy safety<br />
culture.<br />
“The fundamental objective of all<br />
nuclear regulatory bodies is to ensure<br />
that nuclear licensees conduct their<br />
activities related to the peaceful use<br />
of nuclear energy in a safe manner<br />
within their respective countries,”<br />
said NEA Director‐General Magwood.<br />
“National influences on nuclear power<br />
plant operations and safety culture<br />
should also be considered in fostering<br />
and enhancing nuclear safety. Every<br />
country has to find how best to leverage<br />
its national context in order to<br />
build and maintain a healthy safety<br />
culture.”<br />
“We have to consider the national<br />
context, as it has good impacts on<br />
nuclear safety culture while also<br />
presenting some challenges,” added<br />
SSM Deputy Director General Fredrik<br />
Hassel.<br />
WANO CEO Prozesky said, “We are<br />
pleased to work together with the<br />
NEA to explore different ways to<br />
enhance global nuclear safety, particularly<br />
in the area of nuclear safety<br />
culture.”<br />
“The NEA has worked in recent<br />
years to advance the human aspects of<br />
nuclear safety,” said Mr Magwood.<br />
“We have been working with our<br />
membership, other international<br />
organisations and partners like WANO<br />
to make sure that we’re taking the<br />
right actions to enhance nuclear safety<br />
worldwide.”<br />
A summary report of the forum<br />
and its outcomes is in preparation and<br />
will be provided online to serve as<br />
reference point and training tool on<br />
safety culture. It will analyse national<br />
influences on safety culture, identify<br />
country‐specific traits and practical<br />
methods to address challenges, and<br />
propose a roadmap to solutions.<br />
CTBTO: Ground-breaking<br />
ceremony for the permanent<br />
Equipment, Storage &<br />
Maintenance Facility (ESMF)<br />
(ctbto) On 25 January CTBTO held a<br />
ground-breaking ceremony for its new<br />
permanent Equipment, Storage and<br />
Maintenance Facility (ESMF) in<br />
Seibersdorf, Lower Austria. The<br />
Facility will be primarily used as a<br />
storage and maintenance facility for<br />
the equipment of the On-Site<br />
Inspections Division, but will also<br />
benefit the Organization as a whole<br />
with state-of-the-art training facilities,<br />
a media centre and more.<br />
The decision to build a permanent<br />
facility at Seibersdorf is a significant<br />
event for the CTBTO as it will contribute<br />
to the further development of the<br />
monitoring and verification system of<br />
the Treaty, making the work of the<br />
Organization even more visible and<br />
attesting to the fact that it is already<br />
capable of operating to its mandate.<br />
Among the participants of the<br />
ceremony were Michael Linhart,<br />
Vice-Minister & Secretary-General of<br />
the Federal Ministry for Europe,<br />
Integration and Foreign Affairs of the<br />
Republic of Austria, Ambassador<br />
Maria Assunta Accili Sabbatini,<br />
Permanent Representative of the<br />
Republic of Italy and the Chairperson<br />
of the CTBTO PrepCom, Dr. Hannes<br />
Androsch, Chairman of the Supervisory<br />
Board of the Austrian Institute<br />
for Technology (AIT), Gerhard Karner,<br />
Second President of the State<br />
Parliament of Lower Austria, Franz<br />
Ehrenhofer, Mayor of Seibersdorf, as<br />
well as permanent representatives to<br />
the International Organizations in<br />
Vienna.<br />
The symbolic ground-breaking was<br />
only the first small step in the construction<br />
process, as shortly the<br />
construction team will have to dig 150<br />
meters deeper into the ground before<br />
| | Groundbreaking Ceremony of CTBTO’s permanent ESMF Facility in Seibersdorf, Austria 25 January <strong>2018</strong>.<br />
Photo: The Official CTBTO Photostream<br />
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starting work on the facility itself. The<br />
construction of the ESMF is expected<br />
to be completed by the end of <strong>2018</strong>.<br />
At the ceremony, Secretary-<br />
General Linhart pointed out that policies<br />
of nuclear disarmament and<br />
non-proliferation remain among the<br />
main priorities of Austria’s foreign<br />
policy. He reaffirmed Austria’s strong<br />
support for the CTBTO and concluded<br />
that “by building the permanent<br />
Equipment, Storage and Maintenance<br />
Facility in Seibersdorf, the CTBTO’s<br />
links with the host country will be<br />
even stronger”.<br />
Other speakers also highlighted<br />
the importance of the ESMF both for<br />
the strengthening of the CTBTO<br />
verification regime and for Austria<br />
itself, at the level of scientific and<br />
regional development.<br />
| | (18501413), www.ctbto.org<br />
UK Parliament: Brexit: energy<br />
security report published<br />
(uk-par) The EU Energy and Environment<br />
Sub-Committee publishes its<br />
report on Brexit: energy security,<br />
looking at implications for energy<br />
supply, consumer costs and decarbonisation.<br />
Key findings<br />
The report states that Brexit will put<br />
the UK’s current frictionless trade in<br />
energy with the EU at risk. The Committee<br />
calls on Government to set out<br />
how it will work with the EU to anticipate<br />
and manage supply shortages,<br />
and to assess what impact leaving the<br />
Internal Energy Market would have on<br />
the price paid by consumers for their<br />
energy.<br />
The Committee also heard that the<br />
UK’s ability to build future nuclear<br />
generation sites, including Hinkley<br />
Point C, is in doubt if access to<br />
specialist EU workers is curtailed, and<br />
that failure to replace the provisions<br />
of the Euratom Treaty by the time the<br />
UK leaves the EU could result in the<br />
UK being unable to import nuclear<br />
materials.<br />
The Committee found that EU<br />
investment has made a significant<br />
contribution to constructing and<br />
maintaining a secure energy system<br />
in the UK, and that replacing this<br />
funding will be critical to ensuring<br />
sufficient infrastructure is in place to<br />
enable future energy trading.<br />
The report concludes that,<br />
post-Brexit, the UK may be more<br />
vulnerable to energy shortages in<br />
the event of extreme weather or<br />
unplanned generation outages, and<br />
asks the Government to set out how it<br />
will work with the EU to anticipate<br />
and manage such conditions.<br />
Chair’s comments<br />
Chair of the Committee Lord Teverson<br />
said:<br />
“Individuals and businesses across<br />
the UK depend on a reliable and<br />
affordable supply of energy. In recent<br />
years, the UK has achieved such a<br />
supply in partnership with the EU,<br />
working with other Member States to<br />
make cross-border trade in energy<br />
easier and cheaper.<br />
“Over the course of the inquiry the<br />
Committee heard benefits of the UK’s<br />
current energy relationship with the<br />
EU, and the Minister acknowledged<br />
these benefits when he stated his hope<br />
that Brexit would result in as little<br />
change as possible. It remains unclear,<br />
however, how this can be achieved,<br />
without remaining in the single<br />
market, IEM and the other bodies that<br />
develop and implement the EU’s<br />
energy policy.”<br />
| | (18501424), www.parliament.uk<br />
NIA welcomes Greg Clark’s<br />
Written Ministerial Statement<br />
on Euratom<br />
(nia) The UK-based Nuclear Industry<br />
Association NIA has welcomed the<br />
government’s statement on Euratom<br />
and its commitment to update Parliament<br />
every three months as well as<br />
clarity on its intention to negotiate an<br />
implementation period to ensure a<br />
smooth transition from the current to<br />
new arrangements.<br />
Commenting Tom Greatrex, Chief<br />
Executive of the Nuclear Industry<br />
Association, said:<br />
“The Secretary of State’s statement<br />
on Euratom is a useful and welcome<br />
step in setting out the government’s<br />
approach in seeking to secure equivalent<br />
arrangements to those we benefit<br />
from as a member of Euratom.<br />
“The UK industry and research<br />
facilities have been consistently clear<br />
with government about the importance<br />
of these issues since the referendum,<br />
and given the complex nature of<br />
multilateral agreements that will need<br />
to be negotiated, the recognition of<br />
the necessity of transitional arrangements<br />
and the desire for a close future<br />
association with Euratom is welcome.<br />
“Even with a suitable transition,<br />
there remains much work for the<br />
government to do to prevent the<br />
significant disruption that industry is<br />
concerned about.<br />
“There is much still to do in<br />
equipping the UK’s regulator to take<br />
on Euratom’s safeguarding activities;<br />
agreeing a voluntary offer with the<br />
IAEA; negotiating and ratifying<br />
new bilateral Nuclear Co-operation<br />
Agreements with the USA, Canada,<br />
Australia, Japan and others; agreeing<br />
new trading arrangements with the<br />
Euratom community and concluding a<br />
new funding agreement for the UK to<br />
continue its world-leading work in<br />
Euratom’s fusion R&D activities. It is<br />
vital government continues to prioritise<br />
these issues in the period ahead if<br />
there is to be a successful outcome.”<br />
| | (18501421), www.niauk.org<br />
NEI: Nuclear industry urges<br />
prompt next steps for<br />
electricity market reforms<br />
(nei) This afternoon (8 January <strong>2018</strong>)<br />
the Federal Energy Regulatory<br />
Commission (FERC) issued its order<br />
responding to a Notice of Proposed<br />
Rulemaking related to resilience<br />
from the U.S. Department of Energy.<br />
Following is comment from Maria<br />
Korsnick, president and chief executive<br />
officer of the Nuclear Energy<br />
Institute.<br />
“We are disappointed that FERC<br />
did not take affirmative action that<br />
would preserve our nation’s nuclear<br />
plants. America’s nuclear fleet must remain<br />
a strategic asset contributing to<br />
energy security, resilience, reliability,<br />
economic growth and environmental<br />
protection. The status quo, in which<br />
markets recognize only short-term<br />
price signals and ignore the essential<br />
role of nuclear generation, will lead to<br />
more premature shutdowns of wellrun<br />
nuclear facilities. Once closed,<br />
these facilities are shuttered forever.<br />
“We applaud the Secretary’s effort<br />
to place this issue on the national<br />
agenda. To that end, FERC’s order<br />
concluded that resiliency of generation<br />
‘remains an important issue that<br />
warrants the Commission’s continued<br />
attention,’ and that its endorsement of<br />
electricity markets ‘does not conflict<br />
with its oversight of reliability.’ The<br />
Commission has opened a new proceeding<br />
‘to specifically evaluate the<br />
resilience of the bulk power system in<br />
the regions operated by regional<br />
transmission organizations (RTO)<br />
and independent system operators<br />
(ISO).’<br />
“We are committed to working<br />
with FERC, the Department of Energy<br />
and other federal and state policymakers<br />
to ensure that America’s<br />
nuclear fleet continues to deliver<br />
electricity reliably and affordably. We<br />
believe the direction to the RTOs/<br />
ISOs to ‘take a proactive stance on<br />
addressing and ensuring resilience’<br />
193<br />
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194<br />
NEWS<br />
must lead to prompt and meaningful<br />
action, including on issues such as<br />
price formation.”<br />
| | (18501442), www.nei.org<br />
Reactors<br />
European Union: Thematic<br />
peer review – ageing management<br />
of power and research<br />
reactors<br />
(asn) In 2014, the Council of the<br />
European Union adopted directive<br />
2014/87/EURATOM on nuclear security.<br />
The main purpose of this directive,<br />
supplementing a directive of<br />
2009, was to ensure that the licensees<br />
of nuclear facilities learned the lessons<br />
from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear<br />
Power Plant (NPP) accident which<br />
occurred in 2011.<br />
The peer review process, considered<br />
as an important instrument<br />
for promoting the implementation<br />
of continuous safety improvement<br />
measures, was introduced by the<br />
directive in 2014: a peer review of the<br />
nuclear facilities of each Member<br />
State must thus be carried out every<br />
6 years. This in-depth review<br />
process, inspired by that performed<br />
during the stress tests on nuclear<br />
facilities carried out in the wake of<br />
the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident,<br />
started in 2017.<br />
In July 2015, from among the<br />
proposals made by WENRA, the 30 th<br />
meeting of ENSREG selected ageing<br />
management of power and research<br />
reactors as the topic for this first peer<br />
review. In addition to the national<br />
policies developed on this subject,<br />
particularly close attention was<br />
paid to how they are applied to the<br />
following four technical topics: reactor<br />
vessels, containments, concealed<br />
pipes and electrical cables. In accordance<br />
with the provisions [1] regulating<br />
this peer review, the 19 Member<br />
States concerned and participating in<br />
this review are required to submit<br />
their national reports before the end<br />
of 2017. For the nuclear facilities<br />
concerned, ASN publishes its report<br />
in both English and French on its<br />
website. This report is also published<br />
on the ENSREG website.<br />
Following the publication of the<br />
reports from each Member State, a<br />
peer review of the 19 reports for<br />
mutual examination of the steps taken<br />
by the licensees and their assessment<br />
by the regulators will begin in <strong>2018</strong>. A<br />
first workshop is scheduled from 14 to<br />
18 May <strong>2018</strong>. It will be an opportunity<br />
to discuss ageing and identify best<br />
practices. The conclusions of this peer<br />
review will be presented to ENSREG.<br />
| | (18501609),<br />
www.french.nuclear-safety.fr<br />
Russia’s nuclear electricity<br />
share increased up to 18.9 %<br />
in 2017<br />
(rosatom) Following 2017, a share of<br />
electricity production by Russian<br />
nuclear power plants (parts of Power<br />
Division of ROSATOM, Rosenergoatom)<br />
has increased up to 18.9 %<br />
(18.3 % in 2016).<br />
In 2017, the capacity factor has also<br />
grown to reach 83.29 % (83.1 % in<br />
2016).<br />
In 2017, electricity generation<br />
at Russian NPPs reached another<br />
record of 202.868 billion kWh<br />
(196.366 billion kWh in 2016). Thus,<br />
cumulative production has increased<br />
more than 6.6 billion kWh while the<br />
FAS balance of 2017 was exceeded by<br />
3 billion kWh or 1.5 % (at the target<br />
indicator of 199.84 billion kWh).<br />
Russian NPPs set the absolute record<br />
over the entire history of the Russian<br />
nuclear power getting closer to the<br />
absolute pro duction record reached<br />
only during the Soviet Union times in<br />
1989 (212.58 billion kWh, considering<br />
plants in Ukraine, Lithuania and<br />
Armenia).<br />
According to the online data of the<br />
System Operator of the United Energy<br />
System of Russia, the generation of<br />
electricity in Russia in 2017 was<br />
1,073.6 billion kWh that is 0.2 % more<br />
than in 2016. UES of Russia’s power<br />
plants produced 1,053.7 billion kWh<br />
that is 0.5 % more than in 2016.<br />
| | (18501543), www.rosatom.ru<br />
Rosatomflot increased the<br />
number of ice-breaking<br />
escorts through the Northern<br />
Sea Route in 2017<br />
(rosatom) FSUE Atomflot (an enterprise<br />
of ROSATOM) has summed up<br />
the results of 2017. According to the<br />
results, 492 ships of the total gross<br />
tonnage of 7.17 million tons passed<br />
the Northern Sea Route assisted by<br />
nuclear ice-breakers in 2017 (for comparison,<br />
in 2016 there were 410 ships<br />
of the gross tonnage of 5.28 million<br />
tons).<br />
“Off-shipment of hydrocarbon products<br />
is the key factor of the nuclear<br />
icebreaker fleet demand. In future,<br />
the escort numbers will rise. Crews of<br />
the port nuclear icebreakers and tow<br />
boats are maximum responsible for<br />
their contractual commitments. This<br />
is the best ads of their work for their<br />
potential clients,” Mustafa Kashka,<br />
Chief Engineer of Atomflot, says.<br />
Atomflot ensures stable annual<br />
growth of earnings. This is due to the<br />
work the company does to keep the<br />
existing icebreaker service consumers<br />
and to find new clients. In 2017, earnings<br />
of the company grew up to RUB<br />
6,622 million (in 2013 – RUB 1,828<br />
million). In total, over five years (2013<br />
to 2017) this indicator grew up by 3.6<br />
times.<br />
Labor efficiency grew from RUB<br />
1,511,000 in 2013 up to RUB 3,667,000<br />
in 2017. The indicator was up by<br />
243 %.<br />
Mustafa Kashka says: “Based on<br />
the 2016 results, for the first time the<br />
united atomic technological complex<br />
has been formed, the company has got<br />
the net profit of RUB 1,201 million due<br />
to company’s effective performance.<br />
The positive financial result was kept<br />
in 2017: Rosatomflot’s net profit is<br />
estimated at RUB 696 million based<br />
on the year results.”<br />
In 2017, Rosatomflot completed<br />
planned works to extend service lives<br />
of reactors at the Vaygach and Taimyr<br />
icebreakers up to 200,000 hours. The<br />
operation time of the icebreakers was<br />
increased to 5 years.<br />
The planned implementation of<br />
the icebreaker reactor life extension<br />
program allows Atomflot completely<br />
excluding an “ice pause” and smoothly<br />
starting operation of universal<br />
nuclear icebreakers of Project 22220<br />
while strictly following the contractual<br />
commitments.<br />
The Baltijskiy Zavod – Sudostroyenie<br />
continues building universal<br />
nuclear icebreakers (UNI) of Project<br />
22220. In September 2017, the first<br />
UNI Sibir was launched. The leading<br />
UNI Arktika will be set off in mid-2019;<br />
the first series-build nuclear icebreaker<br />
Sibir – November 2020 and<br />
the second series-build nuclear icebreaker<br />
Ural – in November 2021.<br />
In 2017, Atomflot continued its<br />
Portoflot project. It was established by<br />
Rosatomflot as part of the global<br />
Yamal LNG project which is implemented<br />
in the Russia’s Arctic Zone.<br />
The building of a port icebreaker, two<br />
icebreaker towing boats and two tow<br />
boats of ice class are to ensure roundthe-year<br />
safe berthing of large-capacity<br />
ships at berths of Sabetta Port.<br />
In November 2017, the icebreaker<br />
towing boat Yuribei of Project T40105<br />
was put in operation. It is of ice class<br />
Arc 6 that allows the ship to render specialized<br />
services to large-size vehicles<br />
carrying liquefied natural gas and stable<br />
gas condensate. In December 2017,<br />
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| | Rosatomflot increased the number of ice-breaking escorts through the Northern Sea Route in 2017<br />
the Yuribei took part in loading the<br />
first batch of Yamal LNG.<br />
The contract for the port fleet<br />
services is in effect till December 2040<br />
with potential prolongation to two<br />
periods of 5 years each.<br />
The “Atomflot’s Plan of Measures to<br />
Hold the Environmental Year in 2017”<br />
was implemented. The company<br />
operates with no spent nuclear fuel<br />
and radioactive waste accumulating.<br />
In 2017, the disposal of the nuclear<br />
icebreaker Sibir and floating maintenance<br />
base Lepse continued.<br />
In June 2017, the off-shipment of<br />
the first batch of spent nuclear fuel<br />
from Andreeva Bay’s storage facility<br />
for further reprocessing at the<br />
Rosatomflot’s lighter ship Rossita was<br />
the important event for rehabilitation<br />
of the North-West Region.<br />
The positive developments of<br />
Atomflot and the work to conclude<br />
long-term contracts on ice-breaking<br />
services in large-scale projects in the<br />
Arctic Zone of Russia are expected to<br />
allow Rosatomflot to keep with pace<br />
in all main businesses of the company<br />
in <strong>2018</strong>.<br />
| | (18501545), www.rosatom.ru<br />
Fennovoima: Support has<br />
increased for Finland’s<br />
Hanhikivi Nuclear Project<br />
(nucnet) Local support for the Hanhikivi-1<br />
nuclear power plant project in<br />
Finland has increased by 7.6 % since<br />
last year, according to a telephone<br />
survey of 850 people.<br />
Project developer Fennovoima said<br />
75 % of residents in the Pyhäjoki area<br />
support the plant, which is scheduled<br />
to begin commercial operation in<br />
2024.<br />
When surrounding municipalities<br />
were also taken into account, 71.9 %<br />
of residents were in favour of the<br />
project, an increase of 9.9 % over a<br />
similar survey last year.<br />
Fennovoima said the increased support<br />
is an indication that the impact of<br />
the Hanhikivi-1 project, which is using<br />
Russian reactor technology, is becoming<br />
more visible. Fennovoima said<br />
local companies have been “strongly<br />
involved” in the project.<br />
| | (18501707), www.fennovoima.fi<br />
Saudi Arabia to award nuclear<br />
contracts by end of year<br />
(nucnet) Saudi Arabia, the world’s<br />
biggest oil exporter, plans to award<br />
contracts in December <strong>2018</strong> for the<br />
construction of its first nuclear power<br />
plants, Bloomberg reported, quoting a<br />
government official involved with the<br />
project.<br />
The kingdom has received requests<br />
from five bidders from China, France,<br />
the US, South Korea and Russia to<br />
perform the engineering, procurement<br />
and construction work on two<br />
nuclear reactors, Abdulmalik al<br />
Sabery, a consultant in the business<br />
development department at King<br />
Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable<br />
Energy, said in an interview in<br />
Abu Dhabi.<br />
“By April we will sign a project<br />
development agreement with two to<br />
three selected vendors,” Mr al Sabery<br />
said. “We are going to have only one<br />
winner that will be building the two<br />
reactors.” The government expects<br />
construction to start next year and is<br />
aiming to commission the plants in<br />
2027, he said.<br />
Saudi Arabia wants to diversify its<br />
economy and lessen its dependence<br />
on oil sales for most of its official<br />
revenue. As part of these reforms, the<br />
country wants to meet a larger share<br />
of its energy needs from renewables<br />
such as solar power and from nuclear<br />
plants.<br />
Its neighbour the United Arab<br />
Emirates is close to completing the<br />
first of four reactors supplied by South<br />
Korea at the Barakah nuclear station.<br />
In September 2017 a Saudi official<br />
told the International Atomic Energy<br />
Agency that the kingdom was carrying<br />
out feasibility studies before deciding<br />
how and where to build its first reactors.<br />
The official said Saudi Arabia<br />
would have an independent body to<br />
supervise its nuclear industry by the<br />
third quarter of <strong>2018</strong>.<br />
| | (18501719), www.emergy.gov.sa<br />
Finland: Loviisa had record<br />
production year in 2017<br />
(nucnet) Fortum’s two-unit Loviisa<br />
nuclear power station had a record<br />
production year in 2017, generating<br />
8.16 TWh (net) of power, which is<br />
more than 10 % of Finland’s total<br />
electricity production.<br />
Fortum said the 92.7 % load factor<br />
of the Loviisa facility was among the<br />
best in the world for pressurised water<br />
reactor power plants.<br />
Loviisa-1’s load factor was 92.7 %<br />
and Loviisa-2’s was 92.6 %. Production<br />
output at Loviisa-1 was the<br />
highest in the station’s history and at<br />
Loviisa-2 was the second highest.<br />
Both units underwent a short<br />
refuelling annual outage in 2017. Unit<br />
1 was out of production for 21 days<br />
and Unit 2 for 17 days.<br />
In addition to normal scheduled<br />
maintenance and fuel replacement,<br />
high-pressure safety injection pump<br />
motors were renewed. A turbine’s<br />
high-pressure housing was modernised<br />
and two turbine reheaters<br />
replaced to increase the power plants’<br />
production and improve efficiency.<br />
Fortum sad its investments in<br />
Loviisa in 2017 were approximately<br />
€90m ($108m), compared to €100m<br />
in 2016. Investments in the coming<br />
years will continue to be significant,<br />
the company said.<br />
Both Fortum units are 502-MW<br />
PWRs supplied by Russia. Unit 1<br />
began commercial operation in May<br />
1977 and Unit 2 in January 1981.<br />
| | (18501713), www.fortum.com<br />
China: Tianwan-3<br />
aynchronised to grid<br />
(nucnet) The Tianwan-3 nuclear plant<br />
under construction in Jiangsu province,<br />
northeastern China, has been<br />
synchronised to the grid and has<br />
delivered its first kilowatt-hours of<br />
electrical energy at a power level of<br />
25 %, Russia’s state nuclear corporation<br />
Rosatom said on 2 January<br />
2017.<br />
Rosatom said the 990-MW VVER<br />
V-428M unit, which reached first<br />
criticality in September 2017, would<br />
now undergo a series of tests at power<br />
levels of 50 %, 75 % and 100 %. At<br />
100 % power the unit will be operated<br />
for 100 hours before regulators<br />
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* Ouranos, the Greek<br />
god who became<br />
Uranus in Roman<br />
mythology and from<br />
whom the planet<br />
Uranus takes its<br />
name, was later to<br />
serve as a point of<br />
reference when the<br />
term “uranium” was<br />
created.<br />
approve commercial operation. Constriction<br />
of the unit began in December<br />
2012.<br />
The Tianwan nuclear station is the<br />
largest economic cooperation project<br />
between Russia and China, an earlier<br />
statement said. Tianwan-1 and -2,<br />
also VVER V-428M units, began<br />
commercial operation in 2007. The<br />
Tianwan-4 VVER V-428M unit is also<br />
under construction by Russia.<br />
Tianwan-5 and -6 will be indigenous<br />
Generation II+ CNP-1000 units.<br />
| | (18501708), www.rosatom.ru,<br />
www.cnnc.com.cn<br />
France: EDF ompletes cold<br />
functional testing at Flamanville-3<br />
EPR<br />
(nucnet) France’s nuclear operator<br />
EDF has completed the cold func tional<br />
test phase for the Flamanville-3<br />
EPR under construction in northern<br />
France, the state-controlled company<br />
said in a statement on 8 January <strong>2018</strong>.<br />
The cold functional testing phase<br />
is part of the system performance<br />
testing, which started in the first<br />
quarter of 2017, to check and test<br />
operation of all the EPR’s systems.<br />
The cold functional test phase,<br />
which started on 18 December 2017<br />
and was completed on 6 January<br />
<strong>2018</strong>, saw the successful completion<br />
of the leak performance test on the<br />
primary system at a pressure greater<br />
than 240 bar – higher than the<br />
pressure of this system in operation.<br />
More than 500 welds were inspected<br />
during this hydrostatic testing, supervised<br />
by the regulator ASN.<br />
EDF is now preparing hot functional<br />
testing of the 1,600-MW unit to<br />
be started in July <strong>2018</strong>. The objective<br />
is to demonstrate the good working<br />
order of the plant by testing components<br />
with temperature and pressure<br />
levels similar to operating conditions.<br />
EDF said fuel loading and start-up<br />
of the reactor is scheduled for the last<br />
quarter of <strong>2018</strong>.<br />
The group has also confirmed the<br />
cost of the project set at €10.5bn<br />
($12.5bn). A previous estimate of the<br />
total cost in July 2011 was €8bn.<br />
| | (18501715), www.edf.com<br />
Russia: Rostov-4 reaches<br />
first criticality<br />
(nucnet) The Rostov-4 nuclear unit<br />
near Volgodonsk in southern Russia<br />
has reached first criticality and minimum<br />
controlled power, state nuclear<br />
corporation Rosatom said.<br />
Construction of the VVER-1000/<br />
V-320 unit began in June 2010. There<br />
are three other units of the same<br />
design in commercial operation at<br />
Rostov.<br />
When Rostov-4 reaches full power<br />
and commercial operation, nuclear<br />
power will provide 54 % of power in<br />
southern Russia, Rosatom said.<br />
According to the International<br />
Atomic Energy Agency, Russia has 35<br />
nuclear units in commercial operation<br />
and seven, including Rostov-4, under<br />
construction. In 2016 nuclear energy’s<br />
share of electricity production was<br />
17.14 %.<br />
| | (18501710), www.rosatom.ru<br />
Spain: Nuclear reactors<br />
lead electricity generation<br />
with more than 21 %<br />
(nucnet) Spain’s seven commercial<br />
nuclear reactors produced 55.6 TWh<br />
of electricity in 2017, making nuclear<br />
the energy source that contributed<br />
most to the country’s electric system,<br />
the Madrid-based industry group Foro<br />
Nuclear said on 8 January 2017.<br />
Quoting figures from grid operator<br />
Red Eléctrica de España (REE), Foro<br />
Nuclear said Spain’s nuclear fleet<br />
accounted for 7.06 % of installed<br />
power generation capacity, but produced<br />
21.17 % of the total electric<br />
energy consumed. This compares to<br />
21.38 % in 2016 and 20.34 % in 2015.<br />
Foro Nuclear said nuclear power<br />
plants were operational for 7,500<br />
hours during 2017, or 86 % of the<br />
time, the highest number of hours of<br />
any generation source.<br />
Foro Nuclear president Ignacio<br />
Araluce said the nuclear sector’s<br />
performance “represents the availability,<br />
reliability, stability and predictability<br />
offered by nuclear energy”<br />
as it operates continuously and facilitates<br />
the proper management of the<br />
electric system.<br />
He said nuclear power plants do<br />
not emit contaminating gasses or<br />
particles to the atmosphere. In 2017<br />
nuclear production accounted for<br />
almost 40 % of emissions-free electricity<br />
generated in Spain.<br />
| | (18501714), www.foronuclear.org<br />
UAE’s Barakah-3 and -4<br />
connected to grid<br />
(nucnet) The Barakah-3 and -4 nuclear<br />
units under construction in the United<br />
Arab Emirates have been connected to<br />
the grid, Emirates Nuclear Energy<br />
Corporation (ENEC) said today.<br />
ENEC said connecting Units 3 and<br />
4 to the grid will allow the next stage<br />
of testing and the completion of<br />
auxiliary buildings on the site.<br />
The UAE is building four South<br />
Korean APR-1400 reactors at the<br />
Barakah nuclear site, about 240km<br />
west of Abu Dhabi city.<br />
According to ENEC, Unit 4 is more<br />
than 60 % complete, Unit 3 is more<br />
than 79 %, Unit 2 is more than 90 %,<br />
and Unit 1 is undergoing commissioning<br />
and testing before a regulatory<br />
review and receipt of the operating<br />
Licence from the Federal Authority for<br />
Nuclear Regulation.<br />
| | (18501711), www.enev.gov.ua<br />
Company News<br />
New Areva:<br />
We are now Orano!<br />
(orano) New Areva has become<br />
Orano. Refocused on nuclear materials<br />
development and waste management,<br />
Orano’s activities encompass<br />
mining, conversion-enrichment, used<br />
fuel recycling, nuclear logistics, dismantling<br />
and engineering. The group<br />
has 16,000 employees, with a revenue<br />
of 4 billion euros and an order backlog<br />
that represents the equivalent of<br />
nearly eight years of revenue. Its<br />
mining and conversion-enrichment<br />
activities place it in the top three<br />
worldwide. Orano is a leader in<br />
nuclear recycling and logistics, and<br />
is developing its business in the<br />
medical field.<br />
The name Orano has its etymological<br />
roots in the word “uranium”*,<br />
from which nuclear fuel is produced.<br />
“Orano symbolizes a new start. A<br />
new start that has been under preparation<br />
for several years now. We have<br />
set up a new organizational structure,<br />
a new business plan, a new strategic<br />
action plan and a new social contract.<br />
Our new identity is the natural result<br />
of all this.<br />
Our new name symbolizes our<br />
conviction: nuclear power has a<br />
future, as it is a competitive, lowcarbon<br />
energy that creates jobs. Orano<br />
has all it needs to play a key role in<br />
this. We have high ambitions for<br />
Orano, namely for it to become the<br />
leader in the production and recycling<br />
of nuclear materials, waste management,<br />
and dismantling within the<br />
next ten years. I have full confidence<br />
in our capacity to give nuclear energy<br />
its full value.<br />
I am very proud of leading this<br />
group and the men and women who<br />
are part of it,” comments Philippe<br />
Knoche, CEO of Orano.<br />
| | (18501521), www.orano.group<br />
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New AREVA (Orano) and<br />
CNNC acknowledge the<br />
substantial progress made<br />
in the negociation of the<br />
contract for the Chinese commercial<br />
used fuel treatmentrecycling<br />
plant project<br />
(n-a) New AREVA and its Chinese<br />
partner China National Nuclear Corporation<br />
(CNNC) signed on 9 January<br />
<strong>2018</strong> in Beijing, in the presence of the<br />
President of the People’s Republic of<br />
China, Mr. Xi Jinping, and the<br />
President of the French Republic, Mr.<br />
Emmanuel Macron, a memorandum<br />
of commercial agreement for the<br />
Chinese commercial used fuel treatment-recycling<br />
plant project.<br />
Through this memorandum, New<br />
AREVA and CNNC reaffirm their<br />
mutual commitment to complete the<br />
negotiations of the contract for the<br />
Chinese commercial used fuel treatment-recycling<br />
plant project at the<br />
soonest, to launch the project in <strong>2018</strong>,<br />
and acknowledge the substantial progress<br />
made in the negotiation during<br />
the past few months.<br />
The Chinese treatment-recycling<br />
plant (800 tons capacity) will be built<br />
on the model of the La Hague and<br />
Melox plants recognized for their<br />
proven technologies, highest standards<br />
of safety and security, and<br />
industrial performance.<br />
Philippe Knoche, Chief Executive<br />
Officer of New AREVA, commented:<br />
“CNNC and New AREVA have stepped<br />
up their efforts to reach agreement on<br />
the contract and we are seeing today<br />
very positive results. I am looking<br />
forward to finalizing the negotiations<br />
soon, and starting the implementation<br />
of this landmark project with<br />
our partner CNNC in <strong>2018</strong>.”<br />
| | (18501522), www.orono.group<br />
CASTOR® casks support<br />
dismantling in Switzerland<br />
GNS supplies eight spent fuel casks for<br />
the final fuel elements of the Mühleberg<br />
nuclear power plant.<br />
GNS Gesellschaft für Nuklear-<br />
Service mbH and BKW Energie AG<br />
have concluded a contract for the<br />
supply of eight CASTOR® V/52 transport<br />
and storage casks. The casks to be<br />
delivered in 2021 are designated for<br />
the remaining fuel elements of the<br />
Mühleberg nuclear power plant in<br />
Switzerland, which is to be shut-down<br />
at the end of 2019. After the final fuel<br />
elements have been transferred to the<br />
central Swiss interim storage facility<br />
ZWILAG, the boiling water reactor<br />
plant, which was commissioned in<br />
1972, will be fuel-free. This is a decisive<br />
prerequisite for efficient dis mantling.<br />
With its casks, GNS ensures this<br />
important step in the decommissioning<br />
process of the Mühleberg nuclear<br />
power plant and supports the first decommissioning<br />
project in Switzerland<br />
in its optimised dis mantling.<br />
The supply contract was preceded<br />
by a contract for the licensing of<br />
CASTOR® V/52 for Switzerland,<br />
which was concluded last year.<br />
| | (18520857), www.gns.de<br />
MHI completes investment<br />
into France’s Framatome<br />
• MHI acquires 19.5 percent stake in<br />
Framatome, based on prior agreement<br />
from July 2017<br />
• EDF and MHI to collaborate on<br />
ATMEA nuclear reactor jointventure<br />
(framatome) Mitsubishi Heavy Industries,<br />
Ltd. (MHI) has completed<br />
investment into Framatome, a French<br />
company that designs and manufactures<br />
nuclear power plant (NPP)<br />
equipment and systems and renamed<br />
from New NP. MHI now holds a 19.5 %<br />
equity stake in Framatome, an affiliate<br />
of Electricité de France (EDF) recently<br />
established as part of the reorganization<br />
of AREVA Group. The investment<br />
is aimed at establishing a global<br />
structure for delivering the latest<br />
technologies for safe and reliable<br />
nuclear power generation through<br />
strategic collaboration between MHI,<br />
Framatome and EDF. It will also<br />
support the promotion of sales of the<br />
ATMEA1 reactor through collaboration<br />
with EDF.<br />
| | The representatives from BKW Energie AG and GNS Gesellschaft für Nuklear-Service mbH<br />
on the occasion of signing the contract for CASTOR® casks. (Courtesy: GNS)<br />
Framatome evolved from AREVA<br />
NP, an AREVA Group company<br />
with extensive experience in design<br />
and manufacture of NPP equipment,<br />
plant construction and fuel supply.<br />
Framatome will specialize in aftersale<br />
servicing of existing plants as<br />
well as fuel supply, and the design,<br />
manufacture and sale of reactor<br />
equipment for new plants; an area<br />
expected to generate stable earnings.<br />
The completion of the investment<br />
will also result in a reorganization of<br />
ATMEA. ATMEA was formed as a joint<br />
venture between MHI and AREVA<br />
NP to develop the next-generation<br />
ATMEA1 reactor. Under the new<br />
structure, there will be fifty-fifty<br />
ownership of ATMEA between MHI<br />
and EDF, along with a special share<br />
owned by Framatome.<br />
Following completion of the investment,<br />
MHI President and CEO<br />
Shunichi Miyanaga commented,<br />
“MHI has been a key player in cooperation<br />
between Japan and France in<br />
the development of nuclear power<br />
generation technologies for many<br />
years. With the completion of our<br />
investment into Framatome, a new<br />
structure has been created that will<br />
further strengthen the ties between<br />
our nuclear energy industries, and I<br />
am confident this new relationship<br />
will enable further improvement in<br />
technologies to ensure the long-term<br />
sustainability and reliability of nuclear<br />
energy.”<br />
Under the new arrangement, MHI,<br />
EDF and Framatome will collaborate<br />
in promoting worldwide sales of the<br />
ATMEA1 reactor. Further, cooperative<br />
ties between France and Japan’s<br />
nuclear power industries will be<br />
strengthened in areas including equipment<br />
supply to NPPs, after-sale servicing,<br />
and decommissioning work.<br />
Cooperation between MHI and<br />
the AREVA Group began in the 1990s<br />
with collaboration in the fuel cycle<br />
business. In 2006 the two parties<br />
concluded a wider cooperation agreement<br />
in the nuclear energy field.<br />
Following this, integration of the two<br />
partners’ technologies resulted in<br />
development of the ATMEA1; a<br />
pressurized water reactor (PWR), in<br />
the 1,200 megawatt (MW) class, providing<br />
the world’s highest levels of<br />
safety and reliability. Since that time,<br />
prospects for the sale of the ATMEA1<br />
have been expanding worldwide,<br />
especially in emerging economies,<br />
where new NPP construction plans<br />
are moving ahead.<br />
Going forward, through the increasingly<br />
close ties forged with EDF,<br />
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Framatome and the AREVA Group,<br />
MHI will promote the development of<br />
global markets for a broad range of<br />
nuclear power generation-related<br />
technologies. In this way, MHI will<br />
contribute to the formation of a<br />
worldwide structure enabling stable<br />
acquisition and supply of energy with<br />
low emission.<br />
MHI is also scheduled to acquire a<br />
5 percent equity stake in New AREVA<br />
Holding (formerly referred to as<br />
“NewCo”), a company primarily<br />
focused on the fuel cycle field business.<br />
The investment is due to be completed<br />
by the end of January <strong>2018</strong>.<br />
| | (18501525), www.framatome.com<br />
USA: Framatome to acquire<br />
Instrumentation and Control<br />
nuclear business of Schneider<br />
Electric<br />
(framatome) Framatome announced<br />
an agreement with Schneider Electric<br />
to acquire its nuclear automation<br />
business. The two companies recently<br />
signed an asset purchase agreement<br />
that outlines the terms of the sale,<br />
which is expected to close before the<br />
end of the first quarter of <strong>2018</strong>.<br />
The acquisition expands Framatome’s<br />
instrumentation and control<br />
(I&C) offerings. These systems are the<br />
central nervous system of a nuclear<br />
power plant allowing operators to<br />
control reactor operations. Modernizations,<br />
upgrades and ongoing<br />
support, are vital to manage economic<br />
long-term operation of nuclear power.<br />
More than 80 safety I&C systems have<br />
been installed by Framatome on 44<br />
reactors in 17 countries across the<br />
world, and approximately 250 automation<br />
systems have been installed<br />
or are being installed by Schneider<br />
Electric.<br />
The agreement between Framatome<br />
and Schneider Electric also<br />
creates a long-term manufacturing<br />
partnership, which gives customers<br />
I&C options based on a comprehensive<br />
global technical expertise and<br />
market knowledge.<br />
“This is an exciting time of growth<br />
for our company, and the acquisition<br />
and partnership with Schneider<br />
Electric build on our long history of<br />
providing nuclear operators with both<br />
digital and analog I&C solutions,” said<br />
Gary Mignogna, president and CEO of<br />
Framatome Inc. “With this acqui sition,<br />
we will provide long-term support for<br />
our customers’ systems and serve as<br />
the original equipment manufacturer<br />
for their I&C upgrades and modernizations.”<br />
| | (18501526), www.framatome.com<br />
Lightbridge and Framatome<br />
launch Enfission to<br />
commercialize innovative<br />
nuclear fuel<br />
(framatome) Lightbridge Corporation<br />
(NASDAQ: LTBR) and Framatome<br />
finalized and launched Enfission, a<br />
50-50 joint venture company to<br />
develop, license and sell nuclear fuel<br />
assemblies based on Lightbridgedesigned<br />
metallic fuel technology and<br />
other advanced nuclear fuel intellectual<br />
property. Lightbridge is a U.S.<br />
nuclear fuel development company<br />
and Framatome is a leader in designing,<br />
building, servicing, and fueling<br />
today’s reactor fleet and advancing<br />
nuclear energy.<br />
The two companies already began<br />
joint fuel development and regulatory<br />
licensing work under previously<br />
signed agreements initiated in March<br />
2016. The joint venture is a Delawarebased<br />
limited liability company.<br />
Bernard Fontana, Chairman of the<br />
Managing Board and CEO of Framatome,<br />
said: “This is an exciting time<br />
of growth for Framatome and we are<br />
proud to work with Lightbridge on<br />
Enfission. Together, we are developing<br />
an innovative fuel technology<br />
that will provide significant benefits<br />
for our customers, helping them to<br />
generate more electricity from their<br />
nuclear power plants and better compete<br />
in the marketplace. Framatome<br />
provides its next generation of fuel<br />
assembly designs to more than 100 of<br />
the approximately 260 light water<br />
reactors worldwide. Through this<br />
work, we help our customers to<br />
meet their operational goals with<br />
a high level of safety. We are confident<br />
that our strategic partnership<br />
with Lightbridge on Enfission will<br />
strengthen our position as a key<br />
international reference in the global<br />
fuel market.”<br />
Seth Grae, Lightbridge president<br />
and CEO, said: “With the world calling<br />
for more reliable, economic and<br />
carbon- free baseload power, Lightbridge’s<br />
innovative metallic fuel<br />
technology will help both existing and<br />
new nuclear plants fill that need.<br />
Framatome is the ideal partner with<br />
established<br />
manufacturing<br />
| | Joint Venture Negotiation Team Lightbridge<br />
and Framatome<br />
capabilities, an impeccable reputation<br />
as a nuclear fuel supplier and a large<br />
global footprint. We appreciate the<br />
strong support we have already<br />
received from the leading nuclear<br />
operators, both in the U.S. and around<br />
the world. The world’s energy and<br />
climate needs can only be met if<br />
nuclear power grows as a part of<br />
the energy-generating mix. We are<br />
honored to work with Framatome on<br />
this important project and believe<br />
the economic and safety benefits of<br />
our fuel will encourage greater use of<br />
nuclear power.”<br />
| | (18501527), www.framatome.com<br />
Lightbridge awarded key<br />
patents in Europe and China<br />
for innovative metallic<br />
fuel design<br />
(lightbridge) Lightbridge Corporation<br />
(NASDAQ:LTBR), a nuclear fuel technology<br />
company, today announced it<br />
has been awarded key patents in<br />
both Europe and China related to<br />
Lightbridge’s innovative metallic fuel<br />
design that each extend through<br />
2034. These patents follow Notices of<br />
Allowances that were issued by the<br />
European Patent Office and the State<br />
Intellectual Property Office of the<br />
People’s Republic of China, as<br />
reported in October 2017.<br />
The newly issued patents cover an<br />
alternative embodiment of a multilobe<br />
fuel rod design; an all-metal<br />
pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuel<br />
assembly design incorporating multilobe<br />
fuel rods based on the alternative<br />
embodiment; and an all-metal PWR<br />
fuel assembly design incorporating<br />
multi-lobe fuel rods arranged into a<br />
mixed grid pattern, thereby covering<br />
the all-metal fuel assembly design<br />
after the most recent optimization.<br />
Seth Grae, President and CEO of<br />
Lightbridge, said: “These latest<br />
patents are a critical step in solidifying<br />
our intellectual protection around<br />
the world as we gear up for commercialization<br />
through Enfission, our<br />
newly formed joint venture with<br />
Framatome. Our fuel is ideally suited<br />
for the European and Chinese<br />
markets, as it is designed to significantly<br />
enhance both the economics<br />
and safety of existing and planned<br />
nuclear reactors. With 181 operating<br />
nuclear power plants across Europe,<br />
and China poised to become the<br />
largest market for nuclear, these<br />
patents provide us a crucial and<br />
defensible foothold in each of these<br />
markets for years to come.”<br />
Lightbridge has patents pending in<br />
various countries around the world,<br />
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including the United States, South<br />
Korea, Canada, Japan, Eurasia, and<br />
Australia, as well as additional patents<br />
pending in Europe and China.<br />
| | (18501531), www.ltbridge.com<br />
Rosatom: RITM-200 installed<br />
at Sibir Icebreaker<br />
(rosatom) In Saint Petersburg, the<br />
Baltic Shipyard completed the installation<br />
of the second RITM-200 reactor<br />
on the new generation Sibir nuclear<br />
icebreaker.<br />
Installation of the first reactor was<br />
completed earlier, on 14 December.<br />
RITM-200 is an innovative pressurized<br />
water reactor developed and<br />
manufactured for the icebreaker<br />
fleet by AtomEnergoMash, Rosatom’s<br />
engineering division. The new reactor<br />
unit is unparalleled for its compact<br />
size and cost efficiency. Its integrated<br />
design provides for the placement of<br />
core equipment inside the steam<br />
generator shell and makes the unit<br />
twice as light, half more compact and<br />
25 MW more powerful than the<br />
existing icebreaker reactors of the KLT<br />
series. The reactor design enables the<br />
icebreaker to be used both in deep<br />
Arctic waters and river estuaries and<br />
improves its icebreaking speed and<br />
other performance indicators. The<br />
reactors have a service life of 40 years<br />
and are protected by a containment<br />
made of steel, water and concrete.<br />
| | (18501539), www.rosatom.ru<br />
Westinghouse to continue<br />
nuclear fuel delivery to<br />
Ukraine through 2025<br />
(westinghouse) Westinghouse Electric<br />
Company announced that it has<br />
signed a nuclear fuel contract extension<br />
with Ukraine’s State Enterprise<br />
National Nuclear Energy Generation<br />
Company (SE NNEGC) Energoatom.<br />
The contract includes nuclear fuel<br />
deliveries to seven of Ukraine’s 15<br />
nuclear power reactors between 2021<br />
and 2025, expanding and extending<br />
the existing contract for six reactors<br />
that was set to expire in 2020.<br />
“This contract extension solidifies<br />
Westinghouse’s role as a strategic<br />
partner for Energoatom and demonstrates<br />
our ability to support<br />
Ukraine with their energy diversification.<br />
Under the terms of the new<br />
contract, our relation ship with<br />
Ukraine will be strengthened through<br />
our plan to source some of the<br />
fuel components from a Ukrainian<br />
manufacturer,” said José Emeterio<br />
Gutiérrez, Westinghouse president<br />
and chief executive officer.<br />
While commenting on the agreement,<br />
Yurii Nedashkovskyi, President<br />
of SE NNEGC Energoatom, emphasized<br />
that Energoatom is the only operating<br />
utility of VVER-1000 reactors in the<br />
world that has fully diver sified sources<br />
of nuclear fuel supply. Mr. Nedashkovskyi<br />
com mented, “ Cooperation with<br />
Westinghouse was integral to achievement<br />
of this goal.”<br />
Nuclear fuel from Westinghouse<br />
has played an important role in<br />
Ukraine’s work for independence for<br />
more than a decade. Westinghouse<br />
began supplying fuel to Ukraine in<br />
2005, when the first lead test assemblies<br />
were delivered to South-Ukraine<br />
NPP Unit 3.<br />
“We are pleased that Energoatom<br />
is continuing to trust Westinghouse<br />
as an alternative supplier of nuclear<br />
fuel to VVER reactors,” said Aziz<br />
Dag, Westinghouse vice president<br />
and managing director, Northern<br />
Europe.<br />
The manufacturing and assembly<br />
of the nuclear fuel will be performed<br />
by the Westinghouse fuel fabrication<br />
facility in Västerås, Sweden, where<br />
parts of the production lines are solely<br />
dedicated to VVER-1000 fuel. Deliveries<br />
against the contract will begin<br />
in 2021, immediately following the<br />
conclusion of existing contract.<br />
| | (18501538),<br />
www.westinghousenuclear.com<br />
Wood wins Hinkley Point C<br />
contract worth $16m<br />
(wood) Wood has won a contract as<br />
sole supplier of inspection qualification<br />
services to the Hinkley Point C<br />
nuclear power station. EDF Energy,<br />
the station developer, has commissioned<br />
Wood’s Inspection Validation<br />
Centre (IVC) to qualify ultrasonic<br />
inspections on high inte grity welds in<br />
primary circuit com ponents for the<br />
two 1.6GW reactors.<br />
The contract is effective immediately<br />
and the initial task order is<br />
worth $16m.<br />
Wood’s teams will assess the<br />
inspection procedures and their supporting<br />
technical justifications and<br />
will carry out practical trials to demonstrate<br />
that the procedures can be<br />
applied and meet their objectives.<br />
Using flaw implantation techniques,<br />
faults will be introduced into welded<br />
test pieces to test and ultimately assure<br />
that inspectors can identify them.<br />
The work will create a total of 35<br />
new jobs at the IVC in Warrington, UK,<br />
which works with specialist suppliers<br />
across the world.<br />
| | (18501551), www.woodplc.com<br />
Forum<br />
Consumption in the EU above<br />
the energy efficiency target<br />
(eu) The European Union (EU) has<br />
committed itself to reducing energy<br />
consumption by 20 % by 2020 compared<br />
to projections. This objective is<br />
also known as the 20 % energy<br />
efficiency target. In other words, the<br />
EU has pledged to attaining a primary<br />
energy consumption of no more than<br />
1 483 million tonnes of oil equivalent<br />
(Mtoe) and a final energy consumption<br />
of no more than 1 086 Mtoe in 2020.<br />
In 2016, primary energy consumption<br />
in the EU was 4 % off the<br />
effi ciency target. Since 1990, the first<br />
199<br />
NEWS<br />
| | Primary energy consumption in the EU, 2016 | | Final energy consumption in the EU, 2016<br />
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<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
200<br />
NEWS<br />
year for which data are available, the<br />
consumption has reduced by 1.7 %.<br />
However, over the years, the distance<br />
from primary energy consumption<br />
target has fluctuated greatly. The<br />
biggest divergence from the target<br />
was in 2006 (16.2 %, a consumption<br />
level of 1 723 Mtoe), while a record<br />
low was reached in 2014 (1.7 %,<br />
1 509 Mtoe). Over the last two years<br />
the gap rose again, to 4 % above the<br />
2020 target, equating to a consumption<br />
of 1 543 Mtoe in 2016.<br />
In 2016, gross inland energy<br />
consumption in the European Union,<br />
which reflects the energy quantities<br />
necessary to satisfy all inland consumption,<br />
amounted to 1 641 Mtoe.<br />
This was a 10.8 % decrease compared<br />
with the peak of nearly 1 840 Mtoe in<br />
2006, but a 6.1 % increase compared<br />
to the decade between 1996 and 2006.<br />
Energy consumption falling<br />
mainly in Greece, Malta and<br />
Romania over last decade<br />
While 19 Member States increased<br />
their energy consumption between<br />
1996 and 2006, growth in energy<br />
consumption was recorded in only<br />
two Member States between 2006 and<br />
2016: Estonia (13.4 % increase to<br />
6.2 Mtoe in 2016) and Poland (3.2 %<br />
increase to 99.9 Mtoe in 2016).<br />
Among the 26 Member States where<br />
energy consumption decreased,<br />
Greece (-23.6 %), Malta (- 22.5 %)<br />
and Romania (-20.2 %) recorded<br />
decreases of more than 20 %.<br />
These figures are issued by Eurostat,<br />
the statistical office of the European<br />
Union, and are complemented by<br />
an article on energy saving in the EU.<br />
| | (18501600), ec.europa.eu<br />
People<br />
FORATOM welcomes new<br />
President, Dr Teodor Chirica<br />
(foratom) FORATOM is pleased to<br />
announce that Dr Teodor Chirica has<br />
been appointed by the association’s<br />
General Assembly as FORATOM<br />
President for a two-year period<br />
starting on 1 January <strong>2018</strong>. Furthermore,<br />
Mr Esa Hyvärinen, Senior Vice<br />
President of Corporate Relations at<br />
Fortum, has been elected as Vice<br />
President for the same period.<br />
“I look forward to the next two<br />
years working with the General<br />
Assembly, Executive Board, FORATOM<br />
Members and the Secretariat”, states<br />
Dr Chirica. “We have many challenges<br />
ahead of us, but I am certain that by<br />
working together and with our partners<br />
at EU level we will be successful.<br />
Indeed, nuclear energy is essential if<br />
Europe wants to meet its goals in terms<br />
of decarbonising the power sector,<br />
ensuring security of supply and stimulating<br />
growth and jobs in Europe.”<br />
Dr Teodor Chirica has over 40<br />
years’ experience in the Romanian<br />
nuclear energy industry. Actively<br />
involved in the development of the<br />
CANDU project in Romana since the<br />
early 70’s, Dr Chirica has worked for<br />
the CANDU Owners Group, ISPE,<br />
CITON and RENEL. Following this, he<br />
has served in different managerial<br />
positions at Nuclearelectrica (1998-<br />
2009) becoming CEO between March<br />
2005 and January 2009. He also<br />
acted as Managing Director of AMEC<br />
Nuclear Romania (2009-2013) and<br />
as CEO of EnergoNuclear – SPV for<br />
Cernavoda Units 3 & 4 from November<br />
2013. Since October 2017, Dr Chirica<br />
is Senior Adviser to the CEO of<br />
Nuclear electrica. He holds a PhD in<br />
nuclear science from the Polytechnics<br />
University in Bucharest. Dr Chirica<br />
has been instrumental in the setting<br />
up of the Romanian Atomic Forum<br />
(ROMATOM, 2000) and in its affiliation<br />
to FORATOM. He is a FORATOM<br />
Executive Officer since 2006 and<br />
FORATOM Vice President since 2017.<br />
In addition, since 2015, he acts as<br />
Special Advisor ROEC.<br />
Teodor Chirica replaces Bertrand<br />
de L’Epinois, Senior Vice President<br />
for Safety Standards at AREVA, who<br />
has reached the end of his mandate<br />
as FORATOM President. FORATOM<br />
wholeheartedly thanks Bertrand de<br />
L’Epinois for his efforts over the last<br />
two years.<br />
| | (18501444),<br />
www.foratom.org<br />
Market data<br />
(All information is supplied without<br />
guarantee.)<br />
Nuclear Fuel Supply<br />
Market Data<br />
Information in current (nominal)<br />
U.S.-$. No inflation adjustment of<br />
prices on a base year. Separative work<br />
data for the formerly “secondary<br />
market”. Uranium prices [US-$/lb<br />
U 3 O 8 ; 1 lb = 453.53 g; 1 lb U 3 O 8 =<br />
0.385 kg U]. Conversion prices<br />
[US-$/kg U], Separative work<br />
[US-$/SWU (Separative work unit)].<br />
January to December 2013<br />
• Uranium: 34.00–43.50<br />
• Conversion: 9.25–11.50<br />
• Separative work: 98.00–127.00<br />
January to December 2014<br />
• Uranium: 28.10–42.00<br />
• Conversion: 7.25–11.00<br />
• Separative work: 86.00–98.00<br />
January to December 2015<br />
• Uranium: 35.00–39.75<br />
• Conversion: 6.25–9.50<br />
• Separative work: 58.00–92.00<br />
2016<br />
January to June 2016<br />
• Uranium: 26.50–35.25<br />
• Conversion: 6.25–6.75<br />
• Separative work: 58.00–62.00<br />
July to December 2016<br />
• Uranium: 18.75–27.80<br />
• Conversion: 5.50–6.50<br />
• Separative work: 47.00–62.00<br />
2017<br />
January 2017<br />
• Uranium: 20.25–25.50<br />
• Conversion: 5.50–6.75<br />
• Separative work: 47.00–50.00<br />
February 2017<br />
• Uranium: 23.50–26.50<br />
• Conversion: 5.50–6.75<br />
• Separative work: 48.00–50.00<br />
March 2017<br />
• Uranium: 24.00–26.00<br />
• Conversion: 5.50–6.75<br />
• Separative work: 47.00–50.00<br />
April 2017<br />
• Uranium: 22.50–23.50<br />
• Conversion: 5.00–5.50<br />
• Separative work: 45.50–48.50<br />
May 2017<br />
• Uranium: 19.25–22.75<br />
• Conversion: 5.00–5.50<br />
• Separative work: 42.00–45.00<br />
June 2017<br />
• Uranium: 19.25–20.50<br />
• Conversion: 5.55–5.50<br />
• Separative work: 42.00–43.00<br />
July 2017<br />
• Uranium: 19.75–20.50<br />
• Conversion: 4.75–5.25<br />
• Separative work: 42.00–43.00<br />
August 2017<br />
• Uranium: 19.50–21.00<br />
• Conversion: 4.75–5.25<br />
• Separative work: 41.00–43.00<br />
September 2017<br />
• Uranium: 19.75–20.75<br />
• Conversion: 4.60–5.10<br />
• Separative work: 40.50–42.00<br />
October 2017<br />
• Uranium: 19.90–20.50<br />
• Conversion: 4.50–5.25<br />
• Separative work: 40.00–43.00<br />
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<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 63 (<strong>2018</strong>) | Issue 3 ı March<br />
November 2017<br />
• Uranium: 20.00–26.00<br />
• Conversion: 4.75–5.25<br />
• Separative work: 40.00–43.00<br />
December 2017<br />
• Uranium: 23.50–25.50<br />
• Conversion: 5.00–6.00<br />
• Separative work: 39.00–42.00<br />
<strong>2018</strong><br />
January <strong>2018</strong><br />
• Uranium: 21.75–24.00<br />
• Conversion: 6.00–7.00<br />
• Separative work: 38.00–42.00<br />
| | Source: Energy Intelligence<br />
www.energyintel.com<br />
| | Uranium spot market prices from 1980 to <strong>2018</strong> and from 2007 to <strong>2018</strong>. The price range is shown.<br />
In years with U.S. trade restrictions the unrestricted uranium spot market price is shown.<br />
201<br />
NEWS<br />
Cross-border Price<br />
for Hard Coal<br />
Cross-border price for hard coal in<br />
[€/t TCE] and orders in [t TCE] for<br />
use in power plants (TCE: tonnes of<br />
coal equivalent, German border):<br />
2012: 93.02; 27,453,635<br />
2013: 79.12, 31,637,166<br />
2014: 72.94, 30,591,663<br />
2015: 67.90; 28,919,230<br />
2016: 67.07; 29,787,178<br />
I. quarter: 56.87; 8,627,347<br />
II. quarter: 56.12; 5,970,240<br />
III. quarter: 65.03, 7.257.041<br />
IV. quarter: 88.28; 7,932,550<br />
2017:<br />
I. quarter: 95.75; 8,385,071<br />
II. quarter: 86.40; 5,094,233<br />
III. quarter: 88.07; 5,504,908<br />
| | Source: BAFA,<br />
some data provisional<br />
www.bafa.de<br />
EEX Trading Results<br />
January <strong>2018</strong><br />
(eex) In January <strong>2018</strong>, the European<br />
Energy Exchange (EEX) achieved a<br />
total volume of 240.9 TWh on its<br />
power derivatives markets (January<br />
2017: 291.1 TWh). The January<br />
volume comprised 140.3 TWh traded<br />
at EEX via Trade Registration with<br />
subsequent clearing. Clearing and<br />
settlement of all exchange transactions<br />
was executed by European<br />
Commodity Clearing (ECC).<br />
On the markets for France<br />
(23.8 TWh, +42 %), Spain (5.3 TWh,<br />
+30 %) and Italy (46.6 TWh, +89 %),<br />
EEX was able to significantly increase<br />
volumes year-on-year. On the German<br />
markets, nearly 80 % of the total<br />
volume was traded in the Phelix-DE<br />
Future which EEX launched in April<br />
2017 in light of the of the German-<br />
Austrian price zone split and which<br />
| | Separative work and conversion market price ranges from 2007 to <strong>2018</strong>. The price range is shown.<br />
)1<br />
In December 2009 Energy Intelligence changed the method of calculation for spot market prices. The change results in virtual price leaps.<br />
has established itself as the benchmark<br />
for European power.<br />
The Settlement Price for base<br />
load contract (Phelix Futures) with<br />
delivery in 2019 amounted to 34.21 €/<br />
MWh. The Settlement Price for peak<br />
load contract (Phelix Futures) with<br />
delivery in 2019 amounted to 42.90 €/<br />
MWh.<br />
On the EEX markets for emission<br />
allowances, trading volumes increased<br />
by 37 % to 109.8 million tonnes of CO 2<br />
in January (January 2017: 80.1 million<br />
tonnes of CO 2 ). Primary market<br />
auctions contributed 66.5 million<br />
tonnes of CO 2 to the total volume.<br />
In particular, the EUA derivatives<br />
market recorded a significant growth<br />
of 154 % to 40.3 million tonnes of CO 2<br />
(January 2017: 15.9 million tonnes of<br />
CO 2 ).<br />
The EUA price with delivery in<br />
December 2017 amounted to<br />
7.66/9.46 €/ EUA (min./max.).<br />
| | www.eex.com<br />
MWV Crude Oil/Product Prices<br />
December 2017<br />
(mwv) According to information and<br />
calculations by the Association of the<br />
German Petroleum Industry MWV e.V.<br />
in December 2017 the prices for<br />
super fuel, fuel oil and heating oil<br />
noted inconsistent compared with the<br />
pre vious month November 2017. The<br />
average gas station prices for Euro<br />
super consisted of 136.84 €Cent<br />
( November 2017: 138.54 €Cent,<br />
approx. -1.23 % in brackets: each<br />
information for pre vious month or<br />
rather previous month comparison),<br />
for diesel fuel of 119.01 €Cent (118.52;<br />
+0.41 %) and for heating oil (HEL)<br />
of 60.65 €Cent (60.06 €Cent,<br />
+0.98 %).<br />
The tax share for super with<br />
a consumer price of 138.54 €Cent<br />
(138.54 €Cent) consisted of<br />
65.45 €Cent (47.24 %, 65.45 €Cent)<br />
for the current constant mineral oil<br />
tax share and 21.85 €Cent (current<br />
rate: 19.0 % = const., 22.12 €Cent)<br />
for the value added tax. The product<br />
price (notation Rotterdam) consisted<br />
of 37.18 €Cent (27.17 %, 39.06 €Cent)<br />
and the gross margin consisted of<br />
12.36 €Cent (9.03 %; 11.91 €Cent).<br />
Thus the overall tax share for super<br />
results of 66.83 % (66.24 %).<br />
Worldwide crude oil prices<br />
(monthly average price OPEC/Brent/<br />
WTI, Source: U.S. EIA) were again<br />
higher, approx. +2.43 % (+9.43 %)<br />
in December compared to November<br />
2017.<br />
The market showed a stable<br />
development with higher prices; each<br />
in US-$/bbl: OPEC basket: 62.06<br />
(60.74); UK-Brent: 64.37 (62.70);<br />
West Texas Inter mediate (WTI): 57.88<br />
(56.64).<br />
| | www.mwv.de<br />
News
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202<br />
NUCLEAR TODAY<br />
Links to reference<br />
sources:<br />
UK National Audit<br />
Office report:<br />
http://bit.ly/2t1kFLg<br />
US Senate hearing on<br />
nuclear’s contribution:<br />
http://bit.ly/2BIYihS<br />
Exelon Generation<br />
statement on<br />
FitzPatrick<br />
nuclear plant:<br />
http://bit.ly/2FVpFTX<br />
Could Our Nuclear Vision Benefit<br />
From a Spell of Tesla Magic?<br />
John Shepherd<br />
As I put the finishing touches to this latest article, US entrepreneur and boss of the Tesla car giant, Elon Musk,<br />
successfully launched a new rocket, the Falcon Heavy, from the Kennedy Space Center in Florida.<br />
The vast vehicle is the most powerful shuttle system to date<br />
and the whole exercise was ‘only’ a test – or should that be<br />
taste – of what is to come. The rocket’s payload did not<br />
include an array of satellites or other such paraphernalia.<br />
Instead, it carried an unmistakably entrepreneurial touch<br />
– Musk’s old cherry-red Tesla sports car. On top of that,<br />
there was a mannequin in a spacesuit strapped into the<br />
driver’s seat of the car and the radio was set to play a David<br />
Bowie soundtrack.<br />
Maybe this is a bit too theatrical for some, but we’ve<br />
come to expect that of Mr Musk. It was he, after all, who<br />
made a bet with the government of South Australia to<br />
deliver the state the world’s biggest battery within 100 days<br />
of being ordered or deliver it free of charge.<br />
Musk of course delivered the Tesla 100nMW/129nMWh<br />
Powerpack system on time and it is now paired with French<br />
utility Neoen’s Hornsdale wind farm and helping to prevent<br />
power outages in South Australia. Such was the success of<br />
the project – never mind the countless free publicity the<br />
project generated around the world – other Australian<br />
states are investing in similar projects and Tesla is at the<br />
front of the queue.<br />
At this point, you’re probably asking yourself what all<br />
this has to do with nuclear today. Technologically speaking<br />
nothing, of course. But think ‘outside the box’ – as I’m<br />
sure many of you have been told in those corporate<br />
management- training classes. The answer is: ‘vision’. The<br />
unabashed vision to be bold, daring, imaginative. The<br />
vision to believe in technology and to be unafraid to build<br />
on the experience and knowledge gained to date, including<br />
the failures, as we take the next steps forward.<br />
I do wonder if nuclear has lost its way a little in the past<br />
couple of years in terms and our industry has allowed itself<br />
to become bogged down and lose sight of the prize. Perhaps<br />
we’ve allowed ourselves to be overtaken by events?<br />
For example, there are some exciting nuclear developments<br />
in the UK that appear to have been constrained by a<br />
lack of imagination and commitment – not by the company<br />
and workforce but by those who are supposed to show<br />
political leadership.<br />
Horizon Nuclear Power, a subsidiary of Japan’s Hitachi,<br />
aims to build two Advanced Boiling Water Reactor plants<br />
in North Wales and South Gloucestershire. But the governments<br />
in London and Tokyo are still reportedly mulling<br />
over how to support the projects’ financing.<br />
However, the UK’s Franco-Chinese-funded Hinkley<br />
Point C project, to build a twin unit UK EPR capable of<br />
generating 3,260nMW of secure, low carbon electricity for<br />
60 years, has finally got into its stride. This was something<br />
that could have begun sooner were it not for political<br />
prevarication by the UK government. Of course, progress<br />
was not helped by the Brexit referendum and a subsequent<br />
change of prime ministers!<br />
But even when funding and investment guarantees<br />
were finalised for Hinkley Point C, there was still criticism<br />
from the UK’s National Audit Office. The agency could not<br />
resist piling on complaints regarding the investment,<br />
saying the government had “committed electricity<br />
consumers and taxpayers to a high cost and risky deal in a<br />
changing energy marketplace”.<br />
Never mind the more than 25,000 new employment<br />
opportunities the project will create, plus the fact that,<br />
when built, the plant will be generating low-carbon<br />
electricity for around six million homes!<br />
Contrast this approach with that of countries such as<br />
Russia and China, who are prepared not only to invest in the<br />
development of civil nuclear power at home they also see<br />
the value of partnering in projects beyond the own borders.<br />
In the US, key witnesses to a Senate committee hearing<br />
have been telling legislators that markets must do a better<br />
job of properly incentivising baseload power plants like<br />
nuclear, so the national electric grid becomes more<br />
resilient and reliable – especially during extreme weather.<br />
And there are some positive signs for nuclear again in<br />
the US after a period of gloom. Exelon confirmed recently<br />
that the James A FitzPatrick nuclear power plant, which<br />
had been scheduled to close a year ago, is now spurring<br />
investment in local businesses in New York State. The<br />
utility said FitzPatrick launched several capital projects in<br />
2017 totalling more than $ 15.2 million to realign the<br />
station for long-term operations.<br />
In Brussels in February, the European Commission is<br />
convening an ‘EU Industry Day’, to “update stakeholders on<br />
the Commission's strategic approach to industrial policy<br />
and actions to further develop industrial competitiveness in<br />
Europe”. The event will include discussions on proposals to<br />
create an ‘EU Battery Alliance’, which EU leaders say could<br />
support the establishment of a full value chain of batteries<br />
in Europe, with large-scale battery cells production.<br />
The topic of “clean energy” is mentioned throughout<br />
the advance programme for the EU event – but nuclear<br />
does not get a mention. Why is that? If this event is truly<br />
about building support for European industries and<br />
nurturing and investing in the technologies of tomorrow,<br />
what is so terrible about including nuclear energy?<br />
This brings me back to the ‘vision thing’ I mentioned at<br />
the beginning of this article. Leadership in terms of lighting<br />
the way to a cleaner, greener plant does not mean taking a<br />
blinkered view that turns a blind eye to the undeniable<br />
environmental benefits of energy sources that are simply<br />
politically unacceptable to some.<br />
Perhaps the nuclear industry collectively needs to invite<br />
a certain Mr Musk to come on board for a bit of consul tancy<br />
work.<br />
Nuclear can definitely benefit from a sprinkling of his<br />
entrepreneurial spirit and sparkle at this moment in time.<br />
Let’s face it, for someone who can steer a sports car into<br />
space in one piece, driving investments into a new nuclear<br />
era down here on terra firma should be a piece of cake.<br />
Author<br />
John Shepherd<br />
nuclear 24<br />
41a Beoley Road West<br />
St George’s<br />
Redditch B98 8LR, United Kingdom<br />
Nuclear Today<br />
Could Our Nuclear Vision Benefit From a Spell of Tesla Magic? ı John Shepherd
Unsere Jahrestagung – die gemeinsame Fachkonferenz von KTG und DAtF<br />
Unsere Jahrestagung<br />
Die KTG lädt ein.<br />
3 Karl-Wirtz-Preisverleihung<br />
Zur Förderung des wissenschaftlich-technischen<br />
Nachwuchses verleiht die KTG den Karl-Wirtz-Preis<br />
an junge Wissenschaftler.<br />
28. Mai <strong>2018</strong> ı 18:00 Uhr im Anschluss an die<br />
Mitglieder versammlung der KTG<br />
3 Ansprache<br />
ENS – Vision 2020<br />
Alastair C. Laird<br />
ı Präsident, European Nuclear Society (ENS)<br />
28. Mai <strong>2018</strong> ı 19:00 Uhr Get-together der KTG<br />
3 Silber-Sponsor<br />
3 Verleihung der Ehrenmitgliedschaft<br />
Die KTG verleiht ihre Ehrenmitgliedschaft<br />
an Herrn Prof. Winfried Petry.<br />
29. Mai <strong>2018</strong> ı 17:45 Uhr Plenarsitzung<br />
3 Medien-Partner<br />
Registrieren Sie sich für die Jahrestagung Kerntechnik unter:<br />
http://www.nucleartech-meeting.com/registration/<br />
online-registration.html<br />
Unsere Jahrestagung Kerntechnik – das Original seit fast 50 Jahren. Hier trifft sich die Branche.
Combined strength.<br />
One team.<br />
Greater opportunities.<br />
SNC-Lavalin und Atkins arbeiten für Sie als ein Team. Gemeinsam liefern wir unseren Kunden<br />
herausragende Projektdurchführung auf höchstem Sicherheitsniveau.<br />
Kernkraft<br />
Erneuerbare<br />
Energien<br />
Öl & Gas<br />
Bergbau<br />
& Metallurgie<br />
Infrastruktur<br />
In der Kerntechnik in Deutschland bieten wir Ihnen<br />
partnerschaftliche Lösungen jeder Größenordnung<br />
für Ihre Rückbauvorhaben und Entsorgungsaufgaben.<br />
Dies umfasst u.a.<br />
› Unterstützung in der täglichen Projektarbeit z.B.<br />
Unterlagenerstellung für das Genehmigungsund<br />
Aufsichtsverfahren<br />
› Dienstleistungen z.B. Konzeptentwicklung für<br />
Freigabe und Entsorgung, Re-Klassifizierung von<br />
Abfallgebinden, Verfahrensentwicklungen für die<br />
Abfallkonditionierung etc.<br />
› Ausführung von Anlagenlieferungen und<br />
Standortlösungen jeder Größenordnung<br />
Für unser Team in der Kerntechnik<br />
- am Standort Hamburg oder in flexibler<br />
Abstimmung - suchen wir<br />
› Projektmanager (m/w) Ref: EN-002466<br />
› Ingenieure (m/w) Ref: EN-002464<br />
› Rückbau-Experten (m/w) Ref: EN-002463<br />
› Erfahrungsträger im Genehmigungs- und<br />
Aufsichtsverfahren (m/w) Ref: EN-002465<br />
Für weitere Informationen<br />
www.atkinsglobal.com/careers<br />
e: hamburg@atkinsglobal.com<br />
› Planung und Durchführung von<br />
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