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of negotiation. The advisory group continues to work closely with the MoI to ensure the APPF matures and continues to support commercial and development efforts. 4.7: POPULATION SECURITY 25 Afghan national perception in regard to security conditions have improved slightly since September 2011, based on the percentage of polled citizens who described security as either “fair” or “good” (85 percent in September 2011 versus nearly 90 percent in March 2012). Additionally, the percentage of Afghans who described their security environment as “bad” decreased from approximately 15 percent in September 2011 to close to 10 percent in March 2012. Polls indicate that Afghans who believe the police can protect them outnumber their opposites by a 3-to-1 margin. Seventy-three percent of Afghans believe that “the police are capable of protecting their mantaqa,” a three percent increase from the previous quarter, while the percentage of Afghans who rated the police as “incapable” fell from 28 percent to 25 percent during the same timeframe. Two percent of respondents declined to answer or said they didn’t know. Despite negative views of the security situation in some areas across the country, the majority of Afghans believe the government is leading security efforts – a sentiment that has prevailed for several years. Conversely, Afghans’ perception of Taliban and anti-government elements’ contribution to security remains low. 4.8: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES During this reporting period, ISAF took extensive measures, including revising and re-issuing several Tactical Directives, to reduce ISAF-caused civilian casualties. These measures have generated positive results. Data indicates that 78 percent of civilian casualties (CIVCAS) occurring during the reporting period were caused by the insurgency. The total CIVCAS for the period of October 2011 – March 2012 decreased 32 percent from the same period last year. CIVCAS caused by ISAF decreased 49 percent over the same period. Insurgents continue to rely on IEDs as the principal means to execute their campaign. More than 60 percent of CIVCAS caused by insurgents were from indiscriminate IED explosions. More than half of IEDs and mines were found safely cleared by security forces, which has helped to reduce CIVCAS. 25 Data in this sub-section was taken from the Afghan National Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR) Survey, Wave 15, March 2012. 67
Figure 23: Monthly Civilian Wounded or Killed by Insurgents and ISAF (October 2009 – March 2012) # of Civilian Casualties 500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 4.9: GREEN-ON-BLUE INCIDENTS 0 Civilian Casualties caused by Insurgents Civilian Casualties caused by ISAF Oct 09 Nov 09 Dec 09 Jan 10 Feb 10 Mar 10 Apr 10 A number of high-profile incidents occurred during this reporting period in which ANSF members knowingly attacked and/or helped facilitate an attack against coalition members with the intent to maim or kill coalition personnel (“Green-on-Blue” incidents). While statistically small in number, Green-on-Blue attacks have a significant negative operational and strategic impact on the coalition mission in Afghanistan. An attack on NATO mentors at the MoI on February 25, 2012 resulted in a brief suspension of MoI mentoring activities while security protocols were reviewed, and other attacks have caused similar problems. These attacks have not yet caused a major diplomatic rift, nor have they significantly hurt relations between the ANSF and ISAF. The vast majority of coalition mentors have continued to train and fight alongside their Afghan partners with the same dedication and skill as they always have. Indeed, Afghan and ISAF soldiers continue to depend on each other for vital support on a daily basis on partnered operations throughout the country. While they are often high-profile, Green-on-Blue incidents are rare, and have resulted in a relatively small number of casualties. From May 2007 to the end of March 2012, a total of 52 Green-on-Blue incidents occurred. 26 Of these 52 incidents, 43 resulted in the death or injury of coalition (military and civilian personnel), resulting in 86 dead and 115 wounded. Investigations have determined that a large majority of Green-on-Blue attacks are not attributable to insurgent infiltration of the ANSF, but are due to isolated personal grievances against coalition personnel. There is no indication that these recent attacks are part of a deliberate effort by insurgents, nor were they coordinated with each other. 26 The number of Green on Blue incidents is subject to change as newly-identified past cases emerge. May 10 Jun 10 Jul 10 Aug 10 Sep 10 Oct 10 Nov 10 Dec 10 68 Jan 11 Feb 11 Mar 11 Apr 11 May 11 Jun 11 Jul 11 Aug 11 Sep 11 Oct 11 Nov 11 Dec 11 Jan 12 Feb 12 Mar 12
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Cover Image: An Afghan National Arm
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2.6: FIELDED FORCE PARTNERING, OPER
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8.7: GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL STATE
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The relationship between ISAF and t
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lost territory and influence in the
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key elements of the insurgency rema
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(INTENTIONALLY BLANK) 8
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Caldwell (US Army), who had been in
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Reconstruction Team (PRT) by the en
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Despite progress, the ANSF will con
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Figure 3: Ministry of Defense and G
Page 24 and 25: Figure 4: Ministry of Interior Capa
Page 26 and 27: 2.3: INSTITUTIONAL TRAINER AND MENT
Page 28 and 29: ates fluctuated throughout the repo
Page 30 and 31: Figure 8: ANA Officer End-Strength
Page 32 and 33: and growth of a Special Operations
Page 34 and 35: AAF CAPACITY The NATO Air Training
Page 36 and 37: such as the Afghan National Civil O
Page 38 and 39: and NCOs will need to meet the need
Page 40 and 41: partnered with ISAF SOF in high-ris
Page 42 and 43: The ANP remains under-equipped as a
Page 44 and 45: Figure 11: ANSF-ISAF Partnering Rel
Page 46 and 47: Figure 13: ANA Partnering Status Cy
Page 48 and 49: Figure 15: ANSF-ISAF Partnered Oper
Page 50 and 51: Figure 18: ANA Kandak Assessment Fi
Page 52 and 53: Funding for police salaries, as wel
Page 54 and 55: force integration process, ITAG was
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Page 58 and 59: 3.2: CURRENT STATE OF TRANSITION Fi
Page 62 and 63: The insurgency is funded from a var
Page 64 and 65: 4.3: ISAF CONCEPT OF MILITARY OPERA
Page 66 and 67: By the end of the 2011 fighting sea
Page 68 and 69: in the provincial capital of Lashka
Page 70 and 71: continued transition process. Force
Page 72 and 73: Figure 22: ALP Disposition (as of M
Page 76 and 77: Together, coalition forces and the
Page 78 and 79: In November 2011, the Executive Boa
Page 80 and 81: ASGP-II is a multi-donor project th
Page 82 and 83: activities of the ROLFF-A in suppor
Page 84 and 85: facilities to full Afghan Governmen
Page 86 and 87: INTERAGENCY COUNTER-CORRUPTION EFFO
Page 88 and 89: criminal network that operated in t
Page 92 and 93: Improvements in facilities have led
Page 94 and 95: Baraq to Darisuf in Samangan Provin
Page 96 and 97: development in key sectors that hav
Page 98 and 99: development. The program employs ma
Page 100 and 101: number of registered women-owned bu
Page 102 and 103: Figure 25: Quarterly Comparison of
Page 104 and 105: information obtained through the JW
Page 106 and 107: crew members to fly and maintain Mi
Page 108 and 109: and military operations by analyzin
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Page 114 and 115: Further, on February 17, Iranian Pr
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Page 118 and 119: Figure 26: Enemy-Initiated Attacks
Page 120 and 121: A.2: ENEMY-INITIATED ATTACKS EIAs -
Page 122 and 123: RC-WEST From October 2011 - March 2
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RC-NORTH From October 2011 - March
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RC-SOUTH From October 2011 - March
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A.5: COMPLEX AND COORDINATED ATTACK
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Annex B: Congressional Legislation
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(ii) Clarify the chain of command,
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(d) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED: PERFORM
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(II) unemployment and poverty level
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CNJC Afghan Counternarcotics Judici
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RC-N Regional Command North RC-S Re
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