Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in - United States ...
Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in - United States ...
Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in - United States ...
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Cover Image:<br />
An Afghan Nati<strong>on</strong>al Army soldier provides security overwatch as more than 3,500 Afghan citizens<br />
gathered to celebrate the Persian New Year, know to Afghans as “Nowruz,” at the Shah Maqsud Shr<strong>in</strong>e<br />
<strong>in</strong> K<strong>and</strong>ahar prov<strong>in</strong>ce's Khakrez district, March 21, 2011. Residents reported that the festival was<br />
attended by more people than at any time s<strong>in</strong>ce the 1970s. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Benjam<strong>in</strong> Wats<strong>on</strong>).
UNCLASSIFIED<br />
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................................... 1<br />
KEY MILESTONES (OCTOBER 1, 2011 – MARCH 31, 2012) .......................................................... 2<br />
INSURGENCY SEVERELY DEGRADED BY ANSF-ISAF OPERATIONS ............................................ 3<br />
INCREASINGLY INDEPENDENT, THE ANSF CONTINUES TO MAKE PROGRESS ............................. 4<br />
INSURGENT CAPABILITY DEGRADED AND CONTINUES TO FALL SHORT OF OBJECTIVES .............. 5<br />
AFGHAN GOVERNMENT CAPACITY REMAINS LIMITED ................................................................ 6<br />
CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................................................. 7<br />
SECTION 1 – STRATEGY .................................................................................................................. 9<br />
1.1: U.S. MISSION, STRATEGY, AND OBJECTIVES ........................................................................ 9<br />
1.4: FORCE LEVELS AND PLEDGES ............................................................................................ 10<br />
U.S. FORCE LEVELS ............................................................................................................... 10<br />
INTERNATIONAL FORCE LEVELS AND PLEDGES ..................................................................... 11<br />
CAVEATS ............................................................................................................................... 12<br />
SECTION 2 – AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES GROWTH, DEVELOPMENT, AND<br />
OPERATIONS ...................................................................................................... 13<br />
2.1: INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING AND ASSESSMENT ................................................... 14<br />
ASSESSMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ......................................................................... 14<br />
ASSESSMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR ........................................................................ 16<br />
2.2: ANSF LITERACY TRAINING ............................................................................................... 18<br />
2.3: INSTITUTIONAL TRAINER AND MENTOR STATUS ................................................................ 19<br />
2.4: AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY CAPACITY AND GROWTH ........................................................ 19<br />
MANNING .............................................................................................................................. 20<br />
FORCE DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING ................................................................................... 21<br />
LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT .................................................................................................. 22<br />
SPECIAL FORCES .................................................................................................................... 24<br />
WOMEN IN THE ANA ............................................................................................................. 25<br />
EQUIPPING ............................................................................................................................. 25<br />
LOGISTICS CAPABILITY .......................................................................................................... 26<br />
AFGHAN AIR FORCE .............................................................................................................. 26<br />
AAF CAPACITY ..................................................................................................................... 27<br />
AAF OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY ........................................................................................... 28<br />
2.5: AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE CAPACITY AND GROWTH ....................................................... 28<br />
MANNING .............................................................................................................................. 29<br />
AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL CIVIL ORDER POLICE ................................................................... 31<br />
AFGHAN BORDER POLICE ...................................................................................................... 31<br />
AFGHAN UNIFORM POLICE .................................................................................................... 32<br />
SPECIAL FORCES .................................................................................................................... 32<br />
FORCE DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING ................................................................................... 33<br />
WOMEN IN THE ANP .............................................................................................................. 34<br />
EQUIPPING ............................................................................................................................. 34<br />
LOGISTICS CAPABILITIES ....................................................................................................... 35<br />
I
2.6: FIELDED FORCE PARTNERING, OPERATIONS, AND ASSESSMENT ........................................ 36<br />
ANSF PARTNERING AND ADVISING ................................................................................. 36<br />
ANSF OPERATIONS AND ASSESSMENT PROCESS ................................................................... 39<br />
ANA OPERATIONS AND ASSESSMENT ................................................................................... 41<br />
ANP OPERATIONS AND ASSESSMENT .................................................................................... 43<br />
2.7: BUDGET ............................................................................................................................. 44<br />
AFGHANISTAN SECURITY FORCES FUND ................................................................................ 44<br />
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FUNDING FOR THE ANSF ....................................................... 44<br />
DIRECT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND MINISTRY OF DEFENSE.......... 45<br />
INTERNATIONAL DONATIONS ................................................................................................. 45<br />
2.8: INFRASTRUCTURE ............................................................................................................... 46<br />
FACILITIES MAINTENANCE .................................................................................................... 46<br />
FACILITY MANAGEMENT MINISTERIAL DEVELOPMENT ......................................................... 47<br />
ANA INFRASTRUCTURE ......................................................................................................... 48<br />
ANP INFRASTRUCTURE ......................................................................................................... 48<br />
SECTION 3 – TRANSITION ............................................................................................................. 50<br />
3.1: THE SECURITY TRANSITION PROCESS ................................................................................ 50<br />
3.2: CURRENT STATE OF TRANSITION ....................................................................................... 51<br />
TRANCHE ONE ....................................................................................................................... 51<br />
TRANCHE TWO ....................................................................................................................... 51<br />
SECTION 4 – SECURITY ................................................................................................................. 54<br />
4.1: THE INSURGENCY ............................................................................................................... 54<br />
4.2: STATE OF THE INSURGENCY – FALL 2011 AND WINTER 2012 ............................................ 55<br />
4.3: ISAF CONCEPT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS – FALL 2011 AND WINTER 2012 .................... 57<br />
4.4: ANSF-ISAF OPERATIONS ................................................................................................. 58<br />
REGIONAL COMMAND – EAST ................................................................................................ 58<br />
REGIONAL COMMAND – SOUTH ............................................................................................. 59<br />
REGIONAL COMMAND – SOUTHWEST .................................................................................... 60<br />
REGIONAL COMMAND – WEST ............................................................................................... 61<br />
REGIONAL COMMAND – NORTH ............................................................................................ 62<br />
REGIONAL COMMAND – CAPITAL .......................................................................................... 63<br />
4.5: LOCAL DEFENSE INITIATIVES ............................................................................................. 63<br />
VILLAGE STABILITY OPERATIONS ......................................................................................... 64<br />
AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE......................................................................................................... 64<br />
4.6: AFGHAN PUBLIC PROTECTION FORCE (APPF) ................................................................... 66<br />
4.7: POPULATION SECURITY ...................................................................................................... 67<br />
4.8: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES ....................................................................................................... 67<br />
4.9: GREEN-ON-BLUE INCIDENTS .............................................................................................. 68<br />
SECTION 5 – GOVERNANCE .......................................................................................................... 70<br />
5.1: ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL GOVERNANCE ........................................................................ 70<br />
5.2: ASSESSMENT OF SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNANCE ................................................................ 71<br />
II
SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMS ............................................................................ 72<br />
5.3: RULE OF LAW ..................................................................................................................... 74<br />
THE JUSTICE SECTOR ............................................................................................................. 75<br />
DETENTION OPERATIONS ....................................................................................................... 76<br />
5.4: COUNTER-CORRUPTION AND TRANSPARENCY ................................................................... 78<br />
INTERAGENCY COUNTER-CORRUPTION EFFORTS .................................................................. 79<br />
AFGHAN COUNTER-CORRUPTION EFFORTS ........................................................................... 80<br />
5.5: REINTEGRATION ................................................................................................................. 81<br />
5.6: RECONCILIATION ................................................................................................................ 82<br />
SECTION 6 – RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT ................................................................. 84<br />
6.1: GENERAL ASSESSMENT ...................................................................................................... 84<br />
6.2: SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE .................................................................................................. 84<br />
HEALTH ................................................................................................................................. 84<br />
EDUCATION ............................................................................................................................ 86<br />
6.3: ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE ............................................................................................ 86<br />
ROADS ................................................................................................................................... 86<br />
RAIL ....................................................................................................................................... 87<br />
POWER ................................................................................................................................... 87<br />
OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE CAPACITY ......................................................................... 87<br />
6.4: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT .......................................................................... 88<br />
REVENUE GENERATION AND BUDGET EXECUTION ................................................................ 89<br />
AGRICULTURE ........................................................................................................................ 90<br />
EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES ....................................................................................................... 92<br />
6.5: WOMEN’S ISSUES ............................................................................................................... 92<br />
SECTION 7 – COUNTERNARCOTICS .............................................................................................. 94<br />
7.1: STRATEGY AND PRIORITIES ................................................................................................ 94<br />
7.2: COUNTERNARCOTICS OPERATIONS .................................................................................... 94<br />
7.3: COUNTERNARCOTICS LAW ENFORCEMENT UNITS ............................................................. 97<br />
COUNTERNARCOTICS POLICE OF AFGHANISTAN .................................................................... 97<br />
COUNTERNARCOTICS POLICE OF AFGHANISTAN SPECIALIZED UNITS .................................... 97<br />
TRAINING ............................................................................................................................... 99<br />
7.4: INTERAGENCY COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS ................................................................. 100<br />
7.5: AFGHANISTAN THREAT FINANCE CELL (ATFC) .............................................................. 101<br />
7.6: INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL COORDINATION ............................................................ 101<br />
SECTION 8 – REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT ..................................................................................... 104<br />
8.1: PAKISTAN ......................................................................................................................... 104<br />
8.2: INDIA ............................................................................................................................. 105<br />
8.3: CENTRAL ASIAN STATES .................................................................................................. 105<br />
8.4: IRAN ................................................................................................................................. 106<br />
8.5: CHINA .............................................................................................................................. 107<br />
8.6: RUSSIA ............................................................................................................................. 108<br />
III
8.7: GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL STATES ............................................................................ 109<br />
ANNEX A: SECURITY METRICS .................................................................................................. 110<br />
A.1: TOTAL SECURITY INCIDENTS ........................................................................................... 110<br />
A.2: ENEMY-INITIATED ATTACKS ............................................................................................ 113<br />
A.3: ENEMY-INITIATED ATTACKS BY REGIONAL COMMAND ................................................... 114<br />
RC-CAPITAL ........................................................................................................................ 114<br />
RC-WEST ............................................................................................................................ 115<br />
RC-EAST ............................................................................................................................. 116<br />
RC-NORTH .......................................................................................................................... 117<br />
RC-SOUTHWEST .................................................................................................................. 118<br />
RC-SOUTH ........................................................................................................................... 119<br />
A.4: IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE ACTIVITY ..................................................................... 120<br />
A.5: COMPLEX AND COORDINATED ATTACKS ......................................................................... 121<br />
A.6: CACHES FOUND................................................................................................................ 122<br />
ANNEX B: CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION ............................................................................... 123<br />
ANNEX C: GLOSSARY ................................................................................................................. 130<br />
IV
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>in</strong>itial publicati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> June 2008, the <str<strong>on</strong>g>Report</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong> <strong>Progress</strong> <strong>Toward</strong> <strong>Security</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Stability</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
Afghanistan has provided the U.S. C<strong>on</strong>gress semi-annual assessments <strong>on</strong> developments <strong>in</strong><br />
Afghanistan <strong>and</strong> the state of the <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al coaliti<strong>on</strong>’s civil-military campaign. The June 2008<br />
report presented a bleak assessment of the situati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan: “The Taliban regrouped<br />
after its fall from power <strong>and</strong> have coalesced <strong>in</strong>to a resilient <strong>in</strong>surgency.” A year later the<br />
situati<strong>on</strong> had decl<strong>in</strong>ed further; as noted <strong>in</strong> the June 2009 report: “The security situati<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued<br />
to deteriorate <strong>in</strong> much of Afghanistan.” However, these trends gradually began to change as<br />
shifts <strong>in</strong> strategy were supported by critical resources, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> November 2010, the report for the<br />
first time highlighted “modest ga<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> security, governance, <strong>and</strong> development <strong>in</strong> operati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
priority areas,” not<strong>in</strong>g as well their uneven <strong>and</strong> fragile character. The last three iterati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
reported that progress has c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to exp<strong>and</strong>, with the most recent report <strong>in</strong> October 2011<br />
highlight<strong>in</strong>g “important security ga<strong>in</strong>s” <strong>and</strong> “reversal of violence trends <strong>in</strong> much of the country.”<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g the current report<strong>in</strong>g period of October 1, 2011 to March 31, 2012, the Internati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
<strong>Security</strong> Assistance Force (ISAF) <strong>and</strong> its Afghan partners have c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to build <strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> exp<strong>and</strong><br />
this progress. The year 2011 saw the first year-over-year decl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>wide enemy-<strong>in</strong>itiated<br />
attacks <strong>in</strong> five years. These trends have c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued <strong>in</strong> 2012. The performance of the Afghan<br />
Nati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>Security</strong> Forces (ANSF) <strong>and</strong> the close partnership between the ANSF <strong>and</strong> ISAF have<br />
been keys to this success. As a result, the ANSF c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to develop <strong>in</strong>to a force capable of<br />
assum<strong>in</strong>g the lead for security resp<strong>on</strong>sibility throughout Afghanistan. <strong>Security</strong> progress <strong>and</strong> the<br />
development of the ANSF dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period have enabled the security Transiti<strong>on</strong><br />
process to c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue <strong>in</strong> accordance with Lisb<strong>on</strong> Summit commitments. As of the end of the<br />
report<strong>in</strong>g period, nearly 50 percent of Afghans were liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> areas where the ANSF have begun<br />
to assume the lead for security.<br />
Despite these <strong>and</strong> other positive trends dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period, the campaign also c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued<br />
to face both l<strong>on</strong>g-term <strong>and</strong> acute challenges. The Taliban-led <strong>in</strong>surgency <strong>and</strong> its al Qaeda<br />
affiliates still operate with impunity from sanctuaries <strong>in</strong> Pakistan. The <strong>in</strong>surgency’s safe haven<br />
<strong>in</strong> Pakistan, as well as the limited capacity of the Afghan Government, rema<strong>in</strong> the biggest risks<br />
to the process of turn<strong>in</strong>g security ga<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong>to a durable <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>able Afghanistan. The<br />
<strong>in</strong>surgency benefits from safe havens <strong>in</strong>side Pakistan with notable operati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>and</strong> regenerative<br />
capacity. The <strong>in</strong>surgency rema<strong>in</strong>s a resilient <strong>and</strong> determ<strong>in</strong>ed enemy <strong>and</strong> will likely attempt to<br />
rega<strong>in</strong> lost ground <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluence this spr<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> summer through assass<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>in</strong>timidati<strong>on</strong>,<br />
high-profile attacks, <strong>and</strong> the emplacement of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Additi<strong>on</strong>ally,<br />
the Afghan Government c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to face widespread corrupti<strong>on</strong> that limits its effectiveness <strong>and</strong><br />
legitimacy <strong>and</strong> bolsters <strong>in</strong>surgent messag<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
1 This report is submitted c<strong>on</strong>sistent with both House Resoluti<strong>on</strong> 2219 (<str<strong>on</strong>g>Report</str<strong>on</strong>g> 112-110) <strong>and</strong> Secti<strong>on</strong> 1230 of the Nati<strong>on</strong>al Defense Authorizati<strong>on</strong><br />
Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended. It <strong>in</strong>cludes a descripti<strong>on</strong> of the comprehensive strategy of the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> for<br />
security <strong>and</strong> stability <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan. This report is the n<strong>in</strong>th <strong>in</strong> a series of reports required every 180 days through fiscal year 2014 <strong>and</strong> has been<br />
prepared <strong>in</strong> coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> with the Secretary of State, the Office of Management <strong>and</strong> Budget, the Attorney General, the Adm<strong>in</strong>istrator of the Drug<br />
Enforcement Adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong>, the Adm<strong>in</strong>istrator of the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Agency for Internati<strong>on</strong>al Development, <strong>and</strong> the Secretary of Agriculture.<br />
This assessment complements other reports <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>formati<strong>on</strong> about Afghanistan provided to C<strong>on</strong>gress; however, it is not <strong>in</strong>tended as a s<strong>in</strong>gle<br />
source of all <strong>in</strong>formati<strong>on</strong> about the comb<strong>in</strong>ed efforts or the future strategy of the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, its coaliti<strong>on</strong> partners, or Afghanistan. The<br />
<strong>in</strong>formati<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> this report is current as of September 30, 2011. NOTE: This is a historical document that covers progress <strong>in</strong><br />
Afghanistan from October 1, 2011, to March 31, 2012. The next report will <strong>in</strong>clude an analysis of progress toward security <strong>and</strong> stability<br />
from April 1, 2012, to September 30, 2012.<br />
1
The relati<strong>on</strong>ship between ISAF <strong>and</strong> the Afghan Government <strong>and</strong> its security forces endured<br />
significant shocks dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period stemm<strong>in</strong>g from: the video release of U.S. Mar<strong>in</strong>es<br />
defil<strong>in</strong>g corpses presumed to be Taliban fighters; the <strong>in</strong>advertent burn<strong>in</strong>g of religious materials,<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the Holy Quran, by U.S. pers<strong>on</strong>nel at Bagram Air Base; "green-<strong>on</strong>-blue" attacks <strong>in</strong><br />
which members of the ANSF killed ISAF pers<strong>on</strong>nel, such as the kill<strong>in</strong>g of two U.S. military<br />
officers at the Afghan M<strong>in</strong>istry of Interior; <strong>and</strong> the kill<strong>in</strong>g of seventeen Afghan civilians <strong>in</strong><br />
Panjwa’I District, K<strong>and</strong>ahar Prov<strong>in</strong>ce, allegedly by a l<strong>on</strong>e U.S. Soldier. Although widespread<br />
dem<strong>on</strong>strati<strong>on</strong>s sparked by the Quran burn<strong>in</strong>gs triggered violence that led to the death of several<br />
Afghan citizens, the vast majority of ANSF pers<strong>on</strong>nel across the country resp<strong>on</strong>ded<br />
professi<strong>on</strong>ally <strong>and</strong> played a critical role <strong>in</strong> manag<strong>in</strong>g the dem<strong>on</strong>strati<strong>on</strong>s, c<strong>on</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g violence,<br />
<strong>and</strong> protect<strong>in</strong>g both Afghan citizens <strong>and</strong> numerous ISAF <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al community facilities<br />
<strong>and</strong> pers<strong>on</strong>nel. The effective ANSF resp<strong>on</strong>se, c<strong>on</strong>ducted <strong>in</strong> accordance with tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g,<br />
dem<strong>on</strong>strated preparedness to resp<strong>on</strong>d to unexpected challenges, commitment to missi<strong>on</strong>, <strong>and</strong><br />
durability <strong>in</strong> the relati<strong>on</strong>ship with ISAF that withstood impassi<strong>on</strong>ed calls by dem<strong>on</strong>strators to<br />
exact retributi<strong>on</strong> amidst a highly charged envir<strong>on</strong>ment.<br />
KEY MILESTONES (OCTOBER 1, 2011 – MARCH 31, 2012)<br />
The c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g decl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> year-over-year violence (as measured by enemy-<strong>in</strong>itiated attacks) was<br />
the most significant security-related development dur<strong>in</strong>g the current report<strong>in</strong>g period. After five<br />
c<strong>on</strong>secutive years <strong>in</strong> which enemy-<strong>in</strong>itiated attacks <strong>in</strong>creased sharply, enemy-<strong>in</strong>itiated attacks<br />
decreased by 9 percent <strong>in</strong> 2011 compared to 2010, <strong>and</strong> decreased by 16 percent <strong>in</strong> 2012 (as of the<br />
end of this report<strong>in</strong>g period) compared to 2011.<br />
ANSF force growth <strong>and</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g efforts yielded significant operati<strong>on</strong>al improvements dur<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
report<strong>in</strong>g period, <strong>and</strong> the operati<strong>on</strong>al partnership between the ANSF <strong>and</strong> ISAF rema<strong>in</strong>s str<strong>on</strong>g.<br />
The ANSF, now resp<strong>on</strong>sible for lead<strong>in</strong>g security for almost half of Afghanistan’s populati<strong>on</strong>,<br />
partners with ISAF <strong>on</strong> nearly 90 percent of all coaliti<strong>on</strong> operati<strong>on</strong>s, of which the ANSF is the<br />
lead for more than 40 percent of those partnered operati<strong>on</strong>s. Additi<strong>on</strong>ally, the number of Afghan<br />
Nati<strong>on</strong>al Army (ANA) <strong>and</strong> Afghan Nati<strong>on</strong>al Police (ANP) units rated as “Independent with<br />
Advisors” <strong>in</strong>creased substantially over the last six m<strong>on</strong>ths. As of September 2011, no ANP unit,<br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>on</strong>e ANA k<strong>and</strong>ak, 2<br />
had been rated as “Independent with Advisors.” As of the end of the<br />
current report<strong>in</strong>g period, 13 ANA k<strong>and</strong>aks <strong>and</strong> 39 ANP units had achieved this rat<strong>in</strong>g. These<br />
rat<strong>in</strong>gs are regularly substantiated by the field performance of the ANSF, which c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to<br />
exceed expectati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
Military progress throughout the country <strong>and</strong> the c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued growth <strong>and</strong> development of the<br />
ANSF dur<strong>in</strong>g this report<strong>in</strong>g period have enabled ISAF to transfer lead security resp<strong>on</strong>sibility to<br />
the ANSF. The <strong>in</strong>augural tranche of areas for transiti<strong>on</strong>, announced <strong>in</strong> March 2011, have<br />
steadily progressed dur<strong>in</strong>g this timeframe. In October 2011, Afghan President Hamid Karzai<br />
announced the sec<strong>on</strong>d tranche of prov<strong>in</strong>ces, districts, <strong>and</strong> cities for transiti<strong>on</strong> to Afghan security<br />
lead. As of March 31, 2012, 20 of 34 prov<strong>in</strong>ces had either transiti<strong>on</strong>ed entirely or c<strong>on</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
districts <strong>and</strong> cities undergo<strong>in</strong>g transiti<strong>on</strong>, account<strong>in</strong>g for approximately 50 percent of<br />
Afghanistan's populati<strong>on</strong>. As of publicati<strong>on</strong>, discussi<strong>on</strong>s are <strong>on</strong>go<strong>in</strong>g to designate additi<strong>on</strong>al<br />
2 “Battali<strong>on</strong>"<br />
2
areas that are to transiti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> the third tranche, account<strong>in</strong>g for nearly 75 percent of the total<br />
populati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g this report<strong>in</strong>g period, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> completed the first stage of the phased recovery<br />
of the U.S. surge. C<strong>on</strong>sistent with the plan outl<strong>in</strong>ed by President Obama <strong>in</strong> June 2011, 10,000<br />
U.S. troops departed Afghanistan by the end of 2011, <strong>and</strong> the rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g 23,000 pers<strong>on</strong>nel from<br />
the surge will return home by the end of September 2012. Despite the surge withdrawal, enemy<strong>in</strong>itiated<br />
attacks c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to decl<strong>in</strong>e, due <strong>in</strong> large part to the <strong>in</strong>creased size <strong>and</strong> capability of the<br />
ANSF.<br />
Follow<strong>in</strong>g the redeployment of the West Po<strong>in</strong>t surge by the end of September 2012,<br />
approximately 68,000 U.S. troops will rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, <strong>and</strong> Department of Defense (DoD)<br />
plann<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> force level requirements for 2013 <strong>and</strong> 2014 will be c<strong>on</strong>sidered <strong>in</strong> late 2012.<br />
Although U.S. force levels will gradually decrease over this period, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> rema<strong>in</strong>s<br />
committed to the l<strong>on</strong>g-term security <strong>and</strong> stability of Afghanistan, <strong>and</strong> negotiati<strong>on</strong>s are<br />
progress<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> a l<strong>on</strong>g-term strategic partnership between the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> <strong>and</strong> Afghanistan.<br />
INSURGENCY SEVERELY DEGRADED BY ANSF-ISAF OPERATIONS<br />
The ANSF <strong>and</strong> its ISAF partners capitalized <strong>on</strong> the operati<strong>on</strong>al failure of the <strong>in</strong>surgency’s spr<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>and</strong> summer 2011 campaign <strong>and</strong> prevented the <strong>in</strong>surgency from rega<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g momentum <strong>in</strong> the fall<br />
<strong>and</strong> w<strong>in</strong>ter while c<strong>on</strong>solidat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> exp<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g security ga<strong>in</strong>s throughout the country. ANSF-<br />
ISAF operati<strong>on</strong>s have widened the gap between the <strong>in</strong>surgents <strong>and</strong> the populati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> several key<br />
populati<strong>on</strong> centers, limit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>surgent freedom of movement, disrupt<strong>in</strong>g safe havens <strong>in</strong><br />
Afghanistan, <strong>and</strong> degrad<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>surgent leadership. C<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued success of the Afghan Peace <strong>and</strong><br />
Re<strong>in</strong>tegrati<strong>on</strong> Program appears to be amplify<strong>in</strong>g this trend by degrad<strong>in</strong>g Taliban cohesiveness.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period, partnered counter-<strong>in</strong>surgency (COIN) operati<strong>on</strong>s by the ANSF <strong>and</strong><br />
ISAF, complemented by partnered Special Forces target<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>in</strong>surgent leaders, produced<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>able ga<strong>in</strong>s that seriously degraded the <strong>in</strong>surgency’s ability to mount a major offensive<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g the fight<strong>in</strong>g seas<strong>on</strong> of 2012. ANSF-ISAF operati<strong>on</strong>s rema<strong>in</strong>ed focused <strong>on</strong> southern <strong>and</strong><br />
southwestern Afghanistan. Enemy attacks <strong>in</strong> Regi<strong>on</strong>al Comm<strong>and</strong> – Southwest (RC-SW)<br />
decl<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>and</strong> the overall security situati<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to improve, especially <strong>in</strong> the critical terra<strong>in</strong><br />
of the Central Helm<strong>and</strong> River Valley. Afghan-led security <strong>in</strong> Lashkar Gah, Helm<strong>and</strong> Prov<strong>in</strong>ce’s<br />
first district to beg<strong>in</strong> the security transiti<strong>on</strong> process, is progress<strong>in</strong>g well. Three additi<strong>on</strong>al<br />
districts, as well as Nimroz Prov<strong>in</strong>ce, entered transiti<strong>on</strong> dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period. Northern<br />
Helm<strong>and</strong>, however, rema<strong>in</strong>s c<strong>on</strong>tested, <strong>and</strong> Nahr-e Saraj rema<strong>in</strong>s the most k<strong>in</strong>etic district <strong>in</strong><br />
Afghanistan.<br />
The security situati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Regi<strong>on</strong>al Comm<strong>and</strong> – South (RC-S) also improved dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g<br />
period, as evidenced by security progress <strong>in</strong> the decisive terra<strong>in</strong> of K<strong>and</strong>ahar <strong>and</strong> the Argh<strong>and</strong>ab<br />
River Valley west of K<strong>and</strong>ahar City. Afghan-led security <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> around K<strong>and</strong>ahar City is also<br />
exp<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g. Notably, Daykundi became the first prov<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> RC-S to beg<strong>in</strong> the transiti<strong>on</strong> process<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period. Nevertheless, K<strong>and</strong>ahar rema<strong>in</strong>s am<strong>on</strong>g the most c<strong>on</strong>tested<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ces <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, due <strong>in</strong> part to <strong>in</strong>surgent safe havens <strong>and</strong> freedom of movement across<br />
the border <strong>in</strong> Pakistan's Balochistan prov<strong>in</strong>ce. RC-S terra<strong>in</strong> is of central importance to the<br />
<strong>in</strong>surgency, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>surgent operati<strong>on</strong>s dur<strong>in</strong>g the spr<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> summer will likely focus <strong>on</strong> rega<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
3
lost territory <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>in</strong> the key districts of Maiw<strong>and</strong>, Zharay, <strong>and</strong> Panjwa’i <strong>in</strong> K<strong>and</strong>ahar<br />
Prov<strong>in</strong>ce.<br />
The security situati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Regi<strong>on</strong>al Comm<strong>and</strong> North (RC-N) improved dramatically, with enemy<strong>in</strong>itiated<br />
attacks down 60 percent compared to the same period last year. The security situati<strong>on</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong> Regi<strong>on</strong>al Comm<strong>and</strong> West (RC-W) also c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to improve as <strong>in</strong>surgents c<strong>on</strong>ducted sporadic<br />
operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> an effort to divert ISAF resources <strong>and</strong> attenti<strong>on</strong> away from operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> the south<br />
<strong>and</strong> east. The transiti<strong>on</strong> process c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues <strong>in</strong> earnest <strong>in</strong> both RC-N <strong>and</strong> RC-W, with various<br />
districts <strong>and</strong> cities <strong>in</strong> eight regi<strong>on</strong>al prov<strong>in</strong>ces currently undergo<strong>in</strong>g transiti<strong>on</strong> to Afghan security<br />
lead.<br />
As a result of <strong>in</strong>surgent safe havens with<strong>in</strong> Pakistan, such as the Haqqani network's sanctuary <strong>in</strong><br />
North Waziristan, as well as f<strong>in</strong>ancial <strong>and</strong> operati<strong>on</strong>al support from various outside sources, the<br />
security situati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> eastern Afghanistan rema<strong>in</strong>s volatile. Although enemy-<strong>in</strong>itiated attacks<br />
decreased by eight percent dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period as compared to the same period last year,<br />
eastern Afghanistan accounted for 34 percent of all enemy attacks throughout the country, a<br />
relative <strong>in</strong>crease of three percent compared to the same period last year. In Regi<strong>on</strong>al Comm<strong>and</strong><br />
Capital (RC-C), ANSF-led operati<strong>on</strong>s resulted <strong>in</strong> improved security throughout Kabul,<br />
highlighted by the successful Afghan-led security operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> support of the Loya Jirga <strong>in</strong><br />
November <strong>and</strong> the re-open<strong>in</strong>g of Ghazi Stadium <strong>in</strong> December. The ANSF resp<strong>on</strong>se to the April<br />
15 <strong>in</strong>surgent attack <strong>on</strong> Kabul dem<strong>on</strong>strated the clear progress of the comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>trol of the<br />
Afghan <strong>Security</strong> M<strong>in</strong>istries as well as the fight<strong>in</strong>g ability of the Afghan Nati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>Security</strong> Forces.<br />
The coord<strong>in</strong>ated resp<strong>on</strong>se by the ANSF effectively c<strong>on</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed the <strong>in</strong>surgent threats to such an<br />
extent that ISAF resp<strong>on</strong>se forces, although prepared, were not required to assist. Nevertheless,<br />
the capital c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to face persistent threats, many of which are planned <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>trolled from<br />
Pakistan.<br />
The Taliban-led <strong>in</strong>surgency rema<strong>in</strong>s adaptive <strong>and</strong> determ<strong>in</strong>ed with a significant regenerative<br />
capacity, <strong>and</strong> reta<strong>in</strong>s the capability to emplace substantial numbers of IEDs <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>duct isolated<br />
high-profile attacks that disproporti<strong>on</strong>ately fuel a sense of <strong>in</strong>security. As <strong>in</strong>surgent capacity to<br />
c<strong>on</strong>test ANSF-ISAF ga<strong>in</strong>s has eroded, <strong>in</strong>surgents have <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly resorted to asymmetric<br />
efforts <strong>in</strong> an attempt to rega<strong>in</strong> territory <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluence, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g assass<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>s, kidnapp<strong>in</strong>gs,<br />
<strong>in</strong>timidati<strong>on</strong> tactics, <strong>and</strong> strategic messag<strong>in</strong>g campaigns. The <strong>in</strong>surgency will likely exp<strong>and</strong> its<br />
asymmetric operati<strong>on</strong>s as a result of its dim<strong>in</strong>ished operati<strong>on</strong>al capability <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> order to<br />
c<strong>on</strong>serve dim<strong>in</strong>ish<strong>in</strong>g resources.<br />
INCREASINGLY INDEPENDENT, THE ANSF CONTINUES TO MAKE PROGRESS<br />
The ANSF are the backb<strong>on</strong>e of l<strong>on</strong>g-term security <strong>and</strong> stability plans for Afghanistan. Dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the current report<strong>in</strong>g period, the ANA <strong>and</strong> ANP made qualitative progress, display<strong>in</strong>g grow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
operati<strong>on</strong>al effectiveness.<br />
The ANSF are ahead of schedule to achieve the October 2012 end-strength of 352,000, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g<br />
subord<strong>in</strong>ate goals of 195,000 soldiers <strong>and</strong> 157,000 police. S<strong>in</strong>ce March 2011, the ANSF have<br />
grown from a force of 284,952 to a force of 344,108, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g 194,466 soldiers <strong>and</strong> 149,642<br />
police.<br />
4
As the ANA <strong>and</strong> ANP have achieved growth goals, the ANSF <strong>and</strong> the North Atlantic Treaty<br />
Organizati<strong>on</strong> (NATO) Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Missi<strong>on</strong> – Afghanistan (NTM-A) have shifted focus from force<br />
generati<strong>on</strong> to tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> development. More than 112,045 ANSF pers<strong>on</strong>nel are currently<br />
enrolled <strong>in</strong> literacy tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, which serves as a force multiplier <strong>and</strong> an <strong>in</strong>centive for Afghans to<br />
jo<strong>in</strong> the ANSF. Also dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period, the ANSF, <strong>in</strong> partnership with NTM-A,<br />
gradually developed their nascent logistics, <strong>in</strong>telligence, communicati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> other enabl<strong>in</strong>g<br />
capabilities, which are essential for missi<strong>on</strong> effectiveness <strong>and</strong> l<strong>on</strong>g-term susta<strong>in</strong>ment of the force.<br />
In additi<strong>on</strong>, the Afghan Nati<strong>on</strong>al Army Special Forces (ANASF) have emerged as the most<br />
capable comp<strong>on</strong>ent of the ANSF <strong>and</strong> have made impressive strides toward becom<strong>in</strong>g an<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependent <strong>and</strong> effective force.<br />
Nevertheless, the ANSF c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to c<strong>on</strong>fr<strong>on</strong>t challenges, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g attriti<strong>on</strong>, leadership deficits,<br />
<strong>and</strong> limited capabilities <strong>in</strong> staff plann<strong>in</strong>g, management, logistics, <strong>and</strong> procurement. The ANSF<br />
also c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to lack enabl<strong>in</strong>g support, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g air (both transport <strong>and</strong> close air support),<br />
logistics, ISR 3<br />
, <strong>and</strong> medical, from coaliti<strong>on</strong> resources to perform at the level necessary to<br />
produce the security effects required for Transiti<strong>on</strong>. Despite polls show<strong>in</strong>g that the ANSF<br />
c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to rise <strong>in</strong> public esteem, corrupti<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> the <strong>in</strong>fluence of crim<strong>in</strong>al patr<strong>on</strong>age networks,<br />
particularly <strong>in</strong> the Afghan Air Force (AAF), Afghan Border Police (ABP) <strong>and</strong> Afghan Uniform<br />
Police (AUP), rema<strong>in</strong> a c<strong>on</strong>cern that could jeopardize the legitimacy of the ANSF <strong>and</strong> pose a<br />
threat to the Transiti<strong>on</strong> process. The managed force reducti<strong>on</strong> of U.S. <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al forces<br />
will have a corresp<strong>on</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g effect <strong>on</strong> the number of operati<strong>on</strong>al partner<strong>in</strong>g opportunities with the<br />
ANSF. It rema<strong>in</strong>s to be seen what <strong>in</strong>fluence this will have <strong>on</strong> ANSF development.<br />
INSURGENT CAPABILITY DEGRADED AND CONTINUES TO FALL SHORT OF<br />
OBJECTIVES<br />
ANSF-ISAF c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al operati<strong>on</strong>s, complemented by Special Operati<strong>on</strong>s Forces target<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to steadily degrade the <strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>and</strong> the operati<strong>on</strong>al capacity of the <strong>in</strong>surgency. The<br />
<strong>in</strong>surgency failed to rega<strong>in</strong> momentum dur<strong>in</strong>g the fall <strong>and</strong> w<strong>in</strong>ter follow<strong>in</strong>g the operati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
failure of their summer 2011 campaign, <strong>and</strong> the gap between <strong>in</strong>surgent <strong>in</strong>tent <strong>and</strong> capability<br />
c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to grow. This has been further exacerbated by the <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g success of the Afghan<br />
Peace <strong>and</strong> Re<strong>in</strong>tegrati<strong>on</strong> Program (APRP) where rec<strong>on</strong>ciliati<strong>on</strong> efforts appear to be hurt<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Taliban cohesiveness. S<strong>in</strong>ce March of last year, there has been a more than three-fold <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong><br />
the number of formal re<strong>in</strong>tegrees choos<strong>in</strong>g to leave the battlefield through the APRP.<br />
The Taliban-led <strong>in</strong>surgency, however, rema<strong>in</strong>s adaptive <strong>and</strong> determ<strong>in</strong>ed with a significant<br />
regenerative capacity <strong>and</strong> reta<strong>in</strong>s the capability to emplace substantial numbers of IEDs <strong>and</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>duct isolated high-profile attacks. As <strong>in</strong>surgent capacity to directly c<strong>on</strong>test ANSF-ISAF<br />
ga<strong>in</strong>s erodes, <strong>in</strong>surgents have <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly resorted to asymmetric efforts <strong>in</strong> an attempt to rega<strong>in</strong><br />
territory <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluence, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g assass<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>s, kidnapp<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>in</strong>timidati<strong>on</strong> tactics, <strong>and</strong> strategic<br />
messag<strong>in</strong>g campaigns. The <strong>in</strong>surgency will likely exp<strong>and</strong> its asymmetric operati<strong>on</strong>s as a result<br />
of its dim<strong>in</strong>ished operati<strong>on</strong>al capability <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> order to c<strong>on</strong>serve dim<strong>in</strong>ish<strong>in</strong>g resources.<br />
The <strong>in</strong>surgency also c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to receive critical support – <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g sanctuary, tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>frastructure, <strong>and</strong> operati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ancial support – from with<strong>in</strong> neighbor<strong>in</strong>g Pakistan. In fact,<br />
3 Intelligence, Surveillance, <strong>and</strong> Rec<strong>on</strong>naissance<br />
5
key elements of the <strong>in</strong>surgency rema<strong>in</strong> potent <strong>and</strong> threaten<strong>in</strong>g due to the availability of sanctuary<br />
<strong>in</strong>side of Pakistan <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the Afghan Taliban based <strong>in</strong> Balochistan Prov<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>and</strong> the Haqqani<br />
Network <strong>in</strong> North Waziristan Agency.<br />
AFGHAN GOVERNMENT CAPACITY REMAINS LIMITED<br />
The civil-military COIN strategy c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to exp<strong>and</strong> security for the Afghan populati<strong>on</strong>,<br />
provid<strong>in</strong>g the necessary c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s for the Afghan Government to extend effective governance<br />
<strong>and</strong> promote ec<strong>on</strong>omic <strong>and</strong> social development.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period, the Afghan Government made limited progress towards effective<br />
<strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>able governance. The executive branch focused primarily <strong>on</strong> support<strong>in</strong>g the security<br />
Transiti<strong>on</strong> process <strong>and</strong> negotiat<strong>in</strong>g a l<strong>on</strong>g-term strategic partnership with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. The<br />
Loya Jirga, Afghanistan’s highest c<strong>on</strong>sultative body, reaffirmed the country’s commitment to<br />
such a partnership with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. Afghanistan has reached similar agreements with the<br />
<strong>United</strong> K<strong>in</strong>gdom, France, Italy, <strong>and</strong> Turkmenistan. The Afghan Parliament resumed operati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g the resoluti<strong>on</strong> of fraud allegati<strong>on</strong>s from the September 2010 Wolesi Jirga 4<br />
electi<strong>on</strong>s<br />
<strong>and</strong> made progress <strong>on</strong> important legislative <strong>in</strong>itiatives, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g approval of the supplementary<br />
budget request to recapitalize the Afghan Central Bank for costs related to the Kabul Bank<br />
bailout. Importantly, the Internati<strong>on</strong>al M<strong>on</strong>etary Fund (IMF) approved a three-year, $133.6M<br />
extended-credit facility program, which is <strong>in</strong>tended to support strengthened ec<strong>on</strong>omic <strong>and</strong><br />
f<strong>in</strong>ancial governance. C<strong>on</strong>siderable progress was also made <strong>in</strong> the health <strong>and</strong> educati<strong>on</strong> sectors,<br />
<strong>and</strong> critical <strong>in</strong>frastructure c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to develop.<br />
However, the capacity of the Afghan Government <strong>and</strong> the extensi<strong>on</strong> of effective governance <strong>and</strong><br />
rule of law have been limited by multiple factors, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g widespread corrupti<strong>on</strong>, limited<br />
human capacity, <strong>and</strong> uneven c<strong>on</strong>centrati<strong>on</strong> of power am<strong>on</strong>g the judicial, legislative, <strong>and</strong><br />
executive branches. Setbacks <strong>in</strong> governance <strong>and</strong> development c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to slow the<br />
re<strong>in</strong>forcement of security ga<strong>in</strong>s <strong>and</strong> threaten the legitimacy <strong>and</strong> l<strong>on</strong>g-term viability of the Afghan<br />
Government. The M<strong>in</strong>istry of Defense (MoD) <strong>and</strong> M<strong>in</strong>istry of Interior (MoI) are work<strong>in</strong>g<br />
closely with ISAF to develop <strong>and</strong> implement <strong>in</strong>itiatives to combat corrupti<strong>on</strong>. M<strong>in</strong>ister of<br />
Defense Wardak has pers<strong>on</strong>ally taken ownership of anti-corrupti<strong>on</strong> reforms with<strong>in</strong> the M<strong>in</strong>istry<br />
of Defense <strong>and</strong> is fight<strong>in</strong>g to make the MoD an example for the rest of Afghanistan. The <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> <strong>and</strong> the <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al community will c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to work closely with their Afghan partners<br />
to address these challenges.<br />
The closure of the Pakistan Ground L<strong>in</strong>es of Communicati<strong>on</strong> (GLOCs) as a c<strong>on</strong>sequence of the<br />
November 26, 2011 cross-border <strong>in</strong>cident <strong>in</strong> which 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed rema<strong>in</strong>s a<br />
strategic c<strong>on</strong>cern. The resultant st<strong>and</strong>off has hampered ANSF equipp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> field<strong>in</strong>g efforts by<br />
backlogg<strong>in</strong>g thous<strong>and</strong>s of t<strong>on</strong>s of equipment. Failure to settle the GLOC issue will also<br />
significantly degrade redeployment <strong>and</strong> retrograde operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> support of the drawdown of<br />
coaliti<strong>on</strong> forces. Access to Afghanistan via the Central Asian nati<strong>on</strong>s al<strong>on</strong>g the Northern<br />
Distributi<strong>on</strong> Network (NDN) has ensured the susta<strong>in</strong>ment needs of coaliti<strong>on</strong> forces <strong>and</strong> allowed<br />
<strong>in</strong>itial proof of pr<strong>in</strong>ciple shipments for retrograd<strong>in</strong>g material from Afghanistan to the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>. Reopen<strong>in</strong>g the GLOCs would improve the U.S. <strong>and</strong> coaliti<strong>on</strong> forces' missi<strong>on</strong> flexibility<br />
4 Lower House of the Afghan Parliament<br />
6
<strong>and</strong> build capacity. N<strong>on</strong>etheless, the effectiveness of the NDN shows the c<strong>on</strong>cern Afghanistan's<br />
neighbors have for success <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan <strong>and</strong> their leader’s will<strong>in</strong>gness to work with the ISAF<br />
coaliti<strong>on</strong> to achieve shared <strong>in</strong>terests towards Afghanistan's security <strong>and</strong> stability.<br />
CONCLUSIONS<br />
The progress of the civil-military COIN campaign has severely degraded the Taliban-led<br />
<strong>in</strong>surgency, limit<strong>in</strong>g their operati<strong>on</strong>al capacity <strong>and</strong> underm<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g their popular support. The<br />
decl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>surgent capability, coupled with improvements <strong>in</strong> the operati<strong>on</strong>al effectiveness of<br />
the ANSF <strong>and</strong> a resilient ANSF-ISAF partnership, has enabled the security transiti<strong>on</strong> process to<br />
exp<strong>and</strong>. The transiti<strong>on</strong> of security resp<strong>on</strong>sibility to the Afghans by the end of 2014, as agreed at<br />
Lisb<strong>on</strong>, rema<strong>in</strong>s <strong>on</strong> schedule.<br />
The missi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, however, faces l<strong>on</strong>g-term challenges. The <strong>in</strong>surgency draws<br />
strength from safe haven <strong>and</strong> support from with<strong>in</strong> Pakistan <strong>and</strong> garners popular support by<br />
exploit<strong>in</strong>g areas where the Afghan Government has failed to provide sufficient governance, rule<br />
of law, <strong>and</strong> ec<strong>on</strong>omic opportunities. Afghan Government progress toward key governance <strong>and</strong><br />
development <strong>in</strong>itiatives rema<strong>in</strong>s critical for the susta<strong>in</strong>ability of security ga<strong>in</strong>s. Nevertheless,<br />
the missi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan rema<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong>tegral to U.S. nati<strong>on</strong>al security objectives, <strong>and</strong> the strategy<br />
is sound. The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> <strong>and</strong> its coaliti<strong>on</strong> partners are committed to achiev<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>on</strong>g-term<br />
stability <strong>and</strong> security <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan to ensure that the country never aga<strong>in</strong> becomes a safe haven<br />
for al Qaeda or its affiliates.<br />
7
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)<br />
8
SECTION 1 – STRATEGY<br />
1.1: U.S. MISSION, STRATEGY, AND OBJECTIVES<br />
The goal of the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> is to disrupt, dismantle, <strong>and</strong> eventually defeat al Qaeda, <strong>and</strong> to<br />
prevent its return to either Afghanistan or Pakistan. The specific objectives <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan are to<br />
deny safe haven to al Qaeda <strong>and</strong> to deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan<br />
Government.<br />
To support these objectives, U.S. <strong>and</strong> coaliti<strong>on</strong> forces will c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to degrade the Taliban-led<br />
<strong>in</strong>surgency <strong>in</strong> order to provide time <strong>and</strong> space to <strong>in</strong>crease the capacity of the Afghan Nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
<strong>Security</strong> Forces <strong>and</strong> the Afghan Government so they can assume full resp<strong>on</strong>sibility for<br />
Afghanistan’s security by the end of 2014.<br />
Diplomatic efforts c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to complement military operati<strong>on</strong>s. The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> <strong>and</strong> the<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al community support Afghan-led rec<strong>on</strong>ciliati<strong>on</strong> efforts with the Taliban as a means of<br />
achiev<strong>in</strong>g a political soluti<strong>on</strong> to the c<strong>on</strong>flict. <strong>Progress</strong> made toward a political settlement, while<br />
important, rema<strong>in</strong>s nascent.<br />
1.2: ISAF CAMPAIGN PLANNING<br />
The ISAF Operati<strong>on</strong>s Plan (OPLAN) 38302 was revised dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period to <strong>in</strong>tegrate<br />
the COIN strategy, the development strategy for Afghanistan, the transiti<strong>on</strong> of security<br />
resp<strong>on</strong>sibility to Afghan lead, <strong>and</strong> the development of the ANSF. The revised OPLAN,<br />
(Revisi<strong>on</strong> 6), also <strong>in</strong>tegrates the recovery of U.S. surge forces. The missi<strong>on</strong> statement of the<br />
current OPLAN states:<br />
ISAF, <strong>in</strong> partnership with the <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al community, supports the Afghan<br />
Government <strong>in</strong> the c<strong>on</strong>duct of comprehensive, populati<strong>on</strong>-centric<br />
counter<strong>in</strong>surgency operati<strong>on</strong>s – to protect the Afghan people, neutralise <strong>in</strong>surgent<br />
networks, develop an Afghan Nati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>Security</strong> Force that assumes lead<br />
resp<strong>on</strong>sibility for security, <strong>and</strong> support development of Afghan Government<br />
<strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s for legitimate, credible, <strong>and</strong> endur<strong>in</strong>g governance, security, <strong>and</strong><br />
susta<strong>in</strong>able socio-ec<strong>on</strong>omic growth – <strong>in</strong> order to deny terrorists safe havens <strong>and</strong><br />
ensure the Afghan Government’s stability <strong>and</strong> sovereignty not later than 31<br />
December 2014.<br />
The executi<strong>on</strong> of ISAF OPLAN 38302 centers <strong>on</strong> a clear-hold-build strategy focused <strong>on</strong> key<br />
terra<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> area of <strong>in</strong>terest districts where the majority of the Afghan populati<strong>on</strong> lives. Executi<strong>on</strong><br />
of the plan will create the c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s necessary to complete a resp<strong>on</strong>sible Transiti<strong>on</strong> to Afghan<br />
full resp<strong>on</strong>sibility for security throughout the country by the end of 2014.<br />
1.3: COMMAND AND CONTROL<br />
Several leadership changes occurred with<strong>in</strong> the ISAF comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>trol structure dur<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
report<strong>in</strong>g period.<br />
On November 5, 2011, Lieutenant General Daniel Bolger (US Army) assumed comm<strong>and</strong> of<br />
NATO Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Missi<strong>on</strong> – Afghanistan (NTM-A), replac<strong>in</strong>g Lieutenant General William<br />
9
Caldwell (US Army), who had been <strong>in</strong> comm<strong>and</strong> s<strong>in</strong>ce 2009. S<strong>in</strong>ce October, Major General<br />
Mark Gurganus (USMC) replaced Major General John Toolan (USMC) as Comm<strong>and</strong>er Regi<strong>on</strong>al<br />
Comm<strong>and</strong> Southwest; Major General Erich Pfeffer (German Army) replaced Major General<br />
Marcus Kneip (German Army) as Comm<strong>and</strong>er Regi<strong>on</strong>al Comm<strong>and</strong> North; <strong>and</strong> Brigadier General<br />
Luigi Chiapper<strong>in</strong>i (Italian Army) replaced Brigadier General Luciano Portalano (Italian Army)<br />
as Comm<strong>and</strong>er Regi<strong>on</strong>al Comm<strong>and</strong> West.<br />
Figure 1: ISAF Comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> C<strong>on</strong>trol Structure (as of March 31, 2012)<br />
1.4: FORCE LEVELS AND PLEDGES<br />
U.S. FORCE LEVELS<br />
As of March 31, 2012, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> had approximately 86,692 military pers<strong>on</strong>nel “boots <strong>on</strong><br />
the ground” <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, down from 97,795 <strong>on</strong> September 30, 2011.<br />
The drawdown of U.S. forces c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued <strong>in</strong> alignment with President Obama’s troop reducti<strong>on</strong><br />
plan, announced <strong>in</strong> June 2011, to redeploy all 33,000 U.S. surge forces by the end of September<br />
2012, beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g with the redeployment of 10,000 pers<strong>on</strong>nel by the end of December 2011. The<br />
first phase of troop reducti<strong>on</strong>s, completed as scheduled <strong>in</strong> December 2011, <strong>in</strong>volved horiz<strong>on</strong>tal<br />
reducti<strong>on</strong>s across many units <strong>and</strong> functi<strong>on</strong>al capabilities, while reta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g capabilities <strong>in</strong> field <strong>and</strong><br />
10
support to the coaliti<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> the ANSF. The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> will have approximately<br />
68,000 military pers<strong>on</strong>nel <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan follow<strong>in</strong>g the removal of all U.S. surge forces. Force<br />
adjustment plann<strong>in</strong>g to determ<strong>in</strong>e future U.S. force levels <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan after September 2012<br />
will take place after the surge recovery is complete.<br />
enabler 5<br />
As the Afghan Government <strong>and</strong> the <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al community c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to make progress toward<br />
complet<strong>in</strong>g the transiti<strong>on</strong> to Afghan full resp<strong>on</strong>sibility for security by the end of 2014 as agreed<br />
at the 2010 NATO summit <strong>in</strong> Lisb<strong>on</strong>, the U.S. Government is lead<strong>in</strong>g discussi<strong>on</strong>s with the<br />
Afghan Government <strong>and</strong> the <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al community regard<strong>in</strong>g the post-Transiti<strong>on</strong> ANSF force<br />
structure. These discussi<strong>on</strong>s c<strong>on</strong>sider the required size <strong>and</strong> capabilities of the ANSF to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><br />
security follow<strong>in</strong>g Transiti<strong>on</strong>, the capacity of the Afghan Government to fund its security forces,<br />
<strong>and</strong> the fiscal challenges fac<strong>in</strong>g the ec<strong>on</strong>omies of the <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al community; that is,<br />
sufficiency <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability. These discussi<strong>on</strong>s are aimed at establish<strong>in</strong>g a plan supported by<br />
the Afghan Government <strong>and</strong> the <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al community to provide f<strong>in</strong>ancial, tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong><br />
advis<strong>in</strong>g support to the ANSF as the Afghan Government assumes greater resp<strong>on</strong>sibility to<br />
susta<strong>in</strong> their security forces. ISAF is us<strong>in</strong>g semiannual metric <strong>and</strong> milest<strong>on</strong>es-based assessments<br />
of the operati<strong>on</strong>al envir<strong>on</strong>ment, security c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>and</strong> ANSF quality to track the Afghan<br />
Government’s progress <strong>in</strong> susta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g security <strong>and</strong>, as c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s allow, to restructure the ANSF<br />
to a susta<strong>in</strong>able force structure.<br />
INTERNATIONAL FORCE LEVELS AND PLEDGES<br />
The ISAF coaliti<strong>on</strong> currently c<strong>on</strong>sists of 28 NATO nati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> 22 partner<strong>in</strong>g nati<strong>on</strong>s. Coaliti<strong>on</strong><br />
forces are deployed at all NATO Headquarters, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g ISAF Jo<strong>in</strong>t Comm<strong>and</strong> (IJC) <strong>and</strong> NTM-<br />
A. NATO Allies comm<strong>and</strong> three of the six regi<strong>on</strong>al comm<strong>and</strong>s: Regi<strong>on</strong>al Comm<strong>and</strong> – North<br />
(Germany), Regi<strong>on</strong>al Comm<strong>and</strong> – West (Italy), <strong>and</strong> Regi<strong>on</strong>al Comm<strong>and</strong> – Capital (Turkey).<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g the last six m<strong>on</strong>ths, <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al force levels <strong>and</strong> pledged c<strong>on</strong>tributi<strong>on</strong>s from the 50 (n<strong>on</strong>-<br />
US) troop c<strong>on</strong>tribut<strong>in</strong>g nati<strong>on</strong>s decreased to 44,247 pers<strong>on</strong>nel, down from 46,400 as of<br />
September 2011.<br />
Several coaliti<strong>on</strong> members pledged additi<strong>on</strong>al support dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period. In additi<strong>on</strong> to<br />
pledg<strong>in</strong>g four additi<strong>on</strong>al operati<strong>on</strong>al mentor teams <strong>and</strong> 25 tra<strong>in</strong>ers for the ANSF, Turkey also<br />
agreed to extend its comm<strong>and</strong> of Regi<strong>on</strong>al Comm<strong>and</strong> – Capital to November 2012. Georgia,<br />
M<strong>on</strong>golia, <strong>and</strong> M<strong>on</strong>tenegro also pledged to <strong>in</strong>crease their troop levels dur<strong>in</strong>g 2012, with the<br />
Georgians pledg<strong>in</strong>g an additi<strong>on</strong>al battali<strong>on</strong> to their current c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>gent of 935 troops.<br />
Several ISAF allies <strong>and</strong> partners announced troop drawdowns dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period. Most<br />
notably, French President Nikolas Sarkozy announced <strong>in</strong> January an accelerated timel<strong>in</strong>e for the<br />
withdrawal of French forces from Afghanistan. Of the 3,600 French soldiers currently stati<strong>on</strong>ed<br />
<strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, 1,000 are planned to be withdrawn by the end of 2012, 400 more than orig<strong>in</strong>ally<br />
planned, <strong>and</strong> France has announced that it will remove all combat troops by the end of 2013, a<br />
year <strong>in</strong> advance of the timel<strong>in</strong>e agreed up<strong>on</strong> by the ISAF coaliti<strong>on</strong> at the NATO Lisb<strong>on</strong> Summit<br />
<strong>in</strong> 2010. Additi<strong>on</strong>ally, Germany will redeploy the 500 troops committed <strong>in</strong> 2009, <strong>in</strong> support of<br />
the surge, by the end of 2012. Norway will end its operati<strong>on</strong>s at Maimanah Prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />
5<br />
“Enabler” <strong>in</strong> this c<strong>on</strong>text refers to additi<strong>on</strong>al military capabilities, such as <strong>in</strong>telligence, rec<strong>on</strong>naissance,<br />
surveillance, airpower, logistics, etc.<br />
11
Rec<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> Team (PRT) by the end of 2012 but is explor<strong>in</strong>g re<strong>in</strong>vestment opti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> other<br />
areas. Hungary reduced its commitment to the Baghlan (Pul-e Khomri) PRT from 255 to 190 <strong>in</strong><br />
March 2012. Albania will withdraw <strong>on</strong>e of its two force protecti<strong>on</strong> companies (110 pers<strong>on</strong>nel) at<br />
Herat <strong>in</strong> June 2012. Bulgaria will withdraw its force protecti<strong>on</strong> company from Kabul<br />
Internati<strong>on</strong>al Airport <strong>in</strong> January 2013. Slovakia will withdraw its eng<strong>in</strong>eer plato<strong>on</strong> from<br />
K<strong>and</strong>ahar <strong>in</strong> June 2012 <strong>and</strong> its force protecti<strong>on</strong> element from Tar<strong>in</strong> Kowt <strong>in</strong> December 2012.<br />
New Zeal<strong>and</strong> announced that it will end its c<strong>on</strong>tributi<strong>on</strong> of a Special Operati<strong>on</strong>s Forces unit, <strong>and</strong><br />
Norway will fill this requirement as of April 1, 2012.<br />
CAVEATS<br />
Nati<strong>on</strong>al caveats are <strong>in</strong>voked by <strong>in</strong>dividual coaliti<strong>on</strong> partners to ensure forces operate <strong>in</strong><br />
accordance with their respective nati<strong>on</strong>al laws <strong>and</strong> policies. Regardless of nati<strong>on</strong>al caveats, all<br />
ISAF coaliti<strong>on</strong> partners <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan operate accord<strong>in</strong>g to the ISAF Rules of Engagement,<br />
which govern the use of force.<br />
Although some allies <strong>and</strong> partners have reduced these caveats, nati<strong>on</strong>al caveats c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to<br />
c<strong>on</strong>stra<strong>in</strong> ISAF operati<strong>on</strong>s by limit<strong>in</strong>g the types of missi<strong>on</strong>s a given country’s forces are<br />
authorized to undertake. Senior U.S. leadership c<strong>on</strong>sistently emphasizes the need to reduce<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>al caveats <strong>in</strong> order to allow for the greatest operati<strong>on</strong>al effect.<br />
12
SECTION 2 – AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES<br />
GROWTH, DEVELOPMENT, AND OPERATIONS 6<br />
Afghan Nati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>Security</strong> Forces c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to make substantial progress dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g<br />
period, gradually build<strong>in</strong>g a force that will eventually be capable of assum<strong>in</strong>g full resp<strong>on</strong>sibility<br />
for security throughout Afghanistan.<br />
The ANSF grew steadily dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to exceed growth targets.<br />
As of March 31, 2012, the ANA reached 194,466 soldiers <strong>and</strong> the ANP reached 149,642 police,<br />
<strong>and</strong> the overall ANSF has grown from 284,952 pers<strong>on</strong>nel <strong>in</strong> March 2011 to 344,108 pers<strong>on</strong>nel as<br />
of March 2012. Both the ANA <strong>and</strong> ANP are ahead of schedule to achieve their October 2012<br />
surge-level end-strength of 195,000 soldiers <strong>and</strong> 157,000 police, respectively.<br />
As the ANA approach <strong>and</strong> reach its designated surge-level end-strength ahead of schedule,<br />
NTM-A, the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Defense (MoD), <strong>and</strong> the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Interior (MoI) c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue their shift<br />
<strong>in</strong> focus from force generati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> growth to the qualitative development of the force. Literacy<br />
tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g efforts have exp<strong>and</strong>ed, logistics <strong>and</strong> enabler capability have improved, <strong>and</strong> the ANSF’s<br />
12 branch schools c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to provide higher-level tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to promote self-sufficiency <strong>and</strong> l<strong>on</strong>gterm<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability.<br />
Force generati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> development efforts c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to translate <strong>in</strong>to operati<strong>on</strong>al effectiveness.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period, the ANSF made impressive strides <strong>in</strong> performance, dem<strong>on</strong>strat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
their effectiveness as they assumed the lead for security resp<strong>on</strong>sibility <strong>in</strong> transiti<strong>on</strong><strong>in</strong>g areas <strong>in</strong><br />
many parts of the country. The ANSF partners with ISAF <strong>on</strong> nearly 90 percent of all coaliti<strong>on</strong><br />
operati<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>and</strong> the ANSF is <strong>in</strong> the lead for more than 40 percent of partnered operati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
Additi<strong>on</strong>ally, the number of ANA <strong>and</strong> ANP units rated as “Independent with Advisors”<br />
<strong>in</strong>creased substantially over the last six m<strong>on</strong>ths. As of September 2011, no ANP unit <strong>and</strong> <strong>on</strong>ly<br />
<strong>on</strong>e ANA k<strong>and</strong>ak had been rated as “Independent with Advisors.” As of the end of the current<br />
report<strong>in</strong>g period, 13 ANA k<strong>and</strong>aks <strong>and</strong> 39 ANP units have achieved this rat<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
The security m<strong>in</strong>istries of the Afghan Government have made measured progress <strong>in</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al capacity necessary to oversee, manage, <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong> the ANSF. Both the MoD<br />
<strong>and</strong> MoI c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to have problems with corrupti<strong>on</strong>, a c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong> that threatens to underm<strong>in</strong>e the<br />
public percepti<strong>on</strong> of the security m<strong>in</strong>istries <strong>and</strong> the ANSF as capable <strong>and</strong> legitimate security<br />
providers for the Afghan populati<strong>on</strong>. The MoD Transparency <strong>and</strong> Accountability Work<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Group has identified more than 50 recommendati<strong>on</strong>s to counter corrupti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> the m<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>and</strong><br />
has made progress <strong>on</strong> several of them dur<strong>in</strong>g this report<strong>in</strong>g period. The MoI has also set-up a<br />
Transparency <strong>and</strong> Accountability Work<strong>in</strong>g Group, <strong>and</strong> it is now <strong>in</strong> the early stages of its work.<br />
6 This secti<strong>on</strong> is submitted c<strong>on</strong>sistent with Secti<strong>on</strong> 1231 of the Nati<strong>on</strong>al Defense Authorizati<strong>on</strong> Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181),<br />
as amended. This assessment complements other reports <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>formati<strong>on</strong> provided to C<strong>on</strong>gress regard<strong>in</strong>g Afghanistan; however, it is not<br />
<strong>in</strong>tended as a s<strong>in</strong>gle source of <strong>in</strong>formati<strong>on</strong> about the comb<strong>in</strong>ed efforts or the future strategy of the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, its <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al partners, or<br />
Afghanistan. NOTE: This is a historical document that covers the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Plan for Susta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the Afghanistan Nati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>Security</strong><br />
Forces from October 1, 2011, to March 31, 2012.<br />
13
Despite progress, the ANSF will c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to face significant challenges to its expansi<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />
development, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g attriti<strong>on</strong>, leadership deficits, <strong>and</strong> limited capabilities <strong>in</strong> staff plann<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
management, logistics, <strong>and</strong> procurement. The ANSF also c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to require enabl<strong>in</strong>g support,<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g air (both transport <strong>and</strong> close air support), logistics, ISR, <strong>and</strong> medical, from coaliti<strong>on</strong><br />
resources to perform at the level necessary to produce the security effects required for transiti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
2.1: INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING AND ASSESSMENT<br />
NTM-A’s m<strong>in</strong>isterial development activities focus <strong>on</strong> advis<strong>in</strong>g, key leader engagements,<br />
comb<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>and</strong> jo<strong>in</strong>t meet<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g groups, facilitated <strong>in</strong>ter-m<strong>in</strong>isterial coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>,<br />
mentor councils, functi<strong>on</strong>al boards, <strong>and</strong> M<strong>in</strong>isterial Development Boards (MDBs) for the MoI<br />
<strong>and</strong> MoD. Approximately 285 government civilians, military pers<strong>on</strong>nel, <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>tractors,<br />
primarily from the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> <strong>and</strong> Canada, participate <strong>in</strong> this effort.<br />
The MDBs assess the abilities <strong>and</strong> capacity of the MoI <strong>on</strong> a m<strong>on</strong>thly basis <strong>and</strong> the MoD <strong>on</strong> a<br />
quarterly basis, <strong>and</strong> assign rat<strong>in</strong>gs based <strong>on</strong> the Capability Milest<strong>on</strong>e (CM) rat<strong>in</strong>gs system. Each<br />
MDB also assesses <strong>and</strong> approves m<strong>in</strong>isterial development plans.<br />
Figure 2: Capability Milest<strong>on</strong>e Rat<strong>in</strong>g Def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong>s<br />
ASSESSMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE<br />
As of the end of the report<strong>in</strong>g period, the MoD was assessed as requir<strong>in</strong>g some coaliti<strong>on</strong><br />
assistance to accomplish its missi<strong>on</strong>, a CM rat<strong>in</strong>g of CM-2B. The CM rat<strong>in</strong>g for the MoD has<br />
not changed s<strong>in</strong>ce it achieved CM-2B <strong>in</strong> October 2010, primarily because of the additi<strong>on</strong> of new<br />
departments with<strong>in</strong> the overall m<strong>in</strong>istry.<br />
As of the last evaluati<strong>on</strong> period, of the 47 total offices <strong>and</strong> cross-functi<strong>on</strong>al areas, 5 of the<br />
departments had a CM-4 rat<strong>in</strong>g, 10 had achieved a CM-3 rat<strong>in</strong>g, 15 had achieved a CM-2B<br />
rat<strong>in</strong>g, 9 had achieved a CM-2A rat<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> 4 achieved a CM-1B rat<strong>in</strong>g (ANA Recruit<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Comm<strong>and</strong>, Office of the M<strong>in</strong>ister of Defense, General Staff G6 Communicati<strong>on</strong>s Support Unit, <strong>and</strong><br />
14
the Parliamentary, Social, <strong>and</strong> Public Affairs Department). Additi<strong>on</strong>ally, several departments were<br />
established dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Strategy <strong>and</strong> Policy (Programs <strong>and</strong> Analysis),<br />
Headquarters Services Support Brigade, <strong>and</strong> ANA Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Comm<strong>and</strong>. The leadership for the Office<br />
of the Director of the General Staff <strong>and</strong> for MoD Health Affairs has not yet been selected <strong>and</strong> the<br />
departments were not assessed.<br />
15
Figure 3: M<strong>in</strong>istry of Defense <strong>and</strong> General Staff Capability Milest<strong>on</strong>e Rat<strong>in</strong>gs (as of February 2012)<br />
MoD Department or Cross Current<br />
Functi<strong>on</strong>al Area (CFA)<br />
Support to Operati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
CM<br />
AMoD Intelligence Policy 4<br />
AMoD Reserve Affairs 3<br />
AMoD Disaster Resp<strong>on</strong>se 2B<br />
C<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> & Property Mngt Div 2B<br />
MoD Health Affairs Not Assessed<br />
Pers<strong>on</strong>nel<br />
AMoD Pers<strong>on</strong>nel 2A<br />
AMoD Educati<strong>on</strong> 3<br />
Gender Integrati<strong>on</strong> (CFA) 4<br />
Civilianizati<strong>on</strong> (CFA)<br />
Nati<strong>on</strong>al Logistics<br />
3<br />
AMoD Acquisiti<strong>on</strong>,<br />
Logistics<br />
Tech, &<br />
2B<br />
Acquisiti<strong>on</strong> Agency 2A<br />
Logistics Comm<strong>and</strong> 2B<br />
Executive Leadership <strong>and</strong> Defense Policy<br />
Office of M<strong>in</strong>ister of Defense 1B<br />
Office of 1 st Dep M<strong>in</strong> of Defense 2B<br />
AMoD Strategy <strong>and</strong> Policy 2A<br />
MoD Legal 2B<br />
MoD Parliamentary, Soc, & Pub<br />
Affairs<br />
1B<br />
MoD Inspector General 2B<br />
Strategic Communicati<strong>on</strong>s 3<br />
Accountability<br />
(CFA)<br />
& Transparency<br />
Resource Management<br />
MoD F<strong>in</strong>ance 2A<br />
AMoD S&P (Programs <strong>and</strong><br />
Analysis) (New)<br />
4<br />
3<br />
16<br />
GS Department<br />
Support to Operati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
Current<br />
CM<br />
GS G2 Intelligence 2B<br />
GS G3 Operati<strong>on</strong>s 2A<br />
GS G5 Plans 2A<br />
GS G6 Communicati<strong>on</strong>s 2B<br />
GS G6 Communicati<strong>on</strong>s Support<br />
Unit<br />
1B<br />
GS Inspector General 2B<br />
GS Legal 2B<br />
Ground Forces Comm<strong>and</strong> 4<br />
ANA Special Operati<strong>on</strong>s Comm<strong>and</strong> 3<br />
Afghan Air Force 4<br />
Medical Comm<strong>and</strong> 2B<br />
Hqs Services<br />
(New)<br />
Pers<strong>on</strong>nel<br />
Support Brigade<br />
Not Assessed<br />
GS G1 Pers<strong>on</strong>nel 2B<br />
Religious <strong>and</strong> Cultural Affairs 2B<br />
ANA Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Comm<strong>and</strong> (New) Not Assessed<br />
ANA Recruit<strong>in</strong>g Comm<strong>and</strong> 1B<br />
GS G7 Force Struc, Trng, &<br />
Doctr<strong>in</strong>e<br />
3<br />
Office of Sergeant Major of the<br />
Army<br />
Nati<strong>on</strong>al Logistics<br />
3<br />
GS G4 Logistics 2B<br />
Army Support Comm<strong>and</strong> 3<br />
Executive Leadership <strong>and</strong> Defense Policy<br />
Office of the Chief of the GS 2A<br />
Office of the Vice Chief of the GS 2A<br />
Office of the Vice Chief of the GS<br />
(Air)<br />
3<br />
Office of the Director of the GS<br />
Resource Management<br />
Not Assessed<br />
GS G8 F<strong>in</strong>ance 2A
The Master M<strong>in</strong>isterial Development Plan (MMDP), which better <strong>in</strong>tegrates NTM-A partner<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>and</strong> advis<strong>in</strong>g efforts with<strong>in</strong> the MoD <strong>and</strong> General Staff (GS) down through the fielded force, was<br />
completed <strong>in</strong> December 2011. The MMDP was developed to support ISAF campaign plann<strong>in</strong>g<br />
implementati<strong>on</strong>. The MMDP <strong>in</strong>tegrates <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> build<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> m<strong>in</strong>isterial development<br />
activities, help<strong>in</strong>g to ensure focus <strong>on</strong> build<strong>in</strong>g a transparent <strong>and</strong> accountable MoD <strong>and</strong> GS<br />
capable of direct<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g ANA operati<strong>on</strong>s post-2014.<br />
The implementati<strong>on</strong> of the MMDP c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to produce positive results <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g: <strong>in</strong>itiati<strong>on</strong> of<br />
<strong>in</strong>ter-m<strong>in</strong>isterial comb<strong>in</strong>ed plann<strong>in</strong>g between the MoD <strong>and</strong> ISAF; completi<strong>on</strong> of comb<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
operati<strong>on</strong>al plann<strong>in</strong>g between the GS <strong>and</strong> ISAF Jo<strong>in</strong>t Comm<strong>and</strong> (IJC) staff for calendar year<br />
2012; MoD <strong>and</strong> GS executi<strong>on</strong> of Tranche Two of transiti<strong>on</strong>; numerous brief<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>gs<br />
with the Nati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>Security</strong> Council <strong>and</strong> Parliament; a force structure adjustment to the Solar<br />
Year 7 (SY) 1391 tashkil; 8 successful executi<strong>on</strong> of the SY 1390 budget; <strong>and</strong> the submissi<strong>on</strong> of<br />
the 1391 budget as scheduled.<br />
Despite progress, the MoD faces a number of significant challenges. Although the MoD is less<br />
vulnerable to crim<strong>in</strong>al penetrati<strong>on</strong> than the MoI, crim<strong>in</strong>al patr<strong>on</strong>age networks (CPNs) c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to<br />
operate with<strong>in</strong> the MoD, particularly with<strong>in</strong> the Afghan Air Force. Further, the MoD is<br />
challenged by a lack of human capital <strong>in</strong> many specialized areas requir<strong>in</strong>g technical expertise,<br />
<strong>and</strong> the development <strong>and</strong> growth of talent <strong>and</strong> expertise will rema<strong>in</strong> critical to ensur<strong>in</strong>g the l<strong>on</strong>gterm<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability of the MoD.<br />
Synchr<strong>on</strong>iz<strong>in</strong>g the development of the MoD with the Transiti<strong>on</strong> to Afghan security lead<br />
throughout Afghanistan rema<strong>in</strong>s essential, <strong>and</strong> the MoD will need to take <strong>in</strong>itiatives necessary to<br />
ensure that it is, at <strong>on</strong>ce, develop<strong>in</strong>g aut<strong>on</strong>omous m<strong>in</strong>isterial operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> effectively<br />
support<strong>in</strong>g the Transiti<strong>on</strong> process.<br />
ASSESSMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR<br />
As of the end of the report<strong>in</strong>g period, the MoI was assessed as need<strong>in</strong>g significant coaliti<strong>on</strong><br />
assistance, a CM rat<strong>in</strong>g of CM-3; the MoI is expected to achieve CM-2B next quarter. As of the<br />
last evaluati<strong>on</strong> period, of the 30 total offices <strong>and</strong> cross-functi<strong>on</strong>al areas, 3 departments had a<br />
rat<strong>in</strong>g of CM-4, 11 achieved a CM-3 rat<strong>in</strong>g, 9 achieved a CM-2B rat<strong>in</strong>g, 4 achieved a CM-2A<br />
rat<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> 2 achieved a CM-1B rat<strong>in</strong>g. Notably, Public Affairs recently transiti<strong>on</strong>ed to CM-1B,<br />
jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Policy Development. Additi<strong>on</strong>ally, several departments were established dur<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
report<strong>in</strong>g period, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Gender Affairs, Democratic Polic<strong>in</strong>g, Counter-IED, <strong>and</strong> Recruit<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Comm<strong>and</strong>. Recruit<strong>in</strong>g Comm<strong>and</strong> will have its first assessment next rat<strong>in</strong>g period. The corrupti<strong>on</strong><br />
cross-functi<strong>on</strong>al area was dropped as each department now has corrupti<strong>on</strong> metrics as part of its<br />
evaluati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
7 st th<br />
Throughout this report, references to the solar year (SY) refer to the Afghan solar year which runs from approximately March 21 to March 20<br />
of the follow<strong>in</strong>g year from the Gregorian (Western) Calendar with the New Year occurr<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> the vernal equ<strong>in</strong>ox. In a solar year, a m<strong>on</strong>th<br />
typically runs form the 21 st of <strong>on</strong>e m<strong>on</strong>th to the 20 th of the next m<strong>on</strong>th.<br />
8<br />
The tashkil is the mann<strong>in</strong>g document which determ<strong>in</strong>es a unit’s or m<strong>in</strong>istry’s authorizati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
16
Figure 4: M<strong>in</strong>istry of Interior Capability Milest<strong>on</strong>e Rat<strong>in</strong>gs (as of March 2012)<br />
Department<br />
Chief of Staff/Special Staff<br />
Current<br />
CM<br />
Public Affairs 1B<br />
Inspector General 3<br />
Legal Affairs/LEGAD 2B<br />
Intelligence 3<br />
Democratic Polic<strong>in</strong>g 3<br />
Gender Affairs (New) 4<br />
DM Strategy & Policy<br />
Strategic Plann<strong>in</strong>g 2A<br />
Policy Development 1B<br />
Force Management 2B<br />
DM Counter Narcotics<br />
Counter Narcotics 3<br />
DM Adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong><br />
Pers<strong>on</strong>nel Management 2B<br />
Civil Service 2B<br />
Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Management 3<br />
Recruit<strong>in</strong>g Comm<strong>and</strong> (New) Not Assessed<br />
DM APPF<br />
Afghan Public Prot Force (APPF) 4<br />
17<br />
DM <strong>Security</strong><br />
Department<br />
Current<br />
CM<br />
Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) 3<br />
Afghan Border Police (ABP) 2B<br />
GDPSU 2A<br />
Anti-Crime Police 2B<br />
ANCOP 2A<br />
Afghan Local Police (ALP) 3<br />
Operati<strong>on</strong>s Plann<strong>in</strong>g 2A<br />
Force Read<strong>in</strong>ess 2B<br />
Counter-IED (New) 4<br />
DM Support<br />
Logistics 3<br />
F<strong>in</strong>ance & Budget 3<br />
Facilities & Installati<strong>on</strong> 3<br />
Surge<strong>on</strong>, Medical 2B<br />
Informati<strong>on</strong>, Communicati<strong>on</strong>s, &<br />
Technology<br />
Acquisiti<strong>on</strong> & Procurement 2B<br />
Although the MoI dem<strong>on</strong>strated measured progress dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period, it faces multiple<br />
challenges which risk imped<strong>in</strong>g further development. The MoI faces persistent difficulties <strong>in</strong><br />
creat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g a susta<strong>in</strong>able force, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g civil service reform <strong>and</strong> a logistics<br />
capacity with<strong>in</strong> the ANP pillars. Further, the MoI rema<strong>in</strong>s significantly susceptible to<br />
penetrati<strong>on</strong> by CPNs <strong>in</strong> the fielded force. Due to the nature of its missi<strong>on</strong>, the dispersed<br />
deployment of its forces, <strong>and</strong> the span of c<strong>on</strong>trol, the Afghan Border Police is particularly<br />
vulnerable to potential <strong>in</strong>fluence by CPNs. The Afghan Government, <strong>in</strong> partnership with ISAF,<br />
has made <strong>on</strong>ly limited progress toward elim<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g corrupt officials. ISAF <strong>and</strong> the Afghan<br />
Government are accelerat<strong>in</strong>g efforts to develop <strong>in</strong>ternal accountability systems <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>able<br />
processes through m<strong>in</strong>isterial development <strong>and</strong> reform <strong>in</strong>itiatives that will enable preventi<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />
detecti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>in</strong>ternal crim<strong>in</strong>al activity, thereby reduc<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>fluence of CPNs.<br />
3
2.2: ANSF LITERACY TRAINING<br />
Literacy is a critical force enabler <strong>and</strong> force multiplier for the ANSF. Literacy enables ANSF<br />
service members to learn required skills at vocati<strong>on</strong>al schools, enhances <strong>in</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> human<br />
rights <strong>and</strong> the rule of law, <strong>and</strong> promotes the l<strong>on</strong>g-term susta<strong>in</strong>ability of the force as well as postservice<br />
ec<strong>on</strong>omic opportunity.<br />
As focus has shifted from force expansi<strong>on</strong> to force development, literacy tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g efforts have<br />
likewise begun shift<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>in</strong>crease the number of ANSF pers<strong>on</strong>nel at the <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al st<strong>and</strong>ard<br />
for functi<strong>on</strong>al literacy (Level 3). Level 3 literacy is required for ANSF pers<strong>on</strong>nel to attend<br />
professi<strong>on</strong>al military <strong>and</strong> branch schools, as it allows students to learn technical <strong>in</strong>formati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />
skills. Increas<strong>in</strong>g the number of ANSF pers<strong>on</strong>nel at Level 3 literacy will have a significant<br />
positive impact <strong>on</strong> improv<strong>in</strong>g the logistics <strong>and</strong> other technical capabilities of the ANSF.<br />
The size <strong>and</strong> scope of literacy tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g efforts for the ANA <strong>and</strong> ANP rema<strong>in</strong> expansive. As of<br />
March 31, 2012, 2958 full-time Afghan literacy teachers were teach<strong>in</strong>g 112,045 soldiers <strong>and</strong><br />
patrolmen, up from 89,297 as of September 2011. Additi<strong>on</strong>ally, there are currently 11,235 ANA<br />
pers<strong>on</strong>nel at Level 3 literacy <strong>and</strong> 16,559 ANP pers<strong>on</strong>nel at Level 3.<br />
Figure 5: ANSF Literacy <strong>Progress</strong><br />
Passed<br />
Literacy Test<br />
NOV 2009 –<br />
OCT 2010<br />
NOV 2010 –<br />
SEP 2011<br />
OCT 2011 –<br />
MAR 2012<br />
Total<br />
Level 1 16,591 58,962 52,194 127,747<br />
Level 2 8,783 20,016 13,845 42,644<br />
Level 3 4,530 12,045 11,219 27,794<br />
Total 29,904 91,023 77,258 198,185<br />
As of March 31, 2012, 112,045 pers<strong>on</strong>nel were <strong>in</strong> literacy <strong>in</strong>structi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Level 3 literacy tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g is primarily <strong>in</strong>structed at the fielded units, <strong>and</strong> advancement from Level<br />
1 to Level 3 requires an additi<strong>on</strong>al 248 hours of <strong>in</strong>structi<strong>on</strong>. C<strong>on</strong>v<strong>in</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g local comm<strong>and</strong>ers to<br />
provide troops with time to complete literacy tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g is a primary challenge, particularly with<br />
the ANA. S<strong>in</strong>ce spot <strong>in</strong>specti<strong>on</strong>s of the fielded force have shown that <strong>on</strong>ly 50 percent attend<br />
class, emphasis is be<strong>in</strong>g placed <strong>on</strong> hav<strong>in</strong>g more students attend literacy tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g centers. The<br />
recent MoD commitment to establish the Darulaman Literacy Centre will aid these efforts, as the<br />
<strong>in</strong>itial capacity of 400 students is <strong>in</strong>creased to 800 students <strong>in</strong> the com<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>on</strong>ths, build<strong>in</strong>g to an<br />
eventual capacity of 1,500 students.<br />
Despite the expansive tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g efforts <strong>and</strong> significant progress, overcom<strong>in</strong>g the problems caused<br />
by illiteracy <strong>in</strong> the Afghan populati<strong>on</strong> will c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to be a challenge. Literacy <strong>in</strong>structi<strong>on</strong><br />
efforts are expected to <strong>in</strong>crease for the rema<strong>in</strong>der of 2012.<br />
18
2.3: INSTITUTIONAL TRAINER AND MENTOR STATUS<br />
The mann<strong>in</strong>g resources necessary to develop the ANSF are identified <strong>in</strong> the Comb<strong>in</strong>ed Jo<strong>in</strong>t<br />
Statement of Requirements (CJSOR), NATO’s capabilities-based document used to identify<br />
campaign plan force requirements. The tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g missi<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to suffer from shortages of<br />
<strong>in</strong>structors.<br />
In the wake of the high profile attack <strong>on</strong> NATO mentors at the MoI <strong>on</strong> February 25 th , 2012,<br />
ISAF temporarily withdrew mentors while comm<strong>and</strong>ers c<strong>on</strong>ducted force protecti<strong>on</strong> assessments<br />
<strong>and</strong> validated that appropriate security measures were <strong>in</strong> place. That process was c<strong>on</strong>ducted<br />
expeditiously, <strong>and</strong> mentors have returned to duty, with additi<strong>on</strong>al security protocols <strong>in</strong> place.<br />
The ANSF c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to face a shortage of NATO/ISAF tra<strong>in</strong>ers. The total number of required<br />
tra<strong>in</strong>ers is currently 2,774 – reflect<strong>in</strong>g a slight adjustment s<strong>in</strong>ce September 2011 when the<br />
requirement was 2778. This change is due to the elim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of 457 positi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> the additi<strong>on</strong> of<br />
453 different positi<strong>on</strong>s. These changes are <strong>in</strong>dicative of the evoluti<strong>on</strong> of the NTM-A missi<strong>on</strong> as<br />
Afghans take resp<strong>on</strong>sibility for some additi<strong>on</strong>al tasks. The percentage of tra<strong>in</strong>ers <strong>in</strong>-place or<br />
pledged currently st<strong>and</strong>s at 84 percent with a shortfall of 448 positi<strong>on</strong>s. The shortfall of absent<br />
tra<strong>in</strong>ers previously stood at 26 percent, but a Force Generati<strong>on</strong> C<strong>on</strong>ference hosted by NTM-A<br />
<strong>and</strong> SHAPE <strong>in</strong> January 2012 substantially lowered the shortfall to 16 percent. Figure 6<br />
illustrates the current status of the CJSOR.<br />
As the campaign supports Transiti<strong>on</strong>, establish<strong>in</strong>g the ANSF’s self-tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g capability is a critical<br />
milest<strong>on</strong>e. As a result of the “Tra<strong>in</strong> the Instructor” program, the ANA now has 1,913 certified<br />
Afghan <strong>in</strong>structors, of which 453 are Master Skills Instructor Course tra<strong>in</strong>ers. The ANP has 879<br />
certified tra<strong>in</strong>ers. Additi<strong>on</strong>ally, due to the substantial changes associated with the drawdown of<br />
U.S. military forces <strong>in</strong> 2012, CJSOR focus has been to develop the next versi<strong>on</strong> of the statement<br />
of requirements by identify<strong>in</strong>g when <strong>and</strong> where tra<strong>in</strong>ers will be needed <strong>in</strong> the future. Employ<strong>in</strong>g<br />
this approach will prevent other countries from send<strong>in</strong>g pers<strong>on</strong>nel to accomplish a task that has<br />
been disc<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued.<br />
Figure 6: CJSOR Tra<strong>in</strong>er Status (Versi<strong>on</strong> 11.5, as of March 31, 2012) 9<br />
Requirement In-Place Pledged Shortfall<br />
2,778 1,916 418 440<br />
2.4: AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY CAPACITY AND GROWTH<br />
The ANA c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to make steady progress towards its goal of assum<strong>in</strong>g full resp<strong>on</strong>sibility for<br />
security across all of Afghanistan from ISAF by the end of 2014. The ANA is <strong>on</strong>-pace to meet<br />
its current growth targets <strong>and</strong> has steadily <strong>in</strong>creased its capability rat<strong>in</strong>gs. The number of<br />
partnered operati<strong>on</strong>s c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to <strong>in</strong>crease al<strong>on</strong>g with the percentage of these operati<strong>on</strong>s that<br />
were led by Afghan forces. While progress was not uniform across all secti<strong>on</strong>s of the ANA,<br />
some units, such as the Afghan Nati<strong>on</strong>al Army Special Forces, have made impressive strides,<br />
<strong>and</strong> are now very capable. <strong>Progress</strong> has been slower <strong>in</strong> other areas, such as <strong>in</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
ANA logistics capabilities, or the development of the Afghan Air Force.<br />
9 The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> currently sources 1,409 n<strong>on</strong>-CJSOR tra<strong>in</strong>er positi<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
19
MANNING<br />
The current approved end-strength for the ANA – the projected end-strength required to support<br />
transiti<strong>on</strong> to Afghan security lead – is 195,000 pers<strong>on</strong>nel by October 2012.<br />
Figure 7: ANA End-Strength (March 2011-March 2012)<br />
As of the end of the report<strong>in</strong>g period, the overall ANA force level reached 194,466 pers<strong>on</strong>nel.<br />
The ANA has effectively met its surge level end strength with an <strong>in</strong>crease of 23,685 from the<br />
force level at the end of the previous report<strong>in</strong>g period <strong>in</strong> September 2011.<br />
Recruit<strong>in</strong>g rema<strong>in</strong>ed steady throughout the report<strong>in</strong>g period. The ANA met or exceeded its<br />
m<strong>on</strong>thly recruit<strong>in</strong>g goal <strong>in</strong> three of the six m<strong>on</strong>ths dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period. NTM-A <strong>and</strong> the<br />
MoD also ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed efforts to recruit southern Pashtuns as well as improve the overall ethnic<br />
balance of the ANA. Us<strong>in</strong>g the MoD <strong>and</strong> NTM-A-agreed def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong> for Southern Pashtuns 10<br />
,<br />
this ethnic segment made up 6.6 percent of enlisted recruits dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period. Despite<br />
persistent efforts, the impact of the <strong>in</strong>itiatives <strong>on</strong> the security situati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> the south <strong>and</strong> elsewhere<br />
rema<strong>in</strong>s marg<strong>in</strong>al.<br />
10<br />
Southern Pashtuns are def<strong>in</strong>ed as bel<strong>on</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g to the follow<strong>in</strong>g tribes: Ghilzai, Durrani, Zirak, Mohammadzai, Barakzai, Alikozai, Achakzai,<br />
Popalzai, Panjpao, Alizai, Ishaqzai, Tokhi, Hotaki, Khogiani.<br />
20
ates fluctuated throughout the report<strong>in</strong>g period <strong>and</strong> did not meet the targeted level <strong>in</strong><br />
four out of the six m<strong>on</strong>ths. January <strong>and</strong> March were both at 59 percent, slightly below the goal<br />
of 60 percent.<br />
Retenti<strong>on</strong> 11<br />
M<strong>on</strong>thly attriti<strong>on</strong> 12<br />
rates also did not meet the targeted level of 1.4 percent for the first five<br />
m<strong>on</strong>ths of the report<strong>in</strong>g period: 2.4 percent <strong>in</strong> October, 2.6 percent <strong>in</strong> November, 2.3 percent <strong>in</strong><br />
December, 1.9 percent <strong>in</strong> January, 1.8 percent <strong>in</strong> February, <strong>and</strong> 1.2 percent <strong>in</strong> March, for a sixm<strong>on</strong>th<br />
average of 2.0 percent. However, there was c<strong>on</strong>sistent improvement due to improvements<br />
<strong>in</strong> leadership, provid<strong>in</strong>g more leave to soldiers, enhanced liv<strong>in</strong>g c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>and</strong> pay system<br />
improvements.<br />
ISAF rema<strong>in</strong>s focused <strong>on</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g further improvements, <strong>and</strong> ANA officials have partnered with<br />
NTM-A <strong>and</strong> IJC to re-activate the Attriti<strong>on</strong> Work<strong>in</strong>g Group to determ<strong>in</strong>e further potential<br />
soluti<strong>on</strong>s to reduce the overall attriti<strong>on</strong> rate, beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g with a more robust pers<strong>on</strong>nel report that<br />
will better def<strong>in</strong>e <strong>and</strong> facilitate track<strong>in</strong>g of attriti<strong>on</strong> levels. Should ANA attriti<strong>on</strong> rates<br />
c<strong>on</strong>sistently fail to meet target levels, there is a risk that the Afghan Government will not be able<br />
to susta<strong>in</strong> the tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g costs <strong>in</strong>curred to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> the 195,000 soldier force.<br />
Future force levels of the ANA rema<strong>in</strong> to be determ<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>and</strong> are a part of <strong>on</strong>go<strong>in</strong>g discussi<strong>on</strong>s<br />
between the U.S. Government, the Afghan Government, <strong>and</strong> the <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al community. These<br />
discussi<strong>on</strong>s c<strong>on</strong>sider the required size <strong>and</strong> capabilities of the ANSF to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> security<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g transiti<strong>on</strong>, the capacity of the Afghan Government to fund its security forces, <strong>and</strong> the<br />
fiscal challenges fac<strong>in</strong>g the ec<strong>on</strong>omies of the <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al community.<br />
FORCE DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING<br />
NTM-A c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to c<strong>on</strong>centrate <strong>on</strong> the development of Afghan <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> capabilities<br />
necessary to tra<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong> the ANA. As part of this process, NTM-A shifted focus from<br />
<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g pers<strong>on</strong>nel quantity to develop<strong>in</strong>g quality <strong>and</strong> technical capabilities. To support this<br />
shift, the MoD approved the c<strong>on</strong>versi<strong>on</strong> of a tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g center <strong>in</strong> Darulaman <strong>in</strong>to a literacy center,<br />
provid<strong>in</strong>g graduates with the Level 3 literacy skills which are necessary to progress to technical<br />
tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> the Branch Schools. Over the course of the report<strong>in</strong>g period, more than 9,838<br />
soldiers have received advanced tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g from the 12 functi<strong>on</strong><strong>in</strong>g branch schools.<br />
Additi<strong>on</strong>ally, Mobile Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Teams (MTTs) c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to <strong>in</strong>crease the quality of the ANA. The<br />
MTT c<strong>on</strong>cept was developed to provide professi<strong>on</strong>al tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to soldiers previously fielded<br />
without professi<strong>on</strong>al tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g at the ANA’s branch schools.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period, the Afghan Nati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>Security</strong> University became the Afghan<br />
Nati<strong>on</strong>al Defense University (ANDU). Over the next 18 m<strong>on</strong>ths, the ANDU will c<strong>on</strong>solidate<br />
seven professi<strong>on</strong>al development schools under the adm<strong>in</strong>istrative c<strong>on</strong>trol of <strong>on</strong>e headquarters to<br />
improve the future development <strong>and</strong> quality of graduates.<br />
11 Retenti<strong>on</strong> is def<strong>in</strong>ed as the re-c<strong>on</strong>tract<strong>in</strong>g of those soldiers who are eligible for separati<strong>on</strong> from the force <strong>and</strong> also <strong>in</strong>cludes re-accessi<strong>on</strong>s<br />
(former members of the ANA who have re-enlisted follow<strong>in</strong>g a period of separati<strong>on</strong>).<br />
12 Attriti<strong>on</strong> is def<strong>in</strong>ed as the unanticipated loss of a soldier, NCO, or officer, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>cludes pers<strong>on</strong>nel dropped from rolls, killed <strong>in</strong> acti<strong>on</strong>,<br />
permanently disabled, captured, <strong>and</strong> n<strong>on</strong>-combat deaths. A soldier is listed as absent without leave (AWOL) after 24 hours of not report<strong>in</strong>g for an<br />
assigned duty; soldiers <strong>and</strong> NCOs are dropped from rolls after 45 days, <strong>and</strong> officers after 30 days.<br />
21
The capacity of the Kabul Military Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Center (KMTC), the premier military tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g center<br />
<strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, grew significantly dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period. Up<strong>on</strong> completi<strong>on</strong> of c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong> September 2012, KMTC will have 16,000 bed spaces <strong>and</strong> approximately 11,000 classroom<br />
spaces for ANA tra<strong>in</strong>ees. 13<br />
In additi<strong>on</strong> to tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, the ANA made progress <strong>in</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>g force management tools critical to<br />
l<strong>on</strong>g-term susta<strong>in</strong>ment. For example, the Computerized Pay System (CPS), c<strong>on</strong>tracted <strong>in</strong> the Fall<br />
of 2011, began the field<strong>in</strong>g phase <strong>in</strong> March 2012 with<strong>in</strong> ANA units located <strong>in</strong> Kabul <strong>and</strong> will<br />
gradually exp<strong>and</strong> to the regi<strong>on</strong>al corps. Once fully <strong>in</strong>stituted, the CPS, which uses f<strong>in</strong>gerpr<strong>in</strong>t<br />
biometrics to identify soldiers, is designed to expedite the pay process <strong>and</strong> provide oversight to<br />
an <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly complex pay system. The CPS will also provide ANA leaders <strong>and</strong> staff with an<br />
automated ability to properly account for pay <strong>and</strong> query payroll data.<br />
LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT<br />
The MoD c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to improve <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease leadership development by focus<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g<br />
both the quality <strong>and</strong> capacity of officer <strong>and</strong> NCO (N<strong>on</strong>-Commissi<strong>on</strong>ed Officer) tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
programs. A total of 1,893 officers were tra<strong>in</strong>ed between October 1, 2011 <strong>and</strong> March 31, 2012,<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g 812 graduates from Officer C<strong>and</strong>idate School (OCS) <strong>and</strong> 1,081 graduates from the<br />
Mujahedeen Integrati<strong>on</strong> Course. Officers are also produced at the Nati<strong>on</strong>al Military Academy of<br />
Afghanistan (NMAA). NMAA has exp<strong>and</strong>ed its orig<strong>in</strong>al capacity from the first class of 84<br />
students that graduated <strong>in</strong> 2009 to the recently matriculated 2016 class of 640 students.<br />
The pool of potential NCOs <strong>in</strong>creased with c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued growth of the literacy program <strong>and</strong><br />
recruitment focus <strong>on</strong> literate c<strong>and</strong>idates. A total of 8,083 NCOs were generated between October<br />
1, 2011 <strong>and</strong> March 31, 2012, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g 5,908 from the Team Leader Courses <strong>and</strong> 2,175 from<br />
<strong>in</strong>itial entry 1 Uniform courses 14<br />
(1UC).<br />
Nevertheless, the ANA is challenged by a significant current shortfall of nearly 10,600 NCOs as<br />
well as needed growth of 6,800 additi<strong>on</strong>al NCOs this year. The shortage of NCOs will<br />
gradually be reduced through 2014 as experienced, qualified soldiers are identified, tra<strong>in</strong>ed, <strong>and</strong><br />
promoted.<br />
13<br />
The difference <strong>in</strong> spaces takes <strong>in</strong>to account an ability to accommodate class turnover as well as hav<strong>in</strong>g a porti<strong>on</strong><br />
of the tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> nearby field envir<strong>on</strong>ments.<br />
14<br />
The 1 Uniform Course (1UC) is a direct-entry tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g course for qualified c<strong>and</strong>idates who enter the force as NCOs.<br />
22
Figure 8: ANA Officer End-Strength Objectives <strong>and</strong> Actual (November 2009-November 2012)<br />
Figure 9: ANA NCO End-Strength Objectives <strong>and</strong> Actual (November 2009-November 2012)<br />
23
Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g efforts c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to develop effective ANA leadership dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period. As<br />
the ANA reaches its target end-strength, the Afghan Nati<strong>on</strong>al Army Officers Academy<br />
(ANAOA), modeled after the UK S<strong>and</strong>hurst Military Academy, is expected to replace the<br />
current 20-week OCS course with a <strong>on</strong>e-year course designed to improve the professi<strong>on</strong>alism<br />
<strong>and</strong> leadership of junior officers. The ANAOA is a jo<strong>in</strong>t project of the <strong>United</strong> K<strong>in</strong>gdom <strong>and</strong><br />
Australia, which are expected to provide the majority of the mentors. The first <strong>in</strong>structor course<br />
is expected to beg<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> Spr<strong>in</strong>g 2013 <strong>and</strong> the first OCS course is scheduled to beg<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> the Fall of<br />
2013.<br />
SPECIAL FORCES<br />
The Afghan Nati<strong>on</strong>al Army Special Forces 15<br />
are the most capable comp<strong>on</strong>ent of the ANSF <strong>and</strong><br />
have made impressive strides towards becom<strong>in</strong>g an <strong>in</strong>dependent <strong>and</strong> effective force. S<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
activati<strong>on</strong> of the ANA Special Operati<strong>on</strong>s Comm<strong>and</strong> (ANASOC) headquarters by the Chief of<br />
the General Staff <strong>in</strong> April 2011, ANASOC has c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to develop <strong>and</strong> implement its plans for<br />
the mann<strong>in</strong>g, tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> equipp<strong>in</strong>g of its forces, all while simultaneously achiev<strong>in</strong>g effects <strong>on</strong><br />
the battlefield. The development of the ANASOC rema<strong>in</strong>s a critical comp<strong>on</strong>ent of the overall<br />
force structure <strong>and</strong> strategy to susta<strong>in</strong> the transiti<strong>on</strong> to Afghan security lead.<br />
Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g efforts c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to exp<strong>and</strong> the capacity <strong>and</strong> capability of the ANA Comm<strong>and</strong>os 16<br />
(ANACDO) <strong>and</strong> ANASF dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period. The ANASOC currently c<strong>on</strong>sists of 7,809<br />
ANACDO <strong>and</strong> 646 ANASF. Graduati<strong>on</strong> rates for both ANACDO <strong>and</strong> ANASF operators<br />
rema<strong>in</strong>ed steady <strong>and</strong> are <strong>on</strong> schedule to meet end-strength targets. From October 2011 through<br />
March 2012, the ANASOC’s School of Excellence produced a total of 1,817 new CDO <strong>and</strong> 183<br />
new SF operators. Based <strong>on</strong> current recruit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> graduati<strong>on</strong> trends, ANASF are anticipated to<br />
achieve their end-strength force level by March 2013. ANACDO are expected to reach their<br />
end-strength force level by December 2012.<br />
Approval of the SY 1391 tashkil <strong>in</strong> March 2012 enabled the full establishment of the<br />
headquarters <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>cluded two Special Operati<strong>on</strong>s brigades c<strong>on</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g a mix of ANACDO <strong>and</strong><br />
ANASF. Each brigade has five Special Operati<strong>on</strong>s k<strong>and</strong>aks, 17<br />
with <strong>on</strong>e k<strong>and</strong>ak work<strong>in</strong>g directly<br />
for the ANASOC Comm<strong>and</strong>er.<br />
Additi<strong>on</strong>ally, the SY1391 tashkil added <strong>on</strong>e general support k<strong>and</strong>ak <strong>and</strong> the forward support<br />
companies <strong>and</strong> military <strong>in</strong>telligence detachments to each Special Operati<strong>on</strong>s k<strong>and</strong>ak, which gives<br />
the ANASOC Comm<strong>and</strong>er the ability to provide tactical- <strong>and</strong> operati<strong>on</strong>al-level logistical support<br />
to all ANASOC forces. The restructur<strong>in</strong>g of the forward support company <strong>in</strong> each of the exist<strong>in</strong>g<br />
n<strong>in</strong>e Special Operati<strong>on</strong>s k<strong>and</strong>aks creates support assets at the company-level, which better<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>s operati<strong>on</strong>al units whose reach spans multiple prov<strong>in</strong>ces. Furthermore, the approved<br />
field<strong>in</strong>g plan also calls for the creati<strong>on</strong> of a military <strong>in</strong>telligence capability with<strong>in</strong> ANASOC,<br />
which will <strong>in</strong>crease ANASOC’s capacity to generate its own <strong>in</strong>telligence-driven operati<strong>on</strong>s. The<br />
development <strong>and</strong> restructur<strong>in</strong>g of the ANASOC headquarters, the c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued development <strong>and</strong><br />
growth of enablers <strong>in</strong> the form of logisticians <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>telligence pers<strong>on</strong>nel, <strong>and</strong> the establishment<br />
15<br />
ANA Special Forces specialize <strong>in</strong> foreign <strong>in</strong>ternal defense <strong>and</strong> COIN operati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
16<br />
Similar to U.S. Army Rangers, ANA Comm<strong>and</strong>os specialize <strong>in</strong> direct acti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
17<br />
“Battali<strong>on</strong>”<br />
24
<strong>and</strong> growth of a Special Operati<strong>on</strong>s Forces aviati<strong>on</strong> capability rema<strong>in</strong> priorities for the near to<br />
medium term.<br />
WOMEN IN THE ANA<br />
NTM-A c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to work with the ANA to <strong>in</strong>crease female recruitment, as female security<br />
forces play a key role <strong>in</strong> enhanc<strong>in</strong>g the credibility <strong>and</strong> effectiveness of the ANSF. However, the<br />
effort to <strong>in</strong>tegrate women <strong>in</strong>to the ANA has been largely <strong>in</strong>effective. Currently, there are 350<br />
female members of the ANA, which is <strong>on</strong>ly a fracti<strong>on</strong> of the ambitious goal of 19,500.<br />
Nevertheless, tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g capacity c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to be set aside for female recruits; for 2012, there are<br />
two ANA Officer C<strong>and</strong>idate classes (each with a capacity of 60 women) scheduled. Three 1-<br />
UC, 16-week classes (each with a capacity of 75) are also scheduled. The NMAA will enroll 60<br />
women, or 10 percent of the total 2016 class, start<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> March 2012. NMAA will c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue the<br />
practice of offer<strong>in</strong>g 10 seats to female medical students dur<strong>in</strong>g their first year.<br />
The gender <strong>in</strong>tegrati<strong>on</strong> M<strong>in</strong>isterial Development Plan serves as the foundati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />
implementati<strong>on</strong> tool for <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g female representati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> the force by improv<strong>in</strong>g the culture<br />
<strong>and</strong> climate for women currently <strong>in</strong> the ANSF, pay<strong>in</strong>g particular attenti<strong>on</strong> to female senior<br />
leaders. However, the MoD lacks the comb<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of policies, procedures, <strong>and</strong> executi<strong>on</strong> to<br />
promote opportunity <strong>and</strong> fair <strong>and</strong> respectful treatment of women <strong>in</strong> the force. As a result, female<br />
representati<strong>on</strong> will likely rema<strong>in</strong> at extremely low levels <strong>in</strong> the near to medium term.<br />
N<strong>on</strong>etheless, the issue of women <strong>in</strong> the ANA rema<strong>in</strong>s a focus; dur<strong>in</strong>g this report<strong>in</strong>g period, ISAF<br />
hosted a Gender Integrati<strong>on</strong> C<strong>on</strong>ference that brought together lead<strong>in</strong>g stake-holders <strong>in</strong> the<br />
Afghan Government, the ANSF (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g senior female ANSF members), <strong>and</strong> civil society to<br />
discuss ways <strong>in</strong> which the participants <strong>and</strong> others can work together to advance the role of<br />
women <strong>in</strong> the ANSF.<br />
EQUIPPING<br />
Build<strong>in</strong>g a susta<strong>in</strong>able combat capacity <strong>in</strong> the ANA depends <strong>on</strong> the acquisiti<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> field<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
equipment that allows ANA soldiers to shoot, move, <strong>and</strong> communicate. NTM-A’s capacitybuild<strong>in</strong>g<br />
efforts, through the acquisiti<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> field<strong>in</strong>g of equipment, c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to improve ANA<br />
capabilities.<br />
The dynamics of the Afghan COIN campaign <strong>and</strong> terra<strong>in</strong> necessitate susta<strong>in</strong>able <strong>and</strong> reliable<br />
vehicles. As a result, vehicles issued to the ANA have similar st<strong>and</strong>ards as those issued to U.S.<br />
forces. Individual weap<strong>on</strong>s are primarily st<strong>and</strong>ard U.S. weap<strong>on</strong>s, while crew-served weap<strong>on</strong>s are<br />
a comb<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of former Warsaw Pact weap<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ard U.S. weap<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
ANA equipment field<strong>in</strong>g c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued over the course of the report<strong>in</strong>g period. However, beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g<br />
with ANA units fielded dur<strong>in</strong>g March 2012, there will be <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g shortages of equipment,<br />
particularly vehicles, of which nearly 4,194 are currently str<strong>and</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> Pakistan due to the closure<br />
of the Pakistani ground l<strong>in</strong>es of communicati<strong>on</strong> (GLOCs). The closure of the GLOCs has had a<br />
more limited effect <strong>on</strong> communicati<strong>on</strong>s equipment <strong>and</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s, the delivery of which c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues<br />
via air l<strong>in</strong>es of communicati<strong>on</strong> (ALOCs). Field<strong>in</strong>g priorities for the next 180 days are expected<br />
to be met if Pakistani GLOCs are restored. Field<strong>in</strong>g new equipment to units tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g at the<br />
C<strong>on</strong>solidated Field<strong>in</strong>g Center will rema<strong>in</strong> the focus throughout 2012. As additi<strong>on</strong>al equipment<br />
25
ecomes available, NTM-A will c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to backfill corps units to 100 percent of tashkil<br />
authorizati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
LOGISTICS CAPABILITY<br />
As a result of a deliberate decisi<strong>on</strong> made when the plan for exp<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g the ANSF was formulated,<br />
the <strong>in</strong>itial focus for the ANSF was build<strong>in</strong>g combat capability <strong>and</strong> leverag<strong>in</strong>g ISAF enablers to<br />
support the ANSF. As ANSF achieves its end strength goals, ISAF is <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly focus<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong><br />
development of ANA enablers, particularly logistics capabilities<br />
At the nati<strong>on</strong>al level, ANA logistics nodes are complete, <strong>and</strong> development efforts are expected to<br />
<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly focus <strong>on</strong> improv<strong>in</strong>g logistics effectiveness <strong>in</strong> the com<strong>in</strong>g year. On a regi<strong>on</strong>al level,<br />
the future structure of ANA logistics began to take shape <strong>in</strong> early 2012 as a merg<strong>in</strong>g of Forward<br />
Supply Depots <strong>and</strong> Corps Logistics Battali<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong>to Regi<strong>on</strong>al Logistics Support Comm<strong>and</strong>s<br />
(RLSCs) started, with four mergers hav<strong>in</strong>g been completed. Six RLSCs will report to the Army<br />
Support Comm<strong>and</strong> (ASC) of the GS, build<strong>in</strong>g the hub for logistical support. As a sign of Afghan<br />
development, the Comm<strong>and</strong>er of the ASC published the implementati<strong>on</strong> plan for this effort <strong>in</strong><br />
November 2011. Notably, the nascent logistics system successfully distributed packages of cold<br />
weather cloth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipment to ANA units dur<strong>in</strong>g this report<strong>in</strong>g period.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g the com<strong>in</strong>g period, logistics development efforts will focus <strong>on</strong> facilitat<strong>in</strong>g distributi<strong>on</strong><br />
<strong>and</strong> us<strong>in</strong>g completed <strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>in</strong> order to develop an ANA logistics system better able to<br />
resp<strong>on</strong>d to specific requests from the ANA units. However, despite progress, the ANA is<br />
expected to lack combat enablers <strong>and</strong> logistics support for the foreseeable future.<br />
AFGHAN AIR FORCE<br />
The Afghan Air Force’s l<strong>on</strong>g-term development strategy <strong>in</strong>cludes the creati<strong>on</strong> of an air force that<br />
can support the needs of the ANSF <strong>and</strong> Afghan Government by 2016. This force will be capable<br />
of presidential airlift, air mobility, rotary <strong>and</strong> fixed-w<strong>in</strong>g close air support, casualty evacuati<strong>on</strong>,<br />
<strong>and</strong> aerial rec<strong>on</strong>naissance. The AAF also plans to be able to susta<strong>in</strong> its capacity through<br />
<strong>in</strong>digenous tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g a complete educati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>frastructure. The<br />
air fleet will c<strong>on</strong>sist of a mix of Russian <strong>and</strong> Western airframes. Afghan airmen will operate <strong>in</strong><br />
accordance with NATO procedures <strong>and</strong> will be able to support the Afghan Government<br />
effectively by employ<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>struments of airpower.<br />
AAF plans, however, are ambitious <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicative of a need to balance Afghan Government<br />
aspirati<strong>on</strong>s, necessity, <strong>and</strong> affordability. As of the current report<strong>in</strong>g period, AAF capacity <strong>and</strong><br />
capability rema<strong>in</strong>ed extremely limited <strong>and</strong> future progress is challenged by significant obstacles,<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>adequate nati<strong>on</strong>al educati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> literacy levels as well as a nascent pilot tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
program.<br />
Corrupti<strong>on</strong> also rema<strong>in</strong>s a significant problem <strong>in</strong> the AAF, where a crim<strong>in</strong>al patr<strong>on</strong>age network<br />
is <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> numerous illegal activities. ISAF <strong>and</strong> the Afghan Government c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to work<br />
together to combat corrupti<strong>on</strong>, <strong>and</strong> as of the end of the report<strong>in</strong>g period, numerous <strong>in</strong>vestigati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
were <strong>on</strong>go<strong>in</strong>g. Nevertheless, the Afghan Government has yet to dem<strong>on</strong>strate the political will to<br />
address corrupti<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> remove <strong>and</strong> prosecute corrupt officials <strong>on</strong> a c<strong>on</strong>sistent basis.<br />
26
AAF CAPACITY<br />
The NATO Air Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Comm<strong>and</strong> – Afghanistan (NATC-A) focuses <strong>on</strong> build<strong>in</strong>g Afghanistan’s<br />
airpower al<strong>on</strong>g four l<strong>in</strong>es of operati<strong>on</strong>: aircraft build, airmen build, <strong>in</strong>frastructure build, <strong>and</strong><br />
operati<strong>on</strong>al capability. All l<strong>in</strong>es of operati<strong>on</strong> made limited progress dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period,<br />
but rema<strong>in</strong> immature. The AAF build timel<strong>in</strong>e lags the rest of the ANSF, as it started its tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
missi<strong>on</strong> two years later, <strong>and</strong> more time is needed for technical tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to produce pilots,<br />
mechanics, <strong>and</strong> several other technical skill sets.<br />
The AAF airmen build rema<strong>in</strong>s underdeveloped. The overall strength of the AAF was 5,541 at<br />
the end of the report<strong>in</strong>g period, with 1,577 currently <strong>in</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g. The pilot tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g program<br />
currently has 55 c<strong>and</strong>idates progress<strong>in</strong>g through the self-paced (normally 18 m<strong>on</strong>ths) English<br />
language tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g course <strong>and</strong> 64 progress<strong>in</strong>g through 12-m<strong>on</strong>th pilot tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g courses. New<br />
accessi<strong>on</strong> pilot c<strong>and</strong>idates are required to possess an 80 English Competency Level score before<br />
beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g a formal pilot tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g course. Future tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g can now be c<strong>on</strong>ducted entirely with<strong>in</strong><br />
Afghanistan with the open<strong>in</strong>g of the tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g center <strong>in</strong> Sh<strong>in</strong>d<strong>and</strong>, but the March course was<br />
cancelled due to a lack of progressi<strong>on</strong> by pilot c<strong>and</strong>idates <strong>in</strong> the English language course.<br />
Sh<strong>in</strong>d<strong>and</strong> is capable of produc<strong>in</strong>g 70 pilots per year. There are also Afghan pilots attend<strong>in</strong>g<br />
courses <strong>in</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, <strong>United</strong> Arab Emirates, <strong>and</strong> the Czech Republic.<br />
In November 2011, NTM-A <strong>and</strong> the AAF c<strong>on</strong>ducted a data call to assess the tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g level of<br />
AAF airmen, evaluat<strong>in</strong>g 2,800 pers<strong>on</strong>nel, or more than half of the force. The assessment<br />
revealed that 1,918 of those surveyed were undertra<strong>in</strong>ed but rema<strong>in</strong>ed assigned to units.<br />
Comb<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the data call <strong>and</strong> subsequent <strong>in</strong>vestigati<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>on</strong>ly 973 pers<strong>on</strong>nel were found to be<br />
fully tra<strong>in</strong>ed for their positi<strong>on</strong>. NTM-A <strong>and</strong> the AAF resp<strong>on</strong>ded with additi<strong>on</strong>al tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
programs, result<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> 557 additi<strong>on</strong>al pers<strong>on</strong>nel that have now completed tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g. The exist<strong>in</strong>g<br />
shortfall <strong>in</strong> tra<strong>in</strong>ed airmen is significant; the lack of a sufficient aircrew impedes the growth of<br />
the capability <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>frastructure for the AAF <strong>and</strong> underm<strong>in</strong>es the ability to grow the force.<br />
The AAF aircraft build c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to make progress dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period. Basic pilot<br />
tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g is now supported by six Cessna 182 aircraft. Six Cessna 208 aircraft are also <strong>in</strong> place to<br />
support <strong>in</strong>itial fixed w<strong>in</strong>g pilot tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g. On the rotary w<strong>in</strong>g side, six MD-530 helicopters have<br />
now been delivered to support the <strong>in</strong>itial rotary w<strong>in</strong>g pilot tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g requirements. Afghan<strong>in</strong>structed<br />
basic fixed w<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> rotary w<strong>in</strong>g courses started <strong>in</strong> February.<br />
On the operati<strong>on</strong>al side, additi<strong>on</strong>al Mi-17 deliveries dur<strong>in</strong>g summer 2012 will complete the<br />
c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>gent of 56 aircraft provid<strong>in</strong>g Afghanistan’s primary tactical air mobility support for the six<br />
ANA corps. Recapitalizati<strong>on</strong> of the Mi-17 fleet has also been <strong>in</strong>itiated to replace aircraft that<br />
suffered irreparable damage this past year. This recapitalizati<strong>on</strong> will also ensure the fleet<br />
rema<strong>in</strong>s healthy for the foreseeable future.<br />
The AAF’s medium airlift capability is also grow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> expected to reach its full fleet size of<br />
20 C-27A/G222 aircraft <strong>in</strong> the spr<strong>in</strong>g of 2012 with the f<strong>in</strong>al five deliveries from Alenia North<br />
America. Efforts to improve the daily operati<strong>on</strong>al availability of these aircraft have been<br />
<strong>in</strong>itiated, <strong>and</strong> improvements <strong>in</strong> C-27A ma<strong>in</strong>tenance performance <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>tenance tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g are<br />
underway.<br />
27
The AAF’s light-lift missi<strong>on</strong> capability is exp<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g rapidly. In additi<strong>on</strong> to the six Cessna 208<br />
aircraft now <strong>in</strong> place for fixed w<strong>in</strong>g pilot tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, two more Cessna 208s are now <strong>in</strong> country to<br />
beg<strong>in</strong> operati<strong>on</strong>al airlift missi<strong>on</strong>s. This number will c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to grow through the summer of<br />
2013 to reach its full fleet of 20 operati<strong>on</strong>al C-208s.<br />
Limited air-to-ground attack capabilities are be<strong>in</strong>g delivered by seven of the 11 Mi-35<br />
helicopters. The operati<strong>on</strong>al life of the rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g four has now expired. This air-to-ground<br />
capability will transiti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> the future to the much more capable <strong>and</strong> modern Light Air Support<br />
(LAS) aircraft, currently <strong>in</strong> its early acquisiti<strong>on</strong> phase. The LAS will provide a highly capable<br />
western air-<strong>in</strong>terdicti<strong>on</strong> platform.<br />
As of the end of the report<strong>in</strong>g period, the AAF has three rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g c<strong>on</strong>tracts open to complete<br />
the <strong>in</strong>ventories of three aircraft: Mi-17s, C-208s, <strong>and</strong> C-27s.<br />
The AAF’s <strong>in</strong>frastructure build has made significant progress dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period,<br />
reach<strong>in</strong>g nearly 56 percent completi<strong>on</strong> of all facilities projects. Kabul Air W<strong>in</strong>g facilities lead<br />
the way at nearly 83 percent complete, with K<strong>and</strong>ahar Air W<strong>in</strong>g follow<strong>in</strong>g closely at 75 percent<br />
complete. The ma<strong>in</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g base at Sh<strong>in</strong>d<strong>and</strong> will so<strong>on</strong> beg<strong>in</strong> Phase II of its four phases of<br />
c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong>, with tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g operati<strong>on</strong>s already underway. In parallel, plann<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>itial<br />
c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> for the AAF’s air detachments at Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, <strong>and</strong> Jalalabad are also<br />
underway. C<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> of AAF <strong>in</strong>frastructure is expected to be completed <strong>in</strong> late 2014.<br />
AAF OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY<br />
As of March 2012, the AAF was rated as CM-4 (exists but cannot accomplish its missi<strong>on</strong>)<br />
because not all manpower billets are sourced, <strong>and</strong> those that are filled often lack appropriate<br />
tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g. Kabul Air W<strong>in</strong>g is still await<strong>in</strong>g its programmed allocati<strong>on</strong> of aircraft. Currently,<br />
Kabul aircraft <strong>in</strong>clude 15 C-27s, 18 Mi-17s (with expected arrival of six additi<strong>on</strong>al aircraft <strong>in</strong><br />
Spr<strong>in</strong>g 2012), <strong>and</strong> 11 Mi-35s, of which four have expired. As part of this fleet, Kabul also hosts<br />
the Presidential airlift, with three Mi-17s <strong>and</strong> two C-27A aircraft dedicated to this important<br />
missi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
K<strong>and</strong>ahar Air W<strong>in</strong>g is assessed as CM-4, due to the absence of all programmed missi<strong>on</strong> aircraft<br />
(C-27, LAS, C-208). Additi<strong>on</strong>ally, the w<strong>in</strong>g lacks manpower <strong>and</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, which will follow<br />
<strong>on</strong>ce it beg<strong>in</strong>s to receive additi<strong>on</strong>al missi<strong>on</strong> aircraft. K<strong>and</strong>ahar currently has seven of the<br />
planned 11 Mi-17s. Activities are underway now to permanently base four C-27As as the f<strong>in</strong>al<br />
five C-27As are delivered later this spr<strong>in</strong>g. K<strong>and</strong>ahar will also be receiv<strong>in</strong>g the C-208 light lift<br />
aircraft as deliveries c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue through summer 2013.<br />
Although Sh<strong>in</strong>d<strong>and</strong> Air W<strong>in</strong>g is assessed as CM-4, it has c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to mature as the AAF’s<br />
tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g w<strong>in</strong>g. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period, Sh<strong>in</strong>d<strong>and</strong> has begun <strong>in</strong>itial pilot tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g with the<br />
newly delivered C-182 tra<strong>in</strong>er aircraft. The AAF’s English Language Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g immersi<strong>on</strong><br />
program, “Thunder Lab,” will move to Sh<strong>in</strong>d<strong>and</strong> dur<strong>in</strong>g the spr<strong>in</strong>g of 2012.<br />
2.5: AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE CAPACITY AND GROWTH<br />
The ANP c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to make steady progress, <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> size <strong>and</strong> capabilities dur<strong>in</strong>g this<br />
report<strong>in</strong>g period. While progress was not uniform across all secti<strong>on</strong>s of the ANP, some units,<br />
28
such as the Afghan Nati<strong>on</strong>al Civil Order Police (ANCOP), are now highly effective, frequently<br />
partner<strong>in</strong>g with ISAF forces <strong>in</strong> successful operati<strong>on</strong>s. <strong>Progress</strong> has been less rapid <strong>in</strong> other areas,<br />
such as the development of ANP logistics capabilities or the development of the Afghan Border<br />
Police.<br />
MANNING<br />
The current approved end-strength for the ANP – the projected end-strength required to support<br />
transiti<strong>on</strong> to Afghan security lead – is 157,000 pers<strong>on</strong>nel by October 2012.<br />
29
Figure 10: ANP End-Strength (March 2011-March 2012)<br />
End Strength<br />
150000<br />
130000<br />
110000<br />
90000<br />
70000<br />
50000<br />
30000<br />
10000<br />
ANP Strength, Recruit<strong>in</strong>g, Retenti<strong>on</strong>, <strong>and</strong> Attriti<strong>on</strong><br />
Mar-11 Apr-11 May-11 Jun-11 Jul-11 Aug-11 Sep-11 Oct-11 Nov-11 Dec-11 Jan-12 Feb-12 Mar-12<br />
-10000<br />
-5000<br />
Mar-11 Apr-11 May-11 Jun-11 Jul-11 Aug-11 Sep-11 Oct-11 Nov-11 Dec-11 Jan-12 Feb-12 Mar-12<br />
Actual 125589 126291 128622 130622 135029 134865 136122 139070 140596 143797 145577 148932 149642<br />
Attriti<strong>on</strong> -1160 -1730 -1693 -2043 -1813 -2078 -1939 -2452 -1773 -1895 -1338 -1608 -894<br />
Recruitment 2362 2362 3164 2508 3167 3254 2428 4091 3135 2778 2735 2801 1882<br />
Retenti<strong>on</strong> 27 179 233 251 237 90 117 140 66 135 207 164 154<br />
Goal 122000 124440 126880 129321 131760 134257 136708 139159 141610 144061 145355 146649 147943<br />
As of the end of the report<strong>in</strong>g period, the overall ANP force level reached 149,642 pers<strong>on</strong>nel, an<br />
<strong>in</strong>crease of 13,520 from the force level at the end of the previous report<strong>in</strong>g period <strong>in</strong> September<br />
2011. This force <strong>in</strong>cludes 25,195 officers, 39,943 NCOs, 77,653 patrolmen, <strong>and</strong> 6,851 <strong>in</strong>itial<br />
entry tra<strong>in</strong>ees.<br />
Recruit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the ANP rema<strong>in</strong>ed steady, meet<strong>in</strong>g or exceed<strong>in</strong>g overall growth goals each m<strong>on</strong>th<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period. The ANP generally reflects the ethnic make-up of local<br />
communities, as pers<strong>on</strong>nel typically serve <strong>in</strong> the area where they jo<strong>in</strong> the force. However, when<br />
aggregated at the nati<strong>on</strong>al level, Tajiks are significantly overrepresented <strong>in</strong> the force, Pashtuns<br />
are represented proproti<strong>on</strong>ately to the Afghan populati<strong>on</strong>, but Hazara, Uzbeks, <strong>and</strong> others are<br />
underrepresented to vary<strong>in</strong>g degrees.<br />
ANP patrolmen mann<strong>in</strong>g is currently <strong>in</strong> excess of 100 percent of the goal for both AUP <strong>and</strong><br />
ABP, <strong>and</strong> approximately 8,333 patrolmen were mann<strong>in</strong>g NCO billets as of the end of March.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>gly, recruit<strong>in</strong>g has been adjusted to focus <strong>on</strong> qualified direct-entry NCOs, <strong>and</strong> recruit<strong>in</strong>g<br />
goals <strong>and</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g seats for new patrolmen have been reduced <strong>in</strong> favor of NCO <strong>and</strong> quality<br />
tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g opportunities for those already <strong>in</strong> the force.<br />
These efforts are needed to address the current NCO shortage of 8,316 <strong>and</strong> the 16,700 untra<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
patrolmen. Dur<strong>in</strong>g March, MoI successfully took their first steps to self govern the imbalances<br />
<strong>in</strong> the ANP. In additi<strong>on</strong> to temporarily freez<strong>in</strong>g recruitment, the M<strong>in</strong>ister of the Interior also<br />
created a commissi<strong>on</strong> to address the imbalances <strong>in</strong> rank <strong>and</strong> locati<strong>on</strong>. Initial <strong>in</strong>dicati<strong>on</strong>s are that<br />
this self <strong>in</strong>itiated Afghan commissi<strong>on</strong> will emphatically state that over-strength police officers<br />
30<br />
7500<br />
5000<br />
2500<br />
0<br />
-2500<br />
Attriti<strong>on</strong>, Recruitment, <strong>and</strong> Retenti<strong>on</strong><br />
Actual<br />
Attriti<strong>on</strong><br />
Recruitment<br />
Retenti<strong>on</strong><br />
Goal
<strong>and</strong> NCOs will need to meet the needs of the ANP <strong>and</strong> either accept a new positi<strong>on</strong>, move to a<br />
different z<strong>on</strong>e, or accept a reducti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> rank.<br />
Attriti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> the ANP rema<strong>in</strong>ed relatively steady dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period, averag<strong>in</strong>g 1.2<br />
percent, c<strong>on</strong>sistent with the goal of 1.4 percent.<br />
AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL CIVIL ORDER POLICE<br />
As the premiere police force <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, the Afghanistan Nati<strong>on</strong>al Civil Order Police operate<br />
<strong>in</strong> a gendarmerie capacity <strong>in</strong> resp<strong>on</strong>se to significant events <strong>and</strong> deploy <strong>in</strong> support of large-scale<br />
civil order operati<strong>on</strong>s throughout the country, serv<strong>in</strong>g as the lead police organizati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> the<br />
COIN effort <strong>and</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g closely with military counterparts as needed.<br />
As of March 2012, the total strength for the ANCOP, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g policemen <strong>in</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, was<br />
17,442, an <strong>in</strong>crease of 3,042 pers<strong>on</strong>nel from the previous report<strong>in</strong>g period.<br />
Although ANCOP units’ effectiveness <strong>in</strong>itially suffered from high attriti<strong>on</strong> that stemmed largely<br />
from extended deployments <strong>and</strong> high operati<strong>on</strong>s tempo, the adopti<strong>on</strong> of a 12-week recovery <strong>and</strong><br />
retra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g period between deployments has improved this situati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
In additi<strong>on</strong>, the comm<strong>and</strong>er of the ANCOP c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to use new processes to reduce attriti<strong>on</strong><br />
rates <strong>and</strong> ensure that leaders are held accountable for poor performance. As a result of these<br />
efforts, ANCOP attriti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> March 2012 was <strong>on</strong>ly 0.5 percent, <strong>on</strong>e of the lowest rates s<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
track<strong>in</strong>g began. Though the ANCOP still suffers from significant attriti<strong>on</strong> levels, averag<strong>in</strong>g 1.9<br />
percent over the past six m<strong>on</strong>ths, the ANCOP c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to meet growth objectives.<br />
At any given time, there are 14 ANCOP battali<strong>on</strong>s support<strong>in</strong>g coaliti<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> MoI operati<strong>on</strong>s,<br />
primarily <strong>in</strong> southern <strong>and</strong> eastern Afghanistan. The ANCOP has received the highest density of<br />
coaliti<strong>on</strong> partner<strong>in</strong>g dur<strong>in</strong>g tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> employment cycles, which has resulted <strong>in</strong> a highly<br />
effective operati<strong>on</strong>al force. More recently, ANCOP units were <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> anti-riot situati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
that followed the accidental burn<strong>in</strong>g of Korans at the Bagram Air Base <strong>in</strong> Parwan prov<strong>in</strong>ce, <strong>and</strong><br />
dem<strong>on</strong>strated professi<strong>on</strong>alism, sound judgment, courage, <strong>and</strong> effectiveness <strong>in</strong> their performance.<br />
AFGHAN BORDER POLICE<br />
The ABP is the pillar of the ANP resp<strong>on</strong>sible for secur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> safeguard<strong>in</strong>g the Afghan border as<br />
well as provid<strong>in</strong>g security up to 50 km away from the border. As of March 2012, the total<br />
strength for the ABP, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g police <strong>in</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, was 24,927 an <strong>in</strong>crease of 2,968 pers<strong>on</strong>nel<br />
from the previous report<strong>in</strong>g period. However, the ABP c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to face a shortfall of NCOs,<br />
with <strong>on</strong>ly 4,041 of a total 5,622 authorized billets filled <strong>and</strong> an additi<strong>on</strong>al 942 officers <strong>and</strong><br />
patrolmen assigned to NCO billets. The NCO shortfall rema<strong>in</strong>s the primary focus of ABP<br />
tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g efforts.<br />
ABP attriti<strong>on</strong> has averaged 1.5 percent m<strong>on</strong>thly over the report<strong>in</strong>g period (October 2011 through<br />
March 2012).<br />
At present, the ABP’s most significant challenge rema<strong>in</strong>s the development <strong>and</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of its<br />
Blue Border missi<strong>on</strong> (def<strong>in</strong>ed as rule of law enforcement at Border Cross<strong>in</strong>g Po<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>and</strong> Air <strong>and</strong><br />
31
Rail Ports of Entry), as opposed to the Green Border missi<strong>on</strong> (def<strong>in</strong>ed as patroll<strong>in</strong>g borders<br />
between the po<strong>in</strong>ts of entry). ABP also face challenges <strong>in</strong> the development of its other core<br />
<strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s such as Border Coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> Centers, Operati<strong>on</strong>al Coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> Centers, tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
facilities, <strong>and</strong> headquarters. In the absence of these capabilities, the ABP is not effectively<br />
secur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>troll<strong>in</strong>g Afghanistan’s borders. In the near future, NTM-A will work with the<br />
MoI <strong>and</strong> ABP to better def<strong>in</strong>e the Blue Border force structure requirements, identify <strong>and</strong> procure<br />
essential Blue Border missi<strong>on</strong>-specific equipment, <strong>and</strong> develop a Program of Instructi<strong>on</strong> to<br />
satisfy Blue Border development requirements. Green Border plann<strong>in</strong>g teams will c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to<br />
work with IJC to f<strong>in</strong>d the right balance <strong>and</strong> cooperati<strong>on</strong> between ABP <strong>and</strong> ANA for border<br />
security outside the Blue Border missi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Similar to the AAF, the ABP is also challenged by corrupti<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> the penetrati<strong>on</strong> of CPNs.<br />
Although many police units are perform<strong>in</strong>g well, some police units still underm<strong>in</strong>e the rule of<br />
law, fail to take acti<strong>on</strong> aga<strong>in</strong>st crim<strong>in</strong>al or <strong>in</strong>surgent threats, extort the populati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>and</strong> engage <strong>in</strong><br />
a range of other crim<strong>in</strong>al activities. ISAF <strong>and</strong> the Afghan Government c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to work together<br />
to address ANSF corrupti<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> have successfully removed numerous members of the ABP<br />
<strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> crim<strong>in</strong>al activity.<br />
AFGHAN UNIFORM POLICE<br />
The AUP, the largest pillar of the ANP, are resp<strong>on</strong>sible for ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g public order <strong>and</strong><br />
support<strong>in</strong>g rule of law through community-based polic<strong>in</strong>g, which is locally referred to as<br />
democratic polic<strong>in</strong>g. The democratic polic<strong>in</strong>g approach was <strong>in</strong>stituted to create with<strong>in</strong> the AUP<br />
methods to build resp<strong>on</strong>sibility towards the community <strong>and</strong> thereby <strong>in</strong>crease service to <strong>and</strong><br />
reduce crim<strong>in</strong>al acti<strong>on</strong>s aga<strong>in</strong>st the community.<br />
As of March 2012, the total strength for the AUP was 85,434, an <strong>in</strong>crease of 6,002 pers<strong>on</strong>nel<br />
from the previous report<strong>in</strong>g period. The AUP is slated to grow to an end-strength of 85,532<br />
pers<strong>on</strong>nel by November 2012.<br />
Untra<strong>in</strong>ed patrolmen <strong>and</strong> the lack of a susta<strong>in</strong>able logistics system rema<strong>in</strong> the biggest challenges<br />
for the AUP. NTM-A <strong>and</strong> the MoI c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to emphasize recruit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> order to ensure all<br />
available tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g seats are used. As of March 2012, the AUP had a total of 12,500 (20 percent)<br />
untra<strong>in</strong>ed patrolmen <strong>and</strong> NCOs. AUP attriti<strong>on</strong> rema<strong>in</strong>s the lowest of all police pillars, averag<strong>in</strong>g<br />
1.0 percent per m<strong>on</strong>th dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period.<br />
SPECIAL FORCES<br />
The ANP c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to recruit <strong>and</strong> field elite police units that are tra<strong>in</strong>ed by <strong>and</strong> partnered with<br />
ISAF Special Operati<strong>on</strong>s Forces (SOF) <strong>in</strong> support of the COIN strategy.<br />
Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Resp<strong>on</strong>se Companies (PRCs) are prov<strong>in</strong>cially-based Special Police Units (SPU) that<br />
specialize <strong>in</strong> civil order security <strong>and</strong> high-risk arrests, <strong>and</strong> partner with ISAF SOF <strong>and</strong> U.S.<br />
forces for tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> operati<strong>on</strong>s. Currently, 19 PRCs, each comprised of approximately 100<br />
police, have been fielded. ISAF SOF also partners with other SPU, such as Comm<strong>and</strong>o Force<br />
(CF) 333, a special police comm<strong>and</strong>o unit orig<strong>in</strong>ally developed by UK Special Forces for<br />
counternarcotics <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terdicti<strong>on</strong>, but now c<strong>on</strong>sidered a multi-functi<strong>on</strong>al comm<strong>and</strong>o force<br />
capable of high-risk arrests. The Crisis Resp<strong>on</strong>se Unit, a nati<strong>on</strong>al resp<strong>on</strong>se unit based <strong>in</strong> Kabul, is<br />
32
partnered with ISAF SOF <strong>in</strong> high-risk arrest <strong>and</strong> hostage rescue missi<strong>on</strong>s, primarily <strong>in</strong> the capital<br />
regi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Over the report<strong>in</strong>g period, tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g efforts focused <strong>on</strong> the successful completi<strong>on</strong> of the first PRC<br />
Basic Course at the Special Police Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Centre (SPTC) <strong>in</strong> Wardak Prov<strong>in</strong>ce. The SPTC<br />
c<strong>on</strong>ducts centralized Special Police courses for PRCs, a fundamental requirement for the force<br />
generati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> expansi<strong>on</strong> of this organizati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>and</strong> ensures that a comm<strong>on</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ard is set<br />
country-wide. The first eight-week PRC Advanced Course is currently underway.<br />
The Foundati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> Advanced Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of nati<strong>on</strong>al-level special police units c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to be<br />
c<strong>on</strong>ducted by the units themselves at <strong>in</strong>dividual locati<strong>on</strong>s, enabled by the units' coaliti<strong>on</strong> mentor<br />
teams. Work to c<strong>on</strong>solidate <strong>and</strong> centralize these specialist courses through the establishment of a<br />
Special Police Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g W<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> 2012, co-located with CF333 at Fort Hunter <strong>in</strong> Logar Prov<strong>in</strong>ce,<br />
c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues.<br />
Follow<strong>in</strong>g less<strong>on</strong>s learned from the <strong>in</strong>itial PRC Basic Course, a proposal for a dry tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
facility has been developed for fund<strong>in</strong>g c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong>. This facility would c<strong>on</strong>sist of several<br />
compounds <strong>and</strong> build<strong>in</strong>gs of local style, to allow SPTC (<strong>and</strong> others) to c<strong>on</strong>duct realistic<br />
c<strong>on</strong>textual tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> build<strong>in</strong>g/compound assault <strong>and</strong> clearance, sensitive site exploitati<strong>on</strong>,<br />
search, <strong>and</strong> other related tactical activities.<br />
FORCE DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING<br />
The ANP tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g effort c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to focus <strong>on</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>g the quality of the force, <strong>in</strong> particular,<br />
tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g NCOs. As of October 2011, the ANP needed approximately 20,000 more NCOs with<strong>in</strong><br />
the follow<strong>in</strong>g year. An <strong>in</strong>creased emphasis <strong>on</strong> NCO tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period added<br />
9,003 NCOs to the ANP, reduc<strong>in</strong>g the shortfall to 10,997. In additi<strong>on</strong> to a shortage of NCOs,<br />
the ANP also faces a significant amount of assigned but untra<strong>in</strong>ed patrolmen.<br />
Between October 1, 2011 <strong>and</strong> March 31, 2012, ANP tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g capacity <strong>in</strong>creased from nearly<br />
14,500 to 14,584. The ANP was expected to reach approximately 16,000 pers<strong>on</strong>nel by the end<br />
of December 2011; however, severe delays at Nati<strong>on</strong>al Police Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Center (NPTC) – Wardak<br />
impeded achievement of this goal. NTM-A c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to seek efficiencies while develop<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
necessary capacity to grow the size of the ANP, develop the force, <strong>and</strong> create a mature,<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>able ANP Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Management System <strong>in</strong>frastructure to support force tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g. Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
is currently c<strong>on</strong>ducted at 30 formal tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g sites, but this total will eventually decrease to<br />
approximately 11 permanent sites <strong>in</strong> 2014. Across all police pillars <strong>and</strong> all courses, 21,907<br />
students have graduated s<strong>in</strong>ce the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of October 2011.<br />
The establishment of the Afgan Nati<strong>on</strong>al Police Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g General Comm<strong>and</strong> (ANPTGC) was<br />
completed <strong>in</strong> March 2011, with 859 positi<strong>on</strong>s approved by MoI under the tashkil for SY1390.<br />
ANPTGC requested an additi<strong>on</strong>al 1,000 positi<strong>on</strong>s under Comm<strong>and</strong> Plan Review for SY1391.<br />
The MoI approved a total of 1,123 ANPTGC positi<strong>on</strong>s. A comprehensive plann<strong>in</strong>g process was<br />
implemented jo<strong>in</strong>tly with ANPTGC headquarters to best restructure the comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> order to<br />
balance ANP tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g objectives while rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> the tashkil resource c<strong>on</strong>stra<strong>in</strong>ts. The<br />
result was a new series of SY1391 tashkils for all ANPTGC headquarters <strong>and</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g sites.<br />
33
With a comm<strong>and</strong>er <strong>and</strong> high level staff now <strong>in</strong> place, the focus of ANPTGC has shifted from<br />
generat<strong>in</strong>g forces to creat<strong>in</strong>g a permanent, capable tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g organizati<strong>on</strong> to support development<br />
of a quality force. The ANP Professi<strong>on</strong>al Development Board (PDB), chaired by the ANPTGC<br />
Comm<strong>and</strong>er, supports partnership <strong>in</strong> course <strong>in</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> development <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ardizati<strong>on</strong> across<br />
the major stakeholders <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g ANPTGC, NTM-A, the German Police Project Team, <strong>and</strong> the<br />
European Uni<strong>on</strong> Police Missi<strong>on</strong> (EUPOL). The key to the ANP’s professi<strong>on</strong>al susta<strong>in</strong>ability<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g the 2014 transiti<strong>on</strong> is an endur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> effective tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g management capability.<br />
Future tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g objectives for the ANP <strong>in</strong>clude: 1) tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g NCOs <strong>and</strong> untra<strong>in</strong>ed patrolmen; 2)<br />
enabl<strong>in</strong>g balanced growth <strong>in</strong> the size <strong>and</strong> quality of the force; <strong>and</strong>, 3) shift<strong>in</strong>g the focus of the<br />
ANP from COIN missi<strong>on</strong>s to a rule of law-based police force. Part of this effort <strong>in</strong>cludes<br />
plann<strong>in</strong>g for a class of 400-500 tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>structors who will augment the decentralized<br />
Permanent Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Teams, Z<strong>on</strong>e Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Teams, <strong>and</strong> Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Companies. These<br />
tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g units will provide the quality tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g needed to transform the ANP from a COINfocused<br />
security force to <strong>on</strong>e capable of <strong>in</strong>vestigat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> deterr<strong>in</strong>g crimes. ANP’s goal is to<br />
have an additi<strong>on</strong>al 861 <strong>in</strong>structors tra<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>and</strong> certified by the end of 2012.<br />
WOMEN IN THE ANP<br />
Women currently account for less than 0.9 percent of the total ANP force. As of March 2012,<br />
there were 1,340 female members of the ANP: 558 patrolwomen, 576 NCOs, <strong>and</strong> 206 officers.<br />
Women are likely to rema<strong>in</strong> underrepresented <strong>in</strong> the ANP for the foreseeable future; the ANP<br />
failed to meet its recruit<strong>in</strong>g goal <strong>in</strong> 2010 <strong>and</strong> 2011, <strong>and</strong> <strong>on</strong>ly 54 women have been recruited <strong>in</strong><br />
2012.<br />
The effort to promote gender equality <strong>in</strong> the ANP faces significant challenges. Many Prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />
Headquarters Comm<strong>and</strong>ers do not accept policewomen, as they prefer male c<strong>and</strong>idates <strong>and</strong> lack<br />
adequate facilities to support females. Further, similar to the MoD, the MoI faces significant<br />
challenges <strong>in</strong> fully <strong>in</strong>tegrat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> protect<strong>in</strong>g women <strong>in</strong> the ANP workforce, especially am<strong>on</strong>g<br />
operati<strong>on</strong>al units at the prov<strong>in</strong>cial <strong>and</strong> district levels. While women are greatly needed to support<br />
police operati<strong>on</strong>s, a comb<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of cultural impediments, weak recruitment, <strong>and</strong> uneven<br />
applicati<strong>on</strong> of policies h<strong>in</strong>der significant progress. Although str<strong>on</strong>ger documentati<strong>on</strong>,<br />
implementati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>and</strong> enforcement of policies, procedures, <strong>and</strong> guidance to better <strong>in</strong>tegrate<br />
women will help, time will be needed to change the cultural mores that form the basis of many of<br />
the current impediments. Without significant adjustments, the ANP will not achieve the goal of<br />
5,000 women by the year 2014, as set forth <strong>in</strong> MoI Decree 55. 18<br />
EQUIPPING<br />
Build<strong>in</strong>g a capable <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>able ANP depends <strong>on</strong> acquir<strong>in</strong>g the equipment necessary to<br />
support the three basic police functi<strong>on</strong>s: shoot, move, <strong>and</strong> communicate. Accord<strong>in</strong>gly,<br />
significant ANP equipment field<strong>in</strong>g efforts took place dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period. This is<br />
expected to <strong>in</strong>crease the ANP’s <strong>on</strong>-h<strong>and</strong> equipment to approximately 95 percent of tashkil by the<br />
summer of 2012.<br />
18 MoI Decree 55, signed <strong>in</strong> September 2010, aimed to <strong>in</strong>crease the number of women serv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the ANP to 5,000 over the next five years,<br />
establish<strong>in</strong>g an annual goal of 1,000 additi<strong>on</strong>al women per year until 2014.<br />
34
The ANP rema<strong>in</strong>s under-equipped as a result of field<strong>in</strong>g challenges, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g battle loss<br />
replacement needs <strong>and</strong> the closure of Pakistani GLOCs. Due to equipment shortages, the MoI<br />
has developed field<strong>in</strong>g priorities based <strong>on</strong> operati<strong>on</strong>al requirements. To address the delay <strong>in</strong><br />
process<strong>in</strong>g supply/equipment requests, the MoI Material Management Center established a<br />
Customer Care Center <strong>in</strong> April 2011. This s<strong>in</strong>gle po<strong>in</strong>t-of entry clear<strong>in</strong>ghouse for<br />
supply/equipment requests has been a success, significantly reduc<strong>in</strong>g resp<strong>on</strong>se times.<br />
Night visi<strong>on</strong> devices (NVDs) <strong>and</strong> other high-end equipment c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to be issued to ANP<br />
Special Forces, dramatically <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g the capability of ANP Special Forces to c<strong>on</strong>duct highrisk<br />
counterterrorism <strong>and</strong> counternarcotics missi<strong>on</strong>s. Sensitive items such as NVDs require<br />
m<strong>on</strong>thly <strong>in</strong>ventory; the DoD Inspector General verified Afghan adherence to this policy dur<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
July 2011 audit. The ANP also has a m<strong>on</strong>thly <strong>in</strong>ventory requirement for a variety of explosive<br />
ord<strong>in</strong>ance device/counter-IED, pers<strong>on</strong>nel protective equipment, <strong>and</strong> specialty/tool items.<br />
Commensurate with current deliveries, NTM-A is work<strong>in</strong>g to extend accountability processes<br />
<strong>and</strong> ga<strong>in</strong> further fidelity of unit-level <strong>on</strong>-h<strong>and</strong> quantities. As part of the documentati<strong>on</strong> of ANP<br />
force structure decisi<strong>on</strong>s for SY 1391 tashkils, there will be a review of equipment requirements,<br />
ensur<strong>in</strong>g that types <strong>and</strong> quantities are operati<strong>on</strong>ally sufficient <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>able.<br />
LOGISTICS CAPABILITIES<br />
As a result of a deliberate decisi<strong>on</strong> to place <strong>in</strong>itial focus of force generati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> ANP polic<strong>in</strong>g<br />
units, the development of enablers – <strong>in</strong> particular logistics capabilities – was delayed <strong>and</strong> is not<br />
expected to be fully self-sufficient until late 2014. NTM-A began to shift its efforts to logistics<br />
development <strong>in</strong> mid-2011, <strong>and</strong> it will c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to be a key focus <strong>in</strong> 2012.<br />
Major objectives for the development of the ANP logistics system dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period<br />
<strong>in</strong>cluded prepar<strong>in</strong>g the system to susta<strong>in</strong> the ANP for the 2012 fight<strong>in</strong>g seas<strong>on</strong>. In additi<strong>on</strong> to<br />
develop<strong>in</strong>g the logistics annex for the operati<strong>on</strong>al plan, preparati<strong>on</strong>s will focus <strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g<br />
logistics stocks at the Regi<strong>on</strong>al Logistics Centers (RLCs) <strong>in</strong> order to set c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s for logistical<br />
success dur<strong>in</strong>g summer operati<strong>on</strong>s, as well as establish<strong>in</strong>g a nati<strong>on</strong>al ma<strong>in</strong>tenance plan for the<br />
MoI.<br />
The ANP logistics system requires significant coaliti<strong>on</strong> assistance at the regi<strong>on</strong>al level <strong>and</strong> below<br />
<strong>in</strong> order to effectively susta<strong>in</strong> the ANP. The biggest challenges to improvement <strong>in</strong> the logistics<br />
system are the recruitment of qualified police <strong>and</strong> civilian logisticians <strong>and</strong> the tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of<br />
pers<strong>on</strong>nel to use the approved MoI logistical system.<br />
Further, the ANP’s logistics system rema<strong>in</strong>s particularly limited <strong>in</strong> pers<strong>on</strong>nel system<br />
accountability, primarily <strong>in</strong> manag<strong>in</strong>g the assignment <strong>and</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of logistics pers<strong>on</strong>nel. A<br />
major challenge <strong>in</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>on</strong>g-term logistics support to the ANP is the hir<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
of civilian pers<strong>on</strong>nel, as civilian authorizati<strong>on</strong>s make up 50 percent of the logistics workforce.<br />
Due to pay disparity between the MoI civilians, other opportunities for literate c<strong>and</strong>idates with<br />
technical skills, <strong>and</strong> shortfalls <strong>in</strong> hir<strong>in</strong>g processes <strong>and</strong> civilian pers<strong>on</strong>nel management, civilian<br />
hir<strong>in</strong>g will c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to be a challenge until the MoI <strong>in</strong>stitutes civil service pay reforms.<br />
Additi<strong>on</strong>ally, the MoI completed the manpower build-out of the susta<strong>in</strong>ment system by add<strong>in</strong>g<br />
approximately 2,100 logistics positi<strong>on</strong>s (1,400 uniformed, 700 civilian) <strong>in</strong>to the SY1391 tashkil.<br />
35
Reforms to pers<strong>on</strong>nel management <strong>and</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g processes are critical to ensur<strong>in</strong>g the viability of<br />
these new hires; the Afghan Parliament has not yet addressed these needs.<br />
Future objectives for the ANP logistics team <strong>in</strong>clude: 1) complet<strong>in</strong>g plann<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>itiat<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
f<strong>in</strong>al required <strong>in</strong>frastructure builds to meet endur<strong>in</strong>g future needs of the force; <strong>and</strong> 2) assist<strong>in</strong>g<br />
MoI commodity item managers <strong>and</strong> budget program managers <strong>in</strong> improv<strong>in</strong>g supply throughput at<br />
RLCs by f<strong>in</strong>aliz<strong>in</strong>g requirements for the SY1391 budget, <strong>in</strong>itiat<strong>in</strong>g c<strong>on</strong>tracts, <strong>and</strong> establish<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>ventory; <strong>and</strong> 3) ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g accountability of all property acquired by the MoI <strong>and</strong> ANP from<br />
any source, paid or d<strong>on</strong>ated.<br />
2.6: FIELDED FORCE PARTNERING, OPERATIONS, AND ASSESSMENT<br />
ANSF PARTNERING AND ADVISING<br />
Follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>itial recruitment <strong>and</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of Afghan soldiers <strong>and</strong> police by NTM-A, the<br />
operati<strong>on</strong>al development of the ANSF is the resp<strong>on</strong>sibility of the IJC. IJC partner<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong><br />
advis<strong>in</strong>g teams provide a critical bridge from <strong>in</strong>dividual <strong>and</strong> collective tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, received dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
basic tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> at various specialty schools, to the practical necessities of operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a<br />
combat envir<strong>on</strong>ment. Partner<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> advis<strong>in</strong>g teams coach, teach, mentor, <strong>and</strong> support<br />
operati<strong>on</strong>al plann<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> employment of partnered ANSF units.<br />
Regi<strong>on</strong>al Comm<strong>and</strong>s (RCs) establish partner<strong>in</strong>g relati<strong>on</strong>ships based <strong>on</strong> the number of available<br />
coaliti<strong>on</strong> forces <strong>and</strong> campaign plan priorities <strong>and</strong> objectives. Partner <strong>and</strong> mentor teams are<br />
assigned to ANSF units <strong>and</strong> areas that are essential to accomplishment of campaign objectives.<br />
With the recent change to the IJC Operati<strong>on</strong> Plan, ANA <strong>and</strong> ANP partner<strong>in</strong>g requirements have<br />
adjusted accord<strong>in</strong>gly <strong>and</strong> are now based up<strong>on</strong> the <strong>Security</strong> Force Assistance (SFA) c<strong>on</strong>cept. The<br />
SFA c<strong>on</strong>cept is a means for provid<strong>in</strong>g necessary partner<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> advis<strong>in</strong>g assets to develop ANSF<br />
operati<strong>on</strong>al effectiveness <strong>and</strong> support ANSF units. SFA methodology focuses partner<strong>in</strong>g efforts<br />
<strong>on</strong> units <strong>in</strong> Key Terra<strong>in</strong> Districts (KTD) that are essential for campaign success. IJC is<br />
resp<strong>on</strong>sible for provid<strong>in</strong>g partner<strong>in</strong>g assistance to the ANA (Ground Forces Comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />
below); AUP; ANCOP; ABP; <strong>and</strong> Operati<strong>on</strong>al Coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> Center – Regi<strong>on</strong>al (OCC-R) <strong>and</strong><br />
Operati<strong>on</strong>al Coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> Center – Prov<strong>in</strong>cial (OCC-P).<br />
The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> provides the ANSF with the majority of required mentor teams. The<br />
drawdown <strong>in</strong> U.S. forces will result <strong>in</strong> a decreased number of partnered units, creat<strong>in</strong>g additi<strong>on</strong>al<br />
requirements for other coaliti<strong>on</strong> partners.<br />
36
Figure 11: ANSF-ISAF Partner<strong>in</strong>g Relati<strong>on</strong>ship Def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong>s<br />
Comb<strong>in</strong>ed Team units <strong>in</strong> which a trust-based, assigned relati<strong>on</strong>ship exists where both share the same battle space <strong>and</strong> live<br />
together <strong>on</strong> the same <strong>in</strong>stallati<strong>on</strong>. The Partner Units share the same goal of build<strong>in</strong>g capacity <strong>and</strong> capability of the ANSF Unit to<br />
achieve Operati<strong>on</strong>al Effectiveness of Effective w/ Assistance or better whilst work<strong>in</strong>g together to defeat the <strong>in</strong>surgency. The IJC<br />
Embedded Partner Partner Unit shares comprehensive operati<strong>on</strong>s guidance, strategy, <strong>in</strong>formati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>in</strong>telligence <strong>and</strong> IJC tactical directives with its<br />
ANSF counterpart. Partnership <strong>in</strong>cludes an active mentor<strong>in</strong>g role <strong>and</strong> the primary read<strong>in</strong>ess oversight resp<strong>on</strong>sibility. If there is<br />
also an assigned mentor team, the partner<strong>in</strong>g unit is the lead <strong>in</strong> provid<strong>in</strong>g operati<strong>on</strong>al directi<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> guidance to ensure unity of<br />
effort <strong>in</strong> the c<strong>on</strong>duct of operati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
Comb<strong>in</strong>ed Team units <strong>in</strong> which a trust-based, assigned relati<strong>on</strong>ship exists where both share the same battle space but do not<br />
live together <strong>on</strong> the same <strong>in</strong>stallati<strong>on</strong>. The Partner Units share the same goal of build<strong>in</strong>g capacity <strong>and</strong> capability of the ANSF<br />
Unit to achieve Operati<strong>on</strong>al Effectiveness of Effective w/ Assistance or better whilst work<strong>in</strong>g together to defeat the <strong>in</strong>surgency.<br />
Partnered<br />
The IJC Partner Unit shares comprehensive operati<strong>on</strong>s guidance, strategy, <strong>in</strong>formati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>in</strong>telligence <strong>and</strong> IJC tactical directives<br />
with its ANSF counterpart. Partnership <strong>in</strong>cludes an active mentor<strong>in</strong>g role <strong>and</strong> the primary read<strong>in</strong>ess oversight resp<strong>on</strong>sibility. If<br />
there is also an assigned mentor team, the partner<strong>in</strong>g unit is the lead <strong>in</strong> provid<strong>in</strong>g operati<strong>on</strong>al directi<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> guidance to ensure<br />
unity of effort <strong>in</strong> the c<strong>on</strong>duct of operati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
Comb<strong>in</strong>ed Team units <strong>in</strong> which an assigned relati<strong>on</strong>ship exists where both share the same battle space. The Partner Units share<br />
the same goal of build<strong>in</strong>g capacity <strong>and</strong> capability of the ANSF Unit to achieve Operati<strong>on</strong>al Effectiveness of Effective w/<br />
Assistance or better whilst work<strong>in</strong>g together to defeat the <strong>in</strong>surgency. The IJC Partner Unit shares limited operati<strong>on</strong>s guidance,<br />
Limited Partner<strong>in</strong>g<br />
strategy, <strong>in</strong>formati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>in</strong>telligence <strong>and</strong> IJC tactical directives with its ANSF counterpart. Partnership <strong>in</strong>cludes an active<br />
mentor<strong>in</strong>g role <strong>and</strong> the primary read<strong>in</strong>ess oversight resp<strong>on</strong>sibility. If there is also an assigned mentor team, the partner<strong>in</strong>g unit<br />
is the lead <strong>in</strong> provid<strong>in</strong>g operati<strong>on</strong>al directi<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> guidance to ensure unity of effort <strong>in</strong> the c<strong>on</strong>duct of operati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
Comb<strong>in</strong>ed Team units <strong>in</strong> which an assigned relati<strong>on</strong>ship exists where both share the same goal of build<strong>in</strong>g capacity <strong>and</strong><br />
capability of the ANSF Unit to achieve Operati<strong>on</strong>al Effectiveness of Effective w/ Assistance or better. The IJC Partner Unit shares<br />
Mentor<strong>in</strong>g Only<br />
no comprehensive operati<strong>on</strong>s guidance, strategy, <strong>in</strong>formati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>in</strong>telligence <strong>and</strong> IJC tactical directives with its ANSF counterpart.<br />
Partnership is primarily an active mentor<strong>in</strong>g role.<br />
Uncovered Coaliti<strong>on</strong> unit not present / assigned. ANSF Unit is uncovered.<br />
Not Assessed No data available; unable to assess.<br />
The Comm<strong>and</strong>er’s Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT) <strong>and</strong> Rat<strong>in</strong>g Def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong> Levels (RDLs) are used<br />
to assess ANSF operati<strong>on</strong>al effectiveness. Result<strong>in</strong>g reports cover quantitative data (pers<strong>on</strong>nel,<br />
equipment, <strong>and</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g) as well as qualitative assessments <strong>in</strong> areas affect<strong>in</strong>g the effectiveness of<br />
the unit (communicati<strong>on</strong>s, equipp<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong>telligence, logistics, leadership, ma<strong>in</strong>tenance, operati<strong>on</strong>s,<br />
pers<strong>on</strong>nel, partner<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> educati<strong>on</strong>). <str<strong>on</strong>g>Report</str<strong>on</strong>g>s c<strong>on</strong>clude with an overall assessment<br />
of operati<strong>on</strong>al effectiveness. Each assessment area uses the RDL scale specified for that<br />
assessment area, supported with comments from the coaliti<strong>on</strong> partner assigned to the ANSF unit.<br />
In August 2011, RDL titles were changed to reflect the c<strong>on</strong>cept of partner<strong>in</strong>g with units at lower<br />
effectiveness levels <strong>and</strong> advis<strong>in</strong>g with more capable units. Thus, the “Independent” rat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
changed to “Independent with Advisors”; “Effective with Advisors” rema<strong>in</strong>ed unchanged;<br />
“Effective with Assistance” changed to “Effective with Partners”; <strong>and</strong> “Develop<strong>in</strong>g” changed to<br />
“Develop<strong>in</strong>g with Partners.”<br />
Prior to January 31, 2012, the Validati<strong>on</strong> Transiti<strong>on</strong> Team (VTT) was tasked by IJC with<br />
validat<strong>in</strong>g any unit that received a CUAT rat<strong>in</strong>g of “Independent with Advisors” by the Regi<strong>on</strong>al<br />
Comm<strong>and</strong>s. The IJC procedure was to not report a unit assessed by the RCs as “Independent<br />
with Advisors” until the VTT could validate the rat<strong>in</strong>g. Instead, units would rema<strong>in</strong> rated at the<br />
“Effective with Advisors” level until the validati<strong>on</strong> was complete. However, after January 31,<br />
2012, the requirement for outside validati<strong>on</strong> for newly reported “Independent with Advisors”<br />
units was elim<strong>in</strong>ated, which has resulted <strong>in</strong> the recent <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> “Independent with Advisors”<br />
units. The new process places greater emphasis <strong>on</strong> the rat<strong>in</strong>gs from the units partnered with the<br />
ANSF, who have first-h<strong>and</strong> knowledge of the unit’s performance. In the future, there will<br />
37
c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to be <strong>in</strong>creases <strong>in</strong> the number of <strong>in</strong>dependent units, although this is expected to be at a<br />
more gradual rate.<br />
The assessment process has been modified to <strong>in</strong>clude a thorough evaluati<strong>on</strong> of operati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
performance. This data will allow IJC to evaluate the volume of l<strong>on</strong>g-term coaliti<strong>on</strong> assistance<br />
required throughout theater. As units move toward <strong>in</strong>dependence with advisors, the use of<br />
coaliti<strong>on</strong> enablers must be c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ually reviewed, revised, <strong>and</strong> planned.<br />
L<strong>on</strong>g-term reforms to the operati<strong>on</strong>al assessment process <strong>in</strong>clude a separati<strong>on</strong> of ANA <strong>and</strong> ANP<br />
reports. Currently, the CUAT report template is uniform for all ANSF elements. The February<br />
2012 CUAT report, with the support of the Internati<strong>on</strong>al Police Coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> Board (IPCB),<br />
implemented ANP-specific focus questi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> began collect<strong>in</strong>g data <strong>on</strong> community polic<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>and</strong> rule of law capabilities.<br />
With<strong>in</strong> each of the rat<strong>in</strong>gs below, there are detailed explanati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> parameters to guide<br />
partners or mentors <strong>in</strong> properly assign<strong>in</strong>g an RDL. RDL rat<strong>in</strong>gs, al<strong>on</strong>g with leadership<br />
assessments (very positive, positive, neutral, negative, <strong>and</strong> very negative) <strong>and</strong> partner<strong>in</strong>g data,<br />
are <strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>in</strong>to current CUAT reports.<br />
Figure 12: Rat<strong>in</strong>g Def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong> Levels<br />
Independent<br />
w/ Advisors<br />
Effective w/<br />
Advisors<br />
Effective w/<br />
Partners<br />
Develop<strong>in</strong>g<br />
w/ Partners<br />
Established<br />
Not Assessed<br />
The unit is able to plan <strong>and</strong> execute its missi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>trol of subord<strong>in</strong>ate elements, call<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>troll<strong>in</strong>g a QRF<br />
<strong>and</strong>, MEDEVAC assets when required. When necessary the unit can call for <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrate jo<strong>in</strong>t effects from coaliti<strong>on</strong> forces <strong>and</strong> is capable of<br />
exploit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>telligence <strong>and</strong> operat<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> a wider <strong>in</strong>telligence system. Unit pers<strong>on</strong>nel <strong>and</strong> equipment levels are > 75% of the authorized<br />
strength (Present for Duty) <strong>and</strong> are sufficient for the unit to undertake its assigned tasks. The unit can operate, account for <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> its<br />
equipment <strong>and</strong> meet its basic logistic needs with no assistance from Coaliti<strong>on</strong> Forces. The unit is able to co-ord<strong>in</strong>ate its operati<strong>on</strong>s with other<br />
ANSF units <strong>and</strong> headquarters.<br />
Effective plann<strong>in</strong>g, synchr<strong>on</strong>iz<strong>in</strong>g, direct<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> report<strong>in</strong>g of operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> status. Coord<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> communicat<strong>in</strong>g with higher, lower,<br />
adjacent, <strong>and</strong> comb<strong>in</strong>ed/jo<strong>in</strong>t units. Ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s effective read<strong>in</strong>ess reports. Leaders, staff, <strong>and</strong> unit adhere to the ANSF Code of C<strong>on</strong>duct, <strong>and</strong><br />
are loyal to GIRoA. All unit enablers are present <strong>and</strong> effective <strong>in</strong> this unit, <strong>and</strong> are provid<strong>in</strong>g most of the support to the ANSF unit. Coaliti<strong>on</strong><br />
Forces provide <strong>on</strong>ly limited, occasi<strong>on</strong>al guidance to the staff. Coaliti<strong>on</strong> Forces may provide enablers that are miss<strong>in</strong>g from HIGHER or<br />
LOWER ANSF levels. Coaliti<strong>on</strong> Forces augment support <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>on</strong> occasi<strong>on</strong>. Equipment <strong>and</strong> pers<strong>on</strong>nel levels >75%. >75%. OCC P <strong>and</strong> R are always<br />
<strong>in</strong>tegrated, <strong>and</strong> l<strong>in</strong>ks are usually effective.<br />
Requires rout<strong>in</strong>e mentor<strong>in</strong>g for plann<strong>in</strong>g, synchr<strong>on</strong>iz<strong>in</strong>g, direct<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> report<strong>in</strong>g of operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> status; coord<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> communicat<strong>in</strong>g with<br />
higher, lower, adjacent, <strong>and</strong> comb<strong>in</strong>ed/jo<strong>in</strong>t units; <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g effective read<strong>in</strong>ess reports. Leaders, staff, <strong>and</strong> most of the unit adhere to<br />
the ANSF Code of C<strong>on</strong>duct, <strong>and</strong> are loyal to GIRoA. Most unit enablers are present <strong>and</strong> effective. Those enablers present are provid<strong>in</strong>g most<br />
of the support to the ANSF unit. Coaliti<strong>on</strong> Forces may provide enablers that are miss<strong>in</strong>g from this level, <strong>and</strong> augment enabler support at this<br />
level. Equipment <strong>and</strong> pers<strong>on</strong>nel levels >65%. >65%. OCC P <strong>and</strong> R are always <strong>in</strong>tegrated, <strong>and</strong> l<strong>in</strong>ks are sometimes effective .<br />
Requires partner unit presence <strong>and</strong> assistance for plann<strong>in</strong>g, synchr<strong>on</strong>iz<strong>in</strong>g, direct<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> report<strong>in</strong>g of operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> status; coord<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong><br />
communicat<strong>in</strong>g with higher, lower, adjacent, <strong>and</strong> comb<strong>in</strong>ed/jo<strong>in</strong>t units; <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g effective read<strong>in</strong>ess reports. Leaders <strong>and</strong> most of the<br />
staff usually adhere to the ANSF Code of C<strong>on</strong>duct, <strong>and</strong> are loyal to GIRoA. Some unit enablers are present <strong>and</strong> effective at this level of unit.<br />
Those present provide some of the support to the ANSF unit. Coaliti<strong>on</strong> Forces provide the miss<strong>in</strong>g enablers <strong>and</strong> most of the support at this<br />
level. Equipment <strong>and</strong> pers<strong>on</strong>nel levels
Figure 13: ANA Partner<strong>in</strong>g Status<br />
Cycle 13 CUAT data showed the number of reports for partnered units with<strong>in</strong> the ANP <strong>in</strong>creased<br />
from 231 <strong>in</strong> August 2011 to 347 <strong>in</strong> February 2012. This total number may also <strong>in</strong>clude ANP<br />
units that did not previously submit a CUAT report (e.g., <strong>in</strong> the case of newly fielded or recently<br />
partnered units). The number of units reported as uncovered or unassessed <strong>in</strong>creased from 31 to<br />
88, due to an overall <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> units report<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
While surge recovery will decrease the number of pers<strong>on</strong>nel available to partner with the ANP,<br />
the projected impact of the surge recovery <strong>on</strong> the performance of the ANP is unclear. ANP<br />
partner<strong>in</strong>g levels have c<strong>on</strong>sistently lagged beh<strong>in</strong>d those of ANA units. An important aspect of<br />
the <strong>Security</strong> Force Assistance c<strong>on</strong>cept is the deployment of partner <strong>and</strong> mentor units tra<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
specifically for police missi<strong>on</strong>s. This focused effort is anticipated to result <strong>in</strong> a more productive<br />
partner<strong>in</strong>g/advis<strong>in</strong>g relati<strong>on</strong>ship <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>creased ANP capabilities, especially <strong>in</strong> the civil polic<strong>in</strong>g<br />
missi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> functi<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
Figure 14: ANP Partner<strong>in</strong>g Status<br />
ANSF OPERATIONS AND ASSESSMENT PROCESS<br />
Assess<strong>in</strong>g performance <strong>in</strong> operati<strong>on</strong>s is an important method for evaluat<strong>in</strong>g ANSF progressi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
A partnered operati<strong>on</strong> is a dist<strong>in</strong>ct event <strong>in</strong> which ISAF <strong>and</strong> ANSF units work together <strong>in</strong> the<br />
plann<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> executi<strong>on</strong> of a comb<strong>in</strong>ed jo<strong>in</strong>t tactical operati<strong>on</strong>. The number <strong>and</strong> type of these<br />
operati<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>and</strong> whether they are Afghan-led, are m<strong>on</strong>itored <strong>in</strong> the ISAF campaign assessment<br />
framework. Operati<strong>on</strong>al partner<strong>in</strong>g efforts are aimed at improv<strong>in</strong>g the overall operati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
effectiveness of ANSF units, while at the same time protect<strong>in</strong>g the populati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> accomplish<strong>in</strong>g<br />
overall campaign objectives.<br />
39
Ensur<strong>in</strong>g the ability of the ANSF to plan <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>duct operati<strong>on</strong>s unilaterally is the ultimate goal<br />
of partner<strong>in</strong>g relati<strong>on</strong>ships. Units are perform<strong>in</strong>g excepti<strong>on</strong>ally well when the ANSF are capable<br />
not <strong>on</strong>ly of plann<strong>in</strong>g, prepar<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> execut<strong>in</strong>g missi<strong>on</strong>s, but are also able to <strong>in</strong>corporate <strong>and</strong><br />
coord<strong>in</strong>ate other ANSF elements for a jo<strong>in</strong>t operati<strong>on</strong>. ISAF is also focus<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> improv<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability of the combat formati<strong>on</strong>s through the ANSF logistic mechanisms.<br />
ANSF-ISAF operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong>clude: 1) ANA Partnered (ANA c<strong>on</strong>ducted the operati<strong>on</strong> jo<strong>in</strong>tly with<br />
ISAF); 2) ANP Partnered (AUP, ABP, or ANCOP c<strong>on</strong>ducted the operati<strong>on</strong> jo<strong>in</strong>tly with ISAF);<br />
3) Jo<strong>in</strong>t ANSF Partnered (ANA <strong>and</strong> ANP c<strong>on</strong>ducted the operati<strong>on</strong> jo<strong>in</strong>tly with ISAF); 4) ANSF<br />
Led (ANSF c<strong>on</strong>ducted the missi<strong>on</strong> with support from ISAF).<br />
In the past six m<strong>on</strong>ths, the number of partnered operati<strong>on</strong>s as well as ANSF-led operati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
<strong>in</strong>creased. A decrease <strong>in</strong> total number of operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> January <strong>and</strong> February 2012 is attributable<br />
to the extreme w<strong>in</strong>ter weather across the country. The total percentage of ANSF-led operati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
also <strong>in</strong>creased, ris<strong>in</strong>g from 14 percent (16 of 112) <strong>in</strong> September 2011 to almost 33 percent (31 of<br />
95) <strong>in</strong> February 2012.<br />
The majority of reported Level 1 <strong>and</strong> Level 2 partnered operati<strong>on</strong>s, as def<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> figure 16,<br />
occurred <strong>in</strong> Regi<strong>on</strong>al Comm<strong>and</strong>s South (RC-S), Southwest (RC-SW), <strong>and</strong> East (RC-E) between<br />
August 2011 <strong>and</strong> January 2012; ANSF-led operati<strong>on</strong>s typically occurred <strong>in</strong> RC-S, RC-E, <strong>and</strong><br />
Regi<strong>on</strong>al Comm<strong>and</strong> North (RC-N). Partnered operati<strong>on</strong>s are generally expected to yield an<br />
<strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> ANSF-led operati<strong>on</strong>s as ANSF unit capabilities <strong>in</strong>crease. This trend is evident <strong>in</strong> RC-<br />
S <strong>and</strong> RC-E but not <strong>in</strong> RC-SW. A more thorough analysis of Cycle 13 CUAT data for units <strong>in</strong><br />
RC-SW shows an improvement <strong>in</strong> ANSF ability to plan <strong>and</strong> lead Level 0 operati<strong>on</strong>s, which are<br />
not reported through formal channels. CUAT data <strong>in</strong>dicates that ANSF-led operati<strong>on</strong>s are most<br />
frequently lower-risk operati<strong>on</strong>s. This c<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong> is substantiated by data <strong>in</strong> Figure 15: ANSFled<br />
Operati<strong>on</strong>s, which compares Level 1 <strong>and</strong> 2 operati<strong>on</strong>s. There was, however, <strong>on</strong>e ANSF-led<br />
Level 2 operati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Khost (RC-E) <strong>in</strong> February 2012. The success of this operati<strong>on</strong> illustrates<br />
the develop<strong>in</strong>g Afghan capacity to successfully lead operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> this sensitive border area<br />
between Afghanistan <strong>and</strong> Pakistan.<br />
40
Figure 15: ANSF-ISAF Partnered Operati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
Level 1 <strong>and</strong> 2 Operati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
Sep<br />
2011<br />
Oct Nov Dec Jan<br />
2012<br />
Feb Mar<br />
Total Level 1 Operati<strong>on</strong>s 105 112 107 116 112 91<br />
Level 1 Operati<strong>on</strong>s Partnered with ANSF 86 97 97 111 102 75<br />
Level 1 Operati<strong>on</strong>s Partnered with ANSF that were ANSF-led 16 48 46 44 45 30<br />
% of Total Level 1 Operati<strong>on</strong>s that were ANSF-led 15% 43% 43% 38% 40% 33%<br />
Total Level 2 Operati<strong>on</strong>s 7 7 10 6 4 4<br />
Level 2 Operati<strong>on</strong>s Partnered with ANSF 6 6 9 5 3 3<br />
Level 2 Operati<strong>on</strong>s Partnered with ANSF that were ANSF-led 0 0 0 0 0 1<br />
% of Total Level 2 Operati<strong>on</strong>s that were ANSF-led 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 25%<br />
Total Level 1 <strong>and</strong> 2 Operati<strong>on</strong>s 112 119 117 122 116 95<br />
Level 1 <strong>and</strong> 2 Operati<strong>on</strong>s Partnered with ANSF 92 103 106 116 105 78<br />
Level 1 <strong>and</strong> 2 Operati<strong>on</strong>s Partnered with ANSF that were ANSF-led 16 48 46 44 45 31<br />
% of Total Operati<strong>on</strong>s Level 1 <strong>and</strong> 2 Operati<strong>on</strong>s that were ANSF-led 14% 40% 39% 36% 39% 33%<br />
Figure 16: Levels of C<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>gency Operati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
Level 0<br />
(Low Risk)<br />
Day-time deliberate pre-planned forced entry required (progressive “soft-knock” <strong>and</strong> "hard-knock")<br />
Political c<strong>on</strong>sequences offer m<strong>in</strong>imum potential of prejudicial IO, media, or political impact<br />
Operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g entry <strong>in</strong>to houses or compounds at night to <strong>in</strong>clude deliberate pre-planned<br />
Level 1 forced entry required (progressive “soft-knock” <strong>and</strong> "hardknock")<br />
(Medium Risk) May have m<strong>in</strong>or to moderate unfavorable regi<strong>on</strong>al media impact, detrimental IO <strong>and</strong>/or undesirable<br />
political c<strong>on</strong>sequences, manageable at the regi<strong>on</strong>al level<br />
Level 2<br />
(High Risk)<br />
Pre-planned k<strong>in</strong>etic operati<strong>on</strong>s with<strong>in</strong> 10km of border with Pakistan or Iran<br />
SOF c<strong>on</strong>duct<strong>in</strong>g deliberate operati<strong>on</strong>s with company size force or greater with<strong>in</strong> 1km of border with<br />
Pakistan, or 10km of border with Iran<br />
Arrest, apprehensi<strong>on</strong>, or deta<strong>in</strong>ment of any current or prom<strong>in</strong>ent former Afghan Government<br />
appo<strong>in</strong>ted official<br />
Potential for collateral damage, unfavorable media impact, severely detrimental IO, <strong>and</strong>/or undesirable<br />
political c<strong>on</strong>sequences at the nati<strong>on</strong>al level<br />
ANA OPERATIONS AND ASSESSMENT<br />
The overall operati<strong>on</strong>al effectiveness of the ANA c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to improve dur<strong>in</strong>g this report<strong>in</strong>g<br />
period. Although the number of CUAT reports decreased from 158 <strong>in</strong> October 2011 to 156 <strong>in</strong><br />
February 2012, the number of units (k<strong>and</strong>aks) rated as “Independent with Advisors” <strong>in</strong>creased<br />
from 1 to 13. The percentage of all ANA units <strong>and</strong> headquarters assessed as “Effective with<br />
Partners” or higher <strong>in</strong>creased from 72 percent <strong>in</strong> August 2011 to 90 percent <strong>in</strong> February 2012.<br />
41
Figure 17: ANA Operati<strong>on</strong>al Effectiveness Rat<strong>in</strong>gs from CUAT Cycle 13 (January 2012)<br />
Rat<strong>in</strong>g Def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong> Level<br />
(RDL)<br />
Corps Div BDE K<strong>and</strong>ak GSU Coy K<strong>and</strong>ak<br />
Independent w/ Advisors 0 0 1 8 5 1 13 15 7%<br />
Effective w/ Advisors 1 1 14 69 5 11 74 101 46%<br />
Effective w/ Partners 5 0 7 47 8 13 55 80 37%<br />
Develop<strong>in</strong>g w/ Partners 0 0 0 8 1 9 9 18 8%<br />
Established 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 3 1%<br />
Not Assessed 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 1%<br />
TOTAL: 6 1 22 135 21 34 156 219 100%<br />
RDLs for "Headquarters" are for Corps, Divisi<strong>on</strong>, <strong>and</strong> Brigade headquarters <strong>on</strong>ly, not a roll-up.<br />
K<strong>and</strong>aks = all w arfight<strong>in</strong>g K<strong>and</strong>aks, CS, CSS, <strong>and</strong> Comm<strong>and</strong>o K<strong>and</strong>aks; Coys not <strong>in</strong>cluded.<br />
GSU = General Support Unit (K<strong>and</strong>ak equivalent).<br />
Coys = Independent Coys; not part of a K<strong>and</strong>ak.<br />
Total K<strong>and</strong>aks = K<strong>and</strong>aks plus GSUs.<br />
A K<strong>and</strong>ak is a battali<strong>on</strong>-sized unit; a Coy is a company-sized unit.<br />
Source: IJC CTAG ANSF Development - CUAT Cycle 13 (31 January 2012)<br />
ANA units rarely operate completely <strong>in</strong>dependently; nevertheless, there are <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>stances<br />
of ANA units operat<strong>in</strong>g with limited ISAF support. For example, as of February 2012, 13<br />
k<strong>and</strong>aks have achieved a rat<strong>in</strong>g of “Independent with Advisors,” up from 1 k<strong>and</strong>ak <strong>in</strong> August<br />
2011, <strong>and</strong> the number of units rated as “Effective with Advisors” <strong>in</strong>creased from 56 to 74 over <strong>in</strong><br />
the same period. Rat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>creases are attributable <strong>in</strong> some part to the change <strong>in</strong> the “Independent<br />
with Advisors” RDL that reduced unit pers<strong>on</strong>nel <strong>and</strong> equipment levels from not less than 85<br />
percent to not less than 75 percent. 19<br />
More importantly, rat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>creases are attributable to<br />
improved ANA performance <strong>and</strong> ability to plan <strong>and</strong> execute missi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> comm<strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>trol of subord<strong>in</strong>ate units.<br />
The surge recovery is challeng<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g capabilities of the Regi<strong>on</strong>al Comm<strong>and</strong>s;<br />
however, <strong>in</strong>creased emphasis <strong>on</strong> assessments resulted <strong>in</strong> a decrease <strong>in</strong> the number of unassessed<br />
units. Decreases <strong>in</strong> the number of partnered/advised units as a result of the surge recovery will<br />
make completi<strong>on</strong> of CUAT reports <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly difficult. IJC has therefore implemented<br />
measures to help mitigate effects of force reducti<strong>on</strong>s, such as adjust<strong>in</strong>g the CUAT report<strong>in</strong>g<br />
cycle from 6 weeks to 12 weeks <strong>and</strong> ref<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the number <strong>and</strong> type of priority units requir<strong>in</strong>g<br />
CUAT assessments. The partner<strong>in</strong>g/mentor<strong>in</strong>g coverage requirements were also adjusted,<br />
mov<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>on</strong>e-to-<strong>on</strong>e partner<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>on</strong>e-to-many with the <strong>Security</strong> Force Assessment Team<br />
model, which requires fewer forces with the ANSF unit as the overall effectiveness of the unit<br />
<strong>in</strong>creases.<br />
19 Change effective August 2011.<br />
Headquarters Unit Type Total<br />
42<br />
Total Units<br />
& HQs<br />
Percent<br />
of Total
Figure 18: ANA K<strong>and</strong>ak Assessment<br />
F<strong>in</strong>ally, the ANA is gradually develop<strong>in</strong>g the capability to c<strong>on</strong>duct its own assessments, <strong>and</strong> the<br />
MoD ANSF Comb<strong>in</strong>ed Assessment Team is currently at <strong>in</strong>itial operat<strong>in</strong>g capability across the<br />
Regi<strong>on</strong>al Comm<strong>and</strong>s. Additi<strong>on</strong>ally, the MoD has mobile teams that are sent out to assess units at<br />
the discreti<strong>on</strong> of MoD leadership. This plan is expected to exp<strong>and</strong> ANA capability <strong>and</strong><br />
eventually transiti<strong>on</strong> all ANA external unit assessments to the MoD.<br />
ANP OPERATIONS AND ASSESSMENT<br />
The ANP improved its ability to c<strong>on</strong>duct limited <strong>in</strong>dependent polic<strong>in</strong>g operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> coord<strong>in</strong>ate<br />
operati<strong>on</strong>s with other ANSF elements.<br />
Overall, the number of units that were not assessed decreased from 17 percent <strong>in</strong> August 2011 to<br />
14 percent <strong>in</strong> January 2012. As of February 2012, data from the Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Resp<strong>on</strong>se Company<br />
<strong>and</strong> all Operati<strong>on</strong>al Coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> Centers (OCCs), both prov<strong>in</strong>cial <strong>and</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>al, were added to<br />
the overall ANP effectiveness rat<strong>in</strong>gs, account<strong>in</strong>g for the slight <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> the overall number of<br />
submitted reports versus October 2011 data. Overall, 74 percent of units are rated as “Effective<br />
with Partners” or higher, compared to 69 percent <strong>in</strong> August 2011.<br />
RC assessments highlight improvements <strong>in</strong> the overall performance of the ANP across all of the<br />
police pillars <strong>in</strong> the overall plann<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> executi<strong>on</strong> of operati<strong>on</strong>s. The ANP display <strong>in</strong>creased<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence when: c<strong>on</strong>duct<strong>in</strong>g security patrols; operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>g permanent <strong>and</strong><br />
temporary check po<strong>in</strong>ts; provid<strong>in</strong>g security <strong>on</strong> Ma<strong>in</strong> Supply Routes; <strong>and</strong> provid<strong>in</strong>g security for<br />
local government <strong>and</strong> jo<strong>in</strong>t operati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
Jo<strong>in</strong>t Operati<strong>on</strong>s Center (JOC) reports show ANP across the country c<strong>on</strong>duct offensive<br />
engagements, mounted <strong>and</strong> dismounted security patrols, <strong>and</strong> static operati<strong>on</strong>s. ANP forces,<br />
especially ANCOP, are still heavily engaged <strong>in</strong> COIN missi<strong>on</strong>s, such as: resp<strong>on</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>in</strong>surgent<br />
activities; deta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>surgents; seiz<strong>in</strong>g property; identify<strong>in</strong>g, resp<strong>on</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g to, <strong>and</strong> neutraliz<strong>in</strong>g IED<br />
43
threats; <strong>and</strong> react<strong>in</strong>g to direct <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>direct fire dur<strong>in</strong>g offensive engagements both <strong>in</strong> coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong><br />
with <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent of coaliti<strong>on</strong> forces. The ANP are beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g to transiti<strong>on</strong> to accomplish<strong>in</strong>g<br />
civil polic<strong>in</strong>g functi<strong>on</strong>s, primarily <strong>in</strong> areas where security is highest, such as Kabul. Dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
major political events such as the Loya Jirga, the ANP were effective <strong>in</strong> provid<strong>in</strong>g security,<br />
resp<strong>on</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g to threats, <strong>and</strong> prevent<strong>in</strong>g potential threats with the establishment of temporary check<br />
po<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>and</strong> mann<strong>in</strong>g of permanent check po<strong>in</strong>ts. Dur<strong>in</strong>g high-profile <strong>in</strong>cidents, such as the recent<br />
accidental Quran burn<strong>in</strong>gs, the ANP were resp<strong>on</strong>sive <strong>and</strong> effective <strong>in</strong> provid<strong>in</strong>g crowd <strong>and</strong> riot<br />
c<strong>on</strong>trol. There were no significant attacks reported dur<strong>in</strong>g these periods <strong>and</strong> there has been a<br />
noticeable improvement <strong>in</strong> the performance of the ANP.<br />
The ANP c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to show improvement, with 50 percent (219 of 435) of ANP units currently<br />
rated as "Effective with Advisors" or higher compared to 37 percent (80 of 218) <strong>in</strong> August of<br />
2011. The number of ANP units covered by the CUAT system has <strong>in</strong>creased dramatically –<br />
from 218 <strong>in</strong> August 2011 to 435 as of January 2012. The number of units rated “Independent<br />
with Advisors” <strong>in</strong>creased from 0 <strong>in</strong> August 2011 to 39 <strong>in</strong> January 2012.<br />
Figure 19: ANP Operati<strong>on</strong>al Effectiveness Rat<strong>in</strong>gs from CUAT Cycle 13 (January 2012)<br />
Rat<strong>in</strong>g Def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong> Level<br />
(RDL)<br />
2.7: BUDGET<br />
AFGHANISTAN SECURITY FORCES FUND<br />
AUP ABP ANCOP PRC OCC Total<br />
The Afghanistan <strong>Security</strong> Forces Fund (ASFF) provides fund<strong>in</strong>g to grow, tra<strong>in</strong>, equip, <strong>and</strong><br />
susta<strong>in</strong> the ANSF. For FY 2012, C<strong>on</strong>gress appropriated $11.2B, a decrease of $1.6B from the<br />
President’s FY 2012 budget request. This reducti<strong>on</strong> followed COMISAF’s August 2011 review<br />
of ANSF requirements as well as efficiencies <strong>and</strong> cost avoidance opportunities that had been<br />
realized at the time. The FY 2013 request of $5.75B reflects adjustments follow<strong>in</strong>g reviews that<br />
were c<strong>on</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> the w<strong>in</strong>ter of 2011, as well as c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued efficiencies. Moreover, the FY 2013<br />
budget request represents a shift from the more expensive <strong>in</strong>vestment <strong>in</strong> new equipment,<br />
<strong>in</strong>frastructure, <strong>and</strong> new unit tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, to develop<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the ANSF.<br />
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FUNDING FOR THE ANSF<br />
The <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al community also provides fund<strong>in</strong>g for the ANSF. Several nati<strong>on</strong>s have<br />
provided significant c<strong>on</strong>tributi<strong>on</strong>s to the Trust Fund, with d<strong>on</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>s total<strong>in</strong>g more than $550M.<br />
44<br />
Percent<br />
of Total<br />
Independent w/ Advisors 29 4 6 0 0 39 9%<br />
Effective w/ Advisors 130 25 4 1 20 180 41%<br />
Effective w/ Partners 65 10 4 14 9 102 23%<br />
Develop<strong>in</strong>g w/ Partners 22 5 5 3 1 36 8%<br />
Established 12 2 1 1 0 16 4%<br />
Not Assessed 56 4 2 0 0 62 14%<br />
TOTAL: 314 50 22 19 30 435 100%<br />
Source: IJC CTAG ANSF Development - CUAT Cycle 13 (31 January 2012)
Fund<strong>in</strong>g for police salaries, as well as other police development programs, is supported by the<br />
<strong>United</strong> Nati<strong>on</strong>s Development Program (UNDP), which oversees the Law <strong>and</strong> Order Trust Fund<br />
Afghanistan (LOTFA). From 2002-2011, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> d<strong>on</strong>ated $914M to LOTFA, while the<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al community d<strong>on</strong>ated approximately $1.5B.<br />
The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, as well as NTM-A, c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to work through diplomatic channels <strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al organizati<strong>on</strong>s to encourage allies <strong>and</strong> partners to provide greater assistance <strong>in</strong><br />
susta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the ANSF. While the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> will likely c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to provide the majority of the<br />
ANSF fund<strong>in</strong>g for the foreseeable future, the issue of <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al f<strong>in</strong>ancial assistance will<br />
assume greater importance as U.S. fund<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> support of the ANSF decreases over time.<br />
DIRECT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND MINISTRY OF DEFENSE<br />
For SY 1390 (March 2011 - March 2012), NTM-A provided $585.8M <strong>in</strong> direct c<strong>on</strong>tributi<strong>on</strong>s to<br />
the MoD to exp<strong>and</strong> the m<strong>in</strong>istry's capability <strong>and</strong> capacity to procure items <strong>in</strong> their operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong><br />
acquisiti<strong>on</strong> accounts. The m<strong>in</strong>istry used these c<strong>on</strong>tributi<strong>on</strong>s for payment of salaries, goods <strong>and</strong><br />
services, <strong>and</strong> procurement achieved solely through Afghan f<strong>in</strong>ancial systems <strong>and</strong> procurement<br />
systems.<br />
For SY 1390 NTM-A provided $84.7M <strong>in</strong> direct c<strong>on</strong>tributi<strong>on</strong>s to the MoI to exp<strong>and</strong> the<br />
m<strong>in</strong>istry's ability to procure items <strong>in</strong> their operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> acquisiti<strong>on</strong>s accounts. The m<strong>in</strong>istry<br />
used these c<strong>on</strong>tributi<strong>on</strong>s to pay Afghan Local Police (ALP) salaries, goods <strong>and</strong> services, <strong>and</strong><br />
procurements achieved solely through Afghan f<strong>in</strong>ancial systems <strong>and</strong> procurement systems. Both<br />
ANP salaries <strong>and</strong> food are delivered through LOTFA.<br />
NTM-A cooperates with its Afghan partners to closely m<strong>on</strong>itor these systems through liais<strong>on</strong><br />
pers<strong>on</strong>nel embedded <strong>in</strong> Afghan m<strong>in</strong>istries. Further improvement of these key m<strong>in</strong>isterial<br />
processes will m<strong>in</strong>imize risks to Transiti<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> develop self-sufficient Afghan <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al<br />
capabilities that will ensure success <strong>in</strong> the l<strong>on</strong>g term.<br />
INTERNATIONAL DONATIONS<br />
The NTM-A Office of the Deputy Comm<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g General for Internati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>Security</strong> Cooperati<strong>on</strong><br />
evaluates all known <strong>in</strong>frastructure, equipment, <strong>and</strong> weap<strong>on</strong> d<strong>on</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>s to the Afghan Government<br />
to ensure that each item adds capability <strong>and</strong> is affordable <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>able. MoD or MoI<br />
subsequently evaluates, approves, <strong>and</strong> accepts these d<strong>on</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>s. NTM-A may also evaluate<br />
equipment or muniti<strong>on</strong>s offered by a d<strong>on</strong>or nati<strong>on</strong> to verify technical specificati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> quality,<br />
<strong>and</strong> will work with the Afghan Government to coord<strong>in</strong>ate shipp<strong>in</strong>g, receipt, <strong>and</strong> accountability<br />
for all equipment, materials, <strong>and</strong> muniti<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
Nati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong>termittently approach the Afghan Government directly <strong>and</strong> negotiate a bilateral<br />
d<strong>on</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>, which may or may not come to the attenti<strong>on</strong> of NTM-A. When the Afghan<br />
Government <strong>and</strong> the d<strong>on</strong>or nati<strong>on</strong> advise NTM-A early <strong>in</strong> the process, NTM-A is able to track<br />
these cases <strong>and</strong> provide assistance as necessary. NTM-A solicits <strong>and</strong> tracks <strong>in</strong>frastructure,<br />
equipment, <strong>and</strong> weap<strong>on</strong> d<strong>on</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> c<strong>on</strong>juncti<strong>on</strong> with other staff elements, tracks overall<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al m<strong>on</strong>etary d<strong>on</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g bilateral d<strong>on</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>s. S<strong>in</strong>ce 2002, nearly 50 nati<strong>on</strong>s,<br />
NATO, <strong>and</strong> six <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al fund<strong>in</strong>g agencies have c<strong>on</strong>tributed more than $2.9B <strong>in</strong> assistance to<br />
the Afghan Government. For example:<br />
45
• In November 2011, Slovenia d<strong>on</strong>ated 6,880 AK-47 assault rifles. Bosnia <strong>and</strong><br />
Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a d<strong>on</strong>ated 52 D-30s (32 <strong>in</strong> October 2011; 16 <strong>in</strong> December 2011; 4 <strong>in</strong> February<br />
2012).<br />
Future solicitati<strong>on</strong>s will focus <strong>on</strong> literacy materials, equipment, <strong>in</strong>frastructure, <strong>and</strong> m<strong>on</strong>etary<br />
d<strong>on</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>s for both the ANA <strong>and</strong> ANP. M<strong>on</strong>etary d<strong>on</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>s are particularly critical due to the<br />
need for c<strong>on</strong>tracted <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g centers, medical facilities, <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ardized equipment.<br />
2.8: INFRASTRUCTURE<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period, NTM-A improved its facilities plann<strong>in</strong>g capability to effectively<br />
meet the missi<strong>on</strong> while draw<strong>in</strong>g down the workforce. Processes are <strong>in</strong> place to ensure that<br />
discipl<strong>in</strong>ed plann<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>in</strong>ciples are met for every funded project. For each <strong>in</strong>stallati<strong>on</strong>, NTM-A<br />
has a master plan that describes the <strong>in</strong>tended purpose of each facility <strong>and</strong> its <strong>in</strong>tended locati<strong>on</strong>,<br />
<strong>and</strong> ensures that all facility designs meet ANSF Austere Guidel<strong>in</strong>es. This allows for cost c<strong>on</strong>trols<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>frastructure projects <strong>and</strong> ensures that facilities are susta<strong>in</strong>able by Afghan facility eng<strong>in</strong>eers<br />
<strong>in</strong> the future.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period, NTM-A executed the <strong>in</strong>frastructure program to support ANSF<br />
field<strong>in</strong>g with an emphasis <strong>on</strong> build<strong>in</strong>g a susta<strong>in</strong>able facilities ma<strong>in</strong>tenance program. In support<br />
of this effort, the U.S. Army Corps of Eng<strong>in</strong>eers, Air Force Center for Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong><br />
Envir<strong>on</strong>ment, <strong>and</strong> USCENTCOM C<strong>on</strong>tract<strong>in</strong>g Comm<strong>and</strong> have awarded program management<br />
c<strong>on</strong>tracts. Work<strong>in</strong>g with these executi<strong>on</strong> agents, NTM-A has <strong>in</strong>itiated several programs to<br />
improve c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> executi<strong>on</strong>, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g quarterly c<strong>on</strong>ferences that are c<strong>on</strong>ducted with<br />
Regi<strong>on</strong>al Comm<strong>and</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong> local ANSF leaders to discuss specific issues <strong>in</strong> the battle<br />
space. Additi<strong>on</strong>ally, m<strong>on</strong>thly facilities shuras 20<br />
are held with the MoD <strong>and</strong> MoI to discuss<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>al-level c<strong>on</strong>cerns <strong>and</strong> issues.<br />
FACILITIES MAINTENANCE<br />
NTM-A made significant ga<strong>in</strong>s with regard to Afghan facility ma<strong>in</strong>tenance dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g<br />
period. The Infrastructure Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Advisory Group (ITAG) has key embedded tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g teams at<br />
ANSF sites <strong>in</strong> order to ensure future ANSF-led facility susta<strong>in</strong>ment; these teams are charged<br />
with provid<strong>in</strong>g tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, advis<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> synchr<strong>on</strong>izati<strong>on</strong> of Operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> Ma<strong>in</strong>tenance (O&M)<br />
efforts. The <strong>in</strong>itial 22-pers<strong>on</strong> ITAG group grew to nearly 50 pers<strong>on</strong>nel by the end of September<br />
2011 <strong>and</strong> is now at a strength of 113; ITAG teams are currently operat<strong>in</strong>g at 28 ANA sites <strong>and</strong> 3<br />
ANP sites.<br />
ITAG will c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to <strong>in</strong>tegrate three important comp<strong>on</strong>ents: c<strong>on</strong>tracted ma<strong>in</strong>tenance, tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
of Afghan facilities eng<strong>in</strong>eers to build the l<strong>on</strong>g-term capacity of the Afghans to care for their<br />
own facilities, <strong>and</strong> the development of the garris<strong>on</strong> management structure that will be resp<strong>on</strong>sible<br />
for ma<strong>in</strong>tenance <strong>on</strong> a day-to-day basis. Besides encourag<strong>in</strong>g the growth of ma<strong>in</strong>tenance<br />
capabilities over the last six m<strong>on</strong>ths, ITAG has been able to develop partial soluti<strong>on</strong>s to systemic<br />
problems <strong>and</strong> challenges <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g mann<strong>in</strong>g, tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, equipp<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> budget<strong>in</strong>g. Through the<br />
20 “Council” (religious c<strong>on</strong>notati<strong>on</strong>)<br />
46
force <strong>in</strong>tegrati<strong>on</strong> process, ITAG was able to work with the m<strong>in</strong>isterial mentors to <strong>in</strong>crease<br />
authorizati<strong>on</strong>s for the ANA facility pers<strong>on</strong>nel tashkil <strong>and</strong> improve <strong>on</strong> its corresp<strong>on</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g<br />
equipment set, which will provide the ANA with a more effective workforce to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> its<br />
facilities. ITAG recognizes the c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g need for ANSF Facility Eng<strong>in</strong>eers to delegate more<br />
technical services such as power plant, waste water treatment, <strong>and</strong> well operati<strong>on</strong>s to c<strong>on</strong>tractors;<br />
however, a more robust, <strong>in</strong>-house capability will reduce the need for expensive O&M services.<br />
With respect to tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, NTM-A is f<strong>in</strong>aliz<strong>in</strong>g plans for a sec<strong>on</strong>d semester of trade-specific<br />
coursework for approximately 50 students at the MoD’s C<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> Property Management<br />
Department (CPMD) course <strong>and</strong> 70 students at the Afghan Vocati<strong>on</strong>al Technical Trade Center<br />
(AKVTC). AKVTC, located <strong>in</strong> Kabul, tra<strong>in</strong>s students from both the MoD <strong>and</strong> MoI.<br />
Complement<strong>in</strong>g this centralized tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g approach are <strong>in</strong>creases <strong>in</strong> c<strong>on</strong>tractor <strong>and</strong> ITAG<br />
leadership of <strong>on</strong>-the-job tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, the focus of which is more active learn<strong>in</strong>g, tailored to specific<br />
garris<strong>on</strong>s. ITAG <strong>and</strong> M<strong>in</strong>isterial Development are also work<strong>in</strong>g with the m<strong>in</strong>istries <strong>on</strong><br />
develop<strong>in</strong>g tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g opportunities at local trade schools. This third tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g opti<strong>on</strong> is an Afghan<br />
soluti<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> produces more graduates at a lower cost than U.S.-c<strong>on</strong>tracted <strong>in</strong>structi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Also dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period, ITAG c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued close coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> with the M<strong>in</strong>isterial<br />
Development Advisors dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terface with both the MoD <strong>and</strong> MoI. Increased <strong>in</strong>teracti<strong>on</strong> with<br />
the m<strong>in</strong>istries will help ITAG solve the challenges faced at the garris<strong>on</strong> level. The transfer of<br />
facilities from the nati<strong>on</strong>al O&M c<strong>on</strong>tract to Afghan facility eng<strong>in</strong>eers is an area that requires<br />
close coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> with ITAG <strong>and</strong> M<strong>in</strong>isterial Development. Through February 2012, ITAG has<br />
identified 2,566 build<strong>in</strong>gs to transiti<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> facilitated transiti<strong>on</strong> of 217 of those to ANSF c<strong>on</strong>trol.<br />
The transfer of this <strong>in</strong>itial set was a major milest<strong>on</strong>e <strong>and</strong> has provided an example to follow at<br />
every site. C<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued support from the m<strong>in</strong>istries will be important for future facility transiti<strong>on</strong><br />
progress.<br />
FACILITY MANAGEMENT MINISTERIAL DEVELOPMENT<br />
NTM-A c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to advise the MoD CPMD <strong>in</strong> build<strong>in</strong>g capacity to run all facility operati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
<strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>tenance for the ANA by 2014. With the sign<strong>in</strong>g of a decree by the M<strong>in</strong>ister of Defense,<br />
CPMD now has direct c<strong>on</strong>trol over all ANA Facility Eng<strong>in</strong>eers. This decree <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>trol enables<br />
CPMD to provide oversight <strong>in</strong> hir<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of facility eng<strong>in</strong>eers <strong>and</strong> provide budget<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>and</strong> technical directi<strong>on</strong>. NTM-A mentors coord<strong>in</strong>ate directly with ITAG to l<strong>in</strong>k the Facility<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eer tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> transiti<strong>on</strong> at the ANA bases with CPMD to coord<strong>in</strong>ate hir<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong><br />
budget<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> ensure the MoD is prepared to support the new facility eng<strong>in</strong>eer departments <strong>and</strong><br />
provide stewardship of the NTM-A c<strong>on</strong>structed facilities.<br />
As previously stated, the shuras address facility c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong>, facility ma<strong>in</strong>tenance, <strong>and</strong> tashkil<br />
requirements to support facilities ma<strong>in</strong>tenance throughout the country. These events<br />
complement NTM-A’s participati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> the Facilities Department's plan to c<strong>on</strong>duct quarterly<br />
meet<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> Kabul with z<strong>on</strong>e <strong>and</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>cial facilities eng<strong>in</strong>eers. NTM-A is focused <strong>on</strong> reexam<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
the areas of focus <strong>in</strong> the M<strong>in</strong>isterial Development Plan (MDP) that, through<br />
mentor<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> advis<strong>in</strong>g the leadership of the facilities department, will develop the capability<br />
<strong>and</strong> capacity of the organizati<strong>on</strong> to progress from CM-3 to CM-2B. Due to the challenges<br />
associated with grow<strong>in</strong>g the facilities organizati<strong>on</strong> pers<strong>on</strong>nel, NTM-A is work<strong>in</strong>g with the MoI<br />
Facilities Department to restructure facility ma<strong>in</strong>tenance from a “hub-<strong>and</strong>-spoke” ma<strong>in</strong>tenance<br />
47
model to a c<strong>on</strong>tracted ma<strong>in</strong>tenance model, <strong>and</strong> to resolve challenges associated with this<br />
approach.<br />
ANA INFRASTRUCTURE<br />
NTM-A c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> to field the current Afghan Government-approved end strength<br />
of 195,000 pers<strong>on</strong>nel.<br />
At the end of the report<strong>in</strong>g period, NTM-A had 144 projects valued at $3.1B under c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong><br />
for the ANA. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period, 30 projects valued at $764M were awarded <strong>and</strong> 16<br />
projects valued at $256M were completed. Another 163 projects for $3.2B are actively be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
planned.<br />
There are currently more than 400 projects valued <strong>in</strong> excess of $6.7B to support the ANA. For<br />
FY2012, a total of 135 projects valued at more than $1.8B are planned at 17 sites. Three major<br />
c<strong>on</strong>tract awards occurred dur<strong>in</strong>g the last six-m<strong>on</strong>ths: 3/207 Brigade Garris<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Badghis, 2/205<br />
Brigade Garris<strong>on</strong> Expansi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Zabul, <strong>and</strong> ANAREC HQ <strong>in</strong> Kabul.<br />
ANP INFRASTRUCTURE<br />
NTM-A is currently track<strong>in</strong>g more than 1,000 projects valued <strong>in</strong> excess of $4.2B to support all<br />
police pillars. For FY2012, a total of 71 projects valued at more than $557M are planned at 63<br />
sites. The result<strong>in</strong>g c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> will provide facilities for the current approved end-strength of<br />
157,000 police pers<strong>on</strong>nel <strong>and</strong> serve as a key cornerst<strong>on</strong>e <strong>in</strong> Afghan Government’s future success.<br />
Three major c<strong>on</strong>tract awards occurred dur<strong>in</strong>g the last six-m<strong>on</strong>ths: ANCOP Headquarters <strong>in</strong><br />
Panjwa’i, ANCOP Headquarters <strong>in</strong> Tar<strong>in</strong> Kot, <strong>and</strong> MoI Headquarters <strong>in</strong> Kabul.<br />
48
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49
SECTION 3 – TRANSITION<br />
3.1: THE SECURITY TRANSITION PROCESS<br />
The security Transiti<strong>on</strong> process was jo<strong>in</strong>tly c<strong>on</strong>ceived <strong>and</strong> developed by the Afghan<br />
Government, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, the NATO, <strong>and</strong> ISAF nati<strong>on</strong>s at a variety of <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al fora,<br />
beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g with the 2010 L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong> C<strong>on</strong>ference <strong>and</strong> culm<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the NATO Summit <strong>in</strong> Lisb<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
November 2010. Transiti<strong>on</strong> to Afghan security lead began <strong>in</strong> July 2011 <strong>and</strong> transiti<strong>on</strong> to full<br />
Afghan security resp<strong>on</strong>sibility will be complete country-wide by the end of 2014.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the 2010 Inteqal 21<br />
Framework, which governs the Afghan-led process, the Jo<strong>in</strong>t<br />
Afghan-NATO Inteqal Board (JANIB) is resp<strong>on</strong>sible for approv<strong>in</strong>g Transiti<strong>on</strong> implementati<strong>on</strong><br />
plans <strong>and</strong> recommend<strong>in</strong>g areas to enter <strong>and</strong> exit the Transiti<strong>on</strong> process. The JANIB is chaired by<br />
Transiti<strong>on</strong> Coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> Committee chairman Dr. Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai <strong>and</strong> co-chaired by<br />
COMISAF <strong>and</strong> the NATO Senior Civilian Representative (SCR). It also <strong>in</strong>cludes the <strong>United</strong><br />
Nati<strong>on</strong>s Special Representative for Afghanistan.<br />
Careful evaluati<strong>on</strong> of an area’s security, governance, <strong>and</strong> development envir<strong>on</strong>ment is c<strong>on</strong>ducted<br />
when c<strong>on</strong>sider<strong>in</strong>g eligibility for transiti<strong>on</strong>. After an area has been selected, the Afghan<br />
Government, NATO, <strong>and</strong> ISAF develop Transiti<strong>on</strong> implementati<strong>on</strong> plans to be approved by the<br />
JANIB. Up<strong>on</strong> entry of an area <strong>in</strong>to the Transiti<strong>on</strong> implementati<strong>on</strong> process, NATO <strong>and</strong> ISAF<br />
support c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues through four broad stages, progress<strong>in</strong>g from local support to strategic support.<br />
The security of the Afghan people <strong>and</strong> the stability of the government are used to judge<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>cial read<strong>in</strong>ess to move to each successive stage of transiti<strong>on</strong> implementati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
A critical comp<strong>on</strong>ent of the transiti<strong>on</strong> process is the gradual evoluti<strong>on</strong> of Prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />
Rec<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> Teams (PRTs). In recogniti<strong>on</strong> of Afghan c<strong>on</strong>cerns regard<strong>in</strong>g parallel structures,<br />
<strong>and</strong> as part of the effort to promote Afghan capacity, PRTs are transiti<strong>on</strong><strong>in</strong>g from service<br />
delivery to capacity build<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> will either be disb<strong>and</strong>ed or form part of <strong>in</strong>dividual countries<br />
<strong>on</strong>go<strong>in</strong>g commitments to Afghanistan.<br />
To m<strong>in</strong>imize risk <strong>in</strong> later tranches, ISAF <strong>and</strong> the Afghan Government have begun the transiti<strong>on</strong><br />
process <strong>in</strong> some of the more difficult areas, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the South <strong>and</strong> East, to take advantage of<br />
the robust coaliti<strong>on</strong> presence. This plan assumes greater risk earlier <strong>in</strong> the process, but better<br />
ensures that the transiti<strong>on</strong> can be completed by the end of 2014 when the ANSF will have full<br />
resp<strong>on</strong>sibility for security.<br />
21 “Transiti<strong>on</strong>”<br />
50
3.2: CURRENT STATE OF TRANSITION<br />
Figure 20: Transiti<strong>on</strong><strong>in</strong>g Prov<strong>in</strong>ces <strong>and</strong> Districts (as of March 31, 2011)<br />
TRANCHE ONE<br />
Announced by President Karzai <strong>on</strong> March 22, 2011, the implementati<strong>on</strong> of transiti<strong>on</strong> began as<br />
scheduled <strong>in</strong> July 2011 for seven geographic areas: the prov<strong>in</strong>ces of Bamyan, Panjshir, <strong>and</strong><br />
Kabul (exclud<strong>in</strong>g Sarobi District), <strong>and</strong> the municipalities of Mazar-e Sharif (Balkh Prov<strong>in</strong>ce),<br />
Herat (Herat), Lashkar Gah (Helm<strong>and</strong>), <strong>and</strong> Mehtar Lam (Laghman). Tranche One <strong>in</strong>cluded<br />
approximately 25 percent of the Afghan populati<strong>on</strong>. Although n<strong>on</strong>e of the Tranche One areas<br />
have completed the security Transiti<strong>on</strong> process, all have made adequate progress <strong>in</strong> security,<br />
governance, <strong>and</strong> development toward full Transiti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
TRANCHE TWO<br />
On November 27, 2011, President Karzai announced the sec<strong>on</strong>d tranche of areas to beg<strong>in</strong> the<br />
Transiti<strong>on</strong> process. Tranche Two <strong>in</strong>cludes five prov<strong>in</strong>ces <strong>in</strong> their entirety <strong>and</strong> various districts<br />
<strong>and</strong> cities <strong>in</strong> 13 other prov<strong>in</strong>ces.<br />
The prov<strong>in</strong>ces <strong>in</strong>clude Balkh, Takhar, Daykundi, Samangan, <strong>and</strong> Nimroz. The districts <strong>and</strong> cities<br />
<strong>in</strong>clude Sarobi District (Kabul Prov<strong>in</strong>ce); Jalalabad city <strong>and</strong> Behsood, Kooz Kunar, Kama, <strong>and</strong><br />
Surkh Rod Districts (Nangarhar); Chagcharan city (Ghor); Sheberghan city (Jowzjan); Faizabad<br />
city <strong>and</strong> Shahr Buzurg, Yaftal Sufla, Arghanj, Baharak, Tashkan, Kishm, <strong>and</strong> Argo Districts<br />
(Badakhshan); Ghazni city (Ghazni); Qalai-e-Naw city <strong>and</strong> Aan Kamari District (Badghis);<br />
Maidan Shahr city <strong>and</strong> Hesa-e-Awal Beshood, Jalriz, <strong>and</strong> the center of Behsood Districts<br />
(Wardak); Nawa, Na’ad Ali, <strong>and</strong> Marja Districts (Helm<strong>and</strong>); all districts of Herat Prov<strong>in</strong>ce,<br />
51
exclud<strong>in</strong>g Sh<strong>in</strong>d<strong>and</strong>, Obi, <strong>and</strong> Chisht Sharif; Qarghayee District (Laghman); all districts of<br />
Parwan Prov<strong>in</strong>ce, exclud<strong>in</strong>g Sh<strong>in</strong>wary <strong>and</strong> Siagerd; <strong>and</strong> all districts of Sar-e-Pul Prov<strong>in</strong>ce,<br />
exclud<strong>in</strong>g Sayaad.<br />
Tranche Two is much larger <strong>in</strong> scope than Tranche One, <strong>and</strong> also <strong>in</strong>cludes several areas with<br />
more challeng<strong>in</strong>g security envir<strong>on</strong>ments. Different areas will proceed through the stages of<br />
transiti<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> different timel<strong>in</strong>es, based <strong>on</strong> security c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> Afghan capabilities.<br />
On December 1, 2011, Parwan Prov<strong>in</strong>ce became the first area from Tranche Two to formally<br />
enter the transiti<strong>on</strong> process, <strong>and</strong> all areas (with the excepti<strong>on</strong> of Sar-e-Pal <strong>and</strong> Takhar Prov<strong>in</strong>ces)<br />
had entered transiti<strong>on</strong> by March 31, 2012. In total, 138 districts across 20 prov<strong>in</strong>ces have<br />
entered transiti<strong>on</strong>, encompass<strong>in</strong>g approximately 50 percent of the Afghan populati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Tranche Three districts are currently under c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> evaluati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>and</strong> are expected to<br />
beg<strong>in</strong> Transiti<strong>on</strong> later <strong>in</strong> 2012.<br />
52
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53
SECTION 4 – SECURITY<br />
4.1: THE INSURGENCY<br />
The Afghan <strong>in</strong>surgency is composed of a syndicate of semi-aut<strong>on</strong>omous groups, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
Taliban, the Haqqani Network, <strong>and</strong> Hezb-e Islami Gulbudd<strong>in</strong>. The <strong>in</strong>surgency is also supported<br />
by various transnati<strong>on</strong>al terrorist groups such as al Qaeda <strong>and</strong> the Islamic Movement of<br />
Uzbekistan, as well as Pakistan-based militant groups such as Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan <strong>and</strong> the<br />
Comm<strong>and</strong>er Nazir Group. The primary actor with<strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>surgency is the Taliban, led by the<br />
Senior Shura 22<br />
<strong>in</strong> Quetta, Pakistan, <strong>and</strong> the spiritual leader Mullah Omar. Overall, these groups<br />
ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> functi<strong>on</strong>al <strong>and</strong> symbolic relati<strong>on</strong>ships <strong>in</strong> pursuit of overlapp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terests.<br />
Amid major setbacks <strong>and</strong> the loss of several senior leaders <strong>in</strong> Pakistan result<strong>in</strong>g from aggressive<br />
U.S. counterterrorism efforts, al Qaeda’s <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong> the Afghanistan <strong>in</strong>surgency has been<br />
c<strong>on</strong>stra<strong>in</strong>ed. As al Qaeda has been degraded, it has become reliant <strong>on</strong> a shr<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g cadre of<br />
experienced leaders primarily <strong>in</strong>side a Haqqani-facilitated safe haven <strong>in</strong> North Waziristan. Al<br />
Qaeda c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to seek safe haven <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, <strong>and</strong> has a small presence <strong>in</strong> Kunar <strong>and</strong><br />
Nuristan Prov<strong>in</strong>ces. The terrorist group c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to derive some benefits from its engagement<br />
<strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g exploitati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>in</strong>cidents for propag<strong>and</strong>a, pers<strong>on</strong>nel recruitment, <strong>and</strong><br />
tribal c<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong>s that it could use to re-establish future safe havens. Al Qaeda views c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued<br />
<strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan as <strong>in</strong>tegral to its global image <strong>and</strong> relevance.<br />
Although the specific area of operati<strong>on</strong>s for each group associated with the <strong>in</strong>surgency varies, the<br />
<strong>in</strong>surgency generally tends to operate al<strong>on</strong>g the border with Pakistan, primarily <strong>in</strong> the Pashtunmajority<br />
areas of southern <strong>and</strong> eastern Afghanistan, as well as <strong>in</strong> Pashtun communities <strong>in</strong><br />
northern Afghanistan. The majority of <strong>in</strong>surgent comm<strong>and</strong>ers <strong>and</strong> fighters operate <strong>in</strong> or near<br />
their home districts, <strong>and</strong> low-level fighters are often well <strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>to the local populati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Out-of-area fighters comprise a relatively small porti<strong>on</strong> of the <strong>in</strong>surgency.<br />
Taliban senior leaders rema<strong>in</strong> capable of provid<strong>in</strong>g strategic guidance to the broader <strong>in</strong>surgency<br />
<strong>and</strong> channel<strong>in</strong>g resources to support operati<strong>on</strong>al priorities. Pakistan-based senior leaders<br />
exercise vary<strong>in</strong>g degrees of comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>trol over the generally decentralized <strong>and</strong> locallybased<br />
Afghan <strong>in</strong>surgency. With<strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, <strong>in</strong>surgent leadership structures vary by prov<strong>in</strong>ce.<br />
In general, a two-man team composed of a shadow governor <strong>and</strong> a military comm<strong>and</strong>er lead<br />
governance efforts <strong>and</strong> military operati<strong>on</strong>s at the prov<strong>in</strong>cial level, <strong>and</strong> also oversee district-level<br />
<strong>in</strong>surgent leadership <strong>and</strong> lower-level military comm<strong>and</strong>ers. Most shadow governors still reside <strong>in</strong><br />
Pakistan.<br />
To recruit, <strong>in</strong>fluence, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>timidate the Afghan populace, the <strong>in</strong>surgency uses a simple but<br />
effective messag<strong>in</strong>g strategy. Capitaliz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> the lack of basic services <strong>and</strong> government<br />
assistance at the village level, the <strong>in</strong>surgency encourages farmers to plant poppies as a means of<br />
clos<strong>in</strong>g the resource gap experienced by most rural Afghans. The <strong>in</strong>surgency also cultivates <strong>and</strong><br />
exploits popular percepti<strong>on</strong>s of the Afghan Government as corrupt, unresp<strong>on</strong>sive, <strong>and</strong><br />
un<strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> the plight of rural Afghans <strong>in</strong> order to recruit local Afghans to jo<strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>surgency<br />
or to turn to shadow governments <strong>and</strong> courts to resolve issues.<br />
22 “Council” (religious c<strong>on</strong>notati<strong>on</strong>)<br />
54
The <strong>in</strong>surgency is funded from a variety of external sources, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Persian Gulf-based<br />
d<strong>on</strong>ors, state <strong>and</strong> n<strong>on</strong>-state actors <strong>in</strong> Pakistan <strong>and</strong> Iran, <strong>and</strong> various transnati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>and</strong> crim<strong>in</strong>al<br />
enterprises, but rema<strong>in</strong>s dependent <strong>on</strong> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> the narcotics trade as its primary<br />
source of revenue. Insurgents suspend operati<strong>on</strong>al efforts to provide labor for the poppy harvest,<br />
which typically beg<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> April <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to June, as revenue from the poppy harvest is<br />
critical to <strong>in</strong>surgent operati<strong>on</strong>s throughout the year.<br />
The <strong>in</strong>surgency also c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to receive critical support from neighbor<strong>in</strong>g Pakistan <strong>in</strong> the form<br />
of sanctuary, tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>frastructure, <strong>and</strong> at times, f<strong>in</strong>ancial <strong>and</strong> operati<strong>on</strong>al support. Pakistani<br />
sanctuaries bolster the efficacy of the <strong>in</strong>surgency – especially <strong>in</strong> areas where <strong>in</strong>surgents have<br />
access to direct or <strong>in</strong>direct Pakistani logistical <strong>and</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g support – <strong>and</strong> rema<strong>in</strong> the most critical<br />
threat to the ISAF campaign <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan. The <strong>in</strong>surgency also receives materiel support from<br />
Iran, although to a lesser degree than from Pakistan.<br />
4.2: STATE OF THE INSURGENCY – FALL 2011 AND WINTER 2012<br />
The <strong>in</strong>surgency failed to achieve its objectives dur<strong>in</strong>g the 2011 spr<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> summer al Badr<br />
campaign, result<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> dim<strong>in</strong>ished operati<strong>on</strong>s dur<strong>in</strong>g the fall of 2011. Overall, enemy-<strong>in</strong>itiated<br />
attacks 23<br />
from October 2011 through March 2012 were down 16 percent relative to the same<br />
period <strong>in</strong> 2011. Specific <strong>in</strong>surgent goals, bey<strong>on</strong>d escalat<strong>in</strong>g rates of assass<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> highprofile<br />
attacks, focused <strong>on</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g violence levels <strong>in</strong> southern Afghanistan<br />
<strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>duct<strong>in</strong>g high profile attacks <strong>in</strong> K<strong>and</strong>ahar City <strong>and</strong> Kabul. As a result of Afghan <strong>and</strong><br />
coaliti<strong>on</strong> Special Operati<strong>on</strong>s Forces target<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al clear-hold-build operati<strong>on</strong>s, the<br />
<strong>in</strong>surgency failed to achieve these objectives, reflect<strong>in</strong>g an ever-<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g gap between<br />
<strong>in</strong>surgent <strong>in</strong>tent <strong>and</strong> capability.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period, ANSF-ISAF operati<strong>on</strong>s ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>and</strong> exp<strong>and</strong>ed ga<strong>in</strong>s achieved<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g the spr<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> summer of 2011, <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to degrade the cohesi<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> capability of<br />
the <strong>in</strong>surgency. The most significant progress was made <strong>in</strong> RC-S <strong>and</strong> RC-SW, the Taliban’s<br />
primary area of effort, where ANSF-ISAF operati<strong>on</strong>s c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to deny <strong>in</strong>surgents’ access to<br />
some safe havens, limit freedom of movement, <strong>and</strong> disrupt logistics, effectively separat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>surgents from the Afghan populati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> key areas. Enemy-<strong>in</strong>itiated attacks <strong>in</strong> RC-SW are<br />
down 29 percent, <strong>and</strong> attacks <strong>in</strong> RC-S are up by 13 percent, relative to the same period <strong>on</strong>e year<br />
ago. Despite a decrease <strong>in</strong> attacks dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period, the prov<strong>in</strong>ces of Helm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />
K<strong>and</strong>ahar rema<strong>in</strong> two of the most violent prov<strong>in</strong>ces <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, due <strong>in</strong> part to <strong>in</strong>surgent<br />
sanctuaries <strong>and</strong> freedom of movement <strong>in</strong> Balochistan Prov<strong>in</strong>ce, Pakistan.<br />
The overall decl<strong>in</strong>es <strong>in</strong> enemy-<strong>in</strong>itiated attacks dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period, however, does not<br />
signify that the <strong>in</strong>surgency has adopted a strategy of withdraw<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>serv<strong>in</strong>g resources until<br />
the coaliti<strong>on</strong> withdraws. To the c<strong>on</strong>trary, <strong>in</strong>surgent leaders have worked throughout the fall <strong>and</strong><br />
w<strong>in</strong>ter to motivate leaders <strong>and</strong> fighters, particularly <strong>in</strong> the south <strong>and</strong> southwest, to leave Pakistani<br />
sanctuaries <strong>and</strong> return to battle. The <strong>in</strong>ability of Pakistan-based leadership to successfully enlist<br />
<strong>in</strong>surgent comm<strong>and</strong>ers <strong>and</strong> fighters to return to Afghanistan, as cited <strong>in</strong> previous reports, is a<br />
23 Enemy-Initiated Attacks, as currently def<strong>in</strong>ed by ISAF, comprise enemy acti<strong>on</strong>s (enemy-<strong>in</strong>itiated direct fire, <strong>in</strong>direct fire, <strong>and</strong> surface-to-air<br />
fire) <strong>and</strong> explosive hazard events to <strong>in</strong>clude executed attacks <strong>on</strong>ly (IED explosi<strong>on</strong>s/m<strong>in</strong>e strikes). Potential or attempted IED attacks (i.e. IEDs<br />
<strong>and</strong> m<strong>in</strong>es found <strong>and</strong> cleared, premature IED det<strong>on</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>and</strong> IED turn-<strong>in</strong>s) are not <strong>in</strong>cluded.<br />
55
steady trend <strong>and</strong> suggests fractures <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>surgent comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>trol. This trend must not be<br />
overstated; however, as noted previously, the <strong>in</strong>surgency is local <strong>in</strong> nature <strong>and</strong> Afghanistanbased<br />
<strong>in</strong>surgents operate with a degree of aut<strong>on</strong>omy, allow<strong>in</strong>g them to tailor activities to local<br />
c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
The <strong>in</strong>surgency c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to exploit areas where the Afghan Government has failed to provide<br />
sufficient governance, rule of law, c<strong>on</strong>flict resoluti<strong>on</strong>, <strong>and</strong> ec<strong>on</strong>omic opportunities. Furthermore,<br />
security ga<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> RC-S, RC-SW, RC-E <strong>and</strong> Regi<strong>on</strong>al Comm<strong>and</strong> – Capital (RC-C) risk be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
underm<strong>in</strong>ed by support the <strong>in</strong>surgency receives from neighbor<strong>in</strong>g Pakistan. In particular, the<br />
impact of Pakistani support is manifested <strong>in</strong> violence levels <strong>and</strong> high profile attacks <strong>in</strong> RC-E <strong>and</strong><br />
RC-C, where the <strong>in</strong>surgency leverages sanctuaries <strong>and</strong> support to plan <strong>and</strong> execute attacks.<br />
However, ANSF-ISAF <strong>in</strong>terdicti<strong>on</strong> operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly effective security <strong>in</strong> these areas<br />
have led to a decrease <strong>in</strong> enemy-<strong>in</strong>itiated attacks <strong>in</strong> RC-E, which decl<strong>in</strong>ed eight percent<br />
compared to the same period last year, while enemy-<strong>in</strong>itiated attacks <strong>in</strong> RC-C rema<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
statistically unchanged <strong>in</strong> the same time period. C<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s result<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>on</strong>e of the harshest<br />
w<strong>in</strong>ters <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan dur<strong>in</strong>g the last decade also likely c<strong>on</strong>tributed to the year-over-year<br />
decrease <strong>in</strong> security <strong>in</strong>cidents 24<br />
<strong>in</strong> both Kabul <strong>and</strong> RC-E.<br />
Despite the undeniable progress of ANSF-ISAF operati<strong>on</strong>s, the <strong>in</strong>surgency is highly adaptable<br />
with a significant regenerative capacity, <strong>and</strong> reta<strong>in</strong>s the capability to emplace substantial<br />
numbers of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>duct high-profile attacks. Furthermore,<br />
<strong>in</strong>surgent operati<strong>on</strong>s are not limited to direct attacks <strong>on</strong> ANSF <strong>and</strong> ISAF pers<strong>on</strong>nel, <strong>and</strong> the<br />
security statistics cited above are not sufficient to measure the balance of <strong>in</strong>surgent versus<br />
Afghan Government <strong>in</strong>fluence. The <strong>in</strong>surgency c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to exert its <strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan<br />
through alternate methods, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g kidnapp<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>in</strong>timidati<strong>on</strong> tactics, <strong>and</strong> robust assass<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong><br />
efforts, as well as messag<strong>in</strong>g at mosques <strong>and</strong> leverag<strong>in</strong>g the network of familial, tribal, <strong>and</strong><br />
ideological sympathizers to exert their <strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>in</strong> areas c<strong>on</strong>trolled by the ANSF <strong>and</strong> ISAF. The<br />
<strong>in</strong>surgency will likely exp<strong>and</strong> its soft power efforts as a result of its reduced operati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
capability <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> order to c<strong>on</strong>serve dim<strong>in</strong>ish<strong>in</strong>g resources.<br />
Near-term <strong>in</strong>surgent operati<strong>on</strong>s are expected to focus <strong>on</strong> rega<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g c<strong>on</strong>trol of safe havens <strong>and</strong><br />
exp<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>fluence over populati<strong>on</strong> centers <strong>in</strong> Helm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> K<strong>and</strong>ahar. Southern Afghanistan<br />
rema<strong>in</strong>s vital to the <strong>in</strong>surgency for its historical significance to the Taliban movement <strong>and</strong> its<br />
importance to the <strong>in</strong>surgency’s narcotics-related revenues. Kabul will rema<strong>in</strong> a persistent target<br />
for high-profile attacks <strong>and</strong> assass<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> the Taliban’s effort to underm<strong>in</strong>e public support for<br />
the Afghan Government <strong>and</strong> security forces. Additi<strong>on</strong>ally, the <strong>in</strong>surgency will likely c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to<br />
target the ANSF <strong>and</strong> local defense <strong>in</strong>itiatives, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program.<br />
In the l<strong>on</strong>g term, despite <strong>in</strong>itial overtures toward political cooperati<strong>on</strong> with the Afghan<br />
Government <strong>and</strong> the <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al community, the Taliban reta<strong>in</strong>s its goal of overthrow<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
elected Afghan Government follow<strong>in</strong>g the withdrawal of <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al forces.<br />
24 <strong>Security</strong> Incidents are currently def<strong>in</strong>ed by ISAF comprise enemy acti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> explosive hazard events. Enemy acti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong>clude direct fire<br />
attacks, <strong>in</strong>direct fire attacks, surface-to-air fire. By explosive hazards, ISAF means executed IED attacks, namely IED explosi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> m<strong>in</strong>e<br />
strikes, as well as potential IED attacks. Potential IED attacks <strong>in</strong>clude those that were found <strong>and</strong> cleared, premature IED det<strong>on</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>and</strong> IEDs<br />
that were turned <strong>in</strong> to coaliti<strong>on</strong> by local nati<strong>on</strong>als.<br />
56
4.3: ISAF CONCEPT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS – FALL 2011 AND WINTER 2012<br />
Figure 21: Key Terra<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> Area of Interest Districts<br />
Herat<br />
Farah<br />
Nimroz<br />
Badghis<br />
Helm<strong>and</strong><br />
Ghor<br />
Faryab<br />
Jowzjan<br />
K<strong>and</strong>ahar<br />
Sar-e Pul<br />
Daykundi<br />
Uruzgan<br />
Balkh<br />
Bamyan<br />
Zabul<br />
Samangan<br />
Ghazni<br />
The ISAF Campaign through 2012 will c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to see ISAF lead the expansi<strong>on</strong> of security,<br />
governance, <strong>and</strong> development across Afghanistan. Military operati<strong>on</strong>s c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to focus <strong>on</strong> the<br />
provisi<strong>on</strong> of security with<strong>in</strong> key populati<strong>on</strong> centers; c<strong>on</strong>troll<strong>in</strong>g the approaches to Kabul <strong>and</strong><br />
K<strong>and</strong>ahar; <strong>and</strong> deny<strong>in</strong>g al Qaeda safe havens <strong>in</strong>side Afghanistan. C<strong>on</strong>current to these acti<strong>on</strong>s,<br />
ISAF will provide support to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA)<br />
led Transiti<strong>on</strong> process to achieve the Lisb<strong>on</strong> objectives.<br />
The ISAF Campaign c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to move the ANSF to the fore. In January 2012, the first ever<br />
Afghan written campaign plan, OP NAWEED (Dari for “Good News”) was published. This plan<br />
is the ANSF expressi<strong>on</strong> of how the Army, Police <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>telligence services will work together to<br />
protect the populati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> defeat the <strong>in</strong>surgency through 2012 <strong>and</strong> the first half of 2013. This<br />
plan, developed <strong>in</strong> collaborati<strong>on</strong> with ISAF, sets the c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s for this style of plann<strong>in</strong>g to be<br />
replicated at the Army corps <strong>and</strong> police Z<strong>on</strong>e level across the country through 2012. The<br />
adopti<strong>on</strong> of an Afghan-led plan is critical to ensure security ga<strong>in</strong>s are ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed as the ANSF<br />
move <strong>in</strong>to the lead.<br />
ISAF will support Op NAWEED through transiti<strong>on</strong><strong>in</strong>g to a <strong>Security</strong> Force Assistance model.<br />
The adopti<strong>on</strong> of this model will see ISAF transiti<strong>on</strong> through 2012 from a combat force with<br />
advisors, to an advisory force with combat capabilities. The deployment of specially selected<br />
57<br />
Kunduz<br />
Baghlan<br />
Paktika<br />
Takhar<br />
Badakhshan<br />
Panjshayr<br />
Nuristan<br />
Parwan Kapisa<br />
Kunar<br />
Laghman<br />
Wardak Kabul<br />
Nangarhar<br />
Logar<br />
Paktiya<br />
Khost<br />
Key Terra<strong>in</strong> District (KTD)<br />
Area of Interest (AOI)
<strong>and</strong> tra<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>Security</strong> Force Assistance teams will c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue the progress already achieved with<br />
ANSF development <strong>in</strong> the field. The gradual improvement <strong>in</strong> the security situati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> the<br />
grow<strong>in</strong>g capability of the ANSF will enable the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> to recover the f<strong>in</strong>al elements of the<br />
surge force, which will be complete by 30 September 2012. The grow<strong>in</strong>g capabilities of the<br />
Afghan Comm<strong>and</strong>os, Special Police Units <strong>and</strong> the Afghan Local Police have been critical to the<br />
overall improvement <strong>in</strong> the security situati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
These effects through the summer of 2012 will set the c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s for ISAF to take a decreas<strong>in</strong>g<br />
role <strong>in</strong> this expansi<strong>on</strong> as we move towards 2014.<br />
4.4: ANSF-ISAF OPERATIONS<br />
REGIONAL COMMAND – EAST<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g this report<strong>in</strong>g period, enemy-<strong>in</strong>itiated attacks <strong>in</strong> RC-E decreased by eight percent <strong>in</strong> the<br />
October 2011 through March 2012 time period compared to the same time period <strong>on</strong>e year ago.<br />
<strong>Security</strong> <strong>in</strong>cidents <strong>in</strong> RC-E accounted for 34 percent of all security <strong>in</strong>cidents throughout<br />
Afghanistan, an <strong>in</strong>crease of four percent from October 2010 – March 2011.<br />
The eastern border districts of D<strong>and</strong>-Patan <strong>in</strong> Paktiya Prov<strong>in</strong>ce; Jani Maidan, Gurbuz, Sperah,<br />
Bak, <strong>and</strong> Tani <strong>in</strong> Khost Prov<strong>in</strong>ce; <strong>and</strong> Bermal <strong>in</strong> Paktika Prov<strong>in</strong>ce are the current focus of<br />
<strong>in</strong>surgent attacks <strong>in</strong> RC-E, due to key border passes between Afghanistan <strong>and</strong><br />
Pakistan. C<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued jo<strong>in</strong>t operati<strong>on</strong>s by ANSF <strong>and</strong> ISAF dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period <strong>in</strong> these<br />
key border districts, coupled with improved security at border check po<strong>in</strong>ts, decreased <strong>in</strong>surgent<br />
ability to effectively refit or resupply themselves for the summer fight<strong>in</strong>g seas<strong>on</strong>. Major<br />
operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong>clude Operati<strong>on</strong> MAURADER RAPIDS, which resulted <strong>in</strong> more than 70 enemy<br />
pers<strong>on</strong>nel killed <strong>and</strong> significantly disrupted <strong>in</strong>surgent movement, <strong>and</strong> Operati<strong>on</strong> RUGGED<br />
SARAK, which disrupted the flow of lethal aid <strong>and</strong> fighters al<strong>on</strong>g <strong>in</strong>surgent l<strong>in</strong>es of<br />
communicati<strong>on</strong> with the placement of new observati<strong>on</strong> po<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>and</strong> checkpo<strong>in</strong>ts al<strong>on</strong>g <strong>in</strong>surgent<br />
supply routes.<br />
In the north of RC-E, Taliban, al Qaeda, <strong>and</strong> associated networks used the Kunar border to<br />
support their effort to project lethal aid <strong>in</strong>to the Pech River Valley follow<strong>in</strong>g coaliti<strong>on</strong> force<br />
realignment. Also, Taliban senior leaders <strong>in</strong> Nangarhar, Kunar, <strong>and</strong> Nuristan <strong>in</strong>creased<br />
coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> through sub-comm<strong>and</strong>ers for attacks aga<strong>in</strong>st ANSF-ISAF fixed sites <strong>and</strong> patrols. In<br />
Kunar, there have been limited but effective attacks al<strong>on</strong>g the border (Barge-e Matal District);<br />
however, <strong>in</strong>surgents have not had the capability to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> any ga<strong>in</strong>s.<br />
The most vulnerable area <strong>in</strong> RC-E is the corridor from Kurram Agency <strong>in</strong> Pakistan’s Federally<br />
Adm<strong>in</strong>istered Tribal Areas (FATA) through Azrah District (Logar Prov<strong>in</strong>ce) <strong>in</strong>to both Logar <strong>and</strong><br />
Wardak Prov<strong>in</strong>ces, which have been key stag<strong>in</strong>g areas for attacks aga<strong>in</strong>st the capital. Operati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period focused <strong>on</strong> limit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>surgent freedom of movement al<strong>on</strong>g this<br />
<strong>in</strong>filtrati<strong>on</strong> route. The effects of Operati<strong>on</strong> SHAMSHIR have disrupted the <strong>in</strong>surgency <strong>in</strong> Wardak<br />
<strong>and</strong> Logar <strong>and</strong> forced the Taliban to relocate comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>trol nodes, degrad<strong>in</strong>g their ability<br />
to facilitate high-profile attacks <strong>in</strong>to Kabul.<br />
58
By the end of the 2011 fight<strong>in</strong>g seas<strong>on</strong>, there were clear <strong>in</strong>dicators that <strong>in</strong>surgent manpower,<br />
weap<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>and</strong> equipment was degraded. As Taliban leadership returns follow<strong>in</strong>g the w<strong>in</strong>ter<br />
m<strong>on</strong>ths, the major challenge for ANSF <strong>and</strong> ISAF will be to susta<strong>in</strong> momentum ga<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong><br />
security, governance, <strong>and</strong> development from the previous fight<strong>in</strong>g seas<strong>on</strong>. Susta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the<br />
momentum will be facilitated by a supportive populati<strong>on</strong> that is resistant to the <strong>in</strong>surgency <strong>and</strong><br />
which fully embraces the ALP. Transiti<strong>on</strong> of prov<strong>in</strong>ces <strong>and</strong> key terra<strong>in</strong> districts c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues, with<br />
an emphasis <strong>on</strong> populati<strong>on</strong> centers <strong>and</strong> areas where the ANSF <strong>and</strong> the Afghan Government<br />
dem<strong>on</strong>strate the most capacity to execute governance <strong>and</strong> development resp<strong>on</strong>sibilities, <strong>and</strong> to<br />
ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> security primacy. RC-E will c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to take advantage of opportunities to accelerate<br />
transiti<strong>on</strong> while current coaliti<strong>on</strong> combat power provides the ability to mitigate risks <strong>in</strong> more<br />
unstable transiti<strong>on</strong> areas.<br />
REGIONAL COMMAND – SOUTH<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g this report<strong>in</strong>g period, enemy-<strong>in</strong>itiated attacks <strong>in</strong> RC-S <strong>in</strong>creased by 13 percent <strong>in</strong> the<br />
October 2011 through March 2012 time period compared to the same time period <strong>on</strong>e year ago.<br />
Maiw<strong>and</strong>, Zharay, <strong>and</strong> Panjwa’i districts comprised 67 percent of RC-S enemy attacks over the<br />
report<strong>in</strong>g period. <strong>Security</strong> <strong>in</strong>cidents <strong>in</strong> RC-S accounted for 21 percent of all security <strong>in</strong>cidents<br />
throughout Afghanistan, an <strong>in</strong>crease of three percent from October 2010 – March 2011. The<br />
<strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> year-over-year EIAs <strong>in</strong> RC-S is relatively mild given that attack levels are lower over<br />
the w<strong>in</strong>ter period.<br />
The security situati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> RC-S improved dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period, as evidenced by <strong>in</strong>creased<br />
progress <strong>in</strong> the decisive terra<strong>in</strong> of K<strong>and</strong>ahar <strong>and</strong> the Argh<strong>and</strong>ab River Valley west of K<strong>and</strong>ahar<br />
City. Afghan-led security <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> around K<strong>and</strong>ahar City is exp<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> Daykundi Prov<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
transiti<strong>on</strong>ed successfully with Tranche Two. Governance, while c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g to lag beh<strong>in</strong>d ANSF<br />
development <strong>and</strong> security expansi<strong>on</strong>, grew slowly but c<strong>on</strong>sistently as Afghan leaders worked to<br />
develop soluti<strong>on</strong>s that will endure after coaliti<strong>on</strong> forces depart.<br />
The <strong>in</strong>surgency has failed to achieve its objectives for the 2011 fight<strong>in</strong>g seas<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> the RC-S area,<br />
<strong>and</strong> they have <strong>in</strong>curred significant losses to key leadership <strong>and</strong> terra<strong>in</strong>. The <strong>in</strong>surgency is<br />
expected to focus its efforts <strong>in</strong> the summer of 2012 <strong>on</strong> defend<strong>in</strong>g Maiw<strong>and</strong> as a strategic<br />
logistical, f<strong>in</strong>ancial, <strong>and</strong> support z<strong>on</strong>e. This district, al<strong>on</strong>g with Zharay <strong>and</strong> Panjwa’i, rema<strong>in</strong>s<br />
the <strong>in</strong>surgency’s focus <strong>in</strong> their efforts to rega<strong>in</strong> its <strong>in</strong>fluence with the populati<strong>on</strong> of K<strong>and</strong>ahar<br />
City. These three districts account for 67 percent of RC-S enemy attacks s<strong>in</strong>ce October 2011.<br />
Unrelent<strong>in</strong>g ISAF <strong>and</strong> ANSF operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> this area place <strong>in</strong>surgents <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly<br />
disadvantaged positi<strong>on</strong>. If <strong>in</strong>surgents c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to lose <strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>in</strong> this area, they risk los<strong>in</strong>g both<br />
the ability <strong>and</strong> credibility to <strong>in</strong>fluence the larger southern regi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
ANSF <strong>and</strong> ISAF units c<strong>on</strong>ducted partnered operati<strong>on</strong>s throughout the w<strong>in</strong>ter, with the ANSF<br />
assum<strong>in</strong>g the lead throughout the regi<strong>on</strong>al comm<strong>and</strong>. In December 2011, this lead was<br />
evidenced by Operati<strong>on</strong> HOPE HERO, the first <strong>in</strong>dependently planned <strong>and</strong> executed ANSF<br />
operati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> K<strong>and</strong>ahar Prov<strong>in</strong>ce, with ISAF provid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong>ly requested enablers <strong>and</strong> logistic<br />
support. Additi<strong>on</strong>ally, <strong>in</strong> January <strong>and</strong> February 2012, the ANA <strong>and</strong> the K<strong>and</strong>ahar Air W<strong>in</strong>g<br />
planned <strong>and</strong> executed the first two ANA-led air assaults. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the w<strong>in</strong>ter, the ANP established<br />
police garris<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> K<strong>and</strong>ahar City <strong>and</strong> the districts of Qalat, D<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> Argh<strong>and</strong>ab. In the spr<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
garris<strong>on</strong>s will also be established <strong>in</strong> Tar<strong>in</strong> Kot, Sp<strong>in</strong> Boldak <strong>and</strong> Daman Districts. Collectively,<br />
59
these police garris<strong>on</strong>s will positi<strong>on</strong> ANP <strong>in</strong> the security lead, with peripheral support from the<br />
ANA. Forces will then redeploy out of the cities <strong>in</strong> order to c<strong>on</strong>duct offensive operati<strong>on</strong>s that<br />
exp<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> reta<strong>in</strong> the security footpr<strong>in</strong>t. Also, the development of ALP <strong>in</strong> the key terra<strong>in</strong><br />
districts as well as <strong>in</strong> locati<strong>on</strong>s al<strong>on</strong>g Highway 1 have <strong>in</strong>creased village support, greatly<br />
enhanc<strong>in</strong>g the ANSF presence <strong>in</strong> RC-S.<br />
The ma<strong>in</strong> counter-network operati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> RC-S rema<strong>in</strong>s Operati<strong>on</strong> MOUNTAIN LEOPARD II.<br />
RC-S <strong>and</strong> Special Operati<strong>on</strong>s units have c<strong>on</strong>ducted 285 air assaults <strong>and</strong> 67 ground assaults <strong>in</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>juncti<strong>on</strong> with this operati<strong>on</strong> s<strong>in</strong>ce July 2011, successfully target<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> disrupt<strong>in</strong>g facilitators<br />
<strong>and</strong> leadership <strong>and</strong> degrad<strong>in</strong>g their ability to c<strong>on</strong>duct operati<strong>on</strong>s. From July 25, 2011 through<br />
March 31, 2012, comb<strong>in</strong>ed operati<strong>on</strong>s killed or captured 67 <strong>in</strong>surgent leaders, killed 250 other<br />
fighters, <strong>and</strong> deta<strong>in</strong>ed another 651 associated military-aged men for follow-<strong>on</strong> questi<strong>on</strong><strong>in</strong>g.<br />
These operati<strong>on</strong>s destroyed 12.2 t<strong>on</strong>s of explosives, 61.6 t<strong>on</strong>s of explosive pre-cursors, <strong>and</strong> over<br />
159 t<strong>on</strong>s of drugs <strong>and</strong> illegal substances.<br />
By the end of the summer of 2012, RC-S will have two Stryker Brigade Combat Teams set with<br />
47 <strong>Security</strong> Force Assistance Teams, a restructure designed to enable better operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong><br />
partner<strong>in</strong>g with the ANSF. The 205 th Corps <strong>and</strong> 404 th ANP Z<strong>on</strong>e have made excellent progress<br />
establish<strong>in</strong>g areas where ANA <strong>and</strong> ANP operate both <strong>in</strong>side <strong>and</strong> outside large populati<strong>on</strong> areas.<br />
The greatest challenge lies <strong>in</strong> establish<strong>in</strong>g the logistical <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>tenance capacity to susta<strong>in</strong> the<br />
rapid growth <strong>in</strong> ANSF pers<strong>on</strong>nel, equipment, <strong>and</strong> tactical <strong>in</strong>frastructure.<br />
REGIONAL COMMAND – SOUTHWEST<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g this report<strong>in</strong>g period, enemy-<strong>in</strong>itiated attacks <strong>in</strong> RC-SW decreased by 29 percent from<br />
October 2011 through March 2012 compared to the same period <strong>on</strong>e year ago. <strong>Security</strong> <strong>in</strong>cidents<br />
<strong>in</strong> RC-SW accounted for 37 percent of all security <strong>in</strong>cidents throughout Afghanistan, a decrease<br />
of five percent from October 2010 – March 2011.<br />
ANSF <strong>and</strong> ISAF operati<strong>on</strong>s throughout RC-SW improved the overall security situati<strong>on</strong>,<br />
especially <strong>in</strong> the critical terra<strong>in</strong> of the Central Helm<strong>and</strong> River Valley. Afghan-led security <strong>in</strong><br />
Lashkar Gah, Helm<strong>and</strong> Prov<strong>in</strong>ce’s first district to transiti<strong>on</strong> with Tranche One areas, is<br />
progress<strong>in</strong>g well. Three additi<strong>on</strong>al districts <strong>in</strong> Helm<strong>and</strong> Prov<strong>in</strong>ce (Nawah–ye Barakzai, Nad<br />
‘Ali, <strong>and</strong> Marjeh), as well as Nimroz Prov<strong>in</strong>ce, transiti<strong>on</strong>ed dur<strong>in</strong>g Tranche Two.<br />
In the Upper Helm<strong>and</strong> River Valley, ANSF <strong>and</strong> ISAF c<strong>on</strong>ducted a partnered operati<strong>on</strong> to clear<br />
Route 611 through Kajaki District <strong>in</strong> order to provide security for the Kajaki Dam project. This<br />
operati<strong>on</strong> was completed ahead of schedule, <strong>and</strong> additi<strong>on</strong>al operati<strong>on</strong>s to develop security <strong>in</strong><br />
Now Zad <strong>and</strong> Musa Qal’ah began dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period <strong>and</strong> are currently <strong>on</strong>go<strong>in</strong>g. In<br />
additi<strong>on</strong>, RC-SW <strong>and</strong> RC-W c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to c<strong>on</strong>duct jo<strong>in</strong>t plann<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> comb<strong>in</strong>ed operati<strong>on</strong>s with<br />
two ANA Corps (215 th <strong>and</strong> 207 th ). The objective of these operati<strong>on</strong>s is to improve the security<br />
situati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Farah <strong>and</strong> Gulistan <strong>and</strong> al<strong>on</strong>g Highway 1 between Helm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Herat Prov<strong>in</strong>ces.<br />
Despite improvements, many districts <strong>in</strong> Helm<strong>and</strong> rema<strong>in</strong> unstable, with Nahr-e Saraj be<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
most violent district <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan.<br />
The ANSF are gradually assum<strong>in</strong>g resp<strong>on</strong>sibility for security across Helm<strong>and</strong> Prov<strong>in</strong>ce. The<br />
operati<strong>on</strong>al performance of the ANSF c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to improve dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period, not <strong>on</strong>ly<br />
60
<strong>in</strong> the prov<strong>in</strong>cial capital of Lashkar Gah, but also <strong>in</strong> the other key areas <strong>and</strong> populati<strong>on</strong> centers.<br />
ISAF no l<strong>on</strong>ger has maneuver forces <strong>in</strong> the prov<strong>in</strong>cial capital, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> the other transiti<strong>on</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
districts, ISAF posture will c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to th<strong>in</strong> out commensurate with ANSF improvement <strong>and</strong><br />
growth.<br />
Governance c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to develop throughout RC-SW, albeit to various degrees. Representative<br />
government is established <strong>and</strong> active <strong>in</strong> all four of Helm<strong>and</strong>’s transiti<strong>on</strong><strong>in</strong>g districts. Am<strong>on</strong>g<br />
those districts await<strong>in</strong>g transiti<strong>on</strong>, the south has evidenced more substantial progress, while the<br />
districts <strong>in</strong> northern Helm<strong>and</strong> present more risk, as ISAF <strong>and</strong> ANSF operati<strong>on</strong>s have pushed the<br />
<strong>in</strong>surgency to retrench to a few str<strong>on</strong>gholds <strong>in</strong> the north. However, despite <strong>in</strong>stability, security<br />
ga<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> the north have begun to result <strong>in</strong> tangible improvements <strong>in</strong> governance <strong>and</strong><br />
development, all of which <strong>in</strong>creases local support for the Afghan Government <strong>and</strong> the ANSF.<br />
The biggest challenge for the rema<strong>in</strong>der of 2012 will be the retrograde <strong>and</strong> redeployment of more<br />
than 60 percent of Mar<strong>in</strong>e Corps units (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g four Infantry Battali<strong>on</strong>s) as RC-SW force levels<br />
decrease from more than 18,000 Mar<strong>in</strong>es to fewer than 7,000 Mar<strong>in</strong>es by October 2012. The<br />
215th ANA Corps is the youngest of the ANA Corps, <strong>and</strong> al<strong>on</strong>g with Afghan police units, will<br />
assume lead security resp<strong>on</strong>sibility throughout RC-SW. Coaliti<strong>on</strong> forces will focus efforts al<strong>on</strong>g<br />
the district centers <strong>and</strong> key populated areas of the Central Helm<strong>and</strong> River Valley <strong>and</strong> Upper<br />
Helm<strong>and</strong> River Valley. These coaliti<strong>on</strong> force efforts will be delivered through mentor teams, the<br />
support of key enablers (e.g. counter-IED <strong>and</strong> medical evacuati<strong>on</strong>), <strong>and</strong> limited partner<strong>in</strong>g for the<br />
ANSF.<br />
REGIONAL COMMAND – WEST<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g this report<strong>in</strong>g period, enemy-<strong>in</strong>itiated attacks <strong>in</strong> RC-W <strong>in</strong>creased by seven percent <strong>in</strong> the<br />
October 2011 through March 2012 time period compared to the same time period <strong>on</strong>e year ago.<br />
<strong>Security</strong> <strong>in</strong>cidents <strong>in</strong> Regi<strong>on</strong>al Comm<strong>and</strong> – West (RC-W) accounted for five percent of all<br />
security <strong>in</strong>cidents throughout Afghanistan, an <strong>in</strong>crease of <strong>on</strong>e percent from October 2010 –<br />
March 2011.<br />
Operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> RC-W predom<strong>in</strong>antly <strong>in</strong>cluded ANSF-ISAF patrols al<strong>on</strong>g Highway 1 through<br />
Farah <strong>and</strong> Badghis prov<strong>in</strong>ces <strong>in</strong> order to achieve freedom of movement <strong>and</strong> disrupt <strong>in</strong>surgents’<br />
freedom of acti<strong>on</strong>. Patrols <strong>and</strong> operati<strong>on</strong>s with<strong>in</strong> these areas have been c<strong>on</strong>ducted with<strong>in</strong> the<br />
seas<strong>on</strong>al w<strong>in</strong>ter-spr<strong>in</strong>g objectives <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>creased overall security <strong>in</strong> RC-W.<br />
Partnered operati<strong>on</strong>s throughout the report<strong>in</strong>g period dem<strong>on</strong>strated positive ANSF performance<br />
<strong>on</strong> security <strong>and</strong> freedom of movement operati<strong>on</strong>s. Notably, ANA leadership <strong>and</strong> staff capability<br />
with<strong>in</strong> the 207 th Corps <strong>in</strong> RC-W c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to improve through close cooperati<strong>on</strong> with advis<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>and</strong> partner<strong>in</strong>g units. Notably, the ANA 207 th Corps with<strong>in</strong> RC-W has planned <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>ducted<br />
cord<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> search operati<strong>on</strong>s. One of these operati<strong>on</strong>s was the ANSF-planned <strong>and</strong> -led Operati<strong>on</strong><br />
COPPERHEAD <strong>in</strong> Farah Prov<strong>in</strong>ce, which focused <strong>on</strong> ensur<strong>in</strong>g freedom of movement al<strong>on</strong>g<br />
route 515 (stretch<strong>in</strong>g from Farah District to Delaram District) <strong>and</strong> disrupt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>surgent freedom<br />
of acti<strong>on</strong>. Overall, security improved <strong>in</strong> this area, a reflecti<strong>on</strong> of the ANSF’s exp<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
capabilities <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependence.<br />
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The ANA 207 th Corps’ <strong>in</strong>creased plann<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> operati<strong>on</strong>al capability has accelerated <strong>and</strong><br />
exp<strong>and</strong>ed their sense of ownership for operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>creased their <strong>in</strong>teracti<strong>on</strong> with coaliti<strong>on</strong><br />
forces. Nevertheless, shortfalls rema<strong>in</strong> c<strong>on</strong>cern<strong>in</strong>g the plann<strong>in</strong>g of complex operati<strong>on</strong>s (crossboundary<br />
operati<strong>on</strong>s) <strong>and</strong> lack of equipment.<br />
The major challenge with<strong>in</strong> RC-W for the near term will be to susta<strong>in</strong> the ANSF operati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
capability as coaliti<strong>on</strong> forces withdraw <strong>and</strong> rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g forces shift to an advisory role with<strong>in</strong> the<br />
transiti<strong>on</strong> process.<br />
REGIONAL COMMAND – NORTH<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g this report<strong>in</strong>g period, enemy-<strong>in</strong>itiated attacks <strong>in</strong> RC-N decreased by 60 percent <strong>in</strong> the<br />
October 2011 through March 2012 time period compared to the same time period <strong>on</strong>e year ago.<br />
<strong>Security</strong> <strong>in</strong>cidents <strong>in</strong> Regi<strong>on</strong>al Comm<strong>and</strong> – North (RC-N) accounted for two percent of all<br />
security <strong>in</strong>cidents throughout Afghanistan, a decrease of two percent from October 2010 – March<br />
2011.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g the past six m<strong>on</strong>ths, operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> RC-N focused <strong>on</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Afghan Government<br />
c<strong>on</strong>trol over key terra<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> Kunduz, Faryab <strong>and</strong> Baghlan Prov<strong>in</strong>ces, <strong>and</strong> promot<strong>in</strong>g freedom of<br />
movement al<strong>on</strong>g Highways 1, 3, <strong>and</strong> 6. In additi<strong>on</strong> to these efforts, plann<strong>in</strong>g has begun <strong>on</strong><br />
operati<strong>on</strong>s to provide security to enable the c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> of Highway 1 from Qaisar District <strong>in</strong><br />
Faryab Prov<strong>in</strong>ce to Almar District <strong>in</strong> Badghis Prov<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> RC-W. Notably, the plann<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong><br />
eventual executi<strong>on</strong> of this effort is ANSF-led, with ISAF provid<strong>in</strong>g partners, mentors, <strong>and</strong><br />
enablers.<br />
In October 2011, the ANSF, with ISAF support <strong>and</strong> partner<strong>in</strong>g, started Operati<strong>on</strong> EBTEKAR III,<br />
a six-m<strong>on</strong>th ANSF-led operati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> the prov<strong>in</strong>ces of Balkh <strong>and</strong> Jowzjan <strong>in</strong>tended to disrupt<br />
<strong>in</strong>surgents’ activity <strong>and</strong> enable the ANSF to reta<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> exp<strong>and</strong> security. The operati<strong>on</strong> also set<br />
the c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s for the transiti<strong>on</strong> of these areas to Afghan Government c<strong>on</strong>trol.<br />
In February 2012, Operati<strong>on</strong> CHAMTO started as a cross-prov<strong>in</strong>cial operati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Kunduz <strong>and</strong><br />
Baghlan Prov<strong>in</strong>ces. This Afghan-planned <strong>and</strong> -led operati<strong>on</strong> builds <strong>on</strong> the previous security ga<strong>in</strong>s<br />
<strong>and</strong> is expected to reta<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> improve the security situati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> order to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> freedom of<br />
movement <strong>on</strong> Highways 1, 3, <strong>and</strong> 5, a strategically important but fragile area.<br />
With the ANSF <strong>in</strong> the lead, plann<strong>in</strong>g of future operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> force posture c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to focus <strong>on</strong><br />
w<strong>in</strong>ter/spr<strong>in</strong>g operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> current <strong>and</strong> future transiti<strong>on</strong> plann<strong>in</strong>g. The 209 th ANA Corps <strong>in</strong><br />
RC-N c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to develop, <strong>and</strong> all units <strong>in</strong>creased their capabilities for plann<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> executi<strong>on</strong><br />
of operati<strong>on</strong>s dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period.<br />
In January 2012, Tranche Two transiti<strong>on</strong> cerem<strong>on</strong>ies took place <strong>in</strong> Badakhshan, Balkh, <strong>and</strong><br />
Jowzjan Prov<strong>in</strong>ces, with security provided by coord<strong>in</strong>ated operati<strong>on</strong>s between the ANP <strong>and</strong><br />
ANA, <strong>and</strong> ISAF provid<strong>in</strong>g emergency support as needed. ANSF performance dur<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
transiti<strong>on</strong> cerem<strong>on</strong>ies dem<strong>on</strong>strated the improved capabilities for comb<strong>in</strong>ed operati<strong>on</strong>s between<br />
the ANA <strong>and</strong> ANP.<br />
The upcom<strong>in</strong>g challenges for RC-N will be the reducti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> coaliti<strong>on</strong> forces as well as the<br />
62
c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued transiti<strong>on</strong> process. Force reducti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> the planned number of mentor teams will<br />
c<strong>on</strong>stra<strong>in</strong> the coaliti<strong>on</strong>’s ability to mentor <strong>and</strong> advise a high percentage of ANSF units. Further,<br />
as an <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g number of districts <strong>and</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ces transiti<strong>on</strong> to Afghan security lead, ISAF’s<br />
access to <strong>in</strong>formati<strong>on</strong> to support operati<strong>on</strong>s will be reduced.<br />
REGIONAL COMMAND – CAPITAL<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g this report<strong>in</strong>g period, security <strong>in</strong>cidents <strong>in</strong> Regi<strong>on</strong>al Comm<strong>and</strong> – Capital were statistically<br />
<strong>in</strong>significant (less than <strong>on</strong>e percent) compared to all security <strong>in</strong>cidents throughout Afghanistan,<br />
<strong>and</strong> thus represented no significant change compared to the same time period <strong>on</strong>e year ago. RC-<br />
C is by far the smallest RC.<br />
ANSF-ISAF operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> RC-C focused <strong>on</strong> jo<strong>in</strong>t clear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> patroll<strong>in</strong>g operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> order to<br />
provide security for Kabul City as well as c<strong>on</strong>trol Highway 7 <strong>and</strong> Highway 1 with<strong>in</strong> Kabul<br />
Prov<strong>in</strong>ce boundaries. Operati<strong>on</strong>s dur<strong>in</strong>g the reported period helped to neutralize <strong>in</strong>surgent<br />
support z<strong>on</strong>es <strong>and</strong> reduce spectacular attacks <strong>in</strong> Kabul while ga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the trust of the Afghan<br />
populati<strong>on</strong>. In order to achieve these goals, five Capital Divisi<strong>on</strong> ANSF k<strong>and</strong>aks, <strong>in</strong><br />
coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> with ISAF, c<strong>on</strong>ducted clear<strong>in</strong>g operati<strong>on</strong>s focused <strong>in</strong> Musahi, Paghman, Khake<br />
Jabbar, Qarah Bagh, Deh-e Sabz <strong>and</strong> Chahar Asiab Districts.<br />
Kabul City had a relatively calm fall <strong>and</strong> w<strong>in</strong>ter. ISAF, partnered with the ANP, decreased the<br />
frequency of some patrols, such as rotary w<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> rocket box patrols, due to the low level of<br />
enemy attacks dur<strong>in</strong>g the last six m<strong>on</strong>ths. Major security operati<strong>on</strong>s were c<strong>on</strong>ducted <strong>in</strong> support<br />
of critical cerem<strong>on</strong>ies, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the Loya Jirga <strong>in</strong> November, the open<strong>in</strong>g of Ghazi Stadium <strong>in</strong><br />
December <strong>and</strong> the open<strong>in</strong>g of the Afghan Parliament <strong>in</strong> January, with the overall objective of<br />
hav<strong>in</strong>g the ANSF units <strong>in</strong> the lead, supported by ISAF assets.<br />
Throughout the RC, ANSF units have assumed ownership of the security missi<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
a positive work<strong>in</strong>g relati<strong>on</strong>ship with ISAF. The ANSF are <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly capable of plann<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong><br />
synchr<strong>on</strong>iz<strong>in</strong>g operati<strong>on</strong>s to support district <strong>and</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>cial security with <strong>in</strong>creased levels of<br />
Afghan enablers <strong>and</strong> reduced dependence <strong>on</strong> ISAF.<br />
With the w<strong>in</strong>ter fight<strong>in</strong>g seas<strong>on</strong>, the <strong>in</strong>surgency started to <strong>in</strong>crease their efforts to transport<br />
materiel <strong>and</strong> suicide bombers <strong>in</strong>to Kabul City for future attacks <strong>in</strong>to Kabul <strong>and</strong> the surround<strong>in</strong>g<br />
districts. The general threats <strong>and</strong> overall violence <strong>in</strong>dicated that the <strong>in</strong>creased security measures<br />
<strong>and</strong> success of ANSF <strong>and</strong> coaliti<strong>on</strong> forces <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> around Kabul City forced the <strong>in</strong>surgency to<br />
c<strong>on</strong>duct spectacular attacks with low logistical footpr<strong>in</strong>ts but possible high payoffs. As the<br />
ANSF c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to develop <strong>and</strong> improve, however, <strong>in</strong>surgent attacks <strong>in</strong> the capital are expected<br />
to c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to decl<strong>in</strong>e.<br />
4.5: LOCAL DEFENSE INITIATIVES<br />
Village <strong>Stability</strong> Operati<strong>on</strong>s (VSO) <strong>and</strong> the Afghan Local Police are critical comp<strong>on</strong>ents of<br />
ISAF’s COIN strategy. Together, VSO <strong>and</strong> ALP c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to make progress <strong>in</strong> protect<strong>in</strong>g rural<br />
populati<strong>on</strong>s, prevent<strong>in</strong>g their exploitati<strong>on</strong> by the <strong>in</strong>surgency <strong>and</strong> exp<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>fluence of the<br />
Afghan Government. Taken together, VSO <strong>and</strong> ALP reflect both “bottom-up” <strong>and</strong> “top-down”<br />
approaches to COIN – the former be<strong>in</strong>g reflected <strong>in</strong> security, governance, <strong>and</strong> development built<br />
up from the village <strong>and</strong> district levels, <strong>and</strong> the latter evidenced through c<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong>s to nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
63
Afghan Government authorizati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> implement<strong>in</strong>g mechanisms. A key to this relati<strong>on</strong>ship is<br />
Comb<strong>in</strong>ed Forces Special Operati<strong>on</strong>s Comp<strong>on</strong>ent Comm<strong>and</strong> – Afghanistan’s (CFSOCC-A)<br />
Village <strong>Stability</strong> Nati<strong>on</strong>al Coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> Center (VSNCC) <strong>and</strong> its <strong>in</strong>teragency affiliates. Through<br />
the VNSCC’s Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Augmentati<strong>on</strong> Teams <strong>and</strong> District Augmentati<strong>on</strong> Teams, direct support<br />
is facilitated from the nati<strong>on</strong>al level to the village level, <strong>and</strong> local feedback is then returned to<br />
ISAF <strong>and</strong> the Afghan Government.<br />
VILLAGE STABILITY OPERATIONS<br />
The Comb<strong>in</strong>ed Jo<strong>in</strong>t Special Operati<strong>on</strong>s Task Force – Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) <strong>in</strong>itiated VSO <strong>in</strong><br />
2010. VSO are a bottom-up COIN <strong>in</strong>itiative that establishes security areas around rural villages<br />
to promote local governance <strong>and</strong> development. VSO rely <strong>on</strong> embedded U.S. Special Operati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
Forces (USSOF) <strong>and</strong> ANASF to improve security, governance, <strong>and</strong> development <strong>in</strong> communities<br />
where the ANSF <strong>and</strong> ISAF have limited presence. VSO success has c<strong>on</strong>tributed to the<br />
significant growth of the program; VSO <strong>in</strong>itially encompassed <strong>on</strong>ly eight districts, but have s<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
exp<strong>and</strong>ed to <strong>in</strong>clude 5,200 CJSOTF-A pers<strong>on</strong>nel work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> more than 100 communities <strong>in</strong> 58<br />
districts throughout Afghanistan.<br />
Overall security has improved <strong>in</strong> most villages as a result of VSO. K<strong>in</strong>etic activity around the<br />
Village <strong>Stability</strong> Platform (VSP) generally <strong>in</strong>creases immediately before a USSOF team embeds<br />
<strong>in</strong> the “shape” phase, <strong>and</strong> peaks dur<strong>in</strong>g the “hold” phase, which is the m<strong>on</strong>th that the team<br />
embeds. From that po<strong>in</strong>t, the security situati<strong>on</strong> generally improves <strong>and</strong> k<strong>in</strong>etic activity gradually<br />
drops below pre-shap<strong>in</strong>g levels after approximately 15-18 m<strong>on</strong>ths.<br />
In VSP districts, governance activity is generally higher than throughout the rest of Afghanistan,<br />
both am<strong>on</strong>g local villages <strong>and</strong> between villages <strong>and</strong> district authorities. Villages near a VSP<br />
attended an average of 58 percent of bi-weekly Community Development Councils (CDCs)<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period. This attendance figure represents a decl<strong>in</strong>e over the previous<br />
report<strong>in</strong>g period. Local villages <strong>and</strong> district authorities <strong>in</strong>teracted an average of three times<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g every two-week period <strong>in</strong> the report<strong>in</strong>g period; visits by district representatives to villages<br />
supported by the VSO program accounted for nearly half of these <strong>in</strong>teracti<strong>on</strong>s. This c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued<br />
governance activity is noteworthy, given the broader struggles <strong>in</strong> local governance throughout<br />
Afghanistan.<br />
AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE<br />
As the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple comp<strong>on</strong>ent of the VSO <strong>in</strong>itiative, the ALP are village-based security forces<br />
adm<strong>in</strong>istered by the MoI. The program utilizes USSOF to tra<strong>in</strong> Afghans <strong>in</strong> rural areas to defend<br />
their communities aga<strong>in</strong>st threats from <strong>in</strong>surgents <strong>and</strong> militant groups, <strong>in</strong> support of ISAF’s<br />
COIN strategy.<br />
The MoI has approved 99 districts for ALP units; of these, 58 have been validated by their local<br />
shura <strong>and</strong> the MoI, a 21 percent <strong>in</strong>crease from the previous report<strong>in</strong>g period. The total force of<br />
12,660 ALP represents a 56 percent <strong>in</strong>crease from the previous report<strong>in</strong>g period. The Afghan<br />
Government has authorized an end-strength of 30,000 ALP. However, ALP growth <strong>in</strong> the south<br />
<strong>and</strong> east – the ma<strong>in</strong> focus areas of the program – c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to be challenged by <strong>in</strong>surgent<br />
<strong>in</strong>timidati<strong>on</strong> efforts <strong>and</strong> tribal <strong>in</strong>fight<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
64
Figure 22: ALP Dispositi<strong>on</strong> (as of March 31, 2012)<br />
65<br />
65<br />
ALP Validated<br />
ALP Not Validated<br />
The ALP program c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to exp<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> ga<strong>in</strong> popular support. Tactical <strong>and</strong> technical<br />
proficiency of units ga<strong>in</strong>ed dur<strong>in</strong>g the 2011 fight<strong>in</strong>g seas<strong>on</strong> has improved ALP capacity <strong>and</strong><br />
performance. The susta<strong>in</strong>ability of these ga<strong>in</strong>s, however, depends <strong>on</strong> coaliti<strong>on</strong> enabler support,<br />
MoI engagement, <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued USSOF mentor<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
Despite significant success, the ALP face multiple challenges. The program is heavily<br />
dependent <strong>on</strong> U.S. Government fund<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> USSOF tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, mentorship, <strong>and</strong> oversight.<br />
Achiev<strong>in</strong>g the approved total force of 30,000 ALP guardians will challenge the capacity of<br />
CFSOCC-A forces, <strong>and</strong> may require additi<strong>on</strong>al support from USSOF <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al force<br />
enablers. In part mitigat<strong>in</strong>g this c<strong>on</strong>cern, current plans call for transiti<strong>on</strong><strong>in</strong>g some USSOF teams<br />
from directly tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g ALP to an “ISAF overwatch” role for mature ALP units, which would<br />
<strong>in</strong>crease CFSOCC-A’s ability to tra<strong>in</strong>, mentor, <strong>and</strong> oversee ALP with decreased force<br />
requirements.<br />
Numerous ALP sites will transiti<strong>on</strong> to Afghan Government c<strong>on</strong>trol but rema<strong>in</strong> with<strong>in</strong> ISAF<br />
“overwatch.” ISAF overwatch is an endur<strong>in</strong>g operati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>and</strong> adm<strong>in</strong>istrative affiliati<strong>on</strong> between<br />
ISAF elements <strong>and</strong> VSO/ALP sites that have transiti<strong>on</strong>ed to ANSF primary partner<strong>in</strong>g<br />
resp<strong>on</strong>sibility. ISAF overwatch is designed to m<strong>in</strong>imize risk, ensure c<strong>on</strong>sistent support, <strong>and</strong><br />
enhance the success of Afghan security forces. This approach enables ISAF to reassign freed-up<br />
ISAF elements to generate additi<strong>on</strong>al ALP <strong>in</strong> other districts. In order for a VSO/ALP site to be<br />
c<strong>on</strong>sidered for transiti<strong>on</strong>, the Afghan Government must be able to susta<strong>in</strong> security, development,<br />
<strong>and</strong> governance at the district level with m<strong>in</strong>imal-to-no assistance from ISAF. ALP transiti<strong>on</strong>s
are determ<strong>in</strong>ed by c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> the ground <strong>and</strong> the ultimate authority to transiti<strong>on</strong> resides with<br />
the CFSOCC-A Comm<strong>and</strong>er.<br />
ALP face many challenges, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g ethnic <strong>and</strong> tribal tensi<strong>on</strong>s. For example, <strong>in</strong> Baghlan<br />
Prov<strong>in</strong>ce, ethnic tensi<strong>on</strong>s have resulted <strong>in</strong> clashes between Pashtun-dom<strong>in</strong>ated ALP <strong>and</strong> Tajikdom<strong>in</strong>ated<br />
ANP. Although local shuras are largely effective <strong>in</strong> ensur<strong>in</strong>g fair tribal <strong>and</strong> ethnic<br />
representati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> ALP units, some shuras <strong>and</strong> ALP comm<strong>and</strong>ers actively resist recruit<strong>in</strong>g certa<strong>in</strong><br />
ethnicities, which can create significant ethnic tensi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> multi-ethnic villages. To mitigate these<br />
risks, USSOF works closely with the shuras <strong>and</strong> District Chiefs of Police to promote a multiethnic<br />
approach, which is a key to stability.<br />
The proliferati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>in</strong>dependent, n<strong>on</strong>-Afghan Government sancti<strong>on</strong>ed militias, which operate<br />
outside the VSO/ALP framework, threatens to underm<strong>in</strong>e the legitimacy <strong>and</strong> progress of the<br />
programs. Although limited <strong>in</strong> number, these unauthorized organizati<strong>on</strong>s threaten to damage the<br />
ALP “br<strong>and</strong>,” especially those that misuse the ALP name to further their own <strong>in</strong>terests.<br />
F<strong>in</strong>ally, dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period, the <strong>United</strong> Nati<strong>on</strong>s Assistance Missi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan<br />
(UNAMA) released its annual report <strong>on</strong> the protecti<strong>on</strong> of civilians, which discussed the ALP at<br />
length. UNAMA noted that ALP had improved security <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> kept <strong>in</strong>surgents out of ALP areas,<br />
but ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed some criticisms from its 2010 report, which <strong>in</strong>cluded references to isolated issues<br />
<strong>in</strong> recruitment, vett<strong>in</strong>g, tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> discipl<strong>in</strong>e. To address these occurrences, CFSOCC-A<br />
created ALP Assessment Teams charged with <strong>in</strong>vestigat<strong>in</strong>g misc<strong>on</strong>duct allegati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> related<br />
issues affect<strong>in</strong>g the ALP at the district level.<br />
4.6: AFGHAN PUBLIC PROTECTION FORCE (APPF)<br />
The Bridg<strong>in</strong>g Strategy for Presidential Decree 62 (August 16, 2010) stated that commercial,<br />
development fixed site, <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>voy security services, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g ISAF c<strong>on</strong>voys, must transiti<strong>on</strong> to<br />
the Afghan Public Protecti<strong>on</strong> Force (APPF) by March 20, 2012, with security services for ISAF<br />
bases <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> sites transiti<strong>on</strong><strong>in</strong>g to APPF by March 20, 2013.<br />
Six- <strong>and</strong> n<strong>in</strong>e-m<strong>on</strong>th assessments were completed by MoI, ISAF, <strong>and</strong> U.S. Embassy pers<strong>on</strong>nel<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g September 2011 <strong>and</strong> January 2012. Results <strong>in</strong>dicated the APPF was not <strong>on</strong> track to meet<br />
the requirements of the Bridg<strong>in</strong>g Strategy. The assessments c<strong>on</strong>cluded the State Owned<br />
Enterprise (SOE) was not developed <strong>and</strong> lacked sufficient leadership, tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g capacity,<br />
resources, <strong>and</strong> plann<strong>in</strong>g necessary for <strong>in</strong>creased roles <strong>and</strong> resp<strong>on</strong>sibilities. The Afghan<br />
Government acknowledged the assessment <strong>and</strong> requested assistance from ISAF <strong>and</strong> the U.S.<br />
Embassy. As a result the APPF Advisory Group was established to partner with the Afghan<br />
Government <strong>and</strong> build adequate APPF capacity <strong>and</strong> capability.<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce that time, the APPF Advisory Group has worked closely with the MoI to advance APPF<br />
development, <strong>and</strong>, as a result, the APPF has made substantial positive progress <strong>on</strong> critical tasks<br />
necessary to beg<strong>in</strong> the transiti<strong>on</strong> of security resp<strong>on</strong>sibilities <strong>and</strong> President Karzai approved the<br />
APPF transiti<strong>on</strong> plan. APPF has issued 15 permanent Risk Management C<strong>on</strong>sultant licenses <strong>and</strong><br />
an additi<strong>on</strong>al 31 <strong>in</strong>terim RMCs. These <strong>in</strong>terim RMCs will allow security providers to operate<br />
under the APPF even as they pursue permanent RMC licenses. In additi<strong>on</strong>, 40 c<strong>on</strong>tracts with<br />
commercial <strong>and</strong> developmental partners are now complete, with six more <strong>in</strong> the advanced stages<br />
66
of negotiati<strong>on</strong>. The advisory group c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to work closely with the MoI to ensure the APPF<br />
matures <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to support commercial <strong>and</strong> development efforts.<br />
4.7: POPULATION SECURITY 25<br />
Afghan nati<strong>on</strong>al percepti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> regard to security c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s have improved slightly s<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
September 2011, based <strong>on</strong> the percentage of polled citizens who described security as either<br />
“fair” or “good” (85 percent <strong>in</strong> September 2011 versus nearly 90 percent <strong>in</strong> March 2012).<br />
Additi<strong>on</strong>ally, the percentage of Afghans who described their security envir<strong>on</strong>ment as “bad”<br />
decreased from approximately 15 percent <strong>in</strong> September 2011 to close to 10 percent <strong>in</strong> March<br />
2012.<br />
Polls <strong>in</strong>dicate that Afghans who believe the police can protect them outnumber their opposites by<br />
a 3-to-1 marg<strong>in</strong>. Seventy-three percent of Afghans believe that “the police are capable of<br />
protect<strong>in</strong>g their mantaqa,” a three percent <strong>in</strong>crease from the previous quarter, while the<br />
percentage of Afghans who rated the police as “<strong>in</strong>capable” fell from 28 percent to 25 percent<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g the same timeframe. Two percent of resp<strong>on</strong>dents decl<strong>in</strong>ed to answer or said they didn’t<br />
know.<br />
Despite negative views of the security situati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> some areas across the country, the majority of<br />
Afghans believe the government is lead<strong>in</strong>g security efforts – a sentiment that has prevailed for<br />
several years. C<strong>on</strong>versely, Afghans’ percepti<strong>on</strong> of Taliban <strong>and</strong> anti-government elements’<br />
c<strong>on</strong>tributi<strong>on</strong> to security rema<strong>in</strong>s low.<br />
4.8: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g this report<strong>in</strong>g period, ISAF took extensive measures, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g revis<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> re-issu<strong>in</strong>g<br />
several Tactical Directives, to reduce ISAF-caused civilian casualties. These measures have<br />
generated positive results. Data <strong>in</strong>dicates that 78 percent of civilian casualties (CIVCAS)<br />
occurr<strong>in</strong>g dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period were caused by the <strong>in</strong>surgency. The total CIVCAS for the<br />
period of October 2011 – March 2012 decreased 32 percent from the same period last year.<br />
CIVCAS caused by ISAF decreased 49 percent over the same period.<br />
Insurgents c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to rely <strong>on</strong> IEDs as the pr<strong>in</strong>cipal means to execute their campaign. More than<br />
60 percent of CIVCAS caused by <strong>in</strong>surgents were from <strong>in</strong>discrim<strong>in</strong>ate IED explosi<strong>on</strong>s. More<br />
than half of IEDs <strong>and</strong> m<strong>in</strong>es were found safely cleared by security forces, which has helped to<br />
reduce CIVCAS.<br />
25 Data <strong>in</strong> this sub-secti<strong>on</strong> was taken from the Afghan Nati<strong>on</strong>al Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR) Survey, Wave 15, March 2012.<br />
67
Figure 23: M<strong>on</strong>thly Civilian Wounded or Killed by Insurgents <strong>and</strong> ISAF (October 2009 – March 2012)<br />
# of Civilian Casualties<br />
500<br />
450<br />
400<br />
350<br />
300<br />
250<br />
200<br />
150<br />
100<br />
50<br />
4.9: GREEN-ON-BLUE INCIDENTS<br />
0<br />
Civilian Casualties caused<br />
by Insurgents<br />
Civilian Casualties caused<br />
by ISAF<br />
Oct 09<br />
Nov 09<br />
Dec 09<br />
Jan 10<br />
Feb 10<br />
Mar 10<br />
Apr 10<br />
A number of high-profile <strong>in</strong>cidents occurred dur<strong>in</strong>g this report<strong>in</strong>g period <strong>in</strong> which ANSF<br />
members know<strong>in</strong>gly attacked <strong>and</strong>/or helped facilitate an attack aga<strong>in</strong>st coaliti<strong>on</strong> members with<br />
the <strong>in</strong>tent to maim or kill coaliti<strong>on</strong> pers<strong>on</strong>nel (“Green-<strong>on</strong>-Blue” <strong>in</strong>cidents). While statistically<br />
small <strong>in</strong> number, Green-<strong>on</strong>-Blue attacks have a significant negative operati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>and</strong> strategic<br />
impact <strong>on</strong> the coaliti<strong>on</strong> missi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan. An attack <strong>on</strong> NATO mentors at the MoI <strong>on</strong><br />
February 25, 2012 resulted <strong>in</strong> a brief suspensi<strong>on</strong> of MoI mentor<strong>in</strong>g activities while security<br />
protocols were reviewed, <strong>and</strong> other attacks have caused similar problems.<br />
These attacks have not yet caused a major diplomatic rift, nor have they significantly hurt<br />
relati<strong>on</strong>s between the ANSF <strong>and</strong> ISAF. The vast majority of coaliti<strong>on</strong> mentors have c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to<br />
tra<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> fight al<strong>on</strong>gside their Afghan partners with the same dedicati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> skill as they always<br />
have. Indeed, Afghan <strong>and</strong> ISAF soldiers c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to depend <strong>on</strong> each other for vital support <strong>on</strong> a<br />
daily basis <strong>on</strong> partnered operati<strong>on</strong>s throughout the country.<br />
While they are often high-profile, Green-<strong>on</strong>-Blue <strong>in</strong>cidents are rare, <strong>and</strong> have resulted <strong>in</strong> a<br />
relatively small number of casualties. From May 2007 to the end of March 2012, a total of 52<br />
Green-<strong>on</strong>-Blue <strong>in</strong>cidents occurred. 26<br />
Of these 52 <strong>in</strong>cidents, 43 resulted <strong>in</strong> the death or <strong>in</strong>jury of<br />
coaliti<strong>on</strong> (military <strong>and</strong> civilian pers<strong>on</strong>nel), result<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> 86 dead <strong>and</strong> 115 wounded.<br />
Investigati<strong>on</strong>s have determ<strong>in</strong>ed that a large majority of Green-<strong>on</strong>-Blue attacks are not attributable<br />
to <strong>in</strong>surgent <strong>in</strong>filtrati<strong>on</strong> of the ANSF, but are due to isolated pers<strong>on</strong>al grievances aga<strong>in</strong>st coaliti<strong>on</strong><br />
pers<strong>on</strong>nel. There is no <strong>in</strong>dicati<strong>on</strong> that these recent attacks are part of a deliberate effort by<br />
<strong>in</strong>surgents, nor were they coord<strong>in</strong>ated with each other.<br />
26 The number of Green <strong>on</strong> Blue <strong>in</strong>cidents is subject to change as newly-identified past cases emerge.<br />
May 10<br />
Jun 10<br />
Jul 10<br />
Aug 10<br />
Sep 10<br />
Oct 10<br />
Nov 10<br />
Dec 10<br />
68<br />
Jan 11<br />
Feb 11<br />
Mar 11<br />
Apr 11<br />
May 11<br />
Jun 11<br />
Jul 11<br />
Aug 11<br />
Sep 11<br />
Oct 11<br />
Nov 11<br />
Dec 11<br />
Jan 12<br />
Feb 12<br />
Mar 12
Together, coaliti<strong>on</strong> forces <strong>and</strong> the ANSF have been implement<strong>in</strong>g several measures to prevent<br />
<strong>in</strong>filtrati<strong>on</strong>. ISAF has issued a Tactical Directive outl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the ways that ISAF is manag<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
Insider Threat through improv<strong>in</strong>g situati<strong>on</strong>al awareness <strong>and</strong> force protecti<strong>on</strong>. The ANSF has<br />
taken unprecedented acti<strong>on</strong> to counter the <strong>in</strong>sider threat <strong>and</strong> to deny the <strong>in</strong>surgency the ability to<br />
<strong>in</strong>filtrate their units. They have implemented an eight step vett<strong>in</strong>g process <strong>and</strong> have embedded<br />
counter-<strong>in</strong>telligence officers across the services to reduce the <strong>in</strong>sider threat.<br />
Figure 24: ANA Screen<strong>in</strong>g Process<br />
69
SECTION 5 – GOVERNANCE<br />
5.1: ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL GOVERNANCE<br />
The Afghan Government is gradually develop<strong>in</strong>g the capacity to provide stable, effective, <strong>and</strong><br />
resp<strong>on</strong>sive governance to the Afghan populati<strong>on</strong>. However, the government’s l<strong>on</strong>g-term<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability is jeopardized by multiple factors, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g widespread corrupti<strong>on</strong>, dependence <strong>on</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al aid <strong>and</strong> mentor<strong>in</strong>g support, <strong>and</strong> an imbalance of power that favors the executive<br />
branch over the legislative <strong>and</strong> judicial branches. Limited human capacity with appropriate<br />
formal tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g or civilian educati<strong>on</strong> with<strong>in</strong> the civil service sector also impedes the development<br />
of stable <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>able government across Afghanistan.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period, the executive, legislative, <strong>and</strong> judicial branches of the Afghan<br />
government dem<strong>on</strong>strated mixed progress <strong>in</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>g their resp<strong>on</strong>sibilities <strong>and</strong> mov<strong>in</strong>g toward<br />
l<strong>on</strong>g-term susta<strong>in</strong>ability. Both the executive <strong>and</strong> legislative branches began strategic<br />
preparati<strong>on</strong>s necessary for the July 2012 Tokyo C<strong>on</strong>ference. The executive branch focused <strong>on</strong><br />
adm<strong>in</strong>istrat<strong>in</strong>g the transiti<strong>on</strong> process <strong>and</strong> secur<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>on</strong>g-term strategic agreements with the UK,<br />
France, Italy, <strong>and</strong> Turkmenistan. A similar agreement with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> rema<strong>in</strong>s under<br />
negotiati<strong>on</strong>. The judicial branch, with the assistance of the <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al community, made<br />
mixed progress <strong>in</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> staff<strong>in</strong>g sub-nati<strong>on</strong>al judicial positi<strong>on</strong>s. Chr<strong>on</strong>ic absenteeism <strong>and</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>stra<strong>in</strong>ed freedom of movement to urban centers, however, impeded the expansi<strong>on</strong> of rule of<br />
law at the prov<strong>in</strong>cial <strong>and</strong> district levels. Further, the slow development of the judicial system<br />
c<strong>on</strong>tributed to the percepti<strong>on</strong> that <strong>in</strong>surgent shadow governments are more effective <strong>and</strong><br />
accessible <strong>and</strong> that the Afghan Government is <strong>in</strong>different to rural Afghans.<br />
In the legislative realm, the Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assembly made <strong>in</strong>cremental progress <strong>in</strong> address<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
backlog of pend<strong>in</strong>g legislati<strong>on</strong> created <strong>in</strong> the electoral disputes follow<strong>in</strong>g the September 2010<br />
Wolesi Jirga electi<strong>on</strong>s. Most notably, <strong>in</strong> October 2011, the Afghan Parliament approved the<br />
supplementary budget request to recapitalize the Afghan Central Bank for costs associated with<br />
the Kabul Bank bailout. However, <strong>in</strong> March 2012, the lower House of Parliament rejected the FY<br />
1391 budget, which would have allocated funds for the $80M annual payment required to<br />
recapitalize the Afghan Central Bank. Parliament is currently review<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>in</strong>isterial expenditures<br />
<strong>and</strong> budget reports, amend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>ternal rules of procedure, <strong>and</strong> discuss<strong>in</strong>g efforts to create<br />
dis<strong>in</strong>centives for hoard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> price goug<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
Nevertheless, parliamentary authority <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependence rema<strong>in</strong>s subjugated to the executive <strong>and</strong><br />
judiciary branches. This imbalance was evidenced by the Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assembly’s approval of<br />
President Karzai’s n<strong>in</strong>e cab<strong>in</strong>et nom<strong>in</strong>ees <strong>in</strong> March 2012. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the procedures of the<br />
Afghan Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assembly, resubmitt<strong>in</strong>g nom<strong>in</strong>ees for c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong> is illegal; this, however, did<br />
not prevent President Karzai from resubmitt<strong>in</strong>g seven c<strong>and</strong>idates whose appo<strong>in</strong>tments were<br />
previously rejected. After questi<strong>on</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong>ly two <strong>and</strong> alter<strong>in</strong>g Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assembly procedures to<br />
allow the c<strong>and</strong>idates to be resubmitted, the Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assembly approved all n<strong>in</strong>e c<strong>and</strong>idates.<br />
This <strong>in</strong>cident exposed the weakness of the Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assembly <strong>in</strong> relati<strong>on</strong> to the President, while<br />
also dem<strong>on</strong>strat<strong>in</strong>g the absence of a clear authority to <strong>in</strong>terpret the Afghan C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />
regulate Afghan law.<br />
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In November 2011, the Executive Board of the Internati<strong>on</strong>al M<strong>on</strong>etary Fund (IMF) approved a<br />
new three-year, $133.6M Extended Credit Facility program for Afghanistan, which is <strong>in</strong>tended to<br />
support strengthened ec<strong>on</strong>omic <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ancial governance. Follow<strong>in</strong>g the collapse of Kabul Bank,<br />
the IMF required the Afghan Government to place Kabul Bank <strong>in</strong> receivership <strong>and</strong> take a series<br />
of steps to strengthen governance of the bank<strong>in</strong>g system prior to approval of a new program. In<br />
additi<strong>on</strong> to the prior acti<strong>on</strong>s for approval of the program, the Afghan Government <strong>and</strong> IMF staff<br />
developed a 30-po<strong>in</strong>t bank<strong>in</strong>g sector acti<strong>on</strong> plan for the government to implement between<br />
spr<strong>in</strong>g 2011 <strong>and</strong> March 2013. Adherence to the c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s of the IMF program allows the<br />
Afghan Government to dem<strong>on</strong>strate commitment to ec<strong>on</strong>omic <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ancial reforms <strong>and</strong><br />
ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> the support of <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al d<strong>on</strong>ors, some of whom had withheld aid for the Afghan<br />
Government until a new IMF program was <strong>in</strong> place.<br />
The Afghan Government c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to work with the <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al community to garner support<br />
for the 22 Nati<strong>on</strong>al Priority Programs (NPPs) agreed up<strong>on</strong> at the 2010 Kabul C<strong>on</strong>ference. The<br />
NPPs outl<strong>in</strong>e strategic security, governance, development reform, <strong>and</strong> service delivery priorities<br />
over the next three years. The NPP process resumed after a 10-m<strong>on</strong>th delay stemm<strong>in</strong>g from the<br />
Kabul Bank crisis 27<br />
The <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al community had collectively determ<strong>in</strong>ed that it <strong>on</strong>ly endorse NPPs that are<br />
feasible <strong>and</strong> that they were will<strong>in</strong>g to fund, reflect<strong>in</strong>g a renewed commitment to the NPPs <strong>and</strong><br />
the Kabul Process. The current level of endorsement of 50 percent of NPPs is encourag<strong>in</strong>g;<br />
however, the priority programs rema<strong>in</strong> significantly beh<strong>in</strong>d schedule, as all NPPs were due to be<br />
endorsed by July 2011. The Afghan Government has committed to f<strong>in</strong>aliz<strong>in</strong>g the rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
NPPs prior to the July 2012 Tokyo c<strong>on</strong>ference. At the July C<strong>on</strong>ference, the <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
community will expect Afghanistan to present a prioritized <strong>and</strong> sequenced set of NPPs, given<br />
sufficient funds will not be available for all projects at the same time.<br />
5.2: ASSESSMENT OF SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNANCE<br />
The <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al structure of sub-nati<strong>on</strong>al governance <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan is provided by the Afghan<br />
C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>, the extant Local Government Law, the Sub-Nati<strong>on</strong>al Governance Policy, Public<br />
F<strong>in</strong>ancial Management Laws <strong>and</strong> the organizati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>and</strong> adm<strong>in</strong>istrative structure of the<br />
Independent Directorate for Local Governance (which <strong>in</strong>cludes Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Governors’ Offices,<br />
District Governors’ Offices, <strong>and</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>cial municipalities as structures). The result is a highly<br />
centralized structure for sub-nati<strong>on</strong>al governance <strong>in</strong> which budget<strong>in</strong>g is d<strong>on</strong>e by central<br />
M<strong>in</strong>istries <strong>and</strong> the M<strong>in</strong>istry of F<strong>in</strong>ance. Prov<strong>in</strong>cial <strong>and</strong> district adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong>s, under the<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>cial <strong>and</strong> district governor, provide coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>, plann<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>puts, <strong>and</strong> m<strong>on</strong>itor<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
services delivered by M<strong>in</strong>istries. Implementati<strong>on</strong> of services is primarily d<strong>on</strong>e by central<br />
m<strong>in</strong>istries, which are expected, over time, to delegate more implementati<strong>on</strong> resp<strong>on</strong>sibilities to the<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>cial level, <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g the scope for sub-nati<strong>on</strong>al plann<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> accountability.<br />
Sub-nati<strong>on</strong>al bodies at prov<strong>in</strong>cial <strong>and</strong> district levels have established structures <strong>in</strong> most regi<strong>on</strong>s<br />
but rema<strong>in</strong> unable to provide many basic government services. The Afghan Government<br />
27 The Jo<strong>in</strong>t Coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> M<strong>on</strong>itor<strong>in</strong>g Board is the body resp<strong>on</strong>sible for oversee<strong>in</strong>g the implementati<strong>on</strong> of the Afghan<br />
Compact, <strong>and</strong> is composed of Afghan Government officials, members of the <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al community, NATO/ISAF,<br />
<strong>and</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al representatives from the regi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
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ema<strong>in</strong>s highly centralized, with all decisi<strong>on</strong>-mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> service delivery provided by L<strong>in</strong>e<br />
M<strong>in</strong>istries <strong>in</strong> Kabul. As distance <strong>in</strong>creases from prov<strong>in</strong>cial capitals <strong>and</strong> the R<strong>in</strong>g Road, the<br />
provisi<strong>on</strong> of government services, local preference for the Afghan Government, tashkil fills of<br />
critical positi<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>and</strong> effectiveness of the rule of law all decl<strong>in</strong>e.<br />
Afghan support for the government varies by regi<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> is related to the level of basic service<br />
delivery <strong>and</strong> security the government is able to provide. Corrupti<strong>on</strong>, patr<strong>on</strong>age systems, <strong>and</strong> a<br />
lack of substantive representati<strong>on</strong> dilute popular support for municipal, district, <strong>and</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />
government <strong>in</strong>itiatives. Furthermore, sub-nati<strong>on</strong>al policies have limited impact <strong>on</strong> sub-nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
governance structures <strong>in</strong> the short term due to limited communicati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of<br />
plann<strong>in</strong>g between Kabul <strong>and</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>al <strong>and</strong> local levels. Communicati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong><br />
between the prov<strong>in</strong>cial governments <strong>and</strong> Kabul c<strong>on</strong>stituted the area of least improvement dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the report<strong>in</strong>g period.<br />
The development of effective district governance made measured progress dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g<br />
period. Notably, the Afghan Government has agreed <strong>in</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>cipal to a roadmap lead<strong>in</strong>g to a<br />
s<strong>in</strong>gle district-level representative body. This roadmap, likely to be endorsed as a plan by the<br />
summer of 2012, addresses the multiple district representative bodies established by d<strong>on</strong>ors – a<br />
critical requirement for the approval of the NPP <strong>on</strong> Local Governance. However, district<br />
governance rema<strong>in</strong>s limited by the centralized L<strong>in</strong>e M<strong>in</strong>istry system, which depends <strong>on</strong><br />
functi<strong>on</strong><strong>in</strong>g prov<strong>in</strong>cial l<strong>in</strong>e m<strong>in</strong>istries to move funds to the district level.<br />
SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMS<br />
Despite the identified challenges, sub-nati<strong>on</strong>al governance structures witnessed limited<br />
improvement <strong>in</strong> stability, effectiveness, <strong>and</strong> representati<strong>on</strong> dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period. Several<br />
programs have been developed to enhance sub-nati<strong>on</strong>al governance capacity, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Budget Pilot Program (PBPP), the Afghanistan Sub-Nati<strong>on</strong>al Governance Program<br />
(ASGP II), the Performance-Based Governor’s Fund (PBGF II), <strong>and</strong> the District Delivery<br />
Program (DDP). In general, these programs are dependent <strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al fund<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> their<br />
successful implementati<strong>on</strong> relies <strong>on</strong> a favorable security situati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> adequate human resources.<br />
Sub-Nati<strong>on</strong>al Governance (SNG) policy has left many critical issues unresolved or blurred,<br />
particularly <strong>in</strong> relati<strong>on</strong> to the competencies <strong>and</strong> roles of different critical actors at the subnati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
level.<br />
The PBPP, <strong>in</strong>troduced recently by the Afghan M<strong>in</strong>istry of F<strong>in</strong>ance (MoF), seeks to improve<br />
budgetary plann<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> communicati<strong>on</strong> between the prov<strong>in</strong>cial <strong>and</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al levels, build<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>cial capacity, <strong>and</strong> empower prov<strong>in</strong>cial authorities with<strong>in</strong> the budget process. The pilot<br />
program, which encompasses four L<strong>in</strong>e M<strong>in</strong>istries <strong>and</strong> the Independent Directorate for Local<br />
Governance, has made sound progress s<strong>in</strong>ce its implementati<strong>on</strong>. Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> outreach have<br />
<strong>in</strong>creased the communicati<strong>on</strong> between Kabul <strong>and</strong> the prov<strong>in</strong>ces. Of 170 total possible<br />
submissi<strong>on</strong>s, 168 of the prov<strong>in</strong>cial l<strong>in</strong>e directorates completed their project submissi<strong>on</strong>s for<br />
<strong>in</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong>to the SY1391 budget. Several other m<strong>in</strong>istries have requested to be <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> the<br />
sec<strong>on</strong>d year expansi<strong>on</strong> of the pilot program. Periodic reassessments will help to determ<strong>in</strong>e how<br />
this <strong>in</strong>itiative can be further developed to enhance sub-nati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>and</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al governance<br />
<strong>in</strong>itiatives.<br />
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ASGP-II is a multi-d<strong>on</strong>or project that supports the Afghan Government <strong>in</strong> the area of subnati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
governance <strong>and</strong> state build<strong>in</strong>g at the nati<strong>on</strong>al, prov<strong>in</strong>cial, district, <strong>and</strong> municipal levels.<br />
The program is run by the UNDP with the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG)<br />
as the Afghan implement<strong>in</strong>g partner. The program was funded with $83.6 milli<strong>on</strong> provided by<br />
the European Community, Italy, Switzerl<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> the UK. ASGP II, however, has not been able<br />
to report any tangible results besides fund<strong>in</strong>g Nati<strong>on</strong>al Technical Assistance <strong>in</strong> the IDLG.<br />
The sec<strong>on</strong>d <strong>in</strong>stallment of the PBGF, a modificati<strong>on</strong> to the orig<strong>in</strong>al c<strong>on</strong>tractual agreement with<br />
The Asia Foundati<strong>on</strong>, was put <strong>in</strong>to effect <strong>on</strong> October 25, 2011. The PBGF is an 18-m<strong>on</strong>th<br />
program funded at $45.5M. The program is currently funded jo<strong>in</strong>tly by the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> <strong>and</strong> the<br />
<strong>United</strong> K<strong>in</strong>gdom. However, the <strong>United</strong> K<strong>in</strong>gdom is c<strong>on</strong>duct<strong>in</strong>g a review to determ<strong>in</strong>e its<br />
<strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong> PBGF after the end of the Afghan fiscal year (March 21, 2012). This program<br />
has provided each of the 34 Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Governors a budget of $25,000 per m<strong>on</strong>th to cover<br />
operati<strong>on</strong>al expenditures as well as fund small-scale community outreach projects. The PBGF II<br />
was planned to be exp<strong>and</strong>ed with a Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Councils Fund <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ancial system pilot <strong>in</strong><br />
coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> with the IDLG <strong>and</strong> MoF. However, due to limited fund<strong>in</strong>g, the sec<strong>on</strong>d <strong>and</strong> third<br />
comp<strong>on</strong>ents have yet to be implemented.<br />
The DDP is a governance <strong>and</strong> development program created to improve government presence<br />
<strong>and</strong> service-delivery capacity at the district level. The DPP covers 32 districts throughout<br />
Afghanistan. Partner<strong>in</strong>g with both the IDLG <strong>and</strong> MoF, the program is funded by the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>, the <strong>United</strong> K<strong>in</strong>gdom, Denmark, <strong>and</strong> France, with variati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> how it is implemented.<br />
U.S. fund<strong>in</strong>g for the program was suspended <strong>in</strong> July pend<strong>in</strong>g accountability of expenditures <strong>and</strong><br />
a request for IDLG <strong>and</strong> MoF to satisfy several additi<strong>on</strong>al agreed-up<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s. Restorati<strong>on</strong> of<br />
fund<strong>in</strong>g for the program is c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>gent <strong>on</strong> the outcomes of an <strong>on</strong>go<strong>in</strong>g technical assessment, an<br />
upcom<strong>in</strong>g f<strong>in</strong>ancial audit, <strong>and</strong> discussi<strong>on</strong>s lead<strong>in</strong>g toward a renewed commitment for sufficient<br />
program implementati<strong>on</strong> from both the IDLG <strong>and</strong> MoF.<br />
Overall, sub-nati<strong>on</strong>al governance programs are a critical element to develop<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> improv<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the effective extensi<strong>on</strong> of governance from Kabul to the prov<strong>in</strong>cial, district, <strong>and</strong> village level<br />
throughout Afghanistan. The cumulative effect of these programs will improve the ability of the<br />
Afghan Government to resp<strong>on</strong>d to the needs of the local populati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease support for <strong>and</strong><br />
the credibility of the Afghan Government.<br />
SNG programs c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to face challenges, however, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g fund<strong>in</strong>g, procedures, <strong>and</strong><br />
coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of activities to enhance governance <strong>in</strong> the medium <strong>and</strong> l<strong>on</strong>g term through capacity<br />
build<strong>in</strong>g at the sub-nati<strong>on</strong>al level. The practice of d<strong>on</strong>ors’ geographically ear-mark<strong>in</strong>g funds<br />
rema<strong>in</strong>s prevalent, caus<strong>in</strong>g spend<strong>in</strong>g to be highly uneven across prov<strong>in</strong>ces. Years of limited<br />
discreti<strong>on</strong>ary fund<strong>in</strong>g at the central government level <strong>and</strong> plentiful d<strong>on</strong>or fund<strong>in</strong>g at the<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>cial level has distorted the budget formulati<strong>on</strong> process. The operati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>and</strong> management<br />
(O&M) budget is not proporti<strong>on</strong>al to the development budget, <strong>and</strong> this imbalance is amplified by<br />
off-budget <strong>in</strong>frastructure projects that do not account for future O&M.<br />
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5.3: RULE OF LAW<br />
The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> <strong>and</strong> coaliti<strong>on</strong> partners c<strong>on</strong>duct a broad range of programs that promote the rule<br />
of law (RoL) <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan. The Department of Defense (DoD) rule of law efforts <strong>in</strong>clude:<br />
field support to civilian rule of law teams; tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g judges, prosecutors, <strong>and</strong> correcti<strong>on</strong>s officials;<br />
provid<strong>in</strong>g necessary <strong>in</strong>frastructure for courts <strong>and</strong> pris<strong>on</strong>s; <strong>and</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g MoI police forces <strong>in</strong> many<br />
aspects of law enforcement, from <strong>in</strong>vestigati<strong>on</strong>s to community polic<strong>in</strong>g. The U.S. Agency for<br />
Internati<strong>on</strong>al Development (USAID) provides broader governance <strong>and</strong> ec<strong>on</strong>omic development<br />
support, <strong>and</strong> the Department of State (DoS) provides fund<strong>in</strong>g for moderniz<strong>in</strong>g court<br />
adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>g transparency <strong>in</strong> the prosecutorial process. Other agencies like<br />
Justice, Treasury <strong>and</strong> Commerce provide subject matter experts to advise <strong>and</strong> tra<strong>in</strong> key members<br />
of Afghanistan’s rule of law effort.<br />
Overall, progress <strong>in</strong> rule of law c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to be mixed. The ma<strong>in</strong> challenges <strong>in</strong>clude a lack of<br />
access to the formal justice system, poor enforcement of the human rights protecti<strong>on</strong>s guaranteed<br />
by the Afghan c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>, pervasive corrupti<strong>on</strong>, <strong>in</strong>sufficient transparency, <strong>and</strong> unsatisfactory<br />
protecti<strong>on</strong> of justice facilities <strong>and</strong> pers<strong>on</strong>nel. The shortage of human capital <strong>and</strong> lack of political<br />
will <strong>on</strong> the part of the Afghan Government to c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to susta<strong>in</strong> programs <strong>and</strong> facilities which<br />
have been put <strong>in</strong> place to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> security <strong>and</strong> stability as coaliti<strong>on</strong> forces draw down is also a<br />
key challenge go<strong>in</strong>g forward.<br />
RoL breakdowns may be both a cause <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>sequence of c<strong>on</strong>flict am<strong>on</strong>g Afghans. Taliban<br />
justice systems often fill – however brutally – community needs for swift adjudicati<strong>on</strong> to<br />
ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> order. In do<strong>in</strong>g so, it establishes a shadow authority that not <strong>on</strong>ly challenges the<br />
legitimacy of the Afghan central government, but <strong>in</strong>vites warlord <strong>and</strong> crim<strong>in</strong>al competiti<strong>on</strong> for<br />
power <strong>and</strong> engenders further <strong>in</strong>stability. However, because of the c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued weakness of the<br />
Afghan Government, Taliban justice rema<strong>in</strong>s a marketable commodity, as segments of the<br />
Afghan populace view Taliban systems as better than no resoluti<strong>on</strong> at all. To fulfill the<br />
requirements of security <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability, security transiti<strong>on</strong> must <strong>in</strong>clude RoL, <strong>and</strong> transiti<strong>on</strong><br />
from military to civilian support must end with the full ownership of all aspects of the justice<br />
sector—police, courts, <strong>and</strong> pris<strong>on</strong>s—by local, prov<strong>in</strong>cial, <strong>and</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al Afghan stakeholders.<br />
The rule of law missi<strong>on</strong> is shared am<strong>on</strong>g several military <strong>and</strong> civilian rule of law actors – U.S.<br />
military (specifically the Rule of Law Field Force – Afghanistan (ROLFF-A) <strong>and</strong> the Regi<strong>on</strong>al<br />
Comm<strong>and</strong>s), NTM-A, IJC, Regi<strong>on</strong>al Comm<strong>and</strong>ers, the U.S. Government, coaliti<strong>on</strong> civilians<br />
work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Rec<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> Teams (PRTs), UNAMA, a variety of NGOs, Afghan<br />
officials from relevant m<strong>in</strong>istries, <strong>and</strong> other justice officials. While NATO policy authorizes<br />
UNAMA to take the lead <strong>on</strong> all civilian governance <strong>and</strong> rule of law issues, their capacity is<br />
extremely limited, even <strong>in</strong> those regi<strong>on</strong>al comm<strong>and</strong>s led by coaliti<strong>on</strong> partners, such as RC-W<br />
(Italy) <strong>and</strong> RC-N (Germany). In RCs under the c<strong>on</strong>trol of the U.S. military, limited coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong><br />
with UNAMA occurs, <strong>and</strong> the lead <strong>on</strong> rule of law activities is jo<strong>in</strong>tly shared between the U.S.<br />
Government civilian agencies <strong>and</strong> the military actors referenced above.<br />
In an attempt to provide greater unity of effort across all communities, NATO Defense M<strong>in</strong>isters<br />
endorsed the establishment of the NATO Rule of Law Field Support Missi<strong>on</strong> – Afghanistan<br />
(NROLFSM-A) at the June 2011 Defense M<strong>in</strong>isterial. NROLFSM-A was <strong>in</strong>tended first to<br />
complement <strong>and</strong> eventually to assume resp<strong>on</strong>sibility for much of the liais<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong><br />
74
activities of the ROLFF-A <strong>in</strong> support of the <strong>United</strong> Nati<strong>on</strong>s Assistance Missi<strong>on</strong> Afghanistan<br />
(UNAMA) <strong>and</strong> other rule of law actors as U.S. <strong>and</strong> coaliti<strong>on</strong> forces began to draw down. 28<br />
NROLFSM provides essential field capabilities, security to Afghan <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al civilians<br />
who provide technical assistance <strong>and</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> support<strong>in</strong>g the build<strong>in</strong>g of Afghan crim<strong>in</strong>al<br />
justice capacity, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>creased access to dispute resoluti<strong>on</strong> services, thereby help<strong>in</strong>g to improve<br />
the efficacy of the Afghan government. The four ma<strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>es of effort of NROLFSM-A, through<br />
its U.S. operati<strong>on</strong>s under ROLFF-A, are: (1) Develop<strong>in</strong>g human capacity, (2) Build<strong>in</strong>g<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>able <strong>in</strong>frastructure, (3) Promot<strong>in</strong>g awareness of the legal rights of citizens <strong>and</strong> access to<br />
state sancti<strong>on</strong>ed justice actors <strong>and</strong> public trials, <strong>and</strong> (4) Facilitat<strong>in</strong>g justice sector security<br />
(especially for prov<strong>in</strong>cial level judges) to ensure that judges can make fair <strong>and</strong> transparent<br />
decisi<strong>on</strong>s based <strong>on</strong> the law without fear of violence or other reprisals. NROLFSM-A has been a<br />
key facilitator for all aspects of justice development both directly, <strong>and</strong> through its support to the<br />
many U.S. <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al community civilian organizati<strong>on</strong>s assist<strong>in</strong>g with rule of law.<br />
ROLFF-A, when first established, had a specific missi<strong>on</strong> to provide security <strong>and</strong> to assist <strong>in</strong> all<br />
aspects of coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> liais<strong>on</strong> with civilian rule of law actors, ensur<strong>in</strong>g that civilian<br />
agencies such as USAID <strong>and</strong> DoS’s Bureau of Internati<strong>on</strong>al Narcotics <strong>and</strong> Law Enforcement<br />
Affairs were set up for success with respect to their l<strong>on</strong>g-term governance <strong>and</strong> rule of law<br />
projects. Presently, the ROLFF-A missi<strong>on</strong> is focused <strong>on</strong> the Justice Center <strong>in</strong> Parwan 29<br />
(JCIP),<br />
where it is develop<strong>in</strong>g the capacity of Afghan authorities to prosecute <strong>in</strong>surgents <strong>and</strong> terrorists<br />
for crimes under Afghan law, a key element of our comb<strong>in</strong>ed efforts to ensure peace <strong>and</strong> security<br />
<strong>in</strong> Afghanistan. ROLFF-A is also develop<strong>in</strong>g the JCIP <strong>in</strong>to a facility where less experienced<br />
judges, prosecutors <strong>and</strong> defense attorneys can “<strong>in</strong>tern” with more experienced judges assigned to<br />
the court.<br />
As ROLFF-A c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to shift its focus to the JCIP, the NROLFSM-A missi<strong>on</strong> addresses issues<br />
<strong>in</strong> the districts <strong>and</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ces. NROLFSM-A/ROLFF-A has submitted a detailed proposal to the<br />
U.S. Embassy Kabul Interagency Rule of Law Office outl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g programs <strong>and</strong> projects to<br />
effectively employ the $50M C<strong>on</strong>gressi<strong>on</strong>al authorizati<strong>on</strong> for susta<strong>in</strong>able rule of law<br />
development <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan.<br />
THE JUSTICE SECTOR<br />
The DoD engages with nearly every level of the host nati<strong>on</strong> government to enable development<br />
<strong>in</strong> Afghanistan’s justice sector. While improvements <strong>in</strong> the Afghan legal system are often<br />
overshadowed by political <strong>and</strong> security issues that dom<strong>in</strong>ate public discussi<strong>on</strong>, dozens of districts<br />
held their first public trials dur<strong>in</strong>g the current report<strong>in</strong>g period, highlight<strong>in</strong>g modest but<br />
significant progress <strong>in</strong> justice sector development. Additi<strong>on</strong>ally, there have been other positive<br />
signs of Afghan justice sector development. Recently the Afghan Supreme Court swore <strong>in</strong> 54<br />
judges <strong>in</strong> mid-October. These judges were subsequently deployed for three-year tours, after<br />
which the judges will return to Kabul to attend the formal two-year Stage Academy. The<br />
Supreme Court plans to repeat this experiment with another 50 recruits <strong>in</strong> the near future. Such<br />
28<br />
The NATO m<strong>and</strong>ate authoriz<strong>in</strong>g the establishment of NROLFSM-A describes five primary tasks for NROLFSM-<br />
A: security, coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>, movement support, eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g support <strong>and</strong> oversight of the c<strong>on</strong>tractual process.<br />
29<br />
Presently the JCIP is used to transiti<strong>on</strong> those Law of Armed C<strong>on</strong>flict (LOAC) deta<strong>in</strong>ees that can be prosecuted to<br />
the crim<strong>in</strong>al justice process of Afghanistan.<br />
75
<strong>in</strong>itiatives represent a significant step towards fill<strong>in</strong>g critical justice sector gaps <strong>and</strong> improv<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the professi<strong>on</strong>alism of those work<strong>in</strong>g as judges, prosecutors <strong>and</strong> defense attorneys.<br />
Improvements <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>frastructure support<strong>in</strong>g the justice sector <strong>in</strong>clude a number of projects<br />
designed to enable susta<strong>in</strong>ability through the build<strong>in</strong>g or refurbish<strong>in</strong>g courtrooms, pris<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong><br />
judicial offices across Afghanistan.<br />
<strong>Progress</strong> toward a fully functi<strong>on</strong>al, transparent, <strong>and</strong> fair justice delivery system rema<strong>in</strong>s tenuous;<br />
nevertheless, the Afghan judicial sector is <strong>on</strong> a path to greater susta<strong>in</strong>ability. Afghanistan still<br />
faces a host of challenges, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g systemic corrupti<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>adequate coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> between<br />
the formal <strong>and</strong> customary justice systems. Afghan ownership of further development efforts is<br />
critical, as efforts aim to put <strong>in</strong> place the m<strong>in</strong>imum c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s necessary to enable formal local<br />
authorities, <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>and</strong> the wider public to susta<strong>in</strong> the rule of law. This is a gradual process,<br />
requir<strong>in</strong>g c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al support to foster permanent changes <strong>in</strong> public percepti<strong>on</strong>s of<br />
the legitimacy of Afghan justice <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> turn <strong>in</strong>dependent success stories <strong>in</strong>to irreversible<br />
trends.<br />
DETENTION OPERATIONS<br />
Comb<strong>in</strong>ed Jo<strong>in</strong>t Interagency Task Force 435 (CJIATF 435) is resp<strong>on</strong>sible for U.S. Government<br />
deta<strong>in</strong>ee operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> support of Operati<strong>on</strong> ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan.<br />
CJIATF 435 c<strong>on</strong>ducts deta<strong>in</strong>ee operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> the Comb<strong>in</strong>ed Jo<strong>in</strong>t Operati<strong>on</strong>s Area-Afghanistan<br />
(CJOA-A) by provid<strong>in</strong>g secure <strong>and</strong> humane care, custody, <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>trol of the enemy to prevent<br />
their return to the battlefield. Ultimately, U.S. forces will no l<strong>on</strong>ger need to deta<strong>in</strong> most enemy<br />
fighters when Afghanistan has dem<strong>on</strong>strated the capability to protect its citizens from nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
security threats. U.S. forces will reta<strong>in</strong> sufficient deta<strong>in</strong>ee operati<strong>on</strong>s capability for those<br />
enemies that present an endur<strong>in</strong>g threat to U.S. or partner <strong>in</strong>terests <strong>and</strong> homel<strong>and</strong>s.<br />
On March 9, 2012, COMISAF <strong>and</strong> M<strong>in</strong>ister of Defense Wardak signed a Memor<strong>and</strong>um of<br />
Underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g (MOU) to transfer the Detenti<strong>on</strong> Facility <strong>in</strong> Parwan (DFIP) <strong>and</strong> Afghan deta<strong>in</strong>ees<br />
held <strong>in</strong> the DFIP to Afghan c<strong>on</strong>trol. The MOU stipulates a not-later-than transiti<strong>on</strong> date of<br />
September 9, 2012, provided that certa<strong>in</strong> c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s are met by both the U.S. <strong>and</strong> the Afghan<br />
Government. CJIATF 435 has c<strong>on</strong>ducted detailed plann<strong>in</strong>g to implement the transiti<strong>on</strong> of the<br />
3,132 deta<strong>in</strong>ees held by the U.S. under the Law of Armed C<strong>on</strong>flict (LOAC) at the DFIP as of the<br />
end of this report<strong>in</strong>g period.<br />
The transiti<strong>on</strong> will <strong>in</strong>clude a physical separati<strong>on</strong> between the U.S.-c<strong>on</strong>trolled Bagram Airfield<br />
<strong>and</strong> the DFIP, as well as U.S. efforts to partner with <strong>and</strong> mentor the emergent Afghan Detenti<strong>on</strong><br />
Operati<strong>on</strong>s Comm<strong>and</strong> (DOC). The DOC, accord<strong>in</strong>g to the MOU, will be comm<strong>and</strong>ed by an<br />
ANA 3-star general, <strong>and</strong> will <strong>in</strong>clude all comp<strong>on</strong>ents required under <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al law to provide<br />
secure <strong>and</strong> humane care, custody, <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>trol of deta<strong>in</strong>ees transferred from U.S. to Afghan<br />
c<strong>on</strong>trol.<br />
C<strong>on</strong>currently with transiti<strong>on</strong> plann<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> executi<strong>on</strong>, the DFIP c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to see growth <strong>in</strong><br />
deta<strong>in</strong>ees due to c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>creased U.S. <strong>and</strong> Afghan security force operati<strong>on</strong>s. The DFIP<br />
deta<strong>in</strong>ee populati<strong>on</strong> has <strong>in</strong>creased 480 percent s<strong>in</strong>ce its establishment <strong>in</strong> March 2010, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
19 percent <strong>in</strong>crease dur<strong>in</strong>g the current report<strong>in</strong>g period. Currently, the transiti<strong>on</strong> of comm<strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>trol <strong>and</strong> support areas c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues through the c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s-based transfer of detenti<strong>on</strong><br />
76
facilities to full Afghan Government c<strong>on</strong>trol <strong>and</strong> assistance <strong>in</strong> the implementati<strong>on</strong> of Afghan<br />
LOAC policies.<br />
CJIATF 435 ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s transparency of deta<strong>in</strong>ee operati<strong>on</strong>s through extensive cooperati<strong>on</strong> with<br />
the Afghan Government, the Internati<strong>on</strong>al Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), coaliti<strong>on</strong><br />
governments, <strong>and</strong> U.S. authorities. Frequent site visits by senior representatives of the Afghan<br />
government <strong>and</strong> the ICRC help ensure transparency <strong>in</strong> the secure <strong>and</strong> humane care, custody, <strong>and</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>trol of deta<strong>in</strong>ees at both U.S. <strong>and</strong> Afghan facilities at the DFIP.<br />
U.S. deta<strong>in</strong>ee operati<strong>on</strong>s are authorized under the LOAC <strong>and</strong> U.S. law <strong>and</strong> policy. The<br />
transiti<strong>on</strong> of U.S. deta<strong>in</strong>ee operati<strong>on</strong>s to Afghan authority will <strong>in</strong>volve the transfer of many<br />
LOAC deta<strong>in</strong>ees to Afghan custody for crim<strong>in</strong>al prosecuti<strong>on</strong>. These transfers, <strong>in</strong> turn, require<br />
c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued development of the Afghan crim<strong>in</strong>al justice system. Thus, Afghan rule of law efforts<br />
<strong>and</strong> U.S. deta<strong>in</strong>ee operati<strong>on</strong>s, while dist<strong>in</strong>ct, are related <strong>and</strong> mutually support<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
ISAF <strong>and</strong> the Afghan Government are committed to ensur<strong>in</strong>g the safety of all deta<strong>in</strong>ees <strong>and</strong><br />
ensur<strong>in</strong>g they are treated <strong>in</strong> a humane manner that meets ISAF <strong>and</strong> Afghan obligati<strong>on</strong>s. ISAF, <strong>in</strong><br />
coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> with the <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al community <strong>and</strong> n<strong>on</strong>-governmental agencies, is c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g its<br />
efforts to implement a six-phase remediati<strong>on</strong> plan <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>specti<strong>on</strong>s regimen to prevent transfer of<br />
deta<strong>in</strong>ees to any suspended or uncertified Afghan facility.<br />
With<strong>in</strong> 60 days of transfer to the DFIP, <strong>and</strong> every six m<strong>on</strong>ths thereafter, LOAC deta<strong>in</strong>ees are<br />
subject to a Deta<strong>in</strong>ee Review Board (DRB) which hears <strong>in</strong>formati<strong>on</strong> related to the deta<strong>in</strong>ee’s<br />
status <strong>and</strong> the threat posed by the deta<strong>in</strong>ee. After assess<strong>in</strong>g the deta<strong>in</strong>ee’s status <strong>and</strong> threat, the<br />
DRB makes a dispositi<strong>on</strong> recommendati<strong>on</strong>. Based <strong>on</strong> the f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs of the DRB, the deta<strong>in</strong>ee can<br />
be recommended for C<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued Internment, release, re<strong>in</strong>tegrati<strong>on</strong>, or transfer for prosecuti<strong>on</strong> at<br />
the JCIP <strong>and</strong> Afghan <strong>in</strong>carcerati<strong>on</strong>. As part of the transiti<strong>on</strong> plann<strong>in</strong>g, CJIATF 435 is engag<strong>in</strong>g<br />
with Afghan leadership to establish an Afghan deta<strong>in</strong>ee review system similar to the U.S. system<br />
<strong>in</strong> order to comply with <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al law <strong>and</strong> the MOU.<br />
The JCIP represents an <strong>in</strong>tegral part of the transiti<strong>on</strong> effort to help ref<strong>in</strong>e Afghanistan’s legal<br />
capacity for crim<strong>in</strong>al prosecuti<strong>on</strong>, <strong>in</strong> accordance with the Afghan C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>, of <strong>in</strong>dividuals<br />
previously held by the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> at the DFIP. C<strong>on</strong>sist<strong>in</strong>g of courtrooms <strong>and</strong> m<strong>in</strong>isterial<br />
office build<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>and</strong> adjacent to the DFIP <strong>and</strong> Afghanistan Nati<strong>on</strong>al Detenti<strong>on</strong> Facility at<br />
Parwan, judicial capacity at the JCIP has <strong>in</strong>creased <strong>and</strong> is beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g to keep pace with the<br />
number of deta<strong>in</strong>ee cases found by a DRB to be suitable for Afghan prosecuti<strong>on</strong>. Compared to<br />
the previous report<strong>in</strong>g period, judicial capacity at the JCIP has improved significantly; s<strong>in</strong>ce the<br />
first trial <strong>in</strong> June 2010 through March 2012, the Afghan Government has c<strong>on</strong>ducted 439 primary<br />
court trials (367 adult <strong>and</strong> 72 juvenile) <strong>and</strong> 233 appellate court trials (215 adult <strong>and</strong> 18 juvenile)<br />
at the JCIP with Afghan judges, prosecutors, <strong>and</strong> defense counsel. Overall, the JCIP has<br />
completed a total of 672 trials (439 primary <strong>and</strong> 233 appellate court trials).<br />
The number of deta<strong>in</strong>ees identified for transfer to Afghan custody <strong>and</strong> prosecuti<strong>on</strong> at the JCIP<br />
rema<strong>in</strong>s relatively low. LOAC deta<strong>in</strong>ees may be <strong>in</strong>terned because they are part of an armed<br />
forced engaged <strong>in</strong> hostilities, regardless of evidence of specific crim<strong>in</strong>al activity. A deta<strong>in</strong>ee<br />
may have been <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> crim<strong>in</strong>al activity, but captur<strong>in</strong>g units cannot or do not develop<br />
77
sufficient prosecutable evidence. Moreover, attempts to prosecute can be frustrated by the fact<br />
that a majority of deta<strong>in</strong>ees are deta<strong>in</strong>ed based <strong>on</strong> classified <strong>in</strong>formati<strong>on</strong> that cannot be shared<br />
with Afghan judicial actors, <strong>and</strong> therefore cannot form the basis of crim<strong>in</strong>al prosecuti<strong>on</strong>. As<br />
evidence collecti<strong>on</strong> practices improve throughout the Comb<strong>in</strong>ed Jo<strong>in</strong>t Operati<strong>on</strong>al Area –<br />
Afghanistan (CJOA-A), it is predicted that more cases will be recommended for crim<strong>in</strong>al<br />
prosecuti<strong>on</strong>. Also, several tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g programs are be<strong>in</strong>g developed to <strong>in</strong>crease Afghanistan’s<br />
forensic <strong>and</strong> evidence-collecti<strong>on</strong> capabilities, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease coaliti<strong>on</strong> forces’ collecti<strong>on</strong> of<br />
prosecutable evidence for use with<strong>in</strong> the Afghan crim<strong>in</strong>al justice system. The JCIP <strong>and</strong><br />
associated programs may also aid the Afghans <strong>in</strong> prosecut<strong>in</strong>g deta<strong>in</strong>ees transferred to them from<br />
U.S. custody.<br />
5.4: COUNTER-CORRUPTION AND TRANSPARENCY<br />
Corrupti<strong>on</strong> underm<strong>in</strong>es the effectiveness, cohesi<strong>on</strong>, <strong>and</strong> legitimacy of the Afghan Government; it<br />
alienates elements of the populati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> generates popular disc<strong>on</strong>tent; it deters <strong>in</strong>vestment,<br />
encourages the diversi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al assistance, <strong>and</strong> impedes licit ec<strong>on</strong>omic growth; it<br />
enables crim<strong>in</strong>al networks to <strong>in</strong>fluence important state <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> functi<strong>on</strong>s; <strong>and</strong> it facilitates<br />
the narcotics trade <strong>and</strong> other transnati<strong>on</strong>al threats emerg<strong>in</strong>g from Afghanistan. Countercorrupti<strong>on</strong><br />
efforts are essential to strengthen<strong>in</strong>g critical Afghan <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s, c<strong>on</strong>solidat<strong>in</strong>g ga<strong>in</strong>s<br />
<strong>in</strong> the wake of improved security, <strong>and</strong> they will grow <strong>in</strong> importance as the process of transiti<strong>on</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues.<br />
The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> has implemented a number of <strong>in</strong>itiatives to support the Afghan Government <strong>in</strong><br />
its efforts to reduce corrupti<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> organized crime, while work<strong>in</strong>g to ensure the U.S.<br />
c<strong>on</strong>tract<strong>in</strong>g resources <strong>and</strong> development assistance are not subject to fraud <strong>and</strong> corrupti<strong>on</strong>. These<br />
<strong>in</strong>itiatives <strong>in</strong>clude susta<strong>in</strong>ed engagement, capacity-build<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> technical assistance <strong>in</strong> key<br />
Afghan m<strong>in</strong>istries; expansi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>in</strong>teragency efforts to mature organized crime <strong>and</strong> corrupti<strong>on</strong><br />
estimates <strong>in</strong> key sectors as a basis for acti<strong>on</strong>; creati<strong>on</strong> of jo<strong>in</strong>t, Presidentially-sp<strong>on</strong>sored forums<br />
to promote <strong>in</strong>ter-m<strong>in</strong>isterial coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> develop c<strong>on</strong>crete counter-corrupti<strong>on</strong><br />
recommendati<strong>on</strong>s; <strong>and</strong> the development of <strong>in</strong>vestigative leads <strong>and</strong> other forms of support for<br />
vetted Afghan law enforcement, <strong>in</strong>vestigative, <strong>and</strong> oversight bodies. The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> has also<br />
exp<strong>and</strong>ed its vendor-vett<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>tract acti<strong>on</strong>s, suspend<strong>in</strong>g or debarr<strong>in</strong>g c<strong>on</strong>tract<strong>in</strong>g companies<br />
engaged <strong>in</strong> corrupti<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> crim<strong>in</strong>ality. Additi<strong>on</strong>ally, ISAF <strong>and</strong> its <strong>in</strong>teragency partners are<br />
<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly exam<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the transnati<strong>on</strong>al dimensi<strong>on</strong>s of corrupti<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> organized crime <strong>and</strong><br />
identify<strong>in</strong>g ways to combat it.<br />
coord<strong>in</strong>ates counter-corrupti<strong>on</strong> efforts with<strong>in</strong> ISAF, foster<strong>in</strong>g a comm<strong>on</strong><br />
underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of the corrupti<strong>on</strong> problem, plann<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> implement<strong>in</strong>g ISAF anti-corrupti<strong>on</strong><br />
efforts, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrat<strong>in</strong>g ISAF anti-corrupti<strong>on</strong> activities with those of key Afghan <strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al partners, to address President Karzai’s goal of an “active <strong>and</strong> h<strong>on</strong>est<br />
adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong>” <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan.<br />
CJIATF-Shafafiyat 30<br />
30 “Transparency”<br />
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INTERAGENCY COUNTER-CORRUPTION EFFORTS<br />
CJIATF-Shafafiyat has implemented numerous <strong>in</strong>itiatives to support the Afghan government <strong>in</strong><br />
its efforts to reduce corrupti<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> organized crime, while work<strong>in</strong>g to ensure that <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
resources <strong>and</strong> development assistance are not subject to fraud <strong>and</strong> corrupti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
A critical comp<strong>on</strong>ent of counter-corrupti<strong>on</strong> efforts is m<strong>on</strong>itor<strong>in</strong>g c<strong>on</strong>tract funds <strong>and</strong> property<br />
losses <strong>in</strong> order to deny power brokers, crim<strong>in</strong>al networks, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>surgents the opportunity to<br />
benefit from stolen property or illicit revenue. To achieve these objectives, Task Force 2010 was<br />
established. Task Force 2010 coord<strong>in</strong>ates with IJC, the Senior C<strong>on</strong>tract<strong>in</strong>g Official-Afghanistan,<br />
<strong>and</strong> USAID to vet vendors prior to c<strong>on</strong>tract award. S<strong>in</strong>ce its creati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> August 2010, Task<br />
Force 2010 has vetted 1,231 companies, of which 93 were rejected for force protecti<strong>on</strong> or<br />
performance c<strong>on</strong>cerns. Task Force 2010 has also assessed 165 total vendors <strong>in</strong> support of the<br />
Regi<strong>on</strong>al Comm<strong>and</strong>s, identify<strong>in</strong>g 13 of these vendors as “high risk” for force protecti<strong>on</strong>-related<br />
issues. Task Force 2010 c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues c<strong>on</strong>tract oversight efforts, <strong>and</strong> as of the end of the report<strong>in</strong>g<br />
period, had reviewed nearly 1,200 high-value, high-risk c<strong>on</strong>tracts valued at approximately $27B.<br />
Task Force 2010 vett<strong>in</strong>g also resulted <strong>in</strong> the debarment of 81 U.S., <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al, <strong>and</strong> Afghan<br />
companies. In additi<strong>on</strong> to Task Force 2010’s efforts, ISAF exp<strong>and</strong>ed vendor vett<strong>in</strong>g efforts with<br />
the implementati<strong>on</strong> of the Internati<strong>on</strong>al Vendor Vett<strong>in</strong>g Office (IVVO) <strong>in</strong> December 2011.<br />
CJIATF-Shafafiyat provides strategic support to the IVVO by ensur<strong>in</strong>g the scope of work as well<br />
as processes <strong>and</strong> procedures are sufficient to meet the requirements of ISAF’s counter-corrupti<strong>on</strong><br />
objectives. While CJIATF-Shafafiyat is resp<strong>on</strong>sible for these objectives, IVVO is a means of<br />
support<strong>in</strong>g these efforts by review<strong>in</strong>g all NATO <strong>and</strong> coaliti<strong>on</strong> partner c<strong>on</strong>tracts to ensure they are<br />
not diverted by crim<strong>in</strong>al networks or <strong>in</strong>surgent organizati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
In additi<strong>on</strong> to c<strong>on</strong>tract vett<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> oversight, counter-corrupti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong>itiatives are also work<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
<strong>in</strong>sulate the ANSF from crim<strong>in</strong>al subversi<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> corrupti<strong>on</strong>; this activity is a critical comp<strong>on</strong>ent<br />
to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the credibility of the ANA <strong>and</strong> ANP as legitimate security providers. Substantial<br />
progress was made this quarter <strong>in</strong> prevent<strong>in</strong>g crim<strong>in</strong>al <strong>in</strong>terference <strong>and</strong> subversi<strong>on</strong> of <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s<br />
<strong>in</strong> the Afghan security sector. Nevertheless, corrupti<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> organized crime rema<strong>in</strong> a significant<br />
threat to the effectiveness <strong>and</strong> cohesi<strong>on</strong> of the security m<strong>in</strong>istries <strong>and</strong> the ANSF.<br />
The implementati<strong>on</strong> of the 54-po<strong>in</strong>t MoD jo<strong>in</strong>t anti-corrupti<strong>on</strong> acti<strong>on</strong> plan, developed <strong>in</strong> the<br />
course of the Office of Nati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>Security</strong> Council (ONSC) Transparency <strong>and</strong> Accountability<br />
Work<strong>in</strong>g Group (TAWG), is now <strong>in</strong> progress. These recommendati<strong>on</strong>s, formulated by MoD<br />
leaders work<strong>in</strong>g closely with ISAF officials, <strong>in</strong>clude significant reforms at the MoD <strong>in</strong> pers<strong>on</strong>nel,<br />
logistics, <strong>and</strong> acquisiti<strong>on</strong>s systems. Al<strong>on</strong>g with the TAWG recommendati<strong>on</strong>s, M<strong>in</strong>ister of<br />
Defence Wardak has also committed to full <strong>in</strong>vestigati<strong>on</strong>s of crimes committed at the Nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
Military Hospital (separate from but c<strong>on</strong>current with the High Office of Oversight <strong>and</strong> Anti-<br />
Corrupti<strong>on</strong> (HOOAC)-led effort, described below), as well as <strong>in</strong>to <strong>on</strong>go<strong>in</strong>g illicit activity with<strong>in</strong><br />
the Afghan Air Force. M<strong>in</strong>ister Mohammadi has signed a directive authoriz<strong>in</strong>g the ONSC<br />
TAWG’s launch with<strong>in</strong> the MoI, <strong>and</strong> has designated a m<strong>in</strong>isterial lead for the effort. Another<br />
noteworthy counter-corrupti<strong>on</strong> milest<strong>on</strong>e <strong>in</strong> the last quarter is RC-East’s removal of a 50th<br />
negative actor from the security forces <strong>in</strong> the regi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> March 2012.<br />
Corrupti<strong>on</strong> also extends bey<strong>on</strong>d Afghanistan’s borders, <strong>and</strong> address<strong>in</strong>g this transnati<strong>on</strong>al element<br />
is equally critical as elim<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g domestic corrupti<strong>on</strong>. The transnati<strong>on</strong>al dimensi<strong>on</strong>s of the flows<br />
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of m<strong>on</strong>ey, narcotics, precursor chemicals, <strong>and</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s across Afghanistan’s crim<strong>in</strong>al networks<br />
have become <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly apparent. Key figures with<strong>in</strong> Afghan crim<strong>in</strong>al networks are dependent<br />
<strong>on</strong> their l<strong>in</strong>ks to the <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al f<strong>in</strong>ancial system, their capacity to <strong>in</strong>vest the proceeds of their<br />
illicit activities abroad, <strong>and</strong> their ability to travel freely outside of Afghanistan.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period, however, Defense Secretary Le<strong>on</strong> Panetta endorsed COMISAF’s<br />
September 2011 proposal request<strong>in</strong>g the creati<strong>on</strong> of a Wash<strong>in</strong>gt<strong>on</strong>-based <strong>in</strong>teragency body – the<br />
Illicit Activities Initiative for Afghanistan – designed to develop cases <strong>and</strong> direct the applicati<strong>on</strong><br />
of targeted sancti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al law enforcement acti<strong>on</strong>s aga<strong>in</strong>st crim<strong>in</strong>al patr<strong>on</strong>age<br />
networks. This rema<strong>in</strong>s a high priority for Comm<strong>and</strong>er, US Force Comm<strong>and</strong>-Afghanistan.<br />
ISAF is <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly tailor<strong>in</strong>g its operati<strong>on</strong>s to address transnati<strong>on</strong>al threats posed by the nexus<br />
between the <strong>in</strong>surgency, the narcotics trade, organized crime, <strong>and</strong> corrupti<strong>on</strong>, which are<br />
c<strong>on</strong>vergent <strong>and</strong> mutually re<strong>in</strong>forc<strong>in</strong>g. The first quarter of 2012 saw the arrests of senior leaders<br />
with<strong>in</strong> narcotics-traffick<strong>in</strong>g networks <strong>in</strong> Nangarhar <strong>and</strong> Helm<strong>and</strong> Prov<strong>in</strong>ces, as well as the<br />
c<strong>on</strong>victi<strong>on</strong> of senior Nimruz trafficker Haji Eissa—dem<strong>on</strong>strat<strong>in</strong>g a steady rise <strong>in</strong> both sheer<br />
numbers <strong>and</strong> the seniority of traffickers arrested <strong>and</strong> prosecuted. The <strong>in</strong>sulati<strong>on</strong> of the Afghan<br />
Counternarcotics Judicial Center (CNJC) from chr<strong>on</strong>ic political <strong>in</strong>terference <strong>and</strong> crim<strong>in</strong>al<br />
coerci<strong>on</strong> has been central to the success of these efforts. Additi<strong>on</strong>ally, as a result of ISAF’s<br />
mobilizati<strong>on</strong> of Afghan-vetted law enforcement units aga<strong>in</strong>st the nexus of the <strong>in</strong>surgency,<br />
narcotics trade, <strong>and</strong> crim<strong>in</strong>al patr<strong>on</strong>age networks, nearly half of the 29 sub-networks associated<br />
with the ‘Top 10’ narcotics traffick<strong>in</strong>g organizati<strong>on</strong>s have been operati<strong>on</strong>ally degraded.<br />
In other countries that have struggled to overcome the <strong>in</strong>terc<strong>on</strong>nected challenges of terrorism,<br />
<strong>in</strong>surgency, the narcotics trade, organized crime, <strong>and</strong> corrupti<strong>on</strong>, the ultimate reversal of these<br />
threats has depended <strong>on</strong> the mobilizati<strong>on</strong> of civil society <strong>in</strong> support of nati<strong>on</strong>al unity <strong>and</strong> reform.<br />
Recogniz<strong>in</strong>g this, <strong>in</strong> coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> with the Afghan government, ISAF <strong>and</strong> its partners have set<br />
out to identify <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>nect elements of civil society, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dependent media, religious<br />
figures, student organizati<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>and</strong> women’s groups, as well as Afghan civic educati<strong>on</strong>,<br />
leadership development, <strong>and</strong> communicati<strong>on</strong>s programs, <strong>in</strong> a l<strong>on</strong>g-term effort to generate<br />
positive social pressure for counter-corrupti<strong>on</strong> reform.<br />
AFGHAN COUNTER-CORRUPTION EFFORTS<br />
Despite an expansive counter-corrupti<strong>on</strong> campaign led by CJIATF-Shafafiyat <strong>and</strong> ISAF <strong>in</strong> close<br />
cooperati<strong>on</strong> with the Afghan Government, counter-corrupti<strong>on</strong> efforts rely heavily <strong>on</strong> the capacity<br />
<strong>and</strong> political will of the Afghan Government. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period, Afghan leaders –<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g President Karzai – made limited progress <strong>in</strong> address<strong>in</strong>g corrupti<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitut<strong>in</strong>g<br />
reforms <strong>in</strong> cooperati<strong>on</strong> with the <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al community.<br />
Afghanistan’s pr<strong>in</strong>cipal anti-corrupti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>s, the HOOAC <strong>and</strong> the Attorney General’s Office<br />
(AGO), c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to have <strong>on</strong>ly m<strong>in</strong>imal political support for enforc<strong>in</strong>g transparency <strong>and</strong><br />
accountability with<strong>in</strong> the Afghan Government. In resp<strong>on</strong>se to susta<strong>in</strong>ed ISAF <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>teragency<br />
engagement <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluence, however, the Office of the Attorney General created a jo<strong>in</strong>t Afghan<strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
Special Cases Committee (SCC) designed to <strong>in</strong>itiate <strong>and</strong> m<strong>on</strong>itor the progress of<br />
l<strong>on</strong>g-stalled, high-profile cases of corrupti<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> organized crime. A HOOAC-led <strong>in</strong>term<strong>in</strong>isterial<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestigative team, overseen by the SCC, is now mak<strong>in</strong>g progress <strong>in</strong> the case of the<br />
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crim<strong>in</strong>al network that operated <strong>in</strong> the Dawood Nati<strong>on</strong>al Military Hospital <strong>and</strong> Office of the ANA<br />
Surge<strong>on</strong> General from 2008 to 2010. The work of the SSC <strong>and</strong> its <strong>in</strong>ter-m<strong>in</strong>isterial partners<br />
represents a promis<strong>in</strong>g means of achiev<strong>in</strong>g progress <strong>on</strong> revers<strong>in</strong>g the prevail<strong>in</strong>g “culture of<br />
impunity,” but it rema<strong>in</strong>s a develop<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> with <strong>on</strong>ly limited political support.<br />
5.5: REINTEGRATION<br />
The Afghanistan Peace <strong>and</strong> Re<strong>in</strong>tegrati<strong>on</strong> Program, established by President Karzai <strong>in</strong> July 2010,<br />
c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to c<strong>on</strong>solidate security ga<strong>in</strong>s by permanently remov<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>surgents from the battlefield.<br />
As of March 31, 2012, the APRP had formally enrolled 3,907 <strong>in</strong>surgents <strong>in</strong> the peace process<br />
(accelerat<strong>in</strong>g from 2,385 as of September 30, 2011 <strong>and</strong> 699 as of March 2011).<br />
Thus far, the recidivism rate is less than 1 percent.<br />
Disengagement tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g will launch <strong>in</strong> the summer of 2012 <strong>and</strong> will allow re<strong>in</strong>tegrees to formally<br />
“graduate” the program <strong>and</strong> fully re<strong>in</strong>tegrate <strong>in</strong>to Afghan society. APRP structures mediated the<br />
c<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong> of several significant peace deals <strong>in</strong> the prov<strong>in</strong>ces of Herat, Ghor, Kunar, <strong>and</strong><br />
Nangarhar; these mediati<strong>on</strong>s resolved l<strong>on</strong>g-st<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, violent <strong>in</strong>tra-tribal c<strong>on</strong>flicts. The launch of<br />
the nearly f<strong>in</strong>al APRP grievance resoluti<strong>on</strong> strategy, which will be supported by ISAF, should<br />
accelerate similar effects across Afghanistan.<br />
Despite an emphasis <strong>on</strong> RC-S, RC-SW, <strong>and</strong> RC-E, most re<strong>in</strong>tegrati<strong>on</strong> has occurred <strong>in</strong> RC-N <strong>and</strong><br />
RC-W. This disparity is due to a comb<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of mature APRP structures, ANSF performance,<br />
<strong>and</strong> improved security. More than <strong>on</strong>e-third of all re<strong>in</strong>tegrees are from just two prov<strong>in</strong>ces –<br />
Herat <strong>and</strong> Badghis – due primarily to a comb<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of proactive leadership by prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />
governors <strong>and</strong> effective cooperati<strong>on</strong> with Afghan Nati<strong>on</strong>al Directorate for <strong>Security</strong> (NDS) <strong>in</strong><br />
those prov<strong>in</strong>ces. While the Herat <strong>and</strong> Badghis governors credit re<strong>in</strong>tegrati<strong>on</strong> with erod<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
<strong>in</strong>surgency, re<strong>in</strong>tegrati<strong>on</strong> is <strong>in</strong>adequate <strong>on</strong> its own to elim<strong>in</strong>ate crim<strong>in</strong>al violence <strong>and</strong> fully<br />
stabilize communities. APRP is mak<strong>in</strong>g modest progress <strong>in</strong> the south, southwest, <strong>and</strong> east,<br />
although these areas rema<strong>in</strong> significantly beh<strong>in</strong>d other areas of the country <strong>in</strong> the number of<br />
formal re<strong>in</strong>tegrees. However, the number of groups enter<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to discussi<strong>on</strong>s with the Afghan<br />
Government dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period <strong>in</strong>creased <strong>in</strong> the south <strong>and</strong> east.<br />
A dual-track approach, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g improved Afghan outreach <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ed military pressure <strong>on</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>surgent groups, will be used to draw <strong>in</strong>surgents <strong>in</strong>to APRP. ISAF provides robust support to<br />
re<strong>in</strong>tegrati<strong>on</strong> with an emphasis <strong>on</strong> RC-S, RC-SW, <strong>and</strong> RC-E. ISAF provides support to the Jo<strong>in</strong>t<br />
Secretariat through the Force Re<strong>in</strong>tegrati<strong>on</strong> Cell (FRIC), <strong>and</strong> to prov<strong>in</strong>cial peace structures<br />
through logistical, f<strong>in</strong>ancial, <strong>and</strong> capacity-build<strong>in</strong>g assistance. Re<strong>in</strong>tegrati<strong>on</strong> has also been fully<br />
<strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>to the transiti<strong>on</strong> process, <strong>and</strong> will be a prom<strong>in</strong>ent comp<strong>on</strong>ent <strong>in</strong> Tranche Three<br />
plann<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
In the last six m<strong>on</strong>ths, APRP made c<strong>on</strong>siderable strides <strong>in</strong> deliver<strong>in</strong>g community recovery<br />
programs. These programs follow formal demobilizati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> are designed to benefit<br />
communities that accept re<strong>in</strong>tegrees, <strong>and</strong> help transiti<strong>on</strong> them from c<strong>on</strong>flict to stability. The first<br />
Afghan Government community-recovery projects were launched <strong>in</strong> August 2011, <strong>and</strong> as of<br />
March 2012, there were more than 140 community recovery projects <strong>in</strong> 21 prov<strong>in</strong>ces across<br />
Afghanistan.<br />
81
Key challenges to re<strong>in</strong>tegrati<strong>on</strong> are the uneven capacity of APRP pers<strong>on</strong>nel at the prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />
level <strong>and</strong> the difficulty <strong>in</strong> execut<strong>in</strong>g community recovery projects <strong>in</strong> unstable areas. To address<br />
uneven capacity at the prov<strong>in</strong>cial level, the Jo<strong>in</strong>t Secretariat c<strong>on</strong>ducted multiple tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g sessi<strong>on</strong>s<br />
<strong>and</strong> partnered with ISAF <strong>and</strong> the <strong>United</strong> Nati<strong>on</strong>s Development Project (UNDP) to create a<br />
comprehensive tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> mentor<strong>in</strong>g program for prov<strong>in</strong>cial APRP structures; this program<br />
will launch by the summer of 2012. The High Peace Council, Jo<strong>in</strong>t Secretariat <strong>and</strong> ISAF are<br />
engag<strong>in</strong>g the Afghan Government by exp<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g the number of government entities that support<br />
APRP, such the ANA, NDS, M<strong>in</strong>istry of Hajj <strong>and</strong> Religious Affairs, M<strong>in</strong>istry of Border <strong>and</strong><br />
Tribal Affairs, <strong>and</strong> M<strong>in</strong>istry of Refugees <strong>and</strong> Repatriati<strong>on</strong>. <strong>Security</strong> for community recovery will<br />
rema<strong>in</strong> a challenge, but can be facilitated by improved community outreach <strong>and</strong> grievance<br />
resoluti<strong>on</strong> efforts, <strong>and</strong> ANSF/ISAF synchr<strong>on</strong>izati<strong>on</strong> of security operati<strong>on</strong>s with local political<br />
peace efforts.<br />
5.6: RECONCILIATION<br />
In her February 18, 2011 speech at the Asia Society, Secretary of State Hillary Cl<strong>in</strong>t<strong>on</strong> laid out<br />
three foundati<strong>on</strong>s for American policy <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan: a str<strong>on</strong>g military effort to defeat al-Qaida<br />
<strong>and</strong> support Afghans as they secure their sovereignty; a civilian push to promote ec<strong>on</strong>omic<br />
development <strong>and</strong> good governance; <strong>and</strong> a diplomatic surge to support an Afghan-led<br />
rec<strong>on</strong>ciliati<strong>on</strong> process designed to end 30 years of war. As part of the diplomatic surge, the U.S.<br />
is leverag<strong>in</strong>g a broad range of c<strong>on</strong>tacts at many levels across Afghanistan <strong>and</strong> the regi<strong>on</strong>,<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g prelim<strong>in</strong>ary outreach to members of the Taliban. The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> has focused special<br />
attenti<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> the need for regi<strong>on</strong>al support for Afghanistan.<br />
We are focused <strong>on</strong> foster<strong>in</strong>g a credible Afghan political process to end the war. Our progress <strong>on</strong><br />
the Lisb<strong>on</strong> transiti<strong>on</strong> strategy, buttressed by str<strong>on</strong>g commitments to support the Afghans after<br />
2014, is creat<strong>in</strong>g the c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s to potentially br<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>surgents to the negotiat<strong>in</strong>g table. The<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> has also been us<strong>in</strong>g our broad c<strong>on</strong>tacts <strong>in</strong> Afghan society <strong>and</strong> the regi<strong>on</strong> to open<br />
the door for an Afghan-led peace process to rec<strong>on</strong>cile those <strong>in</strong>surgents will<strong>in</strong>g to agree to three<br />
necessary outcomes: break<strong>in</strong>g ties with al-Qaeda; renounc<strong>in</strong>g violence; <strong>and</strong> accept<strong>in</strong>g the Afghan<br />
c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g its protecti<strong>on</strong>s for the rights of women <strong>and</strong> ethnic m<strong>in</strong>orities.<br />
In recent m<strong>on</strong>ths, there have been several senior-level dialogues <strong>on</strong> rec<strong>on</strong>ciliati<strong>on</strong>. Pakistani<br />
Foreign M<strong>in</strong>ister Khar visited Kabul <strong>in</strong> February, followed by a visit by President Karzai the<br />
same m<strong>on</strong>th to Islamabad to attend a trilateral summit meet<strong>in</strong>g with the leaders of Iran <strong>and</strong><br />
Pakistan. The trilateral declarati<strong>on</strong> expressed support for an “Afghan-led <strong>and</strong> Afghan-owned<br />
<strong>in</strong>clusive process of peace <strong>and</strong> rec<strong>on</strong>ciliati<strong>on</strong>.” Follow<strong>in</strong>g Karzai’s visit, Pakistani Prime<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister Gilani issued an “appeal to the Taliban leadership as well as to all other Afghan groups,<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Hezb-e-Islami, to participate <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>tra-Afghan process for nati<strong>on</strong>al rec<strong>on</strong>ciliati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />
peace.” F<strong>in</strong>ally, <strong>on</strong> March 25, delegati<strong>on</strong>s from the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, Pakistan <strong>and</strong> Afghanistan<br />
rec<strong>on</strong>vened a Core Group meet<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Dushanbe. This meet<strong>in</strong>g marked the resumpti<strong>on</strong> of the<br />
Core Group, which had not had met s<strong>in</strong>ce August 2011.<br />
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SECTION 6 – RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT<br />
6.1: GENERAL ASSESSMENT<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce 2002, d<strong>on</strong>or fund<strong>in</strong>g has helped create nati<strong>on</strong>al health <strong>and</strong> educati<strong>on</strong> systems; built<br />
extensive transportati<strong>on</strong>, power, water, communicati<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>and</strong> border <strong>in</strong>frastructure; <strong>and</strong><br />
strengthened ec<strong>on</strong>omic governance. Significant l<strong>on</strong>g-term assistance will c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to be<br />
required, however, to create c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s for susta<strong>in</strong>able ec<strong>on</strong>omic growth. Short-term<br />
development <strong>in</strong>itiatives will focus <strong>on</strong> what is realistically achievable by the end of 2014 to<br />
stabilize the ec<strong>on</strong>omy <strong>and</strong> ensure that the Afghan Government can deliver basic social <strong>and</strong><br />
development services to the Afghan populace. Development dur<strong>in</strong>g transiti<strong>on</strong> will be executed<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st a backdrop of decl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g d<strong>on</strong>or fund<strong>in</strong>g, drawdown of coaliti<strong>on</strong> forces, a rapid decl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong><br />
ISAF spend<strong>in</strong>g, grow<strong>in</strong>g unemployment, <strong>and</strong> likely ec<strong>on</strong>omic recessi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the World Bank, Afghan GDP grew at the rate of 8 percent <strong>in</strong> 2010 <strong>and</strong> 7 percent<br />
<strong>in</strong> 2011. Future growth scenarios are highly c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>gent <strong>on</strong> security, governance, the performance<br />
of the agriculture sector, <strong>and</strong> changes <strong>in</strong> aid levels. The base scenario projects growth to slow to<br />
4-6 percent through 2018, then c<strong>on</strong>verge to 3- 4 percent a year. Improved governance <strong>and</strong> fully<br />
operati<strong>on</strong>al m<strong>in</strong>es would support a scenario of 6-7 percent average annual growth through 2025.<br />
However, should the key factors menti<strong>on</strong>ed above rapidly deteriorate, Afghanistan could<br />
experience negative growth of m<strong>in</strong>us 2 percent a year which would be difficult to recover from.<br />
6.2: SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE<br />
HEALTH<br />
Afghanistan has made significant achievements <strong>in</strong> the health sector over the last 10 years,<br />
supported by external assistance from the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> <strong>and</strong> other d<strong>on</strong>ors. The <strong>in</strong>troducti<strong>on</strong> of<br />
the Basic Package of Health Services 31 (BPHS) <strong>in</strong> 2004 <strong>and</strong> the Essential Package of Hospital<br />
Services 32<br />
(EPHS) <strong>in</strong> 2005 are largely resp<strong>on</strong>sible for the improvement <strong>in</strong> the quality <strong>and</strong><br />
accessibility of health care <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g the current report<strong>in</strong>g period, 24 health facilities opened across Afghanistan, br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>wide total to 2136, up from 498 <strong>in</strong> 2002. Currently, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> supports<br />
approximately 540 health facilities <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g five prov<strong>in</strong>cial hospitals.<br />
Additi<strong>on</strong>ally, 104 mobile health teams have been launched <strong>and</strong> more than 12,000 health posts<br />
have been stood up, supplement<strong>in</strong>g Afghanistan’s health system <strong>in</strong> more remote areas. Internet<br />
<strong>and</strong> communicati<strong>on</strong>s technology are also be<strong>in</strong>g used to a limited degree to enable access to<br />
health care through electr<strong>on</strong>ic health <strong>and</strong> telemedic<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong>itiatives, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g text-message<br />
rem<strong>in</strong>ders for vacc<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> remote diagnostics.<br />
31 The BPHS is designed to provide a st<strong>and</strong>ardized package of basic services that forms the core of service delivery<br />
for all primary care facilities, <strong>and</strong> to promote the redistributi<strong>on</strong> of health services by provid<strong>in</strong>g equitable access,<br />
especially <strong>in</strong> underserved areas.<br />
32 The EPHS is designed to identify a st<strong>and</strong>ardized package of cl<strong>in</strong>ical, diagnostic, <strong>and</strong> adm<strong>in</strong>istrative services for<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>cial, regi<strong>on</strong>al, <strong>and</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al hospitals; to provide guidance <strong>on</strong> how the hospital sector should be staffed,<br />
equipped, <strong>and</strong> provided with drugs for a def<strong>in</strong>ed set of services at each level; <strong>and</strong> to promote a health referral system<br />
which <strong>in</strong>tegrates the BPHS with hospitals.<br />
84
Improvements <strong>in</strong> facilities have led to improvements <strong>in</strong> accessibility. In 2002, <strong>on</strong>ly 9 percent of<br />
the populati<strong>on</strong> had access to basic health services with<strong>in</strong> the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Public Health (MoPH)<br />
benchmark of two hour walk<strong>in</strong>g distance. Today, 68 percent of the populati<strong>on</strong> can reach a<br />
healthcare facility (either public or private) with<strong>in</strong> <strong>on</strong>e hour by foot or animal. In urban areas,<br />
healthcare is much more readily accessible (97 percent); however, access decl<strong>in</strong>es for Afghans <strong>in</strong><br />
rural areas (63 percent) <strong>and</strong> am<strong>on</strong>g nomad populati<strong>on</strong>s (46 percent). Overall, 85 percent can<br />
reach a healthcare facility (public or private) with<strong>in</strong> <strong>on</strong>e hour by any type of transportati<strong>on</strong> (100<br />
percent urban populati<strong>on</strong>, 81 percent rural, <strong>and</strong> 81 percent nomad).<br />
The impact of the <strong>in</strong>creased availability to basic health services has resulted <strong>in</strong> a dramatic<br />
improvement <strong>in</strong> health <strong>in</strong>dicators between 2002 <strong>and</strong> 2010, accord<strong>in</strong>g to an Afghan Mortality<br />
Survey c<strong>on</strong>ducted by the MoPH <strong>in</strong> 2011. The under-5 mortality rate reduced from 257 to 97<br />
deaths per 1,000 live births <strong>and</strong> the <strong>in</strong>fant mortality rate fell from 172 to 77 per 1,000 live births.<br />
Family plann<strong>in</strong>g acceptance rose as the c<strong>on</strong>traceptive prevalence rate <strong>in</strong>creased from 10 to 20<br />
percent, <strong>and</strong> total fertility rates decl<strong>in</strong>ed from 6.3 to 5.1. The maternal mortality ratio decl<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
dramatically from 1,600 to 327 per 100,000 births. Maternal health <strong>in</strong>dicati<strong>on</strong>s improved as<br />
antenatal care coverage <strong>in</strong>creased from 16 to 60 percent, <strong>and</strong> skilled birth attendance also<br />
<strong>in</strong>creased, from 14 to 34 percent. Although these statistics are based <strong>on</strong> imperfect report<strong>in</strong>g<br />
mechanisms <strong>and</strong> have yet to fully mature, they nevertheless po<strong>in</strong>t to promis<strong>in</strong>g trends <strong>in</strong> the<br />
availability <strong>and</strong> quality of Afghan health care, as well as the quality of life for the Afghan<br />
populati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Despite improvements noted above, significant challenges rema<strong>in</strong>. For example, Afghanistan<br />
c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to have some of the poorest health <strong>in</strong>dicators <strong>in</strong> the world. The health situati<strong>on</strong> for<br />
women <strong>and</strong> children rema<strong>in</strong>s grim, particularly am<strong>on</strong>g nomadic <strong>and</strong> rural populati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> those<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>secure areas. Two <strong>in</strong> three women give birth at home without skilled birth attendants <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
unsafe c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>on</strong>e <strong>in</strong> 10 Afghan children die before the age of 5, <strong>on</strong>e Afghan woman dies<br />
every two hours from pregnancy-related causes, <strong>and</strong> <strong>on</strong>ly 56 percent of the populati<strong>on</strong> has access<br />
to clean dr<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g water.<br />
Additi<strong>on</strong>ally, Afghanistan rema<strong>in</strong>s <strong>on</strong>e of <strong>on</strong>ly three countries with endemic polio; the other two<br />
are Pakistan <strong>and</strong> Nigeria. After years of decl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g numbers, Afghanistan experienced a major<br />
outbreak of polio <strong>in</strong> 2011 with 80 c<strong>on</strong>firmed cases, compared to 25 c<strong>on</strong>firmed cases <strong>in</strong> 2010. A<br />
parallel rise <strong>in</strong> cases was seen <strong>in</strong> Pakistan <strong>in</strong> 2011. To address this problem, an Emergency Polio<br />
Acti<strong>on</strong> Plan is be<strong>in</strong>g developed by the MoPH <strong>in</strong> coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> with <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al partners<br />
(<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the World Health Organizati<strong>on</strong>, USAID, <strong>United</strong> Nati<strong>on</strong>s Children’s Fund, the Bill <strong>and</strong><br />
Mel<strong>in</strong>da Gates Foundati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>and</strong> the U.S. Centers for Disease C<strong>on</strong>trol), with the goal of end<strong>in</strong>g<br />
polio transmissi<strong>on</strong> by the end of 2013.<br />
Develop<strong>in</strong>g susta<strong>in</strong>able health f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g opti<strong>on</strong>s will be important to the health sector’s l<strong>on</strong>gterm<br />
viability.<br />
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EDUCATION<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce 2002, the Afghan populace has experienced a dramatic <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> access to basic<br />
educati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> the educati<strong>on</strong>al system has matured to support the enrollment of 8 milli<strong>on</strong> students<br />
– more than 10 times the number of children enrolled <strong>in</strong> early 2002. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the 2011 (SY1390)<br />
school year, primary educati<strong>on</strong> enrollment was greater than 70 percent, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g more than 37<br />
percent of girls. More than 13,000 schools are open nati<strong>on</strong>wide. These schools are staffed by<br />
more than 170,014 teachers, tra<strong>in</strong>ed to Afghan Government st<strong>and</strong>ards with the support of<br />
USAID.<br />
While the quality of <strong>in</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> facilities rema<strong>in</strong>s uneven, the educati<strong>on</strong> of girls <strong>and</strong> women<br />
<strong>in</strong> the southern <strong>and</strong> eastern segments of the country has <strong>in</strong>creased. The educati<strong>on</strong> system has<br />
exp<strong>and</strong>ed to provide vocati<strong>on</strong>al tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to young adults <strong>and</strong> literacy tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to Afghans of all<br />
ages. More than 38,190 students are matriculat<strong>in</strong>g at 142 Technical <strong>and</strong> Vocati<strong>on</strong>al Educati<strong>on</strong><br />
<strong>and</strong> Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g schools, which is an <strong>in</strong>crease of approximately 13,000 students <strong>and</strong> 45 schools from<br />
the prior school year.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to current projecti<strong>on</strong>s, Afghanistan will provide access to basic educati<strong>on</strong> to more<br />
than 77 percent of its school-age populati<strong>on</strong> by 2015, a significant factor <strong>in</strong> reduc<strong>in</strong>g the number<br />
of children exposed to radicalizati<strong>on</strong>, improv<strong>in</strong>g opportunities for females, <strong>and</strong> provid<strong>in</strong>g young<br />
Afghans with <strong>in</strong>creased occupati<strong>on</strong>al choices.<br />
Educati<strong>on</strong> assistance for FY2012 will support the strategic goal of exp<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g access to educati<strong>on</strong><br />
services, particularly for women <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> rural <strong>and</strong> n<strong>on</strong>-secure areas. USAID’s proposed <strong>on</strong>budget<br />
assistance programs with the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Educati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> M<strong>in</strong>istry of Higher Educati<strong>on</strong><br />
will be targeted to improve access to basic <strong>and</strong> higher educati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>in</strong>crease literacy, <strong>and</strong> provide<br />
<strong>in</strong>dividuals with knowledge <strong>and</strong> skills that enhance their ability to c<strong>on</strong>tribute to susta<strong>in</strong>able<br />
ec<strong>on</strong>omic growth.<br />
6.3: ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE<br />
D<strong>on</strong>or-funded development efforts c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to improve Afghan <strong>in</strong>frastructure, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g roads,<br />
rail, power, <strong>and</strong> border c<strong>on</strong>trols. However, the regulatory authorities <strong>and</strong> operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong><br />
ma<strong>in</strong>tenance mechanisms necessary for the l<strong>on</strong>g-term susta<strong>in</strong>ability of this <strong>in</strong>frastructure are<br />
immature or have yet to be developed.<br />
ROADS<br />
The road network <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to exp<strong>and</strong>. The c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>tract for the last 233<br />
km of the R<strong>in</strong>g Road Northwest (Highway 1) was signed <strong>in</strong> December 2011 <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> is<br />
expected to beg<strong>in</strong> by Summer 2012. In the East-West corridor, Italy will fund part of the road<br />
<strong>in</strong> Herat Prov<strong>in</strong>ce from Herat City to Chest-e Sharif (155 km), <strong>and</strong> also from Maiden Shar<br />
(Wardak Prov<strong>in</strong>ce) to Bamyan (Bamyan Prov<strong>in</strong>ce). The Asian Development Bank <strong>and</strong> Japan<br />
have nearly completed the road from Bamyan City to Yakawlang <strong>in</strong> Bamyan Prov<strong>in</strong>ce. The<br />
rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g secti<strong>on</strong>s of the East-West corridor are unfunded.<br />
Al<strong>on</strong>g the North-South corridor, the road from Mazar-e Sharif to Pul-e Baraq (76 km) <strong>in</strong> Balkh<br />
Prov<strong>in</strong>ce was completed by the Asian Development Bank <strong>and</strong> the sec<strong>on</strong>d secti<strong>on</strong> from Pul-e<br />
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Baraq to Darisuf <strong>in</strong> Samangan Prov<strong>in</strong>ce is expected to be complete by summer of 2012. The<br />
road from Tar<strong>in</strong> Kot to Chora (40 km) <strong>in</strong> Uruzgan, sp<strong>on</strong>sored by the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s, was completed<br />
by GIZ, the German Agency for Internati<strong>on</strong>al Cooperati<strong>on</strong> owned by the German Federal<br />
Government. The <strong>United</strong> Arab Emirates is c<strong>on</strong>sider<strong>in</strong>g f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g the last segment of Route 611<br />
<strong>in</strong> Helm<strong>and</strong> Prov<strong>in</strong>ce, estimated at $39M.<br />
RAIL<br />
In additi<strong>on</strong> to the road network, Afghanistan’s future rail system will be critical to ec<strong>on</strong>omic<br />
expansi<strong>on</strong>, particularly <strong>in</strong> the m<strong>in</strong>eral extracti<strong>on</strong> sector. An operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>tenance c<strong>on</strong>tract<br />
with Sogdiana Trans (Uzbekistan Nati<strong>on</strong>al Railroad) has been signed, <strong>and</strong> limited operati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
began <strong>in</strong> February 2012 <strong>on</strong> the newly built 75km rail l<strong>in</strong>e from Hairat<strong>on</strong> border cross<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
Nabe’bed (outside Mazar-e-Sharif). The Afghanistan parastatal ASTRAS has taken over load<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>and</strong> unload<strong>in</strong>g operati<strong>on</strong>s, but is without a c<strong>on</strong>tract <strong>and</strong> lack<strong>in</strong>g the capacity to provide a l<strong>on</strong>gterm<br />
soluti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
In October 2011, USCENTCOM’s Railway Assistance Team drafted a proposal for a muchneeded<br />
Afghan Railway Authority that is currently await<strong>in</strong>g cab<strong>in</strong>et approval. The proposed<br />
authority will regulate future railway c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> operati<strong>on</strong>s. The USCENTCOM team, <strong>in</strong><br />
coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> with <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Transportati<strong>on</strong> Comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the Afghan M<strong>in</strong>istry of M<strong>in</strong>es, is<br />
develop<strong>in</strong>g an Afghan Nati<strong>on</strong>al Rail Plan, which will take <strong>in</strong>to account developments <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>eral<br />
<strong>and</strong> hydrocarb<strong>on</strong> extracti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
POWER<br />
Southeastern Power System’s K<strong>and</strong>ahar-Helm<strong>and</strong> Power Plant program, partially delayed due to<br />
the Route 611 security envir<strong>on</strong>ment, resumed delivery of supplies for the rehabilitati<strong>on</strong> of the<br />
Kajaki Dam <strong>and</strong> Power Plant at the end of December 2011. However, closure of the Pakistan<br />
GLOCs has created a significant backlog of electrical materials required for this project. Unless<br />
the border re-opens or alternate routes <strong>and</strong>/or other shipp<strong>in</strong>g are used (which will <strong>in</strong>crease the<br />
cost of the c<strong>on</strong>tract), we could realistically see a potentially <strong>on</strong>e-year delay <strong>in</strong> gett<strong>in</strong>g K<strong>and</strong>ahar<br />
distributi<strong>on</strong> upgrade materials <strong>in</strong> country. This c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong> will translate to a <strong>on</strong>e-year delay <strong>in</strong><br />
some of the K<strong>and</strong>ahar work, <strong>in</strong> additi<strong>on</strong> to a 6-8 m<strong>on</strong>th delay <strong>in</strong> gett<strong>in</strong>g the Breshna Kot <strong>and</strong><br />
Durai Juncti<strong>on</strong> substati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong>to service. The c<strong>on</strong>tract for replac<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> updat<strong>in</strong>g the 110 kV l<strong>in</strong>e<br />
from Musa Qala through Kajaki substati<strong>on</strong> to Lashkar Gah is be<strong>in</strong>g rescoped <strong>and</strong> rebid after<br />
November 2011 bids were too high. The 110 kV l<strong>in</strong>e from Durai Juncti<strong>on</strong> to K<strong>and</strong>ahar is funded<br />
for FY2012. The Salma Dam has also overcome persistent security <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>tractual issues <strong>and</strong><br />
work is proceed<strong>in</strong>g. The dam, a 42 megawatt (MW) power plant, <strong>and</strong> transmissi<strong>on</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e to Herat<br />
are significantly beh<strong>in</strong>d schedule, due <strong>in</strong> part to security issues. The project is not likely to be<br />
completed until the summer of 2013.<br />
OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE CAPACITY<br />
GIRoA c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to develop the capability <strong>and</strong> capacity to build <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> transportati<strong>on</strong><br />
networks <strong>and</strong> power <strong>in</strong>frastructure. The 2012 Afghanistan Infrastructure Program planned<br />
transportati<strong>on</strong> projects <strong>in</strong>clude road <strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>tenance capacity build<strong>in</strong>g. Future<br />
<strong>in</strong>frastructure susta<strong>in</strong>ment is l<strong>in</strong>ked to efforts to improve capacity <strong>and</strong> capability of the M<strong>in</strong>istry<br />
of Public Works for plann<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g roads, bridges <strong>and</strong> tunnels. The l<strong>on</strong>g-term<br />
87
susta<strong>in</strong>ability for power <strong>in</strong>cludes capacity build<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> commercializati<strong>on</strong> efforts to <strong>in</strong>crease<br />
DABS (Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat) revenue through <strong>in</strong>creased sales, enabl<strong>in</strong>g DABS to<br />
fully fund susta<strong>in</strong>ment <strong>and</strong> capital improvements.<br />
Currently, the m<strong>in</strong>istries’ mechanisms <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al capacity to appropriately budget for<br />
O&M costs <strong>on</strong> a unit cost basis are limited <strong>and</strong> the approval <strong>and</strong> management of the budget at the<br />
major heads of expenditure level is the doma<strong>in</strong> of the MoF, with prov<strong>in</strong>cial level requirements<br />
still often struggl<strong>in</strong>g to be recognized. The rigidity of this system, while necessary due to the<br />
<strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>al envir<strong>on</strong>ment, results <strong>in</strong> significant <strong>in</strong>efficiencies.<br />
The m<strong>in</strong>istries resp<strong>on</strong>sible for critical assets possess limited ability to adequately execute an<br />
O&M plan <strong>on</strong> the scale required <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, with the power <strong>and</strong> water sectors hav<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
most capability. The limitati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternal technical capacity, as well as c<strong>on</strong>tract<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong><br />
procurement to seek outside assistance exhibited by the m<strong>in</strong>istries, would <strong>in</strong>hibit the<br />
effectiveness of any <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> O&M budget disbursed through the Afghan Government.<br />
Currently, the systems <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternal c<strong>on</strong>trols needed to both determ<strong>in</strong>e appropriate O&M<br />
spend<strong>in</strong>g levels <strong>and</strong> ensure that the amounts budgeted for O&M are deployed <strong>and</strong> disbursed for<br />
the appropriate activities, are uniformly deficient throughout the m<strong>in</strong>istries.<br />
The Afghan Government must c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to develop <strong>in</strong>ternal capacity <strong>in</strong> order to susta<strong>in</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>frastructure. Improvements <strong>in</strong> capacity will support both the budget<strong>in</strong>g process for O&M<br />
costs, as well as the disbursement of the O&M budget throughout the year, thereby <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the likelihood of susta<strong>in</strong>ability for assets <strong>and</strong> service delivery.<br />
6.4: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT<br />
Afghanistan c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to experience steady ec<strong>on</strong>omic growth, averag<strong>in</strong>g 8.5 percent annually.<br />
However, this growth is primarily driven by d<strong>on</strong>or <strong>and</strong> ISAF spend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> must transiti<strong>on</strong> to<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestment-driven dem<strong>and</strong> to lay the foundati<strong>on</strong> for susta<strong>in</strong>able ec<strong>on</strong>omic development. Such<br />
development is critical to l<strong>on</strong>g-term stability, but rema<strong>in</strong>s a significant challenge due to current<br />
fiscal gaps, the immaturity of most Afghan ec<strong>on</strong>omic sectors, widespread corrupti<strong>on</strong>, <strong>and</strong><br />
underdeveloped <strong>in</strong>frastructure.<br />
A recent World Bank study <strong>on</strong> transiti<strong>on</strong> ec<strong>on</strong>omics, assum<strong>in</strong>g near-term growth <strong>in</strong> the m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
sector, estimated that dur<strong>in</strong>g the process of security transiti<strong>on</strong>, ec<strong>on</strong>omic growth is expected to<br />
slow to 6 percent annually <strong>and</strong> eventually level off at approximately 4 to 5 percent as transiti<strong>on</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>cludes post-2014. However, two factors can mitigate the possible effects of an ec<strong>on</strong>omic<br />
recessi<strong>on</strong>: assur<strong>in</strong>g that the reducti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> external spend<strong>in</strong>g is more gradual than precipitous; <strong>and</strong><br />
channel<strong>in</strong>g d<strong>on</strong>or fund<strong>in</strong>g through the MoF budget process that flows directly <strong>in</strong>to the Afghan<br />
ec<strong>on</strong>omy.<br />
Major challenges for achiev<strong>in</strong>g ec<strong>on</strong>omic stabilizati<strong>on</strong> are fiscal susta<strong>in</strong>ability <strong>and</strong> transiti<strong>on</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
from a statist, comm<strong>and</strong> ec<strong>on</strong>omy to market-driven ec<strong>on</strong>omic growth. The extent of progress<br />
will depend <strong>on</strong> tangible outcomes <strong>in</strong> creat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> implement<strong>in</strong>g the legal <strong>and</strong> regulatory<br />
framework necessary to stimulate private <strong>in</strong>vestment; complet<strong>in</strong>g major <strong>in</strong>frastructure projects <strong>in</strong><br />
power, roads, rail, <strong>and</strong> air; f<strong>in</strong>ancial sector reform; <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g credit availability, agriculture<br />
<strong>and</strong> agribus<strong>in</strong>ess value cha<strong>in</strong>s, extractive <strong>in</strong>dustries <strong>and</strong> Small to Medium Enterprise<br />
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development <strong>in</strong> key sectors that have the potential for promot<strong>in</strong>g job creati<strong>on</strong>, trade, <strong>and</strong><br />
commerce. Promis<strong>in</strong>g sectors <strong>in</strong>clude carpet manufactur<strong>in</strong>g, dried fruits <strong>and</strong> nuts, jewelry,<br />
cashmere, c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong>, <strong>and</strong> services.<br />
Trade <strong>and</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>al ec<strong>on</strong>omic <strong>in</strong>tegrati<strong>on</strong> are also key factors <strong>in</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>able ec<strong>on</strong>omic growth.<br />
However, implementati<strong>on</strong> of the bilateral Afghan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA)<br />
has not yet been realized. Although Afghanistan became a full member of the South Asian Free<br />
Trade Agreement (SAFTA) <strong>in</strong> August 2011, political tensi<strong>on</strong>s between India <strong>and</strong> Pakistan have<br />
delayed implementati<strong>on</strong> of the membership agreement. Discussi<strong>on</strong>s took place <strong>in</strong> January 2012<br />
between India <strong>and</strong> Pakistan <strong>on</strong> tariff reducti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> n<strong>on</strong>-sensitive goods, followed by a meet<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong><br />
Pakistan by SAFTA members to develop an acti<strong>on</strong> plan for SAFTA implementati<strong>on</strong>. A follow<strong>on</strong><br />
meet<strong>in</strong>g is scheduled to take place <strong>in</strong> April or May to c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue these discussi<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
At the U.S.-Afghan Trade <strong>and</strong> Investment Framework Agreement meet<strong>in</strong>gs that took place <strong>in</strong><br />
Kabul <strong>in</strong> December 2011, U.S. Trade Representative policy discussi<strong>on</strong>s with the Afghan<br />
Government advanced bilateral trade issues. USAID c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to provide technical assistance to<br />
the Afghan Government related to capacity build<strong>in</strong>g for trade agreement implementati<strong>on</strong>. This<br />
support is expected to result <strong>in</strong> positive developments <strong>in</strong> World Trade Organizati<strong>on</strong> accessi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
the medium term.<br />
Although ISAF <strong>and</strong> the <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al community have provided Afghanistan with most of the<br />
critical <strong>in</strong>frastructure necessary for susta<strong>in</strong>able ec<strong>on</strong>omic development, the lack of power<br />
rema<strong>in</strong>s a major c<strong>on</strong>stra<strong>in</strong>t; <strong>in</strong>-country electric power producti<strong>on</strong> is far below the necessary<br />
threshold for str<strong>on</strong>g ec<strong>on</strong>omic growth, <strong>and</strong> the distributi<strong>on</strong> network is significantly<br />
underdeveloped. Further, the development of <strong>in</strong>frastructure over the last decade requires<br />
additi<strong>on</strong>al fund<strong>in</strong>g to meet O&M requirements. Regulatory authorities have been established for<br />
some <strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>in</strong>dustries, such as power <strong>and</strong> telecommunicati<strong>on</strong>s; however, the<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability of strategic <strong>in</strong>frastructure, essential to ec<strong>on</strong>omic growth, is at risk without further<br />
improvements <strong>in</strong> establish<strong>in</strong>g regulatory authorities for civil aviati<strong>on</strong>, roads, <strong>and</strong> rail.<br />
REVENUE GENERATION AND BUDGET EXECUTION<br />
Although the Afghan Government c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to make progress <strong>in</strong> revenue generati<strong>on</strong> from<br />
customs, border management, <strong>and</strong> the grow<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dustry, the rate of expenditure will<br />
c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to far exceed government revenue <strong>in</strong> the near- to medium-term. The World Bank<br />
estimates that <strong>in</strong> 2021-22, the f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g gap between government expenditures <strong>and</strong> domestic<br />
revenues will be approximately 25 percent of GDP, or $7.2B <strong>in</strong> 2011 dollars. This gap may<br />
dim<strong>in</strong>ish somewhat as the size <strong>and</strong> cost of the ANSF is f<strong>in</strong>alized; however, a significant fiscal<br />
gap is expected to rema<strong>in</strong>. As Afghanistan gradually develops its natural resources, royalties <strong>and</strong><br />
taxes <strong>on</strong> the export of materials, al<strong>on</strong>g with taxati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> wealth generated as a result of these<br />
<strong>in</strong>dustries, may help close the budgetary gap.<br />
Domestic revenues reached 74.6 percent of the goal for SY1390 <strong>and</strong> covered 71.6 percent of<br />
total operat<strong>in</strong>g expenditures <strong>in</strong> the first n<strong>in</strong>e m<strong>on</strong>ths of the solar year (March – December 2011),<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g a 10 percent share for security forces <strong>in</strong> the first six m<strong>on</strong>ths of the year, but are<br />
expected to <strong>on</strong>ly cover 65 percent of the total operat<strong>in</strong>g expenditures by the end of the Solar<br />
Year (March 2012). C<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued improvements <strong>in</strong> customs revenue, the <strong>in</strong>troducti<strong>on</strong> of a value<br />
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added tax, <strong>and</strong> the development of agricultural <strong>and</strong> m<strong>in</strong>eral sectors are expected to <strong>in</strong>crease<br />
government revenues. However, Afghanistan dem<strong>on</strong>strates an overreliance <strong>on</strong> customs, m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g,<br />
<strong>and</strong> overflight for revenue generati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>and</strong> needs to diversify. Additi<strong>on</strong>al taxati<strong>on</strong> could provide<br />
the government with much-needed revenue. Over the report<strong>in</strong>g period, the Large Taxpayer<br />
Office saw progress with a pilot project <strong>in</strong> three prov<strong>in</strong>ces; however, corporate tax collecti<strong>on</strong> is<br />
almost exclusively c<strong>on</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ed to Kabul.<br />
Budget executi<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to be a serious obstacle for the Afghan Government, which rema<strong>in</strong>s<br />
<strong>in</strong>capable of effectively execut<strong>in</strong>g the budgets of large-scale d<strong>on</strong>or development projects. In the<br />
last three years, the Afghan government has been able to execute <strong>on</strong>ly 40 percent of its total<br />
development budget each year. For the first six m<strong>on</strong>ths of SY1389 (March – September 2010),<br />
the Afghan government had spent 25.3 percent of its development budget. For the same period<br />
this year, development budget executi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong>creased to 31.5 percent. These <strong>in</strong>cremental ga<strong>in</strong>s,<br />
aided by technical assistance from USAID, the World Bank, <strong>and</strong> the Department for<br />
Internati<strong>on</strong>al Development, are positive steps. However, poor budget executi<strong>on</strong> is endemic <strong>and</strong><br />
will require generati<strong>on</strong>al change.<br />
The Afghan Government’s success <strong>in</strong> execut<strong>in</strong>g its operat<strong>in</strong>g budget is more mature. The<br />
executi<strong>on</strong> rate of the operat<strong>in</strong>g budget <strong>in</strong> the first n<strong>in</strong>e m<strong>on</strong>ths of this year was 64.7 percent, an<br />
<strong>in</strong>crease compared to the executi<strong>on</strong> rate of the first n<strong>in</strong>e m<strong>on</strong>ths of last year (60.4 percent).<br />
AGRICULTURE<br />
More than 80 percent of Afghanistan’s ec<strong>on</strong>omy is agriculture-based, mak<strong>in</strong>g the sector an<br />
important area for U.S. <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al assistance.<br />
Afghanistan’s agriculture sector is not progress<strong>in</strong>g as quickly as other areas of socioec<strong>on</strong>omic<br />
development. Food <strong>in</strong>security rema<strong>in</strong>s a significant c<strong>on</strong>cern, <strong>and</strong> was magnified by a reducti<strong>on</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong> wheat crop producti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> the 2010-2011 seas<strong>on</strong> as compared to the previous two years.<br />
Although the country’s f<strong>in</strong>al wheat producti<strong>on</strong> was statistically close to average, the drop <strong>in</strong><br />
producti<strong>on</strong> was <strong>in</strong>terpreted as significant, prompt<strong>in</strong>g an outpour<strong>in</strong>g of d<strong>on</strong>or aid from several<br />
countries <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al agencies. Although the net precipitati<strong>on</strong> received dur<strong>in</strong>g the grow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
seas<strong>on</strong> prevents the situati<strong>on</strong> from be<strong>in</strong>g classified as drought, dry spells experienced dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
critical maturati<strong>on</strong> periods of wheat seed did negatively impact f<strong>in</strong>al harvest numbers.<br />
The U.S. Agricultural Assistance Strategy for Afghanistan has dual goals: <strong>in</strong>crease the capacity<br />
of Afghanistan’s M<strong>in</strong>istry of Agriculture, Irrigati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>and</strong> Livestock (MAIL) to deliver services;<br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease agricultural sector jobs <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>comes through enhanc<strong>in</strong>g agricultural productivity,<br />
regenerat<strong>in</strong>g agribus<strong>in</strong>ess, rehabilitat<strong>in</strong>g watersheds, <strong>and</strong> improv<strong>in</strong>g irrigati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong>frastructure. The<br />
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is tak<strong>in</strong>g numerous steps to assist MAIL <strong>in</strong> becom<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
more efficient organizati<strong>on</strong> that is able to address the nati<strong>on</strong>’s agricultural needs. Planned<br />
USAID programm<strong>in</strong>g will work directly with MAIL to <strong>in</strong>crease its technical capacity to manage<br />
programs which deliver important services to citizens <strong>in</strong> the areas of research, extensi<strong>on</strong>, <strong>and</strong><br />
irrigati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
USDA c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to implement a multi-year capacity build<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> change management program<br />
to strengthen MAIL’s organizati<strong>on</strong>al capacity to support susta<strong>in</strong>able agriculture sector<br />
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development. The program employs management mentors throughout the m<strong>in</strong>istry to improve<br />
the technical <strong>and</strong> adm<strong>in</strong>istrative knowledge of MAIL civil servants, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> turn, improve the<br />
m<strong>in</strong>istry’s delivery of services to the Afghan people. Notably, the program has improved<br />
MAIL’s ability to receive <strong>and</strong> manage <strong>on</strong>-budget assistance from <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al d<strong>on</strong>ors, although<br />
the extensive d<strong>on</strong>or use of st<strong>and</strong>-al<strong>on</strong>e management units leaves the systems largely untested.<br />
USDA has also begun implementati<strong>on</strong> of a project to strengthen MAIL’s ability to deliver more<br />
effective, dem<strong>and</strong>-driven extensi<strong>on</strong> services to producers <strong>and</strong> other rural clientele <strong>in</strong> targeted<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ces, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Kabul, Herat, Balkh, <strong>and</strong> Nangarhar. The project focuses <strong>on</strong> professi<strong>on</strong>al<br />
development <strong>and</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g for MAIL’s extensi<strong>on</strong> staff (primarily at the prov<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>and</strong> district<br />
level) <strong>in</strong> order to dem<strong>on</strong>strate MAIL’s ability to support farmers <strong>and</strong> promote water <strong>and</strong> natural<br />
resource management, ultimately build<strong>in</strong>g public c<strong>on</strong>fidence <strong>in</strong> MAIL’s capacity to provide<br />
critical services. These efforts will be complemented by a USAID program that will work with<br />
MAIL’s extensi<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> research staff to develop the l<strong>in</strong>kage between applied research <strong>and</strong><br />
extensi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> order to effectively <strong>in</strong>troduce <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong> improved technologies to <strong>in</strong>crease<br />
productivity for Afghan farms.<br />
USAID c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to support projects designed to boost farm producti<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> productivity as well<br />
as enhance farm-to-market l<strong>in</strong>kages required to ensure the agriculture sector c<strong>on</strong>tributes to<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ed ec<strong>on</strong>omic growth. USAID’s Incentives Driv<strong>in</strong>g Ec<strong>on</strong>omic Alternatives for the North,<br />
East, <strong>and</strong> West program is c<strong>on</strong>tribut<strong>in</strong>g to both agricultural development <strong>and</strong> alternative<br />
livelihood objectives by strengthen<strong>in</strong>g farm-to-market l<strong>in</strong>kages for licit crops. This program has<br />
supplemented USDA capacity-build<strong>in</strong>g efforts with various programs aimed at <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>on</strong>gterm<br />
agricultural development <strong>and</strong> employment, as well as improv<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>comes of farm<br />
families. The program generated approximately $4M <strong>in</strong> off-farm sales <strong>in</strong> FY2011, supported<br />
br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g more than 23,000 hectares of l<strong>and</strong> under improved irrigati<strong>on</strong> s<strong>in</strong>ce 2010, <strong>and</strong> created<br />
approximately 42,000 employment opportunities <strong>in</strong> farm communities s<strong>in</strong>ce 2010.<br />
In southern Afghanistan, the <strong>on</strong>e-year, $65M Southern Regi<strong>on</strong>al Agricultural Development<br />
program, funded by USAID, has <strong>in</strong>stituted several programs to support growth <strong>in</strong> the agricultural<br />
sector <strong>in</strong> Helm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> K<strong>and</strong>ahar Prov<strong>in</strong>ce dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g: 1) distributed<br />
grants of farm mach<strong>in</strong>ery to Afghan Government-approved agricultural cooperatives; 2) tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>and</strong> employment of approximately 4,000 laborers to plant more than 1 milli<strong>on</strong> fruit tree sapl<strong>in</strong>gs;<br />
<strong>and</strong> 3) distributi<strong>on</strong> of vegetable seed <strong>and</strong> fertilizer c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>al asset transfers to approximately<br />
1,000 K<strong>and</strong>ahari farmers. This program will be replaced by a five-year agricultural development<br />
program <strong>in</strong> 2012.<br />
Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Rec<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> Teams (PRTs)/Agribus<strong>in</strong>ess Development Teams (ADTs) are key<br />
enablers for growth <strong>in</strong> governance <strong>and</strong> ec<strong>on</strong>omic development, <strong>and</strong> cement<strong>in</strong>g ga<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> security.<br />
ADTs assist private farmers <strong>and</strong> local government officials at the district/prov<strong>in</strong>cial level <strong>and</strong> are<br />
a useful tool <strong>in</strong> capacity-build<strong>in</strong>g efforts. Currently there are 10 ADTs support<strong>in</strong>g 14 prov<strong>in</strong>ces<br />
<strong>in</strong> Afghanistan; seven teams are located throughout RC-E <strong>and</strong> three teams are <strong>in</strong> RC-S. ADTs<br />
are sourced by Nati<strong>on</strong>al Guard pers<strong>on</strong>nel, leverag<strong>in</strong>g civilian skills <strong>and</strong> expertise across a range<br />
of agriculture sciences. ADTs at the local <strong>and</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al levels have <strong>in</strong>stituted hundreds of<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>able projects address<strong>in</strong>g the basic <strong>in</strong>come <strong>and</strong> subsistence needs. USDA offers<br />
Agricultural Development for Afghanistan Pre-deployment Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g (ADAPT), designed to meet<br />
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the needs of U.S. Government <strong>and</strong> NGO pers<strong>on</strong>nel, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g ADTs. Through a comb<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of<br />
classroom curriculum <strong>and</strong> h<strong>and</strong>s-<strong>on</strong> exercises, ADAPT tra<strong>in</strong>ees receive an extensive overview of<br />
the Afghan agricultural envir<strong>on</strong>ment <strong>in</strong> such technical subject areas as U.S. Government policy<br />
<strong>and</strong> strategy, animal husb<strong>and</strong>ry, rangel<strong>and</strong> management, crop <strong>and</strong> horticulture producti<strong>on</strong>,<br />
orchard <strong>and</strong> v<strong>in</strong>eyard management, post-harvest practices, water management, <strong>and</strong> soils.<br />
C<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued USDA capacity-build<strong>in</strong>g efforts, al<strong>on</strong>g with USAID <strong>and</strong> ADT grassroot agricultural<br />
development programs, will be critical to the c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued stabilizati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> growth of<br />
Afghanistan’s agriculture sector.<br />
EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES<br />
The m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, oil, <strong>and</strong> gas sectors made significant progress dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period,<br />
particularly toward <strong>on</strong>go<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> future tenders.<br />
The rights to the Amu Darya oil bas<strong>in</strong> were awarded to the Ch<strong>in</strong>a Nati<strong>on</strong>al Petroleum<br />
Corporati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> the Afghan-Tajik hydrocarb<strong>on</strong> bas<strong>in</strong> seismic survey is <strong>on</strong>go<strong>in</strong>g. The tender for<br />
the West Garmak Coal site closed <strong>in</strong> late November, <strong>and</strong> the outcome of bid evaluati<strong>on</strong>s is<br />
expected <strong>in</strong> mid 2012. Two gold m<strong>in</strong>es, two copper m<strong>in</strong>es, <strong>and</strong> <strong>on</strong>e lithium m<strong>in</strong>e were opened<br />
for tender <strong>in</strong> early December 2011. The gold deposit <strong>in</strong> Badakhshan Prov<strong>in</strong>ce, the Zarkashan<br />
gold <strong>and</strong> copper deposits <strong>in</strong> Ghazni Prov<strong>in</strong>ce, the Namak-Sar lithium deposit <strong>in</strong> Herat Prov<strong>in</strong>ce,<br />
the Shaida copper deposit <strong>in</strong> Herat Prov<strong>in</strong>ce, <strong>and</strong> the Balkhab copper deposit <strong>in</strong> Sar-e-Pul<br />
Prov<strong>in</strong>ce were the first of a l<strong>on</strong>g list of small- to medium-scale m<strong>in</strong>eral <strong>and</strong> “rare earth” deposits<br />
to go to market dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period.<br />
Three of the four blocks of the Hajigak ir<strong>on</strong> deposit were awarded to a c<strong>on</strong>sortium of six Indian<br />
companies; the fourth was awarded to the Canadian company Kilo Gold. The c<strong>on</strong>tract is<br />
expected to be signed <strong>in</strong> Spr<strong>in</strong>g 2012. Although producti<strong>on</strong> is not expected before 2016, the<br />
explorati<strong>on</strong> phase will <strong>in</strong>duce large-scale <strong>in</strong>vestments <strong>in</strong> strategic <strong>in</strong>frastructure, specifically <strong>in</strong><br />
energy, rail, <strong>and</strong> road networks. The resource base of the Hajigak deposit is estimated at 1.6<br />
billi<strong>on</strong> t<strong>on</strong>s at 62 percent ir<strong>on</strong> ore, <strong>and</strong> is expected to provide the Afghan Government with up to<br />
$200M <strong>in</strong> royalty payments per year.<br />
6.5: WOMEN’S ISSUES<br />
Women are mak<strong>in</strong>g progress <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, play<strong>in</strong>g an ever-<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g role at all levels of<br />
Afghan society, particularly <strong>in</strong> the public <strong>and</strong> political arenas. Women hold 27 percent of the<br />
seats <strong>in</strong> the Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assembly <strong>and</strong> 25 percent of the seats <strong>in</strong> the Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Councils. In the<br />
2010 Wolesi Jirga electi<strong>on</strong>, 406 of 2,556 c<strong>and</strong>idates were women, a 24 percent <strong>in</strong>crease from the<br />
2005 electi<strong>on</strong>. Increased participati<strong>on</strong> was met by <strong>in</strong>creased electoral success: there were two<br />
female w<strong>in</strong>ners <strong>in</strong> Nimruz Prov<strong>in</strong>ce who w<strong>on</strong> both prov<strong>in</strong>cial seats; 69 women filled elected<br />
seats, <strong>on</strong>e seat above the reserved number of 68; <strong>and</strong> 11 women had enough votes to enter the<br />
Parliament <strong>in</strong>dependent of the reserved seats. Women have also <strong>in</strong>creased their presence <strong>and</strong><br />
visibility through the Nati<strong>on</strong>al Solidarity Program <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>stitute 24 percent of participants <strong>in</strong> the<br />
local Community Development Councils.<br />
Women are also assum<strong>in</strong>g greater resp<strong>on</strong>sibility <strong>in</strong> the socio-ec<strong>on</strong>omic realm. In the health<br />
arena, 30 – 40 percent of the medical professi<strong>on</strong>als are women. In the ec<strong>on</strong>omic sector, the<br />
92
number of registered women-owned bus<strong>in</strong>esses <strong>in</strong>creased nearly 100 percent <strong>in</strong> 2010 to total<br />
281.<br />
While DoS <strong>and</strong> USAID adm<strong>in</strong>ister the majority of women’s <strong>in</strong>itiatives, DoD also oversees<br />
several programs focus<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> women. These programs <strong>in</strong>clude assistance to the Department of<br />
Women’s Affairs <strong>in</strong> K<strong>and</strong>ahar <strong>and</strong> the District Development Assembly for Women’s Affairs <strong>in</strong><br />
Parwan District.<br />
Some military units also <strong>in</strong>corporate Female Engagement Teams (FETs,) which were first<br />
established by the U.S. Mar<strong>in</strong>e Corps. FETs use female service pers<strong>on</strong>nel or civilians to<br />
accompany military patrols <strong>in</strong> order to engage local Afghan women <strong>and</strong> communities <strong>in</strong> open<br />
communicati<strong>on</strong>, thus facilitat<strong>in</strong>g civil-military <strong>in</strong>teracti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> build<strong>in</strong>g trust, cooperati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>and</strong><br />
security. The Ktah Khas Afghan (Afghan Special Unit) has recently selected the first 11 women<br />
to form Cultural Support Teams (CST) <strong>in</strong> support of their Strike Forces. The Afghan CST will<br />
further the “Afghanizati<strong>on</strong>” of night operati<strong>on</strong>s as they <strong>in</strong>teract with the populati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> help care<br />
for women <strong>and</strong> children encountered <strong>on</strong> special operati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
Recently, the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) program assigned two senior gender<br />
<strong>in</strong>tegrati<strong>on</strong> mentors to NTM-A. These mentors are resp<strong>on</strong>sible for mentor<strong>in</strong>g the Afghan<br />
M<strong>in</strong>istries of Defense <strong>and</strong> Interior <strong>on</strong> gender <strong>in</strong>tegrati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> human rights. The mentors provide<br />
oversight for the development of l<strong>on</strong>g-range strategic plans to improve gender <strong>in</strong>tegrati<strong>on</strong>,<br />
human rights/dignity, <strong>and</strong> equality-related matters with<strong>in</strong> the ANSF.<br />
To reduce discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> violence aga<strong>in</strong>st women, the Afghan Government has enacted a<br />
law prohibit<strong>in</strong>g violence aga<strong>in</strong>st women <strong>and</strong> adopted the c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> the elim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of<br />
discrim<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> aga<strong>in</strong>st women. However, implementati<strong>on</strong> of these agreements rema<strong>in</strong> slow, <strong>and</strong><br />
violence aga<strong>in</strong>st women <strong>and</strong> girls rema<strong>in</strong>s prevalent. In March, a statement by the Ulema<br />
Council, endorsed by President Karzai, outl<strong>in</strong>ed st<strong>and</strong>ards of behavior for women that were<br />
stricter than those <strong>in</strong> the Afghan c<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>. President Karzai's <strong>in</strong>tent is unclear, <strong>and</strong> the<br />
statement by the Ulema Council raises c<strong>on</strong>cerns about its negative implicati<strong>on</strong>s for the advance<br />
of Afghan women's rights. Despite advances, the troubles of poverty, illiteracy, <strong>and</strong> poor health<br />
care c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to affect women disproporti<strong>on</strong>ately, <strong>and</strong> soluti<strong>on</strong>s will require a l<strong>on</strong>g-term<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ed effort.<br />
93
SECTION 7 – COUNTERNARCOTICS<br />
7.1: STRATEGY AND PRIORITIES<br />
The Afghan Government is the lead for all counternarcotics (CN) operati<strong>on</strong>s. The Afghan<br />
Government regularly partners with the U.S. <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al organizati<strong>on</strong>s to target narcotics<br />
traffickers <strong>and</strong> facilities. As part of the COIN strategy, DoD coord<strong>in</strong>ates with the U.S. Drug<br />
Enforcement Agency (DEA) <strong>and</strong> other U.S. Government departments <strong>and</strong> agencies to support<br />
the overall CN strategy for Afghanistan. The ma<strong>in</strong> goal of this strategy is to reduce the ability of<br />
the <strong>in</strong>surgency to draw support from the narcotics <strong>in</strong>dustry. RC-S <strong>and</strong> RC-SW rema<strong>in</strong>ed priority<br />
areas for military <strong>and</strong> law enforcement CN efforts dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period. These regi<strong>on</strong>s<br />
c<strong>on</strong>stitute pr<strong>in</strong>cipal areas for Afghan poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>and</strong> as such, are critical sources of<br />
revenue for the Taliban-led <strong>in</strong>surgency. DoD’s role <strong>in</strong> support of CN operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong>cludes<br />
build<strong>in</strong>g the capacity of the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), improv<strong>in</strong>g border<br />
security, promot<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formati<strong>on</strong> shar<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> foster<strong>in</strong>g regi<strong>on</strong>al <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al cooperati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> has been revis<strong>in</strong>g its CN strategy for Afghanistan s<strong>in</strong>ce the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of this<br />
report<strong>in</strong>g period. This revisi<strong>on</strong> will prioritize CN assistance dur<strong>in</strong>g the security transiti<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />
drawdown of U.S. <strong>and</strong> coaliti<strong>on</strong> combat forces. Additi<strong>on</strong>ally, at the operati<strong>on</strong>al level, a new CN<br />
Campaign Strategy was signed by COMISAF dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period. This campaign<br />
strategy further reiterates the importance of c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g to degrade the <strong>in</strong>surgent-narcotics nexus.<br />
Simultaneously, ISAF will assist the Afghan Government <strong>in</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>g its counternarcotics<br />
capacity <strong>and</strong> capability for the eventual transiti<strong>on</strong> to greater Afghan resp<strong>on</strong>sibility.<br />
7.2: COUNTERNARCOTICS OPERATIONS<br />
Increased ISAF presence <strong>and</strong> exp<strong>and</strong>ed operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> southern Afghanistan, enabled by the surge<br />
<strong>in</strong> forces through 2010, have helped to decrease poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> an area of the country<br />
where CN progress was previously unatta<strong>in</strong>able. Areas with ISAF <strong>and</strong> ANSF presence have<br />
seen a steady decl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> cultivati<strong>on</strong>, most notably <strong>in</strong> Helm<strong>and</strong>, Afghanistan’s largest poppygrow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ce, where cultivati<strong>on</strong> has decl<strong>in</strong>ed for three c<strong>on</strong>secutive years.<br />
This report<strong>in</strong>g period saw a 49 percent decrease <strong>in</strong> seized opium, a 54 percent decrease <strong>in</strong> seized<br />
morph<strong>in</strong>e, a 93 percent decrease <strong>in</strong> seized hero<strong>in</strong>, a 70 percent <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> marijuana <strong>and</strong> hashish<br />
seizures, a 56 percent decrease <strong>in</strong> seized liquid pre-cursor chemicals, a 33 percent <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong><br />
seizure of solid pre-cursor chemicals, <strong>and</strong> a 50 percent decrease (a total of 256 <strong>in</strong>dividuals) <strong>in</strong> the<br />
total number of suspects arrested.<br />
94
Figure 25: Quarterly Comparis<strong>on</strong> of Narcotics Seizures<br />
80000<br />
70000<br />
60000<br />
50000<br />
40000<br />
30000<br />
20000<br />
10000<br />
0<br />
46818<br />
23819<br />
Opium<br />
(kg)<br />
1908<br />
873<br />
Morph<strong>in</strong>e<br />
(kg)<br />
3551<br />
232<br />
Hero<strong>in</strong><br />
(kg)<br />
44109<br />
75059<br />
Hashish<br />
(kg)<br />
Poppy <strong>and</strong> its related opium producti<strong>on</strong> will modestly <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> 2012. This estimate is based<br />
solely <strong>on</strong> historical growth <strong>in</strong>formati<strong>on</strong> collected by the UNODC between 2002 <strong>and</strong> 2011<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g an average of 128,100 hectares per year. Judg<strong>in</strong>g by the average <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>and</strong> decrease<br />
amounts over this ten year period, an <strong>in</strong>crease of no more than 30,000 hectares or 23 percent<br />
could occur but is highly unlikely. There has been no significant change <strong>in</strong> grow<strong>in</strong>g methods,<br />
available l<strong>and</strong>, fertilizers, poppy varieties, or water supplies. Susta<strong>in</strong>ed presence of coaliti<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />
GIRoA security forces will also ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> the status quo of potential grow<strong>in</strong>g output. Informati<strong>on</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g changes <strong>in</strong> potential grow<strong>in</strong>g areas <strong>in</strong> remote locati<strong>on</strong>s bey<strong>on</strong>d previous years does not<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicate any major change to potential cultivati<strong>on</strong> amounts. The above average snow fall this<br />
w<strong>in</strong>ter <strong>and</strong> its snow melt should have little impact <strong>on</strong> poppy grow<strong>in</strong>g but could provide more<br />
mounta<strong>in</strong> streams for morph<strong>in</strong>e <strong>and</strong> hero<strong>in</strong> process<strong>in</strong>g at cl<strong>and</strong>est<strong>in</strong>e laboratories <strong>in</strong> remote<br />
mounta<strong>in</strong> locati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g this report<strong>in</strong>g period, the CNPA planned <strong>and</strong> led an <strong>in</strong>itiative called Operati<strong>on</strong> EAGLE to<br />
c<strong>on</strong>duct coord<strong>in</strong>ated counternarcotics operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Herat, Nimroz <strong>and</strong> Farah Prov<strong>in</strong>ces. The<br />
operati<strong>on</strong>’s objective was to build capacity with<strong>in</strong> the CNPA through comb<strong>in</strong>ed operati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
between CNPA units (prov<strong>in</strong>cial <strong>and</strong> specialized) <strong>and</strong> other Afghan police. Operati<strong>on</strong>s began <strong>on</strong><br />
September 21, 2011 with limited checkpo<strong>in</strong>t operati<strong>on</strong>s designed to dem<strong>on</strong>strate a police<br />
presence <strong>and</strong> develop <strong>in</strong>telligence for future operati<strong>on</strong>s. Subsequent operati<strong>on</strong>s became more<br />
complex <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>volved comb<strong>in</strong>ed activities between prov<strong>in</strong>cial <strong>and</strong> specialized CN police. The<br />
f<strong>in</strong>al operati<strong>on</strong>s were complex ground <strong>and</strong> air narcotics <strong>in</strong>terdicti<strong>on</strong> missi<strong>on</strong>s between CNPA<br />
units, ABP, ANP, <strong>and</strong> others. Missi<strong>on</strong> reviews <strong>and</strong> assessments were completed by mid-<br />
95<br />
17485<br />
7693<br />
Wet<br />
Precursors<br />
(L)<br />
FY2011<br />
Q3 & Q4<br />
50046<br />
66764<br />
Dry<br />
Precursors<br />
(kg)<br />
FY 2012<br />
Q1 & Q2<br />
514<br />
256<br />
Arrests
December 2011. Operati<strong>on</strong> EAGLE was the first time the CNPA had effectively <strong>in</strong>tegrated<br />
specialized <strong>and</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>cial units with the operati<strong>on</strong>s of other MoI police elements.<br />
Meanwhile DEA, the CNPA Nati<strong>on</strong>al Interdicti<strong>on</strong> Unit (NIU), <strong>and</strong> ISAF ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed high CN<br />
operati<strong>on</strong>al tempos throughout the report<strong>in</strong>g period, c<strong>on</strong>duct<strong>in</strong>g several major CN operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong><br />
Helm<strong>and</strong> Prov<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> October <strong>and</strong> November 2011; these operati<strong>on</strong>s resulted <strong>in</strong> the destructi<strong>on</strong><br />
of several drug process<strong>in</strong>g labs. The destructi<strong>on</strong> of these labs has denied the <strong>in</strong>surgency milli<strong>on</strong>s<br />
of dollars <strong>in</strong> potential revenue.<br />
In October 2011, DEA, the Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU), the Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Reacti<strong>on</strong> Company<br />
K<strong>and</strong>ahar, <strong>and</strong> U.S. military forces c<strong>on</strong>ducted a jo<strong>in</strong>t CN operati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> K<strong>and</strong>ahar City which<br />
resulted <strong>in</strong> the seizure of 21,150 kilograms of pre-cursor chemicals. There was also an <strong>in</strong>crease<br />
<strong>in</strong> hashish seizures <strong>in</strong> K<strong>and</strong>ahar Prov<strong>in</strong>ce dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period. On December 24, 2011,<br />
DEA, the SIU, <strong>and</strong> the U.S. military executed two Afghan search warrants, which resulted <strong>in</strong> the<br />
seizure of 10 metric t<strong>on</strong>s of hashish. On January 23, 2012, an operati<strong>on</strong> was c<strong>on</strong>ducted <strong>in</strong> which<br />
16 metric t<strong>on</strong>s of hashish <strong>and</strong> <strong>on</strong>e hashish process<strong>in</strong>g center was seized. On January 30, 2012,<br />
another operati<strong>on</strong> resulted <strong>in</strong> the seizure of 35.3 metric t<strong>on</strong>s of hashish. These seizures resulted<br />
<strong>in</strong> milli<strong>on</strong>s of dollars of potential revenue be<strong>in</strong>g denied to the <strong>in</strong>surgency.<br />
In June 2011, the DEA, SIU, <strong>and</strong> the CNPA Technical Investigative Unit (TIU) began an<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestigati<strong>on</strong> of an <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al drug traffick<strong>in</strong>g organizati<strong>on</strong> (DTO) operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Helm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />
Herat Prov<strong>in</strong>ces. This DTO was resp<strong>on</strong>sible for the distributi<strong>on</strong> of hundreds of kilograms of<br />
hero<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> opium, al<strong>on</strong>g with the importati<strong>on</strong> of Acetic Anhydride from Iran. Through judicially<br />
authorized <strong>in</strong>tercepts, the DEA <strong>and</strong> SIU were able to identify the DTO leader <strong>and</strong> his associates.<br />
On December 16, 2011, <strong>on</strong>e of the s<strong>on</strong>s of a DTO leader was arrested <strong>in</strong> the city of Herat by the<br />
NIU <strong>and</strong> SIU with 23 kilograms of hero<strong>in</strong>. On December 29, 2011, DEA <strong>and</strong> the SIU learned<br />
through judicial teleph<strong>on</strong>e <strong>in</strong>tercepts that the DTO leader was <strong>in</strong> Kabul to meet with the MOI<br />
Deputy M<strong>in</strong>ister of Intelligence regard<strong>in</strong>g the arrest of his s<strong>on</strong>. SIU <strong>in</strong>vestigators were mobilized<br />
to the MOI <strong>and</strong> arrested him without <strong>in</strong>cident. On February 9, 2012, another s<strong>on</strong> was arrested by<br />
the CNPA <strong>in</strong> Heart Prov<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>on</strong> an outst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g arrest warrant. The arrest of these three<br />
<strong>in</strong>dividuals has dismantled the DTO. On February 6, 2012, the DTO leader <strong>and</strong> his s<strong>on</strong> who was<br />
arrested <strong>on</strong> December 16, 2011 were each sentenced by Afghan authorities to 20 years of<br />
impris<strong>on</strong>ment for drug traffick<strong>in</strong>g violati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
On February 18, 2012, DEA <strong>and</strong> the NIU orchestrated the arrest of an <strong>in</strong>dividual at the Lashkar<br />
Gah airport <strong>in</strong> Helm<strong>and</strong> Prov<strong>in</strong>ce, Afghanistan, up<strong>on</strong> his return from India. This <strong>in</strong>dividual had<br />
been sought by the Counter Narcotics Justice Center s<strong>in</strong>ce September 17, 2011, after a CN<br />
operati<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>ducted by the NIU, the DEA Foreign-deployed Advisory Support Team <strong>and</strong> ISAF<br />
Special Operati<strong>on</strong> Forces <strong>in</strong> Margha Village <strong>in</strong> Helm<strong>and</strong> revealed an excepti<strong>on</strong>ally large drug lab<br />
stocked with laboratory equipment <strong>and</strong> precursor chemicals. Approximately 21.5 metric t<strong>on</strong>s of<br />
drugs <strong>and</strong> precursor chemicals were seized.<br />
Other notable CN operati<strong>on</strong>s dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period <strong>in</strong>clude the c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued progress of the<br />
DEA-mentored Judicial Wire Intercept Program (JWIP). The JWIP provides Afghan law<br />
enforcement with lawful <strong>in</strong>tercepts that can be used <strong>in</strong> an Afghan court of law. S<strong>in</strong>ce its<br />
<strong>in</strong>cepti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> 2008, the JWIP has <strong>in</strong>tercepted milli<strong>on</strong>s of calls. S<strong>in</strong>ce the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of FY12,<br />
96
<strong>in</strong>formati<strong>on</strong> obta<strong>in</strong>ed through the JWIP has resulted <strong>in</strong> the arrest of 24 <strong>in</strong>dividuals <strong>and</strong> the seizure<br />
of 55 kilograms of hero<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> 18 kilograms of opium.<br />
On March 14, 2012, Haji Bagcho, a significant Nangarhar-based hero<strong>in</strong> trafficker with ties to the<br />
Taliban, was c<strong>on</strong>victed of violat<strong>in</strong>g two counts of Title 21 U.S.C. § 959; c<strong>on</strong>spiracy to distribute<br />
<strong>and</strong> the distributi<strong>on</strong> of hero<strong>in</strong>, know<strong>in</strong>g or <strong>in</strong>tend<strong>in</strong>g that it would be imported <strong>in</strong>to the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>on</strong>e count Title 21 U.S.C. § 960; engag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> drug traffick<strong>in</strong>g know<strong>in</strong>g or <strong>in</strong>tend<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
provide someth<strong>in</strong>g of m<strong>on</strong>etary value to a terrorist or terrorist organizati<strong>on</strong>. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the course of<br />
this DEA <strong>in</strong>vestigati<strong>on</strong>, ledgers that bel<strong>on</strong>ged to Bagcho reflect hero<strong>in</strong> transacti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> 2006 <strong>in</strong><br />
excess of 123,000 kilograms, estimated to be worth more than $250 milli<strong>on</strong>. Bagcho used a<br />
porti<strong>on</strong> of his drug proceeds to provide cash, weap<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>and</strong> other supplies to the Taliban. He<br />
faces a m<strong>and</strong>atory m<strong>in</strong>imum sentence of 20 years <strong>and</strong> a maximum of life <strong>in</strong> pris<strong>on</strong>. Bagcho’s<br />
sentenc<strong>in</strong>g hear<strong>in</strong>g is tentatively scheduled for June 2012.<br />
7.3: COUNTERNARCOTICS LAW ENFORCEMENT UNITS<br />
COUNTERNARCOTICS POLICE OF AFGHANISTAN<br />
CNPA is the ANP comp<strong>on</strong>ent resp<strong>on</strong>sible for CN operati<strong>on</strong>s throughout Afghanistan. CNPA<br />
headquarters are located <strong>in</strong> Kabul, <strong>and</strong> CNPA has officers stati<strong>on</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> all 34 prov<strong>in</strong>ces <strong>and</strong> four<br />
forward operati<strong>on</strong> bases located throughout Afghanistan. DoD c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to support CNPA<br />
through capacity build<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> order to establish a capable Afghan <strong>in</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> that can counter the<br />
narcotics trade <strong>and</strong> resist corrupti<strong>on</strong>. The current CNPA tashkil is authorized at 2,570 positi<strong>on</strong>s,<br />
to <strong>in</strong>clude CNPA headquarters elements, specialized units, <strong>and</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>cial units.<br />
DoD, <strong>in</strong> partnership with the Department of Justice’s Internati<strong>on</strong>al Crim<strong>in</strong>al Investigative<br />
Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Assistance Program, is fund<strong>in</strong>g the CNPA Development Unit (CDU). The CDU is<br />
work<strong>in</strong>g toward the goal of transiti<strong>on</strong><strong>in</strong>g CN resp<strong>on</strong>sibility to the Afghan Government. In<br />
support of this, the CDU, with the NTMA Senior Police Advisor for Counternarcotics, aided the<br />
CNPA <strong>in</strong> complet<strong>in</strong>g their M<strong>in</strong>isterial Development Plan, a roadmap for CNPA development <strong>and</strong><br />
the transiti<strong>on</strong> of greater security resp<strong>on</strong>sibility to CNPA at the 2014 transiti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
In order to further support the CNPA, the Afghan Government established a Tactical Operati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
Center (TOC), which c<strong>on</strong>ducts tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, develops procedures to fulfill missi<strong>on</strong> requirements, <strong>and</strong><br />
produces materials to support CN operati<strong>on</strong>s. One of the TOC’s most valuable products is the<br />
Daily <str<strong>on</strong>g>Report</str<strong>on</strong>g>, which not <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>in</strong>cludes CNPA statistical data, but also threat <strong>in</strong>formati<strong>on</strong>,<br />
coaliti<strong>on</strong> force military activity <strong>and</strong> seizures, weather, pers<strong>on</strong>nel strength data, <strong>and</strong> highlights of<br />
important CN events. The TOC significantly improved data report<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> is resp<strong>on</strong>sible for<br />
more than 50 percent of seizures reported by CNPA. Other activities at the TOC <strong>in</strong>clude<br />
extensive support for the development <strong>and</strong> plann<strong>in</strong>g of CNPA-derived <strong>and</strong> -directed <strong>in</strong>terdicti<strong>on</strong><br />
missi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong>tegrated with CNPA specialized units.<br />
COUNTERNARCOTICS POLICE OF AFGHANISTAN SPECIALIZED UNITS<br />
The CNPA <strong>and</strong> the TOC are supplemented by a number of specialized <strong>and</strong> highly-tra<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
Afghan CN units, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the NIU, the SIU, the TIU, <strong>and</strong> the Air Interdicti<strong>on</strong> Unit, all of<br />
which fall under the CNPA.<br />
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The NIU is a 470-pers<strong>on</strong> DEA-mentored specialized tactical element of the CNPA. The NIU is<br />
capable of c<strong>on</strong>duct<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terdicti<strong>on</strong> operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> seizures <strong>and</strong> serv<strong>in</strong>g arrest <strong>and</strong> search warrants<br />
<strong>in</strong> a high-threat envir<strong>on</strong>ment, <strong>and</strong> supports CN operati<strong>on</strong>s with full range of capabilities, from<br />
provid<strong>in</strong>g security for undercover officers meet<strong>in</strong>g with drug traffickers, to air <strong>and</strong> vehicle<br />
mobile operati<strong>on</strong>s target<strong>in</strong>g cl<strong>and</strong>est<strong>in</strong>e drug labs <strong>and</strong> storage sites. In 2012, DEA anticipates the<br />
NIU to be at the full authorized strength of 538 officers.<br />
The NIU c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to assume greater resp<strong>on</strong>sibility for CN operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan. For<br />
example, <strong>on</strong> December 24, 2011, the NIU seized 4 kilograms of hero<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> arrested <strong>on</strong>e Afghan<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>al. In additi<strong>on</strong>, <strong>on</strong> February 2, 2012, the NIU seized 8 kilograms of hero<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> arrested<br />
<strong>on</strong>e Afghan nati<strong>on</strong>al. These operati<strong>on</strong>s were Afghan led <strong>and</strong> dem<strong>on</strong>strate the NIU’s<br />
effectiveness of <strong>in</strong>dependently c<strong>on</strong>duct<strong>in</strong>g its own operati<strong>on</strong>s. Further, partner<strong>in</strong>g between<br />
Afghan CN elements <strong>and</strong> ISAF rema<strong>in</strong>s str<strong>on</strong>g. S<strong>in</strong>ce September 2011, the DEA has been<br />
support<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> manag<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>tegrati<strong>on</strong> of the NIU with the U.S. Mar<strong>in</strong>e Corps <strong>in</strong> RC-SW.<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce that time, the NIU has ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed a permanent presence <strong>in</strong> RC-SW <strong>and</strong> has accompanied<br />
the USMC <strong>on</strong> numerous counter-drug operati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
In additi<strong>on</strong> to its presence <strong>in</strong> RC-SW, the NIU established a permanent presence <strong>in</strong> K<strong>and</strong>ahar<br />
Prov<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> October 2011, which represents the <strong>in</strong>itial deployment of a full-time NIU presence <strong>in</strong><br />
RC-S. Previously, the NIU has had a full-time presence <strong>in</strong> RC-N (2009), RC-W (April 2011),<br />
RC-SW (September 2011), <strong>and</strong> RC-S (Uruzgan Prov<strong>in</strong>ce – June 2011).<br />
Other specialized units of the CNPA <strong>in</strong>clude the SIU <strong>and</strong> the TIU. The SIU is a specially vetted<br />
<strong>and</strong> tra<strong>in</strong>ed 77-pers<strong>on</strong> Afghan law enforcement unit. The SIU has evolved <strong>in</strong>to a self-driven unit<br />
with superior <strong>in</strong>vestigative skills, <strong>and</strong> has c<strong>on</strong>ducted operati<strong>on</strong>s which have resulted <strong>in</strong><br />
significant seizures <strong>and</strong> the arrest of numerous narcotics traffickers. The SIU carries out complex<br />
CN <strong>in</strong>vestigati<strong>on</strong>s us<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>telligence developed by the TIU. The TIU is comprised of n<strong>in</strong>e<br />
specially vetted officers <strong>and</strong> 200 c<strong>on</strong>tract l<strong>in</strong>guists <strong>and</strong> translators who perform court-authorized<br />
judicial wire <strong>in</strong>tercepts. In additi<strong>on</strong>, members of the SIU also serve as part of a F<strong>in</strong>ancial<br />
Investigative Team (FIT) at the Afghanistan Threat F<strong>in</strong>ance Cell.<br />
Operati<strong>on</strong>al coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> am<strong>on</strong>g the various specialized units <strong>in</strong> the CNPA c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to improve<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period, as reflected <strong>in</strong> a number of jo<strong>in</strong>t operati<strong>on</strong>s. For example, <strong>in</strong> July<br />
2011, the SIU, NIU, <strong>and</strong> TIU, with DEA support, <strong>in</strong>itiated an <strong>in</strong>vestigati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong>to an <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
DTO transport<strong>in</strong>g hero<strong>in</strong> from the Kabul Internati<strong>on</strong>al Airport to the broader regi<strong>on</strong>. On October<br />
18-19, 2011, SIU <strong>in</strong>vestigators received <strong>in</strong>formati<strong>on</strong> from the TIU identify<strong>in</strong>g the locati<strong>on</strong> of the<br />
head of the DTO, who was subsequently arrested by SIU <strong>and</strong> NIU <strong>in</strong> Kabul City without<br />
<strong>in</strong>cident. The follow<strong>in</strong>g day, us<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formati<strong>on</strong> received by the TIU, the SIU arrested another<br />
<strong>in</strong>dividual work<strong>in</strong>g for the traffick<strong>in</strong>g organizati<strong>on</strong> at the Kabul Internati<strong>on</strong>al Airport. This<br />
complex, l<strong>on</strong>g-term operati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g multiple elements of the CNPA dem<strong>on</strong>strates the<br />
grow<strong>in</strong>g capability of the CNPA.<br />
In additi<strong>on</strong> to the NIU, SIU, <strong>and</strong> TIU, the CNPA's AIU plays a strategic role by enabl<strong>in</strong>g elite<br />
Afghan CN law enforcement pers<strong>on</strong>nel <strong>and</strong> their DEA partners to c<strong>on</strong>duct missi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> dangerous<br />
areas <strong>and</strong> remote terra<strong>in</strong>. The <strong>United</strong> K<strong>in</strong>gdom c<strong>on</strong>tributes <strong>on</strong>e tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g team member,<br />
supplements aircrew salaries, <strong>and</strong> provides five Mi-17 helicopters. DoD tra<strong>in</strong>s Afghan pilots <strong>and</strong><br />
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crew members to fly <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> Mi-17 helicopters to <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al st<strong>and</strong>ards. DoD has also<br />
assigned an embedded tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g team to tra<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> mentor the unit's key leadership <strong>and</strong> pers<strong>on</strong>nel<br />
to acquire <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong> quality st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>in</strong> aviati<strong>on</strong> operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>tenance so the unit is<br />
prepared to provide adequate tactical support to law enforcement missi<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
From October 1 to March 30, 2012, the AIU supported 22 CN missi<strong>on</strong>s, which resulted <strong>in</strong> the<br />
destructi<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> seizure of 24 kg hero<strong>in</strong>, 2,030 kg of poppy seed, 21 enemies killed <strong>in</strong> acti<strong>on</strong><br />
(KIA), 1 enemy wounded <strong>in</strong> acti<strong>on</strong> (WIA), <strong>on</strong>e deta<strong>in</strong>ee, <strong>and</strong> the destructi<strong>on</strong> of two drug labs.<br />
Notably, 21 of the 22 CN missi<strong>on</strong>s were flown with Afghan crewmembers, a major milest<strong>on</strong>e <strong>in</strong><br />
the development of the AIU. However, the AIU will require significant coaliti<strong>on</strong> assistance for<br />
several more years, particularly <strong>in</strong> the area of aviati<strong>on</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>tenance.<br />
The AIU is <strong>in</strong> a process of transiti<strong>on</strong>. Currently, the AIU is subord<strong>in</strong>ate to the M<strong>in</strong>istry of<br />
Interior (MoI) <strong>and</strong> has the primary missi<strong>on</strong> to provide aviati<strong>on</strong> support to Coaliti<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> Afghan<br />
law enforcement organizati<strong>on</strong>s c<strong>on</strong>duct<strong>in</strong>g CN missi<strong>on</strong>s. The AIU provides general aviati<strong>on</strong><br />
support to the MoI as a sec<strong>on</strong>dary missi<strong>on</strong>. The AIU operates 20 Mi-17 helicopters. Plans are<br />
underway to use the pers<strong>on</strong>nel <strong>and</strong> aircraft of the AIU as the basis of form<strong>in</strong>g a new aviati<strong>on</strong><br />
unit, the Special Missi<strong>on</strong> W<strong>in</strong>g (SMW), with a dual missi<strong>on</strong>. The SMW will reta<strong>in</strong> the missi<strong>on</strong><br />
to support CN operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> add a new missi<strong>on</strong> to provide aviati<strong>on</strong> support to Special<br />
Operati<strong>on</strong>s Forces (SOF) missi<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
The c<strong>on</strong>cept is to detail the AIU <strong>in</strong>to a jo<strong>in</strong>t MoI-MoD unit capable of provid<strong>in</strong>g aviati<strong>on</strong> support<br />
for CN operati<strong>on</strong>s as well as SOF support missi<strong>on</strong>s. The aircraft <strong>and</strong> pers<strong>on</strong>nel of the AIU will<br />
form the <strong>in</strong>itial foundati<strong>on</strong> of the SMW. DoD will provide the unit with additi<strong>on</strong>al Mi-17s <strong>and</strong><br />
also add fixed w<strong>in</strong>g aircraft for <strong>in</strong>telligence, surveillance, <strong>and</strong> rec<strong>on</strong>naissance support.<br />
Additi<strong>on</strong>al Afghan pers<strong>on</strong>nel required to exp<strong>and</strong> the unit will be drawn from the MoD Afghan<br />
Air Force (AAF). These additi<strong>on</strong>al pers<strong>on</strong>nel <strong>and</strong> aircraft will be available for both CN <strong>and</strong> SOF<br />
support missi<strong>on</strong>s. The SMW will be subord<strong>in</strong>ate to the MoD Afghan Nati<strong>on</strong>al Army Special<br />
Operati<strong>on</strong>s Comm<strong>and</strong> (ANASOC). Plans are to establish the SMW <strong>in</strong> May 2012.<br />
TRAINING<br />
Specialized tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g is the key element <strong>in</strong> build<strong>in</strong>g the capacity of Afghan CN units. To this end,<br />
the Counternarcotics Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Academy (CNTA) c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to provide basic <strong>in</strong>vestigative<br />
courses of <strong>in</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> for all CNPA officers. Follow<strong>in</strong>g graduati<strong>on</strong> from Basic Police Academy<br />
run by NTM-A, all c<strong>and</strong>idate CNPA officers, must attend the five-week CN tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g course prior<br />
to be<strong>in</strong>g certified as a CN officer. The course is designed to provide fundamental tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
required to effectively <strong>in</strong>vestigate <strong>and</strong> prosecute narcotics crimes. The CNTA was established <strong>in</strong><br />
2007 <strong>and</strong> has s<strong>in</strong>ce graduated 2,180 students, completed 41 classes, <strong>and</strong> has 42 classes <strong>on</strong>go<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
In additi<strong>on</strong> to progress <strong>in</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, efforts to grow <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> the CNPA c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to yield<br />
progress; notably, more predictable pay <strong>and</strong> above-average work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> liv<strong>in</strong>g c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s have<br />
greatly dim<strong>in</strong>ished the CNPA’s recruitment <strong>and</strong> attriti<strong>on</strong> challenges over the last year.<br />
CNTA also c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to develop an Afghan tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g capacity through a “Tra<strong>in</strong>-the-Tra<strong>in</strong>er”<br />
program. The 12-week program was created to build the capacity of an Afghan-owned,<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependent tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g center. This <strong>in</strong>itiative complements the Afghan Government’s development<br />
strategy, <strong>and</strong> is c<strong>on</strong>sidered critical for Afghanistan’s l<strong>on</strong>g-term capability to address narcotics<br />
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traffick<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> organized crime. The <strong>United</strong> Nati<strong>on</strong>s Office <strong>on</strong> Drugs <strong>and</strong> Crime (UNODC)<br />
created Mobile Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Teams (MTT), which provided “Afghan to Afghan” tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> drug <strong>and</strong><br />
precursor identificati<strong>on</strong> as well as basic <strong>in</strong>telligence tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the year, MTT courses<br />
tra<strong>in</strong>ed 366 officers <strong>in</strong> 9 prov<strong>in</strong>ces.<br />
Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g efforts extend bey<strong>on</strong>d the CNTA for the specialized CN units. In order to provide<br />
basic, advanced, <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ment tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to the NIU <strong>and</strong> SIU, DEA established an Afghan<br />
Regi<strong>on</strong>al Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Team (RTT). Dur<strong>in</strong>g the period of October 1, 2011 through March 31, 2012,<br />
approximately 3,292 law enforcement officials participated <strong>in</strong> the RTT Program. Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
sem<strong>in</strong>ars <strong>in</strong>clude firearms <strong>in</strong>structi<strong>on</strong>, basic <strong>and</strong> advanced drug <strong>in</strong>vestigati<strong>on</strong> techniques, <strong>and</strong><br />
map-read<strong>in</strong>g techniques. The RTT c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to mentor <strong>and</strong> tra<strong>in</strong> a cadre of Afghan <strong>in</strong>structors <strong>in</strong><br />
order to provide them with <strong>in</strong>creased resp<strong>on</strong>sibility over their tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g programs. Currently, the<br />
NIU has 12 officers devoted to the tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g cadre <strong>and</strong> the SIU has eight officers committed to the<br />
same. On February 25, 2012, a NIU Basic Class began for approximately 35 participants. This<br />
is the first 100 percent Afghan <strong>in</strong>structed class with <strong>on</strong>ly limited DEA/RTT oversight.<br />
As a result of the RTTs success <strong>and</strong> established tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g credentials, the Afghan Deputy M<strong>in</strong>ister<br />
of Interior for Counter Narcotics sought the assistance of the RTT to provide tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g for<br />
pers<strong>on</strong>nel assigned to the CNP-A Pers<strong>on</strong>al <strong>Security</strong> Detail. In October 211, the RTT c<strong>on</strong>ducted<br />
the first eight-week Pers<strong>on</strong>al <strong>Security</strong> Detail (PSD) tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g course. Approximately 42 students<br />
completed this course. A sec<strong>on</strong>d PSD course c<strong>on</strong>cluded at the end of February 2012, with 38<br />
students complet<strong>in</strong>g this course.<br />
7.4: INTERAGENCY COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS<br />
Several <strong>in</strong>teragency <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al organizati<strong>on</strong>s support CN operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan,<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the Interagency Operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> Coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> Center (IOCC), CJIATF-Nexus, <strong>and</strong> the<br />
Jo<strong>in</strong>t Narcotics Analysis Center (JNAC).<br />
The IOCC provides <strong>in</strong>telligence <strong>and</strong> operati<strong>on</strong>al support to law enforcement CN operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong><br />
Afghanistan. The IOCC, led by the DEA <strong>and</strong> <strong>United</strong> K<strong>in</strong>gdom’s Serious Organized Crime<br />
Agency (SOCA), is the central CN cell for develop<strong>in</strong>g an underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of how the Afghan <strong>and</strong><br />
regi<strong>on</strong>al narcotics trade supports the <strong>in</strong>surgency <strong>and</strong> drives corrupti<strong>on</strong>. As the military drawdown<br />
c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues, the ability to c<strong>on</strong>duct evidence-based operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> comb<strong>in</strong>ed Afghan <strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al civil-military collecti<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> analysis efforts will become <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly essential <strong>in</strong><br />
susta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g CN efforts. The IOCC partners with ISAF, CJIATF-Shafafiyat <strong>and</strong> CJIATF-Nexus to<br />
c<strong>on</strong>duct law enforcement CN operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> n<strong>on</strong>-secure, predom<strong>in</strong>ately military envir<strong>on</strong>ments<br />
while br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g together the necessary resources to c<strong>on</strong>duct an effective civil-military campaign<br />
to counter the narcotics-corrupti<strong>on</strong>-<strong>in</strong>surgent nexus.<br />
CJIATF-Nexus, an ISAF organizati<strong>on</strong> with representatives from the <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al law<br />
enforcement community, also supports <strong>in</strong>terdicti<strong>on</strong> operati<strong>on</strong>s to counter the narcoticscorrupti<strong>on</strong>-<strong>in</strong>surgent<br />
nexus. CJIATF-Nexus specifically targets network functi<strong>on</strong>s (e.g., safe<br />
havens, movement, communicati<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ance), rather than <strong>in</strong>dividual narco-traffickers, to<br />
disrupt network resiliency. CJIATF-Nexus improved <strong>and</strong> exp<strong>and</strong>ed its narcotics target<strong>in</strong>g<br />
support dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period, provid<strong>in</strong>g critical support for law enforcement <strong>in</strong>vestigati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
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<strong>and</strong> military operati<strong>on</strong>s by analyz<strong>in</strong>g key traffick<strong>in</strong>g networks <strong>and</strong> improv<strong>in</strong>g visibility <strong>on</strong><br />
powerbroker corrupti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> RC-S, RC-SW, RC-W, <strong>and</strong> RC-E.<br />
The U.S. <strong>and</strong> UK Jo<strong>in</strong>t Narcotics Analysis Center (JNAC) c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued to perform strategic-level<br />
analysis <strong>and</strong> provide operati<strong>on</strong>al reach-back support for organizati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan <strong>and</strong><br />
improved collaborati<strong>on</strong> across a wide spectrum of CN partnerships. JNAC’s missi<strong>on</strong> is to<br />
formulate strategic counternarcotics policy <strong>and</strong> provide operati<strong>on</strong>al decisi<strong>on</strong>-makers with<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependent, accurate all-source <strong>in</strong>telligence <strong>on</strong> the Afghan <strong>and</strong> wider regi<strong>on</strong>al opiate trade.<br />
JNAC also evaluates the potential <strong>and</strong> actual effectiveness of counternarcotics strategies <strong>and</strong><br />
operati<strong>on</strong>s. From October 1, 2011 through March 31, 2012, JNAC provided UK <strong>and</strong> U.S.<br />
policymakers, U.S. Combatant Comm<strong>and</strong>s, ISAF, <strong>and</strong> key coaliti<strong>on</strong> partners with more than 25<br />
written releasable products <strong>on</strong> key Afghan <strong>and</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>al drug issues, major Afghan drug<br />
networks, <strong>and</strong> evaluati<strong>on</strong>s of the impact of counternarcotics strategies <strong>and</strong> operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong><br />
Afghanistan. JNAC rema<strong>in</strong>s an effective model of <strong>in</strong>teragency <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al collaborati<strong>on</strong><br />
<strong>and</strong> partnership.<br />
7.5: AFGHANISTAN THREAT FINANCE CELL (ATFC)<br />
The ATFC is a U.S. Nati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>Security</strong> Council-m<strong>and</strong>ated organizati<strong>on</strong> that identifies <strong>and</strong> disrupts<br />
sources of <strong>in</strong>surgent <strong>and</strong> terrorist fund<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan. Led by the DEA, with deputies from<br />
DoD <strong>and</strong> the Treasury Department, the cell c<strong>on</strong>sists of DoD service <strong>and</strong> combat support agency<br />
pers<strong>on</strong>nel, Treasury Department analysts, law enforcement agents (DEA <strong>and</strong> Homel<strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>Security</strong>), <strong>and</strong> coaliti<strong>on</strong> partners. DoD provides fund<strong>in</strong>g support through the DoD CN central<br />
account.<br />
The ATFC works through both Afghan law enforcement <strong>and</strong> coaliti<strong>on</strong> forces to identify <strong>and</strong><br />
disrupt <strong>in</strong>surgent <strong>and</strong> terrorist f<strong>in</strong>ancial activities. For law enforcement support, the ATFC works<br />
closely with vetted pers<strong>on</strong>nel from the DEA-mentored NIU <strong>and</strong> SIU, the Afghan Public<br />
Prosecutors’ Office, <strong>and</strong> vetted judges; this cooperati<strong>on</strong> is critical to the development of an<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependent <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>able Afghan f<strong>in</strong>ancial <strong>in</strong>vestigative capability. ATFC <strong>in</strong>vestigati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong><br />
operati<strong>on</strong>s are focused <strong>on</strong> prosecut<strong>in</strong>g narco-traffickers <strong>and</strong> provid<strong>in</strong>g military forces with leads<br />
<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividuals who provide f<strong>in</strong>ancial support to <strong>in</strong>surgents <strong>and</strong> are affiliated with Afghanistan's<br />
narcotics <strong>in</strong>dustry.<br />
ATFC analysts <strong>and</strong> liais<strong>on</strong> officers operate <strong>in</strong> close coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> with ISAF regi<strong>on</strong>al comm<strong>and</strong>s,<br />
the IJC, task forces, <strong>and</strong> SOF to ensure counter-threat f<strong>in</strong>ance efforts are <strong>in</strong>tegrated with military<br />
plann<strong>in</strong>g cycles <strong>and</strong> operati<strong>on</strong>s to disrupt <strong>in</strong>surgent fund<strong>in</strong>g. Specifically, the ATFC provides<br />
operati<strong>on</strong>al-level recommendati<strong>on</strong>s to planners <strong>and</strong> tactical target<strong>in</strong>g support. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
report<strong>in</strong>g period, ATFC identified <strong>and</strong> disrupted sources of <strong>in</strong>surgent fund<strong>in</strong>g throughout<br />
Afghanistan <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrated targets <strong>in</strong>to comm<strong>and</strong>-level operati<strong>on</strong>al plann<strong>in</strong>g. Follow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
successful operati<strong>on</strong>s, ATFC also provided debrief<strong>in</strong>g support at DFIP.<br />
7.6: INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL COORDINATION<br />
Several <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al engagements took place dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period that further<br />
strengthened counternarcotics efforts <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan.<br />
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In late January 2012, the Department of State’s (DoS) Bureau for Internati<strong>on</strong>al Narcotics <strong>and</strong><br />
Law Enforcement Affairs hosted Afghan M<strong>in</strong>ister of Counter Narcotics Zarar Moqbel Osmani <strong>in</strong><br />
Wash<strong>in</strong>gt<strong>on</strong>, D.C., for meet<strong>in</strong>gs with representatives from DoS, DoD, DEA, the Office of<br />
Nati<strong>on</strong>al Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol Policy (ONDCP), <strong>and</strong> USAID, as well as several Senators. M<strong>in</strong>ister<br />
Osmani visited the Sec<strong>on</strong>d Genesis Rehabilitati<strong>on</strong> Center <strong>and</strong> the DEA Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Center at<br />
Quantico. He also participated <strong>in</strong> the open<strong>in</strong>g sessi<strong>on</strong> of the U.S.-UK bilateral meet<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong><br />
Afghan CN <strong>on</strong> January 26. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the visit, Osmani requested U.S. support for CN-oriented<br />
alternative livelihoods efforts, previewed the objectives <strong>in</strong> the updated Afghan Nati<strong>on</strong>al Drug<br />
C<strong>on</strong>trol Strategy, <strong>and</strong> emphasized the need for drug dem<strong>and</strong> reducti<strong>on</strong> activities <strong>and</strong> the<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence of the CNPA. The visit was M<strong>in</strong>ister Osmani’s first official trip to Wash<strong>in</strong>gt<strong>on</strong>,<br />
D.C., <strong>in</strong> his current capacity.<br />
In February 2012, the UN c<strong>on</strong>vened a meet<strong>in</strong>g of pr<strong>in</strong>cipals from the Paris Pact, a UNODCsp<strong>on</strong>sored<br />
partnership of more than 50 member nati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> organizati<strong>on</strong>s focused <strong>on</strong> decreas<strong>in</strong>g<br />
availability of, dem<strong>and</strong> for, <strong>and</strong> traffick<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Afghan opiates. At the meet<strong>in</strong>g, government<br />
m<strong>in</strong>isters stressed the need to reduce drug traffick<strong>in</strong>g, opium poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>and</strong> narcotics<br />
producti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan. On the marg<strong>in</strong>s of the Paris Pact meet<strong>in</strong>g, DoS representatives held<br />
c<strong>on</strong>sultati<strong>on</strong>s with Central Asian partners to discuss the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>’ Central Asia<br />
Counternarcotics Initiative (CACI), which builds <strong>on</strong> established efforts to prosecute drug<br />
traffickers <strong>and</strong> disrupt their networks <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan. Through CACI, the DEA will work with<br />
<strong>in</strong>terested partners <strong>in</strong> Central Asia to establish <strong>in</strong>vestigative units that can develop targets us<strong>in</strong>g<br />
sensitive <strong>in</strong>telligence, share <strong>in</strong>formati<strong>on</strong> with counterpart units <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, <strong>and</strong> attack<br />
transnati<strong>on</strong>al drug networks through the Central Asia Regi<strong>on</strong>al Informati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> Coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong><br />
Center.<br />
On a bilateral basis, the U.S. Government c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued its work with the Russian Federati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong><br />
counternarcotics issues via the U.S.-Russia Counternarcotics Work<strong>in</strong>g Group (CNWG) (formed<br />
as part of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commissi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> July 2009). In November 2011,<br />
the co-chairs of the CNWG (ONDCP Director Gil Kerlikowske <strong>and</strong> Russian Federal Drug<br />
C<strong>on</strong>trol Service Director Viktor Ivanov) met <strong>in</strong> Chicago to discuss a c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued partnership to<br />
address the Afghan drug trade. S<strong>in</strong>ce 2009, the CNWG has greatly improved law enforcement<br />
<strong>in</strong>formati<strong>on</strong> shar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> collaborati<strong>on</strong> between the U.S. <strong>and</strong> Russia <strong>on</strong> Afghanistan drug issues.<br />
At the meet<strong>in</strong>g, the CNWG agreed to c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue their efforts through 2012 by cooperat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> law<br />
enforcement <strong>in</strong>vestigati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> counter<strong>in</strong>g the drug trade’s illicit f<strong>in</strong>ancial flows emanat<strong>in</strong>g from<br />
Afghanistan.<br />
At the regi<strong>on</strong>al level, the Northern Route Work<strong>in</strong>g Group (NRWG) is a multilateral <strong>in</strong>itiative<br />
designed to <strong>in</strong>crease general drug law enforcement cooperati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>formati<strong>on</strong> shar<strong>in</strong>g am<strong>on</strong>g<br />
its members <strong>in</strong> order to target transnati<strong>on</strong>al drug traffick<strong>in</strong>g organizati<strong>on</strong>s resp<strong>on</strong>sible for the<br />
flow of illicit narcotics throughout the Central Asia regi<strong>on</strong>. The NRWG is comprised of DEA<br />
representatives serv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Almaty, Dushanbe, Kabul, Moscow, <strong>and</strong> Tashkent, as well as<br />
members of the CNPA, the Russian Federal Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol Service, the State Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol<br />
Service of Kyrgyzstan, <strong>and</strong> the Tajikistan Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol Agency. The most recent meet<strong>in</strong>g was<br />
held March 29-30, 2012 <strong>in</strong> Dushanbe, Tajikistan.<br />
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(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)<br />
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SECTION 8 – REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT<br />
8.1: PAKISTAN<br />
Pakistan is a state of central importance <strong>in</strong> South Asia, highlighted by a shared border with<br />
Afghanistan, its status as a nuclear power, <strong>and</strong> its role <strong>in</strong> the fight aga<strong>in</strong>st al Qaeda <strong>and</strong> the<br />
Afghan <strong>in</strong>surgency.<br />
The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to seek a relati<strong>on</strong>ship with Pakistan that is c<strong>on</strong>structive <strong>and</strong> mutually<br />
beneficial, <strong>and</strong> that advances both U.S. <strong>and</strong> Pakistani <strong>in</strong>terests. Pakistan has publicly committed<br />
to play<strong>in</strong>g a positive role <strong>in</strong> a genu<strong>in</strong>e nati<strong>on</strong>al rec<strong>on</strong>ciliati<strong>on</strong> that is Afghan-led <strong>and</strong> Afghanowned.<br />
However, Pakistan’s selective counter<strong>in</strong>surgency operati<strong>on</strong>s, passive acceptance - <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
some cases, provisi<strong>on</strong> - of <strong>in</strong>surgent safe havens, <strong>and</strong> unwill<strong>in</strong>gness to <strong>in</strong>terdict material such as<br />
IED comp<strong>on</strong>ents, c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to underm<strong>in</strong>e security <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan <strong>and</strong> threaten ISAF’s campaign.<br />
Relati<strong>on</strong>s became severely stra<strong>in</strong>ed by several events <strong>in</strong> 2011 culm<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g with the November 26,<br />
2011 cross-border <strong>in</strong>cident that resulted <strong>in</strong> the death of 24 Pakistani soldiers, ultimately these<br />
<strong>in</strong>cidents reduced bilateral cooperati<strong>on</strong>. Follow<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>cident, Pakistan canceled its<br />
participati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> the Internati<strong>on</strong>al Afghanistan C<strong>on</strong>ference <strong>in</strong> B<strong>on</strong>n, Germany. The Government<br />
of Pakistan also decided to undertake a comprehensive review of its relati<strong>on</strong>ship with the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>, <strong>and</strong> issued its f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> April 2012 follow<strong>in</strong>g a debate <strong>in</strong> Parliament. Pakistan has<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicated that it seeks to negotiate new terms for its relati<strong>on</strong>ship with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> by<br />
def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Pakistani red l<strong>in</strong>es <strong>on</strong> sovereignty <strong>and</strong> seek<strong>in</strong>g written agreements to def<strong>in</strong>e bilateral<br />
cooperati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> a number of critical areas, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g counterterrorism cooperati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> costs<br />
associated with future use of the ground l<strong>in</strong>es of communicati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Recent meet<strong>in</strong>gs between senior Pakistani <strong>and</strong> Afghan officials have resulted <strong>in</strong> improved<br />
cooperati<strong>on</strong> between the two countries, specifically <strong>on</strong> aspects of a political settlement to the<br />
c<strong>on</strong>flict <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan. A February 1, 2012 visit to Afghanistan by Pakistani Foreign M<strong>in</strong>ister<br />
Khar was followed by a visit by President Karzai to Pakistan later that same m<strong>on</strong>th, <strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
progress <strong>in</strong> Afghan efforts to elicit Pakistan’s support for peace efforts with the Taliban.<br />
Follow<strong>in</strong>g President Karzai’s visit, Pakistani Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Gilani issued a public statement<br />
encourag<strong>in</strong>g Taliban <strong>and</strong> other Afghan <strong>in</strong>surgent leaders to participate <strong>in</strong> an Afghan-led<br />
rec<strong>on</strong>ciliati<strong>on</strong> process, represent<strong>in</strong>g a significant improvement from Pakistan’s previous<br />
reluctance to support this process. Additi<strong>on</strong>ally, a tripartite U.S.-Afghanistan-Pakistan border<br />
meet<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> February 8, 2012 set <strong>in</strong>itial c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s for progress <strong>on</strong> cross-border cooperati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Several military border work<strong>in</strong>g groups designed to <strong>in</strong>crease cross-border cooperati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />
mitigate the threat of future attacks have met s<strong>in</strong>ce then.<br />
In spite of these engagements, pervasive mistrust, l<strong>on</strong>g-st<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g tensi<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>and</strong> divergent strategic<br />
<strong>in</strong>terests c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to make genu<strong>in</strong>e cooperati<strong>on</strong> difficult. Insurgent efforts - <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g<br />
assass<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>s of Afghan officials <strong>and</strong> attacks <strong>on</strong> Afghan <strong>and</strong> coaliti<strong>on</strong> forces emanat<strong>in</strong>g from the<br />
safe havens <strong>in</strong> Pakistan (particularly those shelter<strong>in</strong>g the Haqqani Network <strong>and</strong> other Taliban<br />
affiliates), c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to threaten the emergence of a durable <strong>and</strong> stable political soluti<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
Afghanistan.<br />
104
Pakistan c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to seek a stable, secure Afghanistan, an Afghan government with primacy for<br />
Pashtuns, <strong>and</strong> limited Indian <strong>in</strong>fluence. To this end, Pakistan has allowed an <strong>in</strong>surgent sanctuary<br />
<strong>in</strong> its border areas to persist, offer<strong>in</strong>g a safe haven to Afghan Taliban <strong>and</strong> associated militant<br />
groups <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the Haqqani Taliban Network <strong>in</strong> North Waziristan Agency. Pakistani leaders<br />
have tolerated this due to their c<strong>on</strong>cerns that Pakistan will be left al<strong>on</strong>e to c<strong>on</strong>fr<strong>on</strong>t an unstable,<br />
an unfriendly, or an Indian-<strong>in</strong>fluenced Afghanistan <strong>on</strong> its borders. Accord<strong>in</strong>gly, Pakistan seeks<br />
to play a key role <strong>in</strong> the peace <strong>and</strong> rec<strong>on</strong>ciliati<strong>on</strong> process to advance a political settlement that<br />
c<strong>on</strong>siders Pakistani <strong>in</strong>terests.<br />
8.2: INDIA<br />
In October 2011, Indian Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Manmohan S<strong>in</strong>gh <strong>and</strong> President Karzai signed a<br />
strategic partnership declarati<strong>on</strong>, which formalized cooperati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> governance, ec<strong>on</strong>omics,<br />
commerce, educati<strong>on</strong>, public adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>and</strong> security/law enforcement. Subsequent<br />
engagements at multilateral venues, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the Istanbul C<strong>on</strong>ference <strong>in</strong> early November 2011,<br />
the South Asian Associati<strong>on</strong> for Regi<strong>on</strong>al Cooperati<strong>on</strong> summit <strong>in</strong> the Maldives <strong>in</strong> mid November<br />
<strong>and</strong> the B<strong>on</strong>n C<strong>on</strong>ference <strong>in</strong> December 2011, re<strong>in</strong>forced the positive relati<strong>on</strong>ship between<br />
Afghanistan <strong>and</strong> India.<br />
Indian assistance has previously focused <strong>on</strong> major <strong>in</strong>frastructure projects such as electricity<br />
generati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> transmissi<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> road c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong>. In a broaden<strong>in</strong>g of focus from development<br />
to <strong>in</strong>vestment, India’s SAIL C<strong>on</strong>sortium was awarded 75 percent of the rights at Bamyan<br />
Prov<strong>in</strong>ce’s Hajigak ir<strong>on</strong> ore m<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> November 2011. India has also expressed <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong><br />
bidd<strong>in</strong>g <strong>on</strong> future tenders throughout Afghanistan.<br />
India also supports a variety of high-visibility projects <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>itiatives. For example, India <strong>and</strong><br />
Afghanistan recently f<strong>in</strong>alized plans for c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> of the Indian-funded Afghan Parliament<br />
build<strong>in</strong>g. Indian fund<strong>in</strong>g also c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to support the c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> of the Salma hydroelectric<br />
dam <strong>in</strong> Herat Prov<strong>in</strong>ce. C<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> at Salma, however, is currently beh<strong>in</strong>d schedule, with a<br />
tentative completi<strong>on</strong> date of late 2012. Bey<strong>on</strong>d c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong>, India c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to support the<br />
development of Afghan human capital through scholarship programs at Indian universities (more<br />
than 1,000 scholarships per year), agricultural tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g programs, <strong>and</strong> other vocati<strong>on</strong>al tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
activities. Public op<strong>in</strong>i<strong>on</strong> surveys c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to show that Afghans have a favorable view of Indian<br />
<strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong> their country.<br />
India c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to show <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> Afghan security assistance through strengthen<strong>in</strong>g ANSF<br />
capabilities, although activities <strong>in</strong> this area have been limited to date. India currently provides<br />
scholarships for ANSF pers<strong>on</strong>nel to study <strong>in</strong> India, <strong>and</strong> the Indian Government also is explor<strong>in</strong>g<br />
opti<strong>on</strong>s to tra<strong>in</strong> female Afghan police <strong>in</strong> India.<br />
8.3: CENTRAL ASIAN STATES 33<br />
The Central Asian <strong>States</strong> host the Northern Distributi<strong>on</strong> Network (NDN), which provides<br />
multiple ground <strong>and</strong> air transportati<strong>on</strong> routes <strong>in</strong>to <strong>and</strong> out of Afghanistan for commercial carriers<br />
<strong>and</strong> U.S. military aircraft. NDN GLOCs <strong>and</strong> air l<strong>in</strong>es of communicati<strong>on</strong> (ALOC), which already<br />
33 Central Asian states are Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, <strong>and</strong> Turkmenistan.<br />
105
functi<strong>on</strong>ed as the primary susta<strong>in</strong>ment routes <strong>in</strong>to Afghanistan, <strong>in</strong>creased <strong>in</strong> importance<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g the November 2011 closure of the Pakistani GLOC to ISAF cargo. Ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the<br />
NDN LOCs rema<strong>in</strong>s critical to <strong>on</strong>go<strong>in</strong>g operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan. Efforts are underway to<br />
diversify the NDN, with new over-flight permissi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> exp<strong>and</strong>ed ground transit agreements<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g “reverse” transit <strong>and</strong> transits of wheeled armored vehicles.<br />
The Kyrgyz Republic hosts the Transit Center at Manas Internati<strong>on</strong>al Airport (TCM), the<br />
primary transit po<strong>in</strong>t for U.S. pers<strong>on</strong>nel movement to <strong>and</strong> from Afghanistan. The agreement<br />
between the Kyrgyz Republic <strong>and</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> to allow the TCM to operate will expire <strong>in</strong><br />
July 2014. Access to the TCM bey<strong>on</strong>d the current agreement rema<strong>in</strong>s an <strong>on</strong>go<strong>in</strong>g political issue.<br />
Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev, elected <strong>in</strong> October 2011, c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to affirm his<br />
support for the Transit Center through 2014.<br />
Bey<strong>on</strong>d the NDN <strong>and</strong> logistics support, the Central Asian <strong>States</strong> c<strong>on</strong>tribute <strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>and</strong><br />
ec<strong>on</strong>omic development to Afghanistan. Uzbekistan completed a 75 km railway l<strong>in</strong>e from<br />
Hairatan to Mazar-e-Sharif <strong>in</strong> November 2010; limited railway operati<strong>on</strong>s have begun <strong>and</strong> may<br />
reach full capability later this year. As Afghan <strong>in</strong>frastructure c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to develop, exp<strong>and</strong>ed<br />
road, rail, <strong>and</strong> air networks will facilitate additi<strong>on</strong>al commercial activity between Afghanistan<br />
<strong>and</strong> its northern neighbors. Uzbekistan also provides electricity to Afghanistan.<br />
Central Asian <strong>States</strong>’ c<strong>on</strong>cerns <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan <strong>in</strong>clude both the spread of violent extremism <strong>in</strong><br />
the regi<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> threats stemm<strong>in</strong>g from narcotics traffick<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> related crim<strong>in</strong>al activities.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the <strong>United</strong> Nati<strong>on</strong>s Office <strong>on</strong> Drugs <strong>and</strong> Crime (UNODC), Tajikistan rema<strong>in</strong>s the<br />
primary route for Afghan-produced narcotics to Russian markets, with c<strong>on</strong>duits through other<br />
Central Asian <strong>States</strong>. Border security will also rema<strong>in</strong> a top c<strong>on</strong>cern for the Central Asian <strong>States</strong>,<br />
which are closely attuned to the implicati<strong>on</strong>s for their own countries stemm<strong>in</strong>g from events <strong>in</strong><br />
Afghanistan <strong>and</strong> developments <strong>in</strong> narcotics traffick<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
8.4: IRAN<br />
Iran aims to play a dom<strong>in</strong>ant, l<strong>on</strong>g-term role <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan <strong>and</strong> the broader regi<strong>on</strong>, <strong>and</strong> seeks the<br />
permanent withdrawal of foreign forces from regi<strong>on</strong>al nati<strong>on</strong>-states. Iran’s attempts to <strong>in</strong>fluence<br />
events <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan <strong>in</strong>clude overt support for the Afghan Government; ec<strong>on</strong>omic <strong>and</strong> cultural<br />
outreach to the Afghan populati<strong>on</strong>, particularly to the Shi’a m<strong>in</strong>ority populati<strong>on</strong>s; <strong>and</strong> covert<br />
support, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the provisi<strong>on</strong> of weap<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, for various <strong>in</strong>surgent <strong>and</strong> political<br />
oppositi<strong>on</strong> groups.<br />
At the highest political levels, Iran seeks to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> positive relati<strong>on</strong>s with the Afghan<br />
government. In additi<strong>on</strong> to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g a diplomatic presence <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, Tehran often uses<br />
high-level visits <strong>and</strong> key leadership engagements to publicly criticize the presence of<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al forces <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan <strong>and</strong> to call for the withdrawal of ISAF. Of note dur<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
report<strong>in</strong>g period, Iranian <strong>and</strong> Afghan Defense M<strong>in</strong>istry officials held their first Jo<strong>in</strong>t Defense<br />
Commissi<strong>on</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Tehran <strong>in</strong> December 2011. The officials signed an agreement for Iran to<br />
<strong>in</strong>crease Iranian fuel exports (e.g., gasoil, gasol<strong>in</strong>e, jet fuel) to Afghanistan beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> 2012.<br />
Iran’s Defense M<strong>in</strong>istry also agreed to provide the Afghan Army with food items, medical<br />
equipment, supplies for mosques, <strong>and</strong> scholarships <strong>in</strong> areas such as medic<strong>in</strong>e <strong>and</strong> civil<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
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Further, <strong>on</strong> February 17, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmad<strong>in</strong>ejad <strong>and</strong> President Karzai held<br />
their third trilateral summit <strong>in</strong> Islamabad with Pakistani President Zardari <strong>and</strong> Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister<br />
Gilani, issu<strong>in</strong>g a relatively general statement <strong>on</strong> cooperati<strong>on</strong> issues <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g counternarcotics<br />
<strong>and</strong> refugees. Various Afghan officials c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to welcome <strong>and</strong> seek further Iranian support<br />
despite allegati<strong>on</strong>s of Tehran’s covert support to <strong>in</strong>surgents.<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce 2001, Iran has pledged more than $1B <strong>in</strong> aid to Afghanistan <strong>and</strong> given more than $500M.<br />
Iran’s rec<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> development efforts have been largely c<strong>on</strong>centrated <strong>in</strong> western<br />
Afghanistan. Iran’s aim is to <strong>in</strong>crease its <strong>in</strong>fluence with the local populati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> order to foster<br />
pro-Iranian attitudes. Iran also wants to exp<strong>and</strong> its sphere of <strong>in</strong>fluence bey<strong>on</strong>d border regi<strong>on</strong>s<br />
<strong>in</strong>to other parts of Afghanistan, particularly Kabul. Iran currently ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s c<strong>on</strong>sulates <strong>in</strong> Herat,<br />
Jalalabad, Kabul, K<strong>and</strong>ahar, <strong>and</strong> Mazar-e-Sharif, <strong>and</strong> is c<strong>on</strong>sider<strong>in</strong>g open<strong>in</strong>g additi<strong>on</strong>al<br />
c<strong>on</strong>sulates <strong>in</strong> Bamiyan <strong>and</strong> Nimroz Prov<strong>in</strong>ces.<br />
Iran also c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to provide lethal assistance, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g weap<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, to elements of<br />
the Taliban <strong>and</strong> other <strong>in</strong>surgent groups. S<strong>in</strong>ce 2007, coaliti<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> Afghan forces have <strong>in</strong>terdicted<br />
several shipments of Iranian weap<strong>on</strong>s. Tehran’s relati<strong>on</strong>ship with the <strong>in</strong>surgency, though not<br />
ideologically based, is c<strong>on</strong>sistent with Iran’s short- to mid-term goal of underm<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g coaliti<strong>on</strong><br />
efforts <strong>and</strong> an <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al military presence <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan.<br />
Bey<strong>on</strong>d ec<strong>on</strong>omic <strong>and</strong> security issues, the protracted Afghan refugee situati<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to be a<br />
c<strong>on</strong>tentious issue between Iran <strong>and</strong> Afghanistan. Approximately <strong>on</strong>e milli<strong>on</strong> registered Afghan<br />
refugees <strong>and</strong> about 1.4 milli<strong>on</strong> undocumented Afghan migrants (n<strong>on</strong>-refugees) currently reside <strong>in</strong><br />
Iran. In 2011, about 19,000 registered Afghan refugees voluntarily repatriated to Afghanistan<br />
from Iran, a 55 percent <strong>in</strong>crease compared to the 8,400 Afghans who returned <strong>in</strong> 2010. UNHCR<br />
attributes the upsurge to ec<strong>on</strong>omic pressures <strong>and</strong> the Iranian government’s disc<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>uati<strong>on</strong> of<br />
subsidies <strong>on</strong> basic goods <strong>and</strong> services. Iran did not forcibly expel or return any registered<br />
refugees. Over 211,000 undocumented Afghans (n<strong>on</strong>-refugees) were deported from Iran <strong>in</strong><br />
2011, a 26 percent decrease from the year before. In additi<strong>on</strong>, over 282,000 undocumented<br />
Afghans sp<strong>on</strong>taneously returned to Afghanistan, a 20 percent decrease from 2010 figures.<br />
8.5: CHINA<br />
The People’s Republic of Ch<strong>in</strong>a (PRC) has two primary <strong>in</strong>terests <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan: security <strong>and</strong><br />
trade. It c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to seek improved relati<strong>on</strong>s with, <strong>and</strong> stability for, Afghanistan, while it<br />
devotes diplomatic effort to develop an ec<strong>on</strong>omic relati<strong>on</strong>ship focused primarily <strong>on</strong> future raw<br />
material access <strong>and</strong> extracti<strong>on</strong>. Beij<strong>in</strong>g has given no <strong>in</strong>dicati<strong>on</strong> of it plans to commit security<br />
pers<strong>on</strong>nel to Afghanistan.<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce 2002, Ch<strong>in</strong>a has committed more than $180M <strong>in</strong> aid to the Afghan government, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
2009, Ch<strong>in</strong>a announced it would provide an additi<strong>on</strong>al $75M over the next five years. Further,<br />
PRC companies will likely c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, most notably <strong>in</strong> the development of<br />
Afghanistan’s m<strong>in</strong>es <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>frastructure. The Ch<strong>in</strong>a Nati<strong>on</strong>al Petroleum Corporati<strong>on</strong> was<br />
awarded the rights to a secti<strong>on</strong> of the Amu Darya oil bas<strong>in</strong> dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g period, <strong>and</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>a<br />
is currently c<strong>on</strong>duct<strong>in</strong>g a feasibility study for a rail system to support extracti<strong>on</strong> efforts at the<br />
Aynak copper m<strong>in</strong>e. However, Ch<strong>in</strong>a c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to have security c<strong>on</strong>cerns <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g issues such<br />
as external support to Uighur separatists, the safety of PRC workers <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, <strong>and</strong><br />
107
narcotics traffick<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to western Ch<strong>in</strong>a which can <strong>in</strong>hibit progress <strong>on</strong> projects such as the Aynak<br />
copper m<strong>in</strong>e while imped<strong>in</strong>g other <strong>in</strong>vestments. Ch<strong>in</strong>a <strong>and</strong> Afghanistan exchange regular<br />
political visits <strong>and</strong> seek cooperative bilateral efforts <strong>on</strong> counterterrorism <strong>and</strong> counternarcotics<br />
issues Beij<strong>in</strong>g has also voiced its support for rec<strong>on</strong>ciliati<strong>on</strong> efforts between the Afghan<br />
government <strong>and</strong> the Taliban.<br />
Although Ch<strong>in</strong>a ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s a strict policy of n<strong>on</strong>-<strong>in</strong>volvement with ISAF security operati<strong>on</strong>s, it<br />
has provided ANSF pers<strong>on</strong>nel a variety of n<strong>on</strong>-lethal, Ch<strong>in</strong>a-based tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to bolster<br />
Afghanistan’s security <strong>and</strong> stability s<strong>in</strong>ce 2006. Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g for the ANP c<strong>on</strong>ducted at People’s<br />
Armed Police municipal tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g facilities has covered polic<strong>in</strong>g skills, crowd <strong>and</strong> riot c<strong>on</strong>trol,<br />
crim<strong>in</strong>al <strong>in</strong>vestigati<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternal security duties. Ch<strong>in</strong>a has also offered basic, advanced, <strong>and</strong><br />
senior military courses for ANSF officers at PRC People’s Liberati<strong>on</strong> Army military tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
colleges <strong>and</strong> universities.<br />
Beij<strong>in</strong>g c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to support regi<strong>on</strong>al diplomacy, most notably by <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g President Karzai <strong>in</strong><br />
annual Shanghai Cooperati<strong>on</strong> Organizati<strong>on</strong> (SCO) summits <strong>and</strong> form<strong>in</strong>g an SCO-Afghanistan<br />
C<strong>on</strong>tact Group. Afghanistan is currently under c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong> for observer status at the SCO.<br />
Ch<strong>in</strong>a attended the Istanbul C<strong>on</strong>ference <strong>on</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>al support for Afghanistan <strong>in</strong> November 2011,<br />
<strong>and</strong> is an active participant to the <strong>on</strong>go<strong>in</strong>g Istanbul process, which is plann<strong>in</strong>g another regi<strong>on</strong>al<br />
m<strong>in</strong>isterial c<strong>on</strong>ference <strong>in</strong> June 2012.<br />
8.6: RUSSIA<br />
Russia seeks a stable Afghanistan to m<strong>in</strong>imize the threat of terrorism <strong>and</strong> stem the flow of<br />
narcotics <strong>in</strong>to Central Asia <strong>and</strong> the Northern Caucasus, <strong>and</strong> supports Afghan-led rec<strong>on</strong>ciliati<strong>on</strong><br />
<strong>and</strong> re<strong>in</strong>tegrati<strong>on</strong> efforts. Also, based <strong>on</strong> a commitment made at the November 2010 NATO<br />
Summit <strong>in</strong> Lisb<strong>on</strong>, Russia c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ues to exp<strong>and</strong> the types of cargo shipped by rail <strong>and</strong> air via the<br />
NDN <strong>and</strong> also permits the reverse transit of goods back through the NDN.<br />
Russia recognizes terrorism as be<strong>in</strong>g closely <strong>in</strong>tertw<strong>in</strong>ed with narcotics traffick<strong>in</strong>g. Russia’s<br />
<strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> exp<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g counternarcotics cooperati<strong>on</strong> has c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued with its participati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
multilateral meet<strong>in</strong>gs, UNODC programs, <strong>and</strong> calls for greater <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al support to counternarcotics<br />
efforts <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan. The NATO-Russia Council will also exp<strong>and</strong> its Central Asian<br />
counternarcotics program, which tra<strong>in</strong>s counternarcotics pers<strong>on</strong>nel from Central Asia,<br />
Afghanistan, <strong>and</strong> now Pakistan, <strong>in</strong> Russia, Turkey, <strong>and</strong> via mobile tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g teams.<br />
At the December 5, 2011 B<strong>on</strong>n C<strong>on</strong>ference, Russia asserted that the SCO should st<strong>and</strong> as the<br />
priority venue to coord<strong>in</strong>ate regi<strong>on</strong>al c<strong>on</strong>tributi<strong>on</strong>s to Afghanistan. Russia has supported<br />
Afghanistan’s bid for observer status with<strong>in</strong> the SCO, which rema<strong>in</strong>s under c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong> by the<br />
SCO. This has highlighted the <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly important role that Russia has placed <strong>on</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>al<br />
cooperati<strong>on</strong> mechanisms for ec<strong>on</strong>omic, development, <strong>and</strong> security <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan as ISAF draws<br />
down.<br />
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8.7: GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL STATES 34<br />
The members of the Gulf Cooperati<strong>on</strong> Council (GCC) c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to provide support to Operati<strong>on</strong><br />
Endur<strong>in</strong>g Freedom, <strong>and</strong> have worked to provide f<strong>in</strong>ancial support <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>terest of a stable<br />
Afghanistan. The Gulf, however, is unfortunately also a source of c<strong>on</strong>siderable fund<strong>in</strong>g for the<br />
Taliban <strong>and</strong> other terrorist groups that operate <strong>in</strong> the border regi<strong>on</strong> between Afghanistan <strong>and</strong><br />
Pakistan.<br />
GCC states provide the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> key bas<strong>in</strong>g facilities <strong>and</strong> access <strong>in</strong> support of the missi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Many of the GCC countries provide important air bases <strong>and</strong> over-flight <strong>and</strong> transit rights for<br />
operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan <strong>and</strong> logistical support of these operati<strong>on</strong>s. GCC countries host<br />
USCENTCOM’s forward headquarters, the Comb<strong>in</strong>ed Air Operati<strong>on</strong>s Center, U.S. Naval Forces<br />
Central Comm<strong>and</strong> Headquarters, <strong>and</strong> U.S. Army Central Comm<strong>and</strong> Headquarters (Third Army).<br />
Other GCC countries host key air <strong>and</strong> naval facilities <strong>and</strong> provide stag<strong>in</strong>g capability for combat,<br />
ISR, <strong>and</strong> logistics operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> support of U.S. <strong>and</strong> coaliti<strong>on</strong> operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan. GCC<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>s are key partners <strong>in</strong> efforts to block terrorist f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the seizure of assets<br />
associated with al Qaeda’s f<strong>in</strong>ancial network.<br />
Further, GCC nati<strong>on</strong>s have supported humanitarian operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
establishment of refugee camps <strong>in</strong> Pakistan, f<strong>in</strong>ancial assistance, <strong>and</strong> aid for Afghan refugees.<br />
GCC countries are likely to c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue support to Afghanistan after U.S. <strong>and</strong> coaliti<strong>on</strong> combat<br />
operati<strong>on</strong>s end.<br />
Gulf countries <strong>and</strong> their <strong>on</strong>go<strong>in</strong>g large-scale c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> projects provide opportunities for<br />
migrant labor. Afghan participati<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> this labor force has been large <strong>and</strong> could c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to be a<br />
major source of remittances, further c<strong>on</strong>tribut<strong>in</strong>g to the ec<strong>on</strong>omic development of Afghanistan.<br />
A number of wealthy Afghan expatriates choose to live <strong>in</strong> the GCC states, deepen<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
ec<strong>on</strong>omic, political, <strong>and</strong> familial ties between the countries.<br />
34 GCC members are Bahra<strong>in</strong>, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, <strong>and</strong> the <strong>United</strong> Arab Emirates.<br />
109
A.1: TOTAL SECURITY INCIDENTS<br />
ANNEX A: SECURITY METRICS 35<br />
The security <strong>in</strong>dicators (metrics) rout<strong>in</strong>ely used by ISAF to assess the strength <strong>and</strong> capability of<br />
the <strong>in</strong>surgency are as follows:<br />
• <strong>Security</strong> Incidents<br />
• Enemy-Initiated Attacks (EIAs)<br />
• IED Activity<br />
• Complex / Coord<strong>in</strong>ated Attacks<br />
• Civilian Casualties<br />
• Caches Found<br />
• Green-<strong>on</strong>-Blue Incidents 36<br />
It is important to note that these <strong>in</strong>dicators represent a subset of all available security-related<br />
metrics, <strong>and</strong> that qualitative <strong>in</strong>formati<strong>on</strong> is also used to support ISAF assessments of the security<br />
situati<strong>on</strong>. New metrics c<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ue to be developed <strong>in</strong> order to provide the most holistic assessment<br />
of the dynamic security envir<strong>on</strong>ment <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan.<br />
35 All data c<strong>on</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> Annex A reflects data from the Afghanistan Missi<strong>on</strong> Network CIDNE as of 31 March 2012<br />
36 New <strong>in</strong>dicator emerg<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> importance due to recent events; def<strong>in</strong>iti<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> category details are expla<strong>in</strong>ed further <strong>in</strong> the report.<br />
110
Figure 26: Enemy-Initiated Attacks Nati<strong>on</strong>wide Year-Over-Year Change<br />
Number of Incidents<br />
Jan-Mar<br />
5000<br />
4000<br />
3000<br />
2000<br />
1000<br />
0<br />
-1000<br />
-2000<br />
+73%<br />
Enemy-Initiated Attacks<br />
INCREASE from last Year<br />
DECREASE from last Year<br />
Jan-Mar Jan-Mar Jan-Mar Jan-Mar<br />
+93%<br />
+32%<br />
-21%<br />
Jan 08<br />
Feb 08<br />
Mar 08<br />
Apr 08<br />
May 08<br />
Jun 08<br />
Jul 08<br />
Aug 08<br />
Sep 08<br />
Oct 08<br />
Nov 08<br />
Dec 08<br />
Jan 09<br />
Feb 09<br />
Mar 09<br />
Apr 09<br />
May 09<br />
Jun 09<br />
Jul 09<br />
Aug 09<br />
Sep 09<br />
Oct 09<br />
Nov 09<br />
Dec 09<br />
Jan 10<br />
Feb 10<br />
Mar 10<br />
Apr 10<br />
May 10<br />
Jun 10<br />
Jul 10<br />
Aug 10<br />
Sep 10<br />
Oct 10<br />
Nov 10<br />
Dec 10<br />
Jan 11<br />
Feb 11<br />
Mar 11<br />
Apr 11<br />
May 11<br />
Jun 11<br />
Jul 11<br />
Aug 11<br />
Sep 11<br />
Oct 11<br />
Nov 11<br />
Dec 11<br />
Jan 12<br />
Feb 12<br />
Mar 12<br />
111
<strong>Security</strong> <strong>in</strong>cidents from October 2011 through March 2012 decreased by 15 percent compared to<br />
the corresp<strong>on</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g period last year. Notably, data reflects n<strong>in</strong>e straight m<strong>on</strong>ths (s<strong>in</strong>ce July 2011)<br />
of year-over-year (YoY) decreases <strong>in</strong> security <strong>in</strong>cidents.<br />
Figure 27: M<strong>on</strong>thly <strong>Security</strong> Incidents (October 2009 – March 2012)<br />
Number of <strong>Security</strong> Incidents<br />
6000<br />
5000<br />
4000<br />
3000<br />
2000<br />
1000<br />
0<br />
Oct 09<br />
SAFIRE<br />
Potential IED Attacks<br />
Executed IED Attacks<br />
Direct Fire<br />
Indirect Fire<br />
Nov 09<br />
Dec 09<br />
Jan 10<br />
Feb 10<br />
Mar 10<br />
Apr 10<br />
May 10<br />
Jun 10<br />
Jul 10<br />
Aug 10<br />
Sep 10<br />
Oct 10<br />
Nov 10<br />
Dec 10<br />
112<br />
Jan 11<br />
Feb 11<br />
Mar 11<br />
Apr 11<br />
May 11<br />
Jun 11<br />
Jul 11<br />
Aug 11<br />
Sep 11<br />
Oct 11<br />
Nov 11<br />
Dec 11<br />
Jan 12<br />
Feb 12<br />
Mar 12
A.2: ENEMY-INITIATED ATTACKS<br />
EIAs – which, unlike security <strong>in</strong>cidents, do not <strong>in</strong>clude potential or attempted IED attacks – were<br />
also down 16 percent from October 2011 through March 2012 <strong>in</strong> comparis<strong>on</strong> to the<br />
corresp<strong>on</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g period last year. S<strong>in</strong>ce May 2011, each m<strong>on</strong>th has seen fewer enemy EIAs than<br />
the corresp<strong>on</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>on</strong>th from the previous year.<br />
Figure 28: M<strong>on</strong>thly Enemy-Initiated Attacks (October 2009 – March 2012)<br />
Number of Attacks<br />
4500<br />
4000<br />
3500<br />
3000<br />
2500<br />
2000<br />
1500<br />
1000<br />
500<br />
0<br />
Oct 09<br />
Nov 09<br />
Dec 09<br />
Jan 10<br />
Feb 10<br />
Mar 10<br />
Apr 10<br />
May 10<br />
Jun 10<br />
Jul 10<br />
Aug 10<br />
Sep 10<br />
Oct 10<br />
Nov 10<br />
Dec 10<br />
Jan 11<br />
Feb 11<br />
Mar 11<br />
Apr 11<br />
May 11<br />
Jun 11<br />
Jul 11<br />
113<br />
Aug 11<br />
Sep 11<br />
Oct 11<br />
Nov 11<br />
Dec 11<br />
Jan 12<br />
Feb 12<br />
Mar 12
A.3: ENEMY-INITIATED ATTACKS BY REGIONAL COMMAND<br />
RC-CAPITAL<br />
RC-Capital is the smallest RC, by far, <strong>and</strong> has had low violence levels for several years. As<br />
previously noted, security <strong>in</strong>cidents <strong>in</strong> RC-C were statistically <strong>in</strong>significant dur<strong>in</strong>g the report<strong>in</strong>g<br />
period; the change <strong>in</strong> EIAs <strong>in</strong> RC-C over this period was likewise statistically <strong>in</strong>significant, with<br />
an <strong>in</strong>crease of <strong>on</strong>ly two attacks over the corresp<strong>on</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g period from last year.<br />
Figure 29: YoY M<strong>on</strong>thly Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-Capital (October 2009 – March 2012)<br />
YoY Difference<br />
1200<br />
1000<br />
800<br />
600<br />
400<br />
200<br />
0<br />
-200<br />
-400<br />
-600<br />
-800<br />
Oct 09<br />
Nov 09<br />
Dec 09<br />
Jan 10<br />
Feb 10<br />
Mar 10<br />
Apr 10<br />
May 10<br />
Jun 10<br />
Jul 10<br />
Aug 10<br />
Sep 10<br />
Oct 10<br />
Nov 10<br />
Dec 10<br />
114<br />
Jan 11<br />
Feb 11<br />
Mar 11<br />
Apr 11<br />
May 11<br />
Jun 11<br />
Jul 11<br />
Aug 11<br />
Sep 11<br />
Oct 11<br />
Nov 11<br />
Dec 11<br />
Jan 12<br />
Feb 12<br />
Mar 12
RC-WEST<br />
From October 2011 – March 2012, EIAs <strong>in</strong> RC-W <strong>in</strong>creased 7 percent compared to the<br />
corresp<strong>on</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g period <strong>on</strong>e year ago. RC-W accounted for 5 percent of all EIAs from October<br />
2011 – March 2012, a statistically <strong>in</strong>significant change (<strong>in</strong>crease of 1 percent) compared to the<br />
corresp<strong>on</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g period last year.<br />
Figure 30: YoY M<strong>on</strong>thly Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-West (October 2009 – March 2012)<br />
YoY Difference<br />
1200<br />
1000<br />
800<br />
600<br />
400<br />
200<br />
0<br />
-200<br />
-400<br />
-600<br />
-800<br />
Oct 09<br />
Nov 09<br />
Dec 09<br />
Jan 10<br />
Feb 10<br />
Mar 10<br />
Apr 10<br />
May 10<br />
Jun 10<br />
Jul 10<br />
Aug 10<br />
Sep 10<br />
Oct 10<br />
Nov 10<br />
Dec 10<br />
115<br />
Jan 11<br />
Feb 11<br />
Mar 11<br />
Apr 11<br />
May 11<br />
Jun 11<br />
Jul 11<br />
Aug 11<br />
Sep 11<br />
Oct 11<br />
Nov 11<br />
Dec 11<br />
Jan 12<br />
Feb 12<br />
Mar 12
RC-EAST<br />
From October 2011 – March 2012, EIAs <strong>in</strong> RC-E were down eight percent compared to the<br />
corresp<strong>on</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g period <strong>on</strong>e year ago. RC-E accounted for 34 percent of all EIAs from October<br />
2011 – March 2012, an <strong>in</strong>crease of three percent compared to the corresp<strong>on</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g period <strong>on</strong>e year<br />
ago.<br />
Figure 31: YoY M<strong>on</strong>thly Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-East (October 2009 – March 2012)<br />
YoY Difference<br />
1200<br />
1000<br />
800<br />
600<br />
400<br />
200<br />
0<br />
-200<br />
-400<br />
-600<br />
-800<br />
Oct 09<br />
Nov 09<br />
Dec 09<br />
Jan 10<br />
Feb 10<br />
Mar 10<br />
Apr 10<br />
May 10<br />
Jun 10<br />
Jul 10<br />
Aug 10<br />
Sep 10<br />
Oct 10<br />
Nov 10<br />
Dec 10<br />
116<br />
Jan 11<br />
Feb 11<br />
Mar 11<br />
Apr 11<br />
May 11<br />
Jun 11<br />
Jul 11<br />
Aug 11<br />
Sep 11<br />
Oct 11<br />
Nov 11<br />
Dec 11<br />
Jan 12<br />
Feb 12<br />
Mar 12
RC-NORTH<br />
From October 2011 – March 2012, EIAs <strong>in</strong> RC-N decreased 60 percent compared to the<br />
corresp<strong>on</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g period <strong>on</strong>e year ago. RC-N accounted for two percent of all EIAs from October<br />
2011 – March 2012, a decrease of two percent compared to the corresp<strong>on</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g period <strong>on</strong>e year<br />
ago.<br />
Figure 32: YoY M<strong>on</strong>thly Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-North (October 2009 – March 2012)<br />
YoY Difference<br />
1200<br />
1000<br />
800<br />
600<br />
400<br />
200<br />
0<br />
-200<br />
-400<br />
-600<br />
-800<br />
Oct 09<br />
Nov 09<br />
Dec 09<br />
Jan 10<br />
Feb 10<br />
Mar 10<br />
Apr 10<br />
May 10<br />
Jun 10<br />
Jul 10<br />
Aug 10<br />
Sep 10<br />
Oct 10<br />
Nov 10<br />
Dec 10<br />
117<br />
Jan 11<br />
Feb 11<br />
Mar 11<br />
Apr 11<br />
May 11<br />
Jun 11<br />
Jul 11<br />
Aug 11<br />
Sep 11<br />
Oct 11<br />
Nov 11<br />
Dec 11<br />
Jan 12<br />
Feb 12<br />
Mar 12
RC-SOUTHWEST<br />
From October 2011 – March 2012, EIAs <strong>in</strong> RC-SW decreased by 29 percent compared to the<br />
corresp<strong>on</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g period <strong>on</strong>e year ago. RC-SW accounted for 37 percent of all EIAs from October<br />
2011 – March 2012, a decrease of seven percent compared to the corresp<strong>on</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g period <strong>on</strong>e year<br />
ago.<br />
Figure 33: YoY M<strong>on</strong>thly Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-Southwest (October 2009 – March 2012)<br />
YoY Difference<br />
1200<br />
1000<br />
800<br />
600<br />
400<br />
200<br />
0<br />
-200<br />
-400<br />
-600<br />
-800<br />
Oct 09<br />
Nov 09<br />
Dec 09<br />
Jan 10<br />
Feb 10<br />
Mar 10<br />
Apr 10<br />
May 10<br />
Jun 10<br />
Jul 10<br />
Aug 10<br />
Sep 10<br />
Oct 10<br />
Nov 10<br />
Dec 10<br />
118<br />
Jan 11<br />
Feb 11<br />
Mar 11<br />
Apr 11<br />
May 11<br />
Jun 11<br />
Jul 11<br />
Aug 11<br />
Sep 11<br />
Oct 11<br />
Nov 11<br />
Dec 11<br />
Jan 12<br />
Feb 12<br />
Mar 12
RC-SOUTH<br />
From October 2011 – March 2012, EIAs <strong>in</strong> RC-S <strong>in</strong>creased 13 percent compared to the<br />
corresp<strong>on</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g period <strong>on</strong>e year ago. RC-S c<strong>on</strong>tributed 21 percent of all EIAs from October 2011<br />
- March 2012, an <strong>in</strong>crease of five percent compared to the corresp<strong>on</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g period <strong>on</strong>e year ago.<br />
Figure 34: YoY M<strong>on</strong>thly Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-South (October 2009 – March 2012)<br />
YoY Difference<br />
1200<br />
1000<br />
800<br />
600<br />
400<br />
200<br />
0<br />
-200<br />
-400<br />
-600<br />
-800<br />
Oct 09<br />
Nov 09<br />
Dec 09<br />
Jan 10<br />
Feb 10<br />
Mar 10<br />
Apr 10<br />
May 10<br />
Jun 10<br />
Jul 10<br />
Aug 10<br />
Sep 10<br />
Oct 10<br />
Nov 10<br />
Dec 10<br />
119<br />
Jan 11<br />
Feb 11<br />
Mar 11<br />
Apr 11<br />
May 11<br />
Jun 11<br />
Jul 11<br />
Aug 11<br />
Sep 11<br />
Oct 11<br />
Nov 11<br />
Dec 11<br />
Jan 12<br />
Feb 12<br />
Mar 12
A.4: IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE ACTIVITY<br />
The report<strong>in</strong>g period evidenced an 11 percent year-over-year decrease <strong>in</strong> IED <strong>and</strong> m<strong>in</strong>e<br />
explosi<strong>on</strong>s, while IED <strong>and</strong> m<strong>in</strong>e activity (which <strong>in</strong>cludes executed <strong>and</strong> potential IED attacks)<br />
decreased 13 percent. Potential IED attacks <strong>in</strong>clude those that were found <strong>and</strong> cleared,<br />
premature IED det<strong>on</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>and</strong> those turned <strong>in</strong> to the coaliti<strong>on</strong> by local nati<strong>on</strong>als. IED turn-<strong>in</strong>s<br />
doubled dur<strong>in</strong>g this period compared to <strong>on</strong>e year ago.<br />
Figure 35: M<strong>on</strong>thly IED <strong>and</strong> M<strong>in</strong>e Explosi<strong>on</strong>s (October 2009 – March 2012)<br />
Number of Events<br />
800<br />
700<br />
600<br />
500<br />
400<br />
300<br />
200<br />
100<br />
0<br />
Oct 09<br />
Nov 09<br />
Dec 09<br />
Jan 10<br />
Feb 10<br />
Mar 10<br />
Apr 10<br />
May 10<br />
Jun 10<br />
Jul 10<br />
Aug 10<br />
Sep 10<br />
Oct 10<br />
Nov 10<br />
Dec 10<br />
Jan 11<br />
120<br />
Feb 11<br />
Mar 11<br />
Apr 11<br />
May 11<br />
Jun 11<br />
Jul 11<br />
Aug 11<br />
Sep 11<br />
Oct 11<br />
Nov 11<br />
Dec 11<br />
Jan 12<br />
Feb 12<br />
Mar 12
A.5: COMPLEX AND COORDINATED ATTACKS 37<br />
Complex <strong>and</strong> coord<strong>in</strong>ated attacks from October 2011 – March 2012 decreased 30 percent from<br />
the corresp<strong>on</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g period last year. The latter two m<strong>on</strong>ths <strong>in</strong> the report<strong>in</strong>g period evidenced<br />
gradual <strong>in</strong>creases <strong>in</strong> these attacks, c<strong>on</strong>sistent with historical patterns associated with the start of<br />
the fight<strong>in</strong>g seas<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Figure 36: M<strong>on</strong>thly Complex <strong>and</strong> Coord<strong>in</strong>ated Attacks (October 2009 – March 2012)<br />
Number of Attacks<br />
400<br />
350<br />
300<br />
250<br />
200<br />
150<br />
100<br />
50<br />
0<br />
Oct 09<br />
Nov 09<br />
Dec 09<br />
Jan 10<br />
Feb 10<br />
Mar 10<br />
Apr 10<br />
May 10<br />
Jun 10<br />
Jul 10<br />
Aug 10<br />
Sep 10<br />
Oct 10<br />
Nov 10<br />
Dec 10<br />
Jan 11<br />
37 A complex <strong>and</strong> coord<strong>in</strong>ated attack is an attack which is c<strong>on</strong>ducted by multiple hostile elements employ<strong>in</strong>g at least two dist<strong>in</strong>ct classes of<br />
weap<strong>on</strong> systems from multiple locati<strong>on</strong>s, which <strong>in</strong>dicates a higher level of plann<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
121<br />
Feb 11<br />
Mar 11<br />
Apr 11<br />
May 11<br />
Jun 11<br />
Jul 11<br />
Aug 11<br />
Sep 11<br />
Oct 11<br />
Nov 11<br />
Dec 11<br />
Jan 12<br />
Feb 12<br />
Mar 12
A.6: CACHES FOUND<br />
This report<strong>in</strong>g period saw a decrease <strong>in</strong> total caches found from <strong>on</strong>e year ago <strong>and</strong> from the<br />
previous report<strong>in</strong>g period’s total. Analysis was unable to discern whether the decrease was<br />
attributable to a dim<strong>in</strong>ishment of <strong>in</strong>surgent supplies result<strong>in</strong>g from persistent ANSF/ISAF<br />
operati<strong>on</strong>s, but this c<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong> is reas<strong>on</strong>able, given the broad <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ed campaign aga<strong>in</strong>st the<br />
<strong>in</strong>surgency.<br />
Figure 37: Caches Found (as of 31 March 2012)<br />
Number of Caches<br />
900<br />
800<br />
700<br />
600<br />
500<br />
400<br />
300<br />
200<br />
100<br />
0<br />
Oct 09<br />
Nov 09<br />
Dec 09<br />
Jan 10<br />
Feb 10<br />
Mar 10<br />
Apr 10<br />
May 10<br />
Jun 10<br />
Jul 10<br />
Aug 10<br />
Sep 10<br />
Oct 10<br />
Nov 10<br />
Dec 10<br />
122<br />
Jan 11<br />
Feb 11<br />
Mar 11<br />
Apr 11<br />
May 11<br />
Jun 11<br />
Jul 11<br />
Aug 11<br />
Sep 11<br />
Oct 11<br />
Nov 11<br />
Dec 11<br />
Jan 12<br />
Feb 12<br />
Mar 12
Annex B: C<strong>on</strong>gressi<strong>on</strong>al Legislati<strong>on</strong><br />
FY2008 Nati<strong>on</strong>al Defense Authorizati<strong>on</strong> Act Secti<strong>on</strong> 1230<br />
REPORT ON PROGRESS TOWARD SECURITY AND STABILITY<br />
IN AFGHANISTAN.<br />
(a) REPORT REQUIRED.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,<br />
<strong>and</strong> every 180 days thereafter through the end of fiscal year 2010, the President, act<strong>in</strong>g through<br />
the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate c<strong>on</strong>gressi<strong>on</strong>al committees a report <strong>on</strong><br />
progress toward security <strong>and</strong> stability <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan.<br />
(b) COORDINATION.—The report required under subsecti<strong>on</strong> (a) shall be prepared <strong>in</strong><br />
coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> with the Secretary of State, the Director of Nati<strong>on</strong>al Intelligence, the Attorney<br />
General, the Adm<strong>in</strong>istrator of the Drug Enforcement Adm<strong>in</strong>istrati<strong>on</strong>, the Adm<strong>in</strong>istrator of the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Agency for Internati<strong>on</strong>al Development, the Secretary of Agriculture, <strong>and</strong> the head<br />
of any other department or agency of the Government of the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> <strong>in</strong>volved with<br />
activities relat<strong>in</strong>g to security <strong>and</strong> stability <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan.<br />
(c) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED: STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF UNITED STATES<br />
ACTIVITIES RELATING TO SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN.— The<br />
report required under subsecti<strong>on</strong> (a) shall <strong>in</strong>clude a descripti<strong>on</strong> of a comprehensive strategy of<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> for security <strong>and</strong> stability <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan. The descripti<strong>on</strong> of such strategy shall<br />
c<strong>on</strong>sist of a general overview <strong>and</strong> a separate detailed secti<strong>on</strong> for each of the follow<strong>in</strong>g:<br />
(1) NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL SECURITY<br />
ASSISTANCE FORCE.—A descripti<strong>on</strong> of the follow<strong>in</strong>g:<br />
(A) Efforts of the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> to work with countries participat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the North<br />
Atlantic Treaty Organizati<strong>on</strong> (NATO) Internati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>Security</strong> Assistance Force<br />
(ISAF) <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan (hereafter <strong>in</strong> this secti<strong>on</strong> referred to as ‘‘NATO ISAF<br />
countries’’).<br />
(B) Any acti<strong>on</strong>s by the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> to achieve the follow<strong>in</strong>g goals relat<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
strengthen<strong>in</strong>g the NATO ISAF, <strong>and</strong> the results of such acti<strong>on</strong>s:<br />
(i) Encourage NATO ISAF countries to fulfill commitments to the NATO<br />
ISAF missi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, <strong>and</strong> ensure adequate c<strong>on</strong>tributi<strong>on</strong>s to efforts<br />
to build the capacity of the Afghanistan Nati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>Security</strong> Forces (ANSF),<br />
counter-narcotics efforts, <strong>and</strong> rec<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> development activities <strong>in</strong><br />
Afghanistan.<br />
(ii) Remove nati<strong>on</strong>al caveats <strong>on</strong> the use of forces deployed as part of the<br />
NATO ISAF.<br />
123
(iii) Reduce the number of civilian casualties result<strong>in</strong>g from military<br />
operati<strong>on</strong>s of NATO ISAF countries <strong>and</strong> mitigate the impact of such<br />
casualties <strong>on</strong> the Afghan people.<br />
(2) AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES.—A descripti<strong>on</strong> of the<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g:<br />
(A) A comprehensive <strong>and</strong> effective l<strong>on</strong>g-term strategy <strong>and</strong> budget, with def<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
objectives, for activities relat<strong>in</strong>g to strengthen<strong>in</strong>g the resources, capabilities, <strong>and</strong><br />
effectiveness of the Afghanistan Nati<strong>on</strong>al Army (ANA) <strong>and</strong> the Afghanistan<br />
Nati<strong>on</strong>al Police (ANP) of the ANSF, with the goal of ensur<strong>in</strong>g that a str<strong>on</strong>g <strong>and</strong><br />
fully-capable ANSF is able to <strong>in</strong>dependently <strong>and</strong> effectively c<strong>on</strong>duct operati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
<strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> security <strong>and</strong> stability <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan.<br />
(B) Any acti<strong>on</strong>s by the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> to achieve the follow<strong>in</strong>g goals relat<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
build<strong>in</strong>g the capacity of the ANSF, <strong>and</strong> the results of such acti<strong>on</strong>s:<br />
(i) Improve coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> with all relevant departments <strong>and</strong> agencies of the<br />
Government of the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, as well as NATO ISAF countries <strong>and</strong><br />
other <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al partners.<br />
(ii) Improve ANSF recruitment <strong>and</strong> retenti<strong>on</strong>, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g through improved<br />
vett<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> salaries for the ANSF.<br />
(iii) Increase <strong>and</strong> improve ANSF tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> mentor<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
(iv) Strengthen the partnership between the Government of the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> <strong>and</strong> the Government of Afghanistan.<br />
(3) PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS AND OTHER<br />
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES.—A descripti<strong>on</strong> of the<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g:<br />
(A) A comprehensive <strong>and</strong> effective l<strong>on</strong>g-term strategy <strong>and</strong> budget, with def<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
objectives, for rec<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> development <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g a l<strong>on</strong>gterm<br />
strategy with a missi<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> objectives for each <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>-led Prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />
Rec<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> Team (PRT) <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan.<br />
(B) Any acti<strong>on</strong>s by the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> to achieve the follow<strong>in</strong>g goals with respect<br />
to rec<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> development <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, <strong>and</strong> the results of such acti<strong>on</strong>s:<br />
(i) Improve coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> with all relevant departments <strong>and</strong> agencies of the<br />
Government of the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, as well as NATO ISAF countries <strong>and</strong><br />
other <strong>in</strong>ternati<strong>on</strong>al partners.<br />
124
(ii) Clarify the cha<strong>in</strong> of comm<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> operati<strong>on</strong>s plans for <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>led<br />
PRTs that are appropriate to meet the needs of the relevant local<br />
communities.<br />
(iii) Promote coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> am<strong>on</strong>g PRTs.<br />
(iv) Ensure that each PRT is adequately staffed, particularly with civilian<br />
specialists, <strong>and</strong> that such staff receive appropriate tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g.<br />
(v) Exp<strong>and</strong> the ability of the Afghan people to assume greater<br />
resp<strong>on</strong>sibility for their own rec<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> development projects.<br />
(vi) Strengthen the partnership between the Government of the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> <strong>and</strong> the Government of Afghanistan.<br />
(vii) Ensure proper rec<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> development oversight activities,<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g implementati<strong>on</strong>, where appropriate, of recommendati<strong>on</strong>s of any<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> <strong>in</strong>spectors general, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the Special Inspector General<br />
for Afghanistan Rec<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> appo<strong>in</strong>ted pursuant to secti<strong>on</strong> 1229.<br />
(4) COUNTER-NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES.—A descripti<strong>on</strong> of the follow<strong>in</strong>g:<br />
(A) A comprehensive <strong>and</strong> effective l<strong>on</strong>g-term strategy <strong>and</strong> budget, with def<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
objectives, for the activities of the Department of Defense relat<strong>in</strong>g to counternarcotics<br />
efforts <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g—<br />
(i) roles <strong>and</strong> missi<strong>on</strong>s of the Department of Defense with<strong>in</strong> the overall<br />
counter-narcotics strategy for Afghanistan of the Government of the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g a statement of priorities;<br />
(ii) a detailed, comprehensive, <strong>and</strong> effective strategy with def<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>on</strong>eyear,<br />
three-year, <strong>and</strong> five-year objectives <strong>and</strong> a descripti<strong>on</strong> of the<br />
accompany<strong>in</strong>g allocati<strong>on</strong> of resources of the Department of Defense to<br />
accomplish such objectives;<br />
(iii) <strong>in</strong> furtherance of the strategy described <strong>in</strong> clause (i), acti<strong>on</strong>s that the<br />
Department of Defense is tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> has planned to take to—<br />
(I) improve coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> with<strong>in</strong> the Department of Defense <strong>and</strong><br />
with all relevant departments <strong>and</strong> agencies of the Government of<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>;<br />
(II) strengthen significantly the Afghanistan Nati<strong>on</strong>al Counternarcotics<br />
Police;<br />
125
(III) build the capacity of local <strong>and</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>cial governments of<br />
Afghanistan <strong>and</strong> the nati<strong>on</strong>al Government of Afghanistan to<br />
assume greater resp<strong>on</strong>sibility for counter-narcotics-related<br />
activities, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terdicti<strong>on</strong>; <strong>and</strong><br />
(IV) improve counter-narcotics-related <strong>in</strong>telligence capabilities <strong>and</strong><br />
tactical use of such capabilities by the Department of Defense <strong>and</strong><br />
other appropriate departments <strong>and</strong> agencies of the Government of<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>; <strong>and</strong><br />
(iv) the impact, if any, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the disadvantages <strong>and</strong> advantages, if any,<br />
<strong>on</strong> the primary counter-terrorism missi<strong>on</strong> of the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> military of<br />
provid<strong>in</strong>g enhanced logistical support to departments <strong>and</strong> agencies of the<br />
Government of the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> <strong>and</strong> counter-narcotics partners of the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> <strong>in</strong> their <strong>in</strong>terdicti<strong>on</strong> efforts, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g apprehend<strong>in</strong>g or<br />
elim<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g major drug traffickers <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan.<br />
(B) The counter-narcotics roles <strong>and</strong> missi<strong>on</strong>s assumed by the local <strong>and</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />
governments of Afghanistan <strong>and</strong> the nati<strong>on</strong>al Government of Afghanistan,<br />
appropriate departments <strong>and</strong> agencies of the Government of the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
(other than the Department of Defense), the NATO ISAF, <strong>and</strong> the governments of<br />
other countries.<br />
(C) The plan <strong>and</strong> efforts to coord<strong>in</strong>ate the counternarcotics strategy <strong>and</strong> activities<br />
of the Department of Defense with the counter-narcotics strategy <strong>and</strong> activities of<br />
the Government of Afghanistan, the NATO-led <strong>in</strong>terdicti<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> security forces,<br />
other appropriate countries, <strong>and</strong> other counter-narcotics partners of the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>, <strong>and</strong> the results of such efforts.<br />
(D) The progress made by the governments, organizati<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>and</strong> entities specified<br />
<strong>in</strong> subparagraph (B) <strong>in</strong> execut<strong>in</strong>g designated roles <strong>and</strong> missi<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
coord<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> implement<strong>in</strong>g counternarcotics plans <strong>and</strong> activities, <strong>and</strong> based<br />
<strong>on</strong> the results of this progress whether, <strong>and</strong> to what extent, roles <strong>and</strong> missi<strong>on</strong>s for<br />
the Department of Defense should be altered <strong>in</strong> the future, or should rema<strong>in</strong><br />
unaltered.<br />
(5) PUBLIC CORRUPTION AND RULE OF LAW.—A descripti<strong>on</strong> of any acti<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>and</strong><br />
the results of such acti<strong>on</strong>s, to help the Government of Afghanistan fight public corrupti<strong>on</strong><br />
<strong>and</strong> strengthen governance <strong>and</strong> the rule of law at the local, prov<strong>in</strong>cial, <strong>and</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al levels.<br />
(6) REGIONAL CONSIDERATIONS.—A descripti<strong>on</strong> of any acti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> the results of<br />
such acti<strong>on</strong>s to <strong>in</strong>crease cooperati<strong>on</strong> with countries geographically located around<br />
Afghanistan’s border, with a particular focus <strong>on</strong> improv<strong>in</strong>g security <strong>and</strong> stability <strong>in</strong> the<br />
Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas.<br />
126
(d) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED: PERFORMANCE INDICATORS AND MEASURES OF<br />
PROGRESS TOWARD SUSTAINABLE LONG TERM SECURITY AND STABILITY IN<br />
AFGHANISTAN.—<br />
(1) IN GENERAL.— The report required under subsecti<strong>on</strong> (a) shall set forth a<br />
comprehensive set of performance <strong>in</strong>dicators <strong>and</strong> measures of progress toward<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>able l<strong>on</strong>g-term security <strong>and</strong> stability <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, as specified <strong>in</strong> paragraph (2),<br />
<strong>and</strong> shall <strong>in</strong>clude performance st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>and</strong> progress goals, together with a noti<strong>on</strong>al<br />
timetable for achiev<strong>in</strong>g such goals.<br />
(2) PERFORMANCE INDICATORS AND MEASURES OF PROGRESS<br />
SPECIFIED.— The performance <strong>in</strong>dicators <strong>and</strong> measures of progress specified <strong>in</strong> this<br />
paragraph shall <strong>in</strong>clude, at a m<strong>in</strong>imum, the follow<strong>in</strong>g:<br />
(A) With respect to the NATO ISAF, an assessment of unfulfilled NATO ISAF<br />
missi<strong>on</strong> requirements <strong>and</strong> c<strong>on</strong>tributi<strong>on</strong>s from <strong>in</strong>dividual NATO ISAF countries,<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g levels of troops <strong>and</strong> equipment, the effect of c<strong>on</strong>tributi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong><br />
operati<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>and</strong> unfulfilled commitments.<br />
(B) An assessment of military operati<strong>on</strong>s of the NATO ISAF, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g of NATO<br />
ISAF countries, <strong>and</strong> an assessment of separate military operati<strong>on</strong>s by <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> forces. Such assessments shall <strong>in</strong>clude—<br />
(i) <strong>in</strong>dicators of a stable security envir<strong>on</strong>ment <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, such as<br />
number of engagements per day, <strong>and</strong> trends relat<strong>in</strong>g to the numbers <strong>and</strong><br />
types of hostile encounters; <strong>and</strong><br />
(ii) the effects of nati<strong>on</strong>al caveats that limit operati<strong>on</strong>s, geographic<br />
locati<strong>on</strong> of operati<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>and</strong> estimated number of civilian casualties.<br />
GSDDPC29 with PUBLIC LAWS<br />
(C) For the Afghanistan Nati<strong>on</strong>al Army (ANA), <strong>and</strong> separately for the<br />
Afghanistan Nati<strong>on</strong>al Police (ANP), of the Afghanistan Nati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>Security</strong> Forces<br />
(ANSF) an assessment of the follow<strong>in</strong>g:<br />
(i) Recruitment <strong>and</strong> retenti<strong>on</strong> numbers, rates of absenteeism, vett<strong>in</strong>g<br />
procedures, <strong>and</strong> salary scale.<br />
(ii) Numbers tra<strong>in</strong>ed, numbers receiv<strong>in</strong>g mentor<strong>in</strong>g, the type of tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>and</strong> mentor<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> number of tra<strong>in</strong>ers, mentors, <strong>and</strong> advisers needed to<br />
support the ANA <strong>and</strong> ANP <strong>and</strong> associated m<strong>in</strong>istries.<br />
(iii) Type of equipment used.<br />
(iv) Operati<strong>on</strong>al read<strong>in</strong>ess status of ANSF units, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the type,<br />
number, size, <strong>and</strong> organizati<strong>on</strong>al structure of ANA <strong>and</strong> ANP units that<br />
are—<br />
127
(I) capable of c<strong>on</strong>duct<strong>in</strong>g operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>in</strong>dependently;<br />
(II) capable of c<strong>on</strong>duct<strong>in</strong>g operati<strong>on</strong>s with the support of the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, NATO ISAF forces, or other coaliti<strong>on</strong> forces; or<br />
(III) not ready to c<strong>on</strong>duct operati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
(v) Effectiveness of ANA <strong>and</strong> ANP officers <strong>and</strong> the ANA <strong>and</strong> ANP cha<strong>in</strong><br />
of comm<strong>and</strong>.<br />
(vi) Extent to which <strong>in</strong>surgents have <strong>in</strong>filtrated the ANA <strong>and</strong> ANP.<br />
(vii) Estimated number <strong>and</strong> capability level of the ANA <strong>and</strong> ANP needed<br />
to perform duties now undertaken by NATO ISAF countries, separate<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> forces <strong>and</strong> other coaliti<strong>on</strong> forces, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g defend<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
borders of Afghanistan <strong>and</strong> provid<strong>in</strong>g adequate levels of law <strong>and</strong> order<br />
throughout Afghanistan.<br />
(D) An assessment of the estimated strength of the <strong>in</strong>surgency <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan <strong>and</strong><br />
the extent to which it is composed of n<strong>on</strong>-Afghan fighters <strong>and</strong> utiliz<strong>in</strong>g weap<strong>on</strong>s<br />
or weap<strong>on</strong>s-related materials from countries other than Afghanistan.<br />
(E) A descripti<strong>on</strong> of all terrorist <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>surgent groups operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan,<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the number, size, equipment strength, military effectiveness, sources of<br />
support, legal status, <strong>and</strong> any efforts to disarm or re<strong>in</strong>tegrate each such group.<br />
(F) An assessment of security <strong>and</strong> stability, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g terrorist <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>surgent<br />
activity, <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> Pakistan’s Federally<br />
Adm<strong>in</strong>istered Tribal Areas.<br />
(G) An assessment of <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> military requirements, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g planned<br />
force rotati<strong>on</strong>s, for the twelve-m<strong>on</strong>th period follow<strong>in</strong>g the date of the report<br />
required under subsecti<strong>on</strong> (a).<br />
(H) For rec<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> development, an assessment of the follow<strong>in</strong>g:<br />
(i) The locati<strong>on</strong>, fund<strong>in</strong>g (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the sources of fund<strong>in</strong>g), staff<strong>in</strong>g<br />
requirements, current staff<strong>in</strong>g levels, <strong>and</strong> activities of each <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>led<br />
Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Rec<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> Team.<br />
(ii) Key <strong>in</strong>dicators of ec<strong>on</strong>omic activity that should be c<strong>on</strong>sidered the most<br />
important for determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the prospects of stability <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan,<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g—<br />
(I) the <strong>in</strong>dicators set forth <strong>in</strong> the Afghanistan Compact, which<br />
c<strong>on</strong>sist of roads, educati<strong>on</strong>, health, agriculture, <strong>and</strong> electricity; <strong>and</strong><br />
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(II) unemployment <strong>and</strong> poverty levels.<br />
(I) For counter-narcotics efforts, an assessment of the activities of the<br />
Department of Defense <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, as described <strong>in</strong> subsecti<strong>on</strong> (c)(4),<br />
<strong>and</strong> the effectiveness of such activities.<br />
(J) Key measures of political stability relat<strong>in</strong>g to both central <strong>and</strong> local<br />
Afghan governance.<br />
(K) For public corrupti<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> rule of law, an assessment of anti-corrupti<strong>on</strong><br />
<strong>and</strong> law enforcement activities at the local, prov<strong>in</strong>cial, <strong>and</strong> nati<strong>on</strong>al levels<br />
<strong>and</strong> the effectiveness of such activities.<br />
(e) FORM.—The report required under subsecti<strong>on</strong> (a) shall be submitted <strong>in</strong> unclassified form,<br />
but may <strong>in</strong>clude a classified annex, if necessary.<br />
(f) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFINGS.—The Secretary of Defense shall supplement the report<br />
required under subsecti<strong>on</strong> (a) with regular brief<strong>in</strong>gs to the appropriate c<strong>on</strong>gressi<strong>on</strong>al committees<br />
<strong>on</strong> the subject matter of the report.<br />
(g) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this secti<strong>on</strong>, the term<br />
‘‘appropriate c<strong>on</strong>gressi<strong>on</strong>al committees’’ means—<br />
(1) the Committee <strong>on</strong> Armed Services, the Committee <strong>on</strong> Appropriati<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>and</strong> the<br />
Committee <strong>on</strong> Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; <strong>and</strong><br />
(2) the Committee <strong>on</strong> Armed Services, the Committee <strong>on</strong> Appropriati<strong>on</strong>s, <strong>and</strong> the<br />
Committee <strong>on</strong> Foreign Relati<strong>on</strong>s of the Senate.<br />
129
Annex C: Glossary<br />
1UC 1 Uniform Course: a direct-entry tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g course for qualified c<strong>and</strong>idates<br />
who enter the force as NCOs<br />
AAF Afghan Air Force<br />
ABP Afghan Border Police<br />
ADAPT Agricultural Development for Afghanistan Pre-deployment Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
ADTs Agribus<strong>in</strong>ess Development Teams<br />
AGO Attorney General’s Office<br />
AKVTC Afghan Vocati<strong>on</strong>al Technical Trade Center<br />
ALOC Air L<strong>in</strong>es of Communicati<strong>on</strong><br />
ALP Afghan Local Police<br />
ANA Afghan Nati<strong>on</strong>al Army<br />
ANACDO ANA Comm<strong>and</strong>os<br />
ANAOA Afghan Nati<strong>on</strong>al Army Officers Academy<br />
ANASF Afghan Nati<strong>on</strong>al Army Special Forces<br />
ANASOC ANA Special Operati<strong>on</strong>s Comm<strong>and</strong><br />
ANCOP Afghan Nati<strong>on</strong>al Civil Order Police<br />
ANDU Afghan Nati<strong>on</strong>al Defense University<br />
ANP Afghan Nati<strong>on</strong>al Police<br />
ANPTGC Afghan Nati<strong>on</strong>al Police Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g General Comm<strong>and</strong><br />
ANSF Afghan Nati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>Security</strong> Forces<br />
APPF Afghan Public Protecti<strong>on</strong> Force<br />
APRP Afghan Peace <strong>and</strong> Re<strong>in</strong>tegrati<strong>on</strong> Program<br />
ASC Army Support Comm<strong>and</strong><br />
ASFF Afghanistan <strong>Security</strong> Forces Fund<br />
ASGP II Afghanistan Sub-Nati<strong>on</strong>al Governance Program<br />
ATFC Afghanistan Threat F<strong>in</strong>ance Cell<br />
AUP Afghan Uniform Police<br />
BPHS Basic Package of Health Services<br />
CACI Central Asia Counternarcotics Initiative<br />
CDCs Community Development Councils<br />
CDU CNPA Development Unit<br />
CF Comm<strong>and</strong>o Force<br />
CFSOCC-A Comb<strong>in</strong>ed Forces Special Operati<strong>on</strong>s Comp<strong>on</strong>ent Comm<strong>and</strong> –<br />
Afghanistan<br />
CI C<strong>on</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ued Internment<br />
CIVCAS Civilian Casualties<br />
CJIATF 435 Comb<strong>in</strong>ed Jo<strong>in</strong>t Interagency Task Force 435<br />
CJOA-A Comb<strong>in</strong>ed Jo<strong>in</strong>t Operati<strong>on</strong>al Area – Afghanistan<br />
CJSOR Comb<strong>in</strong>ed Jo<strong>in</strong>t Statement of Requirements<br />
CJSOTF-A Comb<strong>in</strong>ed Jo<strong>in</strong>t Special Operati<strong>on</strong>s Task Force – Afghanistan<br />
CM Capability Milest<strong>on</strong>e<br />
CN Counternarcotics<br />
130
CNJC Afghan Counternarcotics Judicial Center<br />
CNPA Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan<br />
CNTA Counternarcotics Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Academy<br />
CNWG U.S.-Russia Counternarcotics Work<strong>in</strong>g Group<br />
COIN Counter-Insurgency<br />
COMISAF Comm<strong>and</strong>er ISAF<br />
CPMD C<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> Property Management Department<br />
CPNs Crim<strong>in</strong>al Patr<strong>on</strong>age Networks<br />
CPS Computerized Pay System<br />
CST Cultural Support Teams<br />
CUAT Comm<strong>and</strong>ers Unit Assessment Tool<br />
DABS Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat<br />
DDP District Delivery Program<br />
DEA U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency<br />
DFIP Detenti<strong>on</strong> Facility <strong>in</strong> Parwan<br />
DOC Afghan Detenti<strong>on</strong> Operati<strong>on</strong>s Comm<strong>and</strong><br />
DoD Department of Defense<br />
DoS Department of State<br />
DRB Deta<strong>in</strong>ee Review Board<br />
DTO Drug Traffick<strong>in</strong>g Organizati<strong>on</strong><br />
EIAs Enemy-Initiated Attacks<br />
EPHS Essential Package of Hospital Services<br />
EUPOL European Uni<strong>on</strong> Police Missi<strong>on</strong><br />
FATA Pakistan’s Federally Adm<strong>in</strong>istered Tribal Areas<br />
FETs Female Engagement Teams<br />
FRIC Force Re<strong>in</strong>tegrati<strong>on</strong> Cell<br />
GCC Gulf Cooperati<strong>on</strong> Council<br />
GIRoA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan<br />
GLOCs Ground L<strong>in</strong>es of Communicati<strong>on</strong><br />
HOOAC High Office of Oversight <strong>and</strong> Anti-Corrupti<strong>on</strong><br />
IDLG Independent Directorate of Local Governance<br />
IEDs Improvised Explosive Devices<br />
IJC ISAF Jo<strong>in</strong>t Comm<strong>and</strong><br />
IMF Internati<strong>on</strong>al M<strong>on</strong>etary Fund<br />
IOCC Interagency Operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> Coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> Center<br />
IPCB Internati<strong>on</strong>al Police Coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> Board<br />
ISAF Internati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>Security</strong> Assistance Force<br />
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, <strong>and</strong> Rec<strong>on</strong>naissance<br />
ITAG Infrastructure Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Advisory Group<br />
IVVO Internati<strong>on</strong>al Vendor Vett<strong>in</strong>g Office<br />
JCIP Justice Center <strong>in</strong> Parwan<br />
JNAC Jo<strong>in</strong>t Narcotics Analysis Center<br />
JNAC UK Jo<strong>in</strong>t Narcotics Analysis Center<br />
JOC Jo<strong>in</strong>t Operati<strong>on</strong>s Center<br />
JWIP Judicial Wire Intercept Program<br />
K<strong>and</strong>ak Battali<strong>on</strong><br />
131
KIA Killed <strong>in</strong> Acti<strong>on</strong><br />
KMTC Kabul Military Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Center<br />
KTD Key Terra<strong>in</strong> Districts<br />
LOAC Law of Armed C<strong>on</strong>flict<br />
LOTFA Law <strong>and</strong> Order Trust Fund Afghanistan<br />
MAIL M<strong>in</strong>istry of Agriculture Irrigati<strong>on</strong> <strong>and</strong> Livestock<br />
MDBs M<strong>in</strong>isterial Development Boards<br />
MDP M<strong>in</strong>isterial Development Plan<br />
MoD M<strong>in</strong>istry of Defense<br />
MoDA M<strong>in</strong>istry of Defense Advisors<br />
MoF Afghan M<strong>in</strong>istry of F<strong>in</strong>ance<br />
MoI M<strong>in</strong>istry of Interior<br />
MoPH M<strong>in</strong>istry of Public Health<br />
MOU Memor<strong>and</strong>um of Underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
MTT Mobile Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Teams<br />
MTTs Mobile Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Teams<br />
NATC-A NATO Air Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Comm<strong>and</strong> – Afghanistan<br />
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organizati<strong>on</strong><br />
NCO N<strong>on</strong>-Commissi<strong>on</strong>ed Officer<br />
NDN Northern Distributi<strong>on</strong> Network<br />
NDN Northern Distributi<strong>on</strong> Network<br />
NIU Nati<strong>on</strong>al Interdicti<strong>on</strong> Unit<br />
NMAA Nati<strong>on</strong>al Military Academy of Afghanistan<br />
NPPs Nati<strong>on</strong>al Priority Programs<br />
NPTC Nati<strong>on</strong>al Police Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Center<br />
NROLFSM-A NATO Rule of Law Field Support Missi<strong>on</strong> – Afghanistan<br />
NRWG Northern Route Work<strong>in</strong>g Group<br />
NTM-A NATO Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Missi<strong>on</strong> – Afghanistan<br />
NVDs Night visi<strong>on</strong> devices<br />
O&M Operati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>and</strong> Ma<strong>in</strong>tenance<br />
OCC-P Operati<strong>on</strong>al Coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> Center – Prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />
OCC-R Operati<strong>on</strong>al Coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> Center – Regi<strong>on</strong>al <strong>and</strong><br />
OCCs Operati<strong>on</strong>al Coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> Centers<br />
OCS Officer C<strong>and</strong>idate School<br />
OEF Operati<strong>on</strong> Endur<strong>in</strong>g Freedom<br />
ONDCP Office of Nati<strong>on</strong>al Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol Policy<br />
ONSC Office of Nati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>Security</strong> Council<br />
ONSC Nati<strong>on</strong>al <strong>Security</strong> Council<br />
OPLAN Operati<strong>on</strong>s Plan<br />
PATs Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Augmentati<strong>on</strong> Teams<br />
PBGF II Performance-Based Governor’s Fund<br />
PBPP Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Budget Pilot Program<br />
PRC People’s Republic of Ch<strong>in</strong>a<br />
PRCs Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Resp<strong>on</strong>se Companies<br />
PRTs Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Rec<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> Teams<br />
RC-C Regi<strong>on</strong>al Comm<strong>and</strong> Capital<br />
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RC-N Regi<strong>on</strong>al Comm<strong>and</strong> North<br />
RC-S Regi<strong>on</strong>al Comm<strong>and</strong> – South<br />
RC-SW Regi<strong>on</strong>al Comm<strong>and</strong> – Southwest<br />
RC-W Regi<strong>on</strong>al Comm<strong>and</strong> West<br />
RLCs Regi<strong>on</strong>al Logistics Centers<br />
RLSCs Regi<strong>on</strong>al Logistics Support Comm<strong>and</strong>s<br />
RoL Rule of Law<br />
ROLFF-A Rule of Law Field Force – Afghanistan<br />
RTT Regi<strong>on</strong>al Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Team<br />
SAFTA South Asian Free Trade Agreement<br />
SAIL Steel Authority of India Limited<br />
SCC Special Cases Committee<br />
SCO Shanghai Cooperati<strong>on</strong> Organizati<strong>on</strong><br />
SFA <strong>Security</strong> Force Assistance<br />
SIU Sensitive Investigative Unit<br />
SMW Special Missi<strong>on</strong> W<strong>in</strong>g<br />
SNG Sub-Nati<strong>on</strong>al Governance<br />
SOCA <strong>United</strong> K<strong>in</strong>gdom’s Serious Organized Crime Agency<br />
SOE State Owned Enterprise<br />
SOF Special Operati<strong>on</strong>s Forces<br />
SPTC Special Police Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Centre<br />
SY Solar Year<br />
Tashkil The mann<strong>in</strong>g document which determ<strong>in</strong>es a unit’s or m<strong>in</strong>istry’s<br />
authorizati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
TAWG Transparency <strong>and</strong> Accountability Work<strong>in</strong>g Group<br />
TCM Transit Center at Manas Internati<strong>on</strong>al Airport<br />
TIU Technical Investigative Unit<br />
UNAMA <strong>United</strong> Nati<strong>on</strong>s Assistance Missi<strong>on</strong> <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan<br />
UNDP <strong>United</strong> Nati<strong>on</strong>s Development Program<br />
UNDP <strong>United</strong> Nati<strong>on</strong>s Development Project<br />
UNICEF <strong>United</strong> Nati<strong>on</strong>s Children’s Fund<br />
UNODC <strong>United</strong> Nati<strong>on</strong>s Office <strong>on</strong> Drugs <strong>and</strong> Crime<br />
USAID U.S. Agency for Internati<strong>on</strong>al Development<br />
USCENTCOM U.S. Central Comm<strong>and</strong><br />
USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture<br />
USMC US Mar<strong>in</strong>e Corps<br />
USSOF U.S. Special Operati<strong>on</strong>s Forces<br />
VSNCC Village <strong>Stability</strong> Nati<strong>on</strong>al Coord<strong>in</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> Center<br />
VSO Village <strong>Stability</strong> Operati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
VSP Village <strong>Stability</strong> Platform<br />
WHO World Health Organizati<strong>on</strong><br />
WIA Wounded <strong>in</strong> Acti<strong>on</strong><br />
Wolesi Jirga Lower House of the Afghan Parliament<br />
YoY Year-Over-Year<br />
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(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)<br />
134
135