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Figure 13: ANA Partnering Status Cycle 13 CUAT data showed the number of reports for partnered units within the ANP increased from 231 in August 2011 to 347 in February 2012. This total number may also include ANP units that did not previously submit a CUAT report (e.g., in the case of newly fielded or recently partnered units). The number of units reported as uncovered or unassessed increased from 31 to 88, due to an overall increase in units reporting. While surge recovery will decrease the number of personnel available to partner with the ANP, the projected impact of the surge recovery on the performance of the ANP is unclear. ANP partnering levels have consistently lagged behind those of ANA units. An important aspect of the Security Force Assistance concept is the deployment of partner and mentor units trained specifically for police missions. This focused effort is anticipated to result in a more productive partnering/advising relationship and increased ANP capabilities, especially in the civil policing missions and functions. Figure 14: ANP Partnering Status ANSF OPERATIONS AND ASSESSMENT PROCESS Assessing performance in operations is an important method for evaluating ANSF progression. A partnered operation is a distinct event in which ISAF and ANSF units work together in the planning and execution of a combined joint tactical operation. The number and type of these operations, and whether they are Afghan-led, are monitored in the ISAF campaign assessment framework. Operational partnering efforts are aimed at improving the overall operational effectiveness of ANSF units, while at the same time protecting the population and accomplishing overall campaign objectives. 39
Ensuring the ability of the ANSF to plan and conduct operations unilaterally is the ultimate goal of partnering relationships. Units are performing exceptionally well when the ANSF are capable not only of planning, preparing, and executing missions, but are also able to incorporate and coordinate other ANSF elements for a joint operation. ISAF is also focusing on improving the sustainability of the combat formations through the ANSF logistic mechanisms. ANSF-ISAF operations include: 1) ANA Partnered (ANA conducted the operation jointly with ISAF); 2) ANP Partnered (AUP, ABP, or ANCOP conducted the operation jointly with ISAF); 3) Joint ANSF Partnered (ANA and ANP conducted the operation jointly with ISAF); 4) ANSF Led (ANSF conducted the mission with support from ISAF). In the past six months, the number of partnered operations as well as ANSF-led operations increased. A decrease in total number of operations in January and February 2012 is attributable to the extreme winter weather across the country. The total percentage of ANSF-led operations also increased, rising from 14 percent (16 of 112) in September 2011 to almost 33 percent (31 of 95) in February 2012. The majority of reported Level 1 and Level 2 partnered operations, as defined in figure 16, occurred in Regional Commands South (RC-S), Southwest (RC-SW), and East (RC-E) between August 2011 and January 2012; ANSF-led operations typically occurred in RC-S, RC-E, and Regional Command North (RC-N). Partnered operations are generally expected to yield an increase in ANSF-led operations as ANSF unit capabilities increase. This trend is evident in RC- S and RC-E but not in RC-SW. A more thorough analysis of Cycle 13 CUAT data for units in RC-SW shows an improvement in ANSF ability to plan and lead Level 0 operations, which are not reported through formal channels. CUAT data indicates that ANSF-led operations are most frequently lower-risk operations. This conclusion is substantiated by data in Figure 15: ANSFled Operations, which compares Level 1 and 2 operations. There was, however, one ANSF-led Level 2 operation in Khost (RC-E) in February 2012. The success of this operation illustrates the developing Afghan capacity to successfully lead operations in this sensitive border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan. 40
Page 2 and 3: Cover Image: An Afghan National Arm
Page 4 and 5: 2.6: FIELDED FORCE PARTNERING, OPER
Page 6 and 7: 8.7: GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL STATE
Page 8 and 9: The relationship between ISAF and t
Page 10 and 11: lost territory and influence in the
Page 12 and 13: key elements of the insurgency rema
Page 14 and 15: (INTENTIONALLY BLANK) 8
Page 16 and 17: Caldwell (US Army), who had been in
Page 18 and 19: Reconstruction Team (PRT) by the en
Page 20 and 21: Despite progress, the ANSF will con
Page 22 and 23: Figure 3: Ministry of Defense and G
Page 24 and 25: Figure 4: Ministry of Interior Capa
Page 26 and 27: 2.3: INSTITUTIONAL TRAINER AND MENT
Page 28 and 29: ates fluctuated throughout the repo
Page 30 and 31: Figure 8: ANA Officer End-Strength
Page 32 and 33: and growth of a Special Operations
Page 34 and 35: AAF CAPACITY The NATO Air Training
Page 36 and 37: such as the Afghan National Civil O
Page 38 and 39: and NCOs will need to meet the need
Page 40 and 41: partnered with ISAF SOF in high-ris
Page 42 and 43: The ANP remains under-equipped as a
Page 44 and 45: Figure 11: ANSF-ISAF Partnering Rel
Page 48 and 49: Figure 15: ANSF-ISAF Partnered Oper
Page 50 and 51: Figure 18: ANA Kandak Assessment Fi
Page 52 and 53: Funding for police salaries, as wel
Page 54 and 55: force integration process, ITAG was
Page 58 and 59: 3.2: CURRENT STATE OF TRANSITION Fi
Page 62 and 63: The insurgency is funded from a var
Page 64 and 65: 4.3: ISAF CONCEPT OF MILITARY OPERA
Page 66 and 67: By the end of the 2011 fighting sea
Page 68 and 69: in the provincial capital of Lashka
Page 70 and 71: continued transition process. Force
Page 72 and 73: Figure 22: ALP Disposition (as of M
Page 74 and 75: of negotiation. The advisory group
Page 76 and 77: Together, coalition forces and the
Page 78 and 79: In November 2011, the Executive Boa
Page 80 and 81: ASGP-II is a multi-donor project th
Page 82 and 83: activities of the ROLFF-A in suppor
Page 84 and 85: facilities to full Afghan Governmen
Page 86 and 87: INTERAGENCY COUNTER-CORRUPTION EFFO
Page 88 and 89: criminal network that operated in t
Page 92 and 93: Improvements in facilities have led
Page 94 and 95: Baraq to Darisuf in Samangan Provin
Page 96 and 97:
development in key sectors that hav
Page 98 and 99:
development. The program employs ma
Page 100 and 101:
number of registered women-owned bu
Page 102 and 103:
Figure 25: Quarterly Comparison of
Page 104 and 105:
information obtained through the JW
Page 106 and 107:
crew members to fly and maintain Mi
Page 108 and 109:
and military operations by analyzin
Page 110 and 111:
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK) 103
Page 112 and 113:
Pakistan continues to seek a stable
Page 114 and 115:
Further, on February 17, Iranian Pr
Page 116 and 117:
8.7: GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL STATE
Page 118 and 119:
Figure 26: Enemy-Initiated Attacks
Page 120 and 121:
A.2: ENEMY-INITIATED ATTACKS EIAs -
Page 122 and 123:
RC-WEST From October 2011 - March 2
Page 124 and 125:
RC-NORTH From October 2011 - March
Page 126 and 127:
RC-SOUTH From October 2011 - March
Page 128 and 129:
A.5: COMPLEX AND COORDINATED ATTACK
Page 130 and 131:
Annex B: Congressional Legislation
Page 132 and 133:
(ii) Clarify the chain of command,
Page 134 and 135:
(d) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED: PERFORM
Page 136 and 137:
(II) unemployment and poverty level
Page 138 and 139:
CNJC Afghan Counternarcotics Judici
Page 140 and 141:
RC-N Regional Command North RC-S Re
Page 142:
135
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